Whether the appellants proved on preponderance of probabilities that the identified canter lorry was involved in the accident and that its driver acted rashly/negligently. Whether the concurrent findings of the Tribunal and High Court suffer from perversity or are based on palpably erroneous appreciation of evidence such as to warrant interference under Article 136.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Claim for compensation — Standard of proof — Involvement of alleged offending vehicle — Concurrent findings — Appreciation of evidence — Interference under Article 136. Claim petitions for compensation arising from a road accident which resulted in two deaths were dismissed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal; the High Court affirmed on the ground that claimants failed to establish involvement of the alleged offending vehicle. On appeal, this Court held that concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court would not be disturbed unless the appreciation of evidence was perverse or wholly unsatisfactory. The court observed: (i) the relevant standard in civil claims is preponderance of probabilities; (ii) documentary and oral evidence must nonetheless be cogent and consistent to link the offending vehicle to the accident; (iii) material contradictions in witness testimony, absence of independent eye‑witnesses, delayed preparation of spot mahazar, and a Motor Vehicle Inspector's report showing no damage to the recovered vehicle undermine the claim; and (iv) filing of a chargesheet, while relevant, is not conclusive of civil liability. Finding no perversity in the concurrent findings and no exceptional circumstances warranting interference, the appeals were dismissed.

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FACTUAL SUMMARY

• On 14.08.2013, a motorcycle carrying two young men (Sunil Singh — 26 years; Shivu — 22 years) met with a fatal accident near Sugur village. Both occupants died — one on the spot, the other subsequently in hospital.

• Legal representatives of each deceased filed separate claims under Section 166 MV Act against the owner/driver of an allegedly involved canter lorry and its insurer.

• The Claims Tribunal dismissed both petitions; the High Court dismissed the appeals. Primary reasons were unreliability and contradictions in oral testimony, absence of reliable eye‑witnesses positively identifying the offending vehicle at the time of accident, delayed spot mahazar, and a Motor Vehicle Inspector report (dated 05.10.2013) indicating no damage to the vehicle recovered thereafter.

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ISSUES

1. Whether the appellants proved on preponderance of probabilities that the identified canter lorry was involved in the accident and that its driver acted rashly/negligently.

2. Whether the concurrent findings of the Tribunal and High Court suffer from perversity or are based on palpably erroneous appreciation of evidence such as to warrant interference under Article 136.

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ANALYSIS AND REASONS

1. Concurrent findings of fact: Interference under Article 136 in relation to concurrent findings of the Tribunal and the High Court is exceptional; this Court will not disturb such findings unless the appreciation of evidence is manifestly perverse or wholly unsatisfactory (see Collector Singh v. L.M.L. Ltd.).

2. Standard of proof: Civil claims under Section 166 are governed by the standard of preponderance of probabilities. However, preponderance requires credible, cogent and coherent evidence linking the vehicle and its driver to the accident. The absence of registration particulars in the first complaint is not conclusive, but must be read with the totality of evidence.

3. Infirmities in the appellants' case:

   • Key witnesses (P.W.1 and P.W.2) admitted they were not eye‑witnesses and derived their knowledge from police or hearsay; they had not visited the spot and were unfamiliar with other witnesses claimed to have seen the incident.

   • Witnesses P.W.3 and P.W.4 who purportedly narrated confessional statements by the driver gave inconsistent testimony and materially contradicted their examination‑in‑chief during cross‑examination, weakening the reliability of their accounts.

   • The spot mahazar(s) were prepared several days after the incident; provenance and basis for entries were not satisfactorily demonstrated.

   • The Motor Vehicle Inspector's report noted no damage to the vehicle recovered 1.5 months later — a circumstance inconsistent with a collision causing two fatalities.

   • The chargesheet, though relevant, cannot substitute for cogent civil proof; a police charge is not conclusive of civil liability and must be weighed with other materials.

4. Taken cumulatively, these infirmities support the concurrent conclusion that connection between the accident and the alleged offending vehicle was not established on a preponderance of probabilities.

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CONCLUSION & ORDER

1. The appeals are dismissed for lack of merit.

2. The concurrent findings of the Tribunal and the High Court that the appellants failed to establish the involvement of the alleged offending vehicle are not vitiated by perversity or manifest error of appreciation.

3. No order as to costs.

Whether compassionate appointment is a matter of right or a concession requiring scrutiny and satisfaction of policy norms. Whether a dependent who has accepted and joined a compassionate post can, subsequently and after delay, claim appointment on a higher post on the basis of eligibility. Whether delay and laches in seeking relief for higher appointment disentitle claimants to discretionary relief. Whether a claim based on negative discrimination (i.e., others having been irregularly benefited) can sustain a direction to perpetuate the illegality in favour of the claimant.

Compassionate appointment — Nature and object — Whether a matter of right — Second/alternative claim after having accepted first appointment — Delay and laches — Negative discrimination. Appointment on compassionate grounds is a humanitarian concession and an exception to the ordinary rule of public employment; it is not a vested right. The core objective is to relieve the immediate financial distress of the deceased employee's family by providing a source of livelihood, ordinarily in the lower rungs of public employment. Once a dependent has been offered and has accepted employment on compassionate grounds and has joined the post, the purpose is ordinarily fulfilled and a second claim for appointment to a higher post is not maintainable — lest compassion become an open‑ended entitlement. Prolonged delay in pursuing a belated claim dilutes the immediacy which is the essence of compassionate relief; delay and laches may disentitle the claimant to discretionary relief. A plea of parity with other beneficiaries who may have been irregularly benefitted cannot be sustained as negative equality; courts will not perpetuate illegality by directing comparable unlawful relief to others. High Court orders directing appointment to a higher post and backdated salary, where based on such impermissible re‑consideration long after consummation of compassionate appointment, are liable to be set aside.

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FACTS IN BRIEF

1. The appeals arise from a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court and subsequent review order directing appointment of certain respondents (dependents of deceased employees) as Junior Assistants instead of the Class‑IV posts (sweepers) to which they had been appointed on compassionate grounds.

2. Respondents were initially appointed as sweepers on compassionate basis following the deaths of their fathers (employees). They joined the posts. Years later they filed writ petitions seeking appointment to the higher post of Junior Assistant on the ground of possessing requisite qualifications and alleged non‑uniformity with other beneficiaries.

3. The Single Judge granted relief, directing appointment to the higher post and backdating salary; the Division Bench upheld that order and review was dismissed. The appellants challenge those orders before this Court.

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ISSUES

1. Whether compassionate appointment is a matter of right or a concession requiring scrutiny and satisfaction of policy norms.

2. Whether a dependent who has accepted and joined a compassionate post can, subsequently and after delay, claim appointment on a higher post on the basis of eligibility.

3. Whether delay and laches in seeking relief for higher appointment disentitle claimants to discretionary relief.

4. Whether a claim based on negative discrimination (i.e., others having been irregularly benefited) can sustain a direction to perpetuate the illegality in favour of the claimant.

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RELEVANT PRINCIPLES AND ANALYSIS

A. Nature and Object of Compassionate Appointment

• Compassionate appointment is a humanitarian exception to normal recruitment rules — aimed at preventing destitution after the sudden death of an earning family member. It is not a substantive component of the employment contract of the deceased, nor an absolute right of the dependent. Courts have consistently held that the grant is a concession and must be administered on the basis of stated policy, statutory prescriptions and reasoned assessment of the family's financial needs.

B. Once Offered and Accepted, Further Claims are Generally Unsustainable

• Where a dependent applies for compassionate appointment, accepts the post offered and joins service, the object of alleviating immediate financial distress is ordinarily fulfilled. Judicial authorities have held that a second recourse to seek a higher post on compassionate grounds after acceptance would amount to "endless compassion" and is impermissible. Eligibility for a higher post (on academic or other qualifications) does not, by itself, translate into an entitlement to be placed on that post by way of compassionate concession.

C. Delay, Laches and the Immediacy Principle

• The element of immediacy is central to compassionate relief. Significant delay by the applicant in pursuing a higher claim — particularly after having taken up employment on the initial compassionate posting — weakens the claim and may indicate changed family circumstances or alternative sources of livelihood having arisen. Courts exercise discretion to refuse belated claims where delay is unexplained or unreasonable.

D. Negative Equality and Perpetuation of Illegality

• A claimant cannot invoke Article 14 to compel the perpetuation of an illegality earlier committed in favour of another; negative equality is not a permissible ground to extend unlawful advantage. Courts will not order repetition of an earlier irregularity simply because a third party benefited improperly.

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APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE

1. The respondents applied for compassionate appointment and were offered the post of Sweeper (Class IV), which they accepted and joined (dates recorded). Thereafter, after a gap of years (three years in one case; nine years in another), they sought judicial relief for appointment to the higher post of Junior Assistant.

2. The High Court directed appointment to the higher post with backdated effect. On the established principles above, the High Court erred in permitting a post‑consummation re‑consideration and in effectively converting a humanitarian concession into a substantive recruitment avenue.

3. The respondents' delay in approaching the court, their prior acceptance of the compassionate appointment, and the absence of any demonstration that the immediate financial exigency persisted or that statutory policy mandated reconsideration, render their claims unsustainable.

4. The invocation of parity with other beneficiaries cannot validate the claim, since courts must not perpetuate or clone irregularities.

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ORDER

1. Appeals allowed.

2. The impugned judgments of the Madras High Court dated 3.7.2018 and the subsequent review order dated 31.1.2023 are set aside to the extent they direct appointment of the respondents on the post of Junior Assistant and grant any consequential monetary relief from the date of judgment.

3. Consequential writ petitions (W.P. Nos. 16758‑16759 of 2015) filed by the respondents in the High Court are dismissed.

4. No order as to costs.

Whether the writ petition filed as a PIL by a corporator was maintainable to challenge AMC’s tax revision, given the existence of statutory remedies and absence of public‑authorisation. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the merits of AMC’s policy decision increasing property tax rates, rather than confining review to procedural legality. Whether the municipal corporation’s act of revising taxes after a long interregnum was per se arbitrary or unreasonable, warranting judicial intervention.

Municipal Law — Revision of property tax — Procedural challenge by writ petitioner in the guise of PIL — Locus and maintainability — Scope of judicial review — Doctrine of judicial restraint. A writ petition filed as a public interest litigation by a corporator challenging the municipal corporation's resolution revising property tax rates for 2017–18 to 2021–22 was held to be an impermissible attempt to substitute judicial scrutiny for administrative policy. The court emphasised that municipal tax policy and revenue measures are matters of executive/administrative prerogative, and judicial interference is permissible only where there is illegality, perverse decision-making, or patent non-compliance with statutory procedure. Where petitioner did not demonstrate authorization to represent public interest, and statutory remedies existed (appeal under Section 406, Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949), the High Court erred in re‑examining the merits of the tax revision. The Division Bench’s order quashing the municipal resolutions was set aside; appeals allowed. Judicial review was confined to examining whether the procedure was followed and whether the decision was arbitrary or illegal; absent such infirmity, courts must defer to policy decisions of municipal bodies.

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SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. Akola Municipal Corporation (AMC) revised property tax assessment methodology and rates for the five‑year period 2017–18 to 2021–22 by resolutions dated 3 April 2017 and modified 19 August 2017.

2. The revision followed a door‑to‑door survey and engagement of a technical consultant (tender floated; Sthapatya Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. awarded work) to prepare an integrated GIS‑based database and assessment software, addressing a long gap in reassessments since circa 2001.

3. Dr. Zishan Hussain (a corporator), filed PIL No. 42 of 2018 in the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) seeking quashing of the revision on grounds of procedural irregularity and arbitrariness; he did not claim to represent the entire citizenry and had statutory remedies under Section 406 MMA.

4. The High Court allowed the PIL, quashed the municipal resolutions and orders, and directed relief in favour of the writ petitioner; AMC appealed to this Court.

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ISSUES

1. Whether the writ petition filed as a PIL by a corporator was maintainable to challenge AMC’s tax revision, given the existence of statutory remedies and absence of public‑authorisation.

2. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the merits of AMC’s policy decision increasing property tax rates, rather than confining review to procedural legality.

3. Whether the municipal corporation’s act of revising taxes after a long interregnum was per se arbitrary or unreasonable, warranting judicial intervention.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW AND FACTS

A. Locus, Maintainability and Public Interest Litigation

• The petition was filed as a PIL but the petitioner was a corporator who did not assert authorization to represent the public at large. The Court treated the filing as raising primarily a private grievance masked as PIL. Where a petitioner lacks proper locus or authority and statutory remedies are available, courts must scrutinise maintainability. Section 406 MMA offers an efficacious remedy against tax assessments/revisions.

• The Court observed the possibility that the writ petition may have been motivated by business or personal interest, particularly given challenge to the tender and award to the consultant.

B. Scope of Judicial Review — Policy vs. Procedure

• The jurisprudence of this Court establishes that economic and fiscal policy decisions (including tax fixation) lie within the domain of the legislature/executive/municipal authority; courts must exercise restraint and cannot substitute their view of policy or economics where decision‑making is within statutory authority and the procedure followed is lawful (citations: Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India; BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India; Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India).

• Judicial interference in PILs is warranted only where there is demonstrable dereliction of constitutional or statutory obligations, perversity, or manifest illegality. Courts should limit review to legality and reasonableness of the process adopted — not to the substantive wisdom of the policy.

C. Application to the Present Case

• AMC had not revised property taxation since circa 2001; a robust revenue‑generation need existed to fund municipal functions. AMC procured expert assistance, carried out survey and valuation exercises, and formulated a resolution to revise ratable/expected letting values for the 2017–22 period.

• The petitioner did not adduce material showing the procedure adopted was ex facie arbitrary, perverse, or contravened statutory provisions. The High Court, however, substituted its own view and conducted a merits‑based reappraisal of the policy choice — beyond permissible judicial review.

• Given the admitted existence of statutory remedies and the limited grievance confined to procedure, the appropriate course was to confine review to whether statutory mandates were ignored in a manner that vitiates the exercise. No such showing was made.

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CONCLUSION & ORDER

1. The appeals are allowed.

2. The judgment of the High Court dated 9 October 2019 in PIL No. 42 of 2018 and the Review order dated 24 January 2020 are set aside.

3. The Court held that: (i) the writ petition filed as a PIL by the corporator was not a proper vehicle to displace the statutory remedies and to review economic policy; (ii) the High Court exceeded the scope of judicial review by reassessing the wisdom of AMC’s tax revision; and (iii) absent material demonstrating procedural illegality, perversity or arbitrariness, the municipal decision must stand.

4. No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Whether the writ petition filed as a PIL by a corporator was maintainable to challenge AMC’s tax revision, given the existence of statutory remedies and absence of public‑authorisation. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the merits of AMC’s policy decision increasing property tax rates, rather than confining review to procedural legality. Whether the municipal corporation’s act of revising taxes after a long interregnum was per se arbitrary or unreasonable, warranting judicial intervention.

Municipal Law — Revision of property tax — Procedural challenge by writ petitioner in the guise of PIL — Locus and maintainability — Scope of judicial review — Doctrine of judicial restraint. A writ petition filed as a public interest litigation by a corporator challenging the municipal corporation's resolution revising property tax rates for 2017–18 to 2021–22 was held to be an impermissible attempt to substitute judicial scrutiny for administrative policy. The court emphasised that municipal tax policy and revenue measures are matters of executive/administrative prerogative, and judicial interference is permissible only where there is illegality, perverse decision-making, or patent non-compliance with statutory procedure. Where petitioner did not demonstrate authorization to represent public interest, and statutory remedies existed (appeal under Section 406, Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949), the High Court erred in re‑examining the merits of the tax revision. The Division Bench’s order quashing the municipal resolutions was set aside; appeals allowed. Judicial review was confined to examining whether the procedure was followed and whether the decision was arbitrary or illegal; absent such infirmity, courts must defer to policy decisions of municipal bodies.

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SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. Akola Municipal Corporation (AMC) revised property tax assessment methodology and rates for the five‑year period 2017–18 to 2021–22 by resolutions dated 3 April 2017 and modified 19 August 2017.

2. The revision followed a door‑to‑door survey and engagement of a technical consultant (tender floated; Sthapatya Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. awarded work) to prepare an integrated GIS‑based database and assessment software, addressing a long gap in reassessments since circa 2001.

3. Dr. Zishan Hussain (a corporator), filed PIL No. 42 of 2018 in the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) seeking quashing of the revision on grounds of procedural irregularity and arbitrariness; he did not claim to represent the entire citizenry and had statutory remedies under Section 406 MMA.

4. The High Court allowed the PIL, quashed the municipal resolutions and orders, and directed relief in favour of the writ petitioner; AMC appealed to this Court.

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ISSUES

1. Whether the writ petition filed as a PIL by a corporator was maintainable to challenge AMC’s tax revision, given the existence of statutory remedies and absence of public‑authorisation.

2. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the merits of AMC’s policy decision increasing property tax rates, rather than confining review to procedural legality.

3. Whether the municipal corporation’s act of revising taxes after a long interregnum was per se arbitrary or unreasonable, warranting judicial intervention.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW AND FACTS

A. Locus, Maintainability and Public Interest Litigation

• The petition was filed as a PIL but the petitioner was a corporator who did not assert authorization to represent the public at large. The Court treated the filing as raising primarily a private grievance masked as PIL. Where a petitioner lacks proper locus or authority and statutory remedies are available, courts must scrutinise maintainability. Section 406 MMA offers an efficacious remedy against tax assessments/revisions.

• The Court observed the possibility that the writ petition may have been motivated by business or personal interest, particularly given challenge to the tender and award to the consultant.

B. Scope of Judicial Review — Policy vs. Procedure

• The jurisprudence of this Court establishes that economic and fiscal policy decisions (including tax fixation) lie within the domain of the legislature/executive/municipal authority; courts must exercise restraint and cannot substitute their view of policy or economics where decision‑making is within statutory authority and the procedure followed is lawful (citations: Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India; BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India; Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India).

• Judicial interference in PILs is warranted only where there is demonstrable dereliction of constitutional or statutory obligations, perversity, or manifest illegality. Courts should limit review to legality and reasonableness of the process adopted — not to the substantive wisdom of the policy.

C. Application to the Present Case

• AMC had not revised property taxation since circa 2001; a robust revenue‑generation need existed to fund municipal functions. AMC procured expert assistance, carried out survey and valuation exercises, and formulated a resolution to revise ratable/expected letting values for the 2017–22 period.

• The petitioner did not adduce material showing the procedure adopted was ex facie arbitrary, perverse, or contravened statutory provisions. The High Court, however, substituted its own view and conducted a merits‑based reappraisal of the policy choice — beyond permissible judicial review.

• Given the admitted existence of statutory remedies and the limited grievance confined to procedure, the appropriate course was to confine review to whether statutory mandates were ignored in a manner that vitiates the exercise. No such showing was made.

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CONCLUSION & ORDER

1. The appeals are allowed.

2. The judgment of the High Court dated 9 October 2019 in PIL No. 42 of 2018 and the Review order dated 24 January 2020 are set aside.

3. The Court held that: (i) the writ petition filed as a PIL by the corporator was not a proper vehicle to displace the statutory remedies and to review economic policy; (ii) the High Court exceeded the scope of judicial review by reassessing the wisdom of AMC’s tax revision; and (iii) absent material demonstrating procedural illegality, perversity or arbitrariness, the municipal decision must stand.

4. No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Whether the power of seizure under Section 102 CrP...Whether the power of seizure under Section 102 CrPC can be lawfully exercised by investigative authorities in proceedings initiated solely under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Whether Section 18A of the PC Act and the procedural regime under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 are mutually exclusive of the investigative powers under Section 102 CrPC. Whether the decision in Ratan Babulal Lath v. State of Karnataka (2022) constitutes a binding precedent to the effect that the PC Act is an exhaustive code precluding recourse to Section 102 CrPC.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Whether the power of seizure under Section 102 CrP...: Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 18A; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 102 — Seizure v. Attachment — Distinction — App...

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 18A; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 102 — Seizure v. Attachment — Distinction — Applicability. Where investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("PC Act") disclosed alleged disproportionate assets held by a public servant and his relatives, police exercised powers under Section 102 CrPC to freeze bank accounts and seize certain monetary instruments. The High Court set aside the seizure, relying on earlier pronouncements treating the PC Act as a self-contained code governing attachment/confiscation under Section 18A and the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944. Held: The power to seize under Section 102 CrPC and the power to attach/confiscate under Section 18A read with the Ordinance are distinct in purpose, scope and procedure; they are not mutually exclusive. Section 102 CrPC is an investigative power available to police to secure property that may be evidence or alleged to be proceeds/linked with an offence; Section 18A/Ordinance prescribes a separate, judicially supervised procedure for attachment/confiscation with substantive consequences. A prior decision (Ratan Babulal Lath) which summarily characterized the PC Act as a complete code without detailed factual analysis does not constitute binding ratio on the narrow question of seizure under Section 102. Where seizure under Section 102 was exercised in aid of investigation and reported as required, the action is sustainable, subject to assessment of whether retention remains necessary following completion of investigation. De-freezing orders granted without addressing statutory safeguards and post-investigation consequences are liable to be set aside with directions calibrated to the status of investigation and present position of funds. Appeal allowed in part.

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CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. A preliminary enquiry by the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), West Bengal, targeted the accused Prabir Kumar Dey Sarkar. Material alleged substantial unexplained assets vis-à-vis declared income for the check period (2007–2017).

2. FIR No. 09/19 registered; investigation revealed numerous fixed deposits and bank deposits in the names of the main accused and relatives including the respondent (father).

3. Police froze several fixed deposits and bank accounts under Section 102 CrPC. Application to de-freeze was rejected by the City Sessions Court (28.03.2023); subsequently, the Calcutta High Court set aside the freezing order (04.10.2024) holding that Section 102 could not be invoked where the PC Act and Section 18A governed attachment.

4. Sanction for prosecution against the main accused was granted (22.04.2024) and chargesheet filed (13.05.2024). The State challenged the High Court order by way of this appeal.

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ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

1. Whether the power of seizure under Section 102 CrPC can be lawfully exercised by investigative authorities in proceedings initiated solely under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Whether Section 18A of the PC Act and the procedural regime under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 are mutually exclusive of the investigative powers under Section 102 CrPC.

3. Whether the decision in Ratan Babulal Lath v. State of Karnataka (2022) constitutes a binding precedent to the effect that the PC Act is an exhaustive code precluding recourse to Section 102 CrPC.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

A. Nature and Purpose — Seizure (Section 102 CrPC) v. Attachment/Confiscation (Section 18A/Ordinance)

1. Textual and functional distinctions: Section 102 uses the language of seizure and empowers any police officer to take possession of property alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under suspicious circumstances. The Ordinance/Section 18A contemplates attachment and confiscation by an expressly judicial process (application to a District Judge/Special Judge, affidavits, ad-interim attachment, show-cause, hearing and opportunity to furnish security).

2. Comparative statutory practice: Parallel statutes (PMLA, Income-tax Act) evidence that attachment/confiscation is a consequence requiring structured, deliberative and judicially supervised steps. Seizure under Section 102 is immediate and investigative in character, often aimed at securing evidence and preventing tampering or dissipation in the course of a criminal probe.

3. Precedent: This Court's jurisprudence recognises that police may seize bank accounts/passports under Section 102 where the property is related to the commission of an offence (see Tapas D. Neogy, Suresh Nanda, Teesta Setalvad). Freezing under Section 102 must be to aid investigation; it is not in itself an attachment yielding final proprietary consequences.

B. Procedural Safeguards and Post-seizure Obligations

1. Reporting requirement: Section 102(3) mandates that the seizure be reported to the Magistrate "forthwith" — meaning as soon as reasonably possible given context and investigatory exigencies (Shento Varghese). Delay, if satisfactorily explained, does not automatically vitiate seizure; unreasonable delay may invite departmental consequences but does not necessarily undo valid investigative acts.

2. Investigative adequacy: The sustaining of a Section 102 action requires demonstration that retention served investigatory needs — e.g., risk of evidence loss, likelihood of dissipation, or direct nexus to offence. Where investigation is complete, continued retention must be justified; affected parties may seek release or be directed to offer security/bank guarantees.

C. On the Question of a "Code in Itself" and Precedential Value

1. What constitutes ratio decidendi: Precedent binds where the court lays down legal principles tied explicitly to material facts and reasoning; obiter or perfunctory formulations lack binding force. A "code in itself" conclusion requires careful enquiry into whether the statute comprehensively regulates the field and excludes operation of other laws.

2. Ratan Babulal Lath: The Court finds that in that decision the statement that the PC Act is a complete code was not accompanied by a full exposition of facts and a reasoned comparison of the procedural provisions; hence it lacks the necessary elements of a binding ratio on the narrow question at hand. The present bench therefore treats Ratan Babulal Lath as not determinative for the question whether Section 102 CrPC may be used for seizure in aid of investigation under the PC Act.

D. Application of Law to the Present Facts

1. Investigation and sanction were obtained; charges were framed and the chargesheet presented. Initial seizure/freeze of fixed deposits took place during the investigation. The Trial Court rejected the de-freezing application; the High Court inverted that view on the premise that Section 102 could not be used where Section 18A applies.

2. Having found the two regimes distinct, and the investigative power under Section 102 available, the present appeal determines that the High Court erred in setting aside the seizure on the sole ground that attachment procedure was not followed. The seizure was an investigatory step — not an attachment under the Ordinance — and thus permissible if reported/justified.

3. However, completion of the investigation and presentation of the chargesheet changes the calculus. Continued freezing must be re-examined: if funds have already been released or investigation yields no continuing need for retention, equitable remedies (re-deposit, security/bank guarantee, or release) become appropriate.

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CONCLUSION & FINAL ORDER

1. The appeal is allowed in part.

2. Holding: The powers under Section 102 CrPC and the powers under Section 18A of the Prevention of Corruption Act (via the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944) are distinct and not mutually exclusive. Section 102 CrPC may be lawfully invoked by police in the course of investigation under the PC Act to seize or freeze bank accounts and other movable properties where there exists a nexus to the alleged offence or a risk to the investigation, subject to the safeguards and reporting obligations provided under law.

3. On the facts of this case: Given that investigation has concluded and a chargesheet has been filed, the court directs as follows:

   • If the frozen amounts have already been released pursuant to the High Court order, the respondent shall either re-deposit the said amount or furnish tangible security/bank guarantee for the like amount within three weeks from the date of this order.

   • If the amounts have not been released, the status quo as preserved by the stay of the High Court order shall be governed by the directions above and parties retain the right to pursue appropriate proceedings before the competent court to determine proprietary rights and the necessity of continued retention/attachment.

4. The rights and remedies of the parties under the PC Act, Ordinance and CrPC (including appeals and applications for release on furnishing security) are kept open.

5. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of in the terms above.