Arbitration — Time-limit for arbitral award — Section 29A — Arbitrator becomes functus officio on expiry of statutory period — Under Section 29A(1) read with Section 23(4), pleadings must be completed within six months of entering reference; award must follow within twelve months thereafter. Parties did not seek extension under Section 29A(3). Upon expiry of the statutory period (28.02.2023), the sole arbitrator’s mandate stood terminated by operation of law and he became functus officio, subject to any extension ordered by the Court under Section 29A(4).

1. Arbitration — Time-limit for arbitral award — Section 29A — Arbitrator becomes functus officio on expiry of statutory period — Under Section 29A(1) read with Section 23(4), pleadings must be completed within six months of entering reference; award must follow within twelve months thereafter. Parties did not seek extension under Section 29A(3). Upon expiry of the statutory period (28.02.2023), the sole arbitrator’s mandate stood terminated by operation of law and he became functus officio, subject to any extension ordered by the Court under Section 29A(4).

2. Section 29A(6) — Power to substitute arbitrator is independent of Sections 14 and 15 — Remedy under Sections 14 and 15 is distinct and operates on different grounds (de jure / de facto inability). Expiry of mandate under Section 29A(4) furnishes an independent statutory basis for substitution. Rejection of earlier petitions under Sections 14 and 15 (when mandate had not expired) does not bar substitution under Section 29A(6).

3. Extension of mandate impermissible when mandate has already terminated — High Court erred in extending the mandate of an arbitrator whose mandate had already expired under Section 29A(4). Upon termination of mandate, continuation of the same arbitrator is impermissible; substitution becomes obligatory.

4. Purport of Section 29A — Remedial provision — Applies to all pending arbitrations — Section 29A is remedial and ensures time-bound dispute resolution, in consonance with the object of the Act; it applies even to arbitrations pending on 30.08.2019 (Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Siva Industries, (2023) 5 SCC 421).

5. Covid-19 exclusion applies — Period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 excluded per In re Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (2022) 3 SCC 117.

6. Substituted arbitrator appointed — Mandate of sole arbitrator terminated; Court appoints Justice Najmi Waziri (Retd.) as substituted sole arbitrator; proceedings to continue from stage already reached; award to be rendered within six months.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Expiry of mandate under Section 29A(4) results in automatic termination, rendering the arbitrator functus officio, unless the Court extends the period. Since pleadings were completed on 19.11.2020 and the Covid-19 exclusion applied until 28.02.2022, the arbitrator was required to make the award by 28.02.2023. No extension was sought. Therefore, his mandate stood terminated by operation of law.

2. Section 29A(6) confers a substantive and distinct power on the Court to substitute the arbitrator whenever it extends time under Section 29A(4). This power does not depend on, nor is it limited by, the grounds for termination under Sections 14 and 15. Earlier dismissal of proceedings under Sections 14 and 15—when the mandate was still alive—has no bearing once the mandate expires under Section 29A.

3. Once the mandate has expired, continuation of the same arbitrator is impermissible, and the High Court’s extension of mandate was contrary to the statutory scheme. The legislative mandate of ensuring expeditious resolution (object of the Act) requires substitution when mandate ceases.

4. Section 29A is remedial and time-disciplining, applying even to pending arbitrations, and must be enforced strictly to prevent delay contrary to the Act’s object.

5. Arbitral proceedings must continue from the stage already reached upon substitution, ensuring continuity as mandated by Section 29A(6) and (7).

Workplace sexual harassment — Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) — Under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act), an ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman may entertain a complaint against a “respondent” who is employed in a different department or workplace; the phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11(1) is a procedural trigger (directing application of the service rules applicable to that respondent) and does not operate as a jurisdictional bar requiring co-employment of the parties.

1. Workplace sexual harassment — Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) — Under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act), an ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman may entertain a complaint against a “respondent” who is employed in a different department or workplace; the phrase “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11(1) is a procedural trigger (directing application of the service rules applicable to that respondent) and does not operate as a jurisdictional bar requiring co-employment of the parties.

2. Statutory interpretation — Text, context and purpose — The POSH Act must be interpreted purposively as social-welfare legislation enacted to secure women’s right to a safe workplace (Articles 14, 15, 21); definitions of “workplace”, “employee” and “employer” are wide (notably Section 2(o)(v) covering places visited in course of employment) and a narrow, place-bound reading of Section 11 would frustrate the Act’s object and create practical and psychological barriers to access to remedies.

3. Procedure versus punitive authority — Two-stage scheme — The Act contemplates a two-stage process for government employees (investigation/fact-finding by the ICC and, if warranted, formal disciplinary action by the employer/disciplinary authority). An ICC’s fact-finding inquiry at the aggrieved woman’s workplace may form the basis for disciplinary action by the respondent’s employer under service rules; the ICC need not itself be the disciplining authority.

4. Interplay with CCS rules and administrative instructions — The statutory scheme accords with prior judicial directions (Vishaka; Medha Kotwal Lele) and administrative instruments (CCS (CCA) Rules, Rule 14(2) proviso and DoPT Office Memorandum dated 16.07.2015), which envisage that Complaints Committees can act as fact-finding/inquiring authorities and the disciplinary authority must act on ICC recommendations; cooperation by the respondent’s employer (Section 19(f)) is mandatory.

5. Prejudice and relief at interim stage — Where an aggrieved woman’s ICC has conducted only a preliminary/fact-finding inquiry, and no prejudice to the respondent is shown, courts should avoid interfering with ICC jurisdictional validity; disciplinary and other defenses remain available to the respondent in subsequent service/disciplinary proceedings and appeals.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Non-jurisdictional reading of “where the respondent is an employee” (Section 11(1))
   The expression “where the respondent is an employee” in Section 11(1) functions as a conditional/procedural clause — it prescribes the procedure to be followed (i.e., apply service rules applicable to the respondent or the prescribed manner where no service rules exist) and does not restrict the competence of the ICC to entertain complaints merely because the respondent is employed in a different workplace. The section must be read as a whole; isolated reading of the word “where” to infer a territorial or workplace-based jurisdictional limitation would be contrary to the statutory scheme.

2. Purposive construction required by the POSH Act
   The POSH Act is social-welfare legislation aimed at removing barriers to remedy for women subjected to sexual harassment. Its definitions of “workplace”, “employee” and “employer” are deliberately expansive (including places visited during course of employment) and require a purposive construction that allows the aggrieved woman to bring complaints before the ICC of her workplace where the incident occurred or is connected to, even if the respondent is employed elsewhere. A restrictive construction would defeat the legislative purpose and produce absurd and impracticable results.

3. Two-stage investigatory and disciplinary architecture; role of employer
   Section 11 and Section 13 together envisage a two-stage process: (i) ICC performs preliminary/fact-finding inquiry and issues a report/recommendation, and (ii) the respondent’s employer/disciplinary authority acts on those recommendations (including initiating formal disciplinary proceedings under applicable service rules). The ICC’s inquiry is thus investigatory; final disciplinary sanctions are the responsibility of the employer — an ICC at the aggrieved woman’s workplace can validly perform the first stage even when the respondent is from another department.

4. Statutory duty of cooperation and safeguards against prejudice
   The Act imposes on employers duties (Section 19) to cooperate with ICC inquiries and to act upon ICC reports (Section 13). Where the respondent alleges lack of access to material or procedural prejudice because the inquiry is being conducted outside his department, the proper remedy lies in raising those contentions during disciplinary proceedings or by invoking appellate remedies under the Act; absence of demonstrable prejudice at the interim stage is a reason to uphold the ICC’s proceedings.

5. Complementarity with CCS/administrative framework
   The statutory scheme aligns with prior judicial directions and administrative rules (e.g., Medha Kotwal Lele, amendment to CCS (CCA) Rules, and DoPT OM of 16.07.2015) that treat Complaints Committees as appropriate fact-finding/inquiring authorities and prescribe mechanisms to ensure fairness in transition from fact-finding to formal disciplinary inquiry. These integrated instruments support the validity of ICC inquiries conducted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace against respondents from other departments.

Criminal — Bail — Applicability of statutory maximum-undertrial detention (s.436-A CrPC) — Section 436-A CrPC provides that where an undertrial has undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence, the accused shall be released on personal bond (subject to provisos) — but the statutory entitlement excludes “an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified” — accordingly, where the charges include offences for which death is a possible punishment, Section 436-A cannot be invoked to compel release; reliance by a court upon s.436-A in such circumstances is legally unsustainable.

1. Criminal — Bail — Applicability of statutory maximum-undertrial detention (s.436-A CrPC) — Section 436-A CrPC provides that where an undertrial has undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence, the accused shall be released on personal bond (subject to provisos) — but the statutory entitlement excludes “an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified” — accordingly, where the charges include offences for which death is a possible punishment, Section 436-A cannot be invoked to compel release; reliance by a court upon s.436-A in such circumstances is legally unsustainable.

2. Constitutional law — Article 21 — Speedy trial and prolonged pre-trial incarceration — The right to life and personal liberty (Art.21) embraces the right to a speedy trial; unduly protracted incarceration of undertrials engages Art.21 and, in appropriate cases, may justify enlargement on bail even in serious offences — but the entitlement is not absolute and must be balanced against the gravity of the offence, risk of abscondence, tampering/witness influence and national/public interest considerations.

3. Special/terror-laws — Reverse burden statutes (UAPA) and fairness — Where a statute imposes a reverse burden or creates presumptions adverse to the accused (e.g., UAPA), prolonged delay in trial prejudices the accused disproportionately because incarceration restricts access to means of rebuttal; the State and courts must ensure effective, practical safeguards — speedy trial, adequate prosecutorial resources, access to material and legal aid — so that presumptions do not ossify into de facto convictions.

4. Appellate interference — SLP against High Court grant of bail — Supreme Court ordinarily will not interfere with a High Court’s discretionary grant of bail unless there is perversity, illegality, failure to consider relevant factors, or other grounds demonstrating that discretion has been exercised improperly; mere heinousness of the offence or public outcry is not by itself a sufficient basis for interference if the High Court has balanced competing considerations and the accused has not misused liberty.

5. Remedial and administrative directions — Expeditious trial in long-pending matters — Where long delays have occurred, courts may issue prospective in-personam and in-rem administrative directions: trial courts to take daily listing, minimise adjournments, record reasons for past delay; High Courts to review lists of reverse-burden cases, ensure sufficient special courts/prosecutors and prompt assignment of legal-aid counsel; periodic reports to administrative judges to be furnished — such directions are appropriate to protect Art.21 rights and the integrity of criminal adjudication.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Statutory exclusion — s.436-A is not available where death is a possible punishment. The Court construed Section 436-A CrPC (and its successor provision in BNSS) strictly: the statute explicitly excludes offences for which death is one of the prescribed punishments; therefore a person prosecuted for such offences cannot claim release under Section 436-A as of right. This legal construction of the statute is determinative and obligatory.

2. Balance between Article 21 and public interest — proportionality governs bail in grave offences. While the right to a speedy trial and liberty under Article 21 may compel release of undertrials who have suffered prolonged incarceration, the grant of bail in offences that gravely affect national security or public order requires a calibrated balancing exercise — considering (inter alia) gravity of charges, punishment on conviction, prima facie evidence, risk of absconding, likelihood of tampering, stage of trial and whether the accused has suffered manifest prejudice from delay. Where the balancing favours liberty because of inordinate delay and absence of evidence of misuse of bail, enlargement may be warranted notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations.

3. Procedural fairness in reverse-burden regimes — State must provide practical avenues for defence. The imposition of reverse legal burdens (as in UAPA) imposes a correspondingly heightened duty on the State and courts to ensure that accused persons have realistic and effective means to rebut statutory presumptions. Prolonged pre-trial detention severely handicaps an accused’s ability to marshal evidence, witnesses and expert assistance; consequently, when delays are endemic, courts must take remedial steps — administrative and procedural — to protect the accused’s right to a fair contest.

4. Standard for appellate interference with bail orders. The Supreme Court will intervene against a High Court’s grant of bail only upon demonstrable illegality, perversity, failure to apply relevant legal principles, or where the bail order undermines public interest in a manner not justifiable on the record. A mere reiteration of the heinousness of the charge is insufficient absent a showing that the High Court misapplied legal standards or overlooked material considerations.

Assault / outraging modesty / offences under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act — Convictions under Sections 354, 323, 294, 34 IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) SC/ST Act by trial court; appeal dismissed by High Court — Whether prosecution proved offences beyond reasonable doubt — Material contradictions in FIR, depositions and medical evidence; lack of independent / post-occurrence witnesses though many said to be present; hostile witness gave statements favourable to accused which had been ignored by High Court — Medical evidence showed only simple injuries consistent with fall or dragging; no evidence that accused targeted victim because she belonged to Scheduled Caste — Held: Prosecution case suffers from major contradictions and improbabilities; the appellate court should have weighed hostile witness evidence and the inconsistencies; convictions are unsafe and set aside. Appeal allowed; appellants acquitted and discharged.

Criminal law — Trial / Appeal — Assault / outraging modesty / offences under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act — Convictions under Sections 354, 323, 294, 34 IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) SC/ST Act by trial court; appeal dismissed by High Court — Whether prosecution proved offences beyond reasonable doubt — Material contradictions in FIR, depositions and medical evidence; lack of independent / post-occurrence witnesses though many said to be present; hostile witness gave statements favourable to accused which had been ignored by High Court — Medical evidence showed only simple injuries consistent with fall or dragging; no evidence that accused targeted victim because she belonged to Scheduled Caste — Held: Prosecution case suffers from major contradictions and improbabilities; the appellate court should have weighed hostile witness evidence and the inconsistencies; convictions are unsafe and set aside. Appeal allowed; appellants acquitted and discharged.

RATIO / KEY POINTS

1. Standard of proof and appellate scrutiny: Conviction must rest on evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appellate courts must test prosecution testimony for internal consistency, corroboration and probability; they must not ignore material inconsistencies or favourable portions of testimony of hostile witnesses.

2. Material contradictions in versions (FIR v. court deposition): The FIR alleged that both accused were present and that the male accused teased and abused the victim knowing her caste. At trial the victim’s version differed as to whether the second accused accompanied the first or was called by phone. Discrepancies as to how PW-2 (the brother) came to know of the incident (he said he was informed; victim said he ran after hearing her scream) were material and undermined credibility.

3. Absence of independent witnesses despite claimed public presence: PW-2 asserted that many locality persons had seen the incident (Ganesh Puja pandal nearby), yet no independent public witness was produced. The non-production of other witnesses when many were allegedly present is a circumstance militating against prosecution story and weakens reliance on oral testimony of interested witnesses.

4. Medical evidence did not support prosecution’s embellished narrative: Medical officer (PW-5) recorded only simple injuries (scratch marks) on the victim and PW-2; these injuries were consistent with falling or dragging and were simple in nature. The prosecution’s claims of nail-marks, bleeding from nose and mouth, and serious assault were not borne out by the medical report; such divergence is fatal to the prosecution case.

5. Hostile witness whose portions favour defence must be considered: PW-4 turned hostile and deposed to a scuffle at the pandal and that defendants may merely have stepped on feet, provoking an altercation. The High Court erred in disregarding this evidence entirely: portions of a hostile witness’s testimony that are consistent with defence or prosecution deserve close scrutiny and may be accepted in whole or part.

6. Lack of proof of motive under SC/ST Act / statutory ingredients not established: There was no testimony in court that the assault/teasing was committed because the victim belonged to Scheduled Caste; the High Court’s conclusion that offence under SC/ST Act was committed for that reason was perverse and unsupported by the record.

7. Appellate conclusion — acquittal justified: Given the cumulative contradictions, omissions, absence of independent corroboration and medical findings consistent with an alternative hypothesis (scuffle / fall), the convictions were unsafe. The Supreme Court set aside the convictions and sentences of both appellants, ordered their release and discharged them from bail.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Liquidation — Private sale under Regulation 33(2) of the Liquidation Process Regulations, 2016 — Distinction between Reg. 33(2)(c) (private sale at price higher than reserve of failed auction) and Reg. 33(2)(d) (private sale with prior NCLT approval) — Whether sale to appellant constituted a contractual arrangement attracting Section 74, Contract Act — Forfeiture of deposit / payments upon failure to adhere to extended timelines — Power of NCLT under Rule 15 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 to impose conditions including forfeiture when extending time — Appellant’s conduct including suppression before High Court — Applicability of approbate–reprobate principle — Held: Sale was under Reg. 33(2)(d), not Reg. 33(2)(c); transaction not a private commercial contract but one supervised by NCLT; forfeiture clause validly imposed under Rule 15; appellant accepted benefits of extension but defaulted; no relief available; Section 74 Contract Act inapplicable. NCLAT majority correctly upheld forfeiture and dismissal of appeals. Appeals under Section 62 IBC dismissed.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Liquidation — Private sale under Regulation 33(2) of the Liquidation Process Regulations, 2016 — Distinction between Reg. 33(2)(c) (private sale at price higher than reserve of failed auction) and Reg. 33(2)(d) (private sale with prior NCLT approval) — Whether sale to appellant constituted a contractual arrangement attracting Section 74, Contract Act — Forfeiture of deposit / payments upon failure to adhere to extended timelines — Power of NCLT under Rule 15 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 to impose conditions including forfeiture when extending time — Appellant’s conduct including suppression before High Court — Applicability of approbate–reprobate principle — Held: Sale was under Reg. 33(2)(d), not Reg. 33(2)(c); transaction not a private commercial contract but one supervised by NCLT; forfeiture clause validly imposed under Rule 15; appellant accepted benefits of extension but defaulted; no relief available; Section 74 Contract Act inapplicable. NCLAT majority correctly upheld forfeiture and dismissal of appeals. Appeals under Section 62 IBC dismissed.

RATIO / KEY POINTS

1. Nature of sale — Regulation 33(2)(d), not 33(2)(c):
   The auction process for Raichur assets had fully failed by July 2021; SCC had shifted to scrap-sale valuation. Therefore, the appellant’s offer of 09.09.2021 was not an offer higher than a reserve price in a failed auction under Reg. 33(2)(c) but a private sale requiring prior NCLT approval under Reg. 33(2)(d). The liquidator correctly approached NCLT, and the approval order dated 22.03.2022 governed the transaction.

2. Sale not a ‘contract’ under the Contract Act:
   When sale occurs under NCLT supervision, pursuant to IBC and Liquidation Regulations, terms of sale emanate from the Adjudicating Authority, not from consensual contractual stipulations. Thus, Section 74 of the Contract Act (liquidated damages/penalty) does not apply. The forfeiture clause was an NCLT-imposed condition, not a term of a commercial bargain.

3. NCLT’s power to impose terms when granting extension:
   Under Rule 15 of the NCLT Rules, NCLT may extend time “upon such terms as justice may require.” Extension granted on 29.06.2022 was accompanied by an explicit forfeiture clause—failure to meet the new deadlines would result in forfeiture of the entire amount paid. NCLT had jurisdiction to impose such condition, especially given the delays and IBC’s time-bound liquidation mandate.

4. Appellant’s own commitments and failure to honour them:
   The appellant’s offer expressly promised to pay the entire balance within 15 days from NCLT approval (i.e., from 22.03.2022). It failed. SCC showed leniency by granting extension till 30.05.2022; NCLT later extended time further but subject to forfeiture. Appellant paid only part amounts (₹1.50 crore thereafter) and failed to comply with extended deadlines. Its default triggered the forfeiture as per the NCLT order.

5. Approbate and reprobate — conduct disentitles relief:
   The appellant accepted the benefit of the extension by making further payments after 29.06.2022, but simultaneously attempted to challenge the very order and its forfeiture condition. A party cannot take advantage of an order and later repudiate the conditions attached to it.

6. Suppression and abuse of process before High Court:
   The appellant filed a writ petition on 05.09.2022 suppressing the fact that an appeal against the 29.06.2022 order had already been filed before NCLAT (on 13.08.2022). This conduct demonstrated lack of bona fides and justified refusal of equitable relief.

7. Stakeholders’ interest and IBC time-sensitivity:
   Delay in liquidation erodes asset value and defeats IBC’s objectives. The Court reiterated Kridhan Infrastructure v. Venkatesan Sankaranarayan (2021): time is essential in IBC proceedings. The forfeiture clause and rejection of further indulgence were justified to ensure timely conclusion of liquidation.

8. Subsequent resale irrelevant to forfeiture question:
   Even though Raichur assets ultimately sold for ₹145.38 crore (higher than appellant’s ₹105.21 crore offer), the financial creditors still suffered haircuts. Forfeiture is assessed vis-à-vis breach of NCLT’s stipulated timelines, not subsequent market appreciation.

9. Final holding:
   NCLAT’s majority correctly dismissed the appellant’s appeals. No jurisdictional or legal error exists in upholding forfeiture. Appeals under Section 62 IBC lie only on questions of law; none were made out. Supreme Court dismissed the appeals.