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Thursday, January 8, 2026

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Ancestral Property – Proof of Lineage and Title Wh...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Ancestral Property – Proof of Lineage and Title Wh...: advocatemmmohan 1. Civil Suit – Declaration of Title – Burden of Proof In a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the pl...

1. Civil Suit – Declaration of Title – Burden of Proof

In a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to establish title by adducing cogent and reliable evidence. The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case.
(Paras 21–23, 26–27, 54(i), 54(ii))


2. Ancestral Property – Proof of Lineage and Title

Where a claim of title is based on ancestry, the plaintiff must strictly prove the title of his predecessors and the devolution of such title. Mere assertion of lineage or similarity of surname with a religious institution is insufficient.
(Paras 26, 30–33, 54(ii), 54(vi))


3. Revenue Records – Pattadar Passbooks – Cist Receipts – Evidentiary Value

Pattadar passbooks, adangals, mutation entries, and cist receipts are not documents of title. They are maintained for fiscal purposes and do not confer ownership or prove title.
(Paras 26–27, 32–33, 48–53, 54(iii))


4. Possession – Presumption under Section 110 Evidence Act (Section 113 BSA, 2023)

The presumption that possession follows title is rebuttable and arises only when possession is prima facie lawful and referable to title, and where no title vests in any other party. Such presumption cannot be invoked where the claim itself is founded on title which is not proved.
(Paras 38–47, 54(iv), 54(v))


5. Endowment Property – Revenue Records Standing in Name of Religious Institution

Where the suit property stands recorded in the name of a religious endowment, and the plaintiff fails to establish ancestral title by documentary evidence, a decree for declaration cannot be granted.
(Paras 26, 28–29, 32, 54(v), 54(vii))


6. Pleadings – Effect of Plea of “Ignorance”

A plea of “not aware” in the written statement, when read as a whole, does not amount to admission of the plaintiff’s title or possession. Pleadings must be construed in their entirety and not in isolation.
(Paras 34–36)


7. Possession Without Proof of Title – No Declaration

Even assuming possession, in the absence of proof of title in favour of the plaintiff or his ancestors, a suit for declaration of title cannot succeed.
(Paras 47–48, 54(vii))


8. First Appeal – Scope of Interference

Where the trial court has properly appreciated oral and documentary evidence and applied settled principles of law, the appellate court will not interfere merely because another view is possible.
(Paras 27–29, 54(viii))


ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs sought declaration of title and consequential injunction over agricultural lands claiming them to be ancestral properties. Their entire claim was founded on lineage traced to a person bearing the name “Matam Veera Brahmam Swamy” and on revenue documents such as cist receipts and pattadar passbooks.

The Court examined whether the plaintiffs discharged the initial and primary burden of proof. It found that no registered document, no original title deed, and no revenue record establishing ownership of the plaintiffs’ ancestors was produced. The reliance on pattadar passbooks and cist receipts was held insufficient, as such documents do not constitute proof of title.

The plaintiffs attempted to invoke the presumption under Section 110 of the Evidence Act, contending that possession follows title. The Court rejected this contention, holding that such presumption arises only when possession is lawful and referable to title, and where no title is shown to vest in another party. In the present case, the revenue records stood in the name of a religious endowment, thereby negating any presumption in favour of the plaintiffs.

The argument that the defendant’s pleadings amounted to admission was also rejected. The Court clarified that pleadings must be read as a whole and that a plea of “ignorance” regarding certain revenue entries cannot be construed as admission of title or possession.

Ultimately, the Court affirmed that a declaratory suit cannot be decreed merely on the basis of possession or revenue entries, particularly when the property stands recorded in the name of an endowment and the plaintiffs fail to establish ancestral title.


RATIO DECIDENDI

In a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiff must establish title by cogent documentary evidence. Mutation entries, pattadar passbooks, cist receipts, or alleged possession do not confer title. The presumption that possession follows title under Section 110 of the Evidence Act (Section 113 BSA, 2023) is rebuttable and arises only where possession is lawful and no title vests in another party. Where property stands recorded in the name of a religious endowment and ancestral title is not proved, a decree for declaration cannot be granted.

NDPS Act – Extension of remand beyond 180 days – Section 36-A(4) NDPS Act – Article 21 of the Constitution – Accused not produced physically or virtually – No notice of extension of remand – Procedural safeguard violated – Illegality, not mere irregularity – Order extending remand set aside – Bail granted with conditions

Criminal Revision – NDPS Act – Extension of remand beyond 180 days – Section 36-A(4) NDPS Act – Article 21 of the Constitution – Accused not produced physically or virtually – No notice of extension of remand – Procedural safeguard violated – Illegality, not mere irregularity – Order extending remand set aside – Bail granted with conditions

Held:
Extension of remand beyond the statutory period under the NDPS Act without securing the physical or virtual presence of the accused and without informing the accused that the application for extension is being considered constitutes a gross illegality and violates the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Such an order is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
(Paras 5–10)


FACTS

The petitioners/Accused Nos.1 and 2 were arrested in Crime No.296 of 2025 of Pendurthy Police Station, Visakhapatnam Commissionerate, for offences under the NDPS Act and were remanded to judicial custody.

On the 150th day of remand, the prosecution filed a petition seeking extension of remand beyond 180 days. The learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for NDPS cases, Visakhapatnam, by order dated 19.12.2025, extended the remand up to 210 days.

Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed the present Criminal Revision Case challenging the legality of the extension of remand.
(Paras 1–4)


POINT FOR CONSIDERATION

Whether the order extending remand beyond 180 days without securing the presence of the accused or informing them of such extension is sustainable in law.
(Paras 5–9)


FINDINGS

  • No order extending remand was passed on 19.11.2025 or 20.11.2025.

  • The learned Trial Court ultimately passed the extension order without securing the physical or virtual presence of the accused.

  • The impugned order does not reflect that the accused were informed that the application for extension of remand was being considered.

  • Failure to follow this safeguard is not a mere procedural irregularity but a gross illegality affecting the accused’s Article 21 rights.
    (Paras 5–7, 9)

The Court reiterated that even in NDPS cases, remand extension cannot be passed mechanically and the accused must be informed by securing their presence either physically or virtually.
(Para 8)


FINAL ORDER

  1. Criminal Revision Case allowed.

  2. The impugned order dated 19.12.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.1295 of 2025 extending remand is set aside.

  3. Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 and 2 are enlarged on bail, subject to conditions.
    (Paras 10–12)


BAIL CONDITIONS

The Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 & 2 shall:

  1. Execute a bond for Rs.50,000/- each with two sureties for the like sum.

  2. Appear before the SHO, Pendurthy Police Station every Saturday between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. till cognizance.

  3. Not leave the State of Andhra Pradesh without prior permission.

  4. Not commit or indulge in any offence.

  5. Cooperate with investigation.

  6. Not influence or threaten witnesses.

  7. Surrender passports, if any, or file affidavits if none.
    (Para 12)


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. Extension of remand beyond 180 days under the NDPS Act without securing the accused’s physical or virtual presence is illegal.

  2. Failure to inform the accused of consideration of remand extension violates Article 21 and vitiates the order.

  3. Remand extension orders cannot be passed mechanically and must reflect compliance with constitutional safeguards.

Criminal Procedure – Pre-arrest bail – Section 482 BNSS, 2023 – Offences under Section 109(1) r/w 3(5) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita – Specific overt acts alleged – Statement of victim implicating accused – Nature and gravity of allegations – Discretionary relief – Rejection – Liberty to surrender and seek regular bail

Criminal Procedure – Pre-arrest bail – Section 482 BNSS, 2023 – Offences under Section 109(1) r/w 3(5) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita – Specific overt acts alleged – Statement of victim implicating accused – Nature and gravity of allegations – Discretionary relief – Rejection – Liberty to surrender and seek regular bail

Held:
Pre-arrest bail is a discretionary relief and cannot be granted as a matter of course. Where specific overt acts are attributed to the petitioner in the statement of the victim and the nature and gravity of allegations disclose active participation in the offence, the petitioner is not entitled to the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail. However, liberty may be granted to surrender before the jurisdictional Magistrate and seek appropriate relief in accordance with law.
(Paras 5–8)


FACTS

The petitioner/Accused No.7 sought pre-arrest bail in connection with Crime No.194 of 2025 of Srikalahasthi I Town Police Station, registered for offences punishable under Section 109(1) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
(Para 1)

The petitioner contended that he is 19 years old, a student, falsely implicated, and that there are only omnibus allegations against him.
(Para 2)

The State opposed the petition contending that the petitioner has not approached the Court with clean hands and that he had taken law into his own hands.
(Para 3)


FINDINGS

  • As per the record, LW.1/victim was attacked with rods and sticks.

  • Accused Nos.1 and 2 used deadly weapons causing injuries.

  • In the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer, the victim specifically stated that the petitioner also beat him.

  • Wound certificate was yet to be received.
    (Para 5)

The Court reiterated that pre-arrest bail is neither a license to commit offences nor a protective shield for persons against whom specific overt acts are alleged, relying on settled principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
(Para 6)

Considering the nature and gravity of allegations and the specific role attributed, the Court held that the petitioner is disentitled to the relief of pre-arrest bail.
(Para 7)


FINAL ORDER

  • Criminal Petition dismissed.

  • Liberty granted to the petitioner to surrender before the Jurisdictional Magistrate within two weeks and to file an appropriate application.

  • Jurisdictional Court directed to endeavour to dispose of the application within one week, in accordance with law, after giving opportunity to both sides.
    (Para 8)


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. Pre-arrest bail being a discretionary relief cannot be granted where specific overt acts are attributed to the accused.

  2. Nature and gravity of allegations and victim’s statement are decisive factors in considering anticipatory/pre-arrest bail.

  3. Even upon rejection of pre-arrest bail, liberty to surrender and seek regular bail can be granted to balance procedural fairness.

Criminal Appeals – Murder and Theft – Sections 302, 379 r/w 34 IPC – Circumstantial evidence – No eyewitnesses – “Last seen” theory not proved – Recovery of stolen property after long delay – Recovery alone insufficient for conviction for murder – Section 411 IPC – Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Proof of recovery and identification – Partial acquittal

Criminal Appeals – Murder and Theft – Sections 302, 379 r/w 34 IPC – Circumstantial evidence – No eyewitnesses – “Last seen” theory not proved – Recovery of stolen property after long delay – Recovery alone insufficient for conviction for murder – Section 411 IPC – Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Proof of recovery and identification – Partial acquittal

Held:
When the prosecution case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and must form a complete chain pointing only to the guilt of the accused. Conviction for murder and theft cannot be sustained solely on the basis of recovery of stolen property, particularly when such recovery is effected after a considerable lapse of time and there is no evidence of “last seen”, motive, or other incriminating circumstances. However, recovery of stolen property duly proved through identification can sustain conviction under Section 411 IPC.
(Paras 16–23)


FACTS

The appellants (A1 to A4) along with A5 were tried in Sessions Case No.396 of 2014 for offences under Sections 302 r/w 34 IPC, 379 r/w 34 IPC, and Section 411 IPC (against A2), on the allegation that on 20.05.2013 at about 11.30 a.m., they caused the death of Billa Mowlali by hacking and strangulation and committed theft of 20 goats.

The learned Sessions Judge convicted A1 to A4 for offences under Sections 302 and 379 r/w 34 IPC, and A2 additionally under Section 411 IPC, while acquitting A5.
(Paras 1–4)


PROSECUTION EVIDENCE

  • No eyewitnesses to the occurrence.

  • Case based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

  • P.Ws.6 to 16, examined to prove “last seen” and other circumstances, turned hostile.

  • P.Ws.1 to 4 only established that the deceased was missing and that the dead body was found.

  • The sole incriminating circumstance was the alleged recovery of 20 goats from the house of A2, nearly three months after the incident, and their identification by P.W.1 in a Test Identification Parade conducted by P.W.20.
    (Paras 10–17)


POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION

Whether the convictions of A1 to A4 under Sections 302 and 379 r/w 34 IPC and of A2 under Section 411 IPC are sustainable in law.
(Paras 16–17)


DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

(A) Charges under Sections 302 and 379 r/w 34 IPC

  • The prosecution failed to prove the “last seen” theory, as material witnesses did not support the case.

  • Except the recovery of goats, no other circumstance connected the appellants with the murder.

  • Recovery was effected after nearly three months, which by itself was held to be insufficient to sustain conviction for murder and theft.

  • Motive alleged by the prosecution (theft and sale of goats) was found inconsistent, as keeping goats for three months without disposal was improbable.

  • Supreme Court precedents relied upon by the appellants held that recovery alone cannot sustain conviction for murder.
    (Paras 16–20)

(B) Charge under Section 411 IPC against A2

  • Recovery of 20 goats from the house of A2 was proved through P.Ws.20 and 24.

  • The Test Identification Parade of goats was conducted and not challenged in cross-examination.

  • Hence, conviction under Section 411 IPC was held to be proved and sustainable.
    (Paras 19, 21)


DISTINCTION OF PROSECUTION AUTHORITY

The judgment relied upon by the prosecution (Gulab Chand case) was distinguished, as that case related to recovery of jewellery, whereas the present case concerned livestock, which would ordinarily be disposed of quickly.
(Para 20)


FINAL ORDER

  1. Criminal Appeal Nos.1807, 1953 and 2683 of 2018Allowed.

    • Convictions of A1, A3 and A4 under Sections 302 and 379 r/w 34 IPC are set aside.

    • They are acquitted and directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

  2. Criminal Appeal No.266 of 2021Allowed in part.

    • Conviction of A2 under Sections 302 and 379 r/w 34 IPC is set aside.

    • Conviction under Section 411 IPC is confirmed.

    • As A2 had already undergone the sentence, he was directed to be released forthwith.

  3. Fine amounts, if paid, directed to be refunded.
    (Paras 22–24)


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. Recovery of stolen property alone, particularly after a long lapse of time, is insufficient to sustain conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC.

  2. In a circumstantial evidence case, absence of “last seen”, motive, and other connecting links is fatal to prosecution.

  3. However, proved recovery and identification of stolen property can independently sustain conviction under Section 411 IPC.


Criminal Appeal – Murder – Section 302 IPC – Conviction based on solitary eyewitness – Reliability of sole witness – Contradictory versions – Absence of corroboration – Test Identification Parade – Improper conduct – Recovery evidence doubtful – Benefit of doubt – Acquittal

Criminal Appeal – Murder – Section 302 IPC – Conviction based on solitary eyewitness – Reliability of sole witness – Contradictory versions – Absence of corroboration – Test Identification Parade – Improper conduct – Recovery evidence doubtful – Benefit of doubt – Acquittal

Held:
Where the prosecution rests its case solely on the testimony of a single eyewitness, such evidence must be of sterling quality, wholly reliable, free from contradictions, and inspire complete confidence. If the solitary eyewitness gives divergent versions, lacks corroboration, and the surrounding circumstances create serious doubt regarding recovery and identification, conviction under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained. A defective test identification parade and improbable recovery further weaken the prosecution case, entitling the accused to benefit of doubt.
(Paras 10–23)


ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

I. Nature of Appeal

The appeal was preferred by the sole accused challenging the judgment dated 10.05.2018 in Sessions Case No.76 of 2016, whereby he was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with fine.
(Para 1)


II. Prosecution Case

The prosecution alleged that at about 04:00 AM on 20.10.2015, the accused attacked the deceased with a soda bottle, causing fatal head injuries. The case was registered on the report of PW.1, the father of the deceased.
(Paras 2–3)

The prosecution examined PW.1 to PW.14, marked Exs.P1 to P17, and exhibited MOs.1 to 7.
(Para 4)


III. Evidence of the Sole Eyewitness (PW.3)

The prosecution case hinged entirely on PW.3, who claimed to have witnessed the incident while assisting his brother at a pan shop in the early hours of the morning. PW.3 stated that the accused assaulted the deceased with a soda bottle near the pan shop.
(Paras 10–11)

However, critical deficiencies were noticed:

  • PW.3 admitted in cross-examination that he had given two divergent versions before the police and the Magistrate.

  • His narration as to whether the deceased or the accused was on the motorcycle was inconsistent.

  • He admitted that opening the shop at such an early hour was unusual and specific only to that day.
    (Paras 11–12)

The Court found PW.3 not to be a wholly reliable witness.
(Para 13)


IV. Absence of Corroboration

Although PW.3 claimed that about 15 persons gathered at the scene and that he complained to a traffic constable, none of these witnesses were examined.

Further, the informant Srikanth (LW.7), who allegedly informed PW.1 about the incident, was also not examined.
(Paras 11, 17)


V. Evidence of Relatives and Other Witnesses

  • PW.1 and PW.2 (father and wife of the deceased) were not eyewitnesses and their evidence was limited to receiving information after the incident.

  • PW.4 and PW.5 spoke only about an earlier altercation and did not support the prosecution regarding the actual occurrence.
    (Paras 17–18)


VI. Recovery and Arrest – Doubtful Circumstances

The prosecution relied on alleged recovery of blood-stained clothes and the neck portion of a soda bottle from the accused two weeks after the incident.

The Court found it highly improbable that the accused would still be wearing blood-stained clothes or preserve a broken soda bottle for such a long period.
(Para 19)

Accordingly, no reliance was placed on the recovery evidence.


VII. Test Identification Parade

The Test Identification Parade was conducted belatedly on 21.11.2015. PW.3 admitted that the other participants were not of similar age or appearance.

The witness had not given any prior descriptive particulars of the accused. Hence, the Court held that the identification parade lacked credibility.
(Paras 20–21)


VIII. Legal Position on Solitary Witness

The Court reiterated the settled principle that conviction on the basis of a single eyewitness is permissible only when the testimony is of sterling quality. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court precedents emphasising caution where the solitary witness is unreliable or uncorroborated.
(Paras 14–16)


IX. Conclusion on Merits

In view of:

  • Unreliable testimony of PW.3,

  • Absence of corroboration,

  • Improbable recovery, and

  • Defective identification parade,

the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(Paras 21–22)


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. Conviction under Section 302 IPC based solely on a solitary eyewitness is permissible only if the testimony is wholly reliable, consistent, and of sterling quality.

  2. Where the sole eyewitness gives contradictory versions and lacks corroboration from independent evidence, such testimony cannot form the basis of conviction.

  3. Improbable recovery of incriminating material and defective test identification parade further weaken the prosecution case.

  4. In cases of serious doubt, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt and acquittal.


FINAL ORDER

The Criminal Appeal was allowed.
The conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.
(Para 23)