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Tuesday, November 4, 2025

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT, 1956 (NH ACT) — Sections 2(2), 3A, 3C, 3D, 3G, 3H RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013 (RFCTLRR ACT) — Section 23, 26 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA — Articles 14, 19, 21, 300-A Land Acquisition – Challenge to Acquisition Proceedings for Greenfield National Highway (NH-365BG) – Non-declaration under Section 2(2) of NH Act – Procedural Compliance – Market Value Determination – Land Conversion. A. National Highways Act, 1956 — Section 2(2) and 3A Notification: Challenge to acquisition proceedings on the ground that the road, prior to the Section 3A Notification, was not formally declared a National Highway under Section 2(2) of the NH Act; contention that the entire acquisition process is ultra vires and a colourable exercise of power to evade the RFCTLRR Act. B. Procedural Due Process — Section 3C and 3G: Allegation that the Competent Authority failed to conduct a proper enquiry, provide a reasoned order on objections filed under Section 3C, and failed to furnish a copy of the final Award, violating the principles of natural justice and statutory mandate. C. Compensation and Market Value — Section 23, 26 (RFCTLRR Act): Contention that the acquired lands were converted to non-agricultural lands prior to the Section 3A Notification, requiring the market value to be determined based on non-agricultural rates; challenge to the multiplication factor used in compensation calculation. D. Alternative Remedy: Plea by Respondent NHAI that the petitioners have an effective alternative remedy to seek enhanced compensation by invoking arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act.

 


NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT, 1956 (NH ACT) — Sections 2(2), 3A, 3C, 3D, 3G, 3H


RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013 (RFCTLRR ACT) — Section 23, 26


CONSTITUTION OF INDIA — Articles 14, 19, 21, 300-A


Land Acquisition – Challenge to Acquisition Proceedings for Greenfield National Highway (NH-365BG) – Non-declaration under Section 2(2) of NH Act – Procedural Compliance – Market Value Determination – Land Conversion.


A. National Highways Act, 1956 — Section 2(2) and 3A Notification: Challenge to acquisition proceedings on the ground that the road, prior to the Section 3A Notification, was not formally declared a National Highway under Section 2(2) of the NH Act; contention that the entire acquisition process is ultra vires and a colourable exercise of power to evade the RFCTLRR Act.


B. Procedural Due Process — Section 3C and 3G: Allegation that the Competent Authority failed to conduct a proper enquiry, provide a reasoned order on objections filed under Section 3C, and failed to furnish a copy of the final Award, violating the principles of natural justice and statutory mandate.


C. Compensation and Market Value — Section 23, 26 (RFCTLRR Act): Contention that the acquired lands were converted to non-agricultural lands prior to the Section 3A Notification, requiring the market value to be determined based on non-agricultural rates; challenge to the multiplication factor used in compensation calculation.


D. Alternative Remedy: Plea by Respondent NHAI that the petitioners have an effective alternative remedy to seek enhanced compensation by invoking arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act.


Final Order: Writ Petition disposed of; acquisition proceedings upheld; petitioners directed to seek recourse before the Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) for compensation disputes.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

* * *

WRIT PETITION NO.10280 OF 2022

Between:

# Mullapudi Yamini Pushkarini and Others …Petitioners

And

$ Union of India and Others …Respondents

Date of Judgment pronounced : 20-06-2025

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers : Yes/No

 may be allowed to see the judgments?

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked : Yes/No

 to Law Reporters/Journals:

3. Whether the Lordship wishes to see the fair copy : Yes/No

 Of the Judgment?

 _________________________

 JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN

2025:APHC:22777

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* THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN

+ WRIT PETITION NO.10280 OF 2022

% Dated: 20-06-2025

Between:

# Mullapudi Yamini Pushkarini and Others …Petitioners

And

$ Union of India and Others …Respondents

! Counsel for the Petitioner(s) : M.R.K.CHAKRAVARTHY

^ Counsel for Respondent(s) : 1. CHAUDARY AND CHAUDARY ADVOCATES

AND SOLICITORS LAW FIRM

 2. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:

? Cases referred:

1. (2021) 3 SCC 572

2. (2011) 10 SCC 714

3. (2012) SCC Online AP 148

4. (2005) 13 SCC 477

5. 2005(7) SC 627

6. 2023 SCC OnLine J&K 247

7. (2022) SCC Online SC 362

8. 2021 SCC Online SC 1247

9. (1997)1 SCC 134

10.(2011) 12 SCC 69

11.MANU/PH/0150/2022

2025:APHC:22777

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APHC010180142022

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3233]

FRIDAY, THE TWENTIETH DAY OF JUNE

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B KRISHNA MOHAN

WRIT PETITION NO: 10280/2022

Between:

1. MULLAPUDI YAMINI PUSHKARINI,, W/O M.ASHOK AGED ABOUT 29

YEARS, OCC AGRICULTURE, RIO D.NO.3-79, YERRAMPETA,

KOYYALAGUDEM MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT, ANDHRA

PRADESH

2. PAKALAPATI SHYAM KRISHNA,, S/O P.NAGESWARA RAO AGED ABOUT

41 YEARS, OCC AGRICULTURE, RIO D.NO.2-141, YERRAMPETA

VILLAGE, KOYYALAGUDEM MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT,

ANDHRA PRADESH

3. MARNI LOKESH CHOWDARY,, S/O M.V.V.BHASKARA RAO AGED ABOUT

30 YEARS, OCC CULTIVATION, RIO D.NO.1-49, YERRAMPETA VILLAGE,

KOYYALAGUDEM MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT, A.P

4. KODAVATI RAMA KRISHNA,, S/O K.BULLIRAJU AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,

OCC CULTIVATION, RIO D.NO.5-41, KANNAYAGUDEM VILLAGE,

KOYYALAGUDEM MANDAL, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT, A.P

5. JAMMULA UDAYA BHASKAR,, S/O J.VENKATA DURGA RAO, AGED

ABOUT 49 YEARS, OCC CULTIVATION, RIO D.NO.5-5,

KANNAYYAGUDEM VILLAGE, KOYYALAGUDEM MANDAL, WEST

GODAVARI DISTRICT, A.P

...PETITIONER(S)

AND

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1. UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF

SHIPPING ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS TRANSPORT BHAWAN,

1, PARLIAMENT STREET, NEW DELHI.

2. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL

SECRETARY (LAND ACQUISITION) SECRETARIAT, VELAGAPUDI,

AMARAVATHI, GUNTUR DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH,

3. THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA, REP BY ITS

CHAIRMAN, 05 AND 6, SECTOR-10, DWARKA, NEW DELHI - 110075.

4. NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY ITS

PROJECT DIRECTOR, NHAI, NU, RAJAHMUNDRY, EAST GODAVARI.

5. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT,

COLLECTORATE, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI.

6. THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY LA, NH-365 BG AND JOINT COLLECTOR

(VS, WS AND D), ELURU, WEST GODAVARI, ANDHRA PRADESH.

...RESPONDENT(S):

Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the

circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased

toIt is therefore prayed that this Honble Court may be pleased to issue a Writ, Order

or Direction, more particularly one in the Writ of Mandamus, to declare the

Notifications, Award Enquiry Notices, Award, Award Notices, Environment

Clearance (impact assessment) issued under the provisions of the National

Highways Act, 1956 and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, EIA Notification, 2006 vide

(i) SO.No. 1388 (E) published in Gazette No. 1240 dated 27.04.2020 and under

Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 published in Hans India, Andhra

Jyothi daily newspapers dated 08.05.2020 (ii) S.O.No.4189(E), MORT and H dated

23.11.2020 published in Gazette No.3687 under Section 3D of the NH Act (iii)

Public. Notice Rc.No. 1/202020/CALA and JCNHAI/365BG, dated 08.08.2020

published in Praja Sakthi and Hans India newspapers on 20.01.2021 under Section

3(G)(3) of the NH Act (iv) Award Enquiry Notices issued vide R.O.C.No.1/NH-365

BG/2020 dated 20.01.2021 and 23.01.2021 (v) Award.Nos.6/2021/NH-365 BG,

7/2021 /NH-365 BG, dated 15.03. 2021 of the Sixth Respondent under Section 23

of the RFCTLRR Act R/w Section 3G of the NH Act (vi) Award Notices issued vide

Roc.No.01/2020/NH-365 BG dated 17.07. 2021 under Section 3H(2) of the NH Act,

2025:APHC:22777

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1956 and Section 26 of the RFCTLRR Act (vii) Proceedings in File No. 10-

51/2020-IA.III, dated 23.12.2021 issued for the alleged public purpose for building

(widening/two-lane with paved shoulder/four laning etc.), maintenance,

management and operation of Khammam - Devarapalli Greenfield National Highway

(yet to be Assigned) in the stretch of land from Km 148.285 to Km 220.586 in the

district .of West Godavari (office of District Collector Eluru) in the state of Andhra

Pradesh issued in respect of the Petitioners land ad-measuring 5909 Sq. Mts (Ac.1-

46 Cents), 1255 Sq.Mts (A.c.0- 27 Cents) situated in RS Nos 37/2, 31/2 of

Rajavaram Village, 2833 Sq.Mts (Ac.0- 70 Cents) situated in RS.No.233/1B2, 526

Sq.Mts (Ac. 0-12 Cents) situated in Rs No.233/1C2, 40 Sq.Mts (Ac. 0-01 Cent)

situated in RS.No. 194/4A, 1336 Sq.Mts (Ac. 0-33 Cents) situated in RS.No.194/5A,

648 Sq.Mts (Ac. 0-16 Cents) situated in RS.No.194/6, 1781 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-44 Cents)

situated in RS.No.194/3B, 1538 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-38 cents) situated in RS.No.195/4A,

3278 (Ac.0-81 Cents) situated in RS.No. 195/2B, 122 Sq.Mts (Ac. 0-03 Cents)

situated in . 194'7A, 41 Sq.Mts(Ac. 0-01 Cents) situated in RS.No. 194/8A of

Eduvadalapalem Village, 17928 Sq.Mts (Ac.4-41 Cents) situated in RS.No.84/2B,

10719 Sq.Mts (Ac.2-65 Cents) situated in RS.No.88/1B, 8215 Sq.Mts (Ac.2-02

Cents) situated in RS.No. 109/2, 607 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-14 Cents) situated.. in RS.No.

108/2F1 of Kannaigudem Village all of Koyyalagudem Mandal, West Godavari

District as illegal, arbitrary, wholly without jurisdiction and violative of Articles 14, 19,

21 and 300-A of the Constitution and consequently quash the same and pass

such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the

circumstances of the case Prayer is amended as per the Court Order

dated.30.01.2024 vide order passed in IA No.01 of 2024.

IA NO: 1 OF 2022

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in

the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased

to stay all further proceedings pursuant to the Gazette No.2888 dated 25.07.2018,

Gazette. No. 1240 dated 27.04.2020 in SO.No.1388 (E) dated 27.04.2020 under

Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 published in Hans India, Andhra

Jyothi daily newspapers dated 08.05.2020, Gazette No.3687 in S.O.No.4189(E),

MORT & H dated 23.11.2020 under Section 3D, Public Notice

Rc.No.1/202020/CALA&JC/ NHAI/365BG, dated 08.08.2020 published in Praja

Sakthi and Hans India news papers on 20.01.2021 under Section 3(G)(3) and

Award Nos.05/2021/N.H.365 BG, 6/2021/ N.H.365 BG and 7/2021/NH-365BG dated

15.03.2021 under Section 3(G)(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 R/w Section

23 & Schedule-I of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition Rehabilitation Act and Resettlement Act, 2013 in respect of the

2025:APHC:22777

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Petitioners lands to an extent of 5909 Sq.Mts (Ac.l-46 Cents), 1255 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-27

Cents) situated in RS.Nos.37/2, 31/2 of Rajavaram Village, 2833 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-70

Cents) situated in RS.No.233/1B2, 526 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-12 Cents) situated in

RS.No.233/1C2, 40 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-01 Cent) situated in RS.No.194/4A, 1336 Sq.Mts

(Ac.0-33 Cents) situated in RS.No.194/5A, 648 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-16 Cents) situated in

RS.No.194/6, 1781 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-44 Cents) situated in RS.No.194/3B, 1538 Sq.Mts

(Ac.0-38 Cents) situated in RS.No.195/4A, 3278 (Ac.0-81 Cents) situated in

RS.No.195/2B, 122 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-03 Cents) situated in RS.No.194/7A, 41 Sq.Mts

(Ac.0-01 Cents) situated in RS.No.194/8A of Eduvadalapalem Village, 17928

Sq.Mts (Ac.4-41 Cents) situated in RS.No.84/2B, 10719 Sq.Mts (Ac.2-65 Cents)

situated in RS.No.88/1B, 8215 Sq.Mts (Ac.2-02 Cents) situated in RS.No.109/2, 607

Sq.Mts (Ac.O-14 Cents) situated in RS.No.108/2F1 of Kannaigudem Village all the

villages in Koyyalagudem Mandal, West Godavari District including dispossessing

the Petitioners and laying of the Greenfield National Highway NH 365 BG pending

disposal of the above writ petition and to pass

IA NO: 2 OF 2022

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in

the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased Pleased

to dismiss the writ petition by vacating the interim orders dated 21-04-2022 in IA

1/2022 in WP. 10280/2022

IA NO: 3 OF 2022

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in

the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased Pleased

to vacate the interim orders dated 21-04-2022 passed in IA 1/2022 in WP.

10280/2022 and dismiss the writ petition

IA NO: 1 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in

the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased

to grant leave to the Petitioners to file the Additional Reply Affidavit in the above WP

No.10280 of 2022 and pass

IA NO: 2 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in

the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased

to permit the Petitioners to bring on record the Objections dated 22/07/2021 filed at

2025:APHC:22777

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Public Hearing dated 22/07/2021 at Jangaredygudem as additional documents in

the above Writ Petition No. 10280 of 2022 and pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2024

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in

the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased eased to

permit the Petitioners to amend the Affidavit and the prayer in the Writ Petition as

under; “14. It i.s, therefore, prayed that this Hon'hle Court may he pleased to issue

a Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the Writ of Mandamus, to

declare the Notiifcations, Award Enquiry Notices, Award, Award Noiices issued

under the provi.sions ofthe National Highways Act, 1956 and the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013 vide: (i) SO.No. 1388 (E) published in Gazeite No. 1240

dated 27.04.2020 and under Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956

published in Hans India, Andhra Jyothi daily newspapers dated 08.05.2020, (ii)

S.O.No.4189(E), MORE & LI dated 23.11.2020 published in Gazeite No.3687

under Section 3D of the NH Act, (in) Public Notice Rc. No. 1/202020

CALA&JCNHAI365BG, dated 08. 08.2020 published in Praja Sakthi and Hans India

newspapers on 20.01.2021 under Section 3(G)(3) of the NH Act; (iv) .Award Ijujuiry

Notices is.sued vide R.O.C.No.I NH-365 BG 2020 dated 20.01.2021 and

23.01.2021 (V) Award.Nos.6 2021 NH-365 BG, 7 2021 NH-365 BG, dated 15.03.

2021 of the Sixth Respondent under Section 23 of the RldlTLRR Act R w Section

3G of the NH Act; (VI) .Award Notices issued vide Roc.No.OI 2020 NH-365 BG

dated 17.07. 2021 under Section 3H(2) of the NH Act, 1956 and Section 26 of the

RbCTiRRAct: issued for the alleged public purpose for building (widening two-lane

with paved shoulder four laning etc.,), maintenance, management and operation (f

Khammam - Devarapalli Greenifeld National Highway (yet to he Assigned) in the

sirelch of land from Km 148.285 to Km 220.586 in the district of West Godavari

(ofifce of Di.strict Collector Kluni) in the .state of Andhra Pradesh issued in respect

of the Petitioners land ad-measuring 5909 Sep Mis (Ac. 1-46 Cents), 1255 Sq.Mts

(Ac.O- 27 Cents) .situated in RS Nos 37 2, 31 2 of Rajavaram Village, 2833 Sq.Mts

(Ac.O- 70 Cents) situated in RS.No.233 1B2, 526 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-12 CenLs) situated

in RS.No.233 1C2, 40 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-01 ('em) situated in RS.No. 194 4A, 1336

SepMts (Ac.0-33 Ceni.s) situated in RS.No. 194 5A, 648 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-16 Cents)

situated in RS.No. 194 6, 1781 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-44 Cents) situated in RS.No. 1943B,

1538 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-38 Cents) situated in RS.No.195 4A, 3278 (Ac.0-81 Cents)

situated in RS.No. 195 2B. 122 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-03 Cents) .situated in RS.No. 194 7A,

41 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-01 Cents) sitttated in RS.No. 194 8A of Kdiivadalapalem Village,

17928 Sq.Mts (Ac.4-41 Cents) situated in RS.No.84/2B, 10719 Sq.Mts (Ac.2-65

2025:APHC:22777

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Cents) situated in RS.No.88 IB, 8215 Sq.Mts (Ac.2-02 Cents) .situated in RS.No.

109 2, 607 Sq.Mts (Ac.O-14 Cents) .Stmated in RS.No. 108. 2FI of Kannaigudem

Village all of Koyyalagitdem Mandal, West Godavari District as tllegal, arbitrary,

wholly without jurisdiction and violative ofArticles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of the

Constitution and consequently quash the .same and pa.ss .such other order or

orders as this Hon'hle Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the

ca.se. With the following words and letters: "14. It is, therefore, prayed that this

Hon'hle Court may be pleased to issue a rit, Order or Direction, more paritcnlarly

one in the Writ of Mandamus, to declare the Notiifcations, Award Enquiiy Notices,

Award, Award Notices, Environment Clearance (impact assessment) issued under

the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acc}ui,sition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013, EIA Notification, 2006 vide: (i) SO.No. 1388 (E) puhli.shed

in Gazette No. 1240 dated 27.04.2020 and under Section 3A of the National

Highways Act, 1956 published in Hans India, Andhra Jyothi daily newspapers dated

08.05.2020, (ii) S.O.No.4189(E), MORE N H dated 23.11.2020 published in

Gazette No.3687 under Section 3D of the NH Act, (Hi) Public Notice Rc. No.

1202020 CALA&.IC NHAT365BG. dated 08. 08.2020 published in Praja Saklhi and

Hans India newspapers on 20.01.2021 under Section 3(G)(3) of the NH Act; (iv)

Award Enquiry Notices is.sued vide R.O.C.No.l NH-365 BG 2020 dated 20.01.2021

and 23.01.2021 (v) Award.Nos.6:2021/NH-365 BG, 7 2021 NH-365 BG, dated

15.03. 2021 of the Sixth Re.spondent under Section 23 of the RFCTLRR Act R w

Section 3G of the NH Act; (vi) Award Notices is.sued vide Roc.No.Ol 2020 NH-365

BG dated 17.07. 2021 under Section 3H(2) of the NH Act, 1956 and Section 26 of

the RFCTLRR Act; (vit) Proceedings in File No. 10-5T2020-1A.Ill, dated

23.12.2021; issued for the alleged public purpose for building (widening two-lane

with paved shoulder four laning etc.,), maintenance, management and operation of

Khammam - Devarapalli Greenfield National Highway (yet to beAssigned) in the

stretch of land from Km 148.285 to Km 220.586 in the district of West Godavari

(ofifce of District Collector Eluni) in the state of Andhra Pradesh issued in respect of

the Petitioners land ad-measuring 5909 Sq. Mis (Ac. 1-46 Cents), 1255 Sq.Mts

(Ac.O- 27 Cents) situated in RS Nos 3.72, 31 2 of Rajavaram Village, 2833 Sq.Mts

(Ac.O- 70 Cents) .situated in RS.No.233 1B2, 526 Sq.Mts (Ac.O-12 Cents) situated

in RS.No.233 1C2, 40 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-01 Cent) situated in RS.No. 194 4A, 1336

Sq.Mts (Ac.0-33 Cents) situated in RS.No. 194/5A, 648 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-16 Cents)

situated in RS.No. 194 6, 1781 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-44 Cents) .situated in RS.No. 194 3B,

1538 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-38 Cents) situated in RS.No. 195 4A, 3278 (Ac.0-81 Cents)

situated in RS.No. 195 2B, 122 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-03 Cents) situated in RS.No. 194 7A,

41 Sq.Mts Ac. 0-0J Cent.s) situated in RS.No. 194 8A of Ediivadalapalem Village,

2025:APHC:22777

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17928 Scj.Mts (Ac.4-41 Cents) situated in RS.No.84 28, 10719 Sq.Mts (Ac.2-65

Cents) situated in RS.No.88 18, 8215 Sq.Mts .(Ac.2-02 Cent.s) .situated in RS.No.

109 2, 607 Sq.Mts (Ac.0-14 Cents) situated in RS.No. 108 2FI of Kannaigudem

Ullage all of Koyyalagudem Mandal, West Godavari District as illegal, arbitrary,

wholly without jurisdiction and violative of Articles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of the

('onstitution and con.sequently quash the .same and pa.ss such other order or

orders as this Hon'hle Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the

case. and pass

IA NO: 2 OF 2024

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in

the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased

to permit the Petitioners to bring on record the photographs and market value

certificate annexed to this lA on record as additional material in the above Writ

Petition and pass

Counsel for the Petitioner(S):

1.M R K CHAKRAVARTHY

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1.CHAUDHARY AND CHAUDHARY ADVOCATES AND SOLICITORS

LAW FIRM

2.GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION

3.

The Court made the following ORDER:

The land owners, whose lands have come under acquisition for

construction of a four-lane access-controlled Greenfield Highway by National

Highway Authority of India (NHAI) from Khammam-Devarapalli are before this

Court.

2025:APHC:22777

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2. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Counsel

appearing for the respondents.

3. The present petition is filed challenging the Notifications, Award

Enquiry Notices, Award, Award Notices issued under the National Highways

Act, 1956, EIA Notification, 2006 viz., (i) SO.No. 1388 (E) published in

Gazette No.1240 dated 27.04.2020 and under section 3A of the NH Act,

1956 published in Hans India, Andhra Jyothi daily News Papers dated

08.05.2020 (ii) S.O.No.4189(E), MORT & H dated 23.11.2020 published in

Gazette No.3687 under section 3D of the NH Act, (iii) Public Notice

Rc.No.1/2020/CALA&JC/NHAI/365BG, dated 08.08.2020 under section

3(G)(3) of the NH Act; (iv) Award Enquiry Notices vide ROC No.1/NH-365

BG/2020 dated 20.01.2020 and 23.01.2021; (v) Award Nos.6/2021/NH365BG, 7/2021/NH-365 BG, dated 15.03.2021 of the 6th Respondent under

section 23 of RFCTLRR Act r/w section 3G of the NH Act; (vi) Award Notices

issued vide Roc.No.01/2020/NH-365 BG dated 17.07.2021 under section

3H(2) of the NH Act, 1956 and section 26 of RFCTLRR Act; (vii) Proceedings

in File No.10-51/2020-IA.III, dated 23.12.2021.

4. The learned counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Petitioners

are the owners of the lands in Rajavaram, Iduvadalapalem, Kannayagudem

Villages, Koyyalagudem Mandal of West Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh.

2025:APHC:22777

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The said revenue lands were sought to be acquired for public purpose of

constructing Khammam-Devarapalli four-lane access-controlled Greenfield

Highway by Respondents (NHAI).

It is the case of the Petitioners that they have paid conversion tax as

regulated under Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Land (Conversion for NonAgricultural Purposes) Act, 2006 (APLA Act) and that the same has been

intimated to Revenue Divisional Officer. The Petitioners contend that the land

stood converted on payment of conversion tax by the date of Sec.3A

Notification by virtue of Section 3 of APLA Act. However, W.P.No.1377 of

2019 pertaining to conversion of the said lands to non-agricultural lands is

pending before this Hon‟ble Court.

It is also contented by the Petitioners that initially in the year 2018, the

Respondents have issued Notification and Awards similar to the impugned

Proceedings and on receiving objections dated 05.11.2018 from the

Petitioners that the alleged road is not a National Highway published under

NH Act and therefore the provisions of NH Act cannot be invoked, the

Respondent authorities dropped the acquisition proceedings and that after a

lapse of two years, fresh notifications have been issued which are impugned

in the case on hand.

2025:APHC:22777

12

It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for Petitioners that

there is no declaration by the Union of India (1st Respondent) in the Gazette

that the proposed road is a National Highway as mandated under Section

2(2) of the NH Act and therefore the NH Act does not apply and that the

entire impugned Proceedings of acquisition, Notification and Awards are ultra

vires liable to be set aside. It is also argued by the learned counsel for

Petitioners that it is nothing but colourable exercise of power just to escape

the rigors of RFCTLRR Act.

The learned counsel for Petitioners further stated that the Petitioners

have raised objections under Section 3C dated 15.05.2020 and that they

have also filed claim statements in the office of the Competent Authority,

Land Acquisition (6th Respondent) dated 27.01.2021 and 28.01.2021 under

Section 21(2) of RFCTLRR Act and that the Land Acquisition Officer passed

the Award without conducting any enquiry.

It was also submitted by the learned counsel for Petitioners that it was

surprising that the copy of the Award No.7/2021/NH 365BG dt:__.03.3021

was not furnished to the Petitioners and that they had to file the present

petition without annexing the copy of the same. It is also the case of the

Petitioners that notice dated 20.01.2021 under Section 3G(3) of the NH Act is

not in conformity with the RFCTLRR Act. It is also their case that the

2025:APHC:22777

13

Respondents have not taken into consideration the prevailing market values

despite objection being raised and that the lands are non-agricultural lands

and the value should have been determined basing on the prevailing market

value of non-agricultural lands as the lands have been converted to nonagricultural lands prior to the impugned Notification issued vide Gazette

No.1240 dated 27.04.2020 in S.O.No.1388(E) dated 27.04.2020 under

Section 3A(1) of the NH Act, 1956.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contentions

relied upon the following decisions:

i) Project Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy

& Ors 1

.

ii) J&K Housing Board and another v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul and

others2

.

--- To reiterate that statutory provision provides a particular manner for

doing a particular act, the said thing or act must be done in the manner

prescribed.

iii) Bhimavarapu Giridhar Kumar Reddy v. Union Government3

.


1

(2021) 3 SCC 572

2

(2011) 10 SCC 714

3

(2012) SCC Online AP 148

2025:APHC:22777

14

iv) Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory and others

4

.

--- Held in the absence of plan, it is difficult to raise objections under

section 3(c)(1).

v) Hindustan Petroleum v. Darius Shapur Chennai and others5

.

--- Section 3(c)(2) casts a duty on the competent authority to consider

the objections after hearing the objections and making further enquiry shall

allow or disallow the objections and competent authority must give reasons

that the objections raised by the petitioners were dealt by assigning reasons.

But the Competent authority has not applied its mind and the objections were

not dealt with objectively by the competent authority.

6. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Chidambaram for

the Respondents submitted that the National Highways Authority of India

(NHAI) has taken up construction of four lane access controlled Green Field

Highway Project from Khammam-Devarapalli section measuring 162.126 km

in length declared as NH 365BG (erstwhile 365-BB) and the National

Highway Authority of India has decided to construct the KhammamDevarapalli connecting Telangana & Andhra Pradesh states under Inter

Corridor route under Bharathmala Pariyojana as per the directions of the


4

(2005) 13 SCC 477

5

2005 (7) SCC 627

2025:APHC:22777

15

Hon‟ble Prime Minister during Pragathi Meeting held on 23.05.2018 and the

minutes are as follows:

(i) Ministry of Road Transport & Highways should complete survey as per

revised alignment and accordingly, submit the revised Land Acquisition

proposals to Government of Telangana by September, 2018.

(ii) Ministry of Road Transport & Highways in co-ordination with State

Government should resolve all the issues hindering the project and start the

construction work.

The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the

said project has been taken up as a part of green field project as it reduced

the distance between Rajahmundry and Hyderabad by 56km and between

Khammam to Devarapalli by 24 km and creates substantial gains in terms of

vehicle operating cost, reduced travel time and that it is set to boost

economic development of the adjoining areas and that it is considered as

“high priority” as it improves connectivity between the two states of

Telangana and Andhra Pradesh and also aims to decongest NH 65 and NH

16. The counsel for the Respondents also stated that in pursuance of the

same the DPR work was transferred to NHAI via a tripartite agreement and

that the subject work is included in PRAGATI review and the alignment was

reviewed by the Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways in 3rd

2025:APHC:22777

16

week of May, 2018 and that the green field alignment from Khammam to

Devarapalli was given a go ahead by the Hon‟ble Prime Minister in the

meeting held on 23.05.2018.

The learned Senior counsel for the Respondents submitted that the

Joint Collector (A&W) Eluru, was designated as Competent Authority for Land

Acquisition for this project vide Orders 3672(E), dated 25.07.2018. Ministry of

Road Transport and Highways Department has issued Notification in S.O.No.

1388(E) dt:27.04.2020 under Section 3A of NH Act, 1956 for acquisition of

land for formation of NH-365 BG. It is argued by the learned counsel for the

Respondents that the Competent Authority Land Acquisition („CALA‟ for

short) had provided an opportunity of hearing to the land owners and that

infact, the Petitioners attended the enquiry on 04.09.2020 and gave a joint

statement before the authority. Subsequent to the enquiry, the CALA

disallowed the objection vide order dt: 07.09.2020 under section 3C as the

lands are being acquired for public purpose. The learned counsel also refuted

the material allegation made by the Petitioners regarding Section 3C

objections enquiry. It is pertinent to note that the Petitioners and 11 others

have filed Section 3C objections on a Section 3A Notification dt: 27.04.2020.

It is also the case of the Respondents that after verification of an extent

of 73,366 sq.mts in Kannaigudem village of Koyyalagudem Mandal,

2025:APHC:22777

17

Notification u/s 3D(1) and 3D(2) of NH Act has been proposed for approval of

length through the Project Director, NHAI, PIU, Rajahmundry and the

Government of India in exercise of its powers conferred under the said

section vide its Notification S.O.4189(E) dated 23.11.2020 declared that the

lands specified in the schedule acquired for the purpose and in pursuance of

Section 3D(2) shall vest absolutely with the Central Government free from all

encumbrances. Notification with respect to the same has been published in

E.O. issue Part II Section 3 of sub-section (ii) of the Gazette of India Issue

No. 3687, dt: 23.11.2020.

The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents argued that Section

3G Notification was published in one Telugu daily News paper and two

English News papers on 20.01.2021 appraising the land owners/interested

persons to attend award enquiry along with title documents in support of their

claims on 27.01.2021. Subsequently the competent authority conducted the

said enquiry and passed an Award in respect of the lands as per the

provisions of the NH Act, 1956 and section 26 of RFCTLRR Act, 2013.

The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents refuted the

contention of the Petitioners that the initial Notification issued vide S.O.

No.5130(E), dt: 28.09.2018 was for the entire stretch covered under 31

villages including that of the Petitioners and that the said Notification was

2025:APHC:22777

18

issued for 70 m width and that out of 31 villages survey was conducted in 24

villages and Section 3D Notification was also published vide S.O. No.156(E),

dt: 09.01.2019 Gazette No.142, dt: 10.01.2019. Since the Petitioners did not

extend their support for survey the same was lapsed and fresh notification

had to be published under Section 3A for an extent of 60m width vide

S.O.No.1388(E), dt: 27.04.2020 Gazette Notification No.1240(E), dt:

27.04.2020 published in Telugu and English Dailies dt: 08.05.2020 calling for

objections under Section 3C. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that as

per Section 3G(3) of NH Act, 1956 public notice has been issued on

20.01.2021 inviting the landowners /interested persons to file their claims for

the land proposed for acquisition to establish their title over the land before

the competent authority on 27.01.2021 and the said notice was issued in

Telugu and English News Papers on 20.01.2021.

It is also the case of the Respondents that the compensation was

determined in terms of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and coming to the question of

multiplication factor the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways Dept.,

Government of India in its Circular No.NH 11011/30-2015-LA dt: 08.08.2016

clarified that the multiplication factor of 2 which is used in calculation of

determining compensation is notified vide Gazette Notification S.O.425(E) dt:

09.02.2016 is applicable to the land acquired under RFCTLARR and in the

2025:APHC:22777

19

case of appropriate government defined under Section 3(e)(ii) and 3(e)(v) of

the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 with effect from 01.01.2015. As per the orders of

the NHAI authorities and Government of Andhra Pradesh multiplication factor

was calculated at 1.25 and the award was passed accordingly.

The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents argued that the

contention of the Petitioners that there is no notification of declaration under

Section 2(2) of NH Act is incorrect and baseless as the Gazette has been

published vide S.O.2163E dt: 30.06.2020 declaring the New National

Highway number as NH-365BG for Greenfield. It is also stated that the sale

transactions of previous three years to the date of issuance of Section 3A

notification were taken into consideration and the market value was

determined in accordance with Section 26 of RFCTLAAR Act, 2013. It is also

vehemently submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent that

at every stage notices were issued and due procedure was followed from

time to time.

The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents further argued that

the Petitioners can file an application before the Arbitrator cum District

Collector, appointed by the Central Government as per Section 3(G)(5) of NH

Act, 1956, if the compensation award is felt to be inadequate. It is also

submitted that the project work is entrusted to Rajamahendravaram

2025:APHC:22777

20

Greenfield Pvt. Ltd. vide Letter of Award dt: 15.09.2021 and that the

Agreement was concluded on 27.01.2021. It is also argued that the project is

a time bound project and any delay would cause an irreparable loss to the

Authority in the form of penalties, escalation of project cost and ultimately to

the public interest. It is also argued that the writ petition was filed with mala

fide intention to stall the ongoing road widening/construction project which is

undertaken in the interest of public at large and for overall growth and

strengthening of economy of our country.

7. The learned Senior Counsel, in support of his contentions relied upon

the following decisions:

i) Landowners of Village Suthsoo and others v. State of J&K and

others6

, wherein it was observed that for issuance of notification under

section 3A declaration that a particular stretch of road as a National Highway

is not a prerequisite.

ii) Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Dastak NGO and other7

.

iii) Electrosheets Ltd. v. Union of India and another8

and


6

2023 SCC Online J&K 247

7

(2022) SCC Online SC 362

8

2021 SCC Online SC 1247

2025:APHC:22777

21

iv) Project Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy

& Ors, wherein it was observed that environmental clearance is required

before the actual commencement of the work but not necessary at the time of

notification.

8. Having heard the counsels for both the Petitioners and the

Respondents at length and having considered the material on record, this

Court is of the view that the issues raised by the Petitioners can be broadly

classified into two. The primary question that needs to be answered is

whether the project in the impugned proceedings is a national highway

project or not and whether the provisions under sections 3A to I would be

applicable.

The second category of questions pertain to procedure followed in

awarding of compensation, non-consideration of material produced, lack of

opportunity of being heard and multiplication factor.

9. In so far as the first question is concerned, this Court is of the view

that, the project Bharathmala Pariyojana has been conceived with an

intention to optimize the efficiency of freight and passenger movement across

the country by bridging critical infrastructural gaps through effective

interventions like development of Inter Corridors, green field highways etc. As

part of this initiative, the government has taken up this green field project to

2025:APHC:22777

22

reduce the distance between Rajahmundry and Hyderabad by 56 km and

between Khammam to Devarapalli by 24 km and create substantial gains in

terms of vehicle operating cost, reduced travel time and boost the economic

development of the adjoining areas.

10. National Highways Authority has been constituted under the National

Highways Authority of India Act, 1956 with an object to develop, maintain and

manage the National Highways in the country. As has been reiterated by the

law courts, the NH Act, 1956 is a complete code in itself. It is trite to say that

the impediment should not be created in the matter of National Highways

which provides the much-needed transportation infrastructure.

11. Section 2 of the National Highways Act, 1956 reads as under:

2. Declaration of certain highways to be national highways.—(1) Each

of the highways specified in the Schedule2*** is hereby declared to be a

national highway.

(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,

declare any other highway to be a national highway and on the

publication of such notification such highway shall be deemed to be

specified in the Schedule.

(3) The Central Government may, by like notification, omit any highway

from the Schedule and on the publication of such notification, the

highway so omitted shall cease to be a national highway.

 (emphasis supplied)

12. Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 inserted by the

amendment of 1997, empowers the Central Government to declare its

2025:APHC:22777

23

intention to acquire “any land”. The vital condition for exercise of such power

conferred on the Central Government is that it should be satisfied that such

land is required for public purpose of building a national highway or a part

thereof. Section 3B of the Act empowers the person authorized by the central

government to enter upon the notified lands for the limited purpose of survey,

etc. to ascertain its suitability for acquisition for the stated purpose. Section

3C gives an opportunity to any person interested in the land to raise

objections if any on the notified land. The final declaration is issued under

section 3D after hearing all persons who raised objections. Subsequent to

such declaration /notification under section 3D the land vests with the central

government free from all encumbrances and possession is taken under

section 3E upon depositing the compensation amount in the manner

prescribed as per section 3H and as determined under section 3G.

13. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Project Director, Project Implementation

Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Ors. opined that for issuance of notification

under section 3A, declaration/notification of a particular stretch of road as

national highway is not a condition precedent. Relying on the said decision by

the Hon‟ble Apex Court, the Division Bench of Hon‟ble High Court of Jammu

& Kashmir and Ladakh in Landowners of Village Suthsoo & Ors. v. State

of J&K and Ors. held as follows:

2025:APHC:22777

24

23. It is, thus, evident that, for issuance of notification under section

3A, declaration/notification of a particular stretch of road as national

highway is not a condition precedent. The Government is

competent and is empowered under section 3A to issue notification

in the official gazette declaring its intention to acquire land for the

building of a national highway. It is common knowledge and is well

spelt out by the provisions of National Highways Act, that what is

notified as a national highway under section 2 is an existing

highway. Section 2 deals with declaring certain existing highways to

be national highways. Thus, from a reading of section 3A along with

section 2, it would become abundantly clear that for issuing a

notification under section 3A by the central government, advance

declaration of a highway, yet to be constructed, as national highway

is not sine qua non. Such declaration presupposes existence of a

highway.”

14. It is, therefore, evident that for issuance of notification under section

3A, notification under section 2(2) is not a condition precedent. The

government is empowered under section 3A to issue a Gazette notification

declaring its intention to acquire land for building a national highway. It is

reiterated that what is declared as national highway under section 2(2) is

an existing highway. Juxtaposing section 3A and section 2 of the NH Act,

1956 it is amply clear that to issue a notification under section 3A prior

declaration under section 2(2) is not an essential condition. Therefore, the

contention of the Petitioners that this is not a national highway and that it

2025:APHC:22777

25

would not come under the purview of National Highways Act holds no

water.

15. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. v. State of

Maharashtra9

observed as follows:

 Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few

observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now

launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic

advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We

are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent.

We propose to compete with China economically. We wish to attain the

pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as

“Asian tigers”, e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however,

recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining

such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of

transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial

improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call

for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however,

natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the

acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in the

shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition

is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are

also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time

has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind

while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under

Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of

interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And


9

(1997)1SCC134

2025:APHC:22777

26

in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of

justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the

same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders,

more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The

courts have to weigh the public interest vis-à-vis the private interest while

exercising the power under Article 226 — indeed any of their

discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in

case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of noncompliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall

also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a

lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable.

There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a

wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of

redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing

interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We

hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the

courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.

 (emphasis supplied)

16. In another case of Union of India v. Kushala Shetty & Ors.10 the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as under:

“Here, it is apposite to mention that NHAI is a professionally managed

statutory body having expertise in the field of development and

maintenance of National Highways. The projects involving construction

of new highways and widening and development of the existing

highways, which are vital for development of infrastructure in the

country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. It comprises


10 (2011) 12 SCC 69

2025:APHC:22777

27

of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway

development and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects

relating to development and maintenance of National Highways after

thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project reports are

prepared keeping in view the relative factors including intensity of heavy

vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The Courts are not at all

equipped to decide upon the viability and feasibility of the particular

project and whether the particular alignment would sub serve the larger

public interest. In such matters, the scope of judicial review is very

limited.

 (emphasis supplied)

17. The Division Bench of the Hon‟ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana in

Manjit Singh & Ors v. Union of India & Ors.11 held that, “this Court is also

sanguine of the fact that where larger interest of public is involved, sanctity of

date of completion of the project for construction and relevance or importance

cannot be ignored on account of few numbered litigants, who are contesting

for the sake of determination of appropriate compensation. The aspect of

public interest over private rights assumes significance.”

18. From the above discussion, it is abundantly clear that the writ courts

have limited scope of judicial review in matters involving technical expertise

and the law courts have time and again reiterated the fact that public interest


11 MANU/PH/0150/2022

2025:APHC:22777

28

assumes greater significance over private interest and that the Courts must

consider this while exercising discretionary powers under the writ jurisdiction.

19. In the light of the above discussion, this court is of the view that nobody

can dispute that the project is of national importance involving huge public

money and stalling the project any further would not only be against public

interest but also against the interest of the nation. It is to be borne in mind

that “national interest > public interest > private / individual interest”. Thus,

considering all the facts and circumstances and considering various case

laws as mentioned supra, I am of the view that the impugned proceedings

under sec 3A does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality and consequently

the declaration under section 3D is also validly made. It is therefore observed

that no useful purpose would be served by quashing the impugned

proceedings, hence, the prayer of the Petitioners to quash the same is

rejected.

20. Having said this, the Petitioners are at liberty to raise the grievances

pertaining to non-consideration of material by the Competent Authority;

quantum of compensation and the other allied issues like multiplication factor

before the appropriate alternate authority as provided under Section 3G(5) of

the National Highways Act, 1956.

2025:APHC:22777

29

21. The Respondent authorities are expected to complete the project as

expeditiously as possible without prejudice to the rights of the Petitioners to

claim suitable compensation before the appropriate authority.

22. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as

to costs.

The interim order, if any, deemed to have been vacated. Pending

interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.


__________________________

 JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

20-06-2025

Note : LR to be marked

B/O

PND

2025:APHC:22777

A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (Repealed) — A.P. Residential and Non-Residential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017 (Act No. 10 of 2018) — Jurisdiction of Rent Controller — Preliminary Issue. Landlord and Tenant — Jurisdiction: Whether the Rent Controller constituted under the repealed Act, 1960 retains jurisdiction to entertain a fresh eviction petition (R.C.C. No. 4 of 2020) filed after the commencement of the new Act No. 10 of 2018 (which repealed the 1960 Act). Held: A fresh petition filed after the repeal of the Act, 1960 is not a pending proceeding saved by Section 47(2) of the Act No. 10 of 2018. The mere fact that the new specialized forum (Rent Court/Tribunal) under the Act No. 10 of 2018 has not yet been constituted does not automatically revive or confer jurisdiction on the repealed Rent Controller, especially when the new Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court (Section 40). The Rent Controller lacks jurisdiction over the fresh matter. Civil Procedure Code (CPC) — Preliminary Issue (Order XIV Rule 1): Whether the Rent Controller was justified in rejecting an application (I.A. No. 833 of 2023) to decide the issue of "landlord and tenant relationship" as a preliminary issue. Held: The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is foundational to the Rent Controller's jurisdiction. When this relationship is denied and challenged, the issue must be tried as a preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule 1(2) CPC, as the entire proceeding is predicated upon this jurisdictional fact. Conclusion: The impugned order of the Rent Controller rejecting the application (I.A. No. 833 of 2023) is set aside as the Rent Controller erred in both finding that it had jurisdiction and in refusing to decide the jurisdictional fact (landlord-tenant relationship) as a preliminary issue.

 

A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (Repealed) — A.P. Residential and Non-Residential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017 (Act No. 10 of 2018) — Jurisdiction of Rent Controller — Preliminary Issue.


Landlord and Tenant — Jurisdiction:


Whether the Rent Controller constituted under the repealed Act, 1960 retains jurisdiction to entertain a fresh eviction petition (R.C.C. No. 4 of 2020) filed after the commencement of the new Act No. 10 of 2018 (which repealed the 1960 Act).


Held: A fresh petition filed after the repeal of the Act, 1960 is not a pending proceeding saved by Section 47(2) of the Act No. 10 of 2018. The mere fact that the new specialized forum (Rent Court/Tribunal) under the Act No. 10 of 2018 has not yet been constituted does not automatically revive or confer jurisdiction on the repealed Rent Controller, especially when the new Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court (Section 40). The Rent Controller lacks jurisdiction over the fresh matter.


Civil Procedure Code (CPC) — Preliminary Issue (Order XIV Rule 1):


Whether the Rent Controller was justified in rejecting an application (I.A. No. 833 of 2023) to decide the issue of "landlord and tenant relationship" as a preliminary issue.


Held: The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is foundational to the Rent Controller's jurisdiction. When this relationship is denied and challenged, the issue must be tried as a preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule 1(2) CPC, as the entire proceeding is predicated upon this jurisdictional fact.


Conclusion: The impugned order of the Rent Controller rejecting the application (I.A. No. 833 of 2023) is set aside as the Rent Controller erred in both finding that it had jurisdiction and in refusing to decide the jurisdictional fact (landlord-tenant relationship) as a preliminary issue.



1

* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

+C.R.P.No.3018 OF 2024

% 09.05.2025

# Smt Akella Surya Kumari

……Petitioner

And:

$ Nidavolu Thammiraju

….Respondent.

!Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri A. Radha Krishna


^Counsel for the respondent : Nil



<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1.2019 (5) ALD 1

2.1994(TLS) SCC 10653

3.2019 SCC OnLine AP 272

4.(2022) 2 SCC 161

5.2023 SCC OnLine SC 1378

6.2024 sCC OnLine AP 5739

7.(2006) 5 Superme Court Cases 638

8.(2022) 7 SCC 644

9.(2022) 11 SCC 572

2025:APHC:18792

2

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

* * * *

C.R.P.No.3018 OF 2024

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED:09.05.2025

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgments?

Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals

Yes/No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the

fair copy of the Judgment?

Yes/No

____________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI, J

2025:APHC:18792

3

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

C.R.P.No.3018 OF 2024

JUDGMENT:

1. Heard Sri A. Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the

petitioner. None appeared for the respondent.

I. Facts:

2. This civil revision petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner/defendant

challenging the order dated 08.07.2024, passed in R.C.C.No.4 of

2020 (in short, R.C.C), pending in the court of Rent Controllercum-IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, (learned

Court) rejecting I.A.No.833 of 2024 filed by the petitioner under

Order XIV Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure (for short, C.P.C) read

with Section 151 C.P.C, to decide land lord and tenant

relationship and the jurisdiction of the Court as a preliminary

issue as the Rent Court/Rent Tribunal under the Andhra

Pradesh/Telangana Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control

Act, 1960 (for short, “the Act, 1960”) was not constituted.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the title

of the C.R.P as also the impugned order, it is wrongly mentioned

that the petitioner is the plaintiff and the respondent is the

2025:APHC:18792

4

defendant. The correct fact is that the petitioner is the defendant

and the respondent is the plaintiff in the Rent Control Case. He

submitted that a memo to that effect has also been filed.

4. The respondent is the plaintiff. He filed R.C.C.No.4 of 2020

under Section 10(i)(ib) 3(iii)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings

(Lease, Rent And Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short, the Act,

1960) against the petitioner to vacate the petition schedule

premises and deliver the vacant possession, on the plea of, the

petitioner being the tenant and the respondent being the landlord.

5. In R.C.C, the petitioner filed I.A.No.833 of 2023 to decide

the issue of “landlord and tenant relationship” and the jurisdiction

of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge-Rent Controller court as

preliminary issues. It was submitted inter alia that there was no

relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The

execution of the rent agreement dated 06.09.2018 was denied.

The same was said to be forged and fabricated document.

6. The jurisdiction of the court was also challenged on the

plea that, the Act, 1960 had been repealed. New Act namely A.P.

Residential and Non Residential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017

(Act No.10 of 2018) (for short, the Act, 2018), came into force with

effect from 28.03.2018 under which jurisdiction had been

2025:APHC:18792

5

conferred on the Rent Court/Tribunal. The remedy of the

respondent was pleaded to be to file a regular suit in the civil

court as under the Act No.10 of 2018, the Rent Court/Tribunal

had not been constituted. Plea was taken that the remedy could

not be under the Act, 1960. The Court of Rent Controller, as

such, had no jurisdiction.

7. The respondent filed counter to I.A No.833 of 2023,

submitting inter alia that the I.A. had no merit. It was liable to be

dismissed. The R.C.C was coming up for cross-examination of

P.W.1 and to delay the proceedings, the I.A was filed. As the

Rent Court/Tribunal had not been constituted under the Act,

2018, the Rent Control Court constituted under the Act, 1960 had

the jurisdiction.

II. Order of the Court of Rent Controller dated 08.07.2024:

8. The learned Court of Rent Controller rejected the

I.A.No.833 of 2023, holding that the Rent Court/Tribunal was not

constituted under the Act No.10 of 2018. So, under the existing

mechanism as per the Act, 1960, the dispute could be entertained

and adjudicated. It referred to the judgment in Devathi

2025:APHC:18792

6

Ramachandra Rao vs. Kella Dhanalakshmi1

, and

Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Dhadi Sahu2

.

III. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner:

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the

question of jurisdiction had been incorrectly decided. The learned

court of Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. Under the Act No.10

of 2018, the jurisdiction was conferred on the Rent Court/Rent

Tribunal which had not been constituted. Further, in view of the

repeal of the Act, 1960, the Rent Controller could not have

jurisdiction, even if the Rent Court/Rent Tribunal had not been

constituted under the Act No.10 of 2018.

10. Placing reliance in Mara Venkata Lingam vs. State of

Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Principal Secretary, Law

Department and others3

, learned counsel for the petitioner

submitted that the Courts which are vested with the jurisdiction to

entertain the civil suit can also entertain the suits filed by the

lessees stating injustice and for relevant reliefs.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that there

was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the


1

2019 (5) ALD 1

2

1994(TLS) SCC 10653

3

2019 SCC OnLine AP 272

2025:APHC:18792

7

respondent and the petitioner. So, there was no jurisdiction in the

court of Rent Controller. He submitted that the question of

relationship deserved to be decided as a preliminary issue, but

had not been decided by the Rent Controller.

IV. Points for determination:

12. Following points arise for consideration and determination

by this Court:

(A) Whether the court of the Rent Controller-cumIV Additional Junior Civil Judge-Rent Controller

Court, Visakhapatnam had no jurisdiction in the

matter? and

(B) Whether the question of relationship of landlord

and tenant between the respondent and the

petitioner was required to be decided as a

preliminary issue?

(C) Whether the impugned order is legal and justified or

it calls for interference?

V. Analysis:

13. I have considered the submissions advanced by the

learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material on

record.

2025:APHC:18792

8

Point-A:

14. This Court would first refer to Dhadi Sahu (supra), which

has been referred in the impugned order and some later

pronouncements of Hon’ble the Apex Court.

14.1. In Dhadi Sahu (supra), a change in forum came to be

made during pendency of the proceedings before one forum,

Inspecting Assistant Commissioner which initially had the

jurisdiction, under the Income Tax Act when the matter was

referred. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the general principle is

that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not

affect pending actions, unless intention to the contrary is clearly

shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is

by making a provision for change-over of proceedings, from the

court or the tribunal where they are pending to the court or the

tribunal which under the new law gets jurisdiction to try case.

14.2. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that, no litigant has

any vested right in the matter of procedural law, but where the

question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of

procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested

right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a

particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings

2025:APHC:18792

9

are initiated in the tribunal or the court of first instance and unless

the legislature has by express words or by necessary implication

clearly so indicated, that vested right will continue, in spite of the

change of jurisdiction of the different tribunals or forums. With

respect to forum being vested right as opposed to pure procedure

and change of forum ceasing to be a question of procedure only

as held in Dadhi Sahu (supra), the same was recently considered

and discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Neena Aneja and

another vs. Jai Prakash Associates Limited4

.

14.3 Paras 41 to 44 of Neena Aneja (supra) deserve to be

reproduced as under:

“41. Now, in this backdrop, it becomes necessary to consider

the 1992 decision of a two judge Bench of this Court in

Dhadi Sahu (supra) and several decisions which adverted to

it. This was a case where the assessee had preferred

appeals to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal

allowed the appeals and set aside the penalties holding that

in view of the amendment made to Section 274(2) of the

Income Tax Act 1961 with effect from 1 April 1971, the

Inspecting Assistant Commissioner34 lost his jurisdiction.

The power of the Income Tax Officer to impose a penalty

under Section 271 was subject to Section 274. As a result of

the amending Act which came into force on 1st April 1971,

the amount of income allegedly concealed had to exceed


4

(2022) 2 SCC 161

2025:APHC:18792

10

twenty- five thousand rupees. The effect of this amendment

was that the Assistant Commissioner did not have

jurisdiction over the assessee as the concealed “Dhadi

Sahu”; “IAC” PART-C amount was lesser than the minimum

amount prescribed by the subsequent amendment.

42. Yogeshwar Dayal, J speaking for the two judge

Bench premised the judgment on "the general principle of

law" that a change of forum does not affect pending actions

unless a contrary intent is shown:

“18. It may be stated at the outset that the general principle

is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does

not affect pending actions unless intention to the contrary is

clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention

is shown is by making a provision for change-over of

proceedings, from the court or the tribunal where they are

pending to the court or the tribunal which under the new law

gets jurisdiction to try them.”

43. This Court held that the amending Act did not make

any provision that references validly pending before IAC

shall be returned without passing any final order if the

amount of income in respect of which particulars have been

concealed did not exceed rupees twenty five thousand. This,

in the view of the Court, supported the inference that the IAC

continued to have jurisdiction to impose a penalty on

pending references. The previous operation of Section

274(2) as it stood before 1 April 1971 and anything done

under it, continued to have effect under Section 6(b) for

the General Clauses Act enabling the IAC to pass orders

imposing a penalty in a pending reference. If the reference

was made before 1 April 1971, it would be governed by

2025:APHC:18792

11

Section 274(2) as it stood before that date and the IAC

would continue to have jurisdiction. However, in paragraph

21 of the decision, this Court observed:

“21. It is also true that no litigant has any vested right in the

matter of procedural law but where the question is of change

of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The

forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed

to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum.

The right becomes vested when the proceedings are

initiated PART-C in the tribunal or the court of first instance

and unless the legislature has by express words or by

necessary implication clearly so indicated, that vested right

will continue in spite of the change of jurisdiction of the

different tribunals or forums.”

44. This Court in Dhadi Sahu (supra) then adverted to the

decision in Manujendra Dutt(supra) and Mohd. Idris(supra)

and observed that "amending an Act does not show that the

pending proceedings before the court on reference

abate". Therefore, the decision of the two judge Bench in

Dhadi Sahu(supra) held that a litigant had a crystallized right

to a forum when proceedings have been initiated and are

pending. Such a right vested, in the view of the Court, is

distinct from a pure procedure to be followed before the

forum concerned. In taking this view, the two judge Bench in

Dhadi Sahu(supra) did not consider a three judge bench

decision in New India Assurance(supra) as well as a

previous co-ordinate Bench decision in Maria

Cristina(supra), which relied on common law jurisprudence

and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to hold that a

change in forum is purely a procedural matter which

2025:APHC:18792

12

operates retrospectively in the absence of a contrary

legislative mandate. The latter principle has since been

followed in the decisions in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur

(supra); Sudhir G Angur (supra).”

14.4. In Neena Aneja (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court concluded

on the position of law with respect to change of Forum in

paragraphs 72 and 73 which reads as under:-

“72. In considering the myriad precedents that have interpreted

the impact of a change in forum on pending proceedings and

retrospectivity- a clear position of law has emerged: a change

in forum lies in the realm of procedure. Accordingly, in

compliance with the tenets of statutory interpretation

applicable to procedural law, amendments on matters of

procedure are retrospective, unless a contrary intention

emerges from the statute. This position emerges from the

decisions in New India Assurance(supra), Maria

Cristina(supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur(supra), Ramesh Kumar

Soni(supra) and Sudhir G Angur(supra). More recently, this

position has been noted in a three judge Bench decision of this

Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India51. However, there was a

deviation by a two judge bench decision of this Court in Dhadi

Sahu(supra), which overlooked the decision of a larger three

judge bench in New India Assurance(supra) and of a co-ordinate

two judge bench in Maria Cristina(supra). The decision in Dhadi

Sahu(supra) propounded a position that “no litigant has any

vested right in the matter of procedural law but where the question

is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only.

2025:APHC:18792

13

The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed

to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum.

The Writ Petition (C) No. 26 of 2020, decided on 19 January 2021

(Supreme Court of India) PART C right becomes vested when the

proceedings are initiated in the tribunal.” In taking this view, the

two judge bench did not consider binding decisions. Dhadi

Sahu(supra) failed to consider that the saving of pending

proceedings in Mohd. Idris(supra) and Manujendra Dutt(supra)

was a saving of vested rights of the litigants that were being

impacted by the repealing acts therein, and not because a right to

forum is accrued once proceedings have been

initiated. Thereafter, a line of decisions followed Dhadi

Sahu(supra), to hold that a litigant has a crystallized right to a

forum once proceedings have been initiated. A litigant’s vested

right (including the right to an appeal) prior to the amendment or

repeal are undoubtedly saved, in addition to substantive rights

envisaged under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This

protection does not extend to pure matters of procedure. Repeals

or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily

affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears

from the repealing or amending statute.

73. It is relevant to note in this context that the decision

in Ambalal Sarabhai (supra) saved proceedings in relation to a

benefit which although not vested, accrued to the landlord to evict

the tenant by virtue of a proviso to a Section which accorded

protection to the tenant from ejectment. This Court reasoned that

since the right of the landlord flows from a Section which protects

the tenant, it cannot be enlarged into a vested right. However,

Ambalal Sarabhai(supra) did not enunciate an absolute

2025:APHC:18792

14

proposition that the right to institute proceedings at a particular

forum is an accrued right, let alone a vested right. The dictum

that a change of forum is a procedural matter is not altered

by the decision of this Court in Ambalal Sarabhai(supra)

which sought to PART C differentiate between vested rights

and accrued rights, the latter being protected under Section

6(c) of the General Clauses Act, the proceedings in relation to

which are protected under Section 6(e).

14.5 In Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf vs. Badam Balakrishna

Hotel Pvt., Limited and others5

, the Hon’ble Apex Court

considered the issue of retrospective application and change of

Forum. It was held that when a statute is amended on an issue

pertaining to a forum for adjudication, it being procedural, takes

effect retrospectively. A party to a lis does not have any vested

right of forum as against action. In the absence of any substantive

right being subsumed by a particular forum, one has to give

retrospective application.

14.6. In Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf (supra), the Hon’ble Apex

Court observed that there was a subtle difference in dealing with

a case involving quorum non judicie. The principle governing lack

of jurisdiction to a forum might differ from a case where two or

more forums deal with the same issue along with the rights and


5

2023 SCC OnLine SC 1378

2025:APHC:18792

15

liabilities of the parties. To make the position clear, one had to

see as to whether there was any change in the rights and

liabilities of the parties by choosing one forum as against the

other. As an example, taking the case of eviction of a tenant, it

was held that if he was to be evicted only under the Rent Control

Act which extended a certain right to the tenant, who could not be

evicted otherwise than under the provisions contained therein, a

common law remedy could not be invoked by way of a suit as

against a proceeding before the Rent Controller. Para 17 of

Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf (supra) deserves to be reproduced

which reads as under:-

“17. There is a subtle difference when we deal with a

case involving coram non-judice.

The principle governing lack of jurisdiction to a forum

may differ from a case where two or more forums

deal with the same issue along with the rights and

liabilities of the parties. To make the position clear,

one has to see as to whether there is any change in

the rights and liabilities of the parties by choosing one

forum as against the other. As an example, we can

take the case of eviction of a tenant. If he is to be

evicted only under the Rent Control Act which

extends a certain right to the tenant, who cannot be

2025:APHC:18792

16

evicted otherwise than under the provisions contained

therein, a common law remedy cannot be invoked by

way of a suit as against a proceeding before the Rent

Controller. In that view of the matter, certainly the

question of prejudice would arise. However, in a case

involving same rights and liabilities but the question is

only with respect to the forum being judicial or quasijudicial, the issue of jurisdiction would pale into

insignificance when it is sought to be raised as a last

straw at a very belated stage. Therefore, when the

process becomes the same for both parties who

undertake the said route willingly, the question of

jurisdiction cannot be put against each other after it

has attained finality, unless it is demonstrated that the

rights of the party who suffered the decree are

obliterated.”

15. The law, therefore, is well settled that a change in Forum

lies in the realm of procedure. Amendments on matters of

procedure are retrospective unless a contrary intention emerges

from the statute. The repeals or amendments that effect changes

in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a

contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending

statute.

2025:APHC:18792

17

(1)The Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)

Control Act, 1960 is hereby repealed.

(2)Notwithstanding such repeal and subject to the provisions

of this Act all cases and other proceedings under the said Act

pending, at the commencement of this Act, shall be continued

and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said

Act, as if the said Act had continued in force and this Act had

not been passed :Provided that the plaintiff within a period of

180 days of coming into force of this Act shall be entitled to

withdraw any suit or appeal or any other proceeding pending

under the repealed Act with liberty to file fresh application in

respect of the subject-matter of such suit or appeal or any

other proceeding under and in accordance with the provisions

of this Act, and for the purposes of limitation, such application

if it is filed within a period of 270 days from the

commencement of this Act be deemed to have been filed on

the date of filing of the suit which was withdrawn and in case

of withdrawal of appeal or other proceedings on the date on

which the suit was filed out of which such appeal or

proceeding originated.”

17. Section 47 of the Act No.10 of 2008 which repeals the Act,

1960, provides that notwithstanding such repeal and subject to

the provisions of the Act or cases and other proceedings under

16. Section 47 in Andhra Pradesh Residential and NonResidential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017

“47. Repeal and savings.

2025:APHC:18792

18

the Act, 1960, pending at the commencement of the Act of 2018

shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the

provisions of the said Act, as if the said Act had continued in force

and the Act, 2018 had not been passed.

18. So, with respect to the pending matter, under the Act of

1960, pending on the date of enforcement of the Act No.10 of

2018, care has been taken with respect to the forum, i.e that,

those shall be continued in the same forum, as if the Act No.10 of

2018 had not been enacted and the Act of 1960 had not been

repealed. Further, under Section 47(2), option has been given to

the plaintiff within the specified period of 180 days of the, Act

No.10 of 2018 coming into force, permitting him to withdraw the

suit or proceeding under the Act, 1960, with opportunity to file

fresh application in respect of the subject matter under the Act

No.10 of 2018.

19. However, with respect to the fresh proceedings Act No.10

of 2018 provides for new forum of Rent Court under Section 2(h)

to be constituted under Section 30 and for the appeal to Rent

Tribunal under Section 2(j), constituted under Section 31 of the

Act 10 of 2018.

2025:APHC:18792

19

20. Section 2(h),(j), 30 and 31 of the Act No.10/2018 are as

under:-

“2(h) “Rent Court” means a Rent Court constituted under

Section 30;

2(j) “Rent Tribunal” means Rent Tribunal constituted under

Section 31;”

“30. Constitution of Rent Court. –

(1) The State Government may, by notification, constitute

such number of Rent Courts in as many urban areas as

may be deemed necessary by it.

(2) Where two or more Rent Courts are constituted for

any urban area, the State Government may, by general

or special order, regulate the distribution of business

among them.

(3) A Rent Court may consist of one person only

(hereinafter referred to as the Presiding Officer) to be

appointed by the State Government in consultation with

the High Court.

(4) No person shall be eligible to be appointed as

Presiding Officer of the Rent Court unless he is member

of the State Higher Judicial Service.

(5) The State Government may, in consultation with the

High Court, authorize the Presiding Officer of one rent

2025:APHC:18792

20

Court to discharge the functions of the Presiding Officer

of another Rent Court also.”

“31. Constitution of Rent Tribunal. –

(1) The State Government may, by notification, constitute

such number of Rent Tribunals at such places as may be

deemed necessary by it.

(2) Where two or more Rent Tribunals are constituted for

any area, the State Government may, by general or

special order, regulate the distribution of business among

them.

(3) The Rent Tribunal shall consist of one person only

(hereafter referred to as the presiding officer of the rent

Tribunal) to be appointed by the State Government in

consultation with the High Court.

(4) No person shall be eligible to be appointed as the

presiding officer of the Rent Tribunal unless he has been

High Court Judge.”

21. So, far the Rent Court/Tribunal under Act No.10 of 2018

have not been established.

22. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) provides as

under:

“The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained)

have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which

their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

2025:APHC:18792

21

Explanation [I ].-A suit in which the right to property or to an office

is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right

may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or

ceremonies.

[ Explanation II .-For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial

whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in

Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular

place.]”

23. It is well settled in law that exclusion of the jurisdiction of

the civil Court is not to be readily inferred. But it can be excluded

by specific provision or may also follow by necessary implication.

In the present case, Act 10/2018 exclusively bar the jurisdiction of

the Civil Court in respect of the matter under the Act 10/2018.

24. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is also barred. Section 40

of the Act No.10 of 2018 reads as under:-

“40. Jurisdiction of civil Courts barred in respect of certain

matters. – (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no

civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding insofar

as it relates to the provisions of this Act.”

25. A perusal of Section 40 of the Act No.10 of 2018, clearly

shows that save as otherwise provided, no civil court shall

entertain any suit or proceedings in so far as it relates to the

provisions of the Act No.10 of 2008. So, Section 40 clearly bars

2025:APHC:18792

22

the jurisdiction of the civil court with respect to the matters relating

to the provisions of the Act No.10 of 2008.

26. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in Mumtaz Yarud Dowla

Wakf (supra) that When a specialized forum is made available

under a statute, a civil court should normally entertain a dispute

which would otherwise not be amenable before the said Forum.

Therefore, rights and liabilities of the parties arising from an

enactment ought to be adjudicated upon in tune with the

mechanism provided thereunder. The reason being that the

provisions of the enactment ought to be given effect to through

such forums and therefore to the exclusion of a civil court whose

jurisdiction is otherwise to be inferred. Para 27 is reproduced as

under:

“27. When a specialized forum is made available under a

statute, a civil court should normally entertain a dispute which

would otherwise not be amenable before the said forum.

Therefore, rights and liabilities of the parties arising from an

enactment ought to be adjudicated upon in tune with the

mechanism provided thereunder. The reason being that the

provisions of the enactment ought to be given effect to

through such forums and therefore to the exclusion of a civil

court whose jurisdiction is otherwise to be inferred. J. Willes

in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford

2025:APHC:18792

23

[1859] 6 C.B. (NS) 336, “One is where there was a liability

existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a

Statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy

different from the remedy which existed at common law:

there, unless the Statute contains words which expressly or

by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy

the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the

statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the

Statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides, no

particular form of remedy: there, the party can only proceed

by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz.,

where a liability not existing at common law is created by a

Statute which at the same time gives a special and particular

remedy for enforcing it ........ The remedy provided by the

Statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party

to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.”

(emphasis supplied)”

27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mumtaj Yarud Dowla Wakf

(supra) further held that as a principle of law, the powers of the

civil court, being plenary in nature, the onus lies on the party who

contends that it lacked jurisdiction and further that, would not

take away the duty of the civil court to check its own jurisdiction,

more so when a specialized forum had come into being as a

creature of a statute. Para 28 is reproduced as under:

“28. As a principle of law, the powers of the civil court, being

plenary in nature, the onus lies on the party who contends

2025:APHC:18792

24

that it lacks jurisdiction. However, this does not take away the

duty of the civil court to check its own jurisdiction, more so

when a specialized forum has come into being as a creature

of a statute. Of course, there may be certain exceptions when

fundamental principles governing common law, including the

one pertaining to the principle of natural justice, stand

violated. To deal with the said issue one has to take into

consideration the objective behind the enactment, along with

the provisions contained thereunder. Dhulabhai etc. v. State

of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR

1969 SC 78, “32. Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri

Subayya, 1964-1 SCR 752 = (AIR 1964 SC 322) or Kamla

Mills, 1966 1 SCR 64 = (AIR 1965 SC 1942) can be said to

run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed. The result

of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court

may be stated as follows:

(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the

special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to

be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil

courts would normally do in a suit.

Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases

where the provisions of the particular Act have not been

complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in

conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial

procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the

court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to

find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided

2025:APHC:18792

25

may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction

of the civil court.

Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the

remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the

intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry

may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the

statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for

the determination of the right or liability and further lays down

that all questions about the said right and liability shall be

determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether

remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are

prescribed by the said statute or not.

xxxxx (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is

not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set

down apply.”

28. In such a situation, in Devathi Ramachandra Rao (supra),

where the suit for eviction was filed in the court of the Principal

Junior Civil Judge, Tenali and the plaint was returned for

presentation before the proper Forum, considering that the Act

No.10 of 2018 came into force with effect from 28.03.2018, which

contained, express bar to entertain the suit by the civil court,

under Section 40(1) and Section 32, also provided that only the

Rent Control Court and no civil court shall have jurisdiction to

hear and decide the applications relating to disputes between the

2025:APHC:18792

26

landlord and the tenant, and the matters connected with and rent

ancillary thereto, covered under the Act No.10 of 2018, this court

observed that the provisions of Sections 40 and 32 created

express bar to entertain any suit by the civil court, but under the

Act No.10 of 2018, no Tribunal was constituted. This Court

referring to the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra

Pradesh at Hyderabad, in W.P.No.9681 of 2008 dated

11.11.2008,( Sri Udasin Mutt rep by its Mahant Sri Arundas

Udasin, R/o Udasin Mutt H No 203311 Hussaini Alam

Hyderabad and The Deputy Commissioner of Endowments,

Endowments Department Hyderabad Andhra Pradesh)

allowed the revision and directed the learned court of Principal

Junior Civil Judge to entertain the suit.

29. The relevant part of para 6 in Devathi Ramachandra Rao

(supra), reads as under:

“Learned Counsel for the petitioner for the purpose

guiding this Court has submitted the ruling of the

erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at

Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 9681 of 2008,

dated11.11.2008, wherein this Court in the similar

situation held as follows by relying on the judgment

of the Honourable Apex Court.”

2025:APHC:18792

27

 "If is not uncommon that the Tribunal or

agencies are constituted to adjudicate the

disputes arising under the relevant enactments,

While in some cases, the arrangement is made

at the initial stage itself, in the other cases, they

are made by way of amendment. Wherever the

adjudicatory procedure or process is amended,

the known principle is that till the agency

contemplated under the law becomes functional,

the existing arrangement must continue. In fact,

that is the purport of the relevant provisions of

the General Clauses Act,

1897. In COMMISSIONER Of INCOME TAX v

DHADI SAHU [1994 (TLS)SCC 10853] , the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if) the

adjudicatory machinery contemplated under an

enactment is brought into existence, the

arrangement that has been functional prior to it

would continue, Similar view was taken in the

earlier judgments also."

30. Similarly in Mara Venkata Lingam (supra), also the

question was when the Rent Court/Tribunal as envisaged in

Section 30 of the Act No.10 of 2018 was not constituted, what

would be the remedy, and whether the civil court could entertain

the suit for injunction till such rent court was constituted. There

2025:APHC:18792

28

also, the suit was filed by the plaintiff contending that he was a

statutory tenant and could not be evicted from the shop in

tenancy, without following the due process of law. The plaint was

returned referring to Section 40 of the Act 10 of 2018.

Challenging the said order, the petition was filed. This Court

observed that the Act 10 2018, repealed the Act of 1960. The Act

No.10 of 2018 came into force from 28.03.2018 vide

G.O.Ms.No.118 (Municipal Administration and Urban

Development) Department dated 28.03.2018, issued as per

Section 1(3) of the Act 10 of 2018. It was observed that in view of

Section 40, the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred, in respect

of the matters relating to the provisions under the Act No.10 of

2010. However, this court held that since the Rent

Court/Tribunals were not constituted in terms of Section 30 of the

Act No.10 of 2018, the citizens could not be left remediless, in the

interregnum period. Referring to W.P.No.9681 of 2008 (supra)

Mara Venkata Lingam (supra) was also disposed of setting aside

the order of the civil court of return of plaint holding that, the civil

courts were vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

31. The relevant part of para 8 from Mara Venkata Lingam

(supra) reads as under:

2025:APHC:18792

29

“8. In W.P.No.9681 of 2008, the learned single in

this regard referred the judgment of the Hon'ble

Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax's

case referred supra, wherein it was held by the

Apex Court that till the adjudicatory machinery

contemplated under an enactment is brought into

existence, the arrangement that has been

functional prior to it would continue.”

32. In both the aforesaid judgments, Devathi Ramachandra

Rao (supra) and Mara Venkata Lingam (supra), this Court

referred to the order dated 11.11.2008 in W.P.No.9681 of 2008.

33. In W.P.No.9681 of 2008 vide order dated 11.11.2008

(Sri Udasin Mutt, represented by its Mahant Sri Arundas

Udasin vs. Deputy Commissioner of Endowments,

Endowments Department, Hyderabad and others, a

Coordinate Bench of this Court observed that It is not uncommon

that the Tribunal or agencies are constituted to adjudicate the

disputes arising under the relevant enactments. While in some

cases, the arrangement is made at the initial stage itself, in the

other cases, they are made by way of amendment. Wherever the

adjudicatory procedure or process is amended, the known

principle is that till the agency contemplated under the law

2025:APHC:18792

30

becomes functional the existing arrangement must continue. It

was further observed that whatever be the reason, the hiatus

could not permitted to continue.

34. The relevant part in W.P.No.9681 of 2008, reads as under:-

“It is not uncommon that the Tribunal or agencies are

constituted to adjudicate the disputes arising under the relevant

enactments. While in some cases, the arrangement is made at

the initial stage itself, in the other cases, they are made by way of

amendment. Wherever the adjudicatory procedure or process is

amended, the known principle is that till the agency contemplated

under the law becomes functional, the existing arrangement must

continue. In fact, that is the purport of the relevant provisions of

the General Clauses Act, 1897. In Dhadi Sahu (supra), the

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that till the adjudicatory machinery

contemplated under an enactment is brought into existence, the

arrangement that has been functional prior to it would continue.

Similar view was taken in the earlier judgment also.”

35. The Act, 10 of 2018 came into force on 28, March, 2018.

The jurisdiction under the said Act has been conferred on the

Rent Courts and the Rent Tribunal. Those should have been

2025:APHC:18792

31

constituted immediately. This Court finds that In Mara Venkata

Lingam (supra), para 5, it was observed and recoded as under:

“5. Sri Syed Khader Mastan, counsel representing the

Advocate General Office, on instructions would submit

that steps are now under afoot for establishment of the

Rent Courts as laid down under Section 30 of the Act

and within a reasonable time the Rent Courts will be

established in consultation with Hon'ble High Court.”

The aforesaid shows that way back on 18.06.2019, the statement

was made, that within a reasonable time the Rent Courts will be

established. Since then, almost six years are about to elapse but

the rent courts/Tribunals have not come into existence, giving rise

to a situation that there are no Rent Courts/Tribunals constituted

under the Act 10 of 2018. The Civil Courts jurisdiction is barred

under Sections 32 and 40 of the Act 10/2018. The Act also does

not provide for the mechanism to be followed till the constitution

of such rents courts/rent tribunal.

36. The party having the right to take recourse, under the Act,

2018 has not been provided the Forum. The Executive by its

inaction cannot take away the right conferred by the statute on

the landlord seeking redressal against the tenant or on the tenant

2025:APHC:18792

32

to enforce certain obligations of the landlord. It cannot be that

though the party aggrieved has the remedy provided by the

statute, but not the Forum to approach for redressal of grievance

and seek such remedy. This Court is of the view that, therefore,

under the circumstances, the Forum constituted under the Act,

1960, for redressal of the grievance of the landlord or/and tenant,

which are almost of the same nature under the Act 10/2018, can

very well address the grievances, till constitution of the Forum as

provided under the Act No.10/2018. For the grievance under the

Act No.10/2018 and its redressal, the land lord or/and tenant can

approach under the existing Forum created under the Act, 1960,

which still continues and shall have jurisdiction to decide the

disputes under the Act No. 10/2018 as well. It is provided that the

orders passed by such forum shall not be treated as without

jurisdiction on that count.

Point-B:

37. So far as the submission of the petitioner’s counsel that the

learned court has not decided the issue of landlord and tenant

relationship as a preliminary issue, this Court is of the view that

such issue could not be decided as a preliminary issue. Any

2025:APHC:18792

33

provision under the Act, 1960 or Act No. 10/2018 could not be

shown about the applicability of Order 14 Rule 2 C.P.C, nor any

independent provision under the aforesaid Act like Order 14 Rule

2 CPC.

38. However, this Court proceeds to deal with the aforesaid

submission considering the scope of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC.

39. Order 14 Rule 2 CPC reads as under:

“2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.

(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the

Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all

issues.

(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is

of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of

law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-

(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or

(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.

and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other

issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in

accordance with the decision on that issue.”

40. In Kandregula Rama Babu and others vs. Kondapalli

Venkata Lakshmi and others6

, this Court held in paragraphs

13,14,15, 16, 18 and 19 as under:


6

2024 sCC OnLine AP 5739

2025:APHC:18792

34

“13. In Ramesh B.Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta7

, the

Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Code confers no

jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of

law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision

on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be

tried as a preliminary issue.

14. Para No.13 of Ramesh B.Desai (supra), reads as

under:

.. “13. Sub-rule (2) of Order XIV Rule 2 CPC lays down that

where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and

the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be

disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if

that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar

to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. The

provisions of this Rule came up for consideration before this

Court in Major S.S. Khanna vs. Brig. F.J. Dillon AIR 1964 SC

497, and it was held as under:-

"Under O. 14 R. 2 where issues both of law and of fact

arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case

or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law

only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it

thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until

after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction

to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be

exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the whole

suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the

Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit

on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues.


7

(2006) 5 Superme Court Cases 638

2025:APHC:18792

35

Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the Court:

not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of

law depends upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in

a lop-sided trial of the suit."

Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of

Order XIV Rule 2 CPC by the Amending Act, 1976, but the

principle enunciated in the above quoted decision still

holds good and there can be no departure from the principle

that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit

on mixed issue of law and fact as a preliminary issue and

where the decision on issue of law depends upon decision of

fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue.

41. In Sathyanath v. Sarojamani8

, the Hon’ble Apex Court

observed and held as under:

“21. The provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 are part of the

procedural law, but the fact remains that such procedural law

had been enacted to ensure expeditious disposal of the lis and

in the event of setting aside of findings on preliminary issue,

the possibility of remand can be avoided, as was the language

prior to the unamended Order 14 Rule 2. If the issue is a

mixed issue of law and fact, or issue of law depends upon

the decision of fact, such issue cannot be tried as a

preliminary issue. In other words, preliminary issues can

be those where no evidence is required and on the basis

of reading of the plaint or the applicable law, if the jurisdiction

of the court of the bar to the suit is made out, the court may

decide such issues with the sole objective for the expeditious


8

(2022) 7 SCC 644

2025:APHC:18792

36

decision. I Thus, if the court lacks jurisdiction or there is a

statutory bar, such issue is required to be decided in the first

instance so that the process of civil court is not abused by the

litigants, who may approach the civil court to delay the

proceedings on false pretext

23. The different judgments of the High Court referred to above

are in consonance with the principles laid down by this Court

in Ramesh B. Desai(2006(5) SCC 638) that not all issues of

law can be decided as preliminary issues. Only those

issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues which

fell within the ambit of clause (a) relating to the

"jurisdiction of the Court" and (b) which deal with the bar

to the suit created by any law for the time being in force".

The reason to substitute Rule 2 is to avoid piecemeal trial,

protracted litigation and possibility of remand of the case,

where the appellate court differs with the decision of the trial

court on the preliminary issues upon which the trial court had

decided.”

42. In Mongia Realty and Buildwell Private Limited v. Manik

Sethi9

, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that when issues in both

law and facts arise in the same suit, the court may dispose of the

suit by trying the issue of law first. For this purpose, the provision

specifies two questions of law, which are 1) jurisdiction of the

court; and 2) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time

being in force. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the issue


9

(2022) 11 SCC 572

2025:APHC:18792

37

of limitation can also be determined as a preliminary issue under

Order XIV Rule 2 CPC, if the issue of limitation is based on

admitted fact. However, if the facts surrounding the issue of

limitation are disputed, it cannot be decided as a preliminary

issue.

43. It is thus well settled in law that it is only the pure questions

of law, that can be decided as preliminary issues and not the

questions of fact or even mixed questions of law and fact. Those

require the determination on the basis of the evidence adduced

during trial/proceedings.

44. It is also settled in law that in case of dispute as to facts, it is

necessary to be determined, to give a finding on a question of

law, such question cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. In a

case, where the facts are disputed and the question of law is

dependent upon the outcome of the investigation of facts, such

question would not be a pure question of law and cannot be

decided as preliminary issue.”

45. In view of the aforesaid, the question of relationship of

landlord and tenant which is a factual dispute, has rightly not

been decided at this stage of proceedings as a preliminary issue.

2025:APHC:18792

38

Point-C:

46. In view of the consideration made in Points A & B above,

the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality and calls

for no interference.

Result:

47. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No

order as to costs.

48. Let the copy of this judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary

to the Government, Government of Andhra Pradesh, to the

Secretary Law to Government of Andhra Pradesh and to the

learned Advocate General for the State of Andhra Pradesh for

necessary action, for constitution of Rent Court and Rent Tribunal

under the Andhra Pradesh Residential and Non-Residential

Premises Tenancy Act, 2017 (Act No.10 of 2018) also

considering para 35 and 36 of this judgment.

2025:APHC:18792

39

Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this matter, shall

also stand closed.

___________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI,J

Date:09.05.2025.

Note:L.R copy to be marked.

B/o.Gk.

2025:APHC:18792

40

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

C.R.P.No.3018 OF 2024

Date:09.05.2025.

Gk

2025:APHC:18792

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872—Sections 45, 68, 73 Will—Proof of Signature—Expert Opinion—Admissibility—Comparison of Signatures. The mode of proving a Will under Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act (requiring proof through attesting witnesses) does not bar the application of Section 45 (Expert Opinion) read with Section 73 (Court's power to compare signatures). The report/evidence of a handwriting expert on the testator's disputed signature is admissible as opinion evidence and a relevant fact, which may assist the Court in eliciting the truth, though it is not conclusive and cannot substitute the substantive evidence of the attesting witnesses. Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 86 and Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529, referred to. B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)—Order 26 Rule 10A; Constitution of India—Article 227 Will—Dispute over Genuineness—Handwriting Expert—Trial Court Discretion. Where a plaintiff, in a partition suit, disputes the genuineness of two Wills (Exs. B2 & B7) relied upon by the defendants, the Trial Court's decision to allow an interlocutory application (I.A.) to send the disputed signatures to a handwriting expert for comparison with admitted signatures is a valid exercise of judicial discretion. Such an exercise, aimed at securing assistance to arrive at a just conclusion, is permissible and warrants no interference under the supervisory jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. C. Indian Succession Act, 1925—Section 63(c) Will—Proof—Nature of Expert Evidence. While the propounder must prove the Will by removing all suspicious circumstances, including doubts as to the genuineness of the testator's signature, the expert's opinion remains merely corroborative and a piece of opinion evidence; it does not bind the Court or supplant the primary requirement of proving execution through attestation.

 

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872—Sections 45, 68, 73

Will—Proof of Signature—Expert Opinion—Admissibility—Comparison of Signatures. The mode of proving a Will under Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act (requiring proof through attesting witnesses) does not bar the application of Section 45 (Expert Opinion) read with Section 73 (Court's power to compare signatures). The report/evidence of a handwriting expert on the testator's disputed signature is admissible as opinion evidence and a relevant fact, which may assist the Court in eliciting the truth, though it is not conclusive and cannot substitute the substantive evidence of the attesting witnesses.


Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 86 and Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529, referred to.


B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)—Order 26 Rule 10A; Constitution of India—Article 227

Will—Dispute over Genuineness—Handwriting Expert—Trial Court Discretion. Where a plaintiff, in a partition suit, disputes the genuineness of two Wills (Exs. B2 & B7) relied upon by the defendants, the Trial Court's decision to allow an interlocutory application (I.A.) to send the disputed signatures to a handwriting expert for comparison with admitted signatures is a valid exercise of judicial discretion. Such an exercise, aimed at securing assistance to arrive at a just conclusion, is permissible and warrants no interference under the supervisory jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution of India.


C. Indian Succession Act, 1925—Section 63(c)

Will—Proof—Nature of Expert Evidence. While the propounder must prove the Will by removing all suspicious circumstances, including doubts as to the genuineness of the testator's signature, the expert's opinion remains merely corroborative and a piece of opinion evidence; it does not bind the Court or supplant the primary requirement of proving execution through attestation.



* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 343/2025

% .05.2025

# Matta Padma & 2 others.

……Petitioners

And:

$ Matta Venkata Rattaiah & 9 others

….Respondents

!Counsel for the petitioners : Sri Siva Prasad Reddy Venati


^Counsel for the respondent :



<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1. AIR 1964 SC 529

2. AIR 1959 SC 443

3. AIR 1962 SC 567

4. (1973) 2 SCC 86

5. (2006) 13 SCC 65

6. (2012) 8 SCC 263

2025:APHC:20073

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

* * * *

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 343/2025

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: .05.2025

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgments?

Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals

Yes/No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair

copy of the Judgment?

Yes/No

____________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI,J

2025:APHC:20073

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 343/2025

ORDER:

Heard Sri Siva Prasad Reddy Venati, learned counsel for the

petitioners.

2. This Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India has

been filed by the petitioners who are defendant Nos.6 to 8 in O.S.No.364 of

2010 pending in the Court of Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division),

Machilipatnam, Krishna District filed by the plaintiff/respondent No.1 herein.

3. The said suit was filed for partition of the plaint schedule properties

against the defendants/respondent Nos.2 to 10 and present petitioners.

4. In the said suit, the defendant Nos.5, 6 to 8 took a plea that the owner

of the property executed Wills in their favour with regard to the plaint schedule

property. Defendant Nos.5, 6 to 8 produced two different Wills said to be

executed by Matta Suryanarayana with respect to the plaint schedule property

and they were marked as Ex.B2 & B7 respectively.

5. The plaintiff/respondent No.1 herein filed I.A.No.858 of 2024, inter-alia

submitting that Matta Suryanarayana never executed any Will. He requested

to get the signature of the alleged Wills compared with the admitted signatures

of Matta Suryanarayana and prayed to send the alleged signatures on the

Wills Ex.B2 and B7 to compare with the admitted signatures to the expert.

2025:APHC:20073

6. The present petitioners along with defendant Nos.2, 10 to 12 objected

I.A.No.858 of 2024 and they filed the counters. The petitioners submitted that

the Will could not be sent for comparison and requested to dismiss the

petition. They also filed a memo along with the judgments on which they

placed reliance before the learned Trial Court.

7. The defendant Nos.3 and 9 were set ex-parte.

8. Learned Trial Court framed the following point for consideration:

“Whether the petitioner is entitled to seek the Court to send the Wills Ex.B2

and B7 allegedly executed by Matta Suryanarayana for comparison by the

handwriting expert with the admitted signature of Matta Suryanarayana?”

9. On consideration of the judgments on which reliance was placed,

learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was disputing the

genuineness of both the Wills, as also signature thereon and as based on

those Wills Ex.B2 & B7, the defendants were claiming the property and

deciding the claim of the plaintiff, so, there being a serious dispute, it was safe

to take the assistance of the handwriting expert instead of the Court itself

examining the signature. Being of such an opinion it recorded that the

signature of Matta Suryanarayana required examination by the expert, I.A was

allowed. The petitioner therein i.e., plaintiff/respondent No.1 was directed to

file other admitted and contemporaneous signatures and hand writing of Matta

Suryanarayana, if any, to send to the expert for examination with the disputed

signature of Ex.B2 & B7.

10. Challenging the said order dated 22.01.2025, the present Civil Revision

Petition has been filed by the defendant Nos.6 to 8.

2025:APHC:20073

11. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned Court

ought not to have allowed I.A.No.858 of 2024 and ought not to have sent

Ex.B2 & B7 - Wills for comparison of signature of Matta Suryanarayana to the

hand writing expert with his admitted signature. He submitted that in the suit,

the Will is to be proved, as per the provisions of Section 63(c) of the Indian

Succession Act read with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. Additionally,

the plaintiff has to remove the suspicious circumstances surroundings the

execution of Will. He submitted that in view of the legal provisions for proof of

Will the same could not be sent for expert opinion on signatures of testator.

12. I have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material

on record.

13. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners with

respect to the proof of the Will is concerned, there can be no dispute that Will

is required to be proved as per the legal provisions of Section 68 of Indian

Evidence Act and Section 63 (c) of Indian Succession Act.

14. In Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee 1

, the

Constitution Bench, of the Hon’ble Apex Court on the point of proof of Will,

referred to the cases of H.Venkata – Chala Iyengar v. B.N.Thimmajamma 2

& Rani Purnima Devi v. Khagendra Narayan Dev3

and held that the mode

of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other

document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the


1

AIR 1964 SC 529

2

AIR 1959 SC 443

3

AIR 1962 SC 567

2025:APHC:20073

case of a Will by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving

the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances

surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the

signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus.

Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the

propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court, before the Court

accepts the will as genuine. Where the caveator alleges undue influence,

fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. Even where there

are no such pleas but the circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the

propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. The suspicious

circumstances may be as to genuineness of the signature of the testator, the

condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the will being

unnatural improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or there

might be other indication in the will to show that the testator's mind was not

free. In such a case the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate

suspicion should be completely removed before the document is accepted as

the last will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes part in the

execution of the will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a

circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to

remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder

succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the Court would grant

probate, even if the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part

near relations.

2025:APHC:20073

15. However, the submission advanced is that, in view of those legal

provisions on proof of Will, the signature on Will could not be sent for

comparison, which cannot be accepted. The aforesaid provisions do not

create a bar for comparison of signature on the Will. Simply because the

mode of proof of the Will is provided by Section 63(c) of Indian Succession Act

and Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act, applicability of Section 45 of Indian

Evidence Act, in respect of the comparison of signature of the Will, in the view

of this Court, cannot be excluded.

16. In Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra), the report of the expert with

respect to the signature on the Will of the testator was also submitted. The

Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the report of the expert, observed and held

that the evidence of the expert is not conclusive and could not falsify the

evidence of the attesting witnesses as also the circumstances which went to

show that the Will must have been signed in 1943 as it purported to be. The

Hon’ble Apex Court held that the expert’s evidence as to handwriting is an

opinion evidence and it can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive

evidence. Before acting on such evidence it was usual to see if it was

corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. As

in the said case, it was found that all the probabilities were against the

expert’s opinion and the direct testimony of the two attesting witnesses, which

was accepted, was wholly in-consistent with expert opinion, in the

circumstances of that case, it was held that mere opinion of the expert could

not override the positive evidence of the attesting, witnesses.

2025:APHC:20073

17. So from Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra), it is settled that the expert

evidence with respect to the signature on the Will, is merely an opinion

evidence, which cannot be substitute for the substantive evidence of the

attesting witness. The expert report/evidence is only an opinion evidence and

not conclusive. But, the opinion evidence though not binding on the Courts,

may be of assistance in the light of the other evidences led in the suit,

including the evidence of attestators, other witnesses and also the

circumstance evidence. It may also have a corroborative value. Even in

Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra), the report of expert was not discarded on

the ground that it could not be called or submitted. Besides, Section 45 of the

Indian Evidence Act or any other provisions of Indian Evidence Act or of

Indian Succession Act, could not be shown creating a legal bar for comparison

of disputed signature on the Will.

18. In Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh4

, the Hon’ble Apex Court

held that expert opinion adduced in evidence has to be received with great

caution. But, this opinion evidence, is relevant, which may be worthy of

acceptance, if there is internal or external evidence relating to the document in

question supporting the view expressed by the expert.

19. Para No.6 in Ram Narain (supra) reads as under:

“In our view, the legal position enunciated in Fakhruddin’s case (supra) cannot

be said to be inconsistent with the ratio of any one of the earlier decisions to

which reference has been made therein. Now it is no doubt true that the

opinion of a hand-writing expert given in evidence is no less fallible than

any other expert opinion adduced in evidence with the result that such

evidence has to be received with great caution. But this opinion evidence,

which is relevant, may be worthy of acceptance if there is internal or


4

(1973) 2 SCC 86

2025:APHC:20073

external evidence relating to the document in question supporting the

view expressed by the expert. If after comparison of the disputed and the

admitted writings by the Court itself, when the Presiding Officer is familiar with

that language, it is considered safe to accept the opinion of the expert then the

conclusion so arrived at cannot be assailed on special leave on the mere

ground that comparison hand-writing is generally considered as hazardous and

inclusive and that the opinion of the hand-writing expert has to be received with

considerable caution. The question in each case falls for determination on the

appreciation of evidence and unless some serious infirmity or gave failure of

justice is shown, this Court would normally refrain from re-appraising the matter

on appeal by special leave. the Trial Court in this case agreeing with the

principle of law enunciated by this Court compared the relevant documents and

arrived at the conclusion that they have all been written in one hand. The

learned II Temporary Sessions Judge on appeal, after referring to the

comparison of the disputed and specimen writings by the Trial Magistrate,

himself compared those writings with the help of the expert's opinion and his

report and came to a definite conclusion "that the disputed hand-writings tally

with the specimen hand-writing". In the High Court also the learned Single

Judge, after referring to the decision in Fakhruddin casw (supra), observed as

follows :-

"I have myself made a comparison of the specimen writing of the

applicant with the writing contained in the two letters. I have not the least

doubt that the writing in the post-card and the writing in the admitted

writing of the applicant are the same. Thus, I have no reason to differ

from the finding recorded by the courts below."

20. In Baso Prasad v. State of Bihar5

, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that

opinion of an expert, is a relevant fact. The Court may, thus, take the expert

opinion into consideration. But, appreciation of evidence is the Court’s job.

21. Para Nos.37 & 38 in Baso Prasad (supra) read as under:

“37. Opinion of an expert, therefore, is a relevant fact. The court may, thus,

take the expert opinion into consideration. But appreciation of evidence is the

court's job.

38. It is, thus, for the court to arrive at an opinion as to which part of

contradictory expert opinion should be accepted or whether in a given

situation ocular evidence should be believed in preference to medical

evidence or vice versa.”

22. In Dayal Sing v. State of Uttaranchal6

, the Hon’ble Apex Court held

that the courts, normally, look at expert evidence with a greater sense of


5

(2006) 13 SCC 65

2025:APHC:20073

acceptability, but it is equally true that the courts are not absolutely guided by

the report of the experts, especially if such reports are perfunctory,

unsustainable and are the result of a deliberate attempt to misdirect the

prosecution.

23. Para No.35 in Dayal Singh (supra) reads as under:

“35. This brings us to an ancillary issue as to how the Court would

appreciate the evidence in such cases. The possibility of some variations in

the exhibits, medical and ocular evidence cannot be ruled out. But it is not that

every minor variation or inconsistency would tilt the balance of justice in favour

of the accused. Of course, where contradictions and variations are of a

serious nature, which apparently or impliedly are destructive of the substantive

case sought to be proved by the prosecution, they may provide an advantage

to the accused. The Courts, normally, look at expert evidence with a

greater sense of acceptability, but it is equally true that the courts are

not absolutely guided by the report of the experts, especially if such

reports are perfunctory, unsustainable and are the result of a deliberate

attempt to misdirect the prosecution. In Kamaljit Singh v. State of

Punjab {(2003) 12 SCC 155}, the Court, while dealing with discrepancies

between ocular and medical evidence, held:

“8. It is trite law that minor variations between medical evidence and

ocular evidence do not take away the primacy of the latter. Unless

medical evidence in its term goes so far as to completely rule out all

possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner stated

by the eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be

thrown out”.”

25. Learned Trial Court has observed that the opinion of the expert does

not bind the Court. Though the Court itself can compare the disputed

signature with the admitted signature under Section 73 of the Evidence Act,

but it recorded that it would be safe to take the assistance of the hand writing

expert. Learned Trial Court recorded that immediately after getting the

documents marked by the defendant Nos.6 to 8, the plaintiff filed an

application for comparison of signature of Ex.B2 & B7 with the admitted


6

(2012) 8 SCC 263

2025:APHC:20073

signatures. The Court could look into the report of the expert if necessary for

comparison of signature. So, the Court could sent the documents for

comparison. This Court is of the view that if the learned Trial Court in its

wisdom considered it appropriate that the disputed signature of the Will be

sent for comparison to elicit the truth, but at the same time was also conscious

of the legal provision that the report of the expert is not binding on the Court

and may be only of assistance, there is no reason for this Court to interfere

with the exercise of such discretion by the learned Trial Court.

26. If the petitioners feel aggrieved from the finding recorded during trial,

they would have the remedy. But it is not the stage to submit that the disputed

signature could not be sent for comparison with the contemporaneous

signature of the testator.

27. The civil revision petition has no merit and is dismissed.

No order as to costs.

As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also

stand closed.

____________________

RAVI NATH TILHARI, J

Dated: .05.2025

Note: LR copy be marked

B/o.

AG

2025:APHC:20073

582

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 343/2025

Dated: .05.2025

Note: LR copy be marked

B/o.

AG

2025:APHC:20073