Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Ss. 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(B), 25, 29(1), 60(3), 63 — Interim custody of conveyance seized — Release of vehicle — Scope of jurisdiction of Special Court vis-à-vis Drug Disposal Committee — NDPS (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 — Subordinate legislation cannot override parent statute — Rules of 2022 supplement but do not supplant S. 60(3) and S. 63 of NDPS Act — Special Court retains power and jurisdiction under Ss. 451 & 457 CrPC [Ss. 497 & 503 BNSS] to order interim release pending trial — Confiscation a judicial function — Administrative/executive body (DDC) cannot decide confiscation where ownership and absence of knowledge/connivance is asserted — Principles of natural justice. Held, Rules of 2022 do not divest the Special Court of jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim custody/release of a conveyance seized under NDPS Act. Disposal mechanism under Rules is directory and supplemental, not overriding substantive rights of owner under Ss. 60(3) & 63. Confiscation must follow trial and hearing of claimant. Court must safeguard rights of a bona fide owner who establishes lack of knowledge/connivance. Interpretation suggested by High Court leads to anomalous and unjust consequences. (Paras 11-24, 27-30) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 451 & 457 (BNSS — Ss. 497 & 503) — Applicability before NDPS Special Court — Interim release of vehicle — No statutory bar — Judicial discretion must consider status of owner and allegations. Sections 36-C and 51 NDPS Act expressly apply CrPC/BNSS provisions unless inconsistent. Mere liability to confiscation under S. 60 cannot operate as bar to interim custody of a conveyance belonging to a bona fide owner. (Paras 28-29) Precedents — Followed and Explained Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 INSC 32 — ratio applied: four-scenario framework for seized vehicles; in scenario where owner not implicated, interim release is normal rule subject to bond. Court clarifies scenario analysis is not rigid formula — facts here warrant release despite technical fit in second scenario. (Paras 33-35) Tarun Kumar Majhi v. State of West Bengal, Crl. A. No. 1305 of 2025 — followed: confiscation only at conclusion of trial; prior opportunity of hearing mandatory; owner’s innocence protects property rights. (Para 25-26) Result — Appeal Allowed Impugned High Court judgment set aside. Vehicle (TN 52 Q 0315) to be released to appellant on supurdagi, on conditions imposed by Special Court. (Paras 36-37)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

— Ss. 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(B), 25, 29(1), 60(3), 63 — Interim custody of conveyance seized — Release of vehicle — Scope of jurisdiction of Special Court vis-à-vis Drug Disposal Committee — NDPS (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 — Subordinate legislation cannot override parent statute — Rules of 2022 supplement but do not supplant S. 60(3) and S. 63 of NDPS Act — Special Court retains power and jurisdiction under Ss. 451 & 457 CrPC [Ss. 497 & 503 BNSS] to order interim release pending trial — Confiscation a judicial function — Administrative/executive body (DDC) cannot decide confiscation where ownership and absence of knowledge/connivance is asserted — Principles of natural justice.

Held, Rules of 2022 do not divest the Special Court of jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim custody/release of a conveyance seized under NDPS Act. Disposal mechanism under Rules is directory and supplemental, not overriding substantive rights of owner under Ss. 60(3) & 63. Confiscation must follow trial and hearing of claimant. Court must safeguard rights of a bona fide owner who establishes lack of knowledge/connivance. Interpretation suggested by High Court leads to anomalous and unjust consequences. (Paras 11-24, 27-30)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 451 & 457

(BNSS — Ss. 497 & 503)
— Applicability before NDPS Special Court — Interim release of vehicle — No statutory bar — Judicial discretion must consider status of owner and allegations.

Sections 36-C and 51 NDPS Act expressly apply CrPC/BNSS provisions unless inconsistent. Mere liability to confiscation under S. 60 cannot operate as bar to interim custody of a conveyance belonging to a bona fide owner. (Paras 28-29)

Precedents — Followed and Explained

Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 INSC 32 — ratio applied: four-scenario framework for seized vehicles; in scenario where owner not implicated, interim release is normal rule subject to bond. Court clarifies scenario analysis is not rigid formula — facts here warrant release despite technical fit in second scenario. (Paras 33-35)

Tarun Kumar Majhi v. State of West Bengal, Crl. A. No. 1305 of 2025 — followed: confiscation only at conclusion of trial; prior opportunity of hearing mandatory; owner’s innocence protects property rights. (Para 25-26)

Result — Appeal Allowed

Impugned High Court judgment set aside. Vehicle (TN 52 Q 0315) to be released to appellant on supurdagi, on conditions imposed by Special Court. (Paras 36-37)2025 INSC 1258

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025)

DENASH ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. Leave granted.

3. The appellant herein has approached this Court

through this appeal by special leave for assailing the

judgment dated 20th December, 2024 passed by the

learned Single Judge of the Madurai Bench of the

Madras High Court1 in Criminal Revision Case (MD)

No.1021 of 2024, whereby the prayer made by the

appellant for interim custody of his lorry bearing

1 Hereinafter, being referred to as the “High Court”.

2

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

registration no. TN 52 Q 0315 (Ashok Leyland, 14

wheeler)2, was rejected.

Brief Facts: -

4. The appellant is the owner of the vehicle in

question, which was lawfully hired for transporting

29,400 MT of iron sheets from M/s S.S. Steel and

Power, Chhattisgarh to Ashok Steels, Ranipet, Tamil

Nadu. For this purpose, the vehicle had been

assigned to driver Kannan @ Venkatesan (accused

No. 1), Deva (accused No. 2), Senthamalivalavan

(accused No. 3), and Tamil Selvan (accused No. 4).

During the course of transit, on 14th July, 2024, the

officers of Police Station Neyveli Township,

intercepted and searched the vehicle, whereupon 1.5

kilograms of Ganja was found concealed beneath the

driver Kannan’s (accused No. 1) seat, and an

additional 1.5 kilograms each was recovered from the

personal possession of the other three accused,

thereby bringing the total quantity of seized Ganja to

6 kilograms. All four accused persons present in the

vehicle were arrested. Pursuant to the seizure, First

Information Report No. 220 of 2024 was registered at

2 Hereinafter, being referred to as “the vehicle”.

3

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

P.S. Neyveli Township, District Cuddalore, for

offences punishable under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(B),

25 and 29(1) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substance Act, 19853. Upon conclusion of the

investigation, chargesheet was filed against the

aforesaid four accused for the said offences. It is

important to note that the appellant was not

arraigned as an accused in the report filed under

Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure4

[Section 193(3) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita5].

5. Being aggrieved by the continued seizure of his

valuable transport vehicle, the appellant moved an

application under Section 497 BNSS [Section 451

CrPC], being Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.

5495 of 2024, before Additional District

Judge/Presiding Officer, Special Court under

Essential Commodities Act, Thanjavur6, seeking

interim release of the seized vehicle on supurdagi

pending conclusion of trial.

3 For short “NDPS Act”.

4 For short “CrPC”.

5 For short “BNSS”.

6 Hereinafter, being referred to as the “Special Court”.

4

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

6. The Special Court, vide order dated 9th

September, 2024 dismissed the aforesaid application

filed by the appellant on the ground that the vehicle

seized under the provisions of the NDPS Act was not

amenable to release on interim custody by invoking

the provisions under Sections 451 and 452 of CrPC

[Sections 497 and 498 BNSS], as the same was liable

to confiscation under Section 63 of the NDPS Act.

7. Being aggrieved, the appellant approached the

High Court for assailing the order of the Special Court

by filing Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 1021 of

2024 which came to be rejected by the impugned

judgment.

8. The High Court held that pursuant to

introduction of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and

Disposal) Rules, 20227, the Drug Disposal Committee

alone had the authority and jurisdiction to adjudicate

upon the disposal of the property which included

seized drugs as well as the conveyances. The High

Court further held that since the Rules of 2022 vested

exclusive jurisdiction with the Drug Disposal

7 For short “Rules of 2022”.

5

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

Committee, it could be presumed that the Committee

was empowered to consider requests for interim

release of a seized conveyance as well. Accordingly,

the revision preferred by the appellant was dismissed

upon which, the appellant is before us by way of the

instant appeal with special leave.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant

placed reliance on a recent decision in Bishwajit Dey

v. State of Assam8 wherein this Court examined

various facets and scenarios in which a prayer for

interim release of vehicles seized under the NDPS Act

could be entertained and adjudicated. He urged that

the controversy involved in the present case is

squarely covered by the ratio of the above decision

and thus, the appellant is entitled to release of his

seized vehicle.

10. Per contra, learned counsel representing the

State, supported the impugned judgment and urged

that the judgment in Bishwajit Dey (supra), did not

consider the import of the Rules of 2022 and thus,

the ratio thereof must be declared to be per

incuriam/sub silentio insofar as the aspect of release

8 2025 INSC 32.

6

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

of vehicles seized under the NDPS Act is concerned.

It was, therefore, contended that the appeal should

be dismissed, leaving it open for the appellant to take

recourse to the appropriate remedy for seeking

interim release of the vehicle.

Findings and Conclusion: -

11. We have given our thoughtful consideration to

the submissions advanced at bar and have gone

through the impugned judgment and the material

placed on record. We have also carefully perused the

Rules of 2022.

12. Relevant provisions of the Rules of 2022 are

quoted hereinbelow: -

“17. Officers who shall initiate action for

disposal. - Any officer in-charge of a police

station or any officer empowered under section

53 of the Act shall initiate action for disposal of

narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances,

controlled substances or conveyances under

section 52A of the Act after the receipt of

chemical analysis report.

20. Functions of the Drug Disposal Committee.

- The functions of the Drug Disposal Committee

shall be to, -

(a) meet as frequently as possible and

necessary;

(b) conduct a detailed review of seized items

pending disposal; 

7

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

(c) order disposal of seized items, and

(d) advise the respective investigation

officers or supervisory officers on the steps

to be initiated for expeditious disposal.

21. Procedure to be followed by the Drug

Disposal Committee with regard to disposal of

seized materials. –

(1) The officer-in-charge of the godown shall

prepare a list of all the seized materials that

have been certified under section 52A of the

Act and submit it to the Chairman of the

concerned Drug Disposal Committee.

(2) After examining the list referred to in

sub-rule (1) and satisfying that the

requirements of section 52A of the Act have

been fully complied with, the Members of

the concerned Drug Disposal Committee

shall endorse necessary certificates to this

effect and thereafter that Committee shall

physically examine and verify the weight

and other details of each of the seized

materials with reference to the seizure

report, report of chemical analysis and any

other documents, and record its findings in

each case.

(3) In case of conveyance, the committee

shall verify the engine number, chassis

number and other details mentioned in

panchnama and certify the inventory

thereof.

22. Power of Drug Disposal Committee for

disposal of seized material. - The Drug Disposal

Committee can order disposal of seized

materials up to the quantity or value indicated

in the following Table, namely: -

8

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

S. No. Name of Item Quantity per

consignment

1. Heroin 5 Kilogram

2. Hashish (Charas) 100 Kilogram

3. Hashish Oil 20 Kilogram

4. Ganja 1000 Kilogram

5. Cocaine 2 Kilograms

6. Mandrax 3000 Kilogram

7. Poppy Straw Up to 10 Metric

Tonne

8. Other narcotic

drugs,

psychotropic

substances, or

controlled

substances

Up to a quantity of

500 Kilogram or 500

Litre

9. Conveyances Up to a value of Rs.

50 Lakhs

23. Mode of disposal. –

(1) Opium, morphine, codeine and thebaine

shall be disposed of by transferring to the

Government Opium and Alkaloid Works under

the Chief Controller of Factories.

(2) In case of narcotic drugs and psychotropic

substances, other than those mentioned in

sub-rule (1), the Chief Controller of Factories

shall be intimated by the fastest means of

communication available, the details of the

seized materials that are ready for disposal.

(3) The Chief Controller of Factories shall

indicate within fifteen days of the date of

receipt of the communication under sub-rule

(2), the quantities of narcotic drugs and

psychotropic substances, if any, that are 

9

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

required by him to supply as samples under

rule 67B of the Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Rules, 1985.

(4) The quantities of narcotic drugs and

psychotropic substances, if any, as required

by the Chief Controller of Factories under subrule (3) shall be transferred to him and the

remaining quantities of narcotic drugs and

psychotropic substances shall be disposed of

in accordance with the provisions of sub-rules

(5), (6) and (7).

(5) Narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances

and controlled substances having legitimate

medical or industrial use, and conveyances

shall be disposed of in the following

manner;

(a) narcotic drugs, psychotropic

substances and controlled substances

which are in the form of formulations

and labelled in accordance with the

provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics

Act, 1940 (23 of 1940) and rules made

thereunder may be sold, by way of

tender or auction or in such other

manner as may be determined by the

Drug Disposal Committee, after

confirming the composition and

formulation from the licensed

manufacturer mentioned in the label, to

a person fulfilling the requirements of

the said Act and the rules and orders

made thereunder:

Provided that a minimum of 60% of the

shelf life of the seized formulation

remains at the time of such sale; 

10

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

(b) narcotic drugs, psychotropic

substance and controlled substances

seized in the form of formulations and

without proper labelling shall be

destroyed;

(c) narcotic drugs, psychotropic

substances and controlled substances

seized in bulk form may be sold by .way

of tender or auction or in such other

manner as may be determined by the

Drug Disposal Committee, to a person

fulfilling the requirements of the Drugs

and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940)

and the Act, and the rules and orders

made thereunder, after confirming the

standards and fitness of the seized

substances for medical purposes from

the appropriate authority under the said

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the

rules made thereunder;

(d) controlled substances having

legitimate industrial use may be sold, by

way of tender or auction or in such other

manner as may he determined by the

Drug Disposal Committee, to a person

fulfilling the requirements of the Act and

the rules and orders made thereunder;

(e) seized conveyances shall be sold

by way of tender or auction as may be

determined by the Drug Disposal

Committee.

(6) Narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances

and controlled substances which have no

legitimate medical or industrial use or such

quantity of seized substance which is not 

11

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

found fit for such use or could not be sold shall

he destroyed.

(7) The destruction referred to in clause (b) of

sub-rule (5) and sub-rule (6) shall be by

incineration in incinerators fitted with

appropriate air pollution control devices,

which comply with emission standards and

such incineration may only be done in places

approved by the State Pollution Control Board

or where adequate facilities and security

arrangements exist and in the latter case, in

order to ensure that such incineration may

not be a health hazard or polluting, the

consent of the State Pollution Control Board

or Pollution Control Committee, as the case

may be, shall be obtained, and the destruction

shall be carried out in the presence of the

Members of the Drug Disposal Committee.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

13. A bare perusal of the rules, particularly the

provisions pertaining to disposal of conveyances

would make it clear that they are only supplemental

to the scheme of disposal contemplated under the

NDPS Act. The Rules being subordinate legislation,

cannot supersede the provisions of the parent

legislation, i.e., the NDPS Act.9 It is well settled that

the Rules framed under a statute are intended to

9 See Union of India v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande, (2014) 13 SCC 1 (para

29).

12

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

carry out the purposes of the Act and cannot travel

beyond or be inconsistent with the parent legislation.

14. As per Rule 17, initiation of process for disposal

lies exclusively in the domain of the officer in-charge

of the police station or any other officer empowered

under Section 53 of the NDPS Act, and such initiation

has to be preceded by the receipt of the chemical

analysis report.

15. In other words, the Rules do not contemplate

that any person other than the officer in-charge of the

police station or any other officer empowered under

Section 53 of the NDPS Act, can move an application

for disposal. Furthermore, no such application can

be entertained before the receipt of the chemical

analysis report. The clear intention of the Rule

appears to be that disposal proceedings should not

commence until the seized narcotic drug has been

duly verified through chemical examination, as such

verification forms the very basis of further

proceedings under the Act.

16. Furthermore, Rule 22 provides that the Drug

Disposal Committee “can” direct disposal of the

seized materials including conveyances valued less

than Rupees 50 lakhs. Clearly thus, the provision 

13

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

under the said Rule is not mandatory, rather

directory and supplemental to the provisions of

disposal under the Act.

17. While the Rules of 2022 lay down the procedure

for initiation and disposal of seized articles, they are

notably silent on the rights of persons whose property

is affected by such disposal. This omission assumes

particular importance in cases where the seized

property is not a contraband per se but a conveyance

or container belonging to a third party who may have

no connection with the seized contraband. In this

context, it is essential to refer to the substantive and

procedural provisions contained in Sections 60 and

63 of the NDPS Act, which form the statutory

framework governing confiscation and the rights of

claimants.

18. Section 60 and Section 63 are reproduced

hereinbelow for ready reference: -

60. Liability of illicit drugs, substances, plants,

articles and conveyances to confiscation.—

(1) Whenever any offence punishable under this Act

has been committed, the narcotic drug,

psychotropic substance, controlled substance,

opium poppy, coca plant, cannabis plant,

materials, apparatus and utensils in respect of

which or by means of which such offence has been

committed, shall be liable to confiscation. 

14

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

(2) Any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance [or

controlled substances] lawfully produced, imported

inter-State, exported inter-State, imported into

India, transported, manufactured, possessed,

used, purchased or sold along with, or in addition

to, any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance [or

controlled substances] which is liable to

confiscation under sub-section (1) and the

receptacles, packages and coverings in which any

narcotic drug or psychotropic substance [or

controlled substances], materials, apparatus or

utensils liable to confiscation under sub-section (1)

is found, and the other contents, if any, of such

receptacles or packages shall likewise be liable to

confiscation.

(3) Any animal or conveyance used in carrying

any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance [or

controlled substances], or any article liable to

confiscation under sub-section (1) or subsection (2) shall be liable to confiscation, unless

the owner of the animal or conveyance proves

that it was so used without the knowledge or

connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if

any, and the person-in-charge of the animal or

conveyance and that each of them had taken all

reasonable precautions against such use.

63. Procedure in making confiscations. —

(1) In the trial of offences under this Act, whether

the accused is convicted or acquitted or

discharged, the court shall decide whether any

article or thing seized under this Act is liable to

confiscation under section 60 or section 61 or

section 62 and, if it decides that the article is so

liable, it may order confiscation accordingly. 

15

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

(2) Where any article or thing seized under this Act

appears to be liable to confiscation under section

60 or section 61 or section 62, but the person who

committed the offence in connection therewith is

not known or cannot be found, the court may

inquire into and decide such liability, and may

order confiscation accordingly:

Provided that no order of confiscation of an

article or thing shall be made until the expiry of

one month from the date of seizure, or without

hearing any person who may claim any right

thereto and the evidence, if any, which he

produces in respect of his claim:

Provided further that if any such article or thing,

other than a narcotic drug, psychotropic substance

[controlled substance], the opium poppy, coca

plant or cannabis plant is liable to speedy and

natural decay, or if the court is of opinion that its

sale would be for the benefit of its owner, it may at

any time direct it to be sold; and the provisions of

this sub-section shall, as nearly as may be

practicable, apply to the net proceeds of the sale.”

 (Emphasis Supplied)

19. Section 60 deals with the liability of illicit drugs,

substances, articles, and conveyances to

confiscation. Sub-section (3) specifically provides

that any animal or conveyance used in carrying a

narcotic drug or psychotropic substance shall be

liable to confiscation unless the owner proves that

such use occurred without his knowledge or

connivance, and that he, his agent (if any), and 

16

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

the person-in-charge had taken all reasonable

precautions against such use. In other words,

where the owner is able to demonstrate that the

conveyance was used in violation of the NDPS Act

without his knowledge or connivance and that due

diligence was exercised, the vehicle cannot be

confiscated merely because it was used in the

commission of an offence under the said Act.

However, the Rules of 2022 (supra) do not provide any

such liberty to the owner nor do they empower the

Committee to release a vehicle/conveyance seized

under the Act.

20. Section 63 sets out the procedural mechanism

to be followed by the Special Court before passing any

order relating to seized property. It mandates that no

final order of confiscation of the conveyance can be

passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to

the person claiming ownership and without

considering the evidence adduced in support of such

claim. Importantly, the statute expressly vests this

adjudicatory power in the Special Court, thereby

excluding any administrative or executive authority,

such as the Drug Disposal Committee from

unilaterally determining the fate of a seized vehicle 

17

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

where ownership is claimed and fortified by a lawful

defence in terms of Section 60(3) of the NDPS Act.

21. Thus, a conjoint and holistic reading of Sections

60(3) and 63, makes it abundantly clear that the

power to determine whether or not a seized

conveyance is liable to confiscation vests in the

Special Court constituted under the NDPS Act and

not in any administrative or executive authority such

as the Drug Disposal Committee. The statute

stipulates that where an owner proves absence of

knowledge or connivance, the Special Court is dutybound to hear such claim before deciding the fate of

the seized vehicle including confiscation.

22. The legislative scheme thus contemplates that

confiscation, being a measure resulting in

deprivation of property, must conform to the basic

tenets of natural justice and must be preceded with

a prior hearing which would ensure that an innocent

owner or a bona fide claimant, whose vehicle or

container might have been misused without his

knowledge or connivance, is not subjected to undue

hardship and unjust deprivation of his property.

23. Let us take two examples:

18

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

(a) The vehicle owned by one ‘X’ is stolen and

thereafter, the thief uses the said conveyance to

transport narcotic or psychotropic drug. In such

a situation, would it be justified in leaving the

innocent owner to undergo the ordeal of moving

the Drug Disposal Committee after waiting for

the arrival of the chemical examiner’s report,

before the vehicle can be released?

(b) Where a bona fide transporter, assigns his

transport vehicle to a driver and the said driver,

in the process of carrying the consigned goods,

collects some narcotic material on the way and

is apprehended. In such a situation, would it be

justified to leave the owner of transport vehicle

to await the chemical examiner’s report and

then approach the Drug Disposal Committee for

release of the vehicle?

24. Our answer is in the negative. This can never be

the intent of the statute and the interpretation to this

effect would defeat the very purpose behind Section

60(3) of the NDPS Act read with Sections 451 and 457

of CrPC [Sections 497 and 503 of BNSS].

19

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

25. This position has been recently clarified by this

Court in Tarun Kumar Majhi v. State of West

Bengal10

, wherein it was observed as follows:

“It is settled law that the seized vehicles can be

confiscated by the Trial Court only on conclusion

of the trial when the accused is convicted or

acquitted or discharged. Further, even where the

Court is of the view that the vehicle is liable for

confiscation, it must give an opportunity of

hearing to the person who may claim any right

to the seized vehicle before passing an order of

confiscation. However, the seized vehicle is not

liable to confiscation if the owner of the seized

vehicle can prove that the vehicle was used by

the accused person without the owner’s

knowledge or connivance and that he had taken

all reasonable precautions against such use of

the seized vehicle by the accused person.”

 (Emphasis Supplied)

26. The principle enunciated in the aforesaid

decision makes it abundantly clear that confiscation

or otherwise of a conveyance is to be determined

finally, only upon conclusion of the trial, and until

such adjudication, the ownership rights of the owner,

who prima facie establishes that he is unconnected

with the seized contraband, from claiming the seized

vehicle cannot be extinguished. It further

10 Criminal Appeal No. 1305 of 2025

20

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

underscores that the power of confiscation is coupled

with a duty to observe procedural fairness and to

ensure that no prejudice is caused to an innocent

owner who had neither knowledge nor willfully

participated or connived to commit the offence under

the NDPS Act.

27. On the contrary, the Rules of 2022 restrict the

mode of disposal of a seized conveyance to “tender or

auction”, as may be determined by the Drug Disposal

Committee. However, this restrictive procedural

framework must necessarily be read in harmony with

the parent statute. The Rules, being subordinate

legislation, cannot override or curtail the substantive

rights and procedural safeguards envisaged under

the parent legislation that is the NDPS Act. In

Bishwajit Dey (supra), this Court observed that the

provisions of the NDPS Act do not bar the concerned

Court from exercising its discretion, to release the

vehicle in interim custody. While the Act provides for

confiscation in appropriate cases, it does not

preclude the Court from granting interim release of

the vehicle where the circumstances so warrant. The

exercise of such judicial discretion is to be guided by

the facts and circumstances of each case and should 

21

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

be undertaken in a manner that safeguards the

rights of a bona fide owner at the same time

balancing the need for detention of the

vehicle/conveyance in appropriate cases.

28. Moreover, Sections 36-C and 51 of the NDPS Act

expressly make the provisions of the CrPC/BNSS

applicable to proceedings before the Special Court,

insofar as they are not inconsistent with the

provisions of the NDPS Act. Consequently, the

powers under Sections 451 and 457 of CrPC

[Sections 497 and 503 of BNSS] pertaining to

disposal of property pending trial, would certainly

apply to proceedings before the Special Court. In the

absence of an express bar under the NDPS Act, the

mere fact that a vehicle may be liable to confiscation

under Section 60 cannot, by itself, operate to deny

interim custody to a bona fide owner.

29. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in holding

that the Rules of 2022 cannot be interpreted as

divesting the Special Courts of their jurisdiction to

entertain an application for interim custody or

release of a seized conveyance under Sections 451

and 457 of CrPC [Sections 497 and 503 of BNSS]. The

authority of the Special Court to pass appropriate 

22

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

orders for interim custody during the pendency of the

trial, as well as to make final determination upon its

conclusion, continues to operate independently of the

disposal mechanism envisaged under the said Rules.

Any interpretation to the contrary would lead to

anomalous and unjust consequences by depriving a

bona fide owner of his property without judicial

scrutiny or an opportunity of hearing, an outcome

wholly inconsistent with the statutory scheme of the

NDPS Act and contrary to the fundamental principles

of natural justice.

30. Hence, we are of the considered view that the

interpretation given by the High Court, holding that

pursuant to the promulgation of the Rules of 2022,

all other forums, including the Special Court, are

divested of the jurisdiction to decide the fate of a

seized conveyance under the NDPS Act and that the

aggrieved person must necessarily approach the

Drug Disposal Committee, is unsustainable in the

eyes of law.

31. In the present case, it is manifest that the

appellant is the true owner of the vehicle, having valid

documents. The vehicle was lawfully engaged for

transportation of iron sheets weighing 29,400 MT.

23

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

The seized drug, i.e., 6 kilograms Ganja was found in

possession of the four accused persons present in the

vehicle. Neither was the appellant chargesheeted in

the matter nor did the prosecution allege him to be

acting in conspiracy. As a necessary corollary, it can

safely be presumed that the said contraband must

have been procured by the drivers and/or the

khalasis without the knowledge or connivance of the

appellant.

32. Having regard to the valuable consignment

being transported and the high value of the vehicle,

it does not stand to reason that the appellant, being

the owner thereof, would knowingly jeopardize his

business and property by permitting the

transportation of 6 kilograms of Ganja alongside

such valuable cargo.

33. The situation at hand may be examined with

reference to the principles enunciated by this Court

in paragraphs 29 and 30 of Bishwajit Dey (supra),

wherein four scenarios were delineated concerning

the seizure of contraband from a conveyance, along

with the general approach to be adopted by Courts

while considering the question of interim release of

such conveyances. Paragraphs 29 and 30 of 

24

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

Bishwajit Dey (supra), are extracted hereinbelow for

ready reference: -

“29. Though seizure of drugs/substances from

conveyances can take place in a number of

situations, yet broadly speaking there are four

scenarios in which the drug or substance is seized

from a conveyance. Firstly, where the owner of

the vehicle is the person from whom the

possession of contraband drugs/substance is

recovered. Secondly, where the contraband is

recovered from the possession of the agent of

the owner i.e. like driver or cleaner hired by the

owner. Thirdly, where the vehicle has been

stolen by the accused and contraband is

recovered from such stolen vehicle. Fourthly,

where the contraband is seized/ recovered from

a third-party occupant (with or without

consideration) of the vehicle without any

allegation by the police that the contraband was

stored and transported in the vehicle with the

owner’s knowledge and connivance. In the first

two scenarios, the owner of the vehicle and/or

his agent would necessarily be arrayed as an

accused. In the third and fourth scenario, the

owner of the vehicle and/or his agent would not

be arrayed as an accused.

30. This Court is of the view that criminal law

has not to be applied in a vacuum but to the

facts of each case. Consequently, it is only in

the first two scenarios that the vehicle may not

be released on superdari till reverse burden of

proof is discharged by the accused-owner.

However, in the third and fourth scenarios,

where no allegation has been made in the 

25

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

charge-sheet against the owner and/or his

agent, the vehicle should normally be released

in the interim on superdari subject to the owner

furnishing a bond that he would produce the

vehicle as and when directed by the Court and/or

he would pay the value of the vehicle as determined

by the Court on the date of the release, if the Court

is finally of the opinion that the vehicle needs to be

confiscated.

31. This Court clarifies that the aforesaid

discussion should not be taken as laying down a

rigid formula as it will be open to the trial

Courts to take a different view, if the facts of

the case so warrant.”

 (Emphasis Supplied)

34. Although, on a superficial reading, the present

case might appear to fall within the second scenario

delineated in Bishwajit Dey (supra), where

contraband is recovered from the owner’s agent

(driver) who is arrayed as an accused, however, the

application of criminal law cannot be reduced to a

rigid or mechanical formula. Each case must be

examined in light of its peculiar facts and

circumstances. In the present matter, a holistic

consideration of the record reveals that the facts do

not align strictly with the said category for the

following reasons: -

26

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

i- Firstly, the appellant is the lawful owner with

valid documents, and the vehicle was

commercially engaged in transporting a

valuable consignment of 29,400 MT of iron

sheets. It is highly improbable to believe that

he would risk both the costly vehicle and the

high value consigned goods and his business

goodwill by knowingly allowing narcotics to

be transported along with the cargo.

ii- Secondly, the contraband, i.e., 6 kilograms of

Ganja was recovered from the four

chargesheeted accused persons.

iii- Thirdly, the appellant was not arraigned as

an accused and the chargesheet contains no

material suggesting that the appellant had

knowledge of or connived in the offence.

iv- It can thus, safely be presumed that the said

contraband must have been procured by the

drivers and/or the khalasis without the

knowledge or connivance of the appellant.

35. In view of the above, while the present case may

technically correspond to the second scenario as

enumerated in paragraph 29 of Bishwajit Dey 

27

Crl. Appeal @SLP (Crl.) No(s).8698 of 2025

(supra), the peculiar factual matrix warrants a more

pragmatic approach. It would, therefore, be expedient

in the interest of justice to grant interim custody of

the vehicle to the appellant, as the overall

circumstances clearly indicate his bonafides and

absence of any involvement in the drugs being carried

in the vehicle.

36. In wake of the discussion made hereinabove,

the appeal deserves to succeed. The impugned

judgment dated 20th December, 2024 passed by the

High Court is accordingly set aside. The vehicle

bearing Registration No. TN 52 Q 0315 shall be

released on supurdagi to the appellant on such terms

and conditions, which the Special Court may impose.

37. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

38. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

….……………………J.

 (VIKRAM NATH)

...…………………….J.

 (SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 27, 2025.

Service Law — Departmental Proceedings — Proof of Charges — Standard of Proof — Perversity of Findings — Interference by Tribunal — Allegation of demanding illegal gratification from passengers during surprise check — Primary complainant not examined and his statement relied upon without affording delinquent employee opportunity of cross-examination — Other complainants did not support charges; their statements misconstrued — Charge thus based on inadmissible and contradictory evidence — Held, findings perverse; no cogent material to sustain charge. (Paras 5, 7, 12, 17.1) Service Law — Excess Cash Allegation — Possession of Rs. 1254/- excess cash — No rule prescribing ceiling on amount TTE could carry — Amount deposited in Railway sundry accounts — No allegation of misappropriation proved — Circular relied on by department post-dates the incident — Charge unsustainable. (Paras 14, 17.2) Service Law — Failure to Recover Fare Difference — Proof — Passenger not examined, receipt book not produced — Charge held proved solely on vigilance inspector’s statement — Unsupported and insufficient evidence — Cannot sustain penalty. (Paras 14.1, 17.3) Service Law — Forgery Allegation — Handwriting Expert — Alleged extension of validity of duty card pass by forging signature of official — No handwriting expert opinion — Even Enquiry Officer did not conclusively hold charge proved — Cannot be relied upon to punish. (Paras 14.2, 17.4) Administrative Law — Judicial Review — Scope — When findings of Enquiry Officer are perverse, based on completely misleading material, Tribunal was justified in setting aside penalty — High Court erred in interfering with well-reasoned CAT order. (Paras 17–18) Relief — Incident of 1988 — Employee expired during pendency — Order of CAT restored — All consequential monetary and pensionary benefits to legal heirs within three months. (Para 18) Result: Appeal allowed.

Service Law — Departmental Proceedings — Proof of Charges — Standard of Proof — Perversity of Findings — Interference by Tribunal — Allegation of demanding illegal gratification from passengers during surprise check — Primary complainant not examined and his statement relied upon without affording delinquent employee opportunity of cross-examination — Other complainants did not support charges; their statements misconstrued — Charge thus based on inadmissible and contradictory evidence — Held, findings perverse; no cogent material to sustain charge.
(Paras 5, 7, 12, 17.1)

Service Law — Excess Cash Allegation — Possession of Rs. 1254/- excess cash — No rule prescribing ceiling on amount TTE could carry — Amount deposited in Railway sundry accounts — No allegation of misappropriation proved — Circular relied on by department post-dates the incident — Charge unsustainable.
(Paras 14, 17.2)

Service Law — Failure to Recover Fare Difference — Proof — Passenger not examined, receipt book not produced — Charge held proved solely on vigilance inspector’s statement — Unsupported and insufficient evidence — Cannot sustain penalty.
(Paras 14.1, 17.3)

Service Law — Forgery Allegation — Handwriting Expert — Alleged extension of validity of duty card pass by forging signature of official — No handwriting expert opinion — Even Enquiry Officer did not conclusively hold charge proved — Cannot be relied upon to punish.
(Paras 14.2, 17.4)

Administrative Law — Judicial Review — Scope — When findings of Enquiry Officer are perverse, based on completely misleading material, Tribunal was justified in setting aside penalty — High Court erred in interfering with well-reasoned CAT order.
(Paras 17–18)

Relief — Incident of 1988 — Employee expired during pendency — Order of CAT restored — All consequential monetary and pensionary benefits to legal heirs within three months.
(Para 18)

Result: Appeal allowed.2025 INSC 1257

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 1 of 10

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.13017 OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CIVIL) NO.30819 OF 2025)

[@ DIARY NO. 19424 OF 2019]

V.M. SAUDAGAR (DEAD)

THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS

 ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE DIVISIONAL COMMERCIAL

MANAGER, CENTRAL RAILWAY

& ANR.

…. RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. Delay of 519 days is condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. The present Appeal challenges the final judgment and order dated

21.09.2017 in Writ Petition No. 2461 of 2002 passed by High Court of

Judicature at Bombay (Nagpur Bench), whereby the High Court had

reversed the judgment dated 21.03.2002 passed by the Central 

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 2 of 10

Administrative Tribunal1, Mumbai Bench setting aside the dismissal order

of the appellant (now deceased) and directing his reinstatement.

FACTUAL MATRIX

4. At the relevant time, the appellant was serving as a Travelling Ticket

Examiner (TTE) in the Central Railway, Nagpur. On 31.05.1988, while he

was on duty in the Second Class Sleeper Coach of the 39-Down Dadar–

Nagpur Express, a surprise check was conducted by the Railway vigilance

team.

5. It was alleged that appellant had demanded illegal gratification from

passengers, which included, Rs. 25/- from Hemant Kumar, unrefunded

Rs. 20/- from Dinesh Choudhary, and unrefunded Rs.5/- from Rajkumar

Jaiswal, for the allotment of berths. Further charges against the appellant

included him being found in possession of excess cash of Rs.1254/-

(excluding personal and railway cash), his failure to recover Rs.18/- as

fare difference from a passenger (for Ticket No.444750), and the forging of

a duty card pass by extending its validity without authority.

6. Basing the surprise check, a charge-sheet dated 03.07.1989 was

issued against the appellant under the Railway Services (Conduct) Rules,

1 For short, ‘CAT’

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 3 of 10

19662 and a departmental enquiry was initiated against him. It was alleged

that the appellant had demanded illegal gratification from the passengers.

Thus, it was alleged that the appellant had exhibited lack of integrity and

devotion to duty under Rule 3(1)(i) and (ii) of 1966 Rules.

7. During the enquiry, the complainants/passengers - Dinesh

Choudhary and Rajkumar Jaiswal along with Vigilance Inspector N.C.

Dhankode were examined. However, another complainant - Hemant

Kumar was not examined. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on

31.12.1995 to hold that all charges were proved against the appellant.

Accepting the report of the Enquiry Officer, the Divisional Commercial

Manager, Nagpur, the Disciplinary Authority, by order dated 07.06.1996

imposed the penalty of dismissal from service against the appellant.

Aggrieved by the dismissal from service, the appellant preferred a

departmental appeal which was dismissed on 30.07.1997.

8. The appellant thereafter approached CAT, Mumbai Bench, Camp

Nagpur, by filing Original Application No. 431 of 1997 which was allowed

vide order dated 21.03.2002 quashing the dismissal order against the

appellant and directing his reinstatement with all consequential benefits.

2 For short, ‘1966 Rules’

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 4 of 10

9. Challenging the order passed by CAT, the respondents herein

approached the High Court by preferring a writ petition. By an interim

order, the High Court stayed the CAT’s direction for reinstatement of the

appellant and under the impugned final judgment dated 21.09.2017, the

High Court allowed the writ petition preferred by the respondents herein

and had accordingly set aside the CAT’s decision dated 21.03.2002 and

upheld the dismissal of the appellant from service. During pendency of

the writ petition before High Court, the delinquent employee/appellant

passed away, and his legal heirs were brought on record who have now

preferred the present Appeal.

10. According to the High Court, the Enquiry Officer’s findings were

supported by evidence and the charges were duly proved against the

appellant. Therefore, CAT had wrongly interfered with the findings

recorded by the Disciplinary Authority which was duly affirmed by the

Appellate Authority and that judicial review could not be exercised in such

matter.

SUBMISSION OF PARTIES

11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record.

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 5 of 10

12. The learned counsel for the appellant(s) submitted that the

impugned judgment of High Court is legally unsustainable as it reverses a

well-reasoned order passed by CAT. The penalty order was a mere

mechanical reproduction of the Enquiry Officer’s report without any

independent application of mind. It was vehemently argued that the

primary complainant-Hemant Kumar, whose written statement formed the

basis of the charge of illegal gratification, was not examined during the

enquiry and his statement was never subjected to cross-examination.

Therefore, placing reliance on such a material, without affording the

appellant an opportunity of testing it, constituted denial of a fair hearing.

13. It was next submitted on behalf of the appellant(s) that the other two

complainants/passengers, namely Dinesh Choudhary and Rajkumar

Jaiswal, did not support the case of the respondents and, in fact,

corroborated the appellant’s version. However, their statements were

perversely construed to sustain the charge against him.

14. On the second charge, learned counsel argued that the possession

of Rs.1254/- on 31.05.1988 was not misconduct, as there was no rule

prescribing a ceiling on the cash a Travelling Ticket Examiner (TTE) could

carry. It is further submitted that the amount was duly deposited in the

Railway Sundry Accounts and no allegation of misappropriation was made

or proved. 

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 6 of 10

14.1 On third charge, the learned counsel for appellant(s) submitted that

the alleged failure to recover a fare difference of Rs.18/- from a passenger

(for Ticket No.444750) remained unproved as the relevant receipt book was

not produced and the necessary witnesses were not examined.

14.2 On the fourth charge of forgery in relation to Duty Card Pass No.

030545, learned counsel submitted that the same was unsupported, as no

handwriting expert opinion was obtained and even the Enquiry Officer did

not conclusively hold it proved.

15. In light of the above, learned counsel submitted that all the charges

against the appellant remain unproved and prayed for setting aside of

impugned judgment of High Court.

16. Per contra, on merits, learned ASG for the respondents submitted

that the order of dismissal was a reasoned and speaking order passed after

giving the appellant adequate opportunity of defence, strictly adhering to

the principles of natural justice. It is further submitted that the findings

reached by the Enquiry Officer were supported by reasons and the

Disciplinary Authority, after due application of mind, imposed the penalty

of dismissal. Therefore, CAT ought not to have interfered with the findings.

In respect of non-examination of Hemant Kumar, it is argued that the

same does not render the enquiry against the appellant as invalid.

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 7 of 10

17. Let us look at each of the charges levelled against appellant and the

findings reached by the Courts below.

17.1 In respect of the first charge of demanding illegal gratification from

three passengers for allotment of berths in the train, it is to be seen that

one of the passengers, namely Hemant Kumar, was not examined and the

other two passengers, namely Dinesh Choudhary and Rajkumar Jaiswal

have not supported the charges against the appellant. CAT had

reproduced their statements in its order. In response to a specific question

as to whether the appellant demanded illegal gratification of Rs.20 from

Dinesh Choudhary for allotment of berths, the witness (Dinesh

Choudhary) categorically says that the appellant had not demanded any

illegal gratification and that the appellant had categorically told that he

would return the balance amount and would give a receipt afterwards as

he was to attend 2-3 Coaches. In reply to another question, he again

reiterated that the appellant never demanded any illegal gratification.

Similar is the case with another complainant - Rajkumar Jaiswal whose

statement is full of contradiction inasmuch as the charge is of paying

Rs.50; however, the receipt issued by the appellant for the same was of

Rs.45. But Rajkumar Jaiswal deposed that he had made payment of

Rs.120 to the appellant. Thus, his statement is contrary to the charge

itself. It is also to be seen that the Enquiry Officer relied upon the 

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 8 of 10

statement of Hemant Kumar even though he was not even examined

during enquiry and was thus not subjected to cross-examination.

17.2 In respect of the second charge the appellant being found in

possession of excess undeclared cash amounting to Rs.1254/- (excluding

his own private cash), it is important to bear in mind that the appellant is

said to have deposited the said amount in the Railway Sundry Accounts

on the date of incident. Moreover, no official document had been placed

before the Enquiry Officer to substantiate this charge. Before CAT, the

respondents had placed reliance on a circular dated 22.08.1997 issued by

the Railway Board which was not accepted by CAT on the ground that the

same was issued after the date of the incident. We are in agreement with

CAT’s reasoning for not accepting the said circular.

17.3 The third charge against the appellant was that on 31.05.1988, he

failed to recover a difference of fare of Rs.18/- from a passenger bearing

Ticket No. 444750 travelling on berth no. 52 from Dadar to Nagpur. This

amount is said to have been recovered later in the presence of the vigilance

team. This charge was found proved merely on the basis of the statement

of the Vigilance Inspector - N.C. Dhankode ignoring the fact that the

passenger bearing the said ticket number has not been examined and nor

the excess fare receipt book highlighting about the amount of Rs.18/- has

been produced before the Enquiry Officer.

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 9 of 10

17.4 The fourth charge against the appellant was that he had forged the

signature to extend the validity of his duty card pass no.030545 which

was valid till 31.03.1986. However, the appellant is said to have forged

the signature of G.S. Topre, Office Superintendent Pass Section, Nagpur,

to extend the validity of his card first up to 29.03.1987 and then further

up to 31.03.1988. This charge was found not proved by the Enquiry

Officer. No evidence has been adduced to prove the charge of forgery and

only the authenticity of the pass has been verified by the Enquiry Officer

with the statement of the S.M. Gole, then Office Superintendent Pass

Section. CAT noted that even the alleged forged signature has not been

sent to handwriting expert.

18. In the above view of the matter, all the charges have not been found

to be proved conclusively against the appellant and CAT, on the basis of

the material on record, had rightly interfered with the penalty of dismissal

from service against the appellant. The High Court has failed to take note

of the legal position that when the findings of the Enquiry Officer were

perverse basing on completely misleading of the materials produced before

the Enquiry Officer, CAT was fully justified in setting aside the order of

penalty. The incident happened on 31.05.1988, that is more than 37 years

back. In the meanwhile, the delinquent employee has passed away.

Therefore, while setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court 

Diary No.19424 of 2019 Page 10 of 10

and restoring the order of CAT, we direct that all the consequential

monetary benefits including pensionary benefits shall be released in

favour of the appellants who are legal heirs of the deceased employee

within a period of three months from today. Ordered accordingly.

19. The Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

………………………………………J.

 (SANJAY KAROL)

………………………………………J.

 (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 27, 2025

A. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — S. 12A — Mandatory pre-institution mediation — Exception — “contemplates any urgent interim relief” — Scope — Continuing intellectual property infringement — Mere delay does not negate urgency — Urgency viewed from standpoint of plaintiff — Public interest relevance Section 12A is mandatory; however, exemption applies where plaint and accompanying material, on a wholesome reading, disclose a real and immediate need for urgent interim intervention. In cases of continuing infringement of intellectual property rights, urgency is inherent in the persistence of the wrongful acts causing recurring and aggravating harm to business reputation, goodwill and proprietary rights. Delay in filing suit does not legalise infringement or defeat injunction relief when infringement continues. Courts must assess urgency not on merits of interim relief, but from plaintiff’s standpoint, considering immediacy of peril and irreparable harm. Requirement of mediation cannot be used to protect infringer by procedural formality. Public interest in preventing deception of consumers reinforces urgency. Patil Automation (2022) 10 SCC 1; Yamini Manohar (2024) 5 SCC 815; Dhanbad Fuels (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1129, relied on and explained. (Paras 17–25) B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — O. VII R. 11 and O. VII R. 10 — Rejection/return of plaint — Non-compliance with S. 12A when urgent relief genuinely contemplated — Impermissibility Where urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated within S.12A exception, the plaint cannot be rejected under O.VII R.11 CPC for want of pre-institution mediation. High Court erred in treating lapse of time as negation of urgency in ongoing infringement action. (Paras 21, 24–25) C. Intellectual Property Rights — Patent and design infringement — Continuing wrong — Recurring cause of action — Delay — Effect Each infringing manufacture or sale constitutes a fresh wrong and recurring cause of action. Delay in initiating suit does not legalise dishonest appropriation of proprietary rights nor bar injunction. Midas Hygiene (2004) 3 SCC 90, affirmed. (Paras 22–23) D. Market confusion and consumer deception — Public interest — Relevance to urgency Imitation of patented/branded products harms not only rights holder but also marketplace integrity and consumer trust — public interest becomes a factor heightening urgency in injunction suits under S.12A exception. (Para 23) E. Result Impugned orders rejecting plaint set aside. Commercial Suit restored for adjudication on merits. (Paras 26–28)

A. Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — S. 12A — Mandatory pre-institution mediation — Exception — “contemplates any urgent interim relief” — Scope — Continuing intellectual property infringement — Mere delay does not negate urgency — Urgency viewed from standpoint of plaintiff — Public interest relevance

Section 12A is mandatory; however, exemption applies where plaint and accompanying material, on a wholesome reading, disclose a real and immediate need for urgent interim intervention. In cases of continuing infringement of intellectual property rights, urgency is inherent in the persistence of the wrongful acts causing recurring and aggravating harm to business reputation, goodwill and proprietary rights. Delay in filing suit does not legalise infringement or defeat injunction relief when infringement continues.

Courts must assess urgency not on merits of interim relief, but from plaintiff’s standpoint, considering immediacy of peril and irreparable harm. Requirement of mediation cannot be used to protect infringer by procedural formality. Public interest in preventing deception of consumers reinforces urgency.

Patil Automation (2022) 10 SCC 1; Yamini Manohar (2024) 5 SCC 815; Dhanbad Fuels (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1129, relied on and explained.

(Paras 17–25)

B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — O. VII R. 11 and O. VII R. 10 — Rejection/return of plaint — Non-compliance with S. 12A when urgent relief genuinely contemplated — Impermissibility

Where urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated within S.12A exception, the plaint cannot be rejected under O.VII R.11 CPC for want of pre-institution mediation. High Court erred in treating lapse of time as negation of urgency in ongoing infringement action.

(Paras 21, 24–25)

C. Intellectual Property Rights — Patent and design infringement — Continuing wrong — Recurring cause of action — Delay — Effect

Each infringing manufacture or sale constitutes a fresh wrong and recurring cause of action. Delay in initiating suit does not legalise dishonest appropriation of proprietary rights nor bar injunction.

Midas Hygiene (2004) 3 SCC 90, affirmed.

(Paras 22–23)

D. Market confusion and consumer deception — Public interest — Relevance to urgency

Imitation of patented/branded products harms not only rights holder but also marketplace integrity and consumer trust — public interest becomes a factor heightening urgency in injunction suits under S.12A exception.

(Para 23)

E. Result

Impugned orders rejecting plaint set aside. Commercial Suit restored for adjudication on merits.

(Paras 26–28)2025 INSC 1256

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(@ OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 2753 OF 2025)

NOVENCO BUILDING AND INDUSTRY A/S …APPELLANT

VERSUS

XERO ENERGY ENGINEERING

SOLUTIONS PRIVATE LTD. & ANR. …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

ALOK ARADHE, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appeal calls for determination of the expression

‘contemplates any urgent interim relief’ in Section 12A of the

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter, referred to as ‘the Act’) 

2

in its application to an action for infringement of intellectual

property rights.

3. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated

13.11.2024 in Commercial Appeal No. 1 of 2024 passed by

Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, by which

it has dismissed the appeal of the appellant and has affirmed the

order dated 28.08.2024 in Commercial Suit No. 13 of 2024 by a

learned Single Judge, rejecting the plaint of the appellant for

non-compliance with Section 12A of the Act.

FACTUAL MATRIX:-

4. Facts giving rise to filing of this appeal can be summarised

as under :-

The appellant is a Danish company incorporated under the

laws of Denmark. The appellant is engaged in manufacture of

highly efficient industrial fans, marketed under the Brand

‘Novenco ZerAx’. According to the appellant, the said brand was

developed after an investment of approximately 3.66 million

euros between 2007 and 2015. The appellant secured several 

3

patents and design registrations to secure its innovation in India

and abroad.

5. A dealership agreement was executed on 01.09.2017

between the appellant and respondent No.1, Xero Energy

Engineering Solutions Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad (hereinafter, referred

to as ‘Xero Energy’), for marketing and sale of Novenco ZerAx

fans across India. According to the appellant, Xero Energy’s

Director, in violation of distribution agreement, incorporated

respondent No.2, Aeronaut Fans Industry Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter,

referred to as ‘Aeronaut Fans’), for manufacture and sale of

identical fans under deceptively similar name and appearance.

The appellant discovered sometime in July, 2022 that Xero

Energy started marketing competing products.

6. The appellant sent multiple communications to Xero Energy

on 22.08.2022, 30.08.2022 and 14.10.2022 seeking clarification.

However, no explanation was offered by Xero Energy. The

appellant on 14.10.2022 terminated the dealership. Thereafter, it

sent a cease-and-desist notice dated 23.12.2022 to Aeronaut

Fans, who sent replies dated 01.02.2023 and 03.03.2023 to the

notice. Aeronaut Fans filed a petition under Section 148A CPC 

4

before the Madras High Court and an email was sent on

15.05.2023 by counsel of Aeronaut Fans.

7. The technical expert of the appellant on 06.12.2023

inspected the fans installed by Aeronaut Fans at Cavendish

Industries and Hero Moto Corp, Uttarakhand, and submitted his

affidavit on 06.02.2024 confirming the infringement by Aeronaut

Fans. The appellant thereafter obtained patent and design

certificates in March-May, 2024.

8. The appellant on 04.06.2024 filed a commercial suit,

namely, COMS No. 13 of 2024, before the High Court alleging

infringement of its patent and design by the respondent. The

appellant along with the plaint also filed an application under

Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 seeking an ad interim injunction,

and an application under Section 151 of the CPC seeking

exemption from pre-institution mediation as mandated under

Section 12A of the Act.

9. The respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule

10 of the CPC for return of the plaint and an application under

Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of the plaint, inter alia, on the

ground that no urgency was involved in the matter and non-

5

compliance with Section 12A of the Act was fatal to the suit. The

respondents also filed a reply to the application seeking

injunction.

VIEWS OF HIGH COURT:-

10. The learned Single Judge of the High Court passed two

separate orders on 28.08.2024. By the first order, the learned

Single Judge rejected the plea for return of plaint. However, by

the second order, the learned Single Judge held that (i) there was

a delay of six months between the inspection of fans installed by

Aeronaut Fans, in December 2023 and the filing of the suit in

June, 2024, (ii) the plea of the appellant about urgency was not

substantiated as the appellant had issued cease-and-desist

notice as early as December 2022 and had adequate time to

approach for mediation, (iii) pre-institution mediation under

Section 12A of the Act is mandatory, unless urgent interim relief

is sought bonafide, (iv) in the absence of genuine urgency, the

plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.

The learned Single Judge, therefore, allowed the application

under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and rejected the plaint.

6

11. The appellant preferred an appeal. A Division Bench of the

High Court, by an order dated 13.11.2024, agreed with the

reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge. The Division

Bench, inter alia, held that delay between inspection of fans and

filing of the commercial suit exhibits patent lack of urgency and

exemption from requirement of compliance of the mandate

contained in Section 12A of the Act cannot be claimed merely

because interim reliefs were sought. It was further held that

mere continuous infringement of intellectual property rights

could not override the statutory mediation requirements. The

Division Bench, however, clarified that the order of rejection of

the plaint would not bar the appellant in case it chooses to

comply with Section 12A of the Act and subject to the outcome of

the mediation proceeding and if the cause of action still survives,

it may institute a suit. Accordingly, the Division Bench dismissed

the appeal. In the aforesaid factual background, this appeal

arises for our consideration.

12. A Bench of this Court, by an order dated 07.02.2025, while

entertaining the Special Leave Petition, directed the appellant to

move a letter before the mediation centre attached to High Court 

7

of Himachal Pradesh, seeking appointment of a mediator and the

respondents were directed to participate. It is stated before us

that, on 23.06.2025 the mediation between the parties has failed.

SUBMISSIONS:-

13. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the

learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court

erred in not applying the correct test in deciding whether the

appellant would be entitled to an interim injunction based on

urgency involved in the facts of the case. It is further submitted

that it ought to have been appreciated that the urgent interim

relief was not sought to bypass the statutory mandate of prelitigation mediation. It is also submitted that the plaint along

with the documents have to be read together to find out whether

any urgent interim relief is correctly sought. It is contended that

mere delay in filing the suit for infringement and injunction

against continuing violation of intellectual property rights by

itself is not a ground to decline the injunction against an

infringer. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has

been placed on the decisions of this Court in Midas Hygiene 

8

Industries Private Ltd. & Anr. v. Sudhir Bhatia & Ors.1 and

Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi2

.

14. On the other hand, learned senior Counsel for the

respondents, while inviting the attention of this Court to the

order dated 07.02.2025 passed in this appeal submitted that, it

appears that the issue, which according to the court arises for

consideration is whether the plaint, which did not contemplate

urgent relief, should be rejected or be kept in abeyance. It is

submitted that the learned Single Judge as well as the Division

Bench have rightly found that the plaint does not make out any

need for urgent relief. It is submitted that, in the plaint there is

not a single word on the urgency. It is contended that the

appellant had issued a cease-and-desist notice on 23.12.2022

and thereafter had filed the suit after a delay of one and half

years, in June, 2024. It is pointed out that the suit was filed after

four months of the submission of expert opinion. Therefore, there

was no urgency to deviate from the mandatory statutory

requirement under Section 12A of the Act. It is urged that mere

1

(2004) 3 SCC 90

2

(2024) 5 SCC 815

9

filing of an application for interim relief does not ipso-facto

indicate urgency and there is no material on record to suggest

that appellant’s patent is being violated. It is, therefore,

submitted that the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

STATUORY PROVISION :-

15. Before dealing with the rival submissions canvassed on

either side, we must take note of relevant statutory provision. The

Act has been enacted, inter alia, with an object for early

resolution of commercial disputes so as to create a positive image

amongst the investors about our strong and responsive legal

system and to facilitate ease of doing business. The Act was

amended in the year 2018 by Act No. 28 of 2018. By the

aforesaid amending Act, Section 12A was also incorporated with

an object to provide for compulsory mediation before initiation of

a suit where no urgent interim relief is contemplated.

16. Section 12A of the Act reads as under :-

“12A. Pre-Institution Mediation and

Settlement — (1) A suit, which does not

contemplate any urgent interim relief

under this Act, shall not be instituted

unless the plaintiff exhausts the remedy of

pre-institution mediation in accordance 

10

with such manner and procedure as may

be prescribed by rules made by the Central

Government.

(2) The Central Government may, by

notification, authorise the Authorities

constituted under the Legal Services

Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), for the

purposes of pre-institution mediation.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in

the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987,

the Authority authorised by the Central

Government under sub-section (2) shall

complete the process of mediation within a

period of three months from the date of

application made by the plaintiff under

sub-section (1):

Provided that the period of mediation

may be extended for a further period of

two months with the consent of the

parties:

Provided further that, the period

during which the parties remained

occupied with the pre-institution

mediation, such period shall not be

computed for the purpose of limitation

under the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of

1963).

(4) If the parties to the commercial dispute

arrive at a settlement, the same shall be

reduced into writing and shall be signed by

the parties to the dispute and the

mediator.

(5) The settlement arrived at under this

section shall have the same status and

effect as if it is an arbitral award on agreed 

11

terms under sub-section (4) of section 30

of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 (26 of 1996).]”

 Thus, the aim and object of Section 12A is to ensure that,

before a commercial dispute is filed before the court, the

alternative means of resolution of the dispute are adopted, so

that only the most trying cases come before the courts.

PRECEDENT:-

17. The scope and ambit of Section 12A of the Act which makes

pre-institution mediation mandatory for commercial disputes,

except where the suit ‘contemplates any urgent interim reliefs’,

has been considered in three recent decisions of this Court. In

Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd.3

, a

two-Judge Bench of this Court dealt with a case where a suit for

recovery of money was filed without adherence to Section 12A of

the Act. It was held that Section 12A of the Act is mandatory and

any suit instituted in violation of the mandate contained in

Section 12A of the Act must be visited with rejection of the plaint.

3

(2022) 10 SCC 1

12

18. In Yamini Manohar (supra), another two-Judge Bench of

this Court laid down the criteria to judge whether the plaint

contains a prayer for urgent interim relief, by taking into account

the subject matter of the suit, the cause of action and the prayer

for interim relief. It was further held that the facts and

circumstances of the case have to be considered holistically from

the standpoint of the plaintiff and the prayer for urgent interim

relief should not be a disguise or mask to wriggle out of and get

over Section 12A of the Act. The scope and ambit of the words

‘contemplate any urgent interim relief’ in Section12A of the Act,

with reference to the suit, were also considered and it was held

that the plaint, documents, and facts should show and indicate

the need for urgent interim relief. It was further held that this is

the precise and limited exercise that the Commercial Courts will

undertake.

19. In DHANBAD FUELS (P) LTD. v. UOI4

, another two-Judge

Bench of this Court held that the test under Section 12A is not

whether the prayer for urgent interim relief actually comes to be

allowed or not, but whether on examination of the nature and the

4

( 2025) SCC Online SC 1129

13

subject-matter of the suit and the cause of action, the prayer for

urgent interim relief by the plaintiff could be said to be

contemplable when the matter is seen from the standpoint of the

plaintiff. It has been further held that the interim relief must not

merely be an unfounded excuse by the plaintiff to bypass the

mandatory requirement of Section 12A of the Act.

20. The legal test distilled from the aforesaid decisions for the

purposes of rejection of the plaint and for adjudication of interim

relief can be culled out as follows:

(i) Section 12A mandatorily requires pre-institution mediation

for commercial suits, non-compliance of which would

ordinarily render the plaint institutionally defective.

(ii) A plaintiff can be exempted from the requirement of Section

12A only when the plaint and the documents attached with

it clearly show a real need for urgent interim intervention. A

wholesome reading of the plaint and the material annexed to

the plaint ought to disclose the need for urgent relief.

(iii) The court must look at the plaint, pleadings and supporting

documents to decide whether urgent interim relief is 

14

genuinely contemplated. The court may also look for

immediacy of the peril, irreparable harm, risk of losing

rights/assets, statutory timelines, perishable subject-matter,

or where delay would render eventual relief ineffective.

(iv) A proforma or anticipatory prayer for urgent relief used as a

device to skip mediation will be ignored and the court can

require the parties to comply with Section 12A of the Act.

(v) The court is not concerned with the merits of the urgent

relief, but if the relief sought seems to be plausibly urgent

from the standpoint of the plaintiff the court can dispense

with the requirement under Section 12A of the Act.

ANALYSIS

21. Thus, the question whether a suit ‘contemplates any urgent

interim relief’ needs to be examined on the touchstone of the

aforementioned criteria. The issue which arises for consideration

in this appeal is whether a suit alleging continuing infringement

of patent and design rights, accompanied by a prayer for interim

injunction, can be said to contemplate urgent relief within the 

15

meaning of Section 12A of the Act, notwithstanding certain delay

in its institution.

22. The subject matter of the present action is continuing

infringement of intellectual property. Each act of manufacture,

sale, or offer for sale of the infringing product constitutes a fresh

wrong and recurring cause of action. It is well settled in law that

mere delay in bringing an action does not legalise an

infringement and the same cannot defeat the right of the

proprietor to seek injunctive relief against the dishonest user5.

The appellant has pleaded that Xero Energy, its former

distributor, has dishonestly appropriated its proprietary designs

and patents to manufacture and market identical fans under

deceptively similar name. The accompanying material

demonstrates that such infringing activity is continuing and

causing immediate and irreparable harm to the appellant’s

business reputation, goodwill and proprietary rights.

23. From the standpoint of the appellant, each day of

continuing infringement aggravates injury to its intellectual

property and erodes its market standing. The urgency, therefore,

5Midas Hygiene Industries Private Ltd. & Anr. (supra)

16

is inherent in the nature of the wrong and does not lie in the age

of the cause but in the persistence of the peril. The court cannot

be unmindful of the fact that intellectual property disputes are

not confined to the private realm. When imitation masquerades

as innovation, it sows confusion among consumers, taints the

market place and diminishes faith in the sanctity of the trade.

The public interest, therefore, becomes the moral axis upon

which the urgency turns. Therefore, the public interest element,

need to prevent confusion in the market and to protect

consumers from deception further imparts a colour of immediacy

to the reliefs sought.

24. The appellant’s prayer for injunction cannot be

characterised as mere camouflage to evade mediation. It is a real

grievance founded on the continuing nature of infringement and

irreparable prejudice likely to be caused by the delay. The court

must look beyond time lag and evaluate the substance of the plea

for interim protection. The insistence of pre-institution mediation

in a situation of ongoing infringement, in effect, would render the

plaintiff remediless allowing the infringer to continue to profit 

17

under the protection of procedural formality. Section 12A of the

Act was not intended to achieve such kind of anomalous result.

25. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of

the High Court erred in construing the test for urgent relief

enumerated in Section 12A of the Act, in as much as the courts

have proceeded to examine the entitlement of the appellant to

urgent relief based on the merits of the case rather than looking

at the urgency as is evident from the plaint and the documents

annexed thereto from the standpoint of the plaintiff. The High

Court has proceeded on the premise that lapse of time between

the appellant’s discovery of infringement and filing of suit

negated the element of urgency. Such an approach, in our

considered view, is contrary to the principles laid down by the

decisions of this Court. The High Court has also failed to take

into account that the present action is one of the continuous

infringement of intellectual property.

CONCLUSION

26. For the reasons stated above, we hold that (i) In actions

alleging continuing infringement of intellectual property rights,

urgency must be assessed in the context of the ongoing injury 

18

and the public interest in preventing deception, (ii) Mere delay in

institution of a suit by itself, does not negate urgency when the

infringement is continuing.

27. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment

dated 28.08.2024 of the learned Single Judge in Commercial Suit

No. 13 of 2024 and the judgment dated 13.11.2024 of the

Division Bench of the High Court in Commercial Appeal No.1 of

2024 are quashed and set aside. The Commercial Suit No. 13 of

2024 is restored to the file of the High Court to be proceeded with

on merits in accordance with law.

28. The appeal is allowed.

 ……………….……………J.

 [SANJAY KUMAR]

 .…….…………………….J.

 [ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI,

OCTOBER 27, 2025.

A. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — S.2(2) — Scheduled Tribes — Applicability — Statutory exclusion — Act not applicable to members of Scheduled Tribes unless Central Govt. issues notification — Burden wrongly placed by Courts below on female successors to prove entitlement by custom — Held, patriarchal assumptions based on Hindu Law wholly misplaced — Reiterated, exclusion from provision does not imply exclusion from equality-based inheritance — Held, women cannot be denied inheritance only due to absence of explicit enabling custom. B. Customary Law — Proof of custom — When not established by either party — Courts cannot presume exclusion of women — In absence of personal law/custom — inheritance to be adjudicated based on justice, equity and good conscience as statutorily recognised under Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, S.6 — Repeal Act, 2018 — S.4 (Savings) — Right crystallised prior to repeal continues — High Court’s contrary view incorrect. C. Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 15(1), 38, 46 — Gender equality — Tribal woman’s right to inherit ancestral property — Denial of succession on the sole basis of sex violates Art.14 — No rational basis to differentiate tribal daughters from sons where no custom bars inheritance — Progressive interpretation to remove “historical discrimination”. D. Evidence Act, 1872 — Burden of proof — Mistake in approach — Lower courts assumed custom prohibiting female inheritance — Expected plaintiffs to prove contrary — Held, incorrect — Inclusion, not exclusion, must be presumed unless a prohibitory custom proven. Result: Appeal allowed — Judgments of Courts below set aside — Legal heirs of tribal woman (daughter of propositus) entitled to equal share in ancestral property — No costs.

A. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — S.2(2) — Scheduled Tribes — Applicability — Statutory exclusion — Act not applicable to members of Scheduled Tribes unless Central Govt. issues notification — Burden wrongly placed by Courts below on female successors to prove entitlement by custom — Held, patriarchal assumptions based on Hindu Law wholly misplaced — Reiterated, exclusion from provision does not imply exclusion from equality-based inheritance — Held, women cannot be denied inheritance only due to absence of explicit enabling custom.

B. Customary Law — Proof of custom — When not established by either party — Courts cannot presume exclusion of women — In absence of personal law/custom — inheritance to be adjudicated based on justice, equity and good conscience as statutorily recognised under Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, S.6 — Repeal Act, 2018 — S.4 (Savings) — Right crystallised prior to repeal continues — High Court’s contrary view incorrect.

C. Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 15(1), 38, 46 — Gender equality — Tribal woman’s right to inherit ancestral property — Denial of succession on the sole basis of sex violates Art.14 — No rational basis to differentiate tribal daughters from sons where no custom bars inheritance — Progressive interpretation to remove “historical discrimination”.

D. Evidence Act, 1872 — Burden of proof — Mistake in approach — Lower courts assumed custom prohibiting female inheritance — Expected plaintiffs to prove contrary — Held, incorrect — Inclusion, not exclusion, must be presumed unless a prohibitory custom proven.

Result: Appeal allowed — Judgments of Courts below set aside — Legal heirs of tribal woman (daughter of propositus) entitled to equal share in ancestral property — No costs.

2025 INSC 865

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9537 OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP(C)No.5559 of 2023)

RAM CHARAN & ORS. … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SUKHRAM & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

 Leave Granted

2. The instant appeal is preferred against the judgment dated

1

st July 2022 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh,

Bilaspur, in Second Appeal No.465 of 2009, whereby it

affirmed the judgment and decree dated 21st April 2009 passed

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 1

by the Second Additional District Judge (FTC)1

, Surajpur,

District Sarguja (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No.1A/08 and the

judgment and decree dated 29th February 2008 passed by the

Second Civil Judge, Class-2, Surajpur, Sarguja (C.G.)2

 in Civil

Suit No.21A/08, dismissing the suit of partition filed by the

appellant-plaintiffs.

3. The short question involved in this appeal is whether a

tribal woman (or her legal heirs) would be entitled to an equal

share in her ancestral property or not. One would think that in

this day and age, where great strides have been made in

realizing the constitutional goal of equality, this Court would

not need to intervene for equality between the successors of a

common ancestor and the same should be a given, irrespective

of their biological differences, but it is not so.

4. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The appellantsplaintiffs are the legal heirs of one Dhaiya, a woman belonging

to a Scheduled Tribe. They sought partition of a property

belonging to their maternal grandfather, Bhajju alias Bhanjan

Gond. Their mother was one of the six children - five sons and

one daughter, stating that their mother is entitled to an equal

share in the scheduled property. The cause of action arose in

October 1992 when defendant Nos.6 to 16 refused to make a

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘First Appellate Court’

2 Hereinafter referred to as‘Trial Court’

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 2

partition. The appellant-plaintiffs approached the Trial Court

seeking a declaration of title and partition of the suit property.

5. By judgment dated 29th February 2008, the suit was

dismissed holding as follows :

“11. From the contentions of the above three Plaintiff

Witness it is clear that they have stated the fact of the

right of the Bua and her sons i.e. the rights of the

daughters on the land of the father. The judicial review

Heera Lal Gond Vs Sukhbariya Bai M.P. V. No.1993

(Part-2) 143 has been presented on behalf of the

plaintiffs, wherein it has held that as per the custom of

parties of the Gond Caste that on proving the

succession of the widow and daughter they shall get the

succession. This Judicial Review is not applied in this

case, because the plaintiffs have not certified their caste

customs. They have only stated to be claimed the rights

of the daughters to get into the properties of their father,

but who can say that in their knowledge such right has

been given to any specific person. In this regard a

judicial review Bihari Vs. Yashwantin 1973 R.N.. 64

has been presented on behalf of the defendants, wherein

the Hon’ble High Court has opined that the peoples of

the Gond Caste are not governed by the Hindu custom,

but they shall be governed by their specific tradition in

their all cases including succession. In regard to the

certification of tradition, the opinion of the Hon’ble

Court is that the statement being tradition is not

sufficient, they should be presented the real events.

12. Thus, from the analysis of the above evidence it

is made clear that the plaintiff has not made the

statement of even any witness for providing their

custom. Apart from this, they have also not made the

claim of the fact of governing their custom from the

caste tradition in their contentions. They are telling

themselves Hindu and claiming that they are governed

under the Hindu Succession Act, which is a specific

provision in sub-section 2 of section 2 of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956 that the member of the Scheduled

Tribe shall not be governed by this Act. Accordingly,

the plaintiffs have failed to prove suit issues No.1 to 3

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 3

in their favor. Resultantly, their conclusion is made in

the ‘not certified’.”

(Emphasis supplied)

6. The First Appellate Court, by its judgment dated 21st

April 2009 concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that

the mother of the appellant-plaintiffs had no right in the

property of her father. It is held so for the reason that no

evidence had been led to show that children of a female heir are

also entitled to property.

7. An appeal under Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure,

19083

 has been admitted on the following substantial question

of law :

“(l) Whether both the Courts below were justified in

dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs by recording a

finding which is perverse and contrary to the record?”

8. The High Court, having considered the contentions of the

parties qua the first argument of custom, held that the finding of

the Trial Court is in consonance with the judgments of this

Court in Salekh Chand v. Satya Gupta and Ors.4

; Ratanlal v.

Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka5

; and Aliyathammuda

Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v. Pattakal Cheriyakoya6

. It

was held that the appellant-plaintiffs seeking partition of

property had failed to establish their right over such property by

3 Hereinafter ‘CPC’

4 2008 13 SCC 119

5 2018 11 SCC 119

6 (2019) 16 SCC 1

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 4

way of custom, showing that a female heir is also entitled

thereto.

9. The second argument of the counsel for the appellantplaintiffs is that in the absence of custom, justice, equity and

good conscience must prevail, in accordance with Daduram

and Others v. Bhuri Bai & Ors.7

, the judgment of a coordinate

Bench of the said Court. This argument was rejected on the

ground that the coordinate Bench of the High Court was not

informed that the 1875 Act stood repealed on 30th March 2018.

It is the latter order from which the judgment of this Court in

Tirith Kumar v. Daduram8

 arose.

10. In so far as the argument of the appellant-plaintiffs that

they had adopted Hindu traditions, it was held that since there

was no evidence to that effect brought on record, the Trial Court

as well as the First Appellate Court had rightly rejected this

contention. In terms of the above, the substantial question of

law was answered in the negative.

11. In that view of the matter, the appellant-plaintiffs are

before us. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at

length and perused their written submissions.

12. At the outset of our consideration, it is clarified that the

question of the parties having adopted Hindu customs and way

of life is no longer in play. That apart, we may also notice

7 SA No.270 of 2023

8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3810

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 5

Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which

unequivocally excludes from its application, Scheduled Tribes.

It reads :

“Section 2(2): Notwithstanding anything contained in

sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall

apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the

meaning of clause (25) of article 366 of the

Constitution unless the Central Government, by

notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.”

13. Since the Hindu Law has no application, the next

possibility to be considered is that of the application of the

custom. For the application of a custom to be shown, it has to

be proved, but it was not in the present case. In fact, the Courts

below proceeded, in our view, with an assumption in mind and

that assumption was misplaced. The point of inception

regarding the discussion of customs was at the exclusion stage,

meaning thereby that they assumed there to be an exclusionary

custom in a place where the daughters would not be entitled to

any inheritance and expected the appellant-plaintiffs to prove

otherwise. An alternate scenario was also possible where not

exclusion, but inclusion could have been presumed and the

defendants then could have been asked to show that women

were not entitled to inherit property. This patriarchal

predisposition appears to be an inference from Hindu law,

which has no place in the present case.

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 6

14. The Chhattisgarh High Court in Mst. Sarwango and

others v. Mst. Urchamahin and others9

 has observed :

“10. In the present case, both the parties have failed

to prove any law of inheritance or custom prevailing in

their Gond caste i.e. member of Scheduled Caste whom

Hindu law or other law governing inheritance is not

applicable. In absence of any law of inheritance or

custom prevailing in their caste governing the

inheritance the Courts are required to decide the rights

according to justice, equity and good conscience in

term of Section 6 of the Act. Plaintiffs Sawango and

Jaituniya are daughters of Jhangal, nearest relative

rather the respondents, who were daughter-in-law of

brother of Jhangal and legitimate or illegitimate son of

Balam Singh, son of Dakhal.

11. In these circumstances, plaintiffs Sawango and

Jaituniya would be the persons' best entitlement to

inherit the property left by their father. The Courts

below ought to have decreed the suit for partition to the

extent of share of Jhangal, but the Court below i.e. the

lower appellate Court has allowed the appeal and

dismissed the suit in absence of any law or custom for

inheritance for a member of Schedule Tribe. The Courts

below are required to decide their rights of inheritance

in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the

Act applicable to the State of Chhattisgarh and

undivided State of Madhya Pradesh”

(Emphasis supplied)

15. Given the above situation that neither any particular law

of a community nor custom could be brought into application

by either side, we now proceed to examine the argument

advanced before the High Court that is the principle of justice,

equity, and good conscience. These principles find statutory

9 2013 SCC OnLine Chh 5

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 7

recognition in the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, Section 6

whereof is extracted herein below :

“6. In cases not provided for by section five, or by

Rule in cases any other law for the time being in force,

the Courts shall act according to justice, equity and

good conscience.”

16. At the outset, it is observed that regarding the 1875 law,

the impugned judgment notes that the same has been repealed

as of March 2018 and, therefore, cannot be applied. We find this

position to be mistaken. The Repeal Act No.4 of 2018 provides

for a saving clause, which reads as under :

“4. Savings.— The repeal by this Act of any

enactment shall not affect any other enactment in

which the repealed enactment has been applied,

incorporated or referred to;

and this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity,

effect or consequences of anything already done or

suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability

already acquired, accrued or incurred, or any remedy

or proceeding in respect thereof, or any release or

discharge of or from any debt, penalty, obligation,

liability, claim or demand, or any indemnity already

granted, or the proof of any past act or thing;

nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule of law, or

established jurisdiction, form or course of pleading,

practice or procedure, or existing usage, custom,

privilege, restriction, exemption, office or

appointment, notwithstanding that the same

respectively may have been in any manner affirmed or

recognised or derived by, in or from any enactment

hereby repealed;

nor shall the repeal by this Act of any enactment

revive or restore any jurisdiction, office, custom,

liability, right, title, privilege, restriction, exemption,

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 8

usage, practice, procedure or other matter or thing not

now existing or in force.”

(Emphasis supplied)

17. The effect of Section 4 is clear that no right having been

accrued prior to the repeal of the Act shall be affected thereby.

As we have already observed, the parties to the instant lis are

neither governed by Hindu nor Muslim laws and, therefore,

would be covered by Section 6 of the 1875 Act. So, the right

having been accrued in favour of the appellant-plaintiffs’

mother upon the death of her father, which was approximately

30 years before the filing of the plaint became crystallized and

would not be affected by the fact that the Act was no longer in

the statute book. This Act, therefore, necessarily had to be

applied by the High Court. At this juncture, it is pertinent to

consider the meaning of ‘justice, equity and good conscience’.

18. It is trite in law that this principle can be applied only

when there is a void or, in other words, in the absence of any

law governing that aspect. Since no custom to the effect that

women were entitled to the property, the application thereof

would be consistent with this position. What exactly this phrase

‘justice, equity and good conscience’ entails has been

considered by this Court on a few occasions. We may refer to

certain instances :

(a) In Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. 2nd

Punjab Tribunal10, it was held by a Constitution Bench of

10 1957 SCC OnLine SC 64

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 9

this Court that this principle can be applied even in the

context of labour disputes, so long as the law on the

question in consideration is not codified for there are many

situations that arise in everyday function, which, it is not

possible for a legislature to foresee and account for in the

principal legislation.

(b) The principle of ‘justice, equity and good

conscience’ is not of recent application. As J.C. Shah, J.

demonstrated the Courts, which functioned in the former

British Indian territory, were also equipped to apply the

said principle. See Superintendent and Remembrancer of

Legal Affairs v. Corpn. of Calcutta11

.

(c) This principle found an extensive discussion in the

decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in M.

Siddiq v. Suresh Das12 (Ram Janmabhoomi Temple),

relevant extracts whereof are as follows :

“Justice, Equity and Good Conscience today

1019. With the development of statutory law and

judicial precedent, including the progressive

codification of customs in the Hindu Code and in the

Shariat Act, 1937, the need to place reliance on justice,

equity and good conscience gradually reduced. There is

(at least in theory) a reduced scope for the application

of justice, equity and good conscience when doctrinal

positions established under a statute cover factual

situations or where the principles underlying the system

of personal law in question can be definitively

11 1966 SCC OnLine SC 42

12 (2020) 1 SCC 1

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 10

ascertained. But even then, it would do disservice to

judicial craft to adopt a theory which excludes the

application of justice, equity and good conscience to

areas of law governed by statute. For the law develops

interstitially, as Judges work themselves in tandem with

statute law to arrive at just outcomes. Where the rights

of the parties are not governed by a particular personal

law, or where the personal law is silent or incapable of

being ascertained by a court, where a code has a lacuna,

or where the source of law fails or requires to be

supplemented, justice, equity and good conscience may

properly be referred to.

…

1022. The common underlying thread is that justice,

good conscience and equity plays a supplementary role

in enabling courts to mould the relief to suit the

circumstances that present themselves before courts

with the principal purpose of ensuring a just outcome.

Where the existing statutory framework is inadequate

for courts to adjudicate upon the dispute before them,

or no settled judicial doctrine or custom can be availed

of, courts may legitimately take recourse to the

principles of justice, equity and good conscience to

effectively and fairly dispose of the case. A court

cannot abdicate its responsibility to decide a dispute

over legal rights merely because the facts of a case do

not readily submit themselves to the application of the

letter of the existing law. Courts in India have long

availed of the principles of justice, good conscience and

equity to supplement the incompleteness or

inapplicability of the letter of the law with the ground

realities of legal disputes to do justice between the

parties. Equity, as an essential component of justice,

formed the final step in the just adjudication of

disputes. After taking recourse to legal principles from

varied legal systems, scholarly written work on the

subject, and the experience of the Bar and Bench, if no

decisive or just outcome could be reached, a Judge may

apply the principles of equity between the parties to

ensure that justice is done. This has often found form in

the power of the court to craft reliefs that are both

legally sustainable and just.”

(Emphasis supplied)

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 11

(d) In Tirith Kumar (supra), which was also an appeal

arising from a judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh,

this Court speaking through one of us (Sanjay Karol J.)

had the occasion to consider the application of this

principle and in accordance with it, the order of the High

Court granting right over the property to the female heirs

was confirmed.

19. When applying the principle of justice, equity and good

conscience, the Courts have to be mindful of the above and

apply this otherwise open-ended principle contextually. In the

present case, a woman or her successors, if the views of the

lower Court are upheld, would be denied a right to property on

the basis of the absence of a positive assertion to such

inheritance in custom. However, customs too, like the law,

cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to

take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others of

their right.

20. Apart from the application of this general principle, we

also find this to be a question of violation of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India. There appears to be no rational nexus or

reasonable classification for only males to be granted

succession over the property of their forebears and not women,

more so in the case where no prohibition to such effect can be

shown to be prevalent as per law. Article 15(1) states that the

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 12

State shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of

religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. This, along with

Articles 38 and 46, points to the collective ethos of the

Constitution in ensuring that there is no discrimination against

women.

21. In Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. v.

State of U.P.13, it was observed :

“7. Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality

among equals; its aim is to protect persons similarly

placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not,

however, operate against rational classification. A

person setting up a grievance of denial of equal

treatment by law must establish that between persons

similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their

prejudice and the differential treatment had no

reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved

by the law...”

22. This Court in the seminal case of Air India v. Nergesh

Meerza14, laid down the following propositions, among others,

in regard to Article 14 :

“39. Thus, from a detailed analysis and close

examination of the cases of this Court starting from

1952 till today, the following propositions emerge:

…

(2) Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not

reasonable classification. Thus, where persons

belonging to a particular class in view of their special

attributes, qualities, mode of recruitment and the like,

are differently treated in public interest to advance and

boost members belonging to backward classes, such a

classification would not amount to discrimination

13 (1969) 1 SCC 817

14 (1981) 4 SCC 335

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 13

having a close nexus with the objects sought to be

achieved so that in such cases Article 14 will be

completely out of the way.

(3) Article 14 certainly applies where equals are treated

differently without any reasonable basis.

(4) Where equals and unequals are treated differently,

Article 14 would have no application.…”

23. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India15

, it was observed :

“7. Now, the question immediately arises as to what is

the requirement of Article 14 : what is the content and

reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this

article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith

of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests

securely the foundation of our democratic republic.

And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow,

pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should

be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and

meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist

magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many

aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned

within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must

reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority

in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974) 4 SCC 3

: 1974 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1974) 2 SCR 348] namely,

that “from a positivistic point of view, equality is

antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and

arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule

of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and

caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is

arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both

according to political logic and constitutional law and is

therefore violative of Article 14”. Article 14 strikes at

arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and

equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness,

which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential

element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades

Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the

procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the

test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with

15 (1978) 1 SCC 248

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Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not

arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it .would be

no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21

would not be satisfied…”

(Emphasis supplied)

24. While relying on State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa16

,

this Court in Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University17, observed as

follows :

“8. …

It was also observed that discrimination is the essence

of classification and does violence to the constitutional

guarantee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable

basis and it was for the respondents to establish that

classification was unreasonable and bore no rational

nexus with its purported object. Further, dealing with

the right to equality, the Court (in paras 29 & 30) held

thus: (SCC p. 33)

“But the concept of equality has an inherent limitation

arising from the very nature of the constitutional

guarantee. Equality is for equals. That is to say that

those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to an

equal treatment.

....”

25. A Constitution Bench in Shayara Bano v. Union of

India18

, while dealing with the issue of triple talaq, referred to

Article 14 in the following terms :

“62. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a facet of

equality of status and opportunity spoken of in the

Preamble to the Constitution. The Article naturally

divides itself into two parts—(1) equality before the

law, and (2) the equal protection of the law. Judgments

of this Court have referred to the fact that the equality

16 (1974) 1 SCC 19

17 (2003) 8 SCC 440

18 (2017) 9 SCC 1

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 15

before law concept has been derived from the law in the

UK, and the equal protection of the laws has been

borrowed from the 14th Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States of America. In a revealing

judgment, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in State of

U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [State of U.P. v. Deoman

Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 : AIR 1960 SC 1125 :

1960 Cri LJ 1504] , AIR p. 1134 para 26 : SCR at p. 34

further went on to state that whereas equality before

law is a negative concept, the equal protection of the

law has positive content. The early judgments of this

Court referred to the “discrimination” aspect of Article

14, and evolved a rule by which subjects could be

classified. If the classification was “intelligible” having

regard to the object sought to be achieved, it would pass

muster under Article 14's anti-discrimination aspect.

Again, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in Lachhman

Dass v. State of Punjab [Lachhman Dass v. State of

Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 353 : AIR 1963 SC 222] , SCR

at p. 395, warned that: (AIR p. 240, para 50)

“50. … Overemphasis on the doctrine of

classification or an anxious and sustained

attempt to discover some basis for

classification may gradually and

imperceptibly deprive the Article of its

glorious content…”

(Emphasis supplied)

26. This discussion on equality under Article 14, which,

needless to state, includes the aspect of gender equality within

its fold will be, in our view, incomplete without reference to the

first and most commendable step taken under the Hindu Law by

way of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which

made daughters the coparceners in joint family property. The

object and reasons as stated in the Bill are instructive in the

general sense and we reproduce the same with profit :

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 16

“…The law by excluding the daughter from

participating in the coparcenary ownership not only

contributes to her discrimination on the ground of

gender but also has led to oppression and negation of

her fundamental right of equality guaranteed by the

Constitution. having regard to the need to render social

justice to women, the States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil

Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra have made necessary

changes in the law giving equal right to daughters in

Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property. The Kerala

Legislature has enacted the Kerala Joint Hindu Family

System (Abolition) Act, 1975...”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. Similarly, we are of the view that, unless otherwise

prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property

only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the

law should ensure to weed out.

28. Granted that no such custom of female succession could

be established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is

also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be

shown in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case,

denying Dhaiya her share in her father’s property, when the

custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her

brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin.

29. In view of the above discussion, we are of the firm view

that in keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good

conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14

of the Constitution, the appellant-plaintiffs, being Dhaiya’s legal

heirs, are entitled to their equal share in the property. The

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 17

judgments of the Courts below are accordingly set aside to that

extent. The civil appeal is allowed accordingly.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

30. No costs.

….….…………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

…………..…………….J.

(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)

New Delhi;

July 17, 2025.

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