LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Wednesday, October 15, 2025

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 Ss. 166, 168 — Compensation — Determination of quantum — Salary, allowances, income tax deduction, future prospects, and multiplier — Principles reiterated and clarified. Held, “income” includes salary and all allowances shown in the last pay slip unless proved to be non-recurring or non-monetary. High Court erred in excluding allowances while determining the multiplicand. Relying on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava, (2008) 2 SCC 763; Vijay Kumar Rastogi v. U.P.S.R.T.C., 2018 SCC OnLine SC 193; and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nalini, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2252, the Court reiterated that emoluments and benefits accruing to the deceased under various heads must be included for computation of loss of income, whether or not taxable. Further held, deduction towards income tax permissible (Ranjana Prakash v. Divisional Manager, (2011) 14 SCC 639) but must be computed as per prevailing tax slabs of the relevant assessment year, and not by arbitrary flat percentage deduction. In present case, deceased was 27 years old, employed as Engineer with Power Grid Corporation of India (a PSU). Multiplier of 17 adopted by High Court upheld as per Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121, affirmed in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. Addition for future prospects @ 50% justified as deceased was below 40 years and in permanent employment (Pranay Sethi, para 59.3). After deducting income tax as per 2011 slab (Rs. 62,080 on annual income Rs. 6,40,400), net annual income computed at Rs. 5,78,324. After 50% deduction for personal expenses and 50% addition for future prospects, multiplicand arrived at Rs. 4,33,743. Applying multiplier 17, loss of dependency calculated at Rs. 73,73,631. Adding Rs. 15,000 towards loss of estate, Rs. 40,000 towards loss of filial consortium, and Rs. 15,000 towards funeral expenses, total compensation determined at Rs. 74,43,631 with interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of claim petition till realization. High Court judgment reducing compensation to Rs. 38,15,499 set aside. Tribunal’s approach substantially upheld with modification in computation. — Held: (1) Allowances form part of income for determining compensation. (2) Deduction of 30% flat rate towards income tax impermissible; to be computed as per relevant slabs. (3) Addition of 50% for future prospects proper. (4) Multiplier of 17 appropriate for age 27 years. (5) Compensation enhanced to Rs. 74,43,631 with 6% interest. (Paras 12 to 16) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Appeal — Scope of interference by Supreme Court in computation of compensation — Where High Court excluded admissible components of salary and applied incorrect income tax deduction, resulting in unjustified reduction of compensation, Supreme Court justified in re-appreciating computation and restoring correct multiplier, income components, and permissible deductions to arrive at “just compensation” under Ss.166 and 168 of the Act. (Para 15) CASE LAW REFERENCE Case Citation Referred/Followed/Applied Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121 Followed National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680 Followed National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava (2008) 2 SCC 763 Applied Vijay Kumar Rastogi v. U.P.S.R.T.C. 2018 SCC OnLine SC 193 Applied National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nalini 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2252 Followed Ranjana Prakash v. Divisional Manager (2011) 14 SCC 639 Relied on FINAL ORDER Appeal allowed. High Court’s order modifying compensation set aside. Compensation enhanced to Rs. 74,43,631/- with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of claim petition till actual payment.


MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988

Ss. 166, 168 — Compensation — Determination of quantum — Salary, allowances, income tax deduction, future prospects, and multiplier — Principles reiterated and clarified.
Held, “income” includes salary and all allowances shown in the last pay slip unless proved to be non-recurring or non-monetary. High Court erred in excluding allowances while determining the multiplicand. Relying on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava, (2008) 2 SCC 763; Vijay Kumar Rastogi v. U.P.S.R.T.C., 2018 SCC OnLine SC 193; and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nalini, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2252, the Court reiterated that emoluments and benefits accruing to the deceased under various heads must be included for computation of loss of income, whether or not taxable.

Further held, deduction towards income tax permissible (Ranjana Prakash v. Divisional Manager, (2011) 14 SCC 639) but must be computed as per prevailing tax slabs of the relevant assessment year, and not by arbitrary flat percentage deduction.

In present case, deceased was 27 years old, employed as Engineer with Power Grid Corporation of India (a PSU). Multiplier of 17 adopted by High Court upheld as per Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121, affirmed in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680.

Addition for future prospects @ 50% justified as deceased was below 40 years and in permanent employment (Pranay Sethi, para 59.3).

After deducting income tax as per 2011 slab (Rs. 62,080 on annual income Rs. 6,40,400), net annual income computed at Rs. 5,78,324. After 50% deduction for personal expenses and 50% addition for future prospects, multiplicand arrived at Rs. 4,33,743. Applying multiplier 17, loss of dependency calculated at Rs. 73,73,631.

Adding Rs. 15,000 towards loss of estate, Rs. 40,000 towards loss of filial consortium, and Rs. 15,000 towards funeral expenses, total compensation determined at Rs. 74,43,631 with interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of claim petition till realization.

High Court judgment reducing compensation to Rs. 38,15,499 set aside. Tribunal’s approach substantially upheld with modification in computation.

— Held:
(1) Allowances form part of income for determining compensation.
(2) Deduction of 30% flat rate towards income tax impermissible; to be computed as per relevant slabs.
(3) Addition of 50% for future prospects proper.
(4) Multiplier of 17 appropriate for age 27 years.
(5) Compensation enhanced to Rs. 74,43,631 with 6% interest.

(Paras 12 to 16)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Appeal — Scope of interference by Supreme Court in computation of compensation —
Where High Court excluded admissible components of salary and applied incorrect income tax deduction, resulting in unjustified reduction of compensation, Supreme Court justified in re-appreciating computation and restoring correct multiplier, income components, and permissible deductions to arrive at “just compensation” under Ss.166 and 168 of the Act.
(Para 15)

CASE LAW REFERENCE

CaseCitationReferred/Followed/Applied
Sarla Verma v. DTC(2009) 6 SCC 121Followed
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi(2017) 16 SCC 680Followed
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava(2008) 2 SCC 763Applied
Vijay Kumar Rastogi v. U.P.S.R.T.C.2018 SCC OnLine SC 193Applied
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nalini2024 SCC OnLine SC 2252Followed
Ranjana Prakash v. Divisional Manager(2011) 14 SCC 639Relied on

FINAL ORDER

Appeal allowed.
High Court’s order modifying compensation set aside.
Compensation enhanced to Rs. 74,43,631/- with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of claim petition till actual payment.

2025 INSC 1237

Page 1 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. …… OF 2025

(@ Special Leave to Appeal (C) no. 19878/2022)

MANORMA SINHA & ANR. …APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, ORIENTAL INSURANCE

COMPANY LIMITED & ANR. …RESPONDENT (S)


J U D G M E N T

MANOJ MISRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of judgment and order of the High

Court of Judicature at Patna1 dated 04.07.2022 passed

in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 804 of 2017, whereby the

compensation awarded by the XIth Additional District

and Sessions Judge – cum - Motor Accident Claims

Tribunal, Muzaffarpur2 in Claim Case No. 196 of 2011

was reduced from Rs. 88,20,454 to Rs. 38,15,499.

1 High Court

2 Tribunal

Page 2 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

3. As liability to pay compensation is not in issue, the

question that arises for our consideration is whether the

High Court was justified in reducing the compensation

payable to the appellant.

4. The operative part of the award passed by the Tribunal

including computation of compensation is found in

paragraphs 10 to 12 of the award, which are reproduced

below:

“10. Multiplier: So far quantum of compensation is

concerned, the proper multiplier will be 18 as per

Schedule-II of the M.V. Act, as the age of deceased

was 27 years as per evidence on record.

As per Ext. A & A/1 submitted by O.P. No. 2

Insurer (Insurance Company) and also Ext. 1

salary slip submitted by Claimant the salary of the

deceased for the month of Feb., 2011 was as under:

Basic Pay – Rs. 26,420/-

D.A.: 43% - Rs. 11,360/-

Local Allowance:

10% - Rs. 2,642/-

Other allowances:

49% i.e. Rs. 12,945.80

Thus, total salary of deceased comes to Rs.

53,367 per month. Therefore, loss of dependency

would come to Rs. 53,367 x 12 x 18 = Rs.

1,15,27,272/-

Out of which ½ his personal expenses would

be deducted and then loss of dependency would be

Rs. 57,63,636/-. In which 50% future prospects

would be added i.e. amount Rs. 28,81,818/- then

loss of dependency would be Rs. 86,45,454/-.

11. In addition, the claimants are entitled to get a

sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- under the head of loss of

estate, Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of love and

affection and Rs. 15,000/- as funeral expenses.

Page 3 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

Thus, total compensation will be Rs. 88,70,454/-

Hence, claimants are entitled to get Rs.

88,70,454/- with interest thereon at the rate of 6%

per annum.

12. Perusal of case record it is evident that

claimants have already received Rs. 50,000/- as

ad-interim compensation U/s. 140 M.V. Act.

Hence, this amount would be adjusted from the

amount of Rs. 88,70,454/-. Then it comes to Rs.

88,20,454/- as total compensation U/s. 166 M.V.

Act. Hence claimants are entitled to get the said

amount with interest thereon @ 6% per annum.

Therefore, it is,

ORDERED

That the O.P. No. 2 Oriental Insurance

Company Limited, Muzaffarpur is directed to pay

the total compensation amount of Rs. 88,20,454/-

to the claimants within two months with interest

thereon @ 6% per annum from the date of filing till

the date of realization failing which the law will take

its own course.”

5. On an appeal preferred by the Insurance Company (the

respondent herein), the High Court computed the

compensation in the following manner:

“In view of the above, the computation of the claim

of the appellant would be as follows:

1. Monthly basic salary Rs. 26,420/-

2. D.A. (43%) Rs. 11,360/-

3. Future prospect @ 40% Rs. 15,892/-

 Rs. 52,892/-

4. Yearly income (52,892 x 12) Rs. 6,34,704/-

5. Less of 30% income tax -1,90,411/-

 Rs. 4,44,293/-

6. Less of 50% personal expense - 2,22,146/-

(unmarried) Rs. 2,22,147

7. Multiplier (17 x 2,22147) Rs. 37,76,499/-

8. Conventional head (unmarried) + 39,000

(30,000 + 3,000 each in 2014,

 2017 and 2020) Rs. 38,15,499/-

The aforesaid total amount of Rs. 38,15,499/- shall

be paid by the Insurance Company to the

Page 4 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

respondent/claimants within a period of three

months with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per

annum from the date of petition till the date of

realization.”

6. The difference between the order of the Tribunal and

that of the High Court as regards the mode of

computation of compensation is clear. The High Court

while computing the compensation has, inter alia,

excluded the allowances payable as per the last pay slip

and gave future prospects at the rate of 40% in place of

50% as was given by the Tribunal. Besides above, the

High Court made a flat deduction of 30% towards

income tax.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and

have perused the materials on record.

8. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant

is that the High Court has erred in not including the

allowances payable for computing the compensation

and has also erred in reducing the income by a flat rate

of 30% deductible towards income tax even though it

might not be even leviable. It is submitted that if any

deduction towards income tax is to be made it cannot be

at a rate different from the rate at which the tax is

Page 5 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

payable on the annualized income based on the last pay

slip. It has been submitted that the income tax slab

prevailing in 2011 were: annual income up to Rs.1.60

lacs – Nil; annual income between Rs.1.60 lacs to Rs.5

lacs – 10%; annual income between Rs.5 lacs and Rs. 8

lacs – 20%; and annual income above Rs.8 lacs - 30%.

9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent

submitted that though the tax payable may vary but the

allowances must be excluded in computation of salary

in view of decision of this Court in the case of Gestetner

Duplicators (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income

Tax, West Bengal3. Further, while computing

compensation deduction towards income tax is to be

made as held by this Court in Ranjana Prakash &

others v. Divisional Manager & another4.

10. We have given due consideration to the rival

submissions.

11. Before we proceed to determine the just compensation

payable in the context of submissions made before us, it

would be useful to mention that there is no dispute in

3

(1979) 2 SCC 354

4

(2011) 14 SCC 639

Page 6 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

respect of the age of the deceased at the time of accident,

which, as per finding returned by the Tribunal, not

disturbed by the High Court, was 27 years. Therefore,

multiplier of 17, which has been adopted by the High

Court is correct.5

12. Now, the next question is whether allowances are to be

added to the salary for determining the multiplicand. In

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava &

Ors.

6 it was held that “the term income has different

connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having

regard to the change in societal conditions consider the

question not only having regard to pay packet the

employee carries home at the end of the month but also

other perks which are beneficial to the members of the

entire family”. In Vijay Kumar Rastogi v. Uttar

Pradesh State Roadways Transport Corporation7 a

three-Judge Bench of this court noticing earlier

decisions on the point observed that “the income should

include those benefits, either in terms of money or

5 See: Sarla Verma & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 121, paragraph 42, affirmed in

National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi & Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680, paragraph 59.6.

6

(2008) 2 SCC 763, paragraph 9

7 2018 SCC OnLine SC 193 paragraph 11

Page 7 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

otherwise, which are taken into consideration for the

purpose of payment of income tax or professional tax,

although some elements thereof may not be taxable due

to exemption conferred thereupon under the statute.”

Following the decision in Vijay Kumar Rastogi (supra)

in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nalini &

Ors.8 it was held by this Court that the emoluments and

the benefits accruing to the deceased under various

heads for the purposes of computation of loss of income,

ought to be included irrespective of whether they are

taxable or not. Thus, in our view, the High Court erred

in excluding the allowances from the computation to

arrive at the multiplicand. Hence, the total monthly

income was rightly computed by the Tribunal at

Rs.53,367.

13. As regards deduction towards income tax is concerned,

same is permissible in view of the decision of this Court

in Ranjana Prakash9 (supra). However, in our view,

deduction towards income tax should be at such rate

which the annual income may be subjected to in the

8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2252

9 See Paragraph 9 of the judgment in Ranjana Prakash referred to in Footnote 4

Page 8 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

relevant year. It is not demonstrated that the allowances

received were exempt from income tax. Even the nature

of allowances has not been disclosed to enable us to

determine whether they are exempt from tax. Therefore,

we include them in the annual income and compute the

annual income as Rs. 6,40,400 (approximately) for the

purposes of tax. The tax payable in the relevant year

(i.e., with reference to the date of death) would be

Rs.62,080 (Tax: Nil up to Rs. 1.60 lacs; Rs.34,000 @ 10%

up to Rs.5.00 lacs; and Rs.28,080 @ 20% up to

Rs.6,40,400). Thus, net annual income from salary after

deduction of income tax, with the allowances, would be

Rs.5,78,324.

14. In so far as addition for future prospects is concerned,

High Court gave @ of 40% of actual income whereas

Tribunal gave @ of 50%. The deceased was an Engineer

employed with Power Grid Corporation of India, which is

a public sector undertaking. There is no material to

indicate that his job was not permanent in nature or that

he was on a contract for a limited period. In such

circumstances, in our view, addition for future prospects

Page 9 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

would have to be at the rate of 50% considering that

deceased was aged below 40 years at the time of

accident.10 Therefore, the High Court was not justified

in adding future prospects at the rate of 40% in place of

50% as awarded by the Tribunal.

15. In view the discussion above, after deducting 50%

towards personal expenses, 50% of annual net salary

would be Rs.2,89,162. 50% of it for future prospects

would be Rs.1,44,581. Thus, net annual income post

deduction towards personal expenses and addition for

future prospects would be Rs.4,33,743. Consequently,

the multiplicand for determining loss of dependency

would be Rs.4,33,743. As we have found that multiplier

would be 17, the loss of dependency would be 4,33,743

X 17 = Rs.73,73,631. Compensation payable under

conventional heads such as loss of filial consortium, loss

of estate and funeral expenses can be taken at the rate

specified in Pranay Sethi (supra)11 as the accident is of

the year 2011. Hence, we deem it appropriate to add

Rs.15,000 towards loss of estate, Rs.40,000 towards

10 See paragraph 59.3 of the judgment in Pranay Sethi (see footnote 5)

11 See: Paragraph 59.8 of Pranay Sethi decision referred to in Footnote No.5 

Page 10 of 10

Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 19878/2022

loss of filial consortium and Rs.15,000 towards funeral

expenses to Rs.73,73,631 to determine total

compensation payable as Rs.74,43,631.

16. We, therefore, allow the appeal, modify the order of the

High Court by enhancing the compensation payable to

the appellants to Rs.74,43,631 with a direction that the

aforesaid compensation shall carry interest @ six

percent per annum from the date of the claim petition

till the date of actual payment.


….............................................J.

 (Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha)

................................................J.

 (Manoj Misra)

New Delhi;

October 15, 2025

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 — O.7 R.11(d) — Rejection of plaint — Bar by limitation — Scope and stage at which to be considered While considering an application under O.7 R.11(d) CPC, the court must confine itself only to the averments made in the plaint and not to the defence. The plaint can be rejected only if, from the statements in the plaint itself, the suit appears ex facie barred by law. (Para 15) Where plaintiffs, claiming as natural heirs, instituted a suit for declaration, possession and mesne profits within three years of culmination of mutation proceedings (which concluded on 20-7-2017), the suit filed on 31-5-2019 could not be held barred by limitation merely because the will set up by the defendants was of the year 1976 and was relied upon since 1983. Mutation entries being fiscal in nature do not confer title. (Paras 16-18) Held, High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s order and rejecting the plaint under O.7 R.11 CPC. The plaint could not be said to be ex facie barred by limitation. (See also Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137; Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186, relied on.) LIMITATION ACT, 1963 — Art. 65 — Possession based on ownership/title — Limitation of 12 years — Burden of proof When the main relief in a suit is for possession of immovable property based on ownership/title, limitation prescribed under Art. 65 is twelve years from the date possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Until the defendant establishes adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited on limitation. (Para 18) Hence, where plaintiffs sought possession based on title, and validity of defendants’ will was still being contested in mutation proceedings till 2017, plaint could not be rejected as time-barred. (Paras 17-19) (Indira v. Arumugam, (1998) 1 SCC 614, followed.) O.2 R.2 CPC — Bar of second suit — Applicability Where the earlier suit had been rejected under O.7 R.11 CPC as not properly framed and not tried on merits, a subsequent properly framed suit for appropriate reliefs cannot be held barred under O.2 R.2 CPC. (Para 22) Trial court rightly held that plea of bar under O.2 R.2 CPC should be treated as an issue in the suit and not as a ground for rejection of plaint at threshold. (Para 22) DECLARATION AND POSSESSION — Reliefs combined — If one relief within limitation, plaint not liable to rejection Where several reliefs are claimed and any one of them is within limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by limitation under O.7 R.11(d) CPC. (Para 19) (Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208, relied on.) Further held, in a suit for declaration with consequential relief of possession, the limitation would be governed by Article applicable to possession; declaration of title remains a continuing right so long as ownership subsists. (Para 20; N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi & Village Industries Board, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3037, followed; C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808, followed.) REVISION — Ex parte order — Recall — Non-service of notice Where revision before the High Court was decided ex parte without notice being served on respondents, refusal to recall such order was improper. (Para 12) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Mutation entries — Nature of rights conferred Mutation entries are made only for fiscal purposes and do not by themselves confer title. (Paras 16, 18) HELD : High Court failed to consider plaint averments as a whole and was swayed only by the age of the will (36 years). Mutation proceedings were summary in nature and concluded in 2017; the suit filed in 2019 was within limitation. Whether defendants perfected title by adverse possession is a mixed question of law and fact, to be tried on evidence. The plaint could not be rejected at threshold under O.7 R.11 CPC. Trial court’s order rejecting defendants’ application under O.7 R.11 CPC restored; suit to proceed on merits in accordance with law. (Paras 21, 23) CASES REFERRED TO : T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467. Rajendra Bajoria v. Hemant Kumar Jalan, (2022) 12 SCC 641. Ramisetty Venkatanna v. Nasyam Jamal Saheb, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 521. Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137. Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186. Indira v. Arumugam, (1998) 1 SCC 614. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi & Village Industries Board, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3037. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808. Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208. RESULT : Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment and order(s) of the Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside. Order of Trial Court rejecting defendants’ application under O.7 R.11 CPC restored. Trial court to proceed with the suit in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation herein.


CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 — O.7 R.11(d) — Rejection of plaint — Bar by limitation — Scope and stage at which to be considered

While considering an application under O.7 R.11(d) CPC, the court must confine itself only to the averments made in the plaint and not to the defence. The plaint can be rejected only if, from the statements in the plaint itself, the suit appears ex facie barred by law. (Para 15)

Where plaintiffs, claiming as natural heirs, instituted a suit for declaration, possession and mesne profits within three years of culmination of mutation proceedings (which concluded on 20-7-2017), the suit filed on 31-5-2019 could not be held barred by limitation merely because the will set up by the defendants was of the year 1976 and was relied upon since 1983. Mutation entries being fiscal in nature do not confer title. (Paras 16-18)

Held, High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s order and rejecting the plaint under O.7 R.11 CPC. The plaint could not be said to be ex facie barred by limitation.

(See also Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137; Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186, relied on.)

LIMITATION ACT, 1963 — Art. 65 — Possession based on ownership/title — Limitation of 12 years — Burden of proof

When the main relief in a suit is for possession of immovable property based on ownership/title, limitation prescribed under Art. 65 is twelve years from the date possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Until the defendant establishes adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be non-suited on limitation. (Para 18)

Hence, where plaintiffs sought possession based on title, and validity of defendants’ will was still being contested in mutation proceedings till 2017, plaint could not be rejected as time-barred. (Paras 17-19)

(Indira v. Arumugam, (1998) 1 SCC 614, followed.)

O.2 R.2 CPC — Bar of second suit — Applicability

Where the earlier suit had been rejected under O.7 R.11 CPC as not properly framed and not tried on merits, a subsequent properly framed suit for appropriate reliefs cannot be held barred under O.2 R.2 CPC. (Para 22)

Trial court rightly held that plea of bar under O.2 R.2 CPC should be treated as an issue in the suit and not as a ground for rejection of plaint at threshold. (Para 22)

DECLARATION AND POSSESSION — Reliefs combined — If one relief within limitation, plaint not liable to rejection

Where several reliefs are claimed and any one of them is within limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by limitation under O.7 R.11(d) CPC. (Para 19)

(Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208, relied on.)

Further held, in a suit for declaration with consequential relief of possession, the limitation would be governed by Article applicable to possession; declaration of title remains a continuing right so long as ownership subsists. (Para 20; N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi & Village Industries Board, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3037, followed; C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808, followed.)

REVISION — Ex parte order — Recall — Non-service of notice

Where revision before the High Court was decided ex parte without notice being served on respondents, refusal to recall such order was improper. (Para 12)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Mutation entries — Nature of rights conferred

Mutation entries are made only for fiscal purposes and do not by themselves confer title. (Paras 16, 18)

HELD :

High Court failed to consider plaint averments as a whole and was swayed only by the age of the will (36 years). Mutation proceedings were summary in nature and concluded in 2017; the suit filed in 2019 was within limitation. Whether defendants perfected title by adverse possession is a mixed question of law and fact, to be tried on evidence. The plaint could not be rejected at threshold under O.7 R.11 CPC.

Trial court’s order rejecting defendants’ application under O.7 R.11 CPC restored; suit to proceed on merits in accordance with law. (Paras 21, 23)

CASES REFERRED TO :

  1. T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467.

  2. Rajendra Bajoria v. Hemant Kumar Jalan, (2022) 12 SCC 641.

  3. Ramisetty Venkatanna v. Nasyam Jamal Saheb, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 521.

  4. Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137.

  5. Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186.

  6. Indira v. Arumugam, (1998) 1 SCC 614.

  7. N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi & Village Industries Board, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3037.

  8. C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808.

  9. Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208.

RESULT :

Appeal allowed.
Impugned judgment and order(s) of the Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside.
Order of Trial Court rejecting defendants’ application under O.7 R.11 CPC restored.
Trial court to proceed with the suit in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation herein.

2025 INSC 1238

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 1 of 16

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos …… OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023)

KARAM SINGH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. …RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

MANOJ MISRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These two appeals impugn two orders of the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh1. The first is

dated 27.01.2022 passed in Civil Revision No.725/2020

whereas the second is dated 04.07.2022 by which

1 The High Court.

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 2 of 16

application2 seeking recall of the order dated 27.01.2022

has been rejected.

3. The appellant along with Dilbag Singh (i.e., proforma

respondent no. 9) instituted Suit No.424 of 2019 against

Amarjit Singh (i.e., respondent no.1), Shamsher Singh (i.e.,

respondent no.2), Jagdish Singh (i.e., respondent no.3),

Smt. Nachhattar Kaur (i.e., respondent no.4), Kuldeep Kaur

(i.e., respondent no.5), Sukhdeep Kaur (i.e., respondent

no.8), Sandeep Singh (i.e., respondent no.6) and Major

Singh (i.e., respondent no.7) for:

(i) declaring: (a) plaintiff(s) owners of suit land to

the extent of their shares as specified in the

plaint; and (b) the certificate, registered at 277

on 12.01.1977, and mutation no.1377 as

illegal, null and void;

(ii) possession of suit land to the extent of

plaintiffs’ share;

2 Misc. Application No.7259/2022

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 3 of 16

(iii) damages/ compensation/ mesne profits for

use and occupation of suit land for the period

starting from May 2016 to May 2019; and

(iv) permanent prohibitory injunction.

4. The plaint case in a nutshell was that the original

owner of the suit land was Ronak Singh alias Ronaki who

died intestate on 05.10.1924, leaving behind his widow

Kartar Kaur. A dispute arose regarding succession to the

estate of Ronak Singh between Kartar Kaur (i.e. Ronak

Singh’s widow) and Chinki and Nikki (i.e. sisters of Ronak

Singh), predecessor-in interest of the plaintiffs. In between,

Kartar Kaur allegedly gifted the suit land to one Harchand.

Nikki and Chinki challenged the gift. On 22.03.1935, the

civil court held the gift to be invalid as Kartar Kaur had a

limited right. Later, Kartar Kaur herself challenged the gift.

Ultimately, the gift was set aside by decree dated

11.09.1975 and Kartar Kaur was held owner in possession

of the land. Consequent to the decree, on 13.05.1976

mutation was sanctioned and entered in favour of Kartar

Kaur. The mutation entry was contested by predecessor-

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 4 of 16

in-interest of the plaintiffs. During pendency of the

proceedings relating to mutation, Kartar Kaur died on

28.12.1983. The defendants in the suit, namely, the

contesting respondents herein, in the mutation

proceedings, set up a will dated 15.12.1976, alleged to have

been executed by Kartar Kaur, in their favour and claimed

mutation on basis thereof. However, vide order dated

29.04.1984, mutation was ordered in favour of the legal

representatives of Ronak Singh’s sister based on natural

succession and an appeal against the same, filed by the

respondents, was dismissed by the Collector vide order

dated 15.04.1985. Subsequently, the mutation matter was

taken up to higher courts. Finally, the litigation arising out

of mutation ended against the plaintiffs on 20.07.2017.

Thereafter, by claiming that the will set up by the

defendants is null and void, an act of fraud, the plaintiffs

claiming themselves to be natural heirs of Kartar Kaur,

through sisters of Ronak Singh, instituted the suit for the

aforesaid reliefs.

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 5 of 16

5. The defendants (i.e. the contesting respondents) filed

an application under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 19083 for rejection of the plaint on the ground

that the suit is hopelessly barred by time. In the application

it was, inter alia, stated that the will was set up in the year

1983 after the death of Kartar Kaur; the mutation

proceedings based on the will was contested and therefore,

the plaintiffs including their predecessor in interest were

fully aware of the existence of the will; hence, the relief for

declaration qua the will, limitation of which is three years,

was hopelessly barred by limitation. It was also contended

that the plaintiffs’ stand that cause of action had arisen on

20.07.2017 is incorrect and wrong. In addition to above, it

was stated that plaintiffs have concealed a material fact

regarding filing of civil suit no.648/2012, which was filed

by father of plaintiff no.1, wherein the order of mutation

dated 28.05.2012 was challenged without challenging the

will and, therefore, the plaint of the said suit was rejected

3 CPC

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 6 of 16

under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC vide order dated 17.05.2013.

It was thus claimed that the suit was also barred by Order

2 Rule 2 of C.P.C.

6. The trial court rejected the application under Order 7

Rule 11 of CPC, vide order dated 07.01.2020, holding that

on a plain reading of the plaint it cannot be held that the

suit is ex facie barred by limitation; moreover, the question

of limitation is a mixed of question of law and fact therefore,

it would not be appropriate to reject the plaint under Order

7 Rule 11 of CPC. As regards the plea of suit being barred

by Order 2 Rule 2 of C.P.C., the trial court held that the

same can be decided as an issue in the suit.

7. Aggrieved by rejection of their application under Order

7 Rule 11, the contesting respondents preferred revision

before the High Court which came to be allowed by the

impugned order dated 27.01.2022.

8. As the impugned order dated 27.01.2022 was passed

ex parte in as much as none had appeared on behalf of the

plaintiff in the revision, an application was filed for recall of

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 7 of 16

the order dated 27.01.2022, which came to be dismissed by

second impugned order dated 04.07.2022.

9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two orders, these two

appeals have been filed.

10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and

have also given liberty to the counsel for the parties to file

written submissions.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

11. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

the High Court committed a grave error in holding that the

suit was barred by time. In holding so, the High Court

observed that the suit was instituted after almost 36 years

since culmination of mutation proceedings, which is

incorrect in as much as mutation proceedings culminated

on 20.07.2017 and the suit was instituted on 31.05.2019

(i.e., within three years thereof). In addition to above, it was

contended that the suit was for possession, based on title.

Since the main relief was for possession, the limitation

period would be 12 years from the date when the possession

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 8 of 16

of defendants became hostile and adverse to the plaintiff.

The High Court, however, failed to consider that aspect.

12. Besides above, notice of the revision before the High

Court was not served on the respondents and therefore, the

first impugned order, which is an ex parte order, ought to

have been recalled. On the strength of above submissions,

the learned counsel for the appellant contended that it is a

fit case where the appeals should be allowed and the

impugned order(s) set aside.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

13. On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that

predecessor in interest of the appellant had earlier

instituted civil suit no. 648/2012 seeking permanent

prohibitory injunction to restrain the answering

respondents from alienating the suit property. The said suit

was dismissed on 17.05.2013 on the ground that there

could be no injunction against true owner. Since the

present suit is based on the same cause of action, the same

is liable to be dismissed as being nothing but abuse of the

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 9 of 16

process of law. Moreover, the suit is barred by limitation as

plaintiffs had knowledge of the registered will since 1983.

14. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for

the respondents placed reliance on the following decisions

of this court:

(i) T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal4.

(ii) Rajendra Bajoria & Ors. v. Hemant

Kumar Jalan5.

(iii) Ramisetty Venkatanna & Anr. v.

Nasyam Jamal Saheb & Ors.

6.

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS

15. Before we assess the correctness of the impugned

orders, we must remind ourselves of the basic principles

governing rejection of a plaint under Order 7 Rule 117 of

4

(1977) 4 SCC 467

5

(2022) 12 SCC 641

6 2023 SCC Online SC 521

7 11. Rejection of plaint. -- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:-

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the

valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped,

and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed

by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 10 of 16

CPC. Here, the defendants seek rejection of plaint under

clause (d) of Rule 11 (i.e., suit barred by law). Clause (d)

makes it clear that while considering rejection of the plaint

thereunder only the averments made in the plaint and

nothing else is to be considered to find out whether the suit

is barred by law. At this stage, the defense is not to be

considered. Thus, whether the suit is barred by any law or

not is to be determined on the basis of averments made in

the plaint.

16. In the instant case, the plaintiff instituted the suit by

claiming title through succession to the estate of late Kartar

Kaur. On the other hand, the defendants had set up a will

alleged to have been executed by Kartar Kaur in their

favour. Neither the plaint nor any document brought on

record indicated that the will was probated or its validity

was tested and upheld in regular civil proceedings inter se

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:

Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite

stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff

was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature form correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite

stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time

would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 11 of 16

parties. As far as mutation proceedings are concerned, it is

well settled that mutation entries do not confer title. They

serve a fiscal purpose, that is, to realize tax from the person

whose name is recorded in the revenue records8. Besides

above, the plaint averments indicated that the mutation

proceedings culminated in the year 2017 and the suit in

question was instituted within three years thereafter.

17. Apart from above, the suit was not for a mere

declaration of the will being null and void but for possession

as well. The plaintiff claimed title over the suit land by

natural succession and sought possession based on title.

Where a suit is for possession of immovable property or any

interest therein, based on title, the limitation period is 12

years when the possession of the defendants becomes

adverse to the plaintiff (vide Article 65 of the Schedule to

the Limitation Act).

18. In Indira v. Arumugam & Anr.9, this court held that

when the suit is based on title for possession, once the title

8 See: Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, (1997) 7 SCC 137; Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186

9

(1998) 1 SCC 614

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 12 of 16

is established based on relevant documents and other

evidence, unless the defendant proves adverse possession

for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be nonsuited. Consequently, when a suit is instituted for

possession, based on title, to defeat the suit on the ground

of adverse possession, the burden is on the defendant to

prove adverse possession for the prescriptive period. This,

therefore, in our view, cannot be an issue on which the

plaint could be rejected at the threshold. Moreover, the

plaintiffs herein, had clearly disclosed that they had been

contesting the will in the mutation proceedings which

culminated in the year 2017. The suit was instituted within

three years thereafter to declare the mutation entry illegal.

Thus, considering that mutation proceedings are summary

in nature, the institution of the regular suit questioning the

same is not ex facie barred by law10.

19. That apart, where several reliefs are sought in suit, if

any one of the reliefs is within the period of limitation, the

10 See: Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802; Faqruddin (Dead) through

LRs v. Tajuddin (Dead) through LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir & others,

(2008) 9 SCC 368

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 13 of 16

plaint cannot be rejected as barred by law by taking

recourse to Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC11.

20. Further, in “N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi &

Village Industries Board” 12 relying on earlier decision of

this court in “C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa”

13 it

was held:

“23. …in a suit for declaration with a further relief,

the limitation would be governed by the Article

governing the suit for such further relief. In fact, a

suit for a declaration of title to immovable property

would not be barred so long as the right to such a

property continues and subsists. When such right

continues to subsist, the relief for declaration would

be a continuing right and there would be no limitation

for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a

declaration for a right cannot be held to be barred so

long as Right to Property subsist”.

24. Even otherwise, though the limitation for filing a

suit for declaration of title is three years as per Article

58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act but for

recovery of possession based upon title, the limitation

is 12 years from the date the possession of the

defendant becomes adverse in terms of Article 65 of

the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Therefore, suit for

the relief of possession was not actually barred and

as such the court of first instance could not have

dismissed the entire suit as barred by time”.

21. In our view, therefore, the plaint as it stood could not

have been rejected on the ground that the suit as framed

11 See: Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1208

12 2024 SCC Online SC 3037

13 AIR 1961 SC 808

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 14 of 16

was barred by limitation. The view to the contrary taken by

the High Court is erroneous in law.

22. Insofar as the suit being barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of

CPC is concerned, the first suit instituted by the

predecessor-in-interest of the appellant was not tried. In

fact, the plaint of that suit was rejected under Order 7 Rule

11 of CPC as not being properly framed. In such

circumstances, a fresh suit with appropriate relief cannot

be, prima facie, barred by Rule 2 of Order 2 of CPC.

Therefore, in our view, the trial court was justified in

directing that the issue, whether the suit is barred by Order

2 Rule 2 of CPC, shall be considered and decided during

trial.

23. At this stage, we may observe that the High Court

while deciding the revision has failed to consider the plaint

averments in its entirety and was swayed only by the fact

that will set up was 36 years old. It overlooked that will

operates only on the death of the testator and here, after

the death of the testator, the validity of the will was

throughout questioned in mutation proceedings which

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 15 of 16

continued and, ultimately, settled in the year 2017. In

between, whether the defendants perfected their title by

adverse possession would be a mixed question of law and

fact and can appropriately be addressed only after evidence

is led. The same cannot be made basis to reject the plaint

at the threshold. In our view, therefore, the order passed

by the High Court cannot be sustained and the same is

liable to be set aside. The appeals are, therefore, allowed.

The impugned judgment and order(s) of the High Court are

set aside. The order of the trial court rejecting the prayer

to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is restored.

The trial court shall proceed with the suit and bring the

proceedings to its logical conclusion in accordance with

law. It is made clear that any observation made by us shall

not be taken as an opinion on the merit of the issues which

may arise for consideration in the course of the suit

proceedings. We clarify that we have addressed those

issues only with a view to find out whether it was a fit case

for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC.

Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos. 3560-3561/2023 Page 16 of 16

24. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of.


….............................................J.

 (J.B. PARDIWALA)

................................................J.

 (Manoj Misra)

New Delhi;

 October 15, 2025.

Service Law — Recruitment — Wait List/Reserved Panel — Right of Waitlisted Candidate — Nature and Duration of Validity — Held, a candidate merely placed in a “Reserved Panel” or “Wait List” has no vested right to appointment once all the selected candidates have joined their posts. The right to be considered arises only in the contingency that a selected candidate does not join the post. The wait list cannot remain operative indefinitely, and once a fresh recruitment is initiated, the earlier panel stands exhausted. — Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers’ Assn. v. State of Gujarat, (1994) 2 SCC 715, followed. (Para 12) Service Law — Appointment — Concession/Statement Made by Counsel Before Tribunal — Binding Effect — When Not Binding — Held, a wrong concession or assurance made by counsel on a question of law, if contrary to statutory recruitment rules, is not binding upon the department or its client. Such concession cannot override statutory provisions or be enforced in derogation of recruitment rules. Court may permit the party to resile from such concession where its implementation would result in illegality. — Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, (1998) 6 SCC 538 and Central Council for Research in Ayurveda & Siddha v. K. Santhakumari, (2001) 5 SCC 60, applied. (Paras 15–16) Recruitment Rules — Violation of Statutory Procedure — Direction by High Court to absorb a waitlisted candidate (whose name was at Serial No.1 in the 1997 reserved panel) on the basis of an assurance given before the Tribunal in 1999, held unsustainable. Giving effect to such assurance would result in breach of recruitment rules, perpetuation of an expired panel, and deprivation of future eligible candidates of consideration in subsequent recruitments. (Paras 13–17) Practice and Procedure — Judicial Orders Based on Concession — While a party is ordinarily bound by its solemn statement before a Court or Tribunal, compliance cannot be compelled if giving effect to the statement would result in violation of law or statutory rules. (Para 17) Held: The respondent was placed at Serial No. 1 in the Reserved Panel of SC candidates for the 1997 recruitment to the post of Technician in All India Radio, Eastern Zone. All three selected candidates had joined; hence the wait list never operated. The only basis of the respondent’s claim was the statement made by counsel for the Union before the CAT on 15.01.1999, that he would be “absorbed against the next vacancy in SC quota.” Such statement could not override statutory recruitment rules or confer a perpetual right of consideration. Tribunal and High Court earlier held that the respondent had no vested right and that the selection process was valid. The High Court, in directing absorption in 2024, failed to consider that the 1997 wait list had long expired and that giving effect to the 1999 statement would illegally extend the life of a defunct panel. Hence, Supreme Court held that the High Court’s judgment was unsustainable in law, set aside the direction to absorb the respondent, and allowed the appeal. Result: Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated 25.06.2024 in WPCT No.24 of 2021 — set aside. Respondent’s writ petition — dismissed. No order as to costs.

Service Law — Recruitment — Wait List/Reserved Panel — Right of Waitlisted Candidate — Nature and Duration of Validity —

Held, a candidate merely placed in a “Reserved Panel” or “Wait List” has no vested right to appointment once all the selected candidates have joined their posts.
The right to be considered arises only in the contingency that a selected candidate does not join the post. The wait list cannot remain operative indefinitely, and once a fresh recruitment is initiated, the earlier panel stands exhausted.

Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers’ Assn. v. State of Gujarat, (1994) 2 SCC 715, followed.
(Para 12)

Service Law — Appointment — Concession/Statement Made by Counsel Before Tribunal — Binding Effect — When Not Binding —

Held, a wrong concession or assurance made by counsel on a question of law, if contrary to statutory recruitment rules, is not binding upon the department or its client.
Such concession cannot override statutory provisions or be enforced in derogation of recruitment rules.
Court may permit the party to resile from such concession where its implementation would result in illegality.

Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, (1998) 6 SCC 538 and Central Council for Research in Ayurveda & Siddha v. K. Santhakumari, (2001) 5 SCC 60, applied.
(Paras 15–16)

Recruitment Rules — Violation of Statutory Procedure —

Direction by High Court to absorb a waitlisted candidate (whose name was at Serial No.1 in the 1997 reserved panel) on the basis of an assurance given before the Tribunal in 1999, held unsustainable.
Giving effect to such assurance would result in breach of recruitment rules, perpetuation of an expired panel, and deprivation of future eligible candidates of consideration in subsequent recruitments.
(Paras 13–17)

Practice and Procedure — Judicial Orders Based on Concession —

While a party is ordinarily bound by its solemn statement before a Court or Tribunal, compliance cannot be compelled if giving effect to the statement would result in violation of law or statutory rules.
(Para 17)

Held:

  • The respondent was placed at Serial No. 1 in the Reserved Panel of SC candidates for the 1997 recruitment to the post of Technician in All India Radio, Eastern Zone.

  • All three selected candidates had joined; hence the wait list never operated.

  • The only basis of the respondent’s claim was the statement made by counsel for the Union before the CAT on 15.01.1999, that he would be “absorbed against the next vacancy in SC quota.”

  • Such statement could not override statutory recruitment rules or confer a perpetual right of consideration.

  • Tribunal and High Court earlier held that the respondent had no vested right and that the selection process was valid.

  • The High Court, in directing absorption in 2024, failed to consider that the 1997 wait list had long expired and that giving effect to the 1999 statement would illegally extend the life of a defunct panel.

Hence, Supreme Court held that the High Court’s judgment was unsustainable in law, set aside the direction to absorb the respondent, and allowed the appeal.

Result:

Appeal allowed.
Impugned judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated 25.06.2024 in WPCT No.24 of 2021set aside.
Respondent’s writ petition — dismissed.
No order as to costs.

2025 INSC 1235

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 1 of 22

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO……………OF 2025

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No………. of 2025)

(@ Diary No.57192 of 2024)

THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS. APPELLANTS

VERSUS

SUBIT KUMAR DAS RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of

Information and Broadcasting and the All India Radio through its

Director General are aggrieved by the direction issued by the

Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court requiring them to

absorb the services of the respondent on the post of Technician

at the Eastern Zone of All India Radio under the Scheduled 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 2 of 22

Castes (SC) category. According to the appellants, such direction

to absorb the services of the respondent enlarges the right of a

candidate placed in the Reserved Panel much after its expiry and

runs counter to the Recruitment Rules. The respondent supports

the said direction by contending that the appellants had

committed to absorb the respondent in service as far back as on

15.01.1999 and the High Court rightly directed so.

4. Facts relevant for considering the challenge as raised to the

aforesaid direction are that pursuant to a requisition made by the

All India Radio, Eastern Zone for making appointment on the post

of Technician, names of various candidates maintained by the

Employment Exchange came to be forwarded. Three posts of

Technician were reserved for candidates belonging to the SC

category. The Selection Committee interviewed eleven

candidates and finally selected three candidates in the order of

merit against the existing vacancies. The name of the respondent

was placed at Serial No.1 in the Reserved Panel. It was stated

that the candidates placed in the Reserved Panel would be

appointed only in case any of the three selected candidates did

not join the said post for any reason. The respondent being

aggrieved by the decision of the Selection Committee 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 3 of 22

approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short, “the

Tribunal”) by filing Original Application No.989 of 1997

challenging its decision and seeking his appointment on the post

of Technician. On 25.08.1997, the Tribunal passed an interim

order and directed that any appointment made of the selected

candidates would abide by the result of the Original Application.

In the said proceedings, the respondent moved an interim

application praying that no further appointment be made on the

post of Technician without considering his name pursuant to the

earlier recruitment process. During the course of the hearing of

the said application, a statement was made on behalf of the

appellants which was recorded in the order dated 15.01.1999 as

under:

“3. Mrs. Banerjee, Ld. Counsel for the respondents

submits that till the filling up of post of technician from the

reserved quota viz. 1 OBC and 1 ST is taken by the

respondent authorities, the applicant’s case would not be

considered. She further submits as soon as vacancy

would arise against the SC quota, the applicant would be

absorbed.”

On the basis of the said statement, no further orders were

passed on the interim application.

5. Original Application No.989 of 1997 came to be decided by

the Tribunal on 09.12.2004. The Tribunal recorded various 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 4 of 22

findings, inter alia, holding that there did not appear to be any

departure from the procedure and instructions that were required

to be followed while undertaking selection. It further held that the

allegation of bias as made by the respondent against the

members of the Selection Committee was without any basis. It

also referred to the clear stipulation in the records of the

Selection Committee that the right of the respondent to be

appointed was only if any of the selected candidates did not join

the post on which they were appointed. It also held that a

candidate in the wait list had no vested right to be appointed

except when the selected candidate did not join the post and the

wait list was operative. All grounds of challenge raised by the

respondent on merits were turned down. However, in view of the

statement made on behalf of the appellants as recorded on

15.01.1999 that the case of the respondent would not be

considered till the reserved quota of candidates from the Other

Backward Classes (OBC) category and Scheduled Tribes (ST)

category were filled in, the appellants were directed to consider

the case of the respondent in terms of the assurance given to the

Tribunal and take steps to absorb him against the available 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 5 of 22

vacancy in accordance with law within a period of three months

from the date of communication of the order.

6. The appellants being aggrieved by the aforesaid directions

issued by the Tribunal approached the High Court by filing WPCT

No.276 of 2005. The Division Bench of the High Court by its order

dated 23.02.2009 found that the various findings recorded by the

Tribunal against the respondent as regards the right of a

waitlisted candidate as well as the manner of conduct of the

selection proceedings by the Selection Committee had not been

challenged by him. It, however, observed that the direction to

consider the case of the respondent came to be made in view of

the concession recorded in the order dated 15.01.1999. The High

Court, without interfering with the said direction issued by the

Tribunal, modified the said order to the extent that the outer limit

of consideration of six months was not to be applicable, in case

no vacancy arose within that period.

7. In the meanwhile, on 23.02.2013, a fresh notice of

recruitment for various posts including that of Technician came to

be published at the instance of Prasar Bharti. The respondent

again approached the Tribunal by filing Original Application

No.739 of 2013 seeking a direction that he be absorbed on the 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 6 of 22

post of Technician in the SC category as per the advertisement

dated 23.02.2013. By an interim order dated 19.07.2013, the

appellants were directed to keep one post of Technician vacant

under the SC category in the East Zone till the next date of the

proceedings. The aforesaid Original Application came to be

decided on 27.11.2015. While referring to the right of a waitlisted

candidate to seek appointment, the Tribunal noted that the

appellants in the year 1999 had stated that the case of the

respondent would be considered against any available vacancy

in the SC category. The Original Application was disposed of with

a direction to the appellants to act in accordance with the earlier

orders. An appropriate order in that regard was directed to be

passed within a period of three months.

The Deputy Director General (P) passed a speaking order

on 19.02.2016 stating therein that all the three vacancies that

were to be filled up in 1997 had been so filled up as per the select

list. The respondent was at Serial No.4 and he could not be

absorbed. The general assurance for absorption against future

available vacancies was subject to fulfilment of conditions of the

Recruitment Rules. In absence of any vacancy in the SC

category, absorption was not possible. It was also noted that the 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 7 of 22

respondent had crossed the maximum age limit prescribed under

the Recruitment Rules and there was no direction to absorb him

by relaxing the Recruitment Rules. It was, thus, stated that in

absence of any vacant post being available, the respondent

could not be absorbed against the vacancies notified in the

advertisement dated 23.02.2013, more so, as he was not eligible

for appointment as per the Recruitment Rules.

8. The respondent being aggrieved by the aforesaid speaking

order again approached the Tribunal by filing Original Application

No.436 of 2016. The Tribunal on 09.01.2020 observed that the

earlier Original Application No.739 of 2013 was decided on

27.11.2015. The documents placed on record, however,

indicated the vacancy position prior to that date. The Tribunal,

therefore, directed the appellants to issue a fresh speaking order

indicating the number of vacancies on the post of Technician that

occurred after its earlier order dated 27.11.2015 and also indicate

whether the respondent was entitled to be considered in

accordance with the directions of the Tribunal. The respondent,

being aggrieved by the said order, preferred WPCT No.24 of

2021 before the High Court. Besides challenging the order of the

Tribunal dated 09.01.2020, the respondent also sought a 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 8 of 22

direction for being appointed on the post of Technician. The High

Court passed interim orders on 21.06.2021 and 06.09.2021

directing that an affidavit to be filed indicating if any vacancy on

the post of Technician had arisen from 2009 onwards. The

Deputy Director General (P), All India Radio filed an affidavit

dated 09.09.2021 stating therein that there was no vacancy on

the post of Technician at the All India Radio, Calcutta since 2009

till date. The Division Bench thereafter on 25.06.2024 decided

the said writ petition. It was of the view that the appellants on

15.01.1999 had given an assurance before the Tribunal that the

respondent would be considered in the next available vacancy.

However, that statement was not honoured despite a vacancy

being available. It further held that the rejection of the

respondent’s claim on the ground that he was age barred was

illegal. The Division Bench accordingly set-aside the order dated

09.01.2020 passed by the Tribunal and directed the appellants to

absorb the respondent on the post of Technician in any vacancy

under the SC category in the Eastern Zone within a period of four

weeks. The respondent’s absorption was directed to be given

effect from 19.07.2013 onwards on a notional basis. Being 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 9 of 22

aggrieved by this decision, the appellants have come up in

appeal.

9. Ms. Madhusmita Bora, learned Advocate appearing for the

appellants submitted that the High Court committed an error in

directing the appellants to absorb the respondent on the post of

Technician. The vacancy in question was of the year 1997 and

admittedly the respondent was placed at Serial No.1 in the

Reserved Panel. He was entitled to be considered for

appointment only in the event any of the three selected

candidates failed to join the post of Technician. Since all the three

candidates had joined their posts, there was no occasion for the

respondent to claim any entitlement to be appointed by virtue of

his placement in the Reserved Panel. The respondent was

merely a waitlisted candidate and had no vested right to seek

appointment. The direction issued by the High Court, if

implemented, would result in a waitlisted candidate of the year

1997 being absorbed in service after more than twenty five years.

In that regard, the learned counsel referred to the decision in Sri

Sanjoy Bhattacharjee Vs. Union of India & Ors.1

It was then

submitted that the only basis for the High Court to have issued

1 1997 INSC 250

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 10 of 22

the impugned direction was the statement made on behalf of the

appellants on 15.01.1999 that the respondent would be

considered against any vacancy in the SC category in future. The

said statement amounted to a concession in law which was

contrary to the statutory Rules of Recruitment. The said

statement, therefore, would not bind the appellants as the

appellants would be required to disregard the Recruitment Rules

for absorbing the services of the respondent. It was permissible

for the appellants to place the correct position in law while not

proceeding in accordance with such statement. To substantiate

this contention, the learned counsel referred to the decisions in

Director of Elementary Education, Odisha Vs. Pramod

Kumar Sahoo2 and The Employees’ State Insurance

Corporation Vs. Union of India and others3

. It was, thus,

submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court was

liable to be set aside and the respondent was not entitled to any

relief whatsoever.

10. On the other hand, Mr. Rakesh Kumar learned Advocate

appearing for the respondent supported the impugned direction

issued by the High Court. He submitted that it was not

2 2019 INSC 1092

3 2022 INSC 77

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 11 of 22

permissible for the appellants to disregard the statement made

on their behalf on 15.01.1999 before the Tribunal. As such

statement was made on behalf of the appellants, no further relief

was granted to the respondent by the Tribunal. Despite

availability of various vacancies since then, the appellants failed

to absorb the respondent on the post of Technician. It was also

not permissible for the appellants to now change their stand by

stating that the respondent had crossed the age limit for being

appointed. In that regard, the learned counsel placed reliance on

the decisions in Prem Prakash Vs. Union of India4

, H.P. ST

Employees Federation Vs. H.P.S.V.K.K.5 and Rameshwar

Prasad Goyal, Advocate, In Re6

. It was then submitted that the

High Court had rightly found that on 19.07.2013, the

respondent’s right was crystalized as a vacancy had arisen and

hence, the Tribunal had directed one post to be kept vacant. It

was not in dispute that vacancies in the SC category were

available and the respondent could not be deprived of the relief

of absorption. As a model employer, the Union of India ought to

honour its assurance and it could not take a stand contrary to the

4 1984 INSC 150

5

[2013] 10 SCC 308

6 2013 INSC 550

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 12 of 22

statement as made. Denying relief to the respondent would result

in the appellants taking advantage of their own wrong. The

learned counsel referred to the decision in Union of India and

others Vs. Hindustan Development Corporation and others7

in that regard. It was, thus, submitted that the High Court having

rightly found that as the respondent was being deprived of the

benefit of absorption, no interference with the directions issued

by it was called for. The appeal was, thus, liable to be dismissed.

11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length

and with their assistance we have also perused the documents

on record. It is not in dispute between the parties that in the year

1997, three vacancies for the post of Technician from the SC

category were sought to be filled in. The respondent along with

ten other candidates came to be interviewed by the Selection

Committee. Three candidates were chosen and placed serially in

the order of merit. The respondent was placed at Serial No.1 in

the Reserved Panel by noting that if any of the three selected

candidates did not join the post of Technician, the candidates

placed in the Reserved Panel would be appointed. All the three

selected candidates did join the post of Technician as a result of

7 1993 INSC 154

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 13 of 22

which the respondent remained at Serial No.1 in the Reserved

Panel.

12. While considering the entitlement of the respondent to any

relief on the basis of his placement in the Reserved Panel, it

would be necessary to bear in mind the settled position that mere

placement in the wait list does not create any vested right for

being so appointed. The right to be considered for appointment

would spring only in the contingency of a selected candidate not

joining on his post. The wait list operates for a limited period. It

cannot extend for an indefinite period and in any event after a

fresh process of recruitment has commenced. This legal position

is well settled and reference can be made to the decision of a

three Judge Bench in Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers'

Association Vs. State of Gujarat and others8

. In paragraph 9,

it has been held as under:

“9. A waiting list prepared in an examination conducted

by the Commission does not furnish a source of

recruitment. It is operative only for the contingency that if

any of the selected candidates does not join then the

person from the waiting list may be pushed up and be

appointed in the vacancy so caused or if there is some

extreme exigency the Government may as a matter of

policy decision pick up persons in order of merit from the

waiting list. But the view taken by the High Court that

since the vacancies have not been worked out properly,

therefore, the candidates from the waiting list were liable

to be appointed does not appear to be sound. This

8 1994 INSC 199

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 14 of 22

practice, may result in depriving those candidates who

become eligible for competing for the vacancies

available in future. If the waiting list in one examination

was to operate as an infinite stock for appointments,

there is a danger that the State Government may resort

to the device of not holding an examination for years

together and pick up candidates from the waiting list as

and when required. The constitutional discipline requires

that this Court should not permit such improper exercise

of power which may result in creating a vested interest

and perpetrate waiting list for the candidates of one

examination at the cost of entire set of fresh candidates

either from the open or even from service.”

(emphasis supplied by us).

From the aforesaid, it is clear that any right that the

respondent could claim as a waitlisted candidate extinguished

when all the selected candidates joined on their respective posts.

13. The sole basis for the claim of the respondent of seeking

appointment/absorption on the post of Technician is the

statement made on behalf of the appellants as recorded in the

order dated 15.01.1999. As per the said statement, on a vacancy

arising against the SC quota, the respondent was to be

absorbed. According to the appellants, such statement cannot

bind them since its compliance would result in breach of the

Recruitment Rules. The respondent, however, relies upon the

said statement as it was given in all solemnity before the Tribunal.

For considering the binding nature of such statement made

before the Tribunal, certain factual aspects would have to be 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 15 of 22

borne in mind. Though the placement of the respondent was at

Serial No.1 in the Reserved Panel, all the selected candidates

had joined on the post of Technician and, thus, there was no

occasion to operate the wait list is an admitted position. No

vacancy from 1997 was carried forward and a vacancy, if any,

that was to arise in the future would have been a fresh vacancy.

The entitlement of the respondent, if any, was as a waitlisted

candidate qua the select list of 1997. There was no vested right

in favour of the respondent to urge that he was entitled to be

considered and appointed on any fresh vacancy arising in the

future. Secondly, the statement as recorded on 15.01.1999 would

have a limited operation to the extent that only if any of the

selected candidates for the post of Technician in the SC category

failed to join on the said post, the respondent could be appointed

on such vacant post being the candidate at Serial No.1 in the

Reserved Panel. The statement as recorded that the claim of the

respondent, a waitlisted candidate, would be considered as and

when any vacancy would arise against the SC quota cannot

operate in eternity contrary to the Recruitment Rules. Thirdly, it is

necessary to note that the respondent’s challenge to his

placement in the Reserved Panel and the selection of three other 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 16 of 22

candidates on merit was not disturbed either by the Tribunal or

by the High Court. This is clear on a perusal of the judgment of

the Tribunal dated 09.12.2004 in Original Application No.989 of

1997. The High Court in WPCT No.276 of 2005 decided on

23.02.2009 affirmed the findings of the Tribunal that a waitlisted

candidate did not have any legal right to claim appointment and

noted that the said finding recorded by the Tribunal was not under

challenge by the respondent. These material aspects would be

relevant while considering the legal effect of the statement

recorded on 15.01.1999 by the High Court.

14. It is, thus, clear that having failed to assail the success of

the selected candidates, the only string for the respondent to

cling on was the statement recorded on 15.01.1999. The effect

of such statement cannot result in wiping out the adjudication of

the respondent’s claim on merits. In other words, the respondent

cannot claim any higher right especially when it was found by the

Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court that his placement in the

Reserved Panel was correct and requiring no interference. The

appellants are justified in contending that such statement as

made on 15.01.1999 cannot have the effect of requiring them to

act in violation of the Recruitment Rules. 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 17 of 22

15. At this stage, it would be necessary to refer to a few

decisions of this Court on the binding effect of a concession made

by counsel on a question of law in the field of service

jurisprudence. In Uptron India Limited Vs. Shammi Bhan and

another9

, the issue pertained to the legality of a Standing Order

permitting automatic termination of the services of a permanent

employee on account of overstaying leave without permission for

more than seven days. The employer sought to support the

relevant Standing Order on the basis of the concession of the

employee’s counsel that the Standing Order was not invalid. In

paragraphs 22 and 23, this Court observed as under:

“22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed

strong reliance upon a decision of this Court in Civil

Appeal No.3486 of 1992, Scooters India & Ors. vs. Vijay

E.V. Eldred, decided on 03.10.1996, in support of his

contention that any stipulation for automatic termination

of Services made in the Standing Orders could not have

been declared to be invalid. We have been referred to a

stray sentence in that judgment, which is to the following

effect:

“It is also extraordinary for the High Court to have

held clause 9.3.12 of the standing orders as

invalid.”

This sentence in the judgment cannot be read in isolation

and we must refer to the subsequent sentences which

run as under:

“Learned counsel for the respondent rightly made

no attempt to support this part of the High Court’s

order. In view of the fact that we are setting aside

9 1998 INSC 74

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 18 of 22

the High Court’s judgment, we need not deal with

this aspect in detail.”

23. In view of this observation, the question whether

the stipulation for automatic termination of services for

overstaying the leave would be legally bad or not, was

not decided by this Court in the judgment relied upon by

Mr. Manoj Swarup. In that judgment the grounds on

which the interference was made were different. The

judgment of the High Court was set aside on the ground

that it could not decide the disputed question of fact in a

writ petition and the matter should have been better left

to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal. Further, the High

Court was approached after more than six years of the

date on which the cause of action had arisen without

there being any cogent explanation for the delay. Mr.

Manoj Swarup contended that it was conceded by the

counsel appearing on behalf of the employee that the

provision in the Standing Orders regarding automatic

termination of services is not bad. This was endorsed by

this Court by observing that “Learned counsel for the

respondent rightly made no attempt to support this part

of the High Court’s order.” This again cannot be treated

to be a finding that provision for automatic termination of

services can be validly made in the Certified Standing

Orders. Even otherwise, a wrong concession on a

question of law, made by a counsel, is not binding on his

client. Such concession cannot constitute a just ground

for a binding precedent. The reliance placed by Mr.

Manoj on this judgment, therefore, is wholly out of place.”

16. In Central Council for Research in Ayurveda & Siddha &

another Vs. Dr. K. Santhakumari10

, the issue pertained to

promotion on a selection post. Though the principle of merit-cumseniority was prescribed, the employer in its affidavit before the

High Court stated that the principle of seniority-cum-merit was

applicable. On that basis, the employee was held entitled to be

10 2001 INSC 259

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 19 of 22

promoted. Before this Court, the relevant rules indicating the

principle of merit-cum-seniority were placed. In that context, it

was held :

“In the instant case, the selection was made by

Departmental Promotion Committee. The Committee

must have considered all relevant facts including the

inter-se merit and ability of the candidates and prepared

the select list on that basis. The respondent though

senior in comparison to other candidates, secured a

lower place in the select list, evidently because the

principle of "merit-cum-seniority" had been applied by the

Departmental Promotion Committee. The respondent

has no grievance that there was any malafides on the

part of the Departmental Promotion Committee. The only

contention urged by the respondent is that the

Departmental Promotion Committee did not follow the

principle of "seniority-cum-fitness". In the High Court, the

appellants herein failed to point out that the promotion is

in respect of a ’selection post’ and the principle to be

applied is "merit-cum-seniority". Had the appellants

pointed out the true position, the learned Single Judge

would not have granted relief in favour of the respondent.

If the learned Counsel has made an admission or

concession inadvertently or under a mistaken impression

of law, it is not binding on his client and the same cannot

enure to the benefit of any party.

This Court in Uptron India Ltd. Vs. Shammi Bhan and

Another AIR 1998 SC 1681 pointed out that a wrong

concession on question of law made by counsel is not

binding on his client and such concession cannot

constitute a just ground for a binding precedent.

Therefore, even if the appellants had mistakenly

contended in the High Court that the principle of

seniority-cum-fitness was to be followed for promotion to

the post of Research Officer, the departmental rules

clearly show that the promotion was in respect of a

’selection post’ and the promotion was to be made on the

basis of the inter-se merit of the eligible candidates. In

that view of the matter, the respondent was not entitled

to get promotion to the post of Research Officer on the

strength of her seniority alone. The seniority list prepared

by the Departmental Promotion Committee was not

challenged by the respondent on other grounds and we 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 20 of 22

also do not find any ground to assail that select list. Thus,

the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed by setting aside

the orders made therein and in the writ appeal arising

therefrom. Therefore, the appeal succeeds and is

allowed, however, without costs.”

Reliance placed on the decisions in Director of Elementary

Education and The Employees’ State Insurance Corporation

(supra) by the learned counsel for the appellants is also apposite.

The appellants are, thus, within their right in canvassing the

correct position of law by urging that the absorption of the

respondent at this stage would result in violation of the

Recruitment Rules. In this factual and legal backdrop, the ratio of

the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the

respondent cannot further the case of the respondent.

17. It appears that the High Court was much impressed by the

fact that the statement made on 15.01.1999 on behalf of the

appellants was not being honoured. It is true that a statement

made before the Court has its solemnity and the party making

such statement is bound to comply with the same. At the same

time, it has to be seen as to whether such statement in the form

of a concession, if given effect to would result in violation of any

statutory rules or regulations. If such consequence is likely to

flow, it would be open for the affected party on whose behalf such 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 21 of 22

concession in law was made to place before the Court the correct

position of law and urge that it may not be compelled to give

effect to an erroneous concession made on law. In the present

case, giving effect to such statement made on 15.01.1999 would

result in a waitlisted candidate being given an appointment

notwithstanding the fact that all selected candidates in the said

recruitment process had duly joined their posts and there was no

occasion to operate the wait list. It would amount to filling in one

post in the subsequent recruitment on the basis of an exercise

carried out in the previous recruitment. This would definitely

cause prejudice to the candidates seeking recruitment in the

subsequent process as the vacancies would stand reduced.

Moreover, it would also extend the life of the wait list though all

vacancies stand filled in, which would be impermissible.

In these facts therefore, we find that the appellants are

justified in contending that the statement dated 15.01.1999

cannot be acted upon as it would result in conferring benefit on a

waitlisted candidate to which he otherwise in law is not entitled

to. The same is also not shown to be permissible under the

Recruitment Rules. It appears that the High Court glossed over

these vital aspects while directing the appellants to absorb the 

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) Diary No. 57192 of 2024 Page 22 of 22

services of the respondent. The available vacancies having been

filled up in 1997 resulted in exhaustion of the wait list and the said

process of recruitment had come to an end. The High Court has,

therefore, erred in directing the absorption of the respondent.

18. For all these reasons, the judgment of the High Court dated

25.06.2024 in WPCT No.24 of 2021 is found to be unsustainable

in law. It is accordingly set-aside and the writ petition preferred

by the respondent stands dismissed. The civil appeal is allowed

in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs. Pending

applications stand disposed of accordingly.

…………………………………………..J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

…..………………………..J.

[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]

NEW DELHI,

OCTOBER 15, 2025. 

Tuesday, October 14, 2025

(A) Contempt of Court — Compliance with court’s direction — “Consequential benefits” — Scope and import — Where disciplinary proceedings were quashed by the High Court on the ground of real likelihood of bias and employee was exonerated of all blame — Employer directed to grant all consequential benefits — Whether such direction includes promotion and arrears of monetary benefits, even though there was no specific prayer challenging the cancellation of promotion — Held, yes — Once disciplinary proceedings were set aside on a ground not attributable to any fault of the employee, the employer was duty-bound to restore the employee to the same position which he would have occupied had the illegal proceedings not intervened. The expression “all consequential benefits” is of wide amplitude and would include restoration of promotion withheld or cancelled on account of such proceedings together with monetary benefits from the date of entitlement. Absence of a specific prayer for quashing of the cancellation order cannot defeat the substantive relief flowing from the setting aside of the disciplinary proceedings. Ends of justice cannot be sacrificed on the altar of technicalities. — C.O. Arumugam v. State of T.N., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 199; Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109, relied on — Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491, distinguished (Paras 25, 26, 27, 30) (B) Service Law — Promotion — Retrospective promotion — Promotion kept in abeyance due to pending enquiry — Enquiry subsequently quashed — Held, employee entitled to promotion from the date on which promotion results were first declared — Cancellation of promotion being consequential to vitiated enquiry cannot survive — Appellant directed to be granted promotion from 28-7-2001 (date of promotion results) from Manager Scale-II to Manager Scale-III with all monetary benefits and interest @ 6% p.a. from the due dates — The Court held that denial of such promotion would amount to perpetuating injustice since the disciplinary proceedings were nullified for bias. The fact that the appellant was later promoted in 2012 does not obliterate his right to retrospective benefits from 2001. (Paras 23, 25, 26, 30, 32) (C) Contempt of Court — Maintainability — Scope of interference — Where two possible interpretations of the order existed, the action of respondents cannot be held as wilful disobedience — However, Court may mould relief to secure justice — Held, although contempt not made out in strict sense, substantive directions can be issued to effectuate the judgment and avoid injustice to the successful litigant. (Paras 28, 32) (D) Administrative Law — Technicalities — Absence of pleadings or specific prayer — Effect — Held, where relief is implicit in the consequential direction already granted, absence of a formal pleading cannot deprive a litigant of substantive rights — Procedural technicalities must yield to justice — (Para 26) (E) Service Law — Consequential promotions and arrears — Superannuation — Effect — Held, employee who superannuated during pendency of proceedings still entitled to notional and monetary benefits flowing from retrospective promotion granted — Such benefits do not abate merely due to retirement — (Paras 27, 30, 32) (F) Directions Issued — Respondents directed to: Grant appellant promotion from Manager Scale-II to Scale-III w.e.f. 28-7-2001; Pay all monetary benefits with 6% interest per annum from respective due dates; Consider appellant’s claim for further promotions (2016, 2017, 2018 exercises) separately, without rejecting on limitation or laches. Contempt proceedings not pursued, but compliance directed within four weeks. (Paras 31, 32, 33) RESULT Appeal partly allowed. High Court judgment dated 24-8-2023 in Contempt Case No. 311 of 2023 set aside. Directions issued as above. No order as to costs.


(A) Contempt of Court — Compliance with court’s direction — “Consequential benefits” — Scope and import —

Where disciplinary proceedings were quashed by the High Court on the ground of real likelihood of bias and employee was exonerated of all blame — Employer directed to grant all consequential benefits — Whether such direction includes promotion and arrears of monetary benefits, even though there was no specific prayer challenging the cancellation of promotion — Held, yes —

Once disciplinary proceedings were set aside on a ground not attributable to any fault of the employee, the employer was duty-bound to restore the employee to the same position which he would have occupied had the illegal proceedings not intervened. The expression “all consequential benefits” is of wide amplitude and would include restoration of promotion withheld or cancelled on account of such proceedings together with monetary benefits from the date of entitlement. Absence of a specific prayer for quashing of the cancellation order cannot defeat the substantive relief flowing from the setting aside of the disciplinary proceedings. Ends of justice cannot be sacrificed on the altar of technicalities.

— C.O. Arumugam v. State of T.N., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 199;

Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109, relied on

— Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491, distinguished

(Paras 25, 26, 27, 30)

(B) Service Law — Promotion — Retrospective promotion — Promotion kept in abeyance due to pending enquiry — Enquiry subsequently quashed —

Held, employee entitled to promotion from the date on which promotion results were first declared — Cancellation of promotion being consequential to vitiated enquiry cannot survive — Appellant directed to be granted promotion from 28-7-2001 (date of promotion results) from Manager Scale-II to Manager Scale-III with all monetary benefits and interest @ 6% p.a. from the due dates —

The Court held that denial of such promotion would amount to perpetuating injustice since the disciplinary proceedings were nullified for bias. The fact that the appellant was later promoted in 2012 does not obliterate his right to retrospective benefits from 2001.

(Paras 23, 25, 26, 30, 32)

(C) Contempt of Court — Maintainability — Scope of interference —

Where two possible interpretations of the order existed, the action of respondents cannot be held as wilful disobedience — However, Court may mould relief to secure justice —

Held, although contempt not made out in strict sense, substantive directions can be issued to effectuate the judgment and avoid injustice to the successful litigant.

(Paras 28, 32)

(D) Administrative Law — Technicalities — Absence of pleadings or specific prayer — Effect —

Held, where relief is implicit in the consequential direction already granted, absence of a formal pleading cannot deprive a litigant of substantive rights — Procedural technicalities must yield to justice —

(Para 26)

(E) Service Law — Consequential promotions and arrears — Superannuation — Effect —

Held, employee who superannuated during pendency of proceedings still entitled to notional and monetary benefits flowing from retrospective promotion granted — Such benefits do not abate merely due to retirement —

(Paras 27, 30, 32)

(F) Directions Issued —

Respondents directed to:

Grant appellant promotion from Manager Scale-II to Scale-III w.e.f. 28-7-2001;

Pay all monetary benefits with 6% interest per annum from respective due dates;

Consider appellant’s claim for further promotions (2016, 2017, 2018 exercises) separately, without rejecting on limitation or laches.

Contempt proceedings not pursued, but compliance directed within four weeks.

(Paras 31, 32, 33)

RESULT

Appeal partly allowed.

High Court judgment dated 24-8-2023 in Contempt Case No. 311 of 2023 set aside.

Directions issued as above.

No order as to costs.


2025 INSC 110

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ________ of 2025

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10245 of 2024)

K. SAMBA MOORTHY APPELLANT(s)


VERSUS

SANJIV CHADHA & ORS. RESPONDENT(s)

J U D G M E N T

K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal calls in question the correctness of the final

judgment and order dated 24.08.2023 passed by the High Court for

the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in Contempt Case No. 311 of

2023. By the said judgment, the High Court dismissed the

Contempt Petition holding that the orders the violation of which,

2

was complained of, have been duly complied with by the alleged

contemnor-respondents. The High Court further held that

promotion up to Scale-V cannot be granted as there was no

adjudication in the order of the Writ Court and further that the

cancellation of the promotion order had not been challenged. The

High Court noted thatsuch reliefs cannot be granted in the contempt

case.

Brief facts :-

3. In 1983, the appellant was appointed as a Probationary Officer

in the Bank of Baroda and in the year 1992, he was promoted to the

Manager cadre (MMG-II).

4. When the appellant was serving as Branch Manager, Utran

Branch, District Surat, Gujarat, a Show Cause Notice dated

22.03.1999 for alleged lapses and irregularities committed by him

during his service was issued. The appellant submitted his reply on

12.04.1999. A further Show Cause Notice dated 08.02.2000 setting

3

out ten more irregularities was issued to the appellant and he filed

his reply on 19.02.2000.

5. At this stage, the appellant appeared in the promotion exercise

from Scale-II to Scale-III on 22.12.2000. A charge-sheet in the

disciplinary proceedings was issued to him on 26.12.2000.

6. The results of the promotion were declared on 28.07.2001 and

the appellant’s result was kept in abeyance in view of the pendency

of the disciplinary proceedings. On 23.08.2001, after a detailed

enquiry and after observing serious lapses on the part of the

appellant in opening of the savings bank accounts of one Mr.

Tejuddin Hussain and one Mr. Tajeshwali Basha and in

sanctioning, documentation and disbursement of loans to the

aforesaid customers, a minor penalty was imposed on the appellant.

The penalty was “reduction in pay by 1 stage in a time scale for a

period of 3 years without cumulative effect and not adversely

affecting his pension.” The Appeal filed by the appellant before the

Appellate Authority was rejected on 25.01.2002 and the order of

4

the Disciplinary Authority was upheld. A review before the

Reviewing Authority was also rejected on 01.01.2003.

7. Admittedly, on 30.08.2002, the appellant was informed by a

letter of Senior Branch Manager that his promotion from MMG/SII to MMG/S-III, that was kept in abeyance, stood cancelled. On

16.03.2008, the appellant challenged the orders passed in the

disciplinary proceedings and called in question the correctness of

the orders of the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and

the Reviewing Authority. There was no prayer challenging the

cancellation of the promotion.

8. Pending the Writ Petition, in the year 2012, the appellant

appeared in the promotion exercise and was promoted from ScaleII to Scale-III as a Senior Branch Manager. It should be recorded

herein that he further appeared in the subsequent promotion

exercises of 2016, 2017 and 2018 from Scale-III to Scale-IV but

was declared unsuccessful.

5

9. The learned Single Judge, by a judgment dated 20.07.2017,

allowed his Writ Petition on the ground that the Enquiry Officer,

who undertook the process of the enquiry, was junior to the

appellant in Scale-II and the said officer had also appeared for

interview for promotion to the category of Scale-III along with the

appellant. The learned Single Judge concluded that there was real

likelihood of bias. So holding, the learned Single Judge allowed

the Writ Petition in the following terms.

“14. In view of the above reasons, this Court is of the

definite opinion that there existed real likelihood of bias

in the entire process of enquiry. Therefore, this Court has

absolutely no scintilla of hesitation nor any traces of doubt

to hold that the entire impugned proceedings are vitiated.

For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed,

setting aside the orders passed by the 3

rd respondent vide

proceedings No. SGZ:ZVD. 15/0-1372 dated 23.08.2001

as confirmed by the 2

nd respondent vide order dated 25-

01-2002 as confirmed by respondent no. 1 vide

proceedings No. AGM.AP.INSP.AUDIT.3744 dated

01.01.2003 and the petitioner is entitled for all the

consequential benefits. No order as to costs.”

 (emphasis supplied)

6

10. The Bank of Baroda filed Writ Appeal No. 1285 of 2017

against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We find from the

website of the High Court that by an order of 13.09.2017 the

Division Bench suspended the order of the learned Single Judge.

Pending the Writ Appeal, the appellant superannuated on

31.12.2018. The Writ Appeal was disposed of on 30.03.2022 in the

following terms:

“Learned counsel for the appellants is fair enough in

stating before this Court that in the light of the retirement

of the employee in question, the present writ appeal be

disposed of leaving the question of law open.

The writ appeal is accordingly disposed of leaving the

question of law open.”

(Emphasis supplied)

11. On 10.07.2022, the appellant submitted a representation

claiming, restoration of pay since the penalty was set aside;

promotion from Scale-II to Scale-III from July, 2001 and monetary

benefits and also claimed notional promotion placing him as the last

candidate of each promotion exercise whereby the 2001 batchmates

of the appellant got their promotions. This was followed by a legal

7

notice of 16.08.2022 and thereafter on 01.02.2023, a contempt

petition wasfiled before the Division Bench against the respondents

herein seeking relief in terms of prayers made by him in the

representation.

12. The contemnors filed a reply on 20.07.2023 rebutting the

claim of the appellant and contended that they having released the

amount of Rs. 19,446/-, being the reduction in pay for three years,

necessary compliances had been made. They prayed for the

dismissal of the Contempt Petition. The Division Bench, as set out

earlier, closed the contempt case.

Contentions:

13. We have heard Mr. Abhijit Basu, learned senior advocate for

the appellant ably assisted by Ms. Tatini Basu, advocate and Ms.

Praveena Gautam, learned counsel, who effectively presented the

case for the respondent-contemnors.

8

14. Mr. Abhijit Basu, learned senior counsel for the appellant

contended that once the employee was exonerated with the

quashing of the penalty proceedings, the employee has to be

granted promotion by opening the sealed cover with retrospective

effect along with the monetary benefits. Learned senior counsel

contended that the appellant became entitled to promotion with

effect from July, 2001 and he is entitled to consequential benefits

from the said date. Learned senior counsel further contended that

the appellant’s promotion in 2012 and his subsequent inability to

get promoted to the higher scale is wholly irrelevant for the purpose

of the present case because of the appellant’s entitlement for

promotion to Scale-III with effect from July, 2001. Learned senior

counsel contended that even in the year 2012, the promotion

granted was without any pay hike in benefits. Learned senior

counsel contended that the promotion has to be made effective from

July, 2001 and it should remain effective till his superannuation and

all consequential benefits including monetary benefits should be

given by the respondents. Learned senior counsel relied on C.O.

9

Arumugam & Ors. v. State of T.N. & Ors., 1991 Supp (2) SCC

199 (para 5) and Union of India & Ors. v. K.V. Jankiraman &

Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 109 (para 26).

15. Ms. Praveena Gautam, learned counsel for the respondents

submits that the result of the appellant for promotion from Scale-II

to Scale-III, which was kept in abeyance due to the ongoing

disciplinary proceedings, was cancelled vide letter dated

30.08.2022, before the filing of the Writ Petition. In spite of the

same, the learned counsel contends that the appellant did not

challenge the cancellation of promotion dated 30.08.2002. Learned

counsel relied on Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Anr., (2008)

17 SCC 491 to contend that in the absence of pleadings no relief

can be granted.

16. Learned counsel Ms. Praveena Gautam further contends that

in the operative order of the learned Single Judge only

consequential benefits were given and not promotions or notional

promotion up to Scale-V were ordered. According to the learned

10

counsel, the only consequential benefits to which the appellant

became entitled, on the setting aside of the minor penalty imposed

on him, was the payment of the arrears in salary occasioned by the

said penalty and nothing more. According to the learned counsel,

consequential benefits would not include promotion with effect

from 28.07.2001 as the same stood cancelled as early as on

30.08.2002 and was not challenged.

17. Learned counsel further contends that while the appellant may

have a right to be considered for promotion, the appellant does not

have a right to promotion. According to the learned counsel, the

appellant was promoted from Scale-II to Scale-III in the year 2012

and was unsuccessful in the subsequent promotion exercises of

2016, 2017 and 2018 for promotion from Scale-III to Scale-IV.

Learned counsel contends that the appellant has forgone his right to

challenge the cancellation by accepting the subsequent promotion

and appearing in the further promotion exercises. Learned counsel

vehemently opposes the plea made in the representation of the

11

appellant that he be placed as the last candidate of each promotion

exercise where his 2001 batchmates from Scale-II to Scale-III got

their promotions. Learned counsel relied on Chaduranga Kanthraj

URS and Anr. V. P. Ravi Kumar & Ors. (2024 INSC 957) to

contend that a court in contempt cannot go behind the main order

and would not enter into the questions which have not been dealt

with and decided in the judgment or order, the violation of which

is complained of by the applicant.

18. Learned counsel contends that no contempt is made out, since

two interpretations were possible and hence the action of the

respondents cannot be held as contumacious. Learned counsel

relies on the judgment of Govt. of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Dr. Amal

Satpathi & Ors., (2024 INSC 906) to contend that promotion

becomes effective on assumption of duties and since the appellant

has superannuated, he is not entitled to retrospective financial

benefits. Learned counsel distinguishes the judgment in K.V.

Jankiraman (supra) to contend that in the absence of a challenge

12

to the cancellation order, the said judgment cannot be made

applicable.

19. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned

counsel for the parties and perused the records.

20. The undisputed facts are that in contemplation of the

disciplinary enquiry, the appellant participated in the exercise for

promotion from MMG/S-II to MMG/S-III and that his promotion

was kept in abeyance. It is very clear that he was promoted and the

promotion was kept in abeyance. The communication of the

cancellation reads as follows:

“We refer to your representation 22.04.02 requesting for

declaration of your promotion result from MMG/S III2000.

We have been informed,

“On referring the matter to our higher authorities, we are

advised that the promotion of Mr. K. Samba Murthy

from MMG/S II to MMG/S III which was kept in

abeyance has been treated as cancelled.”

13

21. It is also undisputed that after the penalty was imposed in the

disciplinary proceedings and confirmed right up to the Reviewing

Authority, the learned Single Judge of the High Court set aside the

disciplinary proceedings and ordered that the appellant was entitled

to all consequential benefits.

22. Admittedly, thereafter, the Bank of Baroda which was the

employer reported to the Court hearing the Writ Appeal that in view

of the superannuation of the appellant, all that they wanted was that

the questions of the law to be left open. The net result was that the

learned Single Judge’s order remained intact and has since attained

finality. The further undisputed fact is that in the meantime,

pending the Writ Petition, the appellant was promoted in 2012 from

Scale-II to Scale-III and he assumed the promoted post.

23. In this background, the only question that arises in these

proceedings is: Ought not the respondents have granted the benefit

of promotion from MMG/Scale-II to MMG/Scale-III with effect

from 28.07.2001 with all monetary benefits to the appellant.

14

24. Admittedly, the only compliance made by the respondents

was to pay the amount of Rs. 19,446/- being the reduction in pay

for three years. The learned Single Judge set aside the disciplinary

proceedings on a ground for which the appellant was not at fault. A

junior officer, who was competing for promotion with the

appellant, was made the enquiry officer and a clear case of

likelihood of bias was made out by the appellant and it was

accepted by the learned Single Judge. The employer Bank did not

even contest this position before the Division Bench and merely

wanted the question of law to be left open. The appellant was not

at fault for the defect in the enquiry. No fresh enquiry was initiated

nor was any liberty sought from the Division Bench.

25. In this scenario, are we to deny the appellant the benefit of

promotion from 28.07.2001 when he was ordered to be promoted

but which order was kept in abeyance and which was cancelled only

because of the result of the enquiry?

15

26. We think not. That will be very unfair and we are not prepared

to put our imprimatur on such an interpretation. We are also not

impressed with the submissions of Ms. Praveena Gautam, learned

counsel that there were no pleadings about the illegality of the

cancellation order and no prayer for setting aside the order of

cancellation was made. On the facts of this case, we find that such

relief will be encompassed in the phrase “consequential benefits”

which the learned Single Judge clearly granted. In any event, ends

of justice cannot be sacrificed on the altar of technicalities.

27. We also do not find the judgment in Dr. Amal Satpathi

(supra) to be applicable. Unlike in the present case, the result of the

promotion was not kept in abeyance in that case. There, before the

approval for promotion could be received to the post of Chief

Scientific Officer, the incumbent had superannuated. In this case,

in 2012, the appellant assumed the promoted post. The only

question was about giving him the benefit from 28.07.2001, when

he was entitled. The argument that granting relief to the appellant

would tantamount to travelling beyond the main order, does not

16

carry weight insofar as granting the appellant promotion from

Scale-II to Scale-III with effect from 28.07.2001.

28. Merely paying him Rs. 19,446/-, which admittedly is the

reduced pay for three years, cannot amount to compliance with the

order of the learned Single Judge. The objection to the

maintainability of the Contempt Petition before the Division Bench

is also a non-starter. It is a hyper-technical argument and in any

event the Division Bench did not dismiss the Contempt Petition on

maintainability.

29. The respondent-authoritiesshould have on their own extended

the benefit once the writ appeal was disposed of and the order of

the learned Single Judge stood affirmed. The learned Single Judge,

as early as on 20.07.2017, allowed the writ petition filed by the

appellant in 2008, namely, Writ Petition No. 7616 of 2008. The writ

appeal was also disposed of on 30.03.2022 and the interim order

stood vacated. The appellant has been running from pillar to post,

for the last two decades. On 10.07.2022, when he sought

17

compliance, all that the respondent-authorities did was to pay him

a “princely” sum of Rs. 19,446/-, which was the reduced pay for

the three years. Alas, even after succeeding in a long drawn and

hard-fought legal battle the appellant was left only with a pyrrhic

victory.

30. Insofar as promotion with effect from 28.07.2001 for the post

of Manager Grade-III is concerned, we order that the appellant

should be granted the same with all monetary benefits since the

fundamental defect in the enquiry was due to no fault of the

appellant. The defect was also accepted by the Bank when they did

not press the appeal. The benefit of promotion to Manager GradeIII from 28.07.2001 is covered in the expression “consequential

benefits” as ordered in the judgment of the learned Single Judge

dated 20.07.2017 in Writ Petition No. 7616 of 2008. We say so on

the facts of the present case.

31. There is one more additional aspect. It is not clear from the

record as to on what ground the appellant was denied promotion in

18

2016, 2017 and 2018 exercises, for scales upward of Manager

Scale-III. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is dated

20.07.2017. We also find that by an order of 13.09.2017, the

Division Bench suspended the order of the learned Single Judge.

The Division Bench disposed of the matter on 30.03.2022. We

cannot venture into that arena while adjudicating the present

Contempt Petition hence. We reserve liberty to the appellant to

resort to such remedies as may be available to him in law insofar as

his claim of denial for further promotions from upwards of

Management Grade-III is concerned. We order that, in the event of

any proceedings being initiated, all questions may be permitted to

be raised by the parties which will be decided on their own merits.

We also direct that such proceedings should not be rejected on the

grounds of limitation or laches.

32. We are, for the present, not inclined to proceed against the

respondents for action in contempt. We grant an opportunity to

them to pass orders within four weeks from today remedy the

situation by granting promotion to the appellant from Manager

19

Scale-II to Scale-III from 28.07.2001 and grant him all monetary

benefits with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from the

respective dates the monetary benefits fell due.

33. With the above observations, the Appeal is partly allowed.

The impugned judgment dated 24.08.2023 passed by the High

Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in Contempt Case

No. 311 of 2023 is set aside. Parties will act as per the directions in

this judgment. No order as to costs.

………........................J.

 [B.R. GAVAI]

……….........................J.

 [K. V. VISWANATHAN]

New Delhi;

27th January, 2025.