Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires a bona fide, reasonable and satisfactory explanation; vague or casual explanations reflecting negligence or lack of diligence do not constitute “sufficient cause”. Judicial discretion to condone delay, though liberal in approach, is not unfettered and cannot be exercised where the conduct of the litigant or counsel discloses a cavalier attitude towards the Court. Dismissal of a delay-condonation application necessarily entails dismissal of the appeal itself as time-barred. Imposition of costs, including enforceable directions, is justified where frivolous or irresponsible delay petitions are filed.

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 5

Condonation of delay – “Sufficient cause” – Scope

Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion. Delay cannot be condoned in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory and bona fide explanation. A casual, vague or cavalier explanation reflects lack of due diligence and disentitles the applicant to discretionary relief.
(Paras 3–5)

---

Second Appeal – Limitation – Delay in filing

Where the affidavit seeking condonation discloses no valid cause and reflects negligence on the part of the litigant and counsel, delay of even short duration is not liable to be condoned.
(Paras 3–5)

---

Judicial discretion – Exercise

Discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and not mechanically. Liberal approach does not mean unfettered or arbitrary exercise of discretion, particularly where lack of bona fides is evident.
(Paras 3–5)

---

Advocate and litigant – Duty to Court

Cavalier attitude of the litigant and advocate towards judicial proceedings constitutes a relevant factor while considering an application for condonation of delay.
(Para 4)

---

Costs – Imposition – Deterrent measure

Where an application for condonation of delay is found to be frivolous and lacking bona fides, imposition of costs payable to the District Legal Services Authority is justified.
(Para 5)

---

Civil prison – Default in payment of costs

Direction for civil imprisonment on failure to comply with payment of costs imposed by the Court is permissible to enforce judicial orders.
(Para 5)

---

Second Appeal – Consequence of dismissal of delay petition

Dismissal of the application for condonation of delay necessarily results in dismissal of the second appeal itself.
(Para 6)

---

ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Nature of Proceedings

The appellant sought condonation of delay of 77 days in filing the second appeal against concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The delay petition was supported by an affidavit assigning reasons relating to alleged lack of knowledge and opinion of counsel.
(Paras 1–2)

---

2. Governing Principles on Condonation of Delay

The Court undertook an examination of settled principles governing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, reiterating that:

• discretion must be exercised judiciously,

• delay cannot be condoned where there is negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides,

• “sufficient cause” must be real, reasonable and convincing.
  The Court relied on authoritative Supreme Court precedents summarising these principles.
  (Para 3)

---

3. Evaluation of Explanation Offered

On scrutiny of the affidavit, the Court found that:

• no cogent or acceptable reason was assigned for the delay,

• the explanation was vague and self-contradictory,

• the affidavit reflected a casual and irresponsible approach of both litigant and counsel.
  (Paras 4–5)

---

4. Refusal to Condone Delay

The Court held that the explanation failed to satisfy the test of “sufficient cause” and declined to exercise discretion in favour of the appellant.
(Para 5)

---

5. Imposition of Costs and Enforcement

Considering the cavalier attitude, the Court imposed costs of ₹3,000/- payable to the District Legal Services Authority and issued consequential directions for recovery, including civil imprisonment in case of default.
(Para 5)

---

6. Effect on Second Appeal

Since the application for condonation of delay was dismissed, the second appeal itself was dismissed as barred by limitation.
(Para 6)

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires a bona fide, reasonable and satisfactory explanation; vague or casual explanations reflecting negligence or lack of diligence do not constitute “sufficient cause”.

2. Judicial discretion to condone delay, though liberal in approach, is not unfettered and cannot be exercised where the conduct of the litigant or counsel discloses a cavalier attitude towards the Court.

3. Dismissal of a delay-condonation application necessarily entails dismissal of the appeal itself as time-barred.

4. Imposition of costs, including enforceable directions, is justified where frivolous or irresponsible delay petitions are filed.

Landlord and Tenant – Eviction suit – Concurrent findings Where ownership of the plaintiffs and tenancy of the defendants are admitted and both the courts below have, on appreciation of evidence, decreed eviction and arrears of rent, such concurrent findings cannot be re-appreciated in second appeal. (Paras 2–4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100

Second Appeal – Scope – Substantial question of law

Second appeal is not maintainable where the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have recorded concurrent findings of fact and the appellant fails to demonstrate the existence of any substantial question of law warranting interference.
(Paras 4–5)

---

Landlord and Tenant – Eviction suit – Concurrent findings

Where ownership of the plaintiffs and tenancy of the defendants are admitted and both the courts below have, on appreciation of evidence, decreed eviction and arrears of rent, such concurrent findings cannot be re-appreciated in second appeal.
(Paras 2–4)

---

Second Appeal – Admission stage – Dismissal

In the absence of any substantial question of law, the High Court is justified in dismissing the second appeal at the stage of admission itself without issuing notice for final hearing.
(Para 5)

---

Equitable relief – Time to vacate premises

Even while dismissing the second appeal, the High Court may, in exercise of equitable discretion, grant reasonable time to the tenant to vacate the premises, particularly when the tenant is carrying on business in the suit property.
(Para 6)

---

Execution of decree – Liberty to decree-holders

On failure of the tenant to vacate within the time granted by the High Court, decree-holders are at liberty to initiate execution proceedings for eviction and recovery of possession.
(Para 6)

---

ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Nature of the Litigation

The suit was filed by the plaintiffs seeking eviction of the defendants from the plaint schedule property, delivery of vacant possession, and recovery of arrears of rent with interest. The Trial Court decreed the suit, and the First Appellate Court confirmed the decree.
(Paras 2–3)

---

2. Findings of the Courts Below

The High Court noted that:

• Ownership of the plaintiffs was not disputed.

• Existence of landlord-tenant relationship was also not denied.

• Both courts below, on appreciation of evidence, recorded concurrent findings that the defendants were tenants liable for eviction and payment of arrears.
  (Paras 3–4)

---

3. Scope of Interference in Second Appeal

The Court reiterated the settled principle that a second appeal under Section 100 CPC lies only on a substantial question of law. The appellant failed to demonstrate any such question. The appeal merely sought re-appreciation of facts, which is impermissible.
(Paras 4–5)

---

4. Dismissal at Admission Stage

Since no substantial question of law arose for consideration, the High Court declined to admit the second appeal and dismissed it at the admission stage itself.
(Para 5)

---

5. Grant of Time on Equitable Considerations

Notwithstanding dismissal of the appeal, the Court considered the fact that the appellant was running a supermarket in the suit premises and granted four months’ time to vacate, balancing equities between the parties.
(Para 6)

---

6. Consequence of Non-Compliance

The Court clarified that if the appellant fails to vacate within the granted time, the plaintiffs are entitled to initiate execution proceedings for eviction and recovery of possession.
(Para 6)

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A second appeal under Section 100 CPC is not maintainable against concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, unless a substantial question of law is made out.

2. Re-appreciation of evidence or challenge to factual conclusions is impermissible in second appeal.

3. In the absence of a substantial question of law, the High Court can dismiss the second appeal at the admission stage.

4. Even while dismissing a second appeal, the High Court may grant reasonable time to the tenant to vacate the premises on equitable considerations, without affecting the decree-holders’ right to execute the decree on default.

Police aid can be granted to enforce an existing interim injunction even at the ad-interim stage where defendants have entered appearance, filed pleadings, and failed to assert any independent right, title or possession, and where refusal would result in irreparable loss. Existence of a standing crop and imminent danger of its destruction constitutes a compelling circumstance warranting police protection pending adjudication. Refusal of police aid solely on the ground that injunction is ad-interim, without examining pleadings, equities, and practical consequences, amounts to improper exercise of discretion. Where defendants do not claim interest in land or crop, appointment of a Commissioner to take possession of crop is unwarranted. Grant of police aid for a limited duration, coupled with a direction for early disposal of the injunction application, is a just and equitable solution.

Police aid can be granted to enforce an existing interim injunction order where circumstances disclose imminent threat of interference and irreparable loss, and such grant would not cause prejudice to the opposite party.
(Paras 15–17)

---

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC – Interim injunction

Ad-interim injunction – Enforcement

Mere fact that injunction is ad-interim and passed initially in the absence of defendants does not by itself bar grant of police aid, especially where defendants have since entered appearance, filed pleadings, and failed to assert any independent right, title or possession over the suit property.
(Paras 16–17)

---

Standing crop – Protection pending adjudication

Where existence of standing crop is undisputed and delay in adjudication would result in destruction of crop, Court must adopt a pragmatic approach to protect possession and prevent irreparable loss pending disposal of interlocutory application.
(Paras 15–16)

---

Pleadings – Absence of claim of possession by defendants

In the absence of specific pleadings by defendants asserting possession or cultivation of suit land, refusal of police aid on the ground that title dispute is pending is unsustainable.
(Paras 16–17)

---

Trial Court – Duty to balance equities

Trial Court ought to consider practical consequences such as destruction of standing crop and should not confine itself to technical objections when interim protection is already in force.
(Paras 15–16)

---

Commissioner – Appointment – Inappropriateness

Appointment of a Commissioner to take custody of standing crop is not warranted where defendants have not pleaded or established any competing interest over the crop or land.
(Paras 18–19)

---

Relief – Police aid for limited duration

Grant of police aid for a limited period to enable enforcement of interim injunction, coupled with direction to dispose of the pending injunction application expeditiously, is a balanced and equitable course.
(Para 20)

---

ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Nature of Dispute and Interim Protection

The plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction and obtained an ad-interim injunction restraining defendants from interfering with possession. The injunction application itself was pending enquiry. During pendency, the plaintiff sought police aid due to alleged interference at the stage when red gram crop was ripe for harvesting.
(Paras 5–7)

---

2. Trial Court’s Refusal of Police Aid

The trial Court refused police aid on the reasoning that:
(i) injunction was ad-interim,
(ii) no specific acts of interference were pleaded, and
(iii) police aid cannot be granted prior to adjudication of injunction application.
(Paras 10–11)

---

3. High Court’s Reappraisal

The High Court noted that:
• existence of standing red gram crop was undisputed,
• defendants did not plead any right, title or possession in themselves,
• defendants merely disputed plaintiff’s title by asserting third-party ownership, without evidence,
• delay would result in destruction of crop causing irreparable loss.
(Paras 15–17)

---

4. Principle Governing Police Aid

The Court reiterated that although police aid should not be granted mechanically to enforce ad-interim orders, such restraint applies mainly where defendants assert competing possession or rights. In the present case, absence of such pleadings and urgency created by standing crop justified grant of police aid.
(Paras 16–17)

---

5. Rejection of Commissioner Proposal

The suggestion to appoint a Commissioner to take possession of crop was rejected as it would prejudice the petitioner, particularly when defendants never claimed interest over the crop or land in their pleadings.
(Paras 18–19)

---

6. Moulding of Relief

The Court balanced equities by granting police aid only for a limited period of one week and simultaneously directing the trial Court to dispose of the injunction application without delay.
(Para 20)

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Police aid can be granted to enforce an existing interim injunction even at the ad-interim stage where defendants have entered appearance, filed pleadings, and failed to assert any independent right, title or possession, and where refusal would result in irreparable loss.

2. Existence of a standing crop and imminent danger of its destruction constitutes a compelling circumstance warranting police protection pending adjudication.

3. Refusal of police aid solely on the ground that injunction is ad-interim, without examining pleadings, equities, and practical consequences, amounts to improper exercise of discretion.

4. Where defendants do not claim interest in land or crop, appointment of a Commissioner to take possession of crop is unwarranted.

5. Grant of police aid for a limited duration, coupled with a direction for early disposal of the injunction application, is a just and equitable solution.

Public Works Contracts – Sub-contractor – Liability of State Where the State sanctioned special imprest funds, issued direct instructions to the sub-contractor, supervised execution, acknowledged completion of work, and admitted liability in official correspondence, the State cannot evade payment by contending that the sub-contractor must pursue remedies only against the principal contractor. (Paras 5–7, 20–22, 26–27)

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226

Writ of Mandamus – Maintainability – Sub-contractor claiming payment from State – Absence of privity of contract

Writ petition by a sub-contractor is maintainable under Article 226 where the State, having directly instructed execution of works, supervised the work, acknowledged completion, and enjoyed the benefit thereof, cannot deny payment merely on the ground of absence of direct contractual relationship.
(Paras 19–20, 26–27)

---

Public Works Contracts – Sub-contractor – Liability of State

Where the State sanctioned special imprest funds, issued direct instructions to the sub-contractor, supervised execution, acknowledged completion of work, and admitted liability in official correspondence, the State cannot evade payment by contending that the sub-contractor must pursue remedies only against the principal contractor.
(Paras 5–7, 20–22, 26–27)

---

Termination of Main EPC Contract – Effect on Sub-contractor’s dues

Termination of the main Engineer, Procurement and Construction agreement does not absolve the State of its obligation to pay for works already completed by a sub-contractor prior to termination, especially when such completion is admitted and recommended for payment by departmental authorities even after termination.
(Paras 22, 26)

---

Admissions by State – Binding effect

Official letters and minutes of meetings acknowledging execution of work, availability of funds, and recommending payment constitute admissions by the State, and denial of payment contrary thereto is arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
(Paras 21–23, 26–27)

---

Arbitrariness – Article 14

Denial of payment after enjoying the benefit of completed works, despite admitted liability and availability of funds recovered from the main contractor, is arbitrary, unjust, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(Paras 26–27)

---

Government Contracts – Unjust enrichment

The State, having derived benefit from specialised ground improvement works executed under its supervision, cannot unjustly enrich itself by withholding payment on technical pleas relating to contractual structure.
(Paras 26–27)

---

Relief – Direction for payment

Where the amount payable is admitted and quantified by departmental authorities, the Court can direct payment of such amount within a stipulated period in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
(Paras 23–28)

---

ANALYSIS (ISSUE-WISE)

1. Maintainability of Writ Petition

The Court examined the objection regarding absence of privity of contract and held that the writ petition is maintainable, as the petitioner executed works under direct instructions and supervision of the Water Resources Department, and the Department itself acknowledged and benefited from such works.
(Paras 19–20, 26–27)

---

2. Role of Special Imprest and Direct Dealings

The sanction of special imprest funds, issuance of direct instructions to commence work, and continuous monitoring through review meetings established a direct nexus between the petitioner and the State, negating the plea that the petitioner was a mere stranger to the Department.
(Paras 5–6, 20)

---

3. Effect of Termination of EPC Agreement

The Court rejected the contention that termination of the EPC agreement in 2019 extinguished liability towards the petitioner, noting that the works were completed in 2018 and that payment was recommended even after termination.
(Paras 22, 26)

---

4. Evidentiary Value of Official Correspondence

The letter dated 29.12.2020 and the Minutes of Meetings were treated as clear admissions acknowledging the petitioner’s role, completion of work, availability of funds, and recommended payment of ₹45.90 crores.
(Paras 21–23)

---

5. Arbitrariness and Constitutional Violation

The Court held that withholding payment after enjoying the benefit of completed works, despite admitted liability and recovery of substantial sums from the main contractor, amounted to arbitrariness and was unsustainable under Article 14.
(Paras 26–27)

---

6. Entitlement and Relief

Given that the payable amount stood admitted and quantified, the Court exercised writ jurisdiction to direct payment of ₹45.90 crores within a specified period.
(Para 28)

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. The State cannot deny payment to a sub-contractor on the ground of lack of privity when it directly instructed, supervised, acknowledged, and benefited from the work executed.

2. Termination of the principal contract does not extinguish the State’s liability to pay for works already completed and admitted prior to such termination.

3. Official acknowledgements and recommendations by departmental authorities constitute binding admissions, and denial of payment contrary thereto is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

4. Enjoyment of the benefit of completed public works without payment amounts to unjust enrichment and is impermissible in law.

5. Where liability is admitted and quantified, a writ of mandamus directing payment is justified.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Ss. 14, 16, 22...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Ss. 14, 16, 22...: advocatemmmohan Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 226 National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Ss. 14, 16, 22 Maintainability of writ petition...

Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 226

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Ss. 14, 16, 22
Maintainability of writ petition against NGT order – Alternative statutory remedy – Scope

Availability of statutory appeal under Section 22 of the National Green Tribunal Act does not oust the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Writ petition is maintainable where challenge is on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and violation of principles of natural justice. Pendency of writ petition since 2021 with affidavits exchanged is an additional factor justifying entertainment.
(Paras 29–38, 85(i)–(ii))

---

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – S. 16

“Person aggrieved” – Locus standi – Resident of affected village

Resident of the village where mining operations are carried on is a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of Section 16 of the NGT Act, as environmental degradation directly impacts the right to clean environment under Article 21 of the Constitution. Such person cannot be treated as a stranger or busybody.
(Paras 39–48, 85(B))

---

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Ss. 14, 15

Powers of NGT – Suo motu jurisdiction – Preventive and remedial role

National Green Tribunal is a sui generis expert body with wide jurisdiction not confined to adjudication of lis between parties. Tribunal has preventive, remedial and supervisory functions and is empowered to take suo motu cognizance of environmental issues. Tribunal is not restricted only to grounds raised in appeal.
(Paras 58–65, 85(C)(iii)–(iv))

---

Environmental Clearance – Appraisal process – Judicial review

Where the National Green Tribunal, on examination of record, finds non-consideration of material environmental aspects, absence of detailed ecological study, lack of district survey and replenishment assessment, and non-application of relevant guidelines by EAC and MoEF&CC, it is justified in keeping Environmental Clearance in abeyance and remitting the matter for fresh consideration. Such order does not suffer from perversity or jurisdictional error.
(Paras 51–57, 69, 85(C)(ii))

---

Sustainable Sand Mining Management Guidelines, 2016

Applicability – Not confined to river sand mining

Sustainable Sand Mining Management Guidelines, 2016 apply not only to river sand mining but also to sand mining from other sources. The object of the Guidelines is ecological protection and sustainable exploitation of sand resources, and they cannot be narrowly construed.
(Paras 70–72, 85(C)(v))

---

Environmental Clearance – Grant prior to later notifications

Environmental Clearance granted prior to 2021 notification does not enjoy immunity if it is found to be contrary to the law, guidelines and statutory requirements prevailing at the time of grant. Prior grant does not preclude interference where illegality or non-compliance is established.
(Paras 75, 85(C)(vi))

---

Ex-post facto Environmental Clearance – Scope

Grant of ex-post facto Environmental Clearance is not a matter of right. It lies within the domain of the competent authority and must be considered strictly in accordance with law, keeping in view binding Supreme Court precedents, polluter-pays principle and environmental safeguards.
(Paras 76–84, 85(C)(vii))

---

Principles of Natural Justice

Where Environmental Clearance is only kept in abeyance and matter is remitted for reconsideration with opportunity of hearing to all parties, no violation of principles of natural justice is made out warranting interference under Article 226.
(Paras 73–74, 85(C)(i))

---

ANALYSIS (COURT-STYLE, ISSUE-WISE)

1. Maintainability of Writ Petition

The Court undertakes an extensive survey of constitutional jurisprudence to reaffirm that Article 226 jurisdiction forms part of the basic structure. While Section 22 of the NGT Act provides a statutory appeal, it does not bar writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasizes self-restraint, not lack of power. Given allegations of jurisdictional error and natural justice violation, coupled with long pendency, the writ petition was entertained.
(Paras 29–38)

---

2. Locus Standi under Section 16 NGT Act

The Court applies settled principles on “person aggrieved” and contextual interpretation of locus standi in environmental matters. Unlike private disputes, environmental litigation affects community rights. A village resident affected by mining operations has direct environmental interest and legal injury. Hence, the appeal before NGT was competent.
(Paras 39–48)

---

3. Nature and Scope of NGT’s Powers

Relying on Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court characterises NGT as an expert, sui generis forum whose mandate transcends traditional adversarial adjudication. Its powers under Sections 14 and 15 include preventive and restorative jurisdiction, enabling examination of broader ecological issues even beyond pleadings.
(Paras 58–65)

---

4. Validity of NGT’s Interference with EC

The Tribunal recorded detailed findings on ecological sensitivity, absence of district survey, lack of replenishment study, improper appraisal by EAC, mechanised mining concerns, and environmental impact over decades. The High Court finds these conclusions based on record and consistent with environmental jurisprudence. Keeping EC in abeyance is held to be proportionate and lawful.
(Paras 51–57, 69)

---

5. Applicability of SSMMG, 2016

Rejecting the petitioner’s narrow interpretation, the Court holds that the Guidelines are framed for sustainable sand mining in general, not limited to riverbeds. Ecological rationale governs applicability, not the source alone.
(Paras 70–72)

---

6. Ex-post facto Environmental Clearance

The Court recognises that while ex-post facto EC is not absolutely barred, it is exceptional and conditional. Its grant must comply with prevailing Supreme Court law and cannot override environmental protection principles. The issue is left open for competent authority at reconsideration stage.
(Paras 76–84)

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A resident of an environmentally affected area has locus standi as a “person aggrieved” under Section 16 of the NGT Act to challenge Environmental Clearance.

2. The National Green Tribunal is a sui generis expert body with wide preventive, remedial and suo motu jurisdiction, not confined to issues expressly raised by parties.

3. Environmental Clearance granted without proper appraisal, ecological study, district survey, or compliance with applicable guidelines can be lawfully kept in abeyance by the NGT.

4. Availability of appeal under Section 22 of the NGT Act does not bar writ jurisdiction under Article 226 where jurisdictional error or violation of natural justice is alleged.

5. Sustainable Sand Mining Management Guidelines, 2016 apply to sand mining from all sources, not merely river sand.

6. Ex-post facto Environmental Clearance is not a right and must be considered strictly in accordance with law and binding Supreme Court precedent.