ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: “bulldozer justice” has no sanction under the Cons...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: “bulldozer justice” has no sanction under the Cons...: advocatemmmohan Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 21, 32, 142 Demolition of property of accused / convict — Without due process — Unconstit...

Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 21, 32, 142

Demolition of property of accused / convict — Without due process — Unconstitutional

Demolition of residential or commercial property by State machinery merely because a person is an accused or a convict, and that too without following the due process prescribed by law, is wholly unconstitutional — Executive cannot act as judge and impose punishment — Such action violates rule of law and doctrine of separation of powers — Accountability of public officials mandated.
[Paras 53, 54, 71]

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Rule of Law — Foundation of democratic governance — Abuse of power

Rule of law is an umbrella concept to protect citizens against abuse of State power — No person can be punished in body or goods except in accordance with law established by ordinary courts — Executive excesses amounting to arbitrariness have no place in a constitutional system.
[Paras 14–19, 30, 33]

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Separation of Powers — Executive overreach

Executive cannot usurp judicial functions by declaring guilt or inflicting punishment — Demolition of property as a penal measure transgresses constitutional limits of executive power.
[Paras 44, 71]

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Criminal Law — Presumption of innocence — Natural justice

Accused is presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law — Penal consequences cannot be imposed on the basis of accusation or suspicion — Fair trial and due process are indispensable.
[Paras 63, 64, 66, 75]

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Right to Life — Right to shelter — Art. 21

Right to shelter is a facet of right to life — House is not merely property but embodies dignity, security, and socio-economic aspirations — Deprivation of shelter without due process is unconstitutional.
[Paras 76, 78, 84, 86]

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Collective Punishment — Impermissibility

Demolition of a house occupied by family members on the ground that one resident is accused or convicted amounts to collective punishment — Such punishment is alien to constitutional and criminal jurisprudence.
[Paras 76, 88]

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Mala fides — Selective demolition — Pick and choose

Where similarly situated structures are left untouched and property of an accused alone is demolished, a presumption of punitive intent arises — Authorities must rebut presumption of mala fides.
[Para 82]

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Demolition — Proportionality — Last resort

Demolition can be undertaken only when it is the sole option available — Authorities must consider compounding or partial demolition — Extreme step must be justified with reasons.
[Paras 84, 86]

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Constitution of India — Art. 142

Directions to prevent arbitrary demolitions

Mandatory procedural safeguards laid down — Prior show-cause notice, personal hearing, reasoned order, opportunity for appeal, time to vacate, videography of demolition — Non-compliance to entail contempt, restitution, and personal liability of officers.
[Paras 90–94]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Rule of Law as Controlling Principle

The Court reiterates that rule of law is part of the basic structure and exists to restrain arbitrary State power. Any punitive action affecting life or property must be rooted in law and adjudicated by courts, not executive fiat (Paras 14–23).

B. Separation of Powers and Executive Limits

By demolishing property on the ground of criminal accusation, the executive assumes the role of judge and executioner. Such conduct directly violates the constitutional demarcation between executive and judiciary (Paras 44, 71).

C. Criminal Jurisprudence and Presumption of Innocence

The judgment emphatically affirms that punishment cannot precede adjudication. Even convicts cannot be subjected to demolition without statutory authority and due process; a fortiori, accused persons cannot be so punished (Paras 63–75).

D. Right to Shelter under Article 21

The Court elevates shelter beyond a property right, recognising it as intrinsic to dignity and life. Arbitrary demolition, therefore, strikes at the core of Article 21 (Paras 76–86).

E. Collective Punishment and Innocent Family Members

The Court categorically rejects penalisation of spouses, children, parents, or co-owners for acts they are not accused of. Such action is described as anarchy and unconstitutional (Paras 76, 88).

F. Arbitrariness and Mala Fides

Selective targeting of properties associated with accused persons, while ignoring similarly placed structures, invites a presumption of malice in law. The burden shifts to the State to justify bona fides (Para 82).

G. Binding Directions under Article 142

Recognising systemic abuse, the Court issues pan-India binding directions to institutionalise transparency, fairness, and accountability, including personal liability of erring officers and restitution at personal cost (Paras 90–94).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS PER RECORD)

• The writ petitions were filed under Article 32 complaining of demolitions carried out without due process, allegedly on the ground of involvement of occupants in criminal cases (Paras 1–3).

• Interim protection was granted, and the Court stayed demolitions nationwide except for public encroachments and court-ordered demolitions (Paras 6–7).

• The Court considered extensive material, affidavits, and suggestions from States, Union of India, and intervenors, leading to formulation of uniform safeguards (Paras 8–12).

• The factual matrix demonstrated a pattern capable of abuse, necessitating constitutional intervention (Paras 12–13).

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Conclusion

The judgment establishes that “bulldozer justice” has no sanction under the Constitution. Any demolition affecting life or shelter must strictly comply with statutory procedure, constitutional guarantees, and the binding directions issued by the Court.

(Goodwill-Defamation ) An advertisement that goes beyond permissible puffery and conveys a false and derogatory message portraying a rival’s product as unsafe, ineffective or harmful, thereby lowering its estimation in the eyes of right-thinking members of the public, constitutes defamation of goods and actionable injury to goodwill, warranting injunctive relief and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages.

(Defamation of Goods / Goodwill and Reputation — Comparative Advertising)

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Defamation of goods — Goodwill and commercial reputation — Independent civil wrong

Defamation of goods (trade disparagement / slander of goods) is a distinct cause of action, independent of trade mark infringement or passing off — Protected interest is commercial goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff’s product — Court must examine whether the impugned advertisement tends to lower the estimation of the plaintiff’s goods in the minds of right-thinking members of the public.
[Paras 34–35, 37–38]

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Defamation of goodwill — Test — Right-thinking members of society

For an advertisement to be defamatory, the imputation must have a natural and probable tendency to injure the reputation or goodwill of the plaintiff’s goods in the eyes of right-thinking members of society generally — Perception of a limited or sectarian class of users is not determinative.
[Paras 37–38, 43–44]

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Defamation of goods — Comparison permissible — Disparagement impermissible

A trader may commend his own goods and claim superiority (puffery) — However, he may not make false representations concerning the quality or character of a rival’s goods, nor portray them as harmful, worthless or undesirable — Principle reiterated: “Comparison – Yes; Disparagement – No.”
[Paras 34–35]

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Defamation of goodwill — Identification of rival product — Indirect reference sufficient

In cases of disparagement, it is not necessary that the rival product be named — Indirect or implied reference suffices if the overall impression of the advertisement identifies the plaintiff’s goods and conveys a derogatory message injuring goodwill.
[Paras 35, 39–41]

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Defamation of goods — Overall impression — Not frame-by-frame

Impugned advertisement must be assessed as a whole, from the standpoint of an average, reasonable viewer — Excessive frame-by-frame dissection is impermissible — Determinative factor is the overall message conveyed and its impact on the reputation of the plaintiff’s goods.
[Paras 34–36]

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Defamation of goodwill — Falsity and tendency to injure

Where advertisement conveys that use of the rival’s product is unsafe, ineffective, or invites harm (such as permitting germs), such representation amounts to prima facie disparagement, having a direct tendency to injure goodwill, unless truthfully substantiated.
[Paras 27, 34–35]

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Defamation of goods — Evidence — Consumer testimony not mandatory

In an action for disparagement, direct evidence of consumers is not indispensable — Court may itself assess the advertisement from the standpoint of a reasonable viewer — Injury to goodwill may be inferred from the nature, reach and message of the impugned advertisement.
[Paras 15–16, 34–35]

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Damages — Defamation of goodwill — Punitive damages

Where defendant’s conduct demonstrates deliberate and calculated disparagement of a rival’s established product, punitive damages may be awarded even if exact quantification of compensatory loss is difficult — Purpose is deterrence against unfair competitive practices.
[Paras 16, 24, 32–33]

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Ratio (Goodwill-Defamation )

An advertisement that goes beyond permissible puffery and conveys a false and derogatory message portraying a rival’s product as unsafe, ineffective or harmful, thereby lowering its estimation in the eyes of right-thinking members of the public, constitutes defamation of goods and actionable injury to goodwill, warranting injunctive relief and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. Defamation of Goods — Governing Legal Principle

The Court correctly proceeded on the settled principle that:

Defamation of goods is a distinct tort, protecting commercial goodwill, and is independent of infringement or passing off.

The legal inquiry therefore was:

Whether the impugned advertisement had a natural and probable tendency to lower the estimation of the plaintiff’s goods in the minds of right-thinking members of the consuming public.

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2. Test Applied by the Court

The Court applied the following legal tests, though not explicitly grouped earlier:

1. Overall impression test

2. Average consumer with imperfect recollection

3. Derogatory tendency, not mere comparison

4. Likelihood of injury to goodwill, not proof of loss

These tests are classic defamation-of-goods principles.

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3. Application to the Facts — Why Defamation Failed

(a) No Clear Derogatory Assertion

The Court found that:

• the advertisement did not explicitly state that the competing product was harmful, unsafe, or worthless;

• no inevitable inference of reputational harm arose.

Thus, the threshold requirement of defamatory tendency was not satisfied.

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(b) Visual Depiction Insufficient to Harm Goodwill

The visuals relating to:

• stubble,

• skin tone, or

• alternative method of hair removal

were held to be:

• fleeting,

• ambiguous, and

• incapable of conveying a definite defamatory message.

The Court held that speculative or subjective interpretations cannot ground a goodwill-defamation claim.

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(c) Identification Alone Not Enough

Even assuming indirect identification, the Court held that:

• identification without a derogatory message does not injure goodwill;

• defamation lies in what is conveyed, not merely who is referenced.

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4. Quantified Superiority — Partial Recognition of Goodwill Risk

Importantly, the Court did recognise a reputational concern when it restrained the claim:

“up to two times smoother”

The Court reasoned that:

• quantified superiority conveys measurable inferiority of competing products,

• such a claim, without objective substantiation, has a tendency to injure goodwill, and

• therefore warranted limited injunctive relief.

This is a clear application of goodwill-defamation principles, even though framed as a substantiation issue.

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5. Why No Damages or Full Injunction Were Granted

The Court concluded that:

• except for the quantified claim,

• the advertisement did not cross the line from competition into defamation, and

• no prima facie injury to goodwill was established.

Accordingly, blanket restraint or damages were not justified.

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III. SYNTHESISED FINDING ON FACTS AND LAW

Key Finding

The plaintiff failed not because goodwill defamation is legally irrelevant, but because on facts the advertisement did not convey a false or derogatory message capable of lowering the commercial reputation of the plaintiff’s goods.

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IV. CORRECT LEGAL POSITION EMERGING

1. Defamation of goodwill is an independent tort

2. Identification alone is insufficient

3. Derogatory tendency is the core test

4. Quantified superiority may injure goodwill

5. Courts may grant tailored relief instead of total injunction

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V. CONCLUSION 

On a holistic assessment of the advertisement, the Court correctly held that the impugned material did not, except to a limited extent, have the natural and probable tendency to injure the goodwill or commercial reputation of the plaintiff’s product, and therefore did not constitute actionable defamation of goods warranting comprehensive injunctive relief.

Defamation of goods — Trade disparagement — Injury to goodwill — Essential requirements In an action alleging defamation of goods or trade disparagement, plaintiff must establish that the impugned advertisement conveys a false and derogatory representation concerning the plaintiff’s product, having a tendency to lower its commercial reputation or goodwill in the estimation of an average consumer — Mere comparative promotion or praise of advertiser’s product does not amount to defamation. [Paras 29–31, 37–44, 51]

Defamation of Goods / Goodwill & Reputation — Comparative Advertising)

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Defamation of goods — Trade disparagement — Injury to goodwill — Essential requirements

In an action alleging defamation of goods or trade disparagement, plaintiff must establish that the impugned advertisement conveys a false and derogatory representation concerning the plaintiff’s product, having a tendency to lower its commercial reputation or goodwill in the estimation of an average consumer — Mere comparative promotion or praise of advertiser’s product does not amount to defamation.
[Paras 29–31, 37–44, 51]

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Defamation of goodwill — Comparative advertising — Puffery distinguished

Puffery and exaggerated claims promoting advertiser’s product, even if untrue, are permissible — However, comparative advertising becomes actionable when it “rubbishes”, ridicules or portrays the rival product as inferior, harmful or undesirable, thereby injuring its goodwill — Absence of such derogatory tendency negatives defamation.
[Paras 37–44, 51]

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Defamation of goods — Identification of rival product — Not decisive by itself

Identification of rival product is relevant but not the sole test — Even indirect reference may suffice if advertisement conveys a clear derogatory message affecting goodwill — Where advertisement does not inevitably lead consumers to believe that plaintiff’s product is bad or harmful, claim of defamation fails.
[Paras 54–57, 62–64]

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Defamation of goodwill — Visual depiction — Overall impression test

Impugned advertisement must be viewed as a whole from the standpoint of an average consumer with imperfect recollection — Fleeting visuals or generic depictions (such as stubble or skin tone) which do not clearly convey inferiority or harmfulness of rival product do not constitute actionable defamation of goodwill.
[Paras 51, 62–64]

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Defamation of goods — Quantified superiority claims — Tendency to injure goodwill

Quantified claims of superiority (e.g., “up to two times smoother”) imply measurable inferiority of competing products — In absence of objective and neutral substantiation, such claims may have a tendency to injure goodwill of rival goods and justify limited injunctive relief — Relief may be tailored rather than absolute.
[Paras 59–61, 65(b)]

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Defamation of goodwill — Proof — Interim stage

At interlocutory stage, plaintiff is not required to prove actual loss — It is sufficient to show that the impugned representation has a prima facie tendency to damage goodwill — Where such tendency is speculative or remote, injunction is not warranted.
[Paras 51, 63–64]

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Commercial speech — Defamation of goods — Constitutional balance

Comparative advertising forms part of protected commercial speech under Article 19(1)(a) — Such protection is lost only when advertisement is false, misleading or defamatory of rival’s goods — Courts must balance freedom of commercial expression with protection of commercial reputation.
[Paras 36–38, 47–50]

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Ratio (Defamation / Goodwill )

Comparative advertising does not amount to defamation of goodwill unless the impugned representation, read as a whole, conveys a false and derogatory message lowering the commercial reputation of the rival product. Mere promotion, puffery or generic comparison, without such tendency, is not actionable as defamation of goods.

Defamation — Unauthorized biography — Temporary injunction — Scope at interlocutory stage Suit seeking restraint on publication and circulation of an unauthorized biography alleging false and defamatory imputations against a public figure — Trial Court granted interim injunction restraining publication and sale — Appellate Court vacated injunction — High Court examined correctness in supervisory jurisdiction. [Paras 1–7]

Defamation — Unauthorized biography — Temporary injunction — Scope at interlocutory stage

Suit seeking restraint on publication and circulation of an unauthorized biography alleging false and defamatory imputations against a public figure — Trial Court granted interim injunction restraining publication and sale — Appellate Court vacated injunction — High Court examined correctness in supervisory jurisdiction.
[Paras 1–7]

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Freedom of speech and expression — Article 19(1)(a) — Right to reputation — Article 21 — Balancing of rights

Right to reputation is part of right to life under Article 21 — Freedom of speech and expression includes right to publish biographies of public figures — At interlocutory stage, Court must carefully balance competing constitutional values — Prior restraint to be granted only in exceptional cases.
[Paras 6, 31–35]

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Defamation — Public figures — Higher threshold

Public figures are subject to greater degree of public scrutiny — Critical writing, fair comment, and investigative journalism cannot be interdicted merely because it is uncomfortable or unpalatable — Plaintiff must establish clear prima facie falsity and malice to justify prior restraint.
[Paras 31–35]

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Unauthorized biography — Consent — Not mandatory

Writing and publication of biography of a public figure without consent per se not illegal — Consent not a prerequisite where contents are based on public records, published material, interviews, and journalistic sources — Absence of consent alone cannot justify injunction.
[Paras 22–24, 31–33]

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Defamation — Book to be read as a whole

Allegedly defamatory work must be read as a whole — Isolated passages cannot be torn out of context at interim stage to impose blanket restraint — Determination of truth, falsity, and malice requires trial.
[Paras 31–35]

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Temporary injunction — Prior restraint on publication — Principles

Courts must exercise extreme caution before granting injunction restraining publication — Interim gag orders have chilling effect on free speech — Unless publication is ex facie defamatory and irreparable injury is clearly established, injunction should not operate.
[Paras 6, 31–35]

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Supervisory jurisdiction — Article 227 — Limited interference

High Court does not act as appellate court — Interference warranted only where subordinate court acts perversely or ignores settled principles — Appellate Court’s order vacating injunction did not warrant supervisory interference.
[Paras 6–7]

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ANALYSIS OF LAW AND FACTS

1. Nature of Proceedings

The petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenged appellate orders dated 28-04-2018 by which interim injunctions restraining publication and sale of the book “Godman to Tycoon: The Untold Story of Baba Ramdev” were vacated.
[Paras 1–7]

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2. Plaintiff’s Allegations

The petitioner alleged that the book:

• was an unauthorized biography,

• contained false, malicious and defamatory imputations,

• violated his right to reputation and privacy under Article 21, and

• relied on unverified interviews, media reports and online material.
  [Paras 8–30]

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3. Defence of Author and Publisher

The author and publisher contended that:

• the book was a work of investigative journalism,

• it relied on public records, published media reports and interviews,

• substantial material was already in public domain, and

• the petitioner, being a public figure, could not seek prior restraint on publication.
  [Paras 31–35]

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4. Approach to Interim Injunction in Defamation

The High Court reiterated settled law that:

• injunction against publication is an exceptional remedy,

• prior restraint affects not only author and publisher but also public’s right to know, and

• at interlocutory stage, court cannot conduct a mini-trial on truth or falsity.
  [Paras 6, 31–35]

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5. Public Figure Doctrine

The Court emphasised that the petitioner:

• projected himself as a public figure with nationwide and global following,

• actively participated in public discourse, politics, business and media, and

• must tolerate a higher level of criticism than a private individual.
  [Paras 31–35]

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6. Unauthorized Biography and Consent

The Court rejected the premise that lack of consent vitiates publication, holding that biographies of public figures can be written without consent, subject to law of defamation being tested at trial.
[Paras 22–24, 31–33]

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7. Reading the Book as a Whole

The Court accepted the submission that:

• the book must be read holistically,

• isolated passages cannot justify blanket ban, and

• adjudication of defamatory character requires full evidence.
  [Paras 31–35]

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8. Final Determination

The High Court declined to interfere with the appellate orders vacating the injunction, holding that:

• no case of exceptional prior restraint was made out, and

• issues of truth, malice and defamation must be decided at trial.
  [Paras 6–7]

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Ratio Decidendi

At the interlocutory stage, courts must exercise extreme restraint in granting injunctions restraining publication of books, particularly concerning public figures. Unauthorized biographies are not per se illegal, and unless the publication is ex facie defamatory, prior restraint violates the balance between Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21. Alleged defamation must ordinarily be adjudicated after trial.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Defamation — Civil damages — Allegedly defamatory ...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Defamation — Civil damages — Allegedly defamatory ...: advocatemmmohan Defamation — Civil damages — Allegedly defamatory emails and social-media posts — Truth and fair comment Emails and Facebook...

Defamation — Civil damages — Allegedly defamatory emails and social-media posts — Truth and fair comment

Emails and Facebook posts sent by defendants alleging non-payment of dues by plaintiff-company — Evidence showed subsisting outstanding amounts payable by plaintiff — Plaintiff failed to plead or prove that allegations were false — Statements relating to recovery of genuine dues constitute truth / fair comment — Not defamatory.
[Paras 44–45, 47]

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Defamation — Burden of proof — False imputation

In suit for damages for defamation, initial burden lies on plaintiff to establish falsity of statements and injury to reputation — Mere allegation of reputational loss insufficient — Where plaintiff fails to deny existence of dues, defamatory intent not made out.
[Paras 15, 44–47]

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Defamation — Complaints and communications to clients — Actionability

Communications made by defendants to authorities and clients complaining of non-payment and alleged misconduct — When founded on grievance of unpaid dues and not shown to be false, such communications do not amount to actionable defamation.
[Paras 39–45]

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Defamation — Defences — Truth and fair comment

Truth is a complete defence — Fair comment on matters arising from contractual disputes protected — Plaintiff must dislodge defence by proving falsity — Failure to do so fatal to claim.
[Paras 38, 44–45]

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Evidence — Effect of defendants not filing written statement

Even where defendants fail to file written statement or cross-examine witnesses, plaintiff must independently discharge burden of proof — Non-traverse by defendants does not relieve plaintiff of obligation to prove falsity and defamation.
[Paras 47]

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Defamation — Liability of multiple defendants — Proof against each

Vague allegation that one defendant “joined hands” with another — No specific defamatory act attributed — Claim against such defendant not maintainable.
[Para 46]

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Appeal — Findings of fact — Interference

Single Judge’s findings based on pleadings, emails and admissions — No perversity or legal error — Appellate court declined interference — Appeal dismissed.
[Paras 44–48]

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ANALYSIS OF LAW AND FACTS

1. Nature of Proceedings

The appeal challenged the judgment dated 29-10-2018 dismissing the appellant-company’s suit seeking ₹3 crores as damages for alleged loss of reputation caused by emails and social-media posts issued by the respondents.
[Paras 1, 16] 

2. Plaintiff’s Case

The appellant claimed that the respondents, who were engaged as coordinators under MoUs dated 12-03-2015 and 07-08-2015, circulated defamatory emails (notably dated 16-07-2016) and Facebook posts accusing the appellant of fraud, bribery and non-payment, resulting in loss of goodwill and business.
[Paras 2–9, 23] 

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3. Defence Stand

The respondents’ consistent stand, evident from emails and messages on record, was that substantial amounts (about ₹12–15 lakhs) were outstanding and unpaid, compelling them to raise grievances with authorities and clients.
[Paras 39–42] 

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4. Core Issue Before the Court

Whether the impugned emails and social-media posts amounted to false and defamatory imputations, or whether they were truthful grievances / fair comment regarding unpaid dues.
[Paras 23–24, 44]

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5. Appreciation of Evidence

The Court closely examined:

• the email dated 16-07-2016 addressed to NSDC and clients;

• subsequent text messages exchanged between respondent No.1 and the appellant’s Director;

• Facebook posts dated 10-08-2016 and 16-08-2016.

From these, the Court found that the consistent demand for payment of dues was evident and never specifically denied by the appellant in pleadings or evidence.
[Paras 39–44] 

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6. Failure to Prove Falsity

A decisive factor was that:

• the appellant did not plead or prove that no amount was due;

• reliance on MoU clauses (payment contingent on client payments) did not absolve appellant from establishing that the respondents’ assertions were false.

Hence, the basic requirement of falsity — essential to defamation — was not met.
[Paras 44–45, 47] 

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7. Application of Defamation Law

Relying on settled principles (truth, fair comment, privilege), the Court held that:

• statements made to recover allegedly due amounts, if not shown to be false, are protected;

• raising grievances, even in strong language, does not per se constitute defamation.

Accordingly, no actionable defamation was established.
[Paras 38, 44–45]

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8. Claim Against Respondent No.2

The Court noted absence of specific allegations or evidence showing defamatory acts by respondent No.2. A bald plea of “joining hands” was insufficient to fasten liability.
[Para 46]

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9. Effect of Non-filing of Written Statement

The Court rejected the argument that absence of written statement or cross-examination automatically entitled the plaintiff to a decree, reiterating that initial burden of proof always lies on the plaintiff.
[Para 47]

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10. Final Decision

Finding no infirmity in the Single Judge’s reasoning, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal.
[Para 48] 

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Ratio Decidendi

In a civil action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove that the impugned statements are false and defamatory. Where communications complaining of non-payment of dues are not shown to be false, and the plaintiff fails to deny the existence of such dues, the defences of truth and fair comment apply, and no damages for defamation can be awarded.