SARFAESI Act, 2002 — Section 14 — Possession through Advocate Commissioner Measures taken by a secured creditor for taking physical possession of secured assets through an Advocate Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are amenable to challenge before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (Paras 2–3)

Constitution of India — Article 226 — SARFAESI proceedings

Where an efficacious alternative statutory remedy is available under the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the High Court will ordinarily decline to entertain a writ petition under Article 226.
(Paras 3–4)

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SARFAESI Act, 2002 — Section 14 — Possession through Advocate Commissioner

Measures taken by a secured creditor for taking physical possession of secured assets through an Advocate Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are amenable to challenge before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
(Paras 2–3)

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Alternative remedy — Debts Recovery Tribunal

Disputes relating to initiation of SARFAESI measures, including objections regarding notice, legal heirs, and jurisdictional infirmities, fall within the exclusive domain of the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
(Para 3)

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Writ jurisdiction — Self-restraint

High Court should exercise judicial restraint in writ jurisdiction when the legislature has provided a special forum with a complete adjudicatory mechanism for redressal of grievances.
(Paras 3–4)

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Legal heirs — Alleged action against deceased guarantor

Even where the grievance is that SARFAESI measures were initiated against a deceased guarantor without notice to legal heirs, the remedy lies before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and not directly under Article 226.
(Paras 2–3)

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Interim protection — Limited indulgence

While relegating the petitioner to the alternative statutory remedy, the High Court may grant limited interim protection to enable the petitioner to approach the competent forum.
(Para 4)

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Conditional stay — Automatic vacation

Interim protection granted by the High Court stands automatically vacated if the petitioner fails to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal and obtain appropriate interim orders within the time granted.
(Para 4)

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ANALYSIS

The writ petition was filed challenging the notice dated 02.01.2026 issued by the Advocate Commissioner for taking physical possession of the secured property pursuant to orders passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act (Para 1).

The petitioner contended that his mother, the owner of the secured asset and guarantor, died on 10.09.2021, and that the Bank initiated SARFAESI measures without issuing notice to the legal heirs, thereby proceeding against a deceased person (Para 2).

The Division Bench observed that even assuming such a grievance to be correct, the petitioner had an efficacious statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, which is a forum constituted under a special enactment with a complete mechanism for adjudicating SARFAESI disputes (Para 3).

The Court emphasized that without availing the remedy before the Tribunal, the petitioner had straightaway invoked writ jurisdiction, which is impermissible in view of settled principles governing Article 226 where alternative remedies exist (Paras 3–4).

Accordingly, the Court declined to entertain the writ petition on merits and relegated the petitioner to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, granting three days’ time to approach the Tribunal (Para 4).

As a protective interim measure, the Court directed the Advocate Commissioner not to take possession during this limited period, clarifying that such protection would automatically stand vacated if the petitioner failed to approach the Tribunal and secure interim relief within the stipulated time (Para 4).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

When measures are initiated by a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act, including taking physical possession of secured assets through an Advocate Commissioner appointed under Section 14, any grievance—whether relating to notice, jurisdiction, or action against a deceased guarantor—must be agitated before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, will decline interference where an efficacious alternative statutory remedy exists, though it may grant limited interim protection to enable the aggrieved party to approach the competent forum.

Cockfighting involving betting constitutes an unlawful activity attracting the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and allied laws. When authorities fail to act on representations seeking prevention of such activities, the High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, can enforce and reiterate binding Division Bench and Supreme Court directions. District Collectors and Police authorities bear statutory and personal responsibility to prevent cockfights, invoke preventive powers under Cr.P.C., seize instruments and betting money, and ensure effective enforcement of animal welfare laws, including by initiating disciplinary action against erring officials.

Animal Cruelty — Cockfighting — Betting — Public interest

Cockfighting involving betting constitutes an unlawful activity attracting the provisions of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and allied statutes, warranting intervention by State authorities.
(Paras 3, 5)

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Writ jurisdiction — Batch matters — Identical relief

Where multiple writ petitions seek the same relief, they may be heard together and disposed of by a common order.
(Para 1)

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Inaction of authorities — Mandamus

Failure of authorities to act on representations seeking prevention of cockfights justifies issuance of directions under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(Paras 3–5)

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Binding precedent — Division Bench directions

Directions issued by a Division Bench in earlier proceedings concerning prevention of cockfights are binding and can be reiterated and enforced in subsequent writ petitions.
(Paras 3, 5)

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Implementation of statutory duties — Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960

District Collectors, Commissioners of Police and Superintendents of Police are under a statutory obligation to ensure effective implementation of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and the Rules framed thereunder.
(Para 5, Guidelines 1, 5, 6)

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Constitution of SPCA — Mandatory duty

State Government is obligated to constitute State and District Societies for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals strictly in accordance with the 2001 Rules.
(Para 5, Guideline 1)

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Preventive policing — Section 144 Cr.P.C.

District authorities are empowered to invoke Section 144 Cr.P.C. to prevent cockfighting events and allied unlawful activities.
(Para 5, Guideline 3)

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Seizure — Instruments and betting money

Authorities are entitled to seize instruments used for cockfights and money collected towards betting.
(Para 5, Guideline 4)

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Administrative accountability — Personal responsibility

District Collectors, Commissioners of Police and Superintendents of Police can be held personally responsible for lapses in enforcement of animal cruelty laws.
(Para 5, Guideline 5)

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Disciplinary action — Dereliction of duty

Failure of Tahsildars and Police Officers to enforce animal welfare laws can attract disciplinary action.
(Para 5, Guideline 7)

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Supreme Court precedents — Animal welfare

Directions issued are in consonance with binding decisions of the Supreme Court recognising animal welfare as a constitutional and statutory obligation.
(Para 5, Guidelines 1 & 7)

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ANALYSIS

The batch of writ petitions was filed seeking a common relief, namely, directions to the State and its authorities to prevent cockfights, particularly during festive seasons, on the ground that such activities involve betting, cruelty to animals, social degradation, addiction among youth and loss of property (Paras 1, 3).

The petitioners complained of administrative inaction despite representations. They relied on earlier Division Bench directions in W.P.(PIL) No.177 of 2016, wherein detailed preventive and enforcement measures had already been laid down (Paras 3, 5).

The learned Government Pleader for Home, on instructions, submitted that the police were taking steps to educate the public and left the matter to the discretion of the Court (Para 4).

The Court, instead of issuing fresh directions, reiterated and enforced the existing binding guidelines, emphasising that they continue to govern the field. The Court reproduced and applied detailed operational directions relating to constitution of SPCAs, joint inspection teams, preventive measures under Cr.P.C., seizure powers, awareness programmes and administrative accountability (Para 5).

Significantly, the Court underscored personal responsibility of District Collectors, Commissioners of Police and Superintendents of Police for effective enforcement, and recognised the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against erring officials, aligning with Supreme Court jurisprudence on animal welfare (Para 5, Guideline 7).

All writ petitions were accordingly disposed of, preserving liberty to police authorities to take action in case of violation of the guidelines (Para 5, concluding portion).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Cockfighting involving betting constitutes an unlawful activity attracting the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and allied laws. When authorities fail to act on representations seeking prevention of such activities, the High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, can enforce and reiterate binding Division Bench and Supreme Court directions. District Collectors and Police authorities bear statutory and personal responsibility to prevent cockfights, invoke preventive powers under Cr.P.C., seize instruments and betting money, and ensure effective enforcement of animal welfare laws, including by initiating disciplinary action against erring officials.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Negligence — Collision ...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Negligence — Collision ...: advocatemmmohan Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Negligence — Collision between bus and car In a claim arising out of a collision between two veh...

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Negligence — Collision between bus and car

In a claim arising out of a collision between two vehicles, negligence can be established on the basis of eye-witness evidence, crime record, charge-sheet, and surrounding probabilities, without insisting on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(Paras 23–27, 30–35)

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Negligence — APSRTC — Departmental action as corroborative circumstance

Where the driver of the APSRTC bus was subjected to criminal prosecution and departmental suspension, the Corporation cannot simultaneously contend absence of negligence. Such contradictory stands amount to blowing hot and cold and cannot be accepted.
(Paras 27–29)

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Contributory negligence — Burden of proof

Plea of contributory negligence must be established by cogent evidence. Mere allegation that the driver of the car was negligent, without examining independent witnesses or producing motor vehicle inspection evidence, is insufficient.
(Paras 24–30)

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Non-joinder of owner and insurer — When not fatal

Non-joinder of the owner and insurer of the car in which the deceased was travelling is not fatal where the evidence establishes exclusive negligence of the driver of the APSRTC bus.
(Paras 23–30, 35)

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Standard of proof — Motor accident claims

In motor accident claims, the standard of proof is preponderance of probability, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Tribunals must adopt a holistic and pragmatic approach, consistent with the social welfare object of the legislation.
(Paras 30–35)

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Income — Income Tax returns — Evidentiary value

Income Tax returns, PAN card, VAT registration, and testimony of an Income Tax consultant constitute reliable evidence to establish the income of a self-employed deceased. Non-payment of tax does not negate earning capacity.
(Paras 12–14, 38–40)

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Future prospects — Self-employed deceased

In the case of a self-employed deceased aged 26 years, addition towards future prospects is permissible, having regard to the likelihood of progression in income.
(Paras 40–41)

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Multiplier — Age of deceased

For a deceased aged 26 years, the appropriate multiplier is ‘17’.
(Para 41)

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Loss of consortium — Children

Minor children of the deceased are entitled to parental consortium, each at Rs.40,000/-.
(Paras 42, 44)

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Dependency — Parents-in-law

Even if parents-in-law are not direct dependents, reasonable dependency can be recognised where the family was living together, consistent with the beneficial object of the Motor Vehicles Act and principles under the Fatal Accidents Act.
(Para 43)

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Just compensation — Duty of Court

The Tribunal and appellate court are duty-bound to award just and reasonable compensation, avoiding technicalities, and must reassess compensation where the award is found inadequate.
(Paras 36–45)

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Interest — Enhancement

Enhancement of compensation can be accompanied by enhancement of the rate of interest where justified by facts and delay.
(Paras 45–47)

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ANALYSIS

Both appeals arose from the award dated 02.12.2011 in O.P. No.674 of 2009. The APSRTC challenged liability and quantum, while the claimants sought enhancement of compensation (Paras 1–5).

On negligence, the Court affirmed the finding against APSRTC by relying on eye-witness testimony (P.W.2), charge-sheet, FIR, and admissions of the bus driver, holding that contributory negligence of the car driver was not proved (Paras 23–30). The Court strongly deprecated the contradictory stand of APSRTC in denying negligence while subjecting its driver to suspension and disciplinary proceedings (Paras 27–29).

The plea of non-joinder of the car owner and insurer was rejected, as evidence established exclusive negligence of the bus driver (Paras 23–30). The Court reiterated that motor accident claims are to be decided on probability and holistic appreciation, consistent with the summary nature of proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act (Paras 30–35).

On quantum, the Court reassessed the income of the deceased based on Income Tax returns, PAN, VAT registration, and expert testimony, correcting the MACT’s conservative approach (Paras 38–40). Future prospects were added, the appropriate multiplier applied, and compensation recalculated (Paras 40–41).

The Court awarded parental consortium to minor children, recognised reasonable dependency of parents-in-law, and rationalised conventional heads, resulting in enhancement of compensation from Rs.15,84,000/- to Rs.20,37,000/-, with interest enhanced from 8% to 9% per annum (Paras 42–47).

Accordingly, APSRTC’s appeal was dismissed, and the claimants’ appeal was partly allowed (Paras 46–47).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In motor accident claims, negligence may be established on the basis of eye-witness testimony, crime records, and surrounding probabilities, without insisting on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence establishes exclusive negligence of the APSRTC bus driver, pleas of contributory negligence and non-joinder of the car owner or insurer must fail. Income Tax returns and allied statutory records constitute reliable evidence of income of a self-employed deceased, and future prospects must be added in accordance with settled law. Courts are duty-bound to award just compensation, including parental consortium to minor children and reasonable dependency benefits to parents-in-law, even by enhancing compensation and interest on appeal.

Where the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court concurrently hold, on proper appreciation of evidence, that an unregistered Will is duly executed by a testator in a sound and disposing state of mind and that all alleged suspicious circumstances have been satisfactorily explained, the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot interfere in the absence of a substantial question of law; re-appreciation of evidence or reassessment of factual findings is impermissible.

1. Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – Scope and Limit

In a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the jurisdiction of the High Court is confined only to cases involving substantial questions of law, and it cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below.
(Paras 15, 24–26)

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2. Will – Proof – Unregistered Will – Evidentiary Standard

An unregistered Will can be accepted as valid and enforceable when its execution is proved by examination of attestors and scribe, and when the testator is shown to be in a sound and disposing state of mind at the time of execution.
(Paras 9, 14, 19)

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3. Will – Suspicious Circumstances – Burden of Propounder

The propounder of a Will must remove all suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution to the satisfaction of the Court; once such burden is discharged through cogent oral and documentary evidence, the Will is entitled to acceptance.
(Paras 14, 19–21)

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4. Will – Medical Evidence – Doctor’s Certificate – Evidentiary Value

A medical certificate alleging incoherence of the testator loses evidentiary value when the doctor issuing it does not depose in support of the contents of the certificate and admits lack of medical examination or diagnostic tests.
(Paras 20–21)

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5. Competing Wills – Later Will Prevails

Where multiple Wills are proved to have been executed by the testator, the last Will, if proved to be genuine and valid, prevails and renders all prior Wills unenforceable in law.
(Paras 9, 13–14)

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6. Adoption – Effect on Succession

A son given in adoption ceases to have rights in the properties of his natural family, and such adoption is a relevant factor while appreciating succession claims under testamentary dispositions.
(Paras 3, 13(a))

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7. Concurrent Findings of Fact – Non-Interference

When both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court concurrently record findings on execution, validity, and genuineness of a Will after proper appreciation of evidence, such findings cannot be reopened in second appeal.
(Paras 14, 21, 26)

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ANALYSIS

The plaintiff sought declaration of title and recovery of possession based on an unregistered Will dated 18.02.1997 (Ex.A1) executed by late Kurakula Venkata Rao. The defendants resisted the claim by relying on a prior registered Will dated 20.02.1995 (Ex.B2) and by alleging that the later Will was surrounded by suspicious circumstances, particularly on the ground of the testator’s alleged ill-health.

The Trial Court, after exhaustive appreciation of oral evidence (PWs 1 to 6; DWs 1 to 11) and documentary evidence, held that:

• Ex.A1 was the last Will,

• it was executed in a sound and disposing state of mind, and

• earlier Wills stood revoked by implication.

The First Appellate Court independently reassessed the evidence and concurred with these findings, specifically recording that:

• the plaintiff had taken care of the testator in his last days,

• the execution of Ex.A1 was proved through attestors and scribe, and

• the alleged suspicious circumstances were satisfactorily explained.

In Second Appeal, the appellants attempted to re-agitate pure questions of fact, particularly relying on Ex.B3 medical certificate and the evidence of DW-11 (Doctor). The High Court found that:

• DW-11 did not depose in support of the contents of Ex.B3,

• no medical tests were conducted,

• the certificate itself was unsupported by oral testimony, and

• both Courts below had rightly discarded Ex.B3.

The Court emphasized that no substantial question of law arose, as the findings were purely factual and concurrent. Reliance placed by the appellants on Supreme Court precedent relating to suspicious circumstances was held inapplicable, as no such circumstances survived scrutiny in the present case.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court concurrently hold, on proper appreciation of evidence, that an unregistered Will is duly executed by a testator in a sound and disposing state of mind and that all alleged suspicious circumstances have been satisfactorily explained, the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot interfere in the absence of a substantial question of law; re-appreciation of evidence or reassessment of factual findings is impermissible.

Bail – Section 69 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – Scope Grant of bail in an offence under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 depends upon the nature and gravity of allegations, role attributed to the accused, length of custody, stage of investigation, and possibility of tampering with evidence or absconding. (Paras 1, 5–6)

1. Bail – Section 69 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – Scope

Grant of bail in an offence under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 depends upon the nature and gravity of allegations, role attributed to the accused, length of custody, stage of investigation, and possibility of tampering with evidence or absconding.
(Paras 1, 5–6)

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2. Bail – Long Judicial Custody – Completion of Substantial Investigation

Where the accused has been in judicial custody for a considerable period, substantial portion of investigation is completed, material witnesses are examined, and no application for custodial interrogation is pending or maintainable, continued incarceration is not warranted.
(Paras 5–6)

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3. Bail – Relationship Between Parties – Consensual Relationship Alleged

In a case where the complaint itself discloses a prior consensual relationship between the accused and the victim, known to elders of both families, and allegations arise subsequently due to refusal of marriage, such factors are relevant for consideration of bail, without adjudicating the merits of the case.
(Paras 3–4)

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4. Bail – Victim’s Stand – Intention to Marry Accused

The submission of the victim that she still intends to marry the accused is a relevant circumstance for consideration of bail, though it does not by itself determine culpability.
(Para 3)

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5. Bail – Permanent Residence – No Flight Risk

Where the accused is a permanent resident with a fixed abode and no material is placed to show likelihood of absconding, bail can be granted with stringent conditions to secure his presence.
(Para 5)

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6. Bail – Stringent Conditions – Safeguard to Prosecution

Imposition of conditions such as periodical appearance before the police, restriction on travel, non-interference with witnesses, cooperation with investigation, and surrender of passport sufficiently safeguards the interest of prosecution while granting bail.
(Para 7(i)–(vii))

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ANALYSIS

The Criminal Petition was filed seeking bail under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in connection with Crime No.222 of 2025 registered for the offence under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The Court took note of the factual matrix disclosed in the complaint, which indicated a consensual love relationship of about two years between the petitioner and the victim, known to elders of both families, followed by sexual relations, pregnancy, and termination. The subsequent dispute arose when the parents of the petitioner allegedly did not agree for marriage and there were allegations of dowry demand.

While the prosecution opposed bail on the ground of sexual exploitation under the guise of marriage, the Court also considered the submission of the victim, through Legal Aid Counsel, that she still intended to marry the petitioner.

A decisive factor in favour of the petitioner was the length of custody—75 days of judicial detention—and the fact that nine witnesses had already been examined, with substantial investigation completed. The Court also recorded that the statutory period for seeking police custody had expired and that no application for custodial interrogation was pending.

The Court further found that the petitioner was a permanent resident with a fixed address, reducing the risk of absconding. Balancing the seriousness of the allegations with the progress of investigation and the period of incarceration, the Court held that further detention was not necessary.

Accordingly, bail was granted, subject to stringent conditions to ensure cooperation with investigation, prevent witness intimidation, and secure the petitioner’s presence during trial.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In a prosecution under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, where the accused has undergone prolonged judicial custody, substantial investigation is completed, material witnesses are examined, no custodial interrogation is required, and the accused has a fixed place of residence, continued incarceration is unwarranted; bail may be granted with stringent conditions, even having regard to the gravity of allegations, without expressing any opinion on merits.