Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 4, 9, 10-A & 11 Abatement of appeal — Death of respondent — Ignorance of death Abatement occurs by operation of law on expiry of limitation for substitution — However, ignorance of the death of a respondent constitutes sufficient cause for setting aside abatement, particularly when appeal is pending without periodic listing and no notice of death is given. [Paras 4.2–4.5, 5, 14–15]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 4, 9, 10-A & 11

Abatement of appeal — Death of respondent — Ignorance of death

Abatement occurs by operation of law on expiry of limitation for substitution — However, ignorance of the death of a respondent constitutes sufficient cause for setting aside abatement, particularly when appeal is pending without periodic listing and no notice of death is given.
[Paras 4.2–4.5, 5, 14–15]

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Limitation Act, 1963 — Sections 5, Articles 120 & 121

Condonation of delay — Liberal approach in abatement matters

Applications for setting aside abatement and substitution of legal representatives must be considered liberally — Length of delay is immaterial; sufficiency and acceptability of explanation is decisive — Courts are more liberal in abatement cases than in cases of delay in filing appeals.
[Paras 6, 8(ii), 8(iii)]

---

“Sufficient cause” — Meaning and scope

Section 5, Limitation Act

Expression “sufficient cause” must receive a pragmatic, practical and justice-oriented interpretation — Delay not attributable to negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides ought to be condoned to advance substantial justice.
[Paras 6, 8(i)]

---

Duty of counsel — Order XXII Rule 10-A CPC

Counsel for a deceased party has a statutory duty to inform the Court of the death — Failure to report death is a relevant factor while considering condonation of delay and setting aside abatement.
[Paras 4.5, 11, 15]

---

Pending appeals — High Courts — No duty of constant vigilance

Where an appeal is admitted and remains pending for years without being listed, appellant is not expected to make periodic enquiries about the life or death of respondents — Want of diligence cannot be imputed in such circumstances.
[Paras 8(v), 10, 14]

---

Institutions / Bodies — Change of management — Ignorance of proceedings

Where appellant is an institution acting through a managing committee, change of management resulting in ignorance of pending appeal and death of respondent constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
[Paras 3, 15]

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Abatement — Preference for adjudication on merits

Courts should ordinarily set aside abatement and decide matters on merits rather than terminate proceedings on technical grounds, unless deliberate negligence or mala fides is shown.
[Paras 8(ii), 14]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Nature of Abatement

The Court clarifies that abatement under Order XXII CPC:

• occurs automatically by operation of law on expiry of limitation;

• does not require a formal judicial declaration to take effect;

• nevertheless requires judicial cognizance to close proceedings (Paras 4.2–5).

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B. Liberal Approach in Abatement Matters

The judgment draws a clear distinction between:

• delay in filing an appeal, and

• delay in taking steps in a pending appeal.

Courts are required to be far more liberal in the latter category, as refusal would foreclose adjudication on merits (Paras 6, 8(ii)).

---

C. Ignorance of Death as Sufficient Cause

By reference to Order XXII Rule 4(5) CPC, the Court holds that:

• ignorance of the death of a respondent is a statutorily recognised ground;

• such ignorance, if bona fide and uncontradicted, constitutes sufficient cause;

• no diligence can be expected where the appellant is unaware of the death (Paras 4.4–4.5, 12–15).

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D. Role of Rule 10-A CPC

The Court emphasises that:

• counsel for the deceased party has a duty to inform the Court of death;

• failure to discharge this duty weighs in favour of the appellant seeking condonation;

• delay effectively runs from date of knowledge, not date of death (Paras 11, 15).

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E. High Court Appeals — Practical Realities

A significant jurisprudential contribution of this judgment is recognition of ground realities:

• appeals in High Courts often remain unlisted for years;

• litigants are not expected to keep constant vigil;

• expecting periodic enquiry into life status of respondents is unrealistic (Paras 8(v), 10).

---

F. Balancing Accrued Rights vs Substantial Justice

While acknowledging that abatement confers a valuable right on legal representatives, the Court holds that:

• such right should not defeat adjudication on merits where delay is bona fide;

• procedural law is a handmaid of justice, not its mistress (Paras 8(ii), 14).

---

III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Second appeal admitted in 1993 and not listed for hearing for several years (Paras 2, 10).

• Sole respondent died on 17-04-2002 (Para 2).

• Death was not reported by counsel or LRs to the High Court (Paras 11, 15).

• Appellant institution underwent change of management; new committee unaware of appeal (Paras 3, 15).

• Applications for substitution and setting aside abatement filed promptly after knowledge (Para 3).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Delay held satisfactorily explained.

• Orders of High Court refusing condonation and setting aside abatement set aside.

• Delay condoned; abatement set aside.

• Legal representatives permitted to be brought on record.

• High Court directed to hear the appeal on merits.
  [Para 16]

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Ratio (Concise)

In appeals pending without periodic listing, bona fide ignorance of the respondent’s death—especially where counsel failed to report it—constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay and setting aside abatement; courts must prefer adjudication on merits over technical termination.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of de...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of de...: advocatemmmohan Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Scope Delay can be condoned only on proof of ...

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Scope

Delay can be condoned only on proof of “sufficient cause” — The expression means an adequate and enough reason which prevents a party from approaching the Court within limitation — Negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot constitute sufficient cause.
[Paras 9, 11, 15]

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Scope

Delay can be condoned only on proof of “sufficient cause” — The expression means an adequate and enough reason which prevents a party from approaching the Court within limitation — Negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot constitute sufficient cause.
[Paras 9, 11, 15]

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Limitation — Inordinate delay — Discretion of Court

Where delay is gross and unexplained, Court has no jurisdiction to condone the same — Discretion under Section 5 must be exercised judiciously and not on sympathetic or equitable considerations.
[Paras 6, 15, 16]

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Equality — Article 14 — Negative equality

Article 14 does not permit perpetuation of illegality — Erroneous or illegal orders passed in other cases cannot be relied upon to claim similar relief — Doctrine of negative equality is impermissible.
[Para 8]

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Limitation — Conditional condonation — Illegality

Condoning delay by imposing conditions (such as denial of interest for the delay period) without recording satisfaction of “sufficient cause” is impermissible — Such orders are contrary to statutory mandate.
[Paras 7, 15]

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Limitation law — Mandatory application

“Dura lex sed lex”

Law of limitation must be applied with full rigour — Courts have no power to extend limitation on equitable or sympathetic grounds — Hardship is irrelevant where statute is clear.
[Paras 12, 13]

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Public policy — Limitation statutes

Limitation statutes are founded on public policy to ensure certainty, suppress stale claims, and compel diligence — Courts cannot dilute legislative intent by judicial discretion.
[Paras 12, 13]

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Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 54

Appeal — Delay

Appeals under Section 54 are governed strictly by limitation — Inordinate delay of more than five years, without satisfactory explanation, is fatal.
[Paras 1–6, 16]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Meaning of “Sufficient Cause”

The Court undertakes an authoritative exposition of the expression “sufficient cause” and holds that:

• It must be adequate, bona fide, and reasonable;

• It excludes negligence, inaction, or casual conduct;

• The applicant must establish that delay was unavoidable despite due diligence (Paras 9–11).

The Court reiterates that while interpretation may be liberal, it cannot be elastic to the point of defeating limitation law.

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B. Judicial Discretion under Section 5

The discretion to condone delay is not unfettered. The Court stresses that:

• Discretion must be exercised strictly within statutory parameters;

• Courts cannot substitute sympathy for legal standards;

• Absence of sufficient cause ousts jurisdiction to condone delay (Paras 15–16).

---

C. Rejection of “Parity” Argument

A central issue addressed is the plea that other similarly placed litigants had obtained condonation. The Court unequivocally holds:

• Article 14 does not envisage negative equality;

• Illegal or erroneous orders cannot form the basis for claiming similar relief;

• Illegality cannot be multiplied by judicial endorsement (Para 8).

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D. Conditional Condonation — Disapproved

The Court strongly disapproves the practice of condoning delay by imposing conditions such as:

• Denial of interest for the delay period.

Such orders, without first establishing sufficient cause, are held to be illegal and jurisdictionally flawed (Paras 7, 15).

---

E. Limitation as Public Policy

The judgment reiterates the foundational rationale of limitation law:

• To prevent uncertainty and stale litigation;

• To ensure diligence and repose;

• To protect settled rights.

Courts are reminded that they cannot dilute statutory limitation on equitable grounds (Paras 12–13).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Land acquisition awards were passed between 1997–2002 (Paras 1–2).

• Appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act were filed in 2007, with a delay of about 5½ years (Para 6).

• Sole explanation offered was illness of one appellant (Paras 3, 6).

• High Court rejected applications for condonation of delay (Para 2).

• Appellants relied on earlier High Court orders condoning delay conditionally (Para 7).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• No sufficient cause shown for inordinate delay.

• Article 14 plea rejected.

• Conditional condonation practice disapproved.

• Appeals dismissed; High Court order affirmed.
  [Para 16]

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Ratio (Concise)

Condonation of delay is a matter of jurisdictional discretion confined strictly to proof of “sufficient cause”; courts cannot condone inordinate delay on equitable grounds, impose conditions in lieu of statutory compliance, or perpetuate illegality by invoking Article 14.

Criminal defamation — Ingredients — Publication based on public record Publication based substantially on public records and official documents, without embellishment, does not per se constitute defamation — Truthful reporting of facts drawn from public records, if made in good faith, attracts the protection of the First Exception to Section 499 IPC. [Paras 5.2, 18, 52–55, 60–64]

 

Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 499, 500

Criminal defamation — Ingredients — Publication based on public record

Publication based substantially on public records and official documents, without embellishment, does not per se constitute defamation — Truthful reporting of facts drawn from public records, if made in good faith, attracts the protection of the First Exception to Section 499 IPC.
[Paras 5.2, 18, 52–55, 60–64]

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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Sections 202, 204, 482

Quashing of process — Scope

High Court can quash criminal proceedings where the complaint, even if taken at face value, does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence — Criminal law should not be permitted to be used as a tool for harassment or intimidation.
[Paras 9.4–9.9, 55–57, 99–103]

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Defamation — Per se defamatory statements — Test

Statements are not defamatory per se merely because they are critical or uncomfortable — To constitute defamation, imputations must lower the moral or intellectual character of the complainant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society.
[Paras 5.2, 56–58]

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Defamation — Mens rea — Requirement

Mens rea is a necessary ingredient of criminal defamation — Absence of malice, coupled with bona fide journalistic conduct, negatives the offence under Section 499 IPC.
[Paras 5.5, 61–63, 71–73]

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Journalism — Questionnaire — Fair opportunity

Issuance of a questionnaire seeking the version of the person concerned prior to publication, and publication of substantial portions of the reply, evidences bona fides and militates against allegation of malice.
[Paras 5.5, 62–64]

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Defamation — Public figures — Higher threshold

Public figures and persons connected with public life must tolerate a higher degree of scrutiny — Criminal defamation cannot be invoked to stifle investigative journalism on matters of public interest.
[Paras 5.3, 66–69, 74–76]

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Editors / Publishers — Vicarious liability

Criminal liability for defamation cannot be mechanically fastened on editors and persons connected with publication without specific averments of their role and intent — Vicarious liability is unknown to criminal law except where statutorily provided.
[Paras 56, 78–83]

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Abuse of process — Chilling effect on free speech

Allowing prosecution to continue in absence of prima facie defamation would have a chilling effect on free speech and investigative reporting — Courts must prevent misuse of criminal process.
[Paras 97–103]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Essential Ingredients of Criminal Defamation

The Court reiterates that for an offence under Sections 499–500 IPC, the following must coexist:

1. Making or publishing an imputation;

2. Concerning a person;

3. With intention, knowledge or reason to believe that such imputation will harm reputation.

Absent mens rea or defamatory imputation, criminal prosecution cannot survive (Paras 56–58, 61).

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B. Public Record, Truth, and Good Faith

A central legal finding is that:

• The article was substantially based on publicly available records (ROC filings, financial statements).

• Truthful reporting of such records, without distortion, falls within Exception 1 to Section 499 IPC.

• Public good and good faith are evident from the nature and source of information (Paras 60–64).

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C. Role of Mens Rea

The Court gives significant weight to:

• Sending a questionnaire;

• Receiving a detailed reply;

• Publishing substantial portions of the response.

This conduct negates deliberate intent to defame and demonstrates journalistic fairness (Paras 62–64).

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D. Public Figures and Democratic Accountability

Relying on constitutional jurisprudence, the Court holds that:

• Individuals connected with public power or political families cannot claim insulation from scrutiny.

• Criminal defamation should not be used to silence critical reporting on matters having public ramifications (Paras 66–76).

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E. Limits of Magistrate’s Power at Section 202 Stage

Although the scope of inquiry under Section 202 CrPC is limited, the Magistrate must still ensure that:

• The complaint discloses a prima facie offence;

• The essential ingredients are made out.

Mechanical issuance of process, without applying mind to the statutory exceptions, amounts to legal error (Paras 9.4–9.9, 99–101).

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F. Abuse of Criminal Process

The Court strongly cautions that:

• Criminal defamation must not become a weapon of vendetta.

• Continuation of proceedings in the absence of offence would be an abuse of process warranting interference under Section 482 CrPC (Paras 97–103).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Impugned article titled “The Golden Touch of Jay Amit Shah” was published on The Wire (Paras 4.1–4.2).

• Article relied on ROC data and financial disclosures (Paras 5.2, 60).

• Prior to publication, a questionnaire was sent and a reply received (Paras 5.5, 62).

• Substantial portions of the reply were published (Paras 62–64).

• Magistrate issued process under Sections 500/114 IPC after inquiry under Section 202 CrPC (Para 4.7).

• Petitioners invoked Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing (Para 3).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Complaint and order issuing process quashed.

• Continuation of criminal proceedings held to be abuse of process of law.

• Article held not per se defamatory and protected by exceptions to Section 499 IPC.

• Criminal law cannot be invoked to suppress investigative journalism.
  [Paras 101–109]

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Ratio (Concise)

Truthful publication based on public records, made in good faith after seeking the affected party’s version, does not constitute criminal defamation; criminal process cannot be used to stifle investigative journalism or public scrutiny of matters of public interest.

Comparative Advertising — Disparagement — Generic disparagement Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC Calling an entire class of rival products “dhoka / deception” amounts to generic disparagement — Even without naming a specific competitor, denigration of a product category is impermissible — Market leader within the disparaged class is entitled to protection. [Paras 24.9–24.16, 28–29, 35–39]

 

Comparative Advertising — Disparagement — Generic disparagement

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

Calling an entire class of rival products “dhoka / deception” amounts to generic disparagement — Even without naming a specific competitor, denigration of a product category is impermissible — Market leader within the disparaged class is entitled to protection.
[Paras 24.9–24.16, 28–29, 35–39]

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Commercial Speech — Limits of Article 19(1)(a)

Commercial advertising is protected speech, but protection does not extend to false, misleading, unfair or deceptive representations — Freedom of speech does not include the right to disparage or defame competitors.
[Paras 25.2–25.5, 30–33]

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Puffery vs Disparagement — Legal distinction

Exaggeration of one’s own product is permissible — Attributing inferiority, deception, fraud or lack of efficacy to rival products crosses from puffery into disparagement — The distinction between “my product is better” and “others are bad/deceptive” must be maintained.
[Paras 24.13–24.17, 29–33]

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Generic Disparagement — Identification not necessary

Disparagement of a class or genre of products, without specifically identifying a competitor, is actionable — Clever advertising cannot escape liability merely by avoiding brand names.
[Paras 24.14–24.16, 39]

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Medicinal / Ayurvedic Products — Statutory compliance

Where a product is manufactured in accordance with authoritative texts recognised under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, it cannot be portrayed as deceptive — Calling such products “dhoka” is ex-facie false and misleading.
[Paras 24.2, 24.9–24.12, 34–37]

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Endorsements — Influence of spokesperson

Impact of an advertisement must be assessed considering the stature and influence of the endorser — Statements made by a person projected as an expert are likely to be taken as statements of fact by consumers.
[Paras 38, 35–36]

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Interim Injunction — Balance of convenience — Irreparable harm

Where a prima facie case of disparagement is made out, balance of convenience lies in restraining the offending advertisement — Continuing broadcast would cause irreparable harm to goodwill and reputation.
[Paras 40–41]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Generic Disparagement as an Independent Wrong

The Court reiterates settled law that generic disparagement is as actionable as specific disparagement. Denigrating an entire category of goods necessarily harms competitors within that category, especially the market leader. The absence of brand reference is not decisive (Paras 24.14–24.16, 39).

B. Commercial Speech and Constitutional Limits

While acknowledging that advertising is protected under Article 19(1)(a), the Court emphasises that:

• Falsehoods, deception and denigration fall outside constitutional protection.

• Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions where public interest and fair competition are affected (Paras 25.2–25.5, 30).

C. Puffery Distinguished from Disparagement

The judgment carefully delineates the boundary:

• Permissible: claiming superiority, highlighting additional features.

• Impermissible: stating or implying that rival products deceive consumers or lack efficacy.
  The use of the word “dhoka” is held to cross this boundary (Paras 24.13, 29–33).

D. Statutory Context — Ayurvedic Medicines

A crucial legal finding is that all Chyawanprash manufactured as per recognised Ayurvedic texts and licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are statutorily valid medicines. Branding such products as deceptive undermines the statutory framework itself (Paras 34–37).

E. Role of the Average Consumer

The test applied is that of an ordinary reasonable consumer with imperfect recollection. From such a perspective, the impugned advertisement conveys that all non-defendant Chyawanprash are fake or ineffective, which is misleading (Paras 35–36).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Plaintiff Dabur India Limited is the market leader in Chyawanprash with over 61% market share (Paras 24.1–24.4).

• Defendants Patanjali Ayurved Limited and Patanjali Foods Limited released the impugned advertisement in October 2025 (Paras 24.5–24.7).

• Advertisement repeatedly used the word “dhoka” to describe Chyawanprash other than defendants’ product (Paras 24.6–24.13).

• Prior Division Bench order had permitted comparison with “ordinary Chyawanprash” provided it did not deride or refer to the plaintiff’s product (Para 24.8).

• Court found the impugned advertisement contrary to that liberty and prima facie disparaging (Paras 28–39).

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IV. OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS / RESULT

• Ad-interim injunction granted.

• Defendants restrained from issuing, broadcasting or disseminating the impugned advertisement or any advertisement referring to Chyawanprash as “dhoka / deceptive”.

• Defendants directed to take down / disable the advertisement from all media platforms within 72 hours.

• Replies and rejoinders directed; matter listed for further hearing.
  [Paras 42–44]

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Ratio (Concise)

Generic denigration of an entire class of products as deceptive, even without naming a competitor, constitutes actionable disparagement; commercial speech does not protect false or misleading attacks on rival goods, particularly in the case of medicinal products.

Defamation — Internet publication — Hyperlinking Whether hyperlinking amounts to republication Hyperlinking to an allegedly defamatory article does not ipso facto amount to republication — Hyperlink is content-neutral and only provides a reference unless the manner of hyperlinking itself conveys, endorses, or adopts the defamatory content — Each case must be examined on facts. [Paras 2, 35–36, 66–70]

 

Defamation — Internet publication — Hyperlinking

Whether hyperlinking amounts to republication

Hyperlinking to an allegedly defamatory article does not ipso facto amount to republication — Hyperlink is content-neutral and only provides a reference unless the manner of hyperlinking itself conveys, endorses, or adopts the defamatory content — Each case must be examined on facts.
[Paras 2, 35–36, 66–70]

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Defamation — Republication — Fresh cause of action

Article 75, Limitation Act, 1963

Every republication of a libel constitutes a fresh libel and gives rise to a fresh cause of action — Limitation of one year runs from the date of each republication — However, mere continued online availability is not republication.
[Paras 49–58]

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Hyperlinking — Distinction between reference and publication

A hyperlink by itself does not communicate the defamatory content — It requires an independent act of the reader to access the content — Hyperlinking is akin to a reference or footnote, unless accompanied by contextual endorsement.
[Paras 69–70]

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Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Rejection of plaint

Cause of action — Limitation — Order II Rule 2 CPC

Plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC when hyperlinking and repeated references give rise to a triable issue on republication and limitation — Order II Rule 2 CPC does not apply to continuing or recurring causes of action.
[Paras 36–41, 59–65]

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Defamation — Online publication — Continuing tort

Defamation through repeated acts of publication or republication constitutes a continuing tort — Each fresh act gives rise to a fresh cause of action under Section 22 of the Limitation Act.
[Paras 52–55, 58, 63]

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Interim injunction — Defamation — Media reporting

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

Pre-trial injunction in defamation suits must be granted sparingly — Where defence of truth, fair comment, and public interest is raised and requires evidence, injunction cannot be granted mechanically.
[Paras 25–33, 34]

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Freedom of speech vs right to reputation

Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21

Right to reputation is an intrinsic facet of Article 21 — At the same time, investigative journalism and source protection are integral to Article 19(1)(a) — Courts must balance both at the interim stage.
[Paras 3, 30–33]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Concept of Publication in Defamation

The Court reiterates that publication is the sine qua non of defamation. Publication means communication of the defamatory matter to at least one person other than the plaintiff. Mere existence of content on the internet is insufficient unless there is an act of communication or republication (Paras 44–48).

B. Republication and Limitation

Relying on common-law principles and Indian precedent, the Court holds:

• Every republication is a fresh libel.

• Limitation under Article 75 runs from the date of such republication.

• Section 22 of the Limitation Act applies to continuing torts (Paras 49–58).

However, the Court draws a clear distinction between:

• Republication, and

• Passive continued availability of content online.

C. Hyperlinking — Jurisprudential Clarification

This judgment is a landmark exposition on hyperlinking in Indian defamation law. The Court holds:

• A hyperlink does not reproduce content.

• It merely points to where content exists.

• Hyperlinking becomes actionable only if it conveys endorsement, adoption, or contextual defamatory meaning (Paras 66–70).

The Court draws persuasive guidance from comparative jurisprudence (including Canadian law) while grounding its conclusion in Indian constitutional principles.

D. Order II Rule 2 CPC and Continuing Cause

The Court exhaustively analyses Order II Rule 2 CPC and reiterates that:

• It applies only when the cause of action is identical.

• In cases of continuous or recurring causes of action, the bar does not operate.

• Hyperlink-based republication, if established, creates distinct causes of action (Paras 59–65).

E. Interim Injunction in Defamation

Applying the principles of Bonnard v. Perryman and Indian precedent, the Court holds that:

• Pre-trial injunctions in defamation are exceptional.

• Where defendants raise plausible defences of truth, fair comment, and public interest, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial (Paras 25–33).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS PER RECORD)

• Plaintiffs are founders and entities associated with OFB Tech Private Limited and Oxyzo Financial Services Ltd., claiming high reputation and valuation (Paras 4–5).

• Defendant Slowform Media Pvt. Ltd. publishes The Morning Context (Para 6).

• Allegedly defamatory article was first published on 17-05-2023 and later hyperlinked in articles dated 08-11-2023, 29-12-2023, and 07-10-2024 (Paras 7–8, 14).

• Earlier suit concerning a different article dated 07-10-2024 was pending (Paras 9–14).

• Defendants raised objections of limitation and Order II Rule 2 CPC (Paras 16–17).

• Plaintiffs asserted fresh cause of action due to hyperlinking (Paras 18–22).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC dismissed — plaint discloses triable issues on republication and limitation.

• Hyperlinking does not automatically amount to republication; issue requires factual examination.

• Interim injunction declined at this stage — defences of truth, fair comment, and public interest require trial.

• Both applications directed to proceed in accordance with law.
  [Paras 64–65 and concluding directions]

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Ratio (Succinct)

Hyperlinking to allegedly defamatory content does not per se constitute republication; only when hyperlinking conveys endorsement or defamatory meaning can it give rise to a fresh cause of action, and such determination is fact-dependent.