. Criminal Law — Sections 302/149, 307/149, 147, 148 IPC — Unlawful assembly — Common object — Murder — Aggressor identified When a group of accused persons, forming an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, attack another party causing death and injuries, and the evidence establishes that the accused were the aggressors, conviction under Sections 302/149 and 307/149 IPC is justified. Common object need not be premeditated; it can form on the spot when the members act in concert to commit the offence. 2. Evidence — Injured eyewitness — Credibility and evidentiary value Testimony of an injured eyewitness carries greater evidentiary value and cannot be discarded lightly. Unless shown to be unreliable or inconsistent with medical evidence, such testimony is sufficient to sustain conviction. (Ref: Bangal Singh (PW-2) — injured witness whose version corroborated by other eyewitnesses and medical evidence.) 3. Criminal Jurisprudence — Cross cases — Determination of aggressor In cases of cross FIRs arising out of the same incident, the Court must ascertain which party was the aggressor. The mere existence of injuries on both sides does not make it a “free fight.” When the accused side initiates the attack and inflicts fatal injuries, they cannot claim parity or right of private defence. (Here, appellants demolished the ridge and launched attack with sharp weapons.) 4. Delay in lodging FIR — Not always fatal Delay in lodging the FIR is not by itself sufficient to discard the prosecution case if the delay is reasonably explained — for example, when time was spent in taking the injured to hospital or arranging for treatment. (Complainant side’s delay of 3 days was explained satisfactorily.) 5. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC — “Sudden fight” — When not applicable The fourth exception to Section 300 (sudden fight, without premeditation, in heat of passion) is not applicable when: The accused side is the aggressor; Deadly weapons are used; Multiple blows are inflicted with intention to kill; and The attack is not in self-defence. (Hence, conviction for murder under Section 302/149 IPC upheld; not reduced to 304 Part II.) 6. Appeal under Article 136 — Interference with concurrent findings The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and High Court unless such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or involve gross misappreciation of material evidence. (Here, concurrent findings were consistent and supported by credible evidence.) 7. Motive — Boundary dispute — Supporting evidence Existence of a motive (boundary dispute decided against the accused) corroborates the prosecution case and reinforces the inference of premeditation and common object. 8. Medical evidence — Consistency with ocular testimony Medical evidence corroborating the nature and seat of injuries described by eyewitnesses strengthens the prosecution version. (Fatal incised wounds on the skull consistent with use of sharp-edged weapons like tabal and spade.) 9. Sentencing — Life imprisonment — Justified Where two persons were killed and others grievously injured in a deliberate group assault, the sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302/149 IPC and 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 IPC is justified and proportionate.

. Criminal Law — Sections 302/149, 307/149, 147, 148 IPC — Unlawful assembly — Common object — Murder — Aggressor identified

When a group of accused persons, forming an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, attack another party causing death and injuries, and the evidence establishes that the accused were the aggressors, conviction under Sections 302/149 and 307/149 IPC is justified. Common object need not be premeditated; it can form on the spot when the members act in concert to commit the offence.

2. Evidence — Injured eyewitness — Credibility and evidentiary value

Testimony of an injured eyewitness carries greater evidentiary value and cannot be discarded lightly. Unless shown to be unreliable or inconsistent with medical evidence, such testimony is sufficient to sustain conviction.
(Ref: Bangal Singh (PW-2) — injured witness whose version corroborated by other eyewitnesses and medical evidence.)

3. Criminal Jurisprudence — Cross cases — Determination of aggressor

In cases of cross FIRs arising out of the same incident, the Court must ascertain which party was the aggressor. The mere existence of injuries on both sides does not make it a “free fight.” When the accused side initiates the attack and inflicts fatal injuries, they cannot claim parity or right of private defence.
(Here, appellants demolished the ridge and launched attack with sharp weapons.)

4. Delay in lodging FIR — Not always fatal

Delay in lodging the FIR is not by itself sufficient to discard the prosecution case if the delay is reasonably explained — for example, when time was spent in taking the injured to hospital or arranging for treatment.
(Complainant side’s delay of 3 days was explained satisfactorily.)

5. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC — “Sudden fight” — When not applicable

The fourth exception to Section 300 (sudden fight, without premeditation, in heat of passion) is not applicable when:

• The accused side is the aggressor;

• Deadly weapons are used;

• Multiple blows are inflicted with intention to kill; and

• The attack is not in self-defence.
  (Hence, conviction for murder under Section 302/149 IPC upheld; not reduced to 304 Part II.)

6. Appeal under Article 136 — Interference with concurrent findings

The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and High Court unless such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or involve gross misappreciation of material evidence.
(Here, concurrent findings were consistent and supported by credible evidence.)

7. Motive — Boundary dispute — Supporting evidence

Existence of a motive (boundary dispute decided against the accused) corroborates the prosecution case and reinforces the inference of premeditation and common object.

8. Medical evidence — Consistency with ocular testimony

Medical evidence corroborating the nature and seat of injuries described by eyewitnesses strengthens the prosecution version.
(Fatal incised wounds on the skull consistent with use of sharp-edged weapons like tabal and spade.)

9. Sentencing — Life imprisonment — Justified

Where two persons were killed and others grievously injured in a deliberate group assault, the sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302/149 IPC and 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 IPC is justified and proportionate.2025 INSC 1262

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 1 of 25

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1624 OF 2011

OM PAL & ORS …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P

(NOW STATE OF UTTARAKHAND) …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1613-1614 OF 2011

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. The present set of Appeals is directed against the common judgment and

order dated 29.11.2010 whereby the High Court dismissed the criminal appeals

filed by the appellants against their conviction under Section 302 read with

Sections 149 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601.

1 “IPC”

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 2 of 25

2. In the present set of Appeals, Criminal Appeal No.1624 of 2011 is filed by

appellants – Om Pal, Narendra and Ranvir; Criminal Appeal No.1613 of 2011 is

filed by Dharamvir; and Criminal Appeal No.1614 of 2011 was filed by Inchha

Ram, who has passed away during the pendency of the present Appeals.

Therefore, Criminal Appeal No.1614 of 2011 preferred by Inchha Ram stands

abated and the same is, accordingly, dismissed as such.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX

3. In the present case, two sets of First Information Reports2 were lodged with

regard to the same incident which took place on 19.05.1988.

THE FIRST FIR

4. FIR No.65 dated 20.05.1988 was lodged under Sections 147, 148, 149,

323, 324 and 307 of the IPC from the side of the appellants stating that one

Molhar along with his brother Kantu and his sons, Narendra, Om Pal, Inchha,

Ranvir and Pardeep were cutting sugar cane and at the same time, Dile Ram,

Ved Pal, Bengal Singh, Sher Singh entered the field of the appellants along with

lathis, tabals and axes and started attacking the appellants. There was a fight

that ensued and, in the process, Kantu, Narendra, lnchha received several

injuries.

THE SECOND FIR

5. FIR No. 65A/1988 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 324 and 506

of the IPC was lodged by the opposite/complainant side on 23.05.1988 that

2 “FIR”

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 3 of 25

Molhar and Dharamvir Singh damaged their boundary of the field on 19.05.1988

and, thereafter, the appellants started beating Dile Ram with lathis, tabals, axes,

phawara due to which Dile Ram, Braham Singh and Bangal Singh received

serious injuries, both were taken to hospital where Dile Ram succumbed to the

injuries on 24.5.1988 and Braham Singh expired on 31.5.1988.

6. Taking into account the two sets of FIR, FIR No.65 gave rise to Session

Trial No.57 of 1992 and FIR No. 65A emanated into Session Trial No.56 of 1992.

7. In Session Trial No.56 of 1992, out of which the present Appeals have

arisen, all the seven accused persons were found guilty of the offences

punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, and Section 307 read

with Section 149 IPC. Each of them were sentenced to imprisonment for life and

a fine of ₹10,000/- under Section 302/149 IPC, rigorous imprisonment for 10

years and a fine of ₹10,000/- under Section 307/149 IPC. Additionally, the

accused persons were individually sentenced to the following:

Appellant Offence Sentence

Molhar Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Kantu Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Om Pal Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Narendra Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Ranvir Section 147 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Inchha Ram Section 148 IPC R.I. for 2 years

Dharamvir Section 148 IPC R.I. for 2 years

8. On the other hand, in Sessions Trial No.57 of 1992, which emanated from

FIR No. 65A lodged by the appellants, all the accused persons were acquitted. 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 4 of 25

9. Aggrieved by the judgment in Session Trial No.56 of 1992 convicting the

appellants, three separate appeals were preferred — Criminal Appeal No.1516 of

2001 by Molhar and Dharamvir, Criminal Appeal No.921 of 2001 by Kantu and

Criminal Appeal No.922 of 2001 by Om Pal, Narendra, Inchha Ram and Ranvir

before the Allahabad High Court.

10. Aggrieved by the judgment in Session Trial No.57 of 1992, Criminal

Revision No.321 of 2001 was filed by Molhar Singh before the Allahabad High

Court.

11. All the three criminal appeals and the criminal revision were transferred

to the High Court of Uttarakhand under Section 35 of the Uttar Pradesh

Reorganization Act, 2000 after the formation of the State of Uttarakhand.

12. The High Court of Uttarakhand vide its common impugned judgment and

order dated 29.11.2010 after reappreciating the entire evidence of the

prosecution, dismissed all the criminal appeals and the criminal revision filed by

appellants. Thus, the High Court vide impugned judgment affirmed the

conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court in Sessions Trial No.56 of

1992.

13. The appellants are now before us assailing the judgment passed by the

High Court which affirmed their conviction.

B. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

14. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that the present case is not of

a premeditated murder but a result of a free fight that ensued between the two 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 5 of 25

groups. As the injuries were sustained on both sides, the possibility of the

appellants exercising their self-defense cannot be ruled out. Also, the fact that

none of the witnesses could attribute specific role to any particular accused,

thus, it indicates that it was a case of free fight.

15. Additionally, it was the side of the appellants that lodged the first FIR. It

was also argued that the cross-FIR from the side of the complainant was in fact

lodged after three days of the incident by the son of the deceased Dile Ram and

not by the injured eyewitness.

16. Learned counsel for the appellants have also questioned the testimonies

of the eyewitnesses. In a nutshell, it was argued that the conviction of the

appellants under Section 302/149 of the IPC is totally misconceived and, if at all

they are liable, they can be liable only under Section 304 Part II of the IPC as

their case falls under fourth exception to Section 300 IPC.

17. To bolster their submissions, the appellants have relied on the decisions

of this Court in Puran vs. State of Rajasthan3, Pappu vs. State of M.P.

4,

Kailash vs. State of M.P.

5, Vadla Chandraiah vs. State of A.P.

6 and

Sandhya Jadhav (Smt.) vs. State of Maharashtra7.

18. Per contra, the respondent-State has argued that the appellants had the

motive for killing Dile Ram since the consolidation proceedings were pending

3 (1976) 1 SCC 28

4 (2006) 7 SCC 391

5 (2006) 11 SCC 420

6 (2006) 13 SCC 587

7 (2006) 4 SCC 653

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 6 of 25

between the parties, but in the consolidation proceedings, the field was given to

Dile Ram, which enraged the appellants.

19. It was also argued that it was the appellants who were the aggressors.

They are the ones who attacked on the complainant side. PW-2 (Bangal Singh)

(injured eyewitness) in his testimony had stated that the appellants’ lathi

contained an arc shaped iron blade. Hence, it cannot be stated that the injuries

on the person of accused are not explained.

20. The State has argued that the fourth exception to Section 300 of the IPC

is not attracted in the present case considering that it was a shared motive on

the part of the appellants to cause death on the complainant side. Additionally,

on the issue of delay in lodging the FIR by the complainant, the State argues that

the Trial Court has rejected this contention as the delay was well explained by

the complainant side. Thus, the present Appeals need no interference and the

conviction against the appellants be upheld in toto.

21. To bolster its submissions, the State relied on the decisions of this Court

in Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy vs. State of A.P.8 and Abdul

Sayeed vs. State of Madya Pradesh9.

22. The rival submissions now fall for our analysis.

C. ANALYSIS

23. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having

gone through the material on record, the only question that falls for our

8 (2006) 11 SCC 444

9 (2010) 10 SCC 259

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 7 of 25

consideration is whether the High Court committed an error in passing the

impugned judgment and order?

24. As the appellants before us seek for interference with the concurrent

findings by two Courts below, this Court generally should be slow in interfering

with the concurrent findings. In Mekala Sivaiah vs. State of Andhra

Pradesh10, this Court observed as follows:

“15. It is well settled by judicial pronouncement that

Article 136 is worded in wide terms and powers conferred

under the said Article are not hedged by any technical

hurdles. This overriding and exceptional power is,

however, to be exercised sparingly and only in furtherance

of cause of justice. Thus, when the judgment under appeal

has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice by some

misapprehension or misreading of evidence or by ignoring

material evidence then this Court is not only empowered

but is well expected to interfere to promote the cause of

justice.

16. It is not the practice of this Court to reappreciate the

evidence for the purpose of examining whether the findings

of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial court and the

High Court are correct or not. It is only in rare and

exceptional cases where there is some manifest illegality or

grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of

misreading or ignoring material evidence that this Court

would interfere with such finding of fact.”

(Emphasis supplied)

25. The scope of this Court for interference under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India was further explained in Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail

Mohd. Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra11

“23. Again, in Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC

219:1974 SCC (Cri) 837], this Court also held that the

powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the

10 (2022) 8 SCC 253

11 (2023) 12 SCC 558 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 8 of 25

Constitution are wide but in criminal appeals this Court

does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact

save in exceptional circumstances. In

Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham [(1979) 2 SCC

297:1979 SCC (Cri) 454], this Court, while agreeing with

the views expressed on the aforesaid mentioned decisions

of this Court, has thus stated : (SCC p. 300, para 4)

“4. … The power is plenary in the sense

that there are no words in Article 136 itself

qualifying that power. But, the very nature

of the power has led the court to set limits

to itself within which to exercise such

power. It is now the well-established

practice of this Court to permit the

invocation of the power under Article 136

only in very exceptional circumstances, as

when a question of law of general public

importance arises or a decision shocks the

conscience of the court. But, within the

restrictions imposed by itself, this Court

has the undoubted power to interfere even

with findings of fact, making no distinction

between judgments of acquittal and

conviction, if the High Court, in arriving at

those findings, has acted “perversely or

otherwise improperly”.”

(emphasis supplied)”

24. In Nain Singh v. State of U.P. [(1991) 2 SCC 432:

1991 SCC (Cri) 421] , in which all the aforesaid decisions

as referred to hereinabove were considered and after

considering the aforesaid decisions on the question of

exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution

and after agreeing with the views expressed in the

aforesaid decisions, the Court finally laid down the

principle that the evidence adduced by the prosecution

in that decision fell short of the test of reliability and

acceptability and, therefore, was highly unsafe to act

upon it. In State of U.P. v. Babul Nath [(1994) 6 SCC 29:

1994 SCC (Cri) 1585], this Court, while considering the

scope of Article 136 as to when this Court is entitled to

upset the findings of fact, observed as follows : (SCC p.

33, para 5)

“5. At the very outset we may mention that

in an appeal under Article 136 of the

Constitution this Court does not normally

reappraise the evidence by itself and go

into the question of credibility of the

witnesses and the assessment of the 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 9 of 25

evidence by the High Court is accepted by

the Supreme Court as final unless, of

course, the appreciation of evidence and

finding is vitiated by any error of law of

procedure or found contrary to the

principles of natural justice, errors of

record and misreading of the evidence, or

where the conclusions of the High Court

are manifestly perverse and

unsupportable from the evidence on

record.”

25. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court on the

exercise of power of the Supreme Court under Article 136

of the Constitution, the following principles emerge:

25.1. The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution are very wide but in criminal appeals this

Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of

fact save in exceptional circumstances.

25.2. It is open to this Court to interfere with the findings

of fact recorded by the High Court if the High Court

has acted perversely or otherwise improperly.

25.3. It is open to this Court to invoke the power under

Article 136 only in very exceptional circumstances as and

when a question of law of general public importance

arises or a decision shocks the conscience of the Court.

25.4. When the evidence adduced by the

prosecution falls short of the test of reliability and

acceptability and as such it is highly unsafe to act upon

it.

25.5. Where the appreciation of evidence and finding is

vitiated by any error of law of procedure or found contrary

to the principles of natural justice, errors of record and

misreading of the evidence, or where the conclusions of

the High Court are manifestly perverse and

unsupportable from the evidence on record.”

26. The parties in the present matter are close relatives of each other as they

happen to be the descendants of a common ancestor. There was a long-standing

dispute between the rival parties due to the pending land boundary dispute. On 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 10 of 25

the day of the incident, an altercation took place between both the groups as the

appellants had broken the mendh (ridge) between the farmlands of the appellants

and the complainant side. Both the sides inflicted injuries on each other, leading

to the death of Dile Ram and Braham Singh.

27. To prove the guilt of the appellants, the prosecution examined PW-1 (Tejpal

Singh) (complainant and son of deceased Dile Ram), PW-2 (Bangal Singh)

(injured and eyewitness), PW-3 (Mahendra Singh) (eyewitness), PW-4 (Mohan Lal

@ Som) (another eyewitness), PW-5 (Dr. R.K. Singhal) (who conducted

postmortem examination on the dead body of Braham Singh), PW-6 (Constable

Jeet Singh) (who registered the case and prepared chik report of both the cross

cases), PW-7 (Dr. Harish Chandra Dua) (who recorded injuries of the accused

and injured), PW-8 (Sub-Inspector D.C. Yadav) (who started the investigation),

PW-9 (Inspector P.C. Pant) (who completed the investigation), and PW-10 (Dr.

P.S. Chahal) (who conducted postmortem examination on dead body of Dile

Ram).

28. In their statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973, appellant-Om pal admitted the on-going animosity with the complainant

side and he had accordingly stated that Bangal Singh and others had committed

assaults upon him and in order to carve-out a cross-case against him, they had

nominated appellant-Om Pal, as being an accused, in this matter. AppellantNarendra too tendered identical statement. Appellant-Dharamvir had stated

that since he happens to be a witness in the cross-case pertaining to the present

matter, therefore, he had been nominated as an accused. Both the Courts below 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 11 of 25

while holding the appellants guilty heavily relied on the testimonies of PW-1

(Tejpal Singh) (complainant and son of deceased Dile Ram), PW-2 (Bangal Singh)

(injured and eyewitness), PW-3 (Mahendra Singh) (eyewitness) and PW-4 (Mohan

Lal @ Som) (eyewitness).

29. The Trial Court in its judgement while convicting the appellants held that

from the evidence of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4, it is clear that the appellants had

initiated the said occurrence and they had been the aggressor. Further, nature

of the injuries as well as the evidence available on record itself proved that the

injuries had been knowingly and intentionally inflicted with due, proper and

sufficient motive and object, while the blades of spades, phawads had been used,

from their sharp contours in order to inflict fatal injuries on the head of both the

deceased persons resulting in their death.

30. The High Court in the impugned judgment too held that the appellants

were the aggressors. It was further held that the complainant side used lathis to

defend themselves only after the assault was initiated from the side of the

appellants who used sharp weapons. Additionally, PW-3 and PW-4, who were

the eyewitnesses, have corroborated the prosecution’s case as narrated by PW2, an injured eyewitness.

31. Since injuries were sustained from both the sides, at the outset, it will be

appropriate to mention the injuries that were found on Dile Ram, Braham Singh

and Bangal Singh, and appellants - Om Pal, Narendra and Inchha Ram by PW7 (Dr. Harish Chandra Dua) who prepared the injury report. 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 12 of 25

Dile Ram (deceased) received the injuries in nature of

i) Incised wound 13 ½ cm X 2 cm X bone deep over parietal region left

side extending upto right temporal region. Transversely placed.

Margins clear cut, edges well defined, bleeding present.

Braham Singh (deceased) received the following injuries

i) Incised wound 13 cm X 2 cm X bone deep over left parietal region of

skull extending upto left temporal region 9 cm above left ear. Margins

clear cut, edges well defined. Oozing of blood present. Patient

conscious.

ii) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over left parietal

region of skull 3 ½ cm behind injury No. (i).

iii) Lacerated wound 2 ½ cm X ½ cm X bone deep over left parietal region

of skull 3 cm behind injury No.(ii)

iv) Lacerated wound 4 cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over right parietaltemporal region of skull 9 cm above right ear.

v) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X muscle deep over back of left

forearm 7 cm below left elbow joint.

vi) Lacerated wound 2 cm X ½ cm X muscle deep over back of left elbow

joint.

Bangal Singh (PW-2) received following injuries

i) "Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over left parietal

region of skull 9 cm above medial ends of eyebrow.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 13 of 25

ii) Lacerated wound 2 cm X ½ cm X muscle deep in front and middle of

right index finger with traumatic swelling 3 cm X 2 cm. Advised X-ray.

iii) Abrasion ½ cm X ½ cm over back of middle of index finger with

traumatic swelling 2 cm X 1 cm extending upto root. Advised X-ray.

iv) Linear abrasion 6 cm in length over outer aspect of right upper arm 4

cm below the left shoulder.

v) Abrasion 2 cm X 1 cm over back of left forearm, below left elbow joint.

vi) Lacerated wound 3 cm X ½ cm X skin deep over outer aspect of left

arm 14 cm above left elbow joint.

32. From the side of the appellants, Narendra received injuries in the nature

of:

i) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over right parietal

region of skull. Oozing of blood present. Advised X-ray.

ii) Incised wound 20 cm X 4/10 cm X muscle deep over posterio aspect

of index finger of right hand. Margins clear cut, edges well defined.

Bleeding present.

iii) Incised wound 1 cm X 2/10 cm X skin deep just below injury No. (ii).

Margins clear cut, edges well defined.

Om Pal received the following injuries:

i) Abraded contusion 11 cm X 2 ½ cm over upper surface of left

shoulder.

ii) Abrasion in an area 3 cm X 2 cm in front of the lateral part of supra

clavicular region left. 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 14 of 25

iii) Contusion 6 cm X 3 cm over lateral aspect left shoulder.

iv) Traumatic swelling 5 cm X 4 cm over medial aspect of left foot.

Inchha Ram received the following injuries:

i) Lacerated wound 7 cm X 1 cm X bone deep over left parietal region 6

cm above left ear. Margins of the wound are irregular and contused.

ii) Lacerated wound 1 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over right occipital

region of the skull. 3 ½ cm behind injury No. (i).

iii) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep right side of parietal

region 12 cm above top of the right ear.

iv) Lacerated wound 1 ½ cm X ½ cm X scalp deep over right parietal

region of skull. 8 cm above top of right ear.

v) Traumatic swelling in an area 18 cm X 8 cm over back of right forearm

in upper half of the arm. Advised X-ray.

vi) Contusion 9 cm X 2 ½ cm over posterio lateral aspect of right shoulder

and adjoining part of right arm.

vii) Contusion 3 ½ cm X 2 cm over back right side of scapula region, 14

cm below right shoulder.

viii) Contusion 6 cm X 2 cm over back of left arm 10 cm above left elbow

joint.

ix) Abrasion 12 cm X 1 cm over posterio medial aspect of left forearm just

below elbow joint.

x) Lacerated wound 3 ½ cm X ½ cm X skin deep over back of thigh just

below the gluteal region.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 15 of 25

OCULAR EVIDENCE

33. The present case before us is not the one based on circumstantial

evidence, but is based on ocular evidence. Time and again this Court has held

that ocular evidence is the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it.

This Court in Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh (supra) held

thus:

“30. To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence

of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are

whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to

believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such

situations as would make it possible for them to witness

the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there

is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their

evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the

circumstances either elicited from those witnesses

themselves or established by other evidence tending to

improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of

their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which

a court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases

where the plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the

evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined

on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea

or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with

that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case

and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be

taken into account while assessing the value of the

prosecution evidence.

31. There is nothing palpable or glaring in the evidence of

the two eyewitnesses on the basis of which we can take the

view that they are not true or reliable eyewitnesses. Few

contradictions in the form of omissions here or there is not

sufficient to discard the entire evidence of the

eyewitnesses.”

(Emphasis supplied)

34. Coming to the testimony of PW-2 (Bangal Singh), an injured eyewitness.

He stated that on the day of the incident his grandfather Dile Ram and uncle

Braham Singh were working in the sugarcane field when at about 11:00 A.M., 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 16 of 25

Molhar and Dharamvir damaged the mendh (ridge) of the field to which Dile Ram

objected to, and Molhar and Dharamvir started hurling abuses. Thereafter,

Molhar and Dharamvir called other accused Kantu, Inchha Ram, Narendra, Om

Pal, Pehlu (since deceased) and Ranvir. He had further stated that Dharamvir

and Inchha Ram were armed with spades, while the other accused were armed

with lathis. It is further stated that both the deceased persons and PW-2 were

assaulted with dangerous weapons. The witness further stated that at the time

of incident PW-3 and PW-4 also arrived at the spot.

35. It is settled that the testimony of an injured eyewitness is accorded a

special status in law. As being a stamped witness, his presence cannot be

doubted. The testimony of an injured eyewitness has its own relevancy as he has

sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to

his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of

the injured eyewitness should be generally given due importance unless there

are glaring contradictions.

36. While dealing with the importance of the injured eyewitness testimony,

this Court in Jarnail Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab12 held as under

“28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had

been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be

brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the

incident as he was present at the time when the assailants

reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa

Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (3) SCC

235 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1694] this Court has held that the

deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon

unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his

evidence on the basis of major contradictions and

discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the

12 (2009) 9 SCC 719

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 17 of 25

scene stands established in case it is proved that he

suffered the injury during the said incident.

29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand [(2004) 7 SCC 629 :

2004 SCC (Cri) 2021] a similar view has been reiterated

observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its

own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness

sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence,

lends support to his testimony that he was present during

the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to

lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to

discard his testimony, it should be relied upon

(vide Krishan v. State of Haryana [(2006) 12 SCC 459 :

(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 214] ). Thus, we are of the considered

opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly

been relied upon by the courts below.”

(Emphasis supplied)

37. In Abdul Sayeed (supra), this Court explained that injury to the witness

is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the

witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely

implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, deposition by the

injured eyewitness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for

rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies

therein.

38. In the present case before us, it is clear from the record that the defence

had not at all challenged the version of PW-2, but on the contrary, the defence

had admitted his presence at the spot of the said occurrence.

39. Keeping in view the principle that an injured eyewitness enjoys a

presumption of truth and the fact that the same is supported by the medical

evidence, testimony of PW-2 does not suffer from any infirmity and has to be

considered while fixing the guilt of the appellants. 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 18 of 25

40. With respect to the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-4 who were the

eyewitnesses, it has been revealed that they were taking their respective bullockcarts loaded with sugarcanes towards the Northern direction on the chak-road,

in order to get the same weighed. While at the time of the incident, both of them

had been in the vicinity of the spot of occurrence and they had accordingly

arrived there upon hearing hue and cry and commotion being raised. PW-4 had

also narrated that he had seen the mendh (ridge) which stood demolished and

cut-off and the middle portion thereof had since been missing from the spot of

its existence.

41. While examining these eyewitnesses, the defence had not at all been

successful in eliciting any contradiction in their respective evidence on the basis

of which their evidence may be according1y discarded and thrown out in this

matter. Thus, there is nothing palpable or glaring in the evidence of the two

eyewitnesses on the basis of which we can be of the view that they are not true

or reliable eyewitnesses.

MOTIVE

42. Motive although is a relevant factor in all criminal cases, it, however, is

not a sine qua non for establishing the guilt of the accused persons. Motive even

in a case which rests on an eyewitness account, lends strength to the

prosecution’s case and fortify the Court in its ultimate conclusion. Thus, the fact

of motive has to be seen in the light of the other cogent evidence available. In 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 19 of 25

the case of Sheo Shankar Singh vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr.13, this Court

observed as under:

“15. The legal position regarding proof of motive as an

essential requirement for bringing home the guilt of the

accused is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of

this Court. These decisions have made a clear distinction

between cases where the prosecution relies upon

circumstantial evidence on the one hand and those where

it relies upon the testimony of eyewitnesses on the other.

In the former category of cases proof of motive is given the

importance it deserves, for proof of a motive itself

constitutes a link in the chain of circumstances upon

which the prosecution may rely. Proof of motive, however,

recedes into the background in cases where the

prosecution relies upon an eyewitness account of the

occurrence. That is because if the court upon a proper

appraisal of the deposition of the eyewitnesses comes to

the conclusion that the version given by them is credible,

absence of evidence to prove the motive is rendered

inconsequential. Conversely, even if the prosecution

succeeds in establishing a strong motive for the

commission of the offence, but the evidence of the

eyewitnesses is found unreliable or unworthy of credit,

existence of a motive does not by itself provide a safe basis

for convicting the accused. That does not, however, mean

that proof of motive even in a case which rests on an

eyewitness account does not lend strength to the

prosecution case or fortify the court in its ultimate

conclusion. Proof of motive in such a situation certainly

helps the prosecution and supports the eyewitnesses.

See Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 3

SCC 219 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 214] , Hari Shanker v. State of

U.P. [(1996) 9 SCC 40 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 913] and State of

U.P. v. Kishanpal [(2008) 16 SCC 73 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri)

182].”

43. In the present case, the question is what actually drove the appellants to

commit this double murder after forming an unlawful assembly. According to

the prosecution, Dile Ram had asked Molhar and Dharamvir to desist from

mendh (ridge) of his field, whereupon Molhar hurled abuses and then called upon

13 (2011) 3 SCC 654

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 20 of 25

the other appellants on the spot and committed assaults upon the complainant

party with lathis, spades, phawadas, which they had already carried with

themselves. Also, the fact of a prior enmity on account of the boundary dispute

clearly establishes the motive for the commission of the offence.

PRESENT CASE DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE FOURTH EXCEPTION TO

SECTION 300 OF THE IPC

44. Now let us come to the contentions raised by the appellants. One of the

main arguments from the side of the appellants was that since it was a case of

free fight where injuries were received on the side of the appellants as well and

considering there was no premeditation from their side, the case would fall under

the fourth exception to Section 300 of the IPC. We, however, are not convinced

with this argument in view of the law laid down by this Court in Pulicherla

Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy (supra) wherein it was held:

“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the

pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as

that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302

or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant

matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of

children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable

glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes

culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed,

jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases.

There may be no intention. There may be no

premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality.

At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of

murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty

for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was

no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure

that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302,

are not converted into offences punishable under Section

304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting

to murder, are treated as murder punishable under

Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered

generally from a combination of a few or several of the 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 21 of 25

following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the

weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the

accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the

blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of

force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was

in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for

all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or

whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there

was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a

stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden

provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix)

whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the

person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or

has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the

accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list

of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there

may be several other special circumstances with reference

to individual cases which may throw light on the question

of intention. Be that as it may.”

(Emphasis supplied)

45. From the medical evidence on record, it stands established that the death

of both the deceased persons was the result of ante-mortem injuries. The nature

and extent of these injuries, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, leave

no doubt that they were intentionally inflicted. The use of the sharp edges of

spades, phawadas to deliver fatal blows on the heads of the deceased

demonstrates that the assailants acted with a clear motive and object of

permanently eliminating them, thereby committing their murder. Thus, the

circumstances to bring the case under the fourth exception to Section 300 of the

IPC do not exist.

DELAY IN FILING OF FIR IS NOT FATAL TO THE CASE OF THE

PROSECUTION

46. The issue of delay in the filing of the FIR from the side of the complainant

came up during the hearing. It was argued that the cross FIR was lodged on

23.05.1988 which is after three days of the incident. Thus, according to them,

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 22 of 25

the second FIR was merely an afterthought of the first FIR which was lodged by

the appellants. This contention has been dealt by both the Courts below holding

that the delay was well explained by PW-1, who is the son of deceased Dile Ram.

It is a settled position that delay in filing of the FIR cannot be considered to be

fatal to the case of the prosecution when there is direct evidence and when the

delay in filing the FIR is well explained. This Court in the case of State of H.P.

vs. Gian Chand 14 observed that:

“12. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a

ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and

discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in

lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of

putting the court on its guard to search if any explanation

has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is

satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily

explain the delay and there is a possibility of

embellishment in the prosecution version on account of

such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution.

However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the

court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for

disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution….”

(Emphasis supplied)

47. Furthermore, in the case of Raghbir Singh vs. State of Haryana15, this

Court observed thus:

“11. With regard to the delay in filing the FIR, both the

courts have found that there was no delay in filing the FIR.

The trial court found that the rushing of the victim to the

hospital to save his life instead of first going to the police

station was a satisfactory explanation for the delay in

making the complaint. The view was affirmed by the High

Court and we find no reason to interfere with the same.”

(Emphasis supplied)

14 (2001) 6 SCC 71

15 (2000) 9 SCC 88

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 23 of 25

48. In the present case, we will have to consider whether there was a probable

explanation from the side of PW-1 for the delay in the lodging of the FIR. From

the statement of PW-1, it is clear that on his coming back from Muzaffarnagar,

he took his injured father (Dile Ram), injured uncle (Braham Singh), and nephew

to the hospital in Chandigarh and after he came back from Chandigarh on

23.05.1988, he lodged the FIR. The present explanation, according to us, is

probable and natural considering the facts and circumstances of the case.

NON- RECOVERY OF THE WEAPONS IS NOT FATAL TO THE CASE OF THE

PROSECUTION

49. Another contention raised by the appellants was that the weapons used

during the incident were never recovered from the site. However, this Court has

many a times reiterated that non-recovery of the weapons cannot be considered

fatal to the case of the prosecution if there is consistent medical and ocular

evidence. This Court in the case State of Rajasthan vs. Arjun Singh & Ors.16

held as under:

“18. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional

Advocate General appearing for the State that mere nonrecovery of pistol or cartridge does not detract the case of

the prosecution where clinching and direct evidence is

acceptable. Likewise, absence of evidence regarding

recovery of used pellets, bloodstained clothes, etc. cannot

be taken or construed as no such occurrence had taken

place. As a matter of fact, we have already pointed out that

the gunshot injuries tallied with medical evidence. It is also

seen that Raghuraj Singh and Himmat Raj Singh, who had

died, received 8 and 7 gunshot wounds respectively while

Raj Singh (PW 2) also received 8 gunshots scattered in

front of left thigh. All these injuries have been noted by the

doctor (PW 1) in his reports, Exts. P-1 to P-4.”

(Emphasis supplied)

16 (2011) 9 SCC 115

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 24 of 25

50. Also in Nankaunoo vs. State of Uttar Pradesh17, this Court held that

where in light of unimpeachable oral evidence is corroborated by the medical

evidence, non-recovery of murder weapon does not materially affect the case of

the prosecution. Any omission on the part of the investigating officer cannot go

against the prosecution’s case. Story of the prosecution is to be examined dehors

such omission by the investigating agency. Otherwise, it would shake the

confidence of the people not merely in the law enforcing agency but also in the

administration of justice.

D. CONCLUSION

51. From the above discussion, there remains no doubt in our minds that the

present appellants in furtherance of their common intention formed an unlawful

assembly. Inncha and Dharamvir stood armed with sharp edged deadly weapons

committed the murder of Braham Singh and Dile Ram, while in order to achieve

their common intention, they had also inflicted such injuries on the physical

person of Bangal Singh knowing fully well that had Bangal Singh died on account

of the said injuries they ought to have been held guilty of causing his murder in

this matter.

52. Consequently, the Appeals, being sans merit, stand dismissed. As we have

dismissed the Appeals, the appellants shall surrender to custody forthwith and

it will be the duty of the Trial Court to see that they are taken into custody. The

bail bonds stand cancelled accordingly.

17 (2016) 3 SCC 317

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1624 OF 2011 ETC. Page 25 of 25

53. We shall further clarify that nothing mentioned above shall preclude the

appellants from making an application for remission in accordance with law and

the applicable policy of the State Government. In the event, such an application

is preferred, the same shall be considered by the competent authority on its own

merits, strictly in terms of the available policy of the State Government.

………………………………………J.

 (SANJAY KAROL)

………………………………………J.

 (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 28, 2025

(A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 96 — Appeal from original decree — Scope — Reappreciation of evidence — Appellate Court, while hearing a first appeal under S. 96 CPC, has power to reappreciate entire oral and documentary evidence and arrive at its own findings. Where trial court’s judgment is based on improper appreciation of evidence and erroneous application of law, interference by the appellate court is justified. (B) Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 101–103 — Burden of proof — Declaration of title and possession — Onus lies on plaintiff — In a suit for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. Mere possession in the past or payment of land revenue does not confer ownership. Followed: Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira, AIR 1959 SC 31; Sajana Granites v. Manduva Srinivasa Rao, 2001 (6) ALD 270. (C) Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 — Ss. 3(g), 11 — Tank bed land — No Ryotwari patta can be granted — Land classified as “Cheruvu Padaka” (tank bed) or “Ava tank poramboke” is not ryoti land within the meaning of the Act. No person can claim Ryotwari patta over such land. Plaintiffs’ reliance on old pattas and tax receipts could not override the statutory prohibition. Held, that tank bed land vests in the Government and cannot be claimed as private property. (D) Limitation Act, 1963 — Art. 65 — Adverse possession and limitation for possession — Computation — Suit for declaration of title and possession must be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession. Plaintiffs alleged dispossession “after 29-6-1976” but produced no specific evidence of continued possession thereafter. Oral evidence revealed dispossession around 1974–76; suit filed on 17-6-1988 held barred by limitation. Held, vague pleadings about dispossession cannot extend limitation (E) Civil Law — Declaratory relief — Multiple plaintiffs claiming distinct parcels of land — When numerous plaintiffs claim independent parcels under separate alleged grants, each must independently prove title and possession. A composite suit for collective declaration of ownership is not maintainable unless a common right or cause of action is established. Plaintiffs’ joint claim failed for want of individual proof. (F) Land Law — Estates Abolition — Classification of land — Zeroyiti vs. Poramboke — Conversion of land classification by Settlement authorities cannot be interfered with by Civil Court unless shown to be without jurisdiction or in violation of mandatory procedure. No such proof shown in this case; plaintiffs’ claim that zeroyiti lands were wrongly reclassified as poramboke rejected. (G) Result — Appeals allowed — Judgment and decree of Trial Court dated 05.10.2001 in O.S. No. 288/1988 set aside — Suit dismissed — Each party to bear its own costs.

(A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 96 — Appeal from original decree — Scope — Reappreciation of evidence —

Appellate Court, while hearing a first appeal under S. 96 CPC, has power to reappreciate entire oral and documentary evidence and arrive at its own findings. Where trial court’s judgment is based on improper appreciation of evidence and erroneous application of law, interference by the appellate court is justified.

(B) Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 101–103 — Burden of proof — Declaration of title and possession — Onus lies on plaintiff —

In a suit for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. Mere possession in the past or payment of land revenue does not confer ownership.

 Followed:

Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269;

Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira, AIR 1959 SC 31;

Sajana Granites v. Manduva Srinivasa Rao, 2001 (6) ALD 270.

(C) Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 — Ss. 3(g), 11 — Tank bed land — No Ryotwari patta can be granted —

Land classified as “Cheruvu Padaka” (tank bed) or “Ava tank poramboke” is not ryoti land within the meaning of the Act. No person can claim Ryotwari patta over such land. Plaintiffs’ reliance on old pattas and tax receipts could not override the statutory prohibition.

 Held, that tank bed land vests in the Government and cannot be claimed as private property.

(D) Limitation Act, 1963 — Art. 65 — Adverse possession and limitation for possession — Computation —

Suit for declaration of title and possession must be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession. Plaintiffs alleged dispossession “after 29-6-1976” but produced no specific evidence of continued possession thereafter. Oral evidence revealed dispossession around 1974–76; suit filed on 17-6-1988 held barred by limitation.

 Held, vague pleadings about dispossession cannot extend limitation

(E) Civil Law — Declaratory relief — Multiple plaintiffs claiming distinct parcels of land —

When numerous plaintiffs claim independent parcels under separate alleged grants, each must independently prove title and possession. A composite suit for collective declaration of ownership is not maintainable unless a common right or cause of action is established. Plaintiffs’ joint claim failed for want of individual proof.

(F) Land Law — Estates Abolition — Classification of land — Zeroyiti vs. Poramboke —

Conversion of land classification by Settlement authorities cannot be interfered with by Civil Court unless shown to be without jurisdiction or in violation of mandatory procedure. No such proof shown in this case; plaintiffs’ claim that zeroyiti lands were wrongly reclassified as poramboke rejected.

(G) Result —

Appeals allowed — Judgment and decree of Trial Court dated 05.10.2001 in O.S. No. 288/1988 set aside — Suit dismissed — Each party to bear its own costs.

The State Of A.P.Dist.Collector,Eg ... vs Vinit Suryakantham 95 Ors on 27 October, 2025

APHC010338842001

                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

                                 AT AMARAVATI                [3397]

                          (Special Original Jurisdiction)

          MONDAY,THE TWENTY SEVENTH DAY OF OCTOBER

               TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

                                PRESENT

    THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA

                      KRISHNA RAO

                      FIRST APPEAL NO: 2533/2001

Between:

President,atchampeta Sannakaru Vyavasaya Karmika    ...APPELLANT(S)

Sangham&2 and Others

                                 AND

Vinta Suryakantham 80 Others and Others            ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Appellant(S):

  1. INAPURAPU SURYANARAYANA

  2. SRIMAN

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

  1. K S MURTHY

  2. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL

  3. .

  4. P DURGA PRASAD

  5. M SRI ATCHYUT

                                   2

                                                             VGKR, J.

                                               as_2533_2001&921_2002

               FIRST APPEAL NO: 921/2002

Between:

The State Of A.p.dist.collector,eg Dist   ...APPELLANT

                            AND

Vinit Suryakantham 95 Ors and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Appellant:

   1. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

   1. E V V S RAVI KUMAR

   2. SRIMAN

The Court made the following:

                                           3

                                                                            VGKR, J.

                                                              as_2533_2001&921_2002

          THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO

                        APPEAL SUIT NO.2533 OF 2001

                                   AND

                        APPEAL SUIT NO.921 OF 2002

COMMON JUDGMENT:

-

These Appeals, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as "CPC"], are filed by the Appellants challenging the decree and judgment, dated 05.10.2001 in O.S.No.288 of 1988 passed by learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada [hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court"].

2. The defendants 2 to 4 in the said suit proceedings filed A.S.No.2533 of 2001 and the 1st defendant filed A.S.No.921 of 2002 against the same decree and judgment passed in O.S.No.288 of 1988 on the file of learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada.

3. Since both the appeals are filed against the decree and judgment passed in O.S.No.288 of 1988 on the file of learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, both the appeals are clubbed together and common judgment is being pronounced in both these appeals.

4. The appellants in A.S.No.2533 of 2001 are the defendants 2 to 4 and the appellant in A.S.No.921 of 2002 is the 1st defendant in O.S.No.288 of 1988. The respondents 1 to 57 in both the appeals are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.288 of 1988.

5. The respondents / plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of their title to the plaint schedule property, for possession, profits and for costs of the suit.

The suit was originally filed by 22 plaintiffs. During pendency of the suit, some of the plaintiffs died and their legal representatives were brought on record as plaintiffs 23 to 57.

VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002

6. Both the parties in the Appeals will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court.

7. The brief averments of the plaint in O.S.No.288 of 1988 are as under:

(i) In the erstwhile Pithapuram Estate, the schedule lands are situated in Thimmapuram village and they are zeroyiti lands.

These lands and several other neighbouring survey numbers are low lying marshy lands called AVA lands. These survey numbers are noted as ryoti lands in 1913 Record of Rights Register. The lands were granted on Zeroyiti lands by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram to the predecessors of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs and their predecessors were in possession and enjoyment of all the schedule lands till they were forcibly dispossessed by the defendants in June, 1976. The plaintiffs and their predecessors were in possession and enjoyment of the property for more than 80 years by 1976. The names of the plaintiffs and their predecessors have been entered in 1913 Record of Rights Register and Fair Land Registers.

(ii) In about the year 1960, there was survey and settlement conducted by the Government and in the said survey and settlement, the plaintiffs were granted conditional pattas for the said land. Due to some mistake that has crept in Government records subsequently, the said lands were noted as Ava tank poramboke without notice to plaintiffs or others and without any enquiry. The said land is not a poramboke or Government land or land intended for public purpose. The Government has no right to change the category of classification of the land from zeroyiti into poramboke to the detriment of owners without VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 notice to owners in a suomoto enquiry. The alleged change is not even in a primary enquiry as seen from records, but in an alleged appeal by one V.Kondaiah filed against the grant of conditional patta and requesting for an unconditional patta, the Assistant Settlement Officer seems to have granted a conditional patta to V.Kondaiah who filed an appeal against the same Settlement Officer requesting for removal of conditions and for grant of a permanent patta and the Settlement Officer seems to have directed change of category of the schedule land to poramboke even without notice to parties effected by the said change. These facets were revealed in the trial of O.S.No.149 of 1977 on the file of Principal Sub Court, Kakinada, where the records were filed. But the taxes on the respective lands were being collected from plaintiffs on zeroyiti lands upto 1976. Hence plaintiffs and others were also not aware of such wrong classification.

(iii) In about 1976, some persons came to know of the fact that these lands were classified as poramboke lands and induced several landless poor people to form into societies or Sangham with a view to occupy the lands called Ava cheruvu. The defendants Sanghams 2 to 4 have trespassed into the lands in the plaintiffs possession after 9.6.1976 basing on the alleged proceedings of Taluk Office, Kakinada in Ref.B.5/1447/76 dated 29.6.1976. The plaintiffs could not resist dispossession whereas some people like Pabbineedi Venkatarao and others filed suits for injunction like O.S.No.1083/76 on the file of District Munsif, Kakinada and got injunction against Sanghams and could safeguard their possession. The principle is once a zeroyiti land is always a zeroyiti land and it cannot be transferred into Poramboke land in a suo moto enquiry and VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 even without notice to persons entitled to it and also in possession as of right. Such an act is illegal and liable to be quashed by the Civil Court, as such, transformation is done illegally under colour of authority which is not there.

(iv) The 1st plaintiff Vinti Suryakantham is the owner of Ac.7-92 cents in old S.No.103/1, new S.No.136/2 of Timmapuram village. The 1" Plaintiff got the same as per Registered Gift Deed dt.24.2.1955 from Chodisetti Manikyam W/o. Venkataraju and others and has been in enjoyment by paying taxes till dispossession. The 2nd plaintiff Kambala Chakram is the owner of Ac.3-09 cents in Old. S.No.103/, New S.No.136/2 of Timmapuram. The 3rd plaintiff Tummalapalli Sathiraju is the owner of Ac.1-17 cents in Old S.No.143/5, new S.No.176/5 and another Ac.0-81 cents in Old S.No.149/6, new S.No.182/7 in all total Ac.1-98 cents. His title and possession to the land is proved by several tax receipts filed and he obtained the said properties by way of gift deed dt.14.2.1958. He was enjoying the property till he is dispossessed. The 4th plaintiff Chodisetti Kameswara Rao and the 5th plaintiff Chodisetty Satyanarayana are the owners of Ac.5-18 cents in old S.No.131/5, 143/1, 143/4 and 143/6 and new S.Nos. 172/1, 176/1, 176/4 and 176/6 respectively. The 6th plaintiff Vakada Narayana Murty and the 7th plaintiff Vakada Dharamaraju are the owners of Ac.6-57 cents in old S.Nos.139/7, 143/3 and 137/3, new S.Nos.172/1, 176/3 and 170/5 respectively. These plaintiffs were in possession of the property since more than 50 years. The 8 th plaintiff Karri Venkataraju is the owner of Ac.1-78 cents in old S.No.91, new S.No.122 of Timmapuram. The 9th plaintiff Pedapudi Ramulu is the owner of Ac.1-42 cents in old S.No.138/2, new S.No.171/2 of Timmapuram. He has been VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 paying taxes on this land since times immemorial. The 10th plaintiff Pothula Lakshminarayana, the 11th plaintiff Pothula Prabhakara Rao and the 12th plaintiff Pothula Narasimha Rao are the owners of ac.3-57 cents in old S.no.136/2 and new S.No.169/3 and 135/3. This property was the ancestral property of these plaintiffs and they were enjoying the same from 1936 till they were dispossessed by paying taxes in their own name.

(v) The 13th plaintiff Jiyyanna Srimannarayana is the owner of Ac.0-70 cents in old S.No.137/2, new S.No.135/3 of Timmapuram. He purchased the said property as per registered sale deed dt.25.1.1959 from Chelikani Venkata Surya Rao and from then he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same by paying taxes till dispossession. The 14th plaintiff is the son of Chodisetti Subba Rao and the 15th plaintiff Hanumanthu Booraiah are the owners of Ac.3-19 cents in Old S.No.145, 270/5, new S.Nos.178, 128/7 and 158/2 respectively. The 1"

item was obtained by 12th plaintiff by a registered sale deed dt.5.2.1923 from Savaram Yegulu and others and the Rajah of Pithapuram recognized their rights and granted yearly pattas. The 12th plaintiff settled ac.1-00 of land on his sister and mother of the 13th plaintiff on whose death here only son the 13th plaintiff became the owner of the said land. Since then, the 13 th plaintiff has been paying taxes to Government and enjoying the same since times immemorial. The 16th and 17th plaintiffs Muddana Rambabu and Atchutaramaiah are the owners of Ac.1-27 cents in S.No.172/7 and 170/1. The 18th plaintiff Pedapudi Seshagiri Rao is the owner of Ac.4-26 cents in old S.Nos.136, 138/2 and 139, new S.Nos.169/1, 171/2 and 171/3 respectively. The 18th plaintiff died during the pendency of this suit on 16.8.2000. The 19th plaintiff Gangumalla Somulu is the VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 owner of Ac.2-62 cents in old S.No.135, new S.No.168/4 of Timmapuram village. The 20th plaintiff Vakada Padmanabham is the owner of Ac.2-50 cents in old S.No.145, new S.No.178 of Timnapuram village. The 21st plaintiff Karri Kondalah is the owner of Ac.1-00 in old S.No.140/4 of Timmapurum village. The 22nd plaintiff Bandey Veerraju is the owner of Ac.2-16 cents in old S.No.97, new S.No.135/1, total Ac.2-97 cents of Timmapuram village. The defendants 2 to 4 have trespassed into the lands in the possession of plaintiffs after 29.06.1976 based on the alleged proceedings of Taluk office, dated 29.06.1976. Therefore, the plaintiffs constrained to file the suit for the reliefs of title and recovery of possession.

8. The defendant No.3 is set ex parte.

The 1st defendant filed written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and further contended as follows:

The suit is not maintainable and that the plaintiffs‟ claim to be interested in different properties. The schedule property is part of Ava Tank poramboke and is government land for which, the plaintiffs and anybodyelse cannot claim title or possession. Because the schedule properties are low- lying land, they are called Ava cheruvu lands. The plaint schedule land form part of Ava Tank. Ava Tank was in the erstwhile Pithapuram Estate Abolition Act, 1948 during 1950. The Ava Tank is securely bounded by bunds on South and North. There is Kakinada- Pithapuram road in the East and patta lands on the West. The total extent of this Ava Tank is Ac.240.12 cents. This tank receives excess water from Yeleru canal and is being stored. The Ava tank is having an ayacut of Ac.700.00. After the tank is taken over by the Government, it is declared as poramboke during survey and settlement. If really the plaintiffs are in possession of this tank at the time of taking over by the Government, they would have preferred claims before the Settlement Officer. He denied that the schedule lands are noted as Ryoti lands in the VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 Records of Rights Register of 1913. The claims of the plaintiffs were rejected by the Settlement Officer, Director of Settlements, Board of Revenue and the High Court. The civil Court has no jurisdiction and the plaintiffs have no right to re-agitate their claims. They denied that the plaintiffs are paying taxes till 1976 as zeroyiti lands and that they are not aware of the alleged wrong classification. The schedule lands are registered as Ava tank poramboke to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The ineligible encroachers are evicted from the tank bed and the Collector instructed for taking acting for granting the lands on lease for raising 2nd crop only strictly adhering to the instructions issued by the Government. Accordingly, all the encroachers were evicted after due enquiry during Fasli 1381. Subsequently, during Fasli 1382 and Fasli 1383, same persons encroached again, who formed into two societies during Fasli 1384, relinquished their claims and about Ac.70-00 of tank bed lands were leased out to the three societies defendants 2 to 4. If really, the plaintiffs are dispossessed in 1976, there is no reason for not taking any action till 1988. For all the notices received during 1975-76, the Government issues replies and every time, no replies need be sent. The plaint schedule lands were declared as Government poramboke lands. The suit lands are not zeroyiti lands. They are Government poramboke lands. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit.

9. The 2nd defendant filed written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and contended as follows:

The suit lands along with other lands having vested in the 1st defendant and after the abolition of the Pithapuram Estate, the 1st defendant alone has got title to the said lands. The 1st defendant having granted the lands on lease to the Sangham and this defendant thus having been in possession of the lands that were leased out to them, the plaintiffs cannot now question either the title of the 1st defendant or the lease that was granted by the 1st defendant to this Sangham and other Sanghams, as the VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 paramount title holder of the said lands. Some of the ryots might have been granted conditional pattas for the lands by the Survey and Settlement authorities. Later the mistake was rectified by the Director of Settlements, who cancelled these conditional pattas as the lands are Cheruvu Padaka lands and hence treated them as poramboke lands. There is no change in the category of classification of lands. The Director of Settlement held that it is a poramboke land, but not a ryoti land based on the estate records. They denied that these defendants 2 to 4 have trespassed into the lands in the possession of the plaintiffs after 29.6.1976 claiming that the Government granted them one-year lease for the said lands. In fact, this defendant Sangham was constituted in the year 1974, and this defendant was granted lease of certain lands and thereafter, there were some changes in the allotment of lands and ultimately, the said extent of Ac.60.18 cents was leased out to this Sangham in 1976. The plaintiffs have to prove their right, title and possession and enjoyment of the said lands and that the plaintiffs‟ suit is barred by time. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit.

10. The 4th defendant filed its written statement denying the plaint allegations and supported the same version as contended by the 2nd defendant and further contended as follows:

The entire land of Ava tank is poramboke land vested with the Government. In the Survey and Settlement, the concerned authorities are having every right to survey to ascertain the nature of the tenure of the land and the Government issued notices in general and the nature of the land changed by the Government by virtue of the decision given by the concerned Settlement authorities, the lands are notified according to their findings. Several poor people form into societies in Atchampeta as well as Timmapuram requesting the Government to lease out the lands, which are, belongs to them, which were in their possession, then lease was granted and they inducted into possession as lessees. They denied the dispossession as contended by the plaintiffs. It is a tank bed land and it is VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 tank bed poramboke vested with D-1. Therefore, there is no question of conversion of zeroyiti land into poramboke land. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit.

11. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:

(1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title as prayed for?

(2) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to evict the defendants and to deliver vacant possession of the schedule lands as prayed for? (3) Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to scrutinize the proceedings of the Settlement authorities?

(4) Whether the suit is bad for minjoinder of cause of action? (5) Whether the plaint schedule is a part of area tank poramboke as pleaded in the written statement filed by D-1?

(6) Whether the plaintiffs‟ suit is barred by time?

(7) To what relief?

The trial Court has framed the following additional issues:

(1) Whether the plaint schedule properties are ryoti lands in the Pithapuram estate and surveyed as ryoti lands in the records of rights register?

(2) Whether Ava tank of Timmapuram (V) was vested with the Government due to abolition of estate?

(3) Whether conditional patta issued by the Estate Holder only to show pyru crop will come within the purview of the amendment of Sec.20(a) and (b) of Estate Land Act, 1908?

12. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 19 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.172 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.11, Exs.X.1 to X.10 and Exs.C.1 and C.2 were marked.

VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002

13. After completion of the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit vide its judgment, dated 05.10.2001, against which the present appeals are preferred by the defendants in the suit questioning the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court.

14. Heard Sri Inapurapu Suryanarayana and Sri Sriman, learned counsel for the appellants / defendants 2 to 4, Sri D.Yathindra Dev, learned Special Government Pleader attached to the office of learned Advocate General, for the appellant / 1st defendant and Sri M.Sri Atchyuth, learned counsel for the respondents / plaintiffs.

15. Learned counsel for the appellants / defendants 2 to 4 and learned Special Government Pleader for appellant / defendant No.1 would contend that the judgment and decree of the trial Court are contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. They would further contend that the Court below erred in holding that the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title and delivery of vacant possession of the schedule land. They would further contend that the trial Court erred in holding that the suit land is not a part of the tank bed land and that it is ryoti land. They would further contend that the plaintiffs had neither possession nor title to the suit property, instead of dismissing the suit, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit. They would further contend that the plaint schedule land is not a zeroyiti land and the plaint schedule property is part of Ava tank poramboke and the same is Government land, in which the plaintiffs or anybodyelse cannot claim any right, title or possession and further contend that the learned trial Judge without proper appreciation of the evidence on record, decreed the suit and both the appeals may be allowed by setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge.

16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents / plaintiffs would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 trial Judge rightly decreed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the findings arrived by the learned trial Judge

17. Now the points for determination in the present appeals are:

1) Whether the plaintiffs are having valid right and title in the suit schedule property and whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title in the suit schedule property?

2) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation?

3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession of the plaint schedule property?

4) Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit?

18. Point No.1:

Whether the plaintiffs are having valid right and title in the suit schedule property and whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title in the suit schedule property?

The claim of the plaintiffs as per plaint averments is that 22 plaintiffs filed the present suit for seeking the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the suit schedule lands are zeroyiti lands and the lands were granted by way of zeroyiti pattas by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram to the predecessors of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs and their predecessors were in possession and enjoyment of all these schedule lands till they were forcibly dispossessed by the defendants in the month of June, 1976. Another plea taken by the plaintiffs is that in the year 1960, there was a survey and settlement conducted by the Government and in the said survey and settlement, the plaintiffs were granted conditional pattas to the suit schedule land.

19. The 1st defendant contended in the written statement that the suit for declaration of title as sought by the plaintiffs is not maintainable and the plaintiffs are not having possession or title in the plaint schedule property. The 1st defendant further pleaded that the plaint schedule property is a part VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 of Ava tank poramboke and the schedule property is a Government land, in which the plaintiffs or anybodyelse cannot claim any right, title or possession. The 1st defendant further contended that the Ava tank is having an extent of Ac.700 and after the tank is taken over by the Government, it is declared as a poramboke during the survey and settlement. The 1st defendant further pleaded that the plaint schedule lands are registered as Ava tank poramboke to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and ineligible encroachers are evicted from the tank bed and the Collector instructed for taking action for granting the lands on lease for raising the second crop only strictly adhering to the instructions issued by the Government. The 1st defendant further contended in the written statement itself that all the encroachers were evicted after due enquiry during fasali 1381 and subsequently during the fasali 1382 and fasali 1383, some persons encroached again , who formed into two societies during the fasali 1584, relinquished their claims and at about Ac.70.00 of tank bed land was leased out to three societies / defendants 2 to 4. The 1st defendant further contended that as per the policy of the Government, the tank bed lands were granted on one year lease basis to ryot cooli Sangham and small farmers Sangham in the year 1976. The 2nd and 4th defendants also supported the contention of the 1st defendant. They pleaded that the suit claim of the plaintiffs is barred by law of limitation.

20. The claim of the plaintiffs is strongly disputed by the defendants. Therefore, it is for the plaintiffs to prove their right and title in the plaint schedule property.

In a case of Union of India and others vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others1, the Apex Court held as follows:

"In a suit for declaration of title, burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would (2014) 2 Supreme Court Cases 269 VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not. We are of the view that even if the title set up by the defendants is found against, in the absence of establishment of plaintiff‟s own title, plaintiff must be non-suited."

In a case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Thukalan Paulo Avira & others2, the Apex Court held as follows:

"It is perfectly clear that in a suit of this description if the plaintiffs are to succeed they must do so on the strength of their own title."

In a case of Sajana Granites, Madras and another vs. Manduva Srinivasa Rao and others3, the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, held as follows:

"The Supreme Court in M.P. Athanastus case (supra), M.M. Catholices v. Polo Avira case (supra) and this Court in C. Audilakshmamma case (supra) held that plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title, and for recovery of possession, can succeed only on the strength of his own title and that it is not obligatory on the defendants to plead and prove the possible defects in the plaintiffs title and so if the plaintiff fails to establish his title, even if the defendant fails to establish his own title, plaintiff must be non suited. In this case since appellants are seeking declaration of their title to the suit property they have to establish their title; and cannot expect relief on the basis of the weakness of the case of respondents 1 and 2, or on the basis that the evidence adduced by respondents 1 and 2 does not establish their title to the suit property."

In a case of K. Venkatasubba Reddy vs. Bairagi Ramaiah (died) by L.Rs.4, the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, held as follows:

"A Division Bench of this Court also in Chakicherla Adilakshmamma v. Almakuru Rama Rao and Ors,- (3) AIR 1973 AP 149. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 526 (cited supra) held that "in a suit for ejectment, the plaintiff is liable to be nonsuited, if he 1958 SCC OnLine Supreme Court 136 2001 SCC OnLine AP 666 1999 (1) APLJ 416 (HC) VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 fails to establish his own title irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not."

The law laid down by the Supreme Court and also by the Division Bench of this Court in the ejectment suits is also applicable to the suits for declaration of title. Thus, the plaintiff must succeed by establishing his own title, by adducing satisfactory evidence and he cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendant's case.

21. In a case of Brahma Nand Puri vs. Neki Puri Since deceased represented by Mathra Puri and another5, the Apex Court held as follows:

"The plaintiff‟s suit being one for ejnectment he has to succeed or fail on the title that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title his suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant in possession has no title to the property, assuming learned counsel is right in that submission".

In a case of Jagdish Narain vs. Nawab Sai Ahmed Khan6, the Privy Council held as follows:

"In a suit in ejectment the plaintiffs can succeed only on the strength of their own title, and there is no obligation upon the defendants to plead possible defects in the plaintiffs‟ title which might manifest themselves when the title is disclosed. It is sufficient that in the written statement the defendants deny the plaintiffs‟ title, and under this plea, they can avail themselves of any defect which such title discloses."

In a case of A. Ramloo and others vs. G. Sreeramachandra Murthy and others 7 , the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held as follows:

In a ruling reported in Moran Mar Basselios Catheolicos and another v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and others, AIR 1954 SC 526, it has been held by their Lordships as under:

"That the plaintiff in ejectment suit must succeed on the strength of his own title. This can be done by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus that is on him irrespective of whether the defendant has proved his case or not. A mere destruction of the AIR 1965 SC 1506 1945 SCC OnLine PC 56 1999 SCC OnLine AP 80 VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 defendants title, in the absence of establishment of his own title carries the plaintiff nowhere."

22. The claim of the plaintiffs is that the suit schedule lands are zeroyiti lands and zeroyiti pattas were granted by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram to the predecessors of the plaintiffs and in the year 1960, there was a survey and settlement conducted by the Government and in the said survey and settlement, the plaintiffs were granted conditional pattas to the suit land. The plaintiffs relied on Exs.A.81 and A.89. Ex.A.81 is the patta said to have been issued in the year 1958 in the name of Pedapudi Ramulu / 9th plaintiff for Ac.1.22 cents by the Assistant Settlement Officer. Ex.A.89 is in the name of Chodisetti Bangaraiah, which was said to have been issued in the year 1935. The said Chodisetti Bangaraiah or his children are not parties to the suit. Ex.A.37 stands in the name of plaintiff No.24. Ex.A.52 patta stands in the name of Nacharla Gangaraju. The said Nacharla Gangaraju is not plaintiff in the suit. Except plaintiff Nos.9 and 24, none of the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title, filed the alleged pattas before the trial Court. The 9th plaintiff / P.W.8 filed his alleged patta said to have been issued in the year 1958 and its extent is Ac.1.22 cents. As per the evidence of 9th plaintiff / P.W.8, his family used to have Ac.1.40 cents only in suit schedule land and the suit land was given by the King to their parents. The 9th plaintiff also relied on Exs.A.53 to A.73 land revenue receipts. All the said land revenue receipts except Ex.A.70, are much prior to 15.05.1972. Ex.A.70 is dated 15.05.1972. The 9th plaintiff / P.W.8 admits in cross-examination that they were not in possession from 1976 and they voluntarily vacated the suit land and then the Government taken over the possession of the suit land and part of the schedule land was given by the Government to the Sangham people. His evidence clearly shows that they themselves voluntarily vacated the suit land without any protest and the Government has taken over the possession and later part of the said lands were given to the Sangham people. Except the 9th plaintiff and 24th plaintiff, VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 none of the plaintiffs filed their alleged pattas to prove their possession in the schedule property. Though the 9th plaintiff relied on the aforesaid patta, he admits the king gave the land to them and they voluntarily vacated the suit land and the Government taken over the possession and later part of the plaint schedule property was given to Sangham people.

23. Some of the plaintiffs filed land revenue receipts. All the said land revenue receipts are prior to 1975, except Exs.A.141 to A.143 land revenue receipts dated 16.02.1975. Exs.A.141 to A.143 relates to Hanumanthu Buraiah / 15th plaintiff. Ex.A.42 relates to Chodisetti Subba Rao. The said Chodisetti Subba Rao is not one of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also relied on Exs.A.162 to 166 land revenue receipts in the name of 19th plaintiff. It does not mean that the 19th plaintiff is in possession of his property till the year 1976. The latest receipt filed by the 19th plaintiff is Ex.A.166, dated 08.02.1975. Except the 9th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff and 19th plaintiff, none of the plaintiffs filed their land revenue receipts for the year 1975. None of the plaintiffs filed their land revenue receipts from the month of March, 1975 onwards. Moreover, payment of land revenue by the 9th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff and 19th plaintiff, does not mean that they were in possession of their lands till February, 1975. The law is well settled that the payment of land revenue does not confer any title in the plaint schedule property, that too in a suit filed for seeking the relief of declaration of title and possession over the schedule property.

24. The plaintiffs have not filed either 10-1 revenue Adangals or cultivation Adangals. As stated supra, except the 9th plaintiff, none of the plaintiffs filed their alleged pattas said to have been obtained by erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram. The 24th plaintiff filed the alleged patta. But the 24th plaintiff has not filed any suit and the 24th plaintiff was added as legal representative of deceased 7th plaintiff during pendency of the suit. The 24th plaintiff did not enter into the witness box.

VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002

25. It is the contention of the plaintiffs in the plaint itself that the suit schedule lands are zeroyiti lands. No document is filed by the plaintiffs to show that it is a zeroyiti land. Another contention taken by the plaintiffs is that all the schedule properties are zeroyiti lands and they were granted zeroyiti pattas by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram to the predecessors of the plaintiffs and their predecessors were in possession and enjoyment over the schedule property till they were forcibly evicted by the defendants in the month of June, 1976. The plaintiffs also specifically pleaded that in or about the year 1960, there was a survey and settlement conducted by the Government and in the said survey and settlement, the plaintiffs were granted conditional pattas for the said land and due to some mistake that was crept into the Government records, subsequently the said lands were noted as Ava tank poramboke without notice to the plaintiffs or others and without any enquiry. The plaintiffs further pleaded that the suit land is not a poramboke or Government land or the land intended for the public purpose. Admittedly, none of the plaintiffs questioned the said alleged change of classification of zeroyiti land to Ava tank poramboke before the appropriate authorities. The 1st defendant / Government is claiming that the suit schedule land is a Government poramboke land. Even according to the own case of the plaintiffs, in the survey and settlement operations in the year 1960, the schedule property is notified as Ava tank poramboke land. Even assume if the said statement of the plaintiffs in the plaint is correct, they have to challenge the said change of classification as Ava tank poramboke before appropriate authority. Even assume if the said statement of the plaintiffs in the plaint is correct, they have to challenge the said change of classification before the appropriate authority. But, they have not challenged the same from 1960 onwards before the appropriate authorities.

26. As stated supra, the plaintiffs approached the civil Court for seeking the relief of declaration of title and also recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the entire burden is casts upon the VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 plaintiffs to prove their right and title in the plaint schedule property. If they fail to prove their right and title in the plaint schedule property, they are not entitled the consequential relief of recovery of possession as sought in the plaint by the plaintiffs.

27. The 1st plaintiff pleaded that she is the owner of Ac.7.92 cents in old S.No.103/1, now S.No.136/2 of Timmapuram Village and she got the same under a registered gift deed dated 24.02.1955 from Chodisetti Manikyam and others and she has been in enjoyment by paying taxes till dispossession. But admittedly, no „D‟ patta of the said Manikyam is filed. P.W.1 admits in her evidence in cross-examination that Ex.A.1 is the registration extract of gift deed dated 24.02.1955 and except the registration extract of the gift deed, no document is filed to prove her possession and enjoyment over the schedule property. The plaintiffs also relied on Exs.A.4 to A.6 land revenue receipts. Ex.A.4 is dated 11.09.1975. It is not in the name of 1st plaintiff. Ex.A.5 is dated 30.06.1973. It is in the name of 1st plaintiff. Ex.A.6 land revenue receipt dated 16.05.1969. It is also not in the name of 1st plaintiff. Though the 1st plaintiff relied on Exs.A.4 to A6 land revenue receipts, except Ex.A.5, remaining two land revenue receipts are not in the name of 1st plaintiff. The 1st plaintiff as P.W.1 admits that the Sangham people taken over the possession of the said lands in the year 1976. She further admits her land and the plots of the other plaintiffs are different or at different places, but not side by side i.e. continuous plots and she was dispossessed by third parties in the month of June, 1976 and her son Venkataramana informed her about the dispossession by Sangham people. The aforesaid admission clearly goes to show that she is not having any personal knowledge about the dispossession of the lands of the 1st plaintiff. She further admits the patta given in favour of her ancestors is not available with her.

28. The plaint averments shows that the 2nd plaintiff is the owner of Ac.3.09 cents in old S.No.103/1 corresponding new S.No.136/2 of VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 Timmapuram Village. No documents are filed by the 2nd plaintiff. The 2nd plaintiff / P.W.3 deposed that he is the 2nd plaintiff in the suit and the same is ancestral property and one Papa Rao is his father and he is the only son to his parents. There are no documents either in favour of him and his father or his grandfather in respect of item No.2 of the schedule properties. He relied on three tax receipts Exs.A.16 to A.18. Those are dated 23.06.1958, 10.03.1962 and 09.03.1969. He further admits that he does not know the contents in the plaint and P.W.2 taken over the documents and went to the Advocate‟s office and got drafted the plaint and filed the same into the Court. He pleaded ignorance in almost all the crucial aspects. In the case at hand, though he pleaded that he is the owner of Ac.3.09 cents, which is acquired by him by way of ancestral, no document is filed by the 2 nd plaintiff to show that it is his ancestral property.

29. It is the specific case of the 3rd plaintiff that he is the owner of Ac.1.17 cents in old S.No.143/5 corresponding new S.No.176/5 and his title and possession to the land is proved by filing tax receipts. But the 3rd plaintiff did not enter into the witness box. On behalf of the 3rd plaintiff, his son is examined as P.W.4. As per his evidence, one Chodisetti Nagaraju is maternal grandmother and his mother and grandmother executed a gift deed dated 14.02.1958 in favour of his father. He also relied on land revenue receipts much prior to 1975. He admits that the defendants occupied the land in the year 1976, but he did not give any report to the police.

30. The case of the 4th plaintiff is that the 4th and 5th plaintiffs are the owners of Ac.5.18 cents in Timmapuram Village. The 4th plaintiff is examined as P.W.5. The 5th plaintiff is not examined as a witness. P.W.5 deposed in his evidence that he is the 4th plaintiff and 5th plaintiff is his brother and the document of title for Ac.5.18 cents were not traced out either in favour of their father and their grandfather except the land revenue receipts. They relied on Exs.A.32 to A.35 land revenue receipts. Those are VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 much prior to more than 35 years prior to filing of the suit. He further admits that all the aforesaid land revenue receipts stands in the name of his paternal grandfather Atchaiah. He further admits that in or around 1976, the defendants Sangham people trespassed into the land and other ryots lands and they were evicted from Ava lands. He further admits that the Timmapuram Village lands are higher in level than the suit land. He further admits that he does not know exactly whether after taken over the possession by the Government, on the application submitted by ryoti Sanghams, the Government evicted them and handed over the land to the Sangham people as leasehold rights and delivered possession and since then, the Sangham people are cultivating their respective lands.

31. The 6th and 7th plaintiffs relied on the evidence of P.W.6. P.W.6 is the 6th plaintiff in the suit. As per his evidence, the 7th plaintiff is his elder brother. As per his evidence, in the year 1976, Sangham people trespassed into the lands and forcibly taken away the crops in their lands. He further admits that Ex.A.37 is the patta given by the Pithapuram Zamindar dated 16.11.1937 in favour of his father. Exs.A.42 to A.46 are land revenue receipts. Ex.A.47 is the land revenue receipt dated 21.02.1978 in the name of his favour. As stated supra, even as per his own evidence, he was evicted in the year 1976 itself.

32. P.W.7 deposed in his evidence that he is the owner of Ac.1.78 cents in old S.No.91 corresponding new S.No.122 of Timmapuram Village. As per his evidence, the 8th plaintiff is his senior paternal uncle. He further admits that the land was purchased by his father and 8th plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 08.01.1950 and the original sale deed was lost in the fire accident and Ex.A.50 is the registration extract of the said sale deed. Admittedly, he did not choose to file the alleged patta said to have been issued either in the name of his father or his grandfather. He further admits that after dispossession, his father and 8th plaintiff got issued a notice to the District Collector and Sangham people and the said legal notice is Ex.A52 VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 dated 09.06.1977 and they cultivated the land and enjoyed the usufruct till 1976 and in the year 1976, some persons came suddenly and knocked them out and occupied Ac.1.80 cents of land. Admittedly, the 8th plaintiff did not choose to enter into the witness box. On behalf of the 8th plaintiff, his relative was examined as P.W.7.

33. The case of the 9th plaintiff is that he is the owner of Ac.1.42 cents in old S.No.138/2 connected with new S.No.171/2 of Timmapuram Village. The 9th plaintiff is examined as P.W.8. As per his evidence, their family possessed Ac.1.40 cents in the suit schedule land and the land was given by the King to their parents and the said land was enjoyed by their family and in the year 1976, three Sangham people evicted them from that land and also surrounding ryoti lands. He also relied on Exs.A.54 to A.73. But he failed to file the land revenue receipts stands in the name of P.W.8 from 1975 onwards. He relied on Ex.A.77 land revenue receipt dated 03.03.1980 and Ex.A.78 land revenue receipt dated 31.01.1983. Even as per his own case, he was dispossessed in the year 1976. Therefore, no credence will be given to the said land revenue receipts. He further admits that the suit land was not in his possession from 1976 and they voluntarily evicted the suit land and then the Government taken over the possession of the suit land, later given a part of the suit land to each Sangham people and the entire schedule land was given by the Government to the Sangham people. Therefore, his own evidence is not supporting the case of the plaintiffs.

34. As per the plaint averments, the 10th plaintiff, 11th plaintiff and 12th plaintiff possessed Ac.3.59 cents of Timmapuram Village. On their behalf, P.W.9 was alone examined. As per the evidence of P.W.9, he is the 11th plaintiff in the suit and 10th and 12th plaintiffs are his brothers. He further admits in the year 1976, one Surya Rao came and informed him that Sangham people came with sticks and material and taken away their possession by saying that they are not having any right in the said property. It clearly goes to show that he is not having any personal knowledge about VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 the dispossession of the plaintiffs 10 to 12 from out of the plaint schedule property.

35. The case of the 13th plaintiff is that he is the owner of Ac.0-70 cents of land in old S.No.137/2 connected with new S.No.135/3. As per his evidence, the said Ac.0-70 cents stands in the name of his father and his father purchased the same from Venkata Surya Rao and he lost the original sale deed. Ex.A.87 is the registration extract of sale deed dated 25.01.1959. As per the own case of the plaintiffs, it is a patta land. He further admits that himself and his father enjoyed the said Ac.0-70 cents of land till 1976.

36. The 14th plaintiff is examined as P.W.11. The 15th plaintiff is not examined as a witness before the trial Court. As per the evidence of P.W.11, their family enjoyed Ac.3.19 cents of land till 1976 and later the Sangham people forcibly evicted them claiming that the Government given the said land to them and in the same manner, they have also evicted not only himself and other ryots from their respective portions of the lands. He relied on Exs.A.104 to A.145 land revenue receipts. In cross-examination, he admits that he deposed before the Court in his chief examination based on the evidence on record, but not with the personal knowledge. He deposed before the trial Court in his chief examination based on evidence on record, but not the personal knowledge. He further admits that in the records filed into the Court, the suit land is classified as Cheruvu Padaka. He further admits that in Ex.A.94, it was noted as Cheruvu Padaka. He further admits that the Government gave a patta of the land to defendants 2 to 4 and he does not know whether each Sangham taken possession of their respective bit of land out of the suit land. He further admits that the Government given pattas to the Sangham people and thereby the Sangham people occupied the suit land.

VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002

37. According to the plaint averments, the 16th and 17th plaintiffs are the owners of Ac.1.27 cents of Timmapuram Village. They relied on the evidence of P.W.12. P.W.12 is the 16th plaintiff in the suit. As per his evidence, their family got the land from their father and his father purchased the property of Ac.0-64 cents by his father under a sale deed, the original sale deed is not traced out and their vendors‟ vendor document is Ex.A.147. He further deposed after death of his father, himself and 17th plaintiff are cultivating the landed property and in the year 1976, some Sangham people came and evicted them and other ryots from the suit schedule land.

38. As per the plaint averments, the 18th plaintiff is the owner of Ac.4.26 cents. As per his evidence, he does not know whether there is any document for the property of two plots and they paid taxes to the Government for their lands and he kept the documentary proof in a thatched house, but the said documents are misplaced and they enjoyed the property till 1976, later the Sangham people trespassed into the land and taken over the possession. As per his evidence, he is not having any document to show that they are having right and title in the plaint schedule property and all the documents were misplaced.

39. As per the plaint averments, the 19th plaintiff is the owner of Ac.2.62 cents at Timmapuram Village. The 19th plaintiff is examined as P.W.14. He admits that there are no documents either in favour of himself or his father for the land, except the land revenue receipts. He admits that they are in possession till 1976.

40. As per the plaint averments, the 20th plaintiff is the owner of Ac.2.50 cents. As per his evidence, the document and land revenue receipts belongs to them was lost, since their house was collapsed about 30 years back and he has not obtained any copies of the documents from the revenue authorities to establish his right and title in the schedule property. As per the plaint averments, the 21st plaintiff is the owner of Ac.1.00. The VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 21st plaintiff is not examined before the trial Court. His son is examined as P.W.16. As per his evidence, he does not know what is the extent of land and he does not know the exact place of land. He admits the Sangham people occupied the land in the year 1976. He further admits that no record is available with him for his Ac.1.00 land as claimed.

41. As per the plaint averments, the 22nd plaintiff is the owner of Ac.2.16 cents. As per the evidence of 22nd plaintiff / P.W.17, except the two land revenue receipts, the other land revenue receipts and title documents are lost by him and they were not traced.

42. The evidence of the aforesaid witnesses failed to establish that all the plaintiffs are having right and title in the plaint schedule property. As stated supra, some of the plaintiffs relied on the land revenue receipts. The present suit is filed for seeking the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the burden is heavily casts on the plaintiffs to prove their right and title in the plaint schedule property, but they are not supposed to depend upon the weaknesses in the case set up by the defendants. Except the 9th plaintiff, none of the plaintiffs filed their alleged pattas said to have been given by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram. Though the 9th plaintiff relied on the alleged patta, he himself admits that he voluntarily vacated his property and the Government taken over the property and later pattas were given to the Sangham people / defendants 2 to 4. His own evidence is not supporting the case of the plaintiffs.

43. As seen from the judgment of the learned trial Judge in its judgment, the trial Court has not even discussed the evidence of all the witnesses and not even discussed the material admissions in the cross- examination of the depositions of the witnesses. Admittedly, the 3rd plaintiff, 5th plaintiff, 7th plaintiff, 10th plaintiff, 12th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff, 17th plaintiff and 22nd plaintiff not even enter into the witness box and no pattas alleged VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 to have been issued are filed except the 9th plaintiff. Though the 6th plaintiff relied on the patta said to have been issued in the name of his father, the same is not proved that the 6th plaintiff is having right in the suit property. It is the case of the plaintiffs in the plaint itself that they were dispossessed in the year 1976. As stated supra, payment of land revenue does not confer rights in the plaint schedule property. Except some of the plaintiffs, the remaining plaintiffs have not filed land revenue receipts to show that they paid land revenue to the Government. Though some of the plaintiffs relied on land revenue receipts, those are much prior to March, 1975. The suit for recovery of possession filed by the plaintiffs is based on the title. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that they are having valid right and title in the plaint schedule property. But the evidence placed by the plaintiffs failed to prove that they are having right and title in the plaint schedule property.

44. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that the Ava lands situated in Timmapuram Village i.e. the plaint schedule lands are zeroyiti lands. Even in the plaint itself, it was recited that due to mistake crept into the Government records, subsequently the classifications of lands were noted as Ava tank poramboke without notice to the plaintiffs or others and without any enquiry. Admittedly, the plaintiffs have not challenged the said change of classification of the lands from 1960 onwards before the appropriate authority. As per the own document filed by the plaintiffs i.e. Ex.A.11 ROR Register 1913, the lands in S.No.135/1 to 149/8 of Timmapuram Village are Cheruvu Padaka lands, but not the zeroyiti lands. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that the defendants have failed to discharge their burden of proof. In view of the settled legal position, as stated supra, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden heavily lies on the plaintiffs. They have to prove their title, but not by the defendants. The own admissions of the plaintiffs‟ witnesses itself are not supporting the claim of the plaintiffs.

VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002

45. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs placed reliance on L.Ramesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh8.

The facts in the aforesaid case law relates to writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the plaintiffs approached the civil Court for seeking the relief of declaration of title. The 22 plaintiffs filed the single suit for seeking the relief of declaration of title. As stated supra, two plaintiffs alone filed their alleged pattas which are relates to more than 50 years ago prior to institution of the suit. Except the said two plaintiffs, the other plaintiffs have not filed their pattas. Even though the said two plaintiffs filed their pattas, their own evidence itself is not supporting the claim of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs failed to file 10-1 account and cultivation account before the trial Court.

46. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs placed reliance on State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by District Collector v. Kothacheruvu Plantations and Industries Private Limited and others 9 , wherein the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as follows:

"204. Such delivery of possession pending suit would therefore be only subject to the result in the suit/appeal. Even alienations pending suit are subject to result of the suit under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Therefore, if the plaintiff/appellant is held entitled to the reliefs of declaration claimed by it, then in exercise of power of this Court under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, this Court is entitled to grant relief of delivery of possession also to the appellant, even if it was not prayed for in the suit since on the date of the suit it is in possession of the property and the defendants got into possession after the present suit was filed."

The facts in the aforesaid case law are, pending suit proceedings, the suit property was delivered to others. In the case at hand, even as per the own case of the plaintiffs, in the year 1976 itself, they were dispossessed 2022 (2) ALD 234 2014 (4) ALT 380 VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 from out of the plaint schedule property. The present suit is filed on 17.06.1988.

47. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs / respondents contended that the issues consisting declaration of title and recovery of possession have already been adjudicated by the trial Court apart from this Court in a judgment in between State of Andhra Pradesh v. Ramajan and others 10. The facts in the aforesaid case law are the suit for declaration of title and possession and mesne profits was filed before the Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada in the year 1977 vide O.S.No.149 of 1977, but not in the year 1988 and the trial Court decreed the said suit for all reliefs, but the first appellate Court negatived the relief of declaration of title and possession was restored by holding that the plaintiffs in the said suit are forcibly dispossessed by the 2nd defendant after March, 1976. The 1st defendant filed second appeal and the plaintiffs therein filed a cross appeal and the second appeal has been dismissed and cross appeal was allowed. Whereas, the facts in the present case, even as per the own pleadings pleaded by the plaintiffs, they were dispossessed after 29.06.1976 and they filed a civil suit for declaration of title and possession before the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada in the month of June, 1988. The plaintiffs in the present suit and plaintiffs in that suit are different. The plaintiffs herein are not the parties to the said suit. The present suit is filed for relief of declaration of title. The suit for declaration of title is a right in personam not a right in rem.

48. None of the plaintiffs herein stated that they were forcibly evicted by the defendants in the month of June, 1976. Simply, they pleaded that they were evicted in the month of June, 1976. P.W.8 / 9th plaintiff deposed in his evidence that they voluntarily vacated the suit land and the Government taken over the possession of the suit land and later 1991 (1) L.S. 257 VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 Government given up part of the suit land to the Sangham people. P.W.1 simply deposed that he was dispossessed in the month of June, 1976. The aforesaid suit O.S.No.149 of 1977 was filed by the plaintiffs 1 to 5 in the said suit for seeking the relief of declaration of title in S.No.90/1, 93/1, 2, 94, 95/3 in a total extent of Ac.14.63 cents. Whereas in the present case, the survey numbers in the present case are different and the property is situated at same village. As noticed supra, the 22 plaintiffs filed a single suit and they are claiming title in different survey numbers. Therefore, it is the duty of the each plaintiff to prove his title and possession independently as pleaded by the plaintiffs.

49. The 3rd plaintiff, 5th plaintiff, 7th plaintiff, 10th plaintiff, 12th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff, 17th plaintiff and 22nd plaintiff are not even enter into the witness box. None of the plaintiffs except the 6th plaintiff and 9th plaintiff filed the alleged „D‟ pattas said to have been obtained from erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram. The plaintiffs failed to file revenue Adangals, cultivation account before the trial Court. Therefore, the finding given in the said suit vide O.S.No.149 of 1977 are not yet binding in the present suit. In the present case, the Advocate-commissioner was appointed by the trial Court and he visited the suit schedule property and his report is marked as Ex.C.1. Ex.C.1 goes to show that the suit schedule property is low-lying and below the level of surrounding land.

50. In the case at hand, in the ROR Register, in the year 1926 / Ex.A.11 which was relied by the plaintiffs, it is noted as a tank bed "Cheruvu Padaka". It is well settled that the tank is outside the purview of zeroyiti land, as per Section 3(g) of Abolition Act, it is abundantly clear that a ryot is entitled only to such rights, as were conveyed on him under the Act and that the Act does not contemplate the issue of ryotwari patta in respect of a tank.

VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002

51. For the aforesaid reasons, it is evident that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title in the plaint schedule property. Accordingly, point No.1 is answered against the plaintiffs / respondents.

52. Point No.2:

Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation?

Learned Government Pleader for defendant No.1 would contend that all the plaintiffs were evicted during the year 1971 itself and the Government taken over the possession of the properties and subsequently those lands were given to defendants 2 to 4 Sangham people. In the written statement itself, the 1st defendant pleaded that all the encroachers were evicted after due enquiry during fasali 1381, corresponding with the year 1971 and subsequently in the year 1972 and 1973, some persons encroached again, who formed into two societies during the year 1974, relinquished their claims and about Ac.70.00 of tank bed land was leased out to three societies / defendants 2 to 4. The 1st defendant specifically pleaded as per the policy of the Government, the tank bed lands were granted on one year lease basis to ryot cooli Sangham and small farmers Sangham in the year 1976. The recitals in the plaint shows that the plaintiffs were dispossessed in the year 1976. The same is specifically denied by the plaintiffs. Therefore, it is for the plaintiffs to produce oral and documentary evidence to show that on which date and in which month, they were evicted by the defendants. The defendants contend that the suit is barred by law of limitation.

53. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that the trial Court had categorically dealt with the issue of limitation in accordance with the governing principles of law. As seen from the plaint averments in the plaint, it was specifically contended that they were dispossessed after 29.06.1976. The plaintiffs have cleverly not mentioned the date, month and year of dispossession in the plaint itself. The suit is filed in the month of VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 June, 1988 i.e. on 17.06.1988. Therefore, the exact date and month of dispossession are crucial to decide the subject matter of the limitation.

54. P.W.1 admits she was dispossessed in the month of June, 1976. P.W.3 admits he does not know the contents in the plaint and P.W.3 admits in his evidence before the trial Court on 20.07.1999 that "Sangham people occupied his land at about 23 to 25 years back". It means, in or about 1974 to 1976, they were dispossessed. P.W.4 deposed that the defendants occupied the land in the year 1976, but no report was given to the police. P.W.5 deposed that in or around the year 1976, he was dispossessed. P.W.6 deposed in his evidence that in the year 1976, he was evicted. P.W.7 on behalf of 8th plaintiff deposed that he was evicted in the year 1976. P.W.8 / 9th plaintiff deposed that the suit land was not in his possession from 1976 and they have voluntarily vacated the suit land, then the Government has taken over the possession of the suit land and later given the part of the suit land to Sangham people. P.Ws.9 and 10 admits that they enjoyed the properties till 1976, but they stated that the Sangham people came and trespassed into the land in the year 1976. P.Ws.11 and 12 admits that they were dispossessed in the year 1976. P.W.13 deposed that he enjoyed the property till 1976. Admittedly, the 3rd plaintiff, 5th plaintiff, 7th plaintiff, 10th plaintiff, 12th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff, 17th plaintiff and 22nd plaintiff did not enter into the witness box.

55. As stated supra, in the plaint itself, it was simply pleaded that the plaintiffs were dispossessed after 29.06.1976. Admittedly, the suit was filed on 17.06.1988. Therefore, the date, month and year of dispossession are crucial to decide the subject matter of limitation. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that in computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given or for which, the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required in accordance with the requirement of any law for the time being in force, the period of VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 such notice or as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction should be excluded.

56. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.9 legal notice. Ex.A.9 is the legal notice said to have been issued on 12.02.1988 by all the plaintiffs, except the 14th plaintiff. The 14th plaintiff has not issued any notice. Ex.A.8 is legal notice dated 22.02.1988 said to have been issued by the 15th plaintiff and one Chodisetti Subba Rao. The 6th and 7th plaintiffs said to have been issued the legal notice under Ex.A.49 dated 27.12.1976. Ex.A.52 is the another legal notice said to have been issued by Karri Venkata Raju and Karri Ramamurthy on 09.06.1977, they are not the plaintiffs in the suit. Ex.A.146 is another notice dated 25.04.1977 got issued by the 15 th plaintiff and another. The 14th plaintiff has not issued any notice. As seen from the aforesaid legal notices, the 6th and 7th plaintiffs said to have been issued legal notice on 27.12.1976. The 15th plaintiff said to have been issued a legal notice dated 25.04.1977. Ex.A.9 is the latest notice said to have been issued by all the plaintiffs except the 14th plaintiff dated 12.02.1988. If the plaintiffs wants to enjoy the benefit under Section 5(2) of the Limitation Act, they are entitled to avail the same from the date of Ex.A.9 notice from 12.02.1988 but not from 17.04.1988. The suit is filed on 17.06.1988. Therefore, the date of dispossession is crucial to decide the limitation aspect. But, none of the plaintiffs stated in their evidence about the exact date of dispossession. Even in the plaint also, the date, month and year of dispossession is not stated by the plaintiffs.

57. The suit is filed for seeking the relief of declaration of title and possession of the plaint schedule property. The Court fees was paid by the plaintiffs for declaratory relief alone. No separate Court fees has been paid for recovery of possession. Therefore, the relief of recovery of possession is a consequential relief. As stated supra, the plaintiffs failed to prove their title in the plaint schedule property. Since the plaintiffs failed to plead and VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 prove about the exact date, month and year of dispossession in the plaint itself, they simply pleaded in the plaint in para No.IX that after 29.06.1976, they were dispossessed by the defendants. P.W.8 / 9th plaintiff deposed that they voluntarily vacated the land and the Government taken over the possession of the suit land and later given part of the land to the Sangham people.

58. Some of the plaintiffs filed the land revenue receipts. Among those land revenue receipts, two land revenue receipts relates to the month of February, 1975. Remaining plaintiffs have not even filed their land revenue receipts relates to the year 1975. None of the plaintiffs produced any evidence to show that they are in possession of the schedule property from 1975 onwards atleast. As stated supra, the plaintiffs failed to produce 10-1 cultivation account and revenue Adangals to prove their possession over the schedule property.

59. For the aforesaid reasons and considering the aforesaid circumstances, it is evident that the plaintiffs were dispossessed prior to 1976. But for the reasons best known to the plaintiffs, they filed the suit on 17.06.1988. Though the plaintiffs relied on notice under Section 80 CPC said to have been issued to the 1st defendant in the month of February, 1988, the plaintiffs leisurely approached the civil Court as per their choice and they filed the suit for seeking the relief of declaration of title and possession on 17.06.1988. Therefore, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Accordingly, point No.2 is answered.

60. Point No.3:

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession of the plaint schedule property?

In view of my findings on point Nos.1 and 2, since the plaintiffs are not entitled for primary relief of declaration of title, they are not entitled the relief VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 of recovery of possession of the schedule property. Accordingly, point No.3 is answered.

61. Point No.4:

Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit?

For the reasons stated above and having regard to the facts of the case, this Court is of the view that the plaintiffs failed to establish their case. The findings and conclusion recorded by the trial Court are not based on proper appreciation on record. Therefore, the judgment of the trial Court is erroneous and cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be set aside and both the appeals are deserves to be allowed.

62. In the result, both the appeals are allowed and the judgment and decree dated 05.10.2001 passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.288 of 1988 on the file of learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, is hereby set aside. Consequently, the suit in O.S.No.288 of 1988 on the file of learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, is dismissed. Each party do bear their own costs in the appeal.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.

_________________________ V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J Date: 27.10.2025 ARR VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO APPEAL SUIT NO.2533 OF 2001 AND APPEAL SUIT NO.921 OF 2002 Date: 27.10.2025 ARR

(1) NDPS Act, 1985 — Section 20(b)(ii)(B) read with Section 8(c) — Possession of intermediate quantity of ganja — Bail — Considerations. Where the accused, a woman, was found in possession of 4.038 kilograms of ganja (intermediate quantity) and had no prior criminal record, and the investigation was substantially completed, continued detention was held to be unnecessary. Bail can be granted subject to stringent conditions, as the embargo under Section 37 NDPS Act applies only to commercial quantity. (Paras 3–5) (2) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 437 and 439 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Sections 480 and 483 — Grant of bail — Discretion of Court. Discretion under Sections 437 and 439 Cr.P.C. (and corresponding provisions of BNSS, 2023) should be exercised in favour of the accused when the investigation is almost complete, the accused has a fixed place of residence, and there is no likelihood of absconding or tampering with evidence. (Paras 3–4) (3) Criminal Procedure — Bail to Women Accused — Judicial Approach. Special consideration to be given to women accused under the proviso to Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in granting bail to female offenders, particularly when they are first-time offenders and the alleged quantity is not commercial. (Para 3) (4) Bail — Conditions — Stringent safeguards imposed. Bail granted subject to conditions: execution of personal bond and sureties, weekly appearance before SHO, restriction on leaving the State, prohibition on influencing witnesses, and cooperation with investigation. (Para 5) Held: A woman accused of possessing an intermediate quantity of narcotic substance, with no criminal antecedents and a fixed abode, is entitled to bail when investigation is substantially completed, subject to appropriate conditions ensuring her presence and cooperation.

(1) NDPS Act, 1985 — Section 20(b)(ii)(B) read with Section 8(c) — Possession of intermediate quantity of ganja — Bail — Considerations.

Where the accused, a woman, was found in possession of 4.038 kilograms of ganja (intermediate quantity) and had no prior criminal record, and the investigation was substantially completed, continued detention was held to be unnecessary. Bail can be granted subject to stringent conditions, as the embargo under Section 37 NDPS Act applies only to commercial quantity.

(Paras 3–5)

(2) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 437 and 439 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Sections 480 and 483 — Grant of bail — Discretion of Court.

Discretion under Sections 437 and 439 Cr.P.C. (and corresponding provisions of BNSS, 2023) should be exercised in favour of the accused when the investigation is almost complete, the accused has a fixed place of residence, and there is no likelihood of absconding or tampering with evidence.

(Paras 3–4)

(3) Criminal Procedure — Bail to Women Accused — Judicial Approach.

Special consideration to be given to women accused under the proviso to Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in granting bail to female offenders, particularly when they are first-time offenders and the alleged quantity is not commercial.

(Para 3)

(4) Bail — Conditions — Stringent safeguards imposed.

Bail granted subject to conditions: execution of personal bond and sureties, weekly appearance before SHO, restriction on leaving the State, prohibition on influencing witnesses, and cooperation with investigation.

(Para 5)

Held:

A woman accused of possessing an intermediate quantity of narcotic substance, with no criminal antecedents and a fixed abode, is entitled to bail when investigation is substantially completed, subject to appropriate conditions ensuring her presence and cooperation.Asma Bibi vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 23 October, 2025

APHC010543612025

                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

                                 AT AMARAVATI               [3521]

                          (Special Original Jurisdiction)

           THURSDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF OCTOBER

                TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

                               PRESENT

          THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO

                   CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 10577/2025

Between:

  1. ASMA BIBI, W/O. MD. HUSSAIN, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, RJO.

     D.NO.J-281/5A, VIJAY COLONY, USMANPUR, STREET NO.6,

     SHASTRI PARK, EAST DELHI, DELHI.

                                            ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED

                                 AND

  1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, Rep by its Public Prosecutor,

     High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

                                       ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT

Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:

  1. GOLLAPALLI MAHESWARA RAO

Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:

  1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

                                           2

                                                                            Dr.YLR, J

                                                               Crl.P.No.10577 of 2025

The Court made the following:

ORDER:

The Criminal Petition has been filed under Sections 437 and 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity 'the Cr.P.C.') and Sections 480 & 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity 'the BNSS'), seeking to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused on bail in Crime No.205 of 2025 of IV Town Police Station, Visakhapatnam Commissionerate, Visakhapatnam District, was registered against the Petitioner/Accused herein for the offences punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B), read with 8(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for brevity 'the NDPS Act').

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. Perused the record.

3. The petitioner is a lady aged about 32 years and permanent resident of Delhi and she has got fixed abode. She was found in possession of 4.038 Kilograms of Ganja and was arrested on 21.09.2025. She has been in judicial custody for the past 32 days. There was no criminal antecedents against the petitioner. So far, four witnesses were examined, they are the official witnessess. The petitioner may not be in a position to threaten the official witnesses or tamper the official witnessess. The material portion of the investigation to the alleged role of the petitioner is substantially completed.

Dr.YLR, J

4. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature and gravity of allegations levelled against the Petitioner/Accused, this Court is inclined to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused on bail.

5. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed with the following stringent conditions:

i. The Petitioner/Accused shall be enlarged on bail subject to he executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) with two sureties for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge-Special Judge for Trial of Offences under NDPS Act, Visakhapatnam, Visakhapatnam District. ii. The Petitioner/Accused shall appear before the Station House Officer concerned, on every Saturday in between 10:00 am and 05:00 pm, till filing of the charge sheet. iii. The Petitioner/Accused shall not leave the limits of the State of Andhra Pradesh without prior permission from the Station House Officer concerned. iv. The Petitioner/Accused shall not commit or indulge in commission of any offence in future. v. The Petitioner/Accused shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person Dr.YLR, J acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the court or to any police officer.

vi. The petitioner/Accused shall cooperate with the investigating officer in further investigation of the case and shall make himself available for interrogation by the investigating officer as and when required.

_________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 23.10.2025 MSI Dr.YLR, J THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 10577/2025 Date: 23.10.2025 MSI

Contempt of Court – Willful Disobedience – Non-Compliance of Court Order – Filling of Aided Teacher Posts – G.O.Ms.No.1, Education, dated 01.01.1994 – RTE Act, 2009 – Alleged Violation. Writ Mandamus – Implementation of Earlier Order: Petitioners sought to punish respondents for alleged willful disobedience of the order dated 20.02.2023 in W.P.No.4058 of 2023, wherein the Court had directed the authorities to permit filling of aided vacancies in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1 (Education), dated 01.01.1994, and as per the schedule under Sections 19 & 25 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. Respondents’ Compliance: Counter affidavits revealed that the 4th respondent (Joint Director, Model Schools) granted permission on 13.03.2024 to fill the two vacant aided SGT posts, and the petitioner was instructed to proceed after issuing newspaper notifications. The petitioner failed to submit documentary proof of the advertisements and the list of applicants. Despite being advised to give wider publicity, the petitioner did not cooperate. Later, pursuant to Government Memo dated 25.09.2024, applications were invited online (07.12.2024–15.12.2024) and a Deputy Educational Officer was nominated to oversee recruitment. Court’s Observation: The record demonstrated that the respondents had taken active steps to implement the Court’s earlier order. The delay or non-completion of the recruitment process was due to non-cooperation of the petitioner institution, not because of any willful disobedience by the officials. No Willful Violation: The Court held that the respondents had acted bona fide and complied substantially with the order. There was no deliberate or intentional violation of the Court’s directions. Result: Contempt case dismissed — No willful disobedience established. All connected miscellaneous petitions closed. Held: “The respondents did not commit any willful and deliberate violation of the order passed by this Court. Accordingly, the contempt case is closed.”

Contempt of Court – Willful Disobedience – Non-Compliance of Court Order – Filling of Aided Teacher Posts – G.O.Ms.No.1, Education, dated 01.01.1994 – RTE Act, 2009 – Alleged Violation.

1. Writ Mandamus – Implementation of Earlier Order:
   Petitioners sought to punish respondents for alleged willful disobedience of the order dated 20.02.2023 in W.P.No.4058 of 2023, wherein the Court had directed the authorities to permit filling of aided vacancies in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1 (Education), dated 01.01.1994, and as per the schedule under Sections 19 & 25 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.

2. Respondents’ Compliance:
   Counter affidavits revealed that the 4th respondent (Joint Director, Model Schools) granted permission on 13.03.2024 to fill the two vacant aided SGT posts, and the petitioner was instructed to proceed after issuing newspaper notifications.

   • The petitioner failed to submit documentary proof of the advertisements and the list of applicants.

   • Despite being advised to give wider publicity, the petitioner did not cooperate.

   • Later, pursuant to Government Memo dated 25.09.2024, applications were invited online (07.12.2024–15.12.2024) and a Deputy Educational Officer was nominated to oversee recruitment.

3. Court’s Observation:
   The record demonstrated that the respondents had taken active steps to implement the Court’s earlier order. The delay or non-completion of the recruitment process was due to non-cooperation of the petitioner institution, not because of any willful disobedience by the officials.

4. No Willful Violation:
   The Court held that the respondents had acted bona fide and complied substantially with the order. There was no deliberate or intentional violation of the Court’s directions.

5. Result:
   Contempt case dismissed — No willful disobedience established.
   All connected miscellaneous petitions closed.

Held:

“The respondents did not commit any willful and deliberate violation of the order passed by this Court. Accordingly, the contempt case is closed.”St Josephs Primary School vs Sri Praveen Prakash Ias on 24 October, 2025

     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA

                     CONTEMPT CASE NO.6800 OF 2023

ORDER

1. This contempt case is filed complaining the willful disobedience in implementing the Order dated 20.02.2022 passed by this Court in W.P.No.4058 of 2023.

2. The petitioners filed W.P.No. 4058 of 2023 to issue writ of mandamus declaring the action of respondents in not granting permission to fill up the vacant aided posts in the petitioner institution as per G.O.Ms.No.40 dated 30.06.2017 and consequential proceedings in Rc.No.90/PS1/20103 dated 20.07.2017 despite representation made by the petitioner on 08.09.2021 as illegal, arbitrary and consequently direct Respondent Nos.2 to 3 to permit the petitioner institution to fill up the two vacant aided posts as per G.O.Ms.No.40 dated 30.06.2017.

3. On 20.02.2023, this Court disposed of the writ petition in terms of the common order dated 05.01.2023 passed in W.P.No.30927 of 2022 & batch. The operative portion of the order in W.P.No.30927 of 2022 & batch dated 05.01.2023, reads as follows:

"i) The respondent-authorities are hereby directed to permit the petitioners-institutions to fill up all the Aided vacancies in terms of NV,J G.O.Ms.No.1, Education, dated 01.01.1994 and also as per the Schedule prescribed under Sections 19 & 25 of the Act,2009;

ii) In future also, whenever vacancies arise, the institutions have to make applications to the Competent authorities for filling up the vacancies ;

iii) On such applications, the Competent authorities shall inform the institution about the availability of qualified surplus staff, within a period of four (04) weeks from the date of application and allot said surplus staff on permanent basis;

iv) If surplus staff are not available, the Competent authority shall inform the same and permit the petitioners institutions to fill up the vacancies in accordance with the above said Rule, preferably within a period of two (02) months;

v) So far as minority institutions are concerned, the above procedure is not applicable insofar as allotment of surplus staff are concerned, in view of the Judgments of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Modern High School, Zamisthanpur V. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others 1 and Ester Axene Res. High School and Others V. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others2

4. Originally, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 were arrayed as party respondents.

Vide orders of this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2024 dated 19.10.2024, Respondent No.3 was discharged from this contempt case. Further, vide 2002 (1) ALD 96 MANU/AP/0045/2019 NV,J order in I.A.No.2 of 2024 dated 19.010.2024, Respondent No.4 was impleaded as party respondent and vide order in I.A.No.1 of 2025 dated 19.03.2025, Respondent Nos.5 to 7 were impleaded as party respondents to the present contempt case, as they are proper and necessary parties to the lis.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, inspite of specific directions of this Court vide order dated 20.02.2023, the respondent authorities have not permitted the petitioner to fill up the Aided vacancies in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1 (Education) dated 01.01.1994 and also as per the Schedule prescribed under Sections 19 & 25 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, for the reasons best known to them and the respondents have deliberately avoiding to implement the orders of this Court and deliberately flouted the orders of this Court. The failure on the part of the respondents in implementing the orders of this Court would amount to disobedience of the orders of this Hon'ble Court, and, therefore, they are liable for punishment under Sections 10 to 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Complaining the same, the petitioners filed the present Contempt Case.

6. Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 6 did not file their counter affidavits.

NV,J

7. Respondent No.4 & 7 - Joint Director, Model Schools and District Educational Officer, Krishna District, Machilipatnam, filed their respective counter affidavits. It is submitted that, permission was granted to the petitioner on 13.03.2024 to fill two vacant aided SGT posts, in accordance with G.O.Ms.No.1 dated 01.01.1994. The petitioner submitted a letter dated 16.03.2024, indicating that the institution had issued a newspaper advertisement and requested necessary orders to proceed further. However, the petitioner did not provide any documentary evidence of the newspaper notification or details of the candidate applications. Since the petitioner has not submitted information relating to copies of notification published in the newspapers and particulars of candidates who have submitted applications, the 4th respondent requested data from the District School Educational Officer, NTR, on 03.09.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner submitted a letter dated 19.09.2024, stating that notifications were published on 15.03.2024 in two newspapers viz., Praja Shakti and Andhra Jyothi. Despite this, only 52 applications were received in response to the advertisement, which was deemed insufficient for filling two aided SGT posts. The 4th respondent advised the petitioner to widely publicize the vacancies again to attract larger number of applicants, in the public interest. However, neither report nor updated information was submitted by the petitioner. Due to the petitioner's non-cooperation, and following instructions from the 2nd respondent vide NV,J Memo dated 25.09.2024, applications were invited from eligible candidates through an online portal, accompanied by wide press publicity to encourage large number of applications for recruitment in private aided institutions. The application portal opened on 07.12.2024 and closed on 15.12.2024. It is submitted that the 4th respondent appointed the Deputy Educational Officer as the nominee responsible for filling the two aided SGT posts at the petitioner's school, as authorized by the Government and the Commissioner of School Education. It is submitted that the recruitment process for the aided teacher posts at the petitioner's school is to be carried and will be completed in accordance with established norms. As such, they did not violate the orders of this Court and tendered unconditional apology to this Hon'ble Court for any inconvenience caused by them and requested to close contempt case against them.

8. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the respondents/contemnors.

9. The major contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent authorities are not permitting the petitioner to fill up the Aided Vacancies in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1 Education dated 01.01.1994. But, it is evident from the counter affidavits that the 4th respondent has accorded necessary permission on 13.03.2024 to the petitioner to fill up the vacant NV,J aided teaching post by recruitment by duly following the procedure laid down in G.O.Ms.No.1 date 01.01.1994. Correspondence has taken place between the petitioner and the 4th respondent for issuance of necessary orders to proceed further. However, it is observed that, due to non-submission of required documentary evidence of press notification, etc, approvals were not issued, during the Model Code of Conduct. Even when the petitioner submitted that requisite number of applications were not received for filling up 2 aided SGT Posts, the 4th respondent has once again given another opportunity to the petitioner to call for applications and gave wide publicity, in the interest of public and to submit report within 7 days. But, there was no response from the petitioner. Since there was no response from the petitioner, the 4th respondent has invited applications from the eligible candidates to apply through online, by following the instructions in Memo dated 25.09.2024 of the 2nd respondent. Further, a Deputy Educational Officer, was already nominated for filling up the two aided SGT posts in the petitioner institution. Thus, from the above, it appears that the petitioner is not cooperating with the respondents and in-turn making them responsible them for non-complying the orders of this Court. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the respondents have taken utmost care in filling up the two SGT posts in compliance of the orders of this Court.

NV,J

10. Therefore, in view of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the respondents did not commit any willful and deliberate violation of the order passed by this Court. Accordingly, the contempt case is closed.

13. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this contempt case shall stand closed.

_____________________________________ JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA Date:24.10.2025 SP NV,J THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA CONTEMPT CASE NO.6800 OF 2023 Date: 24.10.2025 SP