నల్లనివాడు కలువ కన్నులవాడు — నిలువెత్తు నిండైన విగ్రహంబు కలవాడు
ధవళవస్త్రం మెండుగ ధరించిన వాడు — శంఖచక్రాభయహస్తుని శ్రీహరి నాదుడు
శ్రీ కస్తూరి తిరునామముధరించిన వాడు — విశాల వక్షస్థలమున శ్రీని నిలిపిన వాడు
ఎత్తైన ఏడు కొండలపై కొలువైయున్న వాడు — శ్రీ వెంకటేశ్వరుని వేడుకొంటిని తనివితీరా
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Claim for compensation — Standard of proof — Involvement of alleged offending vehicle — Concurrent findings — Appreciation of evidence — Interference under Article 136. Claim petitions for compensation arising from a road accident which resulted in two deaths were dismissed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal; the High Court affirmed on the ground that claimants failed to establish involvement of the alleged offending vehicle. On appeal, this Court held that concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court would not be disturbed unless the appreciation of evidence was perverse or wholly unsatisfactory. The court observed: (i) the relevant standard in civil claims is preponderance of probabilities; (ii) documentary and oral evidence must nonetheless be cogent and consistent to link the offending vehicle to the accident; (iii) material contradictions in witness testimony, absence of independent eye‑witnesses, delayed preparation of spot mahazar, and a Motor Vehicle Inspector's report showing no damage to the recovered vehicle undermine the claim; and (iv) filing of a chargesheet, while relevant, is not conclusive of civil liability. Finding no perversity in the concurrent findings and no exceptional circumstances warranting interference, the appeals were dismissed.
• On 14.08.2013, a motorcycle carrying two young men (Sunil Singh — 26 years; Shivu — 22 years) met with a fatal accident near Sugur village. Both occupants died — one on the spot, the other subsequently in hospital.
• Legal representatives of each deceased filed separate claims under Section 166 MV Act against the owner/driver of an allegedly involved canter lorry and its insurer.
• The Claims Tribunal dismissed both petitions; the High Court dismissed the appeals. Primary reasons were unreliability and contradictions in oral testimony, absence of reliable eye‑witnesses positively identifying the offending vehicle at the time of accident, delayed spot mahazar, and a Motor Vehicle Inspector report (dated 05.10.2013) indicating no damage to the vehicle recovered thereafter.
Whether the appellants proved on preponderance of probabilities that the identified canter lorry was involved in the accident and that its driver acted rashly/negligently.
Whether the concurrent findings of the Tribunal and High Court suffer from perversity or are based on palpably erroneous appreciation of evidence such as to warrant interference under Article 136.
Concurrent findings of fact: Interference under Article 136 in relation to concurrent findings of the Tribunal and the High Court is exceptional; this Court will not disturb such findings unless the appreciation of evidence is manifestly perverse or wholly unsatisfactory (see Collector Singh v. L.M.L. Ltd.).
Standard of proof: Civil claims under Section 166 are governed by the standard of preponderance of probabilities. However, preponderance requires credible, cogent and coherent evidence linking the vehicle and its driver to the accident. The absence of registration particulars in the first complaint is not conclusive, but must be read with the totality of evidence.
Infirmities in the appellants' case:
Key witnesses (P.W.1 and P.W.2) admitted they were not eye‑witnesses and derived their knowledge from police or hearsay; they had not visited the spot and were unfamiliar with other witnesses claimed to have seen the incident.
Witnesses P.W.3 and P.W.4 who purportedly narrated confessional statements by the driver gave inconsistent testimony and materially contradicted their examination‑in‑chief during cross‑examination, weakening the reliability of their accounts.
The spot mahazar(s) were prepared several days after the incident; provenance and basis for entries were not satisfactorily demonstrated.
The Motor Vehicle Inspector's report noted no damage to the vehicle recovered 1.5 months later — a circumstance inconsistent with a collision causing two fatalities.
The chargesheet, though relevant, cannot substitute for cogent civil proof; a police charge is not conclusive of civil liability and must be weighed with other materials.
Taken cumulatively, these infirmities support the concurrent conclusion that connection between the accident and the alleged offending vehicle was not established on a preponderance of probabilities.
The appeals are dismissed for lack of merit.
The concurrent findings of the Tribunal and the High Court that the appellants failed to establish the involvement of the alleged offending vehicle are not vitiated by perversity or manifest error of appreciation.
No order as to costs.
Compassionate appointment — Nature and object — Whether a matter of right — Second/alternative claim after having accepted first appointment — Delay and laches — Negative discrimination. Appointment on compassionate grounds is a humanitarian concession and an exception to the ordinary rule of public employment; it is not a vested right. The core objective is to relieve the immediate financial distress of the deceased employee's family by providing a source of livelihood, ordinarily in the lower rungs of public employment. Once a dependent has been offered and has accepted employment on compassionate grounds and has joined the post, the purpose is ordinarily fulfilled and a second claim for appointment to a higher post is not maintainable — lest compassion become an open‑ended entitlement. Prolonged delay in pursuing a belated claim dilutes the immediacy which is the essence of compassionate relief; delay and laches may disentitle the claimant to discretionary relief. A plea of parity with other beneficiaries who may have been irregularly benefitted cannot be sustained as negative equality; courts will not perpetuate illegality by directing comparable unlawful relief to others. High Court orders directing appointment to a higher post and backdated salary, where based on such impermissible re‑consideration long after consummation of compassionate appointment, are liable to be set aside.
The appeals arise from a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court and subsequent review order directing appointment of certain respondents (dependents of deceased employees) as Junior Assistants instead of the Class‑IV posts (sweepers) to which they had been appointed on compassionate grounds.
Respondents were initially appointed as sweepers on compassionate basis following the deaths of their fathers (employees). They joined the posts. Years later they filed writ petitions seeking appointment to the higher post of Junior Assistant on the ground of possessing requisite qualifications and alleged non‑uniformity with other beneficiaries.
The Single Judge granted relief, directing appointment to the higher post and backdating salary; the Division Bench upheld that order and review was dismissed. The appellants challenge those orders before this Court.
Whether compassionate appointment is a matter of right or a concession requiring scrutiny and satisfaction of policy norms.
Whether a dependent who has accepted and joined a compassionate post can, subsequently and after delay, claim appointment on a higher post on the basis of eligibility.
Whether delay and laches in seeking relief for higher appointment disentitle claimants to discretionary relief.
Whether a claim based on negative discrimination (i.e., others having been irregularly benefited) can sustain a direction to perpetuate the illegality in favour of the claimant.
• Compassionate appointment is a humanitarian exception to normal recruitment rules — aimed at preventing destitution after the sudden death of an earning family member. It is not a substantive component of the employment contract of the deceased, nor an absolute right of the dependent. Courts have consistently held that the grant is a concession and must be administered on the basis of stated policy, statutory prescriptions and reasoned assessment of the family's financial needs.
• Where a dependent applies for compassionate appointment, accepts the post offered and joins service, the object of alleviating immediate financial distress is ordinarily fulfilled. Judicial authorities have held that a second recourse to seek a higher post on compassionate grounds after acceptance would amount to "endless compassion" and is impermissible. Eligibility for a higher post (on academic or other qualifications) does not, by itself, translate into an entitlement to be placed on that post by way of compassionate concession.
• The element of immediacy is central to compassionate relief. Significant delay by the applicant in pursuing a higher claim — particularly after having taken up employment on the initial compassionate posting — weakens the claim and may indicate changed family circumstances or alternative sources of livelihood having arisen. Courts exercise discretion to refuse belated claims where delay is unexplained or unreasonable.
• A claimant cannot invoke Article 14 to compel the perpetuation of an illegality earlier committed in favour of another; negative equality is not a permissible ground to extend unlawful advantage. Courts will not order repetition of an earlier irregularity simply because a third party benefited improperly.
The respondents applied for compassionate appointment and were offered the post of Sweeper (Class IV), which they accepted and joined (dates recorded). Thereafter, after a gap of years (three years in one case; nine years in another), they sought judicial relief for appointment to the higher post of Junior Assistant.
The High Court directed appointment to the higher post with backdated effect. On the established principles above, the High Court erred in permitting a post‑consummation re‑consideration and in effectively converting a humanitarian concession into a substantive recruitment avenue.
The respondents' delay in approaching the court, their prior acceptance of the compassionate appointment, and the absence of any demonstration that the immediate financial exigency persisted or that statutory policy mandated reconsideration, render their claims unsustainable.
The invocation of parity with other beneficiaries cannot validate the claim, since courts must not perpetuate or clone irregularities.
Appeals allowed.
The impugned judgments of the Madras High Court dated 3.7.2018 and the subsequent review order dated 31.1.2023 are set aside to the extent they direct appointment of the respondents on the post of Junior Assistant and grant any consequential monetary relief from the date of judgment.
Consequential writ petitions (W.P. Nos. 16758‑16759 of 2015) filed by the respondents in the High Court are dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Municipal Law — Revision of property tax — Procedural challenge by writ petitioner in the guise of PIL — Locus and maintainability — Scope of judicial review — Doctrine of judicial restraint. A writ petition filed as a public interest litigation by a corporator challenging the municipal corporation's resolution revising property tax rates for 2017–18 to 2021–22 was held to be an impermissible attempt to substitute judicial scrutiny for administrative policy. The court emphasised that municipal tax policy and revenue measures are matters of executive/administrative prerogative, and judicial interference is permissible only where there is illegality, perverse decision-making, or patent non-compliance with statutory procedure. Where petitioner did not demonstrate authorization to represent public interest, and statutory remedies existed (appeal under Section 406, Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949), the High Court erred in re‑examining the merits of the tax revision. The Division Bench’s order quashing the municipal resolutions was set aside; appeals allowed. Judicial review was confined to examining whether the procedure was followed and whether the decision was arbitrary or illegal; absent such infirmity, courts must defer to policy decisions of municipal bodies.
Akola Municipal Corporation (AMC) revised property tax assessment methodology and rates for the five‑year period 2017–18 to 2021–22 by resolutions dated 3 April 2017 and modified 19 August 2017.
The revision followed a door‑to‑door survey and engagement of a technical consultant (tender floated; Sthapatya Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. awarded work) to prepare an integrated GIS‑based database and assessment software, addressing a long gap in reassessments since circa 2001.
Dr. Zishan Hussain (a corporator), filed PIL No. 42 of 2018 in the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) seeking quashing of the revision on grounds of procedural irregularity and arbitrariness; he did not claim to represent the entire citizenry and had statutory remedies under Section 406 MMA.
The High Court allowed the PIL, quashed the municipal resolutions and orders, and directed relief in favour of the writ petitioner; AMC appealed to this Court.
Whether the writ petition filed as a PIL by a corporator was maintainable to challenge AMC’s tax revision, given the existence of statutory remedies and absence of public‑authorisation.
Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the merits of AMC’s policy decision increasing property tax rates, rather than confining review to procedural legality.
Whether the municipal corporation’s act of revising taxes after a long interregnum was per se arbitrary or unreasonable, warranting judicial intervention.
• The petition was filed as a PIL but the petitioner was a corporator who did not assert authorization to represent the public at large. The Court treated the filing as raising primarily a private grievance masked as PIL. Where a petitioner lacks proper locus or authority and statutory remedies are available, courts must scrutinise maintainability. Section 406 MMA offers an efficacious remedy against tax assessments/revisions.
• The Court observed the possibility that the writ petition may have been motivated by business or personal interest, particularly given challenge to the tender and award to the consultant.
• The jurisprudence of this Court establishes that economic and fiscal policy decisions (including tax fixation) lie within the domain of the legislature/executive/municipal authority; courts must exercise restraint and cannot substitute their view of policy or economics where decision‑making is within statutory authority and the procedure followed is lawful (citations: Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India; BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India; Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India).
• Judicial interference in PILs is warranted only where there is demonstrable dereliction of constitutional or statutory obligations, perversity, or manifest illegality. Courts should limit review to legality and reasonableness of the process adopted — not to the substantive wisdom of the policy.
• AMC had not revised property taxation since circa 2001; a robust revenue‑generation need existed to fund municipal functions. AMC procured expert assistance, carried out survey and valuation exercises, and formulated a resolution to revise ratable/expected letting values for the 2017–22 period.
• The petitioner did not adduce material showing the procedure adopted was ex facie arbitrary, perverse, or contravened statutory provisions. The High Court, however, substituted its own view and conducted a merits‑based reappraisal of the policy choice — beyond permissible judicial review.
• Given the admitted existence of statutory remedies and the limited grievance confined to procedure, the appropriate course was to confine review to whether statutory mandates were ignored in a manner that vitiates the exercise. No such showing was made.
The appeals are allowed.
The judgment of the High Court dated 9 October 2019 in PIL No. 42 of 2018 and the Review order dated 24 January 2020 are set aside.
The Court held that: (i) the writ petition filed as a PIL by the corporator was not a proper vehicle to displace the statutory remedies and to review economic policy; (ii) the High Court exceeded the scope of judicial review by reassessing the wisdom of AMC’s tax revision; and (iii) absent material demonstrating procedural illegality, perversity or arbitrariness, the municipal decision must stand.
No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
Municipal Law — Revision of property tax — Procedural challenge by writ petitioner in the guise of PIL — Locus and maintainability — Scope of judicial review — Doctrine of judicial restraint. A writ petition filed as a public interest litigation by a corporator challenging the municipal corporation's resolution revising property tax rates for 2017–18 to 2021–22 was held to be an impermissible attempt to substitute judicial scrutiny for administrative policy. The court emphasised that municipal tax policy and revenue measures are matters of executive/administrative prerogative, and judicial interference is permissible only where there is illegality, perverse decision-making, or patent non-compliance with statutory procedure. Where petitioner did not demonstrate authorization to represent public interest, and statutory remedies existed (appeal under Section 406, Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949), the High Court erred in re‑examining the merits of the tax revision. The Division Bench’s order quashing the municipal resolutions was set aside; appeals allowed. Judicial review was confined to examining whether the procedure was followed and whether the decision was arbitrary or illegal; absent such infirmity, courts must defer to policy decisions of municipal bodies.
Akola Municipal Corporation (AMC) revised property tax assessment methodology and rates for the five‑year period 2017–18 to 2021–22 by resolutions dated 3 April 2017 and modified 19 August 2017.
The revision followed a door‑to‑door survey and engagement of a technical consultant (tender floated; Sthapatya Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. awarded work) to prepare an integrated GIS‑based database and assessment software, addressing a long gap in reassessments since circa 2001.
Dr. Zishan Hussain (a corporator), filed PIL No. 42 of 2018 in the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) seeking quashing of the revision on grounds of procedural irregularity and arbitrariness; he did not claim to represent the entire citizenry and had statutory remedies under Section 406 MMA.
The High Court allowed the PIL, quashed the municipal resolutions and orders, and directed relief in favour of the writ petitioner; AMC appealed to this Court.
Whether the writ petition filed as a PIL by a corporator was maintainable to challenge AMC’s tax revision, given the existence of statutory remedies and absence of public‑authorisation.
Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the merits of AMC’s policy decision increasing property tax rates, rather than confining review to procedural legality.
Whether the municipal corporation’s act of revising taxes after a long interregnum was per se arbitrary or unreasonable, warranting judicial intervention.
• The petition was filed as a PIL but the petitioner was a corporator who did not assert authorization to represent the public at large. The Court treated the filing as raising primarily a private grievance masked as PIL. Where a petitioner lacks proper locus or authority and statutory remedies are available, courts must scrutinise maintainability. Section 406 MMA offers an efficacious remedy against tax assessments/revisions.
• The Court observed the possibility that the writ petition may have been motivated by business or personal interest, particularly given challenge to the tender and award to the consultant.
• The jurisprudence of this Court establishes that economic and fiscal policy decisions (including tax fixation) lie within the domain of the legislature/executive/municipal authority; courts must exercise restraint and cannot substitute their view of policy or economics where decision‑making is within statutory authority and the procedure followed is lawful (citations: Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India; BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India; Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India).
• Judicial interference in PILs is warranted only where there is demonstrable dereliction of constitutional or statutory obligations, perversity, or manifest illegality. Courts should limit review to legality and reasonableness of the process adopted — not to the substantive wisdom of the policy.
• AMC had not revised property taxation since circa 2001; a robust revenue‑generation need existed to fund municipal functions. AMC procured expert assistance, carried out survey and valuation exercises, and formulated a resolution to revise ratable/expected letting values for the 2017–22 period.
• The petitioner did not adduce material showing the procedure adopted was ex facie arbitrary, perverse, or contravened statutory provisions. The High Court, however, substituted its own view and conducted a merits‑based reappraisal of the policy choice — beyond permissible judicial review.
• Given the admitted existence of statutory remedies and the limited grievance confined to procedure, the appropriate course was to confine review to whether statutory mandates were ignored in a manner that vitiates the exercise. No such showing was made.
The appeals are allowed.
The judgment of the High Court dated 9 October 2019 in PIL No. 42 of 2018 and the Review order dated 24 January 2020 are set aside.
The Court held that: (i) the writ petition filed as a PIL by the corporator was not a proper vehicle to displace the statutory remedies and to review economic policy; (ii) the High Court exceeded the scope of judicial review by reassessing the wisdom of AMC’s tax revision; and (iii) absent material demonstrating procedural illegality, perversity or arbitrariness, the municipal decision must stand.
No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
