Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 163-A, 166, 168 & 169 – A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 – Rule 476 – Claims Tribunal – Evidence and Basis of Award – Standard of Proof
-
Rule 476(7) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 – Documentary Basis for Award – Nature of Proof Required
– Certified copies of FIR, post-mortem certificate, inquest, and MVI report are sufficient basis for the Claims Tribunal to determine the occurrence of accident, involvement of the vehicle, and death of the victim.
– Rule 476(7) provides a statutory foundation for considering such records as prima facie evidence, dispensing with the strict rules of the Evidence Act.
– [Ref. Bimla Devi v. HRTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530; Anitha Sarma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 1 SCC 171.] -
Proceedings before MACT – Summary in Nature – Standard of Proof
– Proof beyond reasonable doubt not required; the Tribunal must proceed on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities.
– Motor accident claims are social welfare proceedings and cannot be rejected on mere technicalities or procedural lapses.
– (Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509.)
Section 163-A – No-fault Liability – Examination of Negligence and Involvement of Vehicle
-
Section 163-A – Necessity to Prove Negligence – Scope of Tribunal’s Power
– In a claim under Section 163-A, claimant need not plead or prove negligence, but the Tribunal is not precluded from examining whether the accident was caused due to the involvement of the vehicle or whether any defence such as false implication or non-involvement is made out.
– The burden on the claimant is limited to establishing involvement of the vehicle, not the fault of its driver. -
Multi-vehicle Accidents under Section 163-A – Apportionment of Liability
– When two vehicles are involved, and evidence indicates participation of both in the occurrence, apportionment of liability is permissible even in a Section 163-A claim.
– The Tribunal is empowered to fix proportionate responsibility between owners and insurers of both vehicles based on the circumstances of the case.
– [Applied A.P.S.R.T.C. v. K. Hemlatha, (2008) 6 SCC 767; T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan, (2008) 3 SCC 748.]
Negligence – Composite and Contributory Negligence – Determination
-
Composite Negligence – Joint and Several Liability
– When two or more vehicles jointly cause an accident resulting in injury or death to a third party, the tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, and the claimant can recover entire compensation from any of them. -
Contributory Negligence – Evaluation
– Negligence must be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable driver under the circumstances.
– Mere failure to avoid an accident does not constitute contributory negligence.
– (Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak, (2002) 6 SCC 455; Swadling v. Cooper, 1931 AC 1.)
Liability of Insurers – Pay and Recovery – Absence of Driving Licence
-
Driving Licence – Pay and Recovery
– Absence of a valid driving licence with the rider/driver at the time of the accident constitutes a violation of policy conditions, entitling the insurer, upon payment to the claimants, to recover the amount from the offending owner or driver.
– The insurer cannot be completely exonerated where statutory liability exists, but may be granted liberty of recovery.
– [Ref. National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297.] -
Pay and Recovery – When Not Automatic
– Pay and recovery is not a mechanical consequence of every licence violation; the Tribunal must find a causal link between breach and accident.
– In the absence of such link, the insurer cannot be absolved of liability merely because the driver held no valid licence.
Compensation – Quantum – Multiplier – Principles of Computation
-
Assessment of Income and Multiplier
– When there is no documentary evidence of income, notional income under Second Schedule (Rs.15,000 per annum) may be adopted, subject to judicial updating for inflation.
– Multiplier method as per Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121, applied; for age 40, multiplier of 15 held appropriate. -
Heads of Compensation – Conventional Sums – Future Prospects
– Compensation must include fixed heads:-
Loss of dependency
-
Loss of consortium
-
Loss of estate
-
Funeral expenses
– Enhancement of compensation permissible in light of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, though quantum in this case upheld for want of proof of higher income.
-
Pillion Rider – Status as Third Party – Entitlement to Compensation
-
Pillion Rider – Third Party Status
– A pillion rider is treated as a third party vis-à-vis the insurer of the motorcycle, and his legal heirs are entitled to claim compensation against the insurer and owner.
– Rejection of claim on the ground that pillion rider is not a third party is contrary to settled law.
– [Ref. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani, (2003) 2 SCC 223; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tilak Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 404.]
Result and Holdings
-
Held
– (i) In a claim under Section 163-A, while negligence need not be proved, the Tribunal may examine the participation of vehicles and fix apportionment where both are involved.
– (ii) FIR, inquest, post-mortem and MVI reports are sufficient to establish involvement of the vehicle.
– (iii) Both the lorry and motorcycle contributed to the accident; apportionment of liability at 50% each between the insurers (Oriental and Bajaj Allianz) is upheld.
– (iv) Pay-and-recovery direction in respect of Bajaj Allianz against the unlicensed rider sustained.
– (v) Quantum of compensation at Rs.1,59,500/- upheld as per notional income scale and multiplier method.
– (vi) Appeals dismissed; award of the Tribunal confirmed.
Mrs.Veerla Akkamma 4 Ors vs D.Satyanarayana 3 Ors on 24 October, 2025
1
APHC010656862012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3520]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY,THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF OCTOBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 73/2012
Between:
1. MRS.VEERLA AKKAMMA & 4 ORS, W/O.LATE VEERLA
VENKATESWARLU, HINDU R/O.YADAVA BAZAR, MACHERLA,
GUNTUR DISTRICT.
2. VEERLA RAMA KRISHNA, S/O.LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU,
HINDU R/O.YADAVA BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
3. VEERLA VIJAYA LAXMI, D/O.LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU,
HINDU [P3 BEING MINOR REP BY HER MOTHER NATURAL
GUARDIAN I.E. P! R/O.YADAVA BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR
DISTRICT.
4. MR.VEERLA CHINA MUTTAIAH, S/O.CHINA JANAIAH SHEET
BUSINESS R/O.YADAVA BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
5. MR.VEERLA CHOWDAMMA, S/O.CHINA MUTTAIAH R/O.YADAVA
BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
...APPELLANT(S)
AND
1. D SATYANARAYANA 3 ORS, S/O.POORNA CHANDRA RAO OWNER
OF LORRY NO.AP 16 U 9735 R/O.II FLOOR, GAYATRI COMPLEX,
NEAR BENZ CIRCLE, VIJAYAWADA.
2
2. M/S ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO LTD, REP BY ITS DIVISIONAL
MANAGER O/O.DIVISIONAL OFFICE: OPP.KRISHNA PICTURE
PALACE, GUNTUR.
3. MELKAVAAGU KRISHNA YADAV, S/O.PEDANASARAIAH R/O.21ST
WARD, OLD TOWN, MACHERLA-522 426.
4. M/S BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD, REP BY ITS
MANAGER O/O.3-B, BALAJI'S MANGALAGIRI CHAMBERS, VIP ROAD,
CBM COMPOUND, VISAKHAPATNAM - 530 003.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be
pleased to
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. CH RAVINDRA BABU
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GUDI SRINIVASU
2.
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 1221/2014
Between:
1. M/S BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED,,
REP.BY ITS MANAGER, 3-B, BALAJI'S MANGALAGIRI CHAMBERS,
VIP ROAD, CBM COMPOUND,
...APPELLANT
AND
1. SMT VEERLA AKKAMMA, W/O LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU
R/O YADAV BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
2. VEERLA RAMAKRISHNA, S/O LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU R/O
YADAV BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
3
3. VEERLA VIJAYA LAXMI, D/O LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU
MINOR, REP.BY RES.NO.1 [MOTHER] R/O YADAV BAZAR,
MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
4. VEERLA CHINA MUTTAIAH, S/O CHINA JANAIAH R/O YADAV BAZAR,
MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
5. SMT VEERLA CHOWDAMMA, W/O CHINA MUTTAIAH R/O YADAV
BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
6. D SATYANARAYANA, S/O POORNA CHANDEER RAO 2ND FLOOR,
GAYATHRI COMPLEX, NEAR BENZ CIRCLE,
7. M/S ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, REP.BY ITS
DIVISIONAL MANAGER, OPP: KIRSHNA PICTURE PALACE,
GUNTUR.
8. SRI M KRISHNA YADAV, S/O PEDA NARASAIAH R/O 21ST WARD,
OLDTOWN, MACHERLA.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be
pleased to
IA NO: 1 OF 2009(MACMAMP 2014 OF 2009
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
condone the delay of 36 days in preferring the appeal against the orders in
OP.NO.465 of 2006
IA NO: 2 OF 2009(MACMAMP 2085 OF 2009
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
grant stay of all further proceedings including the execution proceedings if any
in OP.No. 465/2006 on the file of the MACT cum X Addl. District and Sessions
Jduge (FTC) Guntur Narasaraopet, order dated 19.08.2008 pending disposal of
the above MACMA.
4
IA NO: 1 OF 2010(MACMAMP 540 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
vacate the interim order of stay dated 17.04.2009 made in MACMAMP.No.
2085/2009 in MACMA(SR).No. 11684/2009
IA NO: 1 OF 2011(MACMAMP 49626 OF 2011
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. P RAJASEKHAR
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GUDI SRINIVASU
2. CH RAVINDRA BABU
The Court made the following:
5
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A.Nos.73 of 2012 and 1221 of 2014
COMMON JUDGMENT:
Introductory:
1. Claimants in M.V.O.P.No.465 of 2006 on the file of Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-X Additional District & Sessions Judge (FTC), Guntur at Narasaraopet (for short "the learned MACT") filed M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012 and Respondent No.4 / M/s. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited before the learned MACT filed M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014.
2. Claiming compensation for the death of one Veerla Venkateswarlu (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") in a road traffic accident, his legal representatives and dependents filed the claim petition M.V.O.P.No.465 of 2006 with a prayer for awarding compensation.
3. The deceased was a pillion rider on a motorcycle bearing No.AP 07 TR AC-0198. A lorry bearing No.AP 16 U 9735 (hereinafter referred to as "the offending vehicle"), driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner came from behind, dashed the motorcycle and ran over them, causing multiple injuries and instantaneous death.
4. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as the claimants and the respondents as and how they are arrayed before the learned MACT.
5. Respondent No.1 is the owner of the offending vehicle. Respondent No.2 is the Insurance Company with which the offending vehicle was insured.
Respondent No.3 is the owner and rider of the motorcycle on which the deceased was travelling and the same was insured with Respondent No.4.
6. The learned MACT, under the impugned judgment, awarded compensation of Rs.1,59,500/-, apportioning the liability at 50% each between Respondent Nos.2 and 4, granting liberty to Respondent No.4 to recover the compensation amount paid by it from Respondent No.3.
7. Respondent Nos.1 and 3 remained ex parte before the learned MACT.
8. The claimants are questioning the just and reasonable nature of compensation awarded. Respondent No.4 is questioning the liability imposed. There is no appeal by respondent No.2. However, the respondent No.2 is supporting the judgment of the learned MACT as to apportionment of the liability at 50% among respondent Nos.2 and 4, while opposing enhancement of compensation.
9. Heard the learned counsel for claimants/appellants in M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012, the learned counsel for appellant in M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014, and also the learned counsels for respondent Nos.2 and 4 before the learned MACT. Perused the record available. Thoughtful consideration is given to the arguments advanced by both sides.
Case of the claimants:
10. Claimant No.1 is the wife, claimant Nos.2 and 3 are children and claimant Nos.4 and 5 are parents of the deceased. The deceased was aged about „40‟, doing sheep business, earning Rs.8,000/- per month and contributing the same for the family. On the fateful day viz. 01.12.2004 at about 06:30 am, the deceased, along with respondent No.3 was proceeding to Dhulipalla via Piduguralla and whey they reached Buggavagu near Piduguralla on their motorcycle, the offending vehicle came in a rash and negligent manner from behind, dashed the motorcycle and ran over the deceased causing instantaneous death.
11. A case in Crime No.255 of 2004 for the offences under section 304-A IPC was registered against the driver of the offending vehicle and he was subsequently charge sheeted. The negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle/lorry viz. the respondent No.1 is the cause for the accident. Petitioners lost all valuable support, both financial and emotional. Hence, entitled for just and reasonable compensation.
Plea of Respondent No.2:
12. The petitioners shall prove the accident, negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle/lorry, age, occupation, income and dependency of the claimants, apart from proving the valid and effective driving license, coverage of risk under the Insurance Policy and in any event, the quantum of compensation claimed is excessive.
Plea of Respondent No.4:
13. The claimants shall prove coverage of policy. There is no driving license for respondent No.3. There is negligence on the part of the driver of the lorry / the offending vehicle alone. There was no negligence on the part of the rider of the motorcycle. Further, the deceased being a pillion rider he is not a third party. Hence, respondent No.4 is not liable to pay compensation. The claimants shall prove age, occupation and income of the deceased and their dependency as well as entitlement for compensation.
14. On the strength of pleadings, the learned MACT settled the following issues for trial:
1) Whether the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Ashok Leyland Lorry bearing No.AP16U-9735?
2) To what compensation the petitioners are entitled and from whom?
3) To what relief?
15. Evidence before the learned MACT:
Description Remarks
Oral evidence P.W.1: Veerla Akkamma Claimant No.1/
wife of the
deceased
P.W.2: Mellavagu Krishna Eye witness to the
accident.
R.W.1: G. Chandra Sekhar Junior Executive-
Legal
R.W.2: J. Vijaya Durga Junior Assistant-
RTO‟s office,
Narasaraopet.
Documentary Ex.A1: Attested copy of FIR.
evidence Ex.A2: Attested copy of post-mortem
report.
Ex.A3: Attested copy of inquest report. On behalf of the
Ex.A4: Attested copy of MVI report. petitioner(s).
Ex.A5: Attested copy of scene
observation report.
Ex.A6: Charge Sheet
Ex.B1: Authorization letter (Xerox).
Ex.B2: Attested copy of Policy. On behalf of the
Ex.B3: Letter issued by Bajaj Allianz Respondents.
General Insurance Company.
Ex.B4: Notice issued by Bajaj Allianz
General Insurance Company.
Ex.B5: Extract copy of DL of
respondent No.3.
Ex.B6: Issued RTA certificate by RTA
by R.W.2.
Findings of the learned MACT:
On the point of Negligence:
16. Since the claim is made under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimants need not plead negligence on the part of the offending vehicle. It is sufficient if they establish the involvement of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Attested copies of Ex.A1-FIR, Ex.A2-Post-mortem Report, Ex.A3- Inquest Report and Ex.A4-MVI report are sufficient to believe the involvement of the vehicle and death of the deceased due to the accident.
17. Evidence of P.W.2 shows that the respondent No.1 is the owner of the lorry/ offending vehicle, Respondent No.2 is the insurer. P.W.2 is the owner of the motorcycle and respondent No.4 is the insurer of the same. P.W.2 was driving the motorcycle at the relevant time. Therefore, both drivers are responsible for the accident. Ex.A1 to A6 supports the evidence of P.W.2. On quantum of compensation:
18. The deceased was aged about 40 years as per the charge sheet and inquest report. Multiplier applicable is „15‟. Notional income at Rs.15,000/- per annum can be adopted. If 1/3rd is deducted towards personal expenditure of the deceased. Rs.10,000/- can be taken as loss of dependency. Upon application of the multiplier „15‟, the entitlement comes to Rs.1,50,000/-. Towards funeral expenses Rs.2,000/-, towards loss of estate Rs.2,500/-, Rs.5,000/- as loss of consortium to claimant No.1 / wife of the deceased can be awarded. Therefore, in all, the claimants are entitled to Rs.1,59,500/-, as per the learned MACT.
On liability:
19. R.W.1 deposed that there is negligence of respondent No.1. There is no driving license to respondent No.3 by the date of accident. The license was issued on 21.02.2005, whereas the date of accident is 01.12.2004. Therefore, there is a violation. Further, the driving license is non-transport category of motorcycle with gear. For the mistake of respondent No.3 for the legitimate claim cannot be defeated. However, respondent No.4, on payment, is entitled to recover from respondent No.3. Both Respondent Nos.2 and 4 are liable to pay the compensation awarded at the rate of 50% each. Arguments in the appeals:
For the claimants / appellants in M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012:
20(i). The compensation awarded is not in tune with the settled law and practices.
(ii). The income of the deceased adopted at Rs.15,000/- per annum is baseless and very low.
(iii). The quantification of compensation done under various heads is not matching with the uniformity of practice and scales to be adopted as advised by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
(iv). The imposition of liability, pay and recovery etc. ordered are not in tune with the law. However, the claimants are entitled for more compensation payable by appropriate respondents as may be decided by the Court.
For Respondent No.4-Insurance Company/appellant in M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014 :
21(i). When it is found that there was negligence on the part of the driver of the lorry / the offending vehicle, proceedings against the owner and Insurance Company of the motorcycle are not necessary. When the learned MACT found that there was no driving license, ordering pay and recovery is not correct. Instead, respondent No.4 Insurance Company should have been totally exonerated from the liability.
(ii). The entitlement of the pillion rider for compensation and his status as a third party though pleaded, said point is not properly addressed by the learned MACT and the liability imposed on the respondent Nos.3 and 4 is an error in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the evidence.
For Respondent No.2-Insurance Company of the offending vehicle:
22. When a claim is made under Section 163-A and when two vehicles are involved, apportionment of liability among the two vehicles involved is proper.
In view of the absence of evidence as to income of the deceased, adoption of notional income by the learned MACT cannot be found fault with. There are no grounds to interfere and both the appeals are liable to be dismissed. Points for consideration:
23. In the light of the factual matrix and arguments canvassed by all parties, the points that arise for determination in these appeals are:
1) Whether negligence of the riders / drivers of the offending vehicle can be considered in a claim filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, if so, when and to what extent? and what was the contribution of negligence by the rider of the motorcycle bearing No.AP 07 TR AC 0198 and the driver of the offending vehicle bearing No.AP 16 U 9735?
2) Whether the apportionment of negligence and liability among the owners and Insurance Companies of the motorcycle bearing No.AP 07 TR AC 0198 and the lorry / offending vehicle bearing No.AP 16 U 9735 done by the learned MACT is proper?
3) Whether pay and recovery ordered against respondent No.4 in the impugned proceedings is proper and sustainable?
4) Whether the compensation awarded in a sum of Rs.1,59,500/- is just, reasonable and adequate or require any enhancement, if so, to what quantum and on what grounds?
5) What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012?
6) What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014?
Point Nos.1 and 2:
24. Since both the points are interlinked, they are being answered together under the common discussion under one head.
Statutory and Precedential Guidance:
Statutory Guidance:
25(i). It is relevant to note that the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 are applicable in deciding the cases by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and they are made in exercise of powers conferred under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as follows:
176. Power of State Government to make rules.--A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:--
(a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications;
(b) the procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter;
(c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal;
(d) the form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and
(e) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.
(ii). Chapter „11‟ of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 commencing from Rule 455 to Rule 476A deals with the powers of the Tribunal and all other allied aspects like form of application, registration, notice to parties, appearance and examination of parties, local inspection, summary examination of parties, method of recording evidence, adjournments, framing and determination of issues, judgments and enforcements of awards, Court fee relating to claim petitions applicability of Civil Procedure Code and the application for claim basis to award the claim by the claims tribunal. Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 reads as follows:
Rule 476: Application for claim :-
(7) Basis to award the claim :- The Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of;-
(i) Registration Certificate of the Motor Vehicle involved in the accident;
(ii) Insurance Certificate or Policy relating to the insurance of the Motor Vehicle against the Third party risk;
(iii) Copy of First Information Report;
(iv) Post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the Medical Officer; and
(v) The nature of the treatment given by the Medical Officer who has examined the victim.
(7A) Specification of amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to each victim:- Where compensation is awarded to two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall also specify the amount payable to each of them.
26. As per Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the crime record can be the basis. The official acts done are presumed to be proper until a contrary is proved particularly when some statutory recognition is given to such official records.
27. It is relevant to note that in view of the summary nature and mode of enquiry contemplated under Motor Vehicles Act and social welfare nature of legislation the Tribunal shall have holistic view with reference to facts and circumstances of each case. It is sufficient if there is probability. The principle of standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering a claim seeking compensation for the death or the injury on account of road accident. The touch stone of the case, the claimants shall have to establish is preponderance of probability only. The legal position to this extent is settled and consistent.
Precedential Guidance:
28(i). The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation1, in para 15 observed as follows:
"15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties.."
(ii). In a case between Bhagwan Ram and Ors. Vs. Deen Dayal and Ors.2, while considering the nature of proof is required for believing the negligent driving in Motor Accident Claims, the Hon‟ble High Court of Rajasthan found that Certificate and the copies of documents prepared by the Police on the spot, including the Challan, First Information Report etc. are admissible, even in the absence of statement of eye witnesses and the same can be the basis to believe the negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, vide para-11 which reads as follows:
"11. The fact that any of the eye witness or the police personnel and authorities, who had prepared the documents - certified copies of challan Exhibit-1, First Information Report as Exhibit-2, Naksha Mauka as Exhibit-4, Halat Mauka as Exhibit-5, Postmortem Report as Exhibit-10 were not examined is of no consequence. The said documents being certified copies 2009 (13) SCC 530 2013 (0) sc (Raj) 812 of public documents even in absence of such statements are admissible in evidence as held by this Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Devilal & Ors., reported at 1991 ACJ 230 and Shrwan Kumar v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., reported at 1995 ACJ 337. It was held by this Court in the case of Shrwan Kumar as under:-
"18. Public documents like the first information report and the report of the mechanical inspection of the bus can be taken into consideration and this point is no longer res integra so far as this court is concerned. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Devilal, 1991 ACJ 230 (Rajasthan) , it was observed that strictly speaking, provisions of Evidence Act are not applicable before the Tribunal; if a document is a certified copy of a public document it need not be proved by calling a witness or the person who prepared it."
(iii). In Anitha Sarma and Others Vs. New Indian Assurance Company Ltd.3, the Honble Apex Court observed that in Motor Accident Claims, standard of proof required is the preponderance of possibilities but not beyond reasonable doubt; approach and role of the Courts, while examining the evidence in accident cases, ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of the best eye witnesses, as may happen in criminal Trial, but instead should be only to analyse the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant‟s version is more likely than not true. The observations in para-17 are as follows:-
"17. Unfortunately, the approach of the High Court was not sensitive enough to appreciate the turn of events at the spot, or the appellant- 2021(1) SCC 171 claimants' hardship in tracing witnesses and collecting information for an accident which took place many hundreds of kilometers away in an altogether different State. Close to the facts of the case in hand, this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand [Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 605] , viewed that :
(SCC p. 638, para 12) "12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed [Amir Chand v.
Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302] the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor's chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitized enough to appreciate the plight of the victim.
...
„15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.'"
(iv). In a case between New India Assurance Company Ltd., Vs. Kethavarapu Sathyavathi and Ors.4, the Hon‟ble Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh has referred to Section 168, 169 of M.V. Act and Rule 476(7) of A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules and also catena of decisions. The point 2009 Supreme (AP) 136=2010(2) ALD 403=2009(3) ALT 260 for consideration before the Hon‟ble Division Bench was that in holding an inquiry in terms of Motor Vehicles Act, what is the procedure to be followed and whether the F.I.R. can be basis for considering the claim. Observations in para 5 to 7 are as follows:
"5. Point:
Under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the Act"), the Claims Tribunal shall give the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and make an award determining just compensation, etc. In holding any such inquiry, Section 169 of the Act mandates the Tribunal to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit subject to rules. The Tribunal was conferred with the powers of a civil Court for the specified purposes and under Rule 476 of the Rules, the Claims Tribunal was directed to follow the procedure of summary trial as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Tribunal was cautioned not to reject any application on the ground of any technical flaw and was also obligated to obtain whatever information necessary from the police, medical and other authorities. It is true that sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules states that the Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of registration certificate of the motor vehicle, insurance certificate or Policy, copy of first information report, post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the medical officer and the nature of treatment given by the medical Officer.
6. The said sub-rule obviously refers to the relevant dependable criteria for assessment of the compensation, which is patently illustrative and can never be considered to be exhaustive. This Sub-rule stating the basis to award the claim, is obviously subject to the prohibition against depending on any technical flaw and the procedure for summary trial to be followed by the Tribunal. The said sub-rule cannot travel beyond the statutory obligation imposed on the Tribunal to determine the just compensation after an inquiry, in which an opportunity of being heard is given to the parties. The judicial determination of the questions in controversy before the Tribunal in terms of Sections 168 and 169 of the Act cannot be confined to consideration of the five documents referred to in sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules alone and exclude any other oral or documentary evidence. The procedure of summary trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure which the Tribunal shall follow under Rule 476 of the Rules itself mandates taking all such evidence as may be produced by both sides in support of their respective versions, apart from the evidence which the Court, of its own motion, causes to be produced as per Section 262 read with Sections 254 and 255 of the said Code. Sub-rule (7) to be understood in the light of the object and scheme of the Act, is a directory provision referring to some of the documents which can offer guidance to the Tribunal in discharge of its statutory duty and the word "shall" used in the said: subrule has to be necessarily understood as "may".
7. That apart, to say that the, first information report alone should be the conclusive basis for determining the manner of the accident, even in spite of the availability of other dependable evidence on record on that aspect, will be offending the plain language of the statute and if that were the purport of sub-rule (7), it cannot be considered valid, as any such delegated legislation cannot travel beyond the legislation itself."
(v). In Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz5, the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed in Para 7 to 9, as follows:-
" 7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the part of the first respondent who was driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [(2009) 13 SCC 530] (2013) 10 SCC 646
8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta [(2011) 10 SCC 509 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions
(ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow : (SCC p. 518, para 10) "10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal.
.....
(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. ...
(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry."
9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note : (Shila Datta case [(2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] , SCC p. 519) "10. ... We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute."
(vi). Hon‟ble Supreme Court in a case between Pavan Kumar and Another vs. Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal and others6, after referring to T.O.Anthony (2014) 3 SCC 590 vs. Karvarnan and others7 and Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Another vs. K. Hemlatha and others8 addressed as to distinction between the principles of composite and contributory negligence vide para Nos.7, 8 and 9 as follows:
7. The distinction between the principles of composite and contributory negligence has been dealt with in Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (Chapter 21) (15th Edn. 1998). It would be appropriate to notice the following passage from the said work:
"Where two or more people by their independent breaches of duty to the plaintiff cause him to suffer distinct injuries, no special rules are required, for each tortfeasor is liable for the damage which he caused and only for that damage. Where, however, two or more breaches of duty by different persons cause the plaintiff to suffer a single injury the position is more complicated. The law in such a case is that the plaintiff is entitled to sue all or any of them for the full amount of his loss, and each is said to be jointly and severally liable for it. This means that special rules are necessary to deal with the possibilities of successive actions in respect of that loss and of claims for contribution or indemnity by one tortfeasor against the others. It is greatly to the plaintiff's advantage to show that he has suffered the same, indivisible harm at the hands of a number of defendants for he thereby avoids the risk, inherent in cases where there are different injuries, of finding that one defendant is insolvent (or uninsured) and being unable to execute judgment against him. The same picture is not, of course, so attractive from the point of view of the solvent defendant, who may end up carrying full responsibility for a loss in the causing of which he played only a partial, even secondary role.
*** (2008) 3 SCC 748 (2008) 6 SCC 767 The question of whether there is one injury can be a difficult one.
The simplest case is that of two virtually simultaneous acts of negligence, as where two drivers behave negligently and collide, injuring a passenger in one of the cars or a pedestrian, but there is no requirement that the acts be simultaneous...."
8. Where the plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be a party to the negligence the question of joint and several liability cannot arise and the plaintiff's claim to the extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have to be severed. In such a situation the plaintiff can only be held entitled to such part of damages/compensation that is not attributable to his own negligence. The above principle has been explained in T.O. Anthony [T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan, (2008) 3 SCC 748 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738] followed in K. Hemlatha [A.P. SRTC v. K. Hemlatha, (2008) 6 SCC 767 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 34].
9. Paras 6 and 7 of T.O. Anthony [T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan, (2008) 3 SCC 748 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738] which are relevant may be extracted herein below : (SCC p. 751) "6. „Composite negligence‟ refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence on the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence.
7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is, his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of „composite negligence‟ will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50 : 50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error."
29. In the light of the above, I am of the view as to the parameters that the learned MACT can consider while assessing negligence are:
1) Whether there is denial by proper person.
2) There must be convincing evidence from disputing party.
3) There must be at least oath against oath and tested by cross-
examination.
4) Examination of eye witnesses reflected in charge sheet filed by
Police is preferable. However, the same cannot be the thumb rule.
5) Examination of witnesses present at the scene of offence, at relevant time.
6) The driver of the offending vehicle, if takes witness stand and denies the negligence, it will have some importance, in cases of contributory negligence.
7) In cases of serious dispute as to planting of either witnesses or vehicles, summoning the investigating officers and eliciting the probabilities or improbabilities is necessary.
8) The rough sketch of scene of offence and Motor Vehicles Inspector Report indicating the damage to the vehicles etc. will be helpful to draw some inference.
9) However, no straight jacket and standard formula is possible and each matter has to be considered on its own merits and facts and circumstances including the relevant and reliable evidence placed before the tribunal.
10) Finally the Tribunal shall have holistic view of the matter.
30. While addressing the defence of contributory negligence, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Sushma Vs. Nitin Ganapati Rangole and others9, at Paragraph Nos.36 and 37 made reference to other judgments and extracted relevant observations which are as follows:
2024 (6) ALD (SC)=2024 SCC OnLine SC 2584
36. In the case of Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak, {(2002) 6 SCC 455}, this Court while referring to a decision of the High Court of Australia in Astley v. Austrust Ltd., {(1999) 73 ALJR 403}, went on to hold that:
"... where, by his negligence, if one party places another in a situation of danger which compels that other to act quickly in order to extricate himself, it does not amount to contributory negligence, if that other acts in a way which, with the benefit of hindsight is shown not to have been the best way out of the difficulty."
37. In the very same judgment, this Court also referred to and approved the view taken in Swadling v. Cooper, {1931 AC 1}, as below:
"Mere failure to avoid the collision by taking some extra ordinary precaution, does not in itself constitute negligence."
Analysis:
31. P.W.2 is an eye witness to the accident. His evidence is that while he was riding a motorcycle on the left side of the road, suddenly the offending vehicle / lorry, driven by its driver, came from behind without blowing horn and dashed, whereby the accident occurred, as the lorry ran over the deceased, who died on the spot. On his complaint, crime under Ex.A1-FIR was registered for the offences under Section 304-A. Rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry / offending vehicle is the cause for the accident.
32. During cross examination, he also asserted that the negligence of the driver of the lorry / offending vehicle is the cause for the accident. Ex.A1-FIR is indicating the driver of the lorry as the accused. Ex.A6-charge sheet is indicating the driver of the lorry one S. Yadaiah as the accused.
33. To lay a claim under section 163-A, the involvement of the vehicle is sufficient, but when negligence is specifically disputed by the person concerned with the vehicle, whether there is at least prima facie indicating the negligence or involvement requires examination is a pertinent question.
34. Mere physical presence or involvement with some negligence is the mandate for fastening liability require consideration in some cases, although not in every case. When two vehicles are involved and there is no little finger raised against one of such vehicles as to contribution in occurrence of the accident, merely, on account of presence of vehicle at occurrence of accident, whether liability of such vehicle is automatic in a claim under Section 163-A is a serious and important question. When the record and evidence are clinching that, there was no role at all of a particular vehicle or the particular person concerned with such vehicle and that the substantial role from the inception stage to the end is with the one vehicle, making the spectator vehicle or the person concerned with it accountable cannot be appreciated or accepted.
35. Another importance facet require examination is that, if the claim is made by a victim who is not a tortfeasor, the negligence, if any, of the tortfeasors is joint and several, as the negligence would be composite but not contributory.
The aspect of contributory negligence and apportionment generally arises where the claim is made by or the dependents of one of the tortfeasors. But, in case of composite negligence, the third-party victim is entitled to proceed against both the tortfeasors and the liability of both tortfeasors is joint, several and equal and each one is liable for the full extent. Their right to seek contribution from a co-tortfeasor is a different aspect, depending on the contribution of negligence.
36. For examining whether there was any contribution of negligence for the purpose of apportionment, when there is disowning of total negligence by one of the tortfeasors and when there is attribution of negligence on the other tortfeasor, examination of the contribution of negligence by both tortfeasors becomes necessary. However, mere presence of the vehicle per se is not a ground to avoid examining absence of negligence and extent of negligence in every case, particularly in cases like the present one, merely because the claim is under Section 163-A. Since the persons concerned with the two vehicles involved are throwing blame on each other. Looking at the applying fault theory is necessary. For the said purpose, examination of evidence is also necessary.
37. From the angle of claimants, it may not be necessary to prove negligence but from the angle of the answering respondents, the examination of extent of negligence becomes necessary. No doubt, the burden to prove negligence cannot be cast on the claimants. The language of Section 163-A is clear that the claimant has no role or burden other than to show the involvement of the vehicle. The burden to prove absence of negligence or to disown the liability cast on the respondents. In such an event, the tribunal will be put to consider the evidence as to whose fault the accident occurred. Section 163-A is an enabling provision to exempt the claimant / victim to prove the negligence but it does not shut the doors of the respondents or the Court to examine the absence of negligence in deserving cases.
38. There may be cases of planting a vehicle and that the vehicle in question is not involved. There may be cases of complete self-negligence of the victim. A straightjacket formula cannot be drawn as to which are the cases examination of negligence is necessary but the facts and circumstances of each case matters. Rule is that, the claimant need not prove negligence, but that does not mean there is no scope for examination of the absence of negligence. Involvement of the vehicle, means involvement in the process of accident, but not mere spectator involvement. In the present case, when a lorry came from behind, as per the evidence covered by Ex.A1 and Ex.A6 also the evidence of P.W.2, an eye witness, what can be the role of rider of motorcycle i.e. Respondent No.3 and what can be the accountability of the motorcycle which had no role in occurrence of the accident, except being a victim of the accident. Therefore, making such a spectator / victim accountable is not a correct application of the provision. The objective of that provision patently gets defeated, if such exercise is allowed.
39. In view of the discussion made above, point Nos.1 and 2 are answered as follows:
a) The negligence of the riders/drivers of the offending vehicle can be considered even in a claim filed under 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, depending on the context and circumstances, as to whether there is involvement of the vehicle in the process of the accident, but not merely presence and where multiple vehicles are involved. The doors are not completely closed for examining the absence of negligence of one of the multiple vehicles involved in the accident.
b) In the present case, there is no evidence to believe the negligence of the rider of the motorcycle. Therefore, the findings of the learned MACT imposing liability on the owner and the Insurance Company of the motorcycle is not proper.
Point No.3:
40. The learned MACT found that there is no driving license. Then ordering pay and recovery does not arise. Neither statutory nor precedential guidance is relied on for such ordering by the learned MACT. Therefore such findings are not proper.
41. In view of the findings on point Nos.1 and 2 and for the reasons stated above, the imposition of liability on respondent No.4 and ordering pay and recovery under the impugned decree found not proper, hence unsustainable. Point No.3 is answered accordingly.
Point No.4:
Precedential guidance:-
a) Adoption of Multiplier, Multiplicand and Calculation:
42(i). Hon‟ble Apex Court to have uniformity of practice and consistency in awarding just compensation provided certain guidelines in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.10 vide paragraph Nos.18 and 19, while prescribing a table directed adoption of suitable multiplier mentioned in column No.4 of the table. As per the observations in the judgment the claimants have to establish the following:
1. Age of the deceased.
2. Income of the deceased.
3. Number of dependents.
(ii). Hon‟ble Apex Court directed certain steps while determining the compensation, they are:
Step No.1:
Ascertain the multiplicand, which shall be the income of the deceased he / she should have contributed to the dependents and the same can be arrived after deducting certain part of personal living expenses of the deceased.
Step No.2:
Ascertaining Multiplier with reference to the age of the deceased. This shall be as per the table provided in judgment itself.
2009 (6) SCC 121 Step No.3:
Calculation of the compensation.
Final Step:
After calculation adding of certain amount towards conventional heads towards loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenditure, cost of transport, cost of medical expenses for treatment of the deceased before the death etc. are advised.
b) Adding of future prospects:
43(i). Enhancing the scope for awarding just compensation, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Others11 case guided for adding of future prospect. In respect of permanent employment, 50% where the deceased is below 40 years, 30% where the deceased is 40-50 years and 15% where the deceased is 50-60 years.
(ii). The actual salary to be taken shall be after deducting taxes. Further, in respect of self employed on fixed salary addition is recommended, at 40% for the deceased below 40 years, at 25% where the deceased is between 40-50 years, at 10% where the deceased is between 50-60 years. Further, adding of compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses at Rs.15,000/- and Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively is recommended by Hon‟ble Apex court with an addition of 10% for every three years in Pranay Sethi's case.
2017(16) SCC 680
c) Loss of Consortium under the heads of parental and filial consortium:
44. Further enlarging the scope for awarding just and reasonable compensation in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and Others12, Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that compensation can be awarded under the heads of loss of consortium not only to the spouse but also to the children and parents under the heads of parental and filial consortium.
d) Just Compensation:
45. In Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others13, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in para Nos.10 and 11 made relevant observations, they are as follows:
10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in this case. At para 10 of Nagappa case [Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 274 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 523 : AIR 2003 SC 674] , it was held as follows: (SCC p. 280) "10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to „make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just‟. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be „just‟. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation."
The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2009) 2 (2018) 18 SCC 130 (2013) 9 SCC 54 SCC (Civ) 877 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 987] and in Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1213]
11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate, as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim.
Analysis:
Precedential guidance with regard to quantifying compensation in a claim filed under Section 163-A beyond the caps contemplated under the said provision viz. Section 163-A:-
46. The claim in the present case is laid invoking Section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act which suggests for adoption of II schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act in the process of quantifying the compensation. The relevant factors to be considered are:
(i). Adoption of annual income with reference to age of the deceased and multiplier mentioned therein. Even the compensation part is also specifically mentioned in II schedule in thousands. It is further mentioned that 1/3rd of the income shall be reduced towards personal expenses of the deceased. Towards general damages for funeral expenses, loss of consortium, loss of estate, medical expenditure amounts mentioned therein shall be granted. The claim made under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act permits awarding and quantification of compensation as per the II schedule, the amount mentioned under each head are as follows:
3.General Damage(in case of death):
The following General Damages shall be payable in addition to compensations outlined above:
(i) Funeral expenses -- Rs. 2,000/-
(ii) Loss of Consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse -- Rs. 5,000/-
(iii) Loss of Estate -- Rs. 2,500/-
(iv) Medical Expenses actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding -- Rs. 15,000/-
47. This schedule was inserted pursuant to Act No.54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 while amending Motor Vehicles Act, 1998. With regard to adding of future prospects taking note of notional income, necessity to consider more income than what is mentioned in the table contemplated in terms of Section 163-A and awarding compensation under the conventional heads etc., Hon‟ble Apex Court in a case between Kurvan Ansari Alias Kuran Ali and Another vs. Shyam Kishore Murmu and another14, discussed the legal position with reference to earlier directions of the Apex Court in the context of considering a claim of a minor boy (non earning group) and adherence to cap of Rs.15000/- per annum as the income of the deceased. Relevant observations are made in paragraph Nos.12 to 15 of the judgment as to non-binding nature of caps fixed under Section 163-A and necessity to take increase notional income by taking (2022) 1 SCC 317 note of inflation and devolution of rupee and increase cost of living. The observations are as follows:
12. In the judgment in Puttamma [Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] , this Court has observed that the Central Government was bestowed with the duties to amend Schedule II in view of Section 163-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but it failed to do so. In view of the same, specific directions were issued to the Central Government to make appropriate amendments to Schedule II keeping in mind the present cost of living. In the said judgment, till such amendments are made, directions were issued for award of compensation by fixing a sum of Rs 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) towards compensation for the non-earning children up to the age of 5 (five) years old and a sum of Rs 1,50,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) for the non-earning persons of more than 5 (five) years old.
13. In R.K. Malik [R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 265 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1265] also, this Court has observed that the notional income fixed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as Rs 15,000 per annum should be enhanced and increased as the same continued to exist without any amendment since 14-11-1994. In Kishan Gopal [Kishan Gopal v. Lala, (2014) 1 SCC 244 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 184 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] where the deceased was a ten-year-old child, this Court has fixed his notional income at Rs 30,000 per annum.
14. In this case, it is to be noted that the accident was on 6-9- 2004. In spite of repeated directions, Schedule II is not yet amended.
Therefore, fixing notional income at Rs 15,000 per annum for non- earning members is not just and reasonable.
15. In view of the judgments in Puttamma [Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] , R.K. Malik [R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 265 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1265] and Kishan Gopal [Kishan Gopal v. Lala, (2014) 1 SCC 244 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 184 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] , we are of the view that it is a fit case to increase the notional income by taking into account the inflation, devaluation of the rupee and cost of living. In view of the same, the judgment in Rajendra Singh [Rajendra Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC 256 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 99 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 134] relied on by the learned counsel for Respondent 2 insurance company would not render any assistance to the case of the insurance company.
48. Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Meena Devi vs. Nunu Chand mahto alias Nemchand Mahto & Others15, while referring to Kurvan Ansari Alias Kuran Ali and Another vs. Shyam Kishore Murmu and another case adopted more income than fixed in the II schedule in the Motor Vehicles Act in a case filed in terms of Section 163-A of M.V.Act, at para Nos. Nos.14 and 15 of the judgment.
2023 (1) SCC 204
49. In view of the legal position and precedential guidance, the following points will emerge:
(i) Even in claims under Section 163-A, the caps contemplated under section 163-A as to adopting the income at a particular scale with reference to the II Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act can be deviated from if the circumstances justify.
(ii) Even in respect of claimants under Section 163-A, awarding compensation under the heads of loss of consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenses etc. under the heads of general damages is permissible beyond the caps fixed in II schedule taking aid of the scales adopted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
(iii) It is also relevant to note that, after the amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act, 2019, under Act No.32 of 2019, the provision under Section 163-A is omitted. Consequently, the II Schedule is also omitted by Act No.32 of 2019. However, the applicability of the same to pending matters and earlier causes of action is a different aspect.
(iv) The Motor Vehicles Act being social welfare in nature and its intention being beneficial and as there are earlier directions of the Hon‟ble Apex Court to take appropriate call by the legislature, it can be deemed that the limitations and caps contemplated under Section 163-A will not have any conspicuous significance in quantification and awarding of just compensation where the claimants are entitled for the same in the facts and circumstances of such case.
(v) However, we should keep in view of the basic concept of no-fault liability contemplated under Section 163-A while calculating compensation under the head of loss of dependency.
(vi) In respect of general damages referred to in the II Schedule, like funeral expenses, loss of estate, loss of consortium, transport expenses etc., it is clear that strict adherence to the caps in the Schedule will result in defeating the object and even the purpose of law when the amounts fixed are seen.
50. Claimants invoking Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act need not plead or prove negligence, but at the instance of tortfeasor or their indemnifier, the Court may proceed to examine negligence and apply the fault theory in appropriate cases. Then, the cap under Section 163-A need not be followed and the tortfeasor or their indemnifier, having invited examination of negligence which is contemplated under Section 166, cannot ask the claimants to be confined to the cap under Section 163-A. The purpose of any system of justice is to provide remedies to the victims and to restore the victims of a tort or crime to their original positions to the extent possible. Therefore, the concerns of all stakeholders connected to the process of redress and reparation should focus on providing adequate compensation. The development and culture of any society will be seen from how it treats its criminals and victims. The evolution of legal system from retribution to restoration is clear in this century. If the aim of the law is to restore what is lost and to undo the wrong, then providing adequate compensation to the victim should be considered as important as punishing or reforming the wrongdoer.
51. PW.2 stated that he is engaged in the sheep business along with the deceased and they were getting Rs.8,000/- per month. It is only oral evidence, there is no other evidence. However, upon considering the age of the deceased i.e. „40‟ years and the social responsibilities of the deceased and more so, in the light of the evidence of P.W.2, who is a contemporary of the deceased involved in the same business, the income of the deceased during relevant period can be safely accepted at Rs.3,000/- per month. On adding future prospects at 30%, the income can be taken at Rs.4,000/- per month and the same comes to Rs.48,000/- per annum (Rs.4000/- x12). Since the dependents being five in number, 1/4th of the income of the deceased can be deducted towards personal expenditure. Then his contribution can be accepted as 3/4th to the family, whereby his contribution can be taken at Rs.3,000/- per month and Rs.36,000/- per annum. Rs.36,000/- can be considered as the multiplicand. The Multiplier applicable is „15‟. Then, the entitlement of claimants for compensation under the head of loss of dependency comes to Rs.5,40,000/- (Rs.36,000/- x 15).
52. Under the conventional heads in the light of the precedential guidance mentioned above, an amount of Rs.15,000/- each towards funeral expenditure and loss of estate can be awarded. Further, under loss of consortium, all the claimants viz. for the parents towards filial consortium, for the wife towards spousal consortium and for the children towards parental consortium entitled at the rate of Rs.40,000/- each. Then, the entitlement of the claimants for compensation comes to Rs.7,70,000/-.
53. In view of the reasons and evidence referred above, the entitlement of the claimants for reasonable compensation in comparison to the compensation awarded by the learned MACT is found as follows:
Head Compensation Fixed by this
awarded by Court
the learned MACT
(i) Loss of dependency Rs.1,50,000/- Rs.5,40,000/-
(ii) Loss of estate Rs.2,500/- Rs.15,000/-
(iii) Loss of Consortium Rs.5,000/- Rs.2,00,000/-
@ Rs.40,000/- to
each claimant
(iv) Funeral expenses Rs.2,000/- Rs.15,000/-
Total compensation awarded Rs.1,59,500/- Rs.7,70,000/-
Interest (per annum) 7.5% 7.5%
54. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the discussion made above, the point No.4 framed is answered concluding that the claimants are entitled for compensation of Rs.7,70,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization and the judgment and decree dated 19.08.2008 passed by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.465 of 2006 require modification accordingly.
Granting of more compensation than what claimed, if the claimants are otherwise entitled:-
55. The legal position with regard to awarding more compensation than what claimed has been considered and settled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court holding that there is no bar for awarding more compensation than what is claimed. For the said preposition of law, this Court finds it proper to refer the following observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made in:
(1) Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others16, at para 21 of the judgment, that -
"..there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award "just" compensation, which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record."
(2) Kajal Vs. Jagadish Chand and Ors.17 at para 33 of the judgment, as follows:-
"33. We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed. However, it is well settled law that in the motor accident claim petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor."
(3) Ramla and Others Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Others18 at para 5 of the judgment, as follows:-
"5. Though the claimants had claimed a total compensation of Rs 25,00,000 in their claim petition filed before the Tribunal, we feel that the compensation which the claimants are entitled to is higher than the same as mentioned supra. There is no restriction that the Court cannot award (2003) 2 SCC 274 2020 (04) SCC 413 (2019) 2 SCC 192 compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award "just compensation". The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. A "just compensation" is one which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time-barred. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The courts are duty-bound to award just compensation."
Point Nos.5 and 6:
56. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the conclusions drawn under point Nos.1 to 4, Point Nos.5 and 6 are answered as follows:
(i) M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012 filed by the claimants is allowed.
(ii) M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014 filed by the appellant / M/s. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited is allowed.
(iii) Compensation awarded by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.465 of 2006 at Rs.1,59,500/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum is modified and enhanced to Rs.7,70,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization.
(iv) Liability imposed on Respondent No.4 / M/s. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited is hereby set-aside.
(v) Apportionment:
(a) Claimant No.1 / wife of the deceased is entitled to Rs.3,70,000/- with proportionate interest and costs.
(b) Claimant Nos.2 and 3 / children of the deceased are entitled to Rs.1,00,000/- each with proportionate interest.
(c) Claimant Nos.4 and 5 / parents of the deceased are entitled to Rs.1,00,000/- each with proportionate interest.
(d) The apportionment shall be with proportionate interest and it shall be inclusive of the compensation awarded under the head of loss of consortium.
(vi) Claimants are liable to pay the Court fee for the enhanced part of the compensation, before the learned MACT.
(vii) Respondent Nos.1 and 2 before the learned MACT are jointly and severally liable. However, Respondent No.2 / M/s. Oriental Insurance Company Limited shall be liable to pay the compensation amount in view of the Insurance Policy.
(viii) Claimants are entitled to withdraw the compensation amount at once on deposit.
(ix) Time for deposit is two months.
(x) There shall be no order as to costs, in these appeals.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in these appeals shall stand closed.
____________________________ A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J Date:24.10.2025 Note:L.R. copy to be marked.
(B/o).
Knr HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA M.A.C.M.A.Nos.73 of 2012 & 1221 of 2014 24.10.2025 Knr
