LIMITATION ACT, 1963 — Art. 60 — Avoidance of transfer by guardian — Limitation Where the minor, on attaining majority, executes a sale deed of the same property within the limitation period, that act constitutes valid repudiation of the earlier sale made by the guardian. Such conduct satisfies the requirement of avoidance under Art. 60, and the purchaser under the guardian’s sale acquires no valid title.

HINDU MINORITY AND GUARDIANSHIP ACT, 1956

S. 8(2) & (3) — Alienation by natural guardian without court’s permission — Nature of transaction — Whether void or voidable — Manner of repudiation — Whether filing of suit necessary

Held, under S. 8(2) a natural guardian has no authority to mortgage, sell, gift or otherwise transfer any part of the immovable property of a minor without the previous permission of the court.
Any disposal of a minor’s immovable property in contravention of sub-ss. (1) or (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him, and not void.

The statute does not require that such a voidable transaction be avoided only by instituting a suit.
A minor, on attaining majority, may repudiate the transaction either by instituting a suit or by his unequivocal conduct, such as by transferring the property himself within the prescribed period of limitation.
Such avoidance by conduct is permissible, as (i) the minor may be unaware of the transaction, or (ii) the transferee may not be in possession, leaving the property apparently intact in the minor’s hands.

Once a voidable transaction is avoided, it becomes void ab initio, and the avoidance relates back to the date of the transaction.

Referred to/Followed:
Abdul Rahman v. Sukhdayal Singh, 1905 SCC OnLine All 106;
G. Annamalai Pillai v. District Revenue Officer, Cuddalore, 1984 SCC OnLine Mad 185;
Chacko Mathew v. Ayyappan Kutty, 1961 SCC OnLine Ker 24;
Madhegowda v. Ankegowda, (2002) 1 SCC 178;
Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163;
Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma v. Gopalkrishnan Nair, (2004) 8 SCC 785;
Murugan v. Kesava Gounder, (2019) 20 SCC 633;
G. Annamalai Pillai v. District Revenue Officer, (1993) 2 SCC 402.

Principle reaffirmed: A transaction entered into by a guardian in contravention of S. 8(2) is voidable, and the minor, on attaining majority, may avoid or repudiate it either by suit or by conduct. Filing a suit is not mandatory.

LIMITATION ACT, 1963 — Art. 60 — Avoidance of transfer by guardian — Limitation

Where the minor, on attaining majority, executes a sale deed of the same property within the limitation period, that act constitutes valid repudiation of the earlier sale made by the guardian. Such conduct satisfies the requirement of avoidance under Art. 60, and the purchaser under the guardian’s sale acquires no valid title.

EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 — Ss. 101 & 114 — Proof of title — Plaintiff not entering witness box — Effect

The plaintiff, claiming title and seeking declaration and possession, must prove her own title.
Failure of the plaintiff to enter the witness box and to prove the sale deed or the title of her vendor is fatal.
A power-of-attorney holder cannot depose to facts within the principal’s personal knowledge.
(Followed: Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217; Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 981.)

Where plaintiff neither proves her vendor’s title nor testifies personally, no right or title is established.

HELD

(i) It is not always necessary for a minor to institute a suit for cancellation of a voidable sale executed by his guardian; such transaction can be repudiated by conduct.
(ii) The minors herein, on attaining majority, executed a fresh sale deed of the property, thereby validly repudiating the earlier sale by their father without court’s permission.
(iii) The plaintiff failed to establish her title and did not depose personally.
Hence, no valid right or title stood transferred to her vendor, and the suit must fail.

Appeal allowed.
Judgments of the High Court (19-03-2013) and First Appellate Court (30-06-2005) set aside.
Trial Court decree restored.
No order as to costs.

2025 INSC 1195

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11342 OF 2013

K. S. SHIVAPPA …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SMT. K. NEELAMMA …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

 PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. One Mahadevappa, son of Waderahalli Basappa of Village

Shamanur was the owner of sites measuring 42 ft. x 30 ft.

and 41 ½ ft. x 30 ft., which were carved out of Survey Nos.

113/2 and 114/1. These revenue sites were described as

plots Nos. 56 and 57 respectively. The aforesaid plots Nos. 56

and 57 were purchased by Rudrappa on 15.09.1971, in the

name of his three minor sons, namely, Maharudrappa, 

2

Basavaraj and Mungeshappa. Thus, all the three minors

became the joint owners of the aforesaid two plots.

2. Rudrappa, the father and the natural guardian of the three

minors, transferred one of the two plots i.e. plot No. 56 in

favour of one S.I. Bidari by a registered sale deed without the

court’s permission. The said S.I. Bidari further transferred

the said plot i.e. plot No. 56 to one Smt. B.T. Jayadevamma

vide sale deed dated 31.01.1983. Subsequently, when the

two surviving minors (as one of them died) attained majority,

they along with their mother transferred the aforesaid plot in

favour of one K.S. Shivappa vide sale deed dated 03.11.1989.

Acting in furtherance of the above registered sale deed, K.S.

Shivappa started working on the said land due to which Smt.

B.T. Jayadevamma thought there was interference with her

rights on the said land.

3. As a result, Smt. B.T. Jayadevamma filed an Original Suit

No. 120/1997 in the Court of II Additional Civil Judge (Sr.

Div.), Davanagere for declaration, possession and permanent

injunction. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of B.T.

Jayadevamma holding that the minors on attaining majority

3

failed to file a suit to get the sale deed executed by their father

repudiated. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order,

K.S. Shivappa filed Regular First Appeal No. 1522/2003

before the High Court. The appeal was allowed, and the

judgment and order passed by the Trial Court was reversed,

holding that the sale deed of the said plot executed by the

father of the minors was voidable at the instance of the

minors and that the minors can repudiate the same within

the prescribed time, upon attaining majority either by filing

a suit or by unequivocal conduct, such as, by transferring

the property to a third party. Thus, the transfer of the

property by the minors, on attaining majority within the

period of limitation, amounted to repudiation of the contract

of sale of the property executed by their father without

seeking the permission of the District Judge.

4. In a similar fashion, as above, Rudrappa, the father and

natural guardian of the minors, transferred the second plot,

i.e. plot No. 57 through a registered sale deed dated

13.12.1971 in favour of one Krishnoji Rao without taking any

permission from the court. The said purchaser Krishnoji Rao 

4

vide Sale Deed dated 17.02.1993 transferred the said plot in

favour of Smt. K. Neelamma. On the other hand, the

surviving minors on attaining majority, along with their

mother within the prescribed time sold the property, i.e., plot

No. 57 to K. S. Shivappa, the purchaser of the earlier plot No.

56. The said Shivappa clubbed both the properties, i.e. plot

Nos. 56 and 57 and built a house to live therein.

5. In the above background of the facts and circumstances,

Smt. K. Neelamma, the purchaser of plot No. 57 who

purchased it from Krishnoji Rao, as a plaintiff instituted O.S.

No. 76/1997 in the Court of Additional Civil Judge, (Jr. Div.),

Davanagere against K.S. Shivappa. The said suit was

dismissed on 14.02.2003 by the Trial Court holding that the

sale deed under which the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff

had purchased the aforesaid plot from the father and natural

guardian of the minors was voidable as no permission of the

court was taken for its sale. The minors could repudiate the

same on attaining majority, which in fact, has been done by

them by executing the sale deed in favour of K.S. Shivappa. 

5

Therefore, the plaintiff, Smt. K. Neelamma derives no legal

rights in the said plot.

6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, order and decree, the

plaintiff Smt. K. Neelamma preferred Regular Appeal No.

67/2003 before the Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Div.),

Davangere. The said appeal was allowed, and the judgment

and order of the Trial Court was reversed. It was held that

since the minors have not challenged the earlier sale deed

executed by their guardian, they could not have sold the plot

subsequently on attaining majority.

7. The Second Appeal preferred by K.S. Shivappa against the

aforesaid judgment and order was dismissed by the High

Court vide judgment and order dated 19.03.2013 on the

same reasoning that since no suit for cancellation of the

earlier sale deed was filed by the minors on attaining

majority, the sale deed executed by their natural guardian

had attained finality. Thus, the plaintiff Smt. K. Neelamma is

the valid title holder of the plot No. 57.

6

8. This is how, K.S. Shivappa, the purchaser of the two plot Nos.

56 and 57 has come up before this Court by way of this

appeal.

9. It may be pertinent to clarify herein itself that the dispute in

the present appeal is confined to plot No. 57 only. The dispute

regarding plot No. 56 stands conclusively settled by the

judgment and order of the High Court, which was never

challenged by either party before any higher forum. No

material is on record to indicate that any special leave

petition or appeal was filed against it.

10. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the moot

question which falls for our consideration in this appeal is:

whether it is necessary for the minors to have filed a suit

upon attaining majority within the prescribed time period, to

set aside the earlier sale deed executed by their natural

guardian, with respect to plot no.57 or such a sale deed could

be repudiated through their conduct within three years of

attaining majority.

11. In order to answer the above question of law, it would be

beneficial to refer and quote the relevant provisions of Section 

7

8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 19561. The

relevant provisions are sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (3) of

Section 8 of the Act, which are being reproduced hereinbelow:

“8. Powers of natural guardian.—(1) The natural

guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to

the provisions of this section, to do all acts which

are necessary or reasonable and proper for the

benefit of the minor or for the realisation, protection

or benefit of the minor's estate; but the guardian

can in no case bind the minor by a personal

covenant.

(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the

previous permission of the court,—

(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift,

exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable

property of the minor, or

(b) lease any part of such property for a term

exceeding five years or for a term extending more

than one year beyond the date on which the minor

will attain majority.

(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a

natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section

(1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of

the minor or any person claiming under him.

 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ”

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’

8

12. A simple reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it

abundantly clear that a natural guardian of a minor has no

authority in law to mortgage, sell, gift or otherwise transfer

any part of the immovable property of the minor or even to

lease out any part of such property for a term exceeding five

years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the

date on which the minor will attain majority without the prior

permission of the court. Therefore, prior permission of the

court is a sine qua non for a guardian of a minor to transfer

the property of the minor in any of the manners provided

under sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of the Act.

13. Sub-Section (3) of Section 8 of the Act in unequivocal terms

provides that the disposal of any immovable property by the

natural guardian in contravention of sub-Section (1) or subSection (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any

person claiming under him. In other words, if the natural

guardian or a minor disposes of the immovable property of a

minor in contravention of sub-Section (1) and sub-Section (2)

particularly without the permission of the court, such a

transaction would be voidable at the instance of the minor.

9

14. The aforesaid provision, however, nowhere categorically

provide the manner in which such a transaction of disposal

of the property of a minor by a guardian without the

permission of the court would be a voidable. Such a

transaction can be avoided or repudiated by the minor

expressly by filing a suit for the cancellation of such a

transaction or impliedly by his conduct namely by

transferring the property himself on attaining the majority

within the time prescribed. The avoidance of such a

transaction by conduct appears to be permissible for two

reasons. First, at times the minor may not be aware of such

a transaction and as such may not be in a position to

institute any suit; secondly, the transaction of such a nature,

if any, may not have been given effect to and the party

acquiring right in the property may not be having possession

of the property giving an impression that the property is

intact in the hands of the minor, in which case also the minor

on attaining majority may not deem it proper to institute a

suit.

10

15. ‘Travellyan’ in his well-known book on Minors 5th Edition, on

Page No.202 stated:

“A transaction which is voidable at the instance

of the minor may be repudiated by any act or

omission of the late minor, by which he intends to

communicate the repudiation, or which has the

effect of repudiating it, for instance, a transfer of

land by him avoids a transfer of the same land

made by his guardian before he attained the age

of majority. It is not necessary that he should

bring a suit.”

16. Mulla’s Hindu Law, 12th Edition, on Page No.276 observes as

under:

“An alienation made by a Hindu widow……….

without legal necessity and without the consent

of the next reversioners is ………. voidable at their

option. They may affirm it, or treat it as a nullity

without the intervention of a court, and they show

their election to do the latter by commencing an

action to recover possession of the property.”

17. Both the above texts indicate that the transfer which is

voidable, can be repudiated by the minor on attaining

majority by his action and not necessarily by the intervention

of the court.

11

18. In a century and quarter old case of Abdul Rahman vs.

Sukhdayal Singh,

2 a property of the minor was leased out

by the guardian but not for the benefit of the minor. The

minor sold the property on attaining majority. The court

observed that it is not necessary that a suit should be

instituted to set aside the lease which was executed by the

guardian of the minor and that the act of the minor of selling

the property on attaining majority is enough to repudiate the

lease deed.

19. In G. Annamalai Pillai vs The District Revenue Officer,

Cuddalore3, Madras a lease deed of minor’s land was

executed by his father in contravention of Section 8 (1) and

(2) of the Act. The transferee moved an application for

registering himself as a cultivating tenant on the basis of the

above lease. The minor on attaining majority resisted the

application on the ground that the lease is not valid and is in

violation of sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. It was held

that the lease having been avoided by the minor after

2 1905 SCC OnLine All 106

3 1984 SCC OnLine Mad 185

12

attaining the age of majority, there was no valid lease and as

such the transferee under the lease cannot claim the status

of a cultivating tenant.

20. The above decision is certainly not binding upon this Court,

nonetheless, it has some persuasive value. It in clear term

reveals that the minor on attaining majority can avoid a

transaction which is voidable under sub-Section (2) of

Section 8 by his conduct such as by resisting the application

of the transferee to register him as a cultivating tenant. It

means that it is not mandatory to file a suit for the

cancellation of the lease deed.

21. In another case reported in Chacko Mathew v. Ayyappan

Kutty4, it was held thus:

“It is not always necessary that a party entitled to

avoid a transaction not binding on him should sue

for its rescission. He can himself avoid it by an

unequivocal act repudiating it”.

The opinion so expressed throw enough light to support the

view that a transaction which is in violation or contravention

of sub-Section (2) of Section 8 of the Act can be avoided by

4 1961 SCC OnLine Ker 24

13

the minor not only by suing for the recession of such a

transaction but by otherwise also.

22. In view of the legal opinion expressed by Travellyan, Mulla

and the High Courts of Allahabad, Madras and Kerala, it is

amply clear that a transaction in relation to the property of a

minor executed in contravention of the express provisions of

Section 8 of the Act is voidable at the option of the minor or

any person claiming under him and such an option to avoid

a transaction of the above nature can be by initiating a law

suit or may be by conduct as enumerated above.

23. In Madhegowda vs Ankegowda5, this Court in paragraph

25 held as under:

“25. …The minor, on attaining majority, can

repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when

occasion for it arises. After attaining majority if

he/she transfers his/her interest in the property in

a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same

that is sufficient to show that the minor has

repudiated the transfer made by the “de facto

guardian/manager”.”

5 (2002) 1 SCC 178

14

24. In Vishwambhar and Ors. vs Laxminarayan (Dead)

through Lrs. and Anr.6 a Division Bench in a matter where

the minor filed a suit for possession contending that the sale

deeds executed by their guardian (mother) were inoperative

and not binding upon them as the same were affected

without the permission of the court in contravention of

Section 8 (2) of the Act, and wherein the relief for setting aside

the sale deeds was added after the period of limitation had

expired, the Court held that though the sale deeds were

executed without legal necessity and in contravention of

Section 8 (2), but the suit was rightly dismissed as the relief

for cancellation of the sale deeds could not have been added

after the expiry of the limitation.

25. The aforesaid decision is not one which lays down that the

filing of a suit by the minor on attaining majority for the

cancellation of the sale deeds executed by the guardian is

mandatory. It only lays down that the relief of cancellation of

sale deeds, if added after expiry of limitation period, cannot

be granted. The said decision, therefore, has no application

6 (2001) 6 SCC 163

15

to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand to answer

the question whether a voidable transaction can be

repudiated by the minor only by filing a civil suit or otherwise

by his conduct also.

26. Another Division Bench of this Court in Nangali Amma

Bhavani Amma vs Gopalkrishnan Nair and Ors.7 while

holding that a transaction entered into by the guardian of a

minor in violation of Section 8 (2) is voidable at the instance

of the minor and is not void and that the minor can avoid the

same on attaining majority. The Division Bench relying upon

Vishwambhar (Supra) observed that a suit must be filed by

minor in order to avoid transaction within period prescribed

under Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The aforesaid

decision also nowhere rules that there are no other

alternative modes to avoid the transaction which is in

contravention of Section 8 (2) of the Act and that the filing of

the suit alone is the remedy thereof.

7 (2004) 8 SCC 785

16

27. The decision of this Court in Murugan & Ors. vs Kesava

Gounder (Dead) through legal representatives & Ors.8,

though in the facts and circumstances of the said case, states

that alienations which are voidable at the instance of minor

are required to be set aside before relief of possession can be

claimed by such minor but even then the said decision is of

no help to answer the question before us in this appeal.

28. The aforesaid decision is only an authority to the effect that

relief of possession cannot be claimed by the minor without

getting the sale deeds, which are voidable, set aside.

However, the aforesaid decision also falls quite short of laying

down that the suit for setting aside the voidable sale deeds is

mandatory to repudiate a transaction entered into by the

guardian on behalf of the minor in contravention of Section

8 (2) of the Act.

29. Apart from the above decisions of the Apex Court, there is

another important decision of this Court in G. Annamalai

Pillai vs District Revenue Officer and Ors.

9 In the said

8 (2019) 20 SCC 633

9 (1993) 2 SCC 402

17

case, the guardian of a minor who was the owner of the

property, had executed the lease deed of the property of the

minor in contravention of Section 8 of the Act. The lease was

avoided by the minor on attaining majority. The Court held

that the effect of such avoidance would be that though the

lease was voidable but once it is avoided it becomes void from

its very inception and no statutory rights accrue in favour of

the lessee. It was held that the avoidance relates back to the

date of the transaction. The Court quoted Salmond on

Jurisprudence, 12th edition, page no.341 as under:

“… A valid agreement is one which is fully

operative in accordance with the intent of the

parties. A void agreement is one which entirely

fails to receive legal recognition or sanction, the

declared will of the parties being wholly destitute

of legal efficacy. A voidable agreement stands

midway between these two cases. It is not a

nullity, but its operation is conditional and not

absolute. By reason of some defect in its origin it is

liable to be destroyed or cancelled at the option of

one of the parties to it. On the exercise of this power

the agreement not only ceases to have any efficacy

but is deemed to have been void ab initio. The

avoidance of it relates back to the making of it. The

hypothetical or contingent efficacy which has

hitherto been attributed to it wholly disappears, as

if it had never existed. In other words, a voidable 

18

agreement is one which is void or valid at the

election of one of the parties to it.”

30. The Court in the aforesaid decision went further ahead to

state that the Privy Council in Satgur Prasad vs Mahant

Har Narain Das10 and in S. N. R. Sundara Rao & Sons,

Madurai vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras11, held

that when a person dissents from the alienation, his dissent

is in relation to the whole transaction and not merely to the

possession. In the result, the effect is to get rid of the

transaction as if the transaction had never taken place.

31. In the light of the above observations, this Court in

G. Annamalai Pillai (supra) went on to record that when

the respondent avoided the lease deed executed by his father,

the lease became void from its inception and no statutory

rights could therefore accrue in favour of the other party.

32. In view of the above discussion, it can safely be concluded

that a voidable transaction executed by the guardian of the

minor can be repudiated and ignored by the minor within

10 1932 SCC OnLine PC 2

11 1956 SCC OnLine Mad 300

19

time on attaining majority either by instituting a suit for

setting aside the voidable transaction or by repudiating the

same by his unequivocal conduct.

33. In the case at hand, undisputedly the surviving minors on

attainment of majority had repudiated the transaction of sale

executed by their father by entering into a fresh contract of

sale of the property in question. It is admitted on record that

on the basis of the sale deed executed by the father of the

minors, the purchaser or the subsequent purchasers have

not entered into possession and the name of the minors

continued to appear in the revenue records. There is no

material on record that the minors had the knowledge of the

execution of the sale deed by their father. In the facts and

circumstances, if they have avoided the sale executed by their

father on attaining majority, it is sufficient repudiation of the

said sale and it was not necessary for them to have instituted

the suit for the cancellation of such a sale rather the

purchasers of the property of the minors through the

guardian on acquiring knowledge of the sale executed by the

minors on attaining majority ought to have instituted a suit 

20

either for the cancellation of the sale deed executed by the

minors or for declaration of their right, title and interest in

the property.

34. The above discussion leads us conclusively to hold that it is

not always necessary for a minor to institute a suit for

cancellation of a voidable sale transaction executed by his

guardian on attaining majority within the limitation provided

and that such a transaction can be avoided or repudiated by

his conduct. The question stands answered accordingly.

35. There is one another issue which goes in favour of K.S.

Shivappa.

36. The plaintiff, Smt. K. Neelamma in instituting the original

suit in the plaint simply pleaded that she had purchased the

property vide registered sale deed dated 17.12.1993 for a

valuable consideration from Krishnoji Rao. She has nowhere

stated or pleaded that she had verified the title of the vendor

or that the vendor, Krishnoji Rao, was having a valid title over

the property so as to transfer it in her favour.

37. She further pleaded that the cause of action for the suit arose

on 27.01.1997 when she noted certain waste products on the 

21

suit land and requested the defendant, K.S. Shivappa to

remove them, who refused to clear the same denying the title

of the plaintiff.

38. The aforesaid plaintiff, Smt. K. Neelamma had not entered

the witness box to prove her plaint case or to assert her title

over the suit property. She had not even proved the sale deed

dated 17.12.1993 under which she has allegedly purchased

the suit land from Krishnoji Rao or to state that Krishnoji Rao

was having a valid title over the said land to transfer her. In

fact, she could not even upon entering the witness box could

have proved the valid title of Krishnoji Rao in the absence of

any plaint allegations to the above effect. It is settled that the

evidence either ocular or documentary cannot travel beyond

the pleadings.

39. The power-of-attorney holder of the plaintiff, Smt. K.

Neelamma namely Shivaji Rao Salanki, PW-1 was not

competent to depose or to prove anything which was not

within his personal knowledge or was otherwise personally

known to the plaintiff, Smt. K. Neelamma. The testimony of

such a witness i.e. a power-of-attorney holder is inadmissible 

22

with regard to the facts within the personal knowledge of the

plaintiff who has failed to enter the witness box. This is

settled by this Court in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani vs.

IndusInd Bank Ltd.12 In the recent case of Rajesh Kumar

vs Anand Kumar and Ors.,

13 a Division Bench of this Court

in which one of us (P. Mithal, J. was a member) reaffirmed

the principle that where the plaintiff refuses to testify, the

proxies cannot substitute his personal testimony on key

issues within the personal knowledge of the plaintiff. A

Power-of-Attorney holder is thus, not entitled to depose in

place of the principal.

40. In the overall facts and circumstances of the case, firstly for

the reason that the plaintiff failed to enter the witness box so

as to testify and prove her plaint case; and secondly for the

reason that the sale deed executed by the father of the minors

was repudiated by the minors within time on attaining

majority, no valid right or title stood transferred to Krishnoji

12 (2005) 2 SCC 217

13 2024 SCC OnLine SC 981

23

Rao from whom Smt. K. Neelamma had allegedly purchased

the suit land. Therefore, the suit as instituted has to fail.

41. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the High Court dated

19.03.2013 and that of the First Appellate Court dated

30.06.2005 are set aside and that of the Trial Court is

restored so as to decree the suit.

42. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.

.............……………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

.............……………………………….. J.

(PRASANNA B. VARALE)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 07, 2025. 

Tender – Judicial review of tender conditions – Scope and limits thereof – It is well settled that the Government must have a free hand in setting the terms of the tender and the Court cannot strike down the terms prescribed by the tendering authority merely because it feels that some other terms would have been fairer, wiser or more logical. The Court would not interfere unless the action of the tendering authority is found to be arbitrary, discriminatory or actuated by mala fides. Held, discretion of the Government in granting largesse is not unlimited. The Government cannot without adequate reason exclude any person from dealing with it or take away largesse arbitrarily. Government activities have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality in action. (Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489; Directorate of Education v. EDUCOMP Datamatics Ltd., (2004) 4 SCC 19; Global Energy Ltd. v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2005) 4 SCC 435; Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board, (2019) 4 SCC 401; Uflex Ltd. v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (2022) 1 SCC 165, relied on.) Tender – Eligibility criteria – Restrictive tender condition – Reasonableness – Doctrine of level playing field – Condition in tender notice requiring bidders to have supplied sports goods worth at least ₹6 crores (cumulative) to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the preceding three financial years (2021-22, 2022-23, 2023-24, or 2022-23, 2023-24, 2024-25), held, arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Such condition had the effect of excluding bidders who, though financially sound and technically competent, had no experience of supply of sports goods to the State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the past three years. The State, by linking eligibility to past local supplies, created an artificial barrier against suppliers from outside the State. Held, the object of public procurement is to secure quality goods and services for the benefit of the public exchequer. Such object can be achieved by requiring bidders to demonstrate financial capacity, technical experience, and past performance in contracts of similar nature regardless of the place of performance. Confining eligibility within one State is irrational and disproportionate to the goal sought to be achieved. Such restriction cannot be justified as reasonable within the meaning of Article 19(6). While the State enjoys freedom to prescribe tender conditions, it cannot exercise such power in a manner that infringes constitutional guarantees or closes the market to outsiders without just cause. The doctrine of level playing field requires that all equally placed competitors must be given equal opportunity to participate, and that the State should not skew the market in favour of a few by erecting artificial barriers. (Bharat Forge Ltd. v. Union of India, (2022) 17 SCC 188, followed.) Constitution of India – Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 19(6) – Doctrine of level playing field – Scope – The doctrine of level playing field, which finds expression in Article 19(1)(g), requires that all equally placed competitors must be given an equal opportunity to participate in trade and commerce. It is designed to prevent the State from skewing the market in favour of a few by erecting artificial barriers. Held, the impugned tender condition linking eligibility to past supply within the State of Chhattisgarh violated the mandate of Article 14 and freedom of trade under Article 19(1)(g). Such a condition curtailed the fundamental rights of otherwise eligible bidders, promoted cartelisation, and restricted wider participation. Tender – Justification of impugned condition – Plea that State of Chhattisgarh being a Maoist affected area, local suppliers alone could ensure timely delivery – Held, untenable – The tender in question was for supply of Sports Kits and did not involve security sensitive material. Only some districts of Chhattisgarh are affected by Maoist activities; treating the entire State as uniformly affected is incorrect. A successful bidder, though not conversant with local topography, could always engage a local supply chain for distribution. Hence, justification offered by the State was unsustainable. Result – Impugned orders dated 11.08.2025 and 12.08.2025 passed by High Court of Chhattisgarh in Writ Petition (C) Nos. 4263, 4266 and 4274 of 2025, as also impugned tender notices dated 21.07.2025, quashed and set aside. Respondents at liberty to issue fresh tender notices. Appeals allowed. Held: The impugned tender condition restricting eligibility to those who had supplied sports goods worth ₹6 crores to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the last three financial years is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The said condition is quashed.

Tender – Judicial review of tender conditions – Scope and limits thereof –

It is well settled that the Government must have a free hand in setting the terms of the tender and the Court cannot strike down the terms prescribed by the tendering authority merely because it feels that some other terms would have been fairer, wiser or more logical. The Court would not interfere unless the action of the tendering authority is found to be arbitrary, discriminatory or actuated by mala fides.

Held, discretion of the Government in granting largesse is not unlimited. The Government cannot without adequate reason exclude any person from dealing with it or take away largesse arbitrarily. Government activities have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality in action.
(Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489; Directorate of Education v. EDUCOMP Datamatics Ltd., (2004) 4 SCC 19; Global Energy Ltd. v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2005) 4 SCC 435; Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board, (2019) 4 SCC 401; Uflex Ltd. v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (2022) 1 SCC 165, relied on.)

Tender – Eligibility criteria – Restrictive tender condition – Reasonableness – Doctrine of level playing field –

Condition in tender notice requiring bidders to have supplied sports goods worth at least ₹6 crores (cumulative) to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the preceding three financial years (2021-22, 2022-23, 2023-24, or 2022-23, 2023-24, 2024-25), held, arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Such condition had the effect of excluding bidders who, though financially sound and technically competent, had no experience of supply of sports goods to the State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the past three years. The State, by linking eligibility to past local supplies, created an artificial barrier against suppliers from outside the State.

Held, the object of public procurement is to secure quality goods and services for the benefit of the public exchequer. Such object can be achieved by requiring bidders to demonstrate financial capacity, technical experience, and past performance in contracts of similar nature regardless of the place of performance. Confining eligibility within one State is irrational and disproportionate to the goal sought to be achieved.

Such restriction cannot be justified as reasonable within the meaning of Article 19(6). While the State enjoys freedom to prescribe tender conditions, it cannot exercise such power in a manner that infringes constitutional guarantees or closes the market to outsiders without just cause. The doctrine of level playing field requires that all equally placed competitors must be given equal opportunity to participate, and that the State should not skew the market in favour of a few by erecting artificial barriers.

(Bharat Forge Ltd. v. Union of India, (2022) 17 SCC 188, followed.)

Constitution of India – Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 19(6) – Doctrine of level playing field – Scope –

The doctrine of level playing field, which finds expression in Article 19(1)(g), requires that all equally placed competitors must be given an equal opportunity to participate in trade and commerce. It is designed to prevent the State from skewing the market in favour of a few by erecting artificial barriers.

Held, the impugned tender condition linking eligibility to past supply within the State of Chhattisgarh violated the mandate of Article 14 and freedom of trade under Article 19(1)(g). Such a condition curtailed the fundamental rights of otherwise eligible bidders, promoted cartelisation, and restricted wider participation.

Tender – Justification of impugned condition – Plea that State of Chhattisgarh being a Maoist affected area, local suppliers alone could ensure timely delivery – Held, untenable –

The tender in question was for supply of Sports Kits and did not involve security sensitive material. Only some districts of Chhattisgarh are affected by Maoist activities; treating the entire State as uniformly affected is incorrect. A successful bidder, though not conversant with local topography, could always engage a local supply chain for distribution. Hence, justification offered by the State was unsustainable.

Result –

Impugned orders dated 11.08.2025 and 12.08.2025 passed by High Court of Chhattisgarh in Writ Petition (C) Nos. 4263, 4266 and 4274 of 2025, as also impugned tender notices dated 21.07.2025, quashed and set aside. Respondents at liberty to issue fresh tender notices. Appeals allowed.

Held:

The impugned tender condition restricting eligibility to those who had supplied sports goods worth ₹6 crores to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in the last three financial years is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The said condition is quashed.

2025 INSC 1182

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(@ SLP (C) No. 24075 of 2025)

VINISHMA TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD. … APPELLANT

 Versus

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(@ SLP (C) No. 26192 of 2025)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(@ SLP (C) No. 23611 of 2025)

J U D G M E N T

 ALOK ARADHE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals take exception to orders dated 11.08.2025

and 12.08.2025 passed in three Writ Petitions preferred by

the appellant. The High Court of Chhattisgarh by the said

orders, has repelled the challenge to the impugned tender

condition contained in three tender notices dated 

2

21.07.2025 which were issued for supply of Sports Kits to

the students of Government Primary School, Government

Upper Primary Schools and Government High and Higher

Secondary Schools in the State of Chhattisgarh.

3. The facts giving rise to filing of these appeals which lie in a

narrow compass, are as under:

(I) FACTS

4. The appellant is a Company registered under the

Companies Act, 2013 and claims to have experience of

supplying Sports Kits to various Departments of the States

of Bihar, Karnataka, Gujarat and Government of NCT

Delhi. The respondent No. 1 is State of Chhattisgarh

whereas respondent No. 2 is State Project Director,

Samagra Shiksha Chhattisgarh State Project Office,

Department of School Education, Government of

Chhattisgarh.

5. The Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS) Scheme

is a Scheme for providing for supplementary nutrition,

immunization and pre-school education to the children,

launched in the year 1975, is a popular flagship program

of the Central Government. The said Scheme provides for 

3

the integrated package of services, for the holistic

development of the child and is a centrally sponsored

scheme implemented by State Governments and the Union

Territories. The Scheme is largely funded by the

Government of India.

6. The Samagra Shiksha Chhattisgarh State Project Office,

Department of School Education, Chhattisgarh published

three tender notices (hereinafter to be referred to as

“impugned tender notices”) on 21.07.2025 through

Government-e-Market Place Portal for supply of Sports Kits

to the students of Primary School, Upper Primary Schools

and High and Higher Secondary Schools run by the State

Government in the State of Chhattisgarh. The Sports Kits

were to be supplied to 5540 cluster resource centres

situated across all 33 districts in the State. The tender

value of the contract was Rs.15.24 crores, Rs.13.08 crores

and Rs.11.49 crores.

7. Section III(A) of the impugned tender notices prescribe

qualification criteria with additional terms and conditions.

The appellant was aggrieved by additional terms and

conditions namely, condition Nos. 1, 4, 11 and 13, which 

4

rendered the appellant ineligible for participation in the

impugned tender process. It, therefore, submitted a

representation on 29.07.2025 to the State Project Director,

Samagra Shiksha, School Education Department,

Chhattisgarh. The aforesaid representation failed to evoke

any response. The appellant thereupon filed three writ

petitions, namely, Writ Petition (C) No. 4266 of 2025, Writ

Petition (C) No. 4263 of 2025 and Writ Petition (C) No. 4274

of 2025, before the High Court in which validity of the

aforesaid impugned tender conditions was challenged.

8. During the pendency of the writ petition by way of

corrigendum dated 07.08.2025 condition Nos. 1, 11, and

13 were deleted. The Division Bench of the High Court by a

common order dated 11.08.2025 passed in Civil Writ

Petition (C) No. 4266 of 2025, Writ Petition (C) No. 4263 of

2025 and by an order dated 12.08.2025 passed in Writ

Petition (C) No. 4274 of 2025, inter alia held that the

impugned eligibility condition namely, condition No. 4 with

regard to past performance is of similar nature and

purpose, as, the condition in Association of Registration 

5

Plates v. Union of India and Ors1. It was further held that

respondents have demonstrated that the impugned tender

condition is not unique to the State of Chhattisgarh but is

prevalent in other States such as Gujarat, Assam, Delhi,

Orissa and Jharkhand. It was further found by the High

Court that a contract containing a similar condition, was

awarded to the appellant in the State of Jharkhand. The

High Court repelled the challenge to impugned tender

condition on the ground of discrimination and

unreasonableness.

9. It was further held by the Division Bench that State is

entitled to prescribe the condition in the impugned tender

notices, to ensure that selection of the most capable and

reliable bidder takes place, to execute the public project of

significant scale, sensitivity and public importance. It was

also held that impugned tender condition is neither

violative of Article 14 nor Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution

of India and relates to legitimate object of ensuring

technical competence, financial strength, operational

capacity as well as long term reliability of successful bidder.

1

(2005) 1 SCC 679

6

Accordingly, the writ petitions preferred by the appellant

were dismissed. In the aforesaid factual background, these

appeals arise for our consideration.

(II) SUBMISSIONS OF APPELLANT

10. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that

High Court has failed to appreciate that decision of this

Court in Association of Registration Plates (supra) has

no application to the obtaining factual matrix of the case

and therefore, erred in placing reliance on the said decision

while deciding the writ petitions. It is further submitted

that the impugned tender condition which prescribes that

bidders must have supplied Sports Kits worth at least

Rs.6.00 crores (cumulative) to State Government agencies

of Chhattisgarh in last 3 financial years is violative of

Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India, as it

excludes competent suppliers from outside the State and

discourages wider participation and fosters cartelisation. It

is urged that the impugned tender condition excludes the

appellant from participating in the impugned tender. It is

therefore urged that the impugned common orders are 

7

liable to be quashed and set aside and the impugned tender

condition is liable to be struck down.

(III) SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT

11. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for

respondent No. 2 submitted that the tendering authority is

well within its power to frame the impugned tender

condition. It is further submitted that in view of

geographic/social conditions of State of Chhattisgarh, the

impugned tender condition is incorporated to safeguard

timely delivery, ensure quality compliance and prevent

supply chain disruptions. It is also submitted that

impugned condition is prevalent in other States as well. It

is pointed out that on 21.08.2025, financial bids have

already been opened and the successful bidders have been

identified. It is urged that in case this Court interferes with

the impugned tender process, the consequent re-tendering

would consume a considerable time and substantial

portion of academic year would stand forfeited.

12. Learned Senior counsel for respondent No. 1 has adopted

the submissions made on behalf of respondent No. 2 and

has submitted that the impugned tender condition has 

8

been incorporated with an object to ensure that successful

bidder has the knowledge of the topography of the State of

Chhattisgarh which is a Naxal affected State, so that Sports

Kits could be timely delivered to the children of Government

Schools in the State.

(IV) ANALYSIS

13. We have considered the rival submissions and have

perused the record. For the facility of reference the

impugned tender condition is extracted below :

“(4) Past Performance Restriction :

Bidders must have supplied sports

goods worth at least

Rs.6.00 crores (cumulative) to State

Government agencies of Chhattisgarh

in the last three financial years

(2021-22, 2022-23, 2023-24 or 2022-

23, 2023-24, 2024-25).”

14. The solitary question which arises for consideration in

the instant appeals is whether the aforesaid impugned

tender condition meets the test of reasonableness and

fairness and or whether the same constitutes an arbitrary

criteria which excludes the other eligible bidders from

participation thereby violating, the mandate contained in

Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 

9

15. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to briefly advert

to contours of judicial review with regard to tender

conditions which are well delineated. A three Judge Bench

of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International

Airport Authority of India & Ors.2

, held that discretion of

the Government in granting the largesse, is not unlimited

and the Government cannot give or withhold largesse in its

arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will. It has further been

held that Government cannot without adequate reason

exclude any person from dealing with it or take away

largesse arbitrarily. It also held that activities of the

Government have a public element and therefore there

should be fairness and equality. It is well settled in law that

Government must have free hand in setting the terms of the

tender and the Court cannot strike down the terms of the

tender prescribed by the Authority merely because it feels

some other terms in the tender would have been fairer,

wiser or more logical3. It is equally well settled legal

proposition that in the matter of formulating conditions of

2

(1979) 3 SCC 489; AIR 1979 SC 1628

3 Directorate of Education & Ors. v. EDUCOMP Datamatics Ltd. & Ors. (2004) 4 SCC 19

10

tender document unless the action of tendering authority

is found to be arbitrary and malicious the Court would not

interfere4. It is also well settled in law that a Court cannot

sit over judgment on what should be the eligibility criteria

in the tender notice unless the same is arbitrary,

discriminatory or actuated by mala fides.

5

16. The principle of non-discrimination is embodied in Article

14 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 has to be read in

conjunction with Rights conferred by other Articles like

Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 of the

Constitution of India refers to Right to Life which includes

‘opportunity’ as well. The doctrine of level playing field is an

important concept while construing Article 19 (1) (g) of the

Constitution of India. Article 19(1) (g) confers Fundamental

Right to carry out business to a company, it is entitled to

invoke the doctrine of level playing field which is however,

subject to public interest. The doctrine of level playing field

4 Global Energy Ltd. & Anr. v. Adani Exports Ltd. & Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 435 - Shimni Utsch India Pvt. Ltd.

& Anr. v. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors (2010) 6 SCC 303.

5

Icomm Tele Ltd vs. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Anr. (2019) 4 SCC 401; Uflex

Ltd. V. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2022) 1 SCC 165

11

provides the space within which equally placed competitors

are allowed to bid so as to subserve larger public interest. 6

17. In the backdrop of well settled legal principles, we advert

to the fact of the case in hand. The present tender is for

supply of Sports Kits to the students of Primary School,

Upper Primary School and High and Higher Secondary

School run by the State Government in the State of

Chhattisgarh. The eligibility criteria mentioned in the

impugned tender notices must have rational nexus with the

object sought to be achieved i.e., supply of good quality

Sports Kits to students of the school, at the best price. The

eligibility criteria in impugned notices therefore, should be

framed in a manner which encourages wider participation

and secures the best prize for the State, which in turn

safeguards the public exchequer.

18. This Court in BHARAT FORGE supra has enunciated the

doctrine level playing field and has stated that the same

finds expression in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The

doctrine of level playing field requires that all equally

placed competitors must be given an equal opportunity to

6 UOI & Ors. Bharat Forge Ltd. & ANR. (2022) 17 SCC 188.

12

participate in trade and commerce. It is designed to prevent

the State from skewing the market in favour of few by

erecting artificial barriers. In the instant case, the

impugned tender condition has the effect of excluding

bidders who though otherwise financially sound and

technically competent, have no experience of supply of

sports goods to the State Government agencies of

Chhattisgarh in past three years. The State by linking the

eligibility criteria with past local supplies has created an

artificial barrier, against the suppliers who had no past

dealing with the State of Chhattisgarh. The impugned

condition curtails the fundamental rights of the bidders,

who have been ineligible to participate in the tenders.

19. The object of public procurement is to secure quality

goods and services for the benefit of public exchequer. The

said object can be achieved by requiring the bidders to

demonstrate financial capacity, technical experience, and

past performance in contracts of similar nature, regardless

of place of performance of the contract. To confine the

eligibility to participate in the tender, within one State is 

13

not only irrational but is also disproportionate to the goal

of ensuring effective delivery of Sports Kits.

20. Such a restriction, therefore, cannot be justified as

reasonable within the meaning of 19(6) of the

Constitution of India. The State while it enjoys the freedom

to prescribe the conditions in the tender, cannot exercise

that power in a manner that infringes upon constitutional

guarantees, by closing the market to outsiders without just

cause. The doctrine of level playing field requires that gates

of competition be opened to all who are equally placed. The

impugned tender condition excludes the competent and

experienced suppliers, who may have executed contracts of

far greater magnitude in other States or for the Central

Government departments, from participating in the tender

and has the impact of promoting cartelisation. The

impugned condition operates as a closed door to outsiders

and restricts the wider participation of bidders and restricts

competition. The impugned tender condition, therefore, is

violative of Article 14 and also offends Article 19(1)(g) of the

Constitution of India. 

14

21. The justification advanced by the State that Chhattisgarh

being a Maoist affected area and only those with past

experience of supply in the State to State Government

agencies of Chhattisgarh can be relied upon, is untenable

for several reasons. Firstly, the tender in question is not for

security sensitive equipment but is for supply of Sports Kits

which does not involve, any special risk or security

repercussions. Secondly, only some districts of

Chhattisgarh are affected by Maoist activities, and it is

incorrect to treat the entire State, as uniformly affected by

Naxalites, for exclusion of other eligible bidders. Thirdly,

a successful bidder, who may not be conversant with the

topography can engage a local supply chain to supply the

Sports Kits.

22. In the light of aforesaid discussion this Court finds that

impugned tender condition is arbitrary, unreasonable and

is discriminatory. The same does not have any rational

nexus to the object of ensuring effective supply of Sports

Kits to the children in State. It offends the mandate of

Article 14 and freedom of trade guaranteed by Article

19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 

15

 (V) CONCLUSION

23. In the result, the impugned orders dated 11.08.2025 and

12.08.2025 passed in Writ Petition (C) No. 4266 of 2025,

Writ Petition (C) No. 4263 of 2025 and Writ Petition (C) No.

4274 of 2025 respectively by the High Court as well as

impugned tender notices dated 21.07.2025 issued by

Department of School Education, Government of

Chhattisgarh for supply of Sports Kits to students of

Government Primary, Upper Primary, High and Higher

Secondary Schools are quashed and set aside. Needless to

state that respondents are at liberty to issue fresh notices

inviting tenders. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed.

……………….……………J.

 [SANJAY KUMAR]

..….……………………….J.

 [ALOK ARADHE]

NEW DELHI,

OCTOBER 6, 2025.

Natural Justice — Court not to travel beyond pleadings — Litigant cannot be rendered worse off in own petition — High Court exceeded writ jurisdiction. The appellants, lessees under the Cochin Devaswom Board, challenged enhancement of licence fee from Rs.227.25 per annum to Rs.1,50,000 per annum. The High Court dismissed their writ petition upholding the enhancement, but proceeded further to direct (i) fixation of licence fee afresh applying T. Krishnakumar v. Cochin Devaswom Board, 2022 (4) KLT 798; and (ii) an inquiry by the Chief Vigilance Officer into leasing of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom land to the appellants. Held, the High Court was not justified in issuing directions beyond the scope of the writ petition. The appellants, having only challenged the enhancement order, could not have been rendered worse off by directions that went beyond the reliefs sought. The impugned directions were made without notice to the appellants and in violation of principles of natural justice. (Paras 20–23, 25–28, 29) Judicial restraint — Remarks and directions without notice — Impermissible. Reiterating V.K. Majotra v. Union of India, (2003) 8 SCC 40 and State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703, the Court observed that writ courts must decide petitions on the points raised, and if exceptional circumstances warrant consideration of additional issues, affected parties must be put on notice. Judicial pronouncements must be guided by justice, fair play, and restraint; courts should avoid “fishing and roving enquiries” that impinge on the reputation of parties. (Paras 23–25) Litigants — Access to justice — Court action should not have chilling effect. When courts travel beyond pleadings and make directions adverse to a litigant without notice, it discourages citizens from seeking judicial remedies and undermines access to justice and the rule of law. (Para 28) Writ Petition — Reliefs confined to scope of challenge — High Court cannot enlarge controversy. In a writ challenging enhancement of licence fee, the High Court having upheld the enhancement should have dismissed the petition simpliciter. Directions for refixation of licence fee or vigilance inquiry were wholly outside its jurisdiction. (Paras 20–22, 26–27) Service Law analogy applied — Writ petitioner cannot be placed in worse position. Applying the principle in Ashok Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P., (2016) 12 SCC 797 and Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India, (2005) 12 SCC 219 — a writ petitioner cannot be penalised or placed in a worse-off situation by approaching the Court for redress. (Paras 26–27) Result — Appeal partly allowed. Directions in Para 53 of the High Court judgment directing fixation of licence fee afresh and vigilance enquiry expunged and set aside. However, the Cochin Devaswom Board may independently enhance licence fee in accordance with law. Appellants directed to pay balance amount as undertaken within three months. No order as to costs. (Paras 30–33) Held High Court’s directions for refixation of licence fee and vigilance inquiry, being beyond the scope of writ proceedings and issued without notice, are set aside.

Natural Justice — Court not to travel beyond pleadings — Litigant cannot be rendered worse off in own petition — High Court exceeded writ jurisdiction.

The appellants, lessees under the Cochin Devaswom Board, challenged enhancement of licence fee from Rs.227.25 per annum to Rs.1,50,000 per annum. The High Court dismissed their writ petition upholding the enhancement, but proceeded further to direct (i) fixation of licence fee afresh applying T. Krishnakumar v. Cochin Devaswom Board, 2022 (4) KLT 798; and (ii) an inquiry by the Chief Vigilance Officer into leasing of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom land to the appellants.

Held, the High Court was not justified in issuing directions beyond the scope of the writ petition. The appellants, having only challenged the enhancement order, could not have been rendered worse off by directions that went beyond the reliefs sought. The impugned directions were made without notice to the appellants and in violation of principles of natural justice.

(Paras 20–23, 25–28, 29)

Judicial restraint — Remarks and directions without notice — Impermissible.

Reiterating V.K. Majotra v. Union of India, (2003) 8 SCC 40 and State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703, the Court observed that writ courts must decide petitions on the points raised, and if exceptional circumstances warrant consideration of additional issues, affected parties must be put on notice. Judicial pronouncements must be guided by justice, fair play, and restraint; courts should avoid “fishing and roving enquiries” that impinge on the reputation of parties.

(Paras 23–25)

Litigants — Access to justice — Court action should not have chilling effect.

When courts travel beyond pleadings and make directions adverse to a litigant without notice, it discourages citizens from seeking judicial remedies and undermines access to justice and the rule of law.

(Para 28)

Writ Petition — Reliefs confined to scope of challenge — High Court cannot enlarge controversy.

In a writ challenging enhancement of licence fee, the High Court having upheld the enhancement should have dismissed the petition simpliciter. Directions for refixation of licence fee or vigilance inquiry were wholly outside its jurisdiction.

(Paras 20–22, 26–27)

Service Law analogy applied — Writ petitioner cannot be placed in worse position.

Applying the principle in Ashok Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P., (2016) 12 SCC 797 and Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India, (2005) 12 SCC 219 — a writ petitioner cannot be penalised or placed in a worse-off situation by approaching the Court for redress.

(Paras 26–27)

Result — Appeal partly allowed.

Directions in Para 53 of the High Court judgment directing fixation of licence fee afresh and vigilance enquiry expunged and set aside. However, the Cochin Devaswom Board may independently enhance licence fee in accordance with law. Appellants directed to pay balance amount as undertaken within three months. No order as to costs.

(Paras 30–33)

Held

High Court’s directions for refixation of licence fee and vigilance inquiry, being beyond the scope of writ proceedings and issued without notice, are set aside.2025 INSC 1183

Page 1 of 20

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.11902 OF 2025

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.23740 OF 2023)

P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. …Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors. …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1. Leave was granted in this matter on 09.09.2025.

2. The present appeal calls in question the judgment and

order dated 09.08.2023 passed by the High Court of Kerala at

Ernakulam in Writ Petition (C) No. 29089/2020. At the

commencement of the hearing, Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned

Senior Counsel, submitted that the appellants in terms of the

Ext.P3-Proceedings dated 16.09.2014 and Ext.P9-Notice

dated 27.11.2020, shall pay the licence fee, at the rate of 

Page 2 of 20

Rs.1,50,000/- per annum along with arrears to the first

respondent-Cochin Devaswom Board (hereinafter referred

to as the “Board”).

3. However, the grievance of the appellants is that the

further directions of the High Court have rendered them

worse off in their own writ petition. The further directions in

Para 53 of the judgment, which according to the appellant,

are beyond the scope of the writ petition and with which they

are seriously aggrieved are in the following terms:

“The 1st respondent Board shall take necessary steps to fix

the licence fee in respect of the land covered by Exts.P13

to P16 orders, taking note of the law laid down by this

Court in T. Krishnakumar [2022 (4) KLT 798: 2022 (5)

KHC SN 8] and also the law laid down in this judgment,

with notice to the 2nd petitioner Chinmaya Mission

Educational and Cultural Trust, as expeditiously as

possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the

date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.”

“In view of the facts noticed by this Court in paragraphs 36

and 37 of this judgment and also the stand taken by the 1st

respondent Board before this Court that other than the

copy of Exts.P13 to P16 orders, no other documents are

seen in the relevant files, we deem it appropriate to direct

the 1st respondent Board to conduct an enquiry by the

Chief Vigilance Officer (Superintendent of Police), Cochin

Devaswom Board in the matter relating to leasing out the 

Page 3 of 20

land of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom to the 2nd petitioner

Trust and take necessary action, if found necessary, based

on the report of the Chief Vigilance Officer”

4. The appellants filed a writ petition on 21.12.2020 before

the High Court of Kerala praying for the following reliefs:

“a) call for the records of the case leading upto Exts. P3, P7

and P9 and quash the same by the issuance of writ of

certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction.

b) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ,

order or direction staying all further proceedings pursuant

to Exhibits P3, P7 and P9 proceedings.

and

c) Pass any other appropriate writ, order or direction

which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to issue and the

petitioner may pray from time to time.”

5. Ext.P3 under challenge was the order of the first

respondent-Board dated 16.09.2014, enhancing the annual

license fee of the premises let out to the second appellant

from Rs.227.25/- per annum to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum.

Ext.P7 is the proceeding dated 02.05.2015 rejecting any

review of the order dated 16.09.2014 and further directing

the measurement of the property. Ext.P9 is the

communication dated 27.11.2020 demanding arrears totaling 

Page 4 of 20

to Rs.20,46,788/- within 14 days of the receipt of the

communication.

6. To understand the grievance of the appellants before

the High Court, a brief reference to the facts of the case is

essential. The second appellant-Chinmaya Mission

Educational and Cultural Trust was established as a society

under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It functions under the

Central Chinmaya Mission Trust, Bombay, and is involved in

social, religious and cultural activities in Kerala for more than

half a century. By a Royal Order (Thittooram), the Maharaja

of Cochin, on the request of Swami Chinmayananda,

transferred the Rama Varma Bhajanamadam, a part of the

Bhuvaneswari temple and situated on the northern side of the

Swaraj Round, Thrissur, to the second appellant.

7. When matters stood thus, on 16.02.1974, the Board

allotted six cents of land adjacent to the Rama Varma

Bhajanamadam for constructing a hall subject to the

following conditions:

Page 5 of 20

“1. The hall constructed by the Mission should be used

only for marriage and religious and cultural activities.

2. Accommodation to the tourist pilgrims coming to the

Wadakunathan temple should be provided in the hall as

per request of the Assistant Commissioner, Trichur free

of rent.

3. For religious and cultural activities of the Devaswom

Department the hall should be spared free of rent as per

the request of the Assistant commissioner, Trichur.

4. The Mission will pay in the Wadakunnathan Devaswom

an annual contribution of Rs. 101/- for the use of this site.

5. The Assistant Commissioner, Trichur should be an exofficio member, in the committee for the proper

utilization and maintenance of the hall.

6. Space should be left at the northern end for providing

a pathway of 12 ft wide for entrance from the Devaswom

road to the remaining portion of the vacant space on the

eastern side of the proposed site.

7. The Mission will provide compound wall on the

northern and eastern sides of the site granted to them.

8. The Mission will execute proper agreement on stamp

paper as advised by the Devasom Advocate.”

8. It will be noticed that for the site, an annual contribution

of Rs.101/- was fixed as use charges. On the site a hall was to

be constructed by the second appellant and was to be used 

Page 6 of 20

only for marriage, religious and cultural activities. As part of

the consideration, in the hall, tourist pilgrims coming to the

Wadakunnathan temple should be provided accommodation

as per the request of the Assistant Commissioner free of rent.

Further, for religious and cultural activities of the Devaswom

Department, the hall should be spared free of rent as per the

request of the Assistant Commissioner. The Assistant

Commissioner was also to be an ex-officio member in the

committee for the proper utilisation and maintenance of the

hall. A twelve feet wide pathway was to be left at the

northern end for entrance from the Devaswom Road to the

remaining portion of the vacant site. Pursuant to the

proceedings dated 16.02.1974, an agreement of license

dated 19.07.1974 was executed incorporating the conditions

set out in the proceeding dated 16.02.1974.

9. By the proceeding dated 13.12.1974, on the request of

the second appellant for additional space, and on being

satisfied that the purpose for which the site was originally

allotted can be achieved only if some additional space is 

Page 7 of 20

allowed, a further extent of 2½ cents of land lying vacant on

the eastern side of the site already allotted, was allotted to

the second appellant. Consequently, fresh agreement of

license was executed on 25.03.1975. It is averred that the

license fee was revised from Rs.101/- per annum to Rs.142/-

per annum with the very same stipulations as contained in

the license agreement dated 19.07.1974. By proceeding

dated 09.12.1976, further four cents of land were allotted,

and by the proceeding dated 21.02.1977 a small bit of land

lying vacant on the eastern side was also sanctioned for the

second appellant and it was ordered that the license fee be

fixed on pro-rata basis.

10. The second appellant is in occupation of 13.5 cents of

land and is using the hall constructed by it for religious and

cultural purposes and for conducting marriages. According

to the appellants only few takers are available for the

marriage hall since there is no parking space and further that

the hall is not air-conditioned. Though the rent levied is

Rs.50,000/- per day for the marriages, very few marriages 

Page 8 of 20

numbering ten or fifteen per year are held and the second

appellant-Trust is running at a loss with its income being

compensated from the money generated from other units. It

is also averred that even now the hall is given free for the

programmes of the Board as and when requested.

11. The license fee was finally revised in the year 1977 to

Rs. 227.25/- per annum. According to the appellants, no

period for license having been fixed, the license continued

uninterruptedly.

12. At this stage, by proceeding dated 16.09.2014,

unilaterally and without affording any opportunity the license

fee was refixed at Rs.1,50,000/- with a direction that the

license fee shall be renewed every three years. The

appellants, by a letter dated 29.10.2014, sent a reply to the

proceedings dated 16.09.2014. In the reply, the appellants

set out that the order of 16.09.2014 was unauthorized, illegal

and against the terms of entrustment. It denied that the

second appellant was a profit-making institution. It conceded

that a reasonable hike was justified but questioned the 

Page 9 of 20

exorbitant hike to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum. It highlighted the

fact that after taking possession they had developed the

same and constructed a two-storey building with accessories

and provided furniture at their expense. They stated that the

hike was unilateral, and no notice was given to them and

prayed that the enhancement be dropped.

13. By its order of 07.02.2015, the Board declared that there

was no need for review of the orders hiking the license fee

charges to Rs.1,50,000/-. The Board further issued orders of

02.05.2015 and 27.11.2020, the details of which have been set

out hereinabove.

14. The first appellant filed Writ Petition (Civil) No.29089 of

2020 for the reliefs stated in the earlier portion of the order.

The second appellant was later impleaded as a party. It is in

the said writ petition that the order as extracted in para 3

above has come to be passed after the High Court found that

there was nothing illegal in the enhancement of the license

fee and the High Court upheld the proceedings dated 

Page 10 of 20

26.09.2014, the order dated 02.05.2015 and the notice dated

27.11.2020.

15. The High Court, in the impugned order, was called upon

to decide on the validity of Ext.P3, P7 and P9. In the process

of adjudicating the validity, the High Court noticed that the

license fee issue was flagged by the local fund audit and the

local fund audit raised objection against the quantum of

license fee as originally fixed. The High Court observed that

there was no validity period fixed for the license and there

was no clause for periodic hike prior to the issuance of Ext.P3

order. The High Court saw the photographs of the property

in question. The High Court also made a detailed analysis of

the provisions of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious

Institutions Act, 1950 and dealt with the powers and duties of

a trustee.

16. The High Court, after perusal of the files in question and

the correspondence observed that the appellants themselves

had requested the Board to increase the fee to a reasonable

extent. After observing that the land was situated in a prime 

Page 11 of 20

locality, the High Court dealt with the judgment of T.

Krishnakumar v. Cochin Devaswom Board1 and in the end

analysis upheld the levy of Rs. 1,50,000/- per annum by

observing as follows: -

“52. In the above circumstances, we find no reason to

interfere with Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 of the

1st respondent Board whereby the rate of licence fee of the

property covered by Exts.P13 to P16 was enhanced from

Rs.227.25 per annum to Rs.1.50 lakhs per annum; Ext.P7

proceedings dated 02.05.2015 of the Board whereby the

stand taken in Ext.P5 letter dated 07.02.2015 not to review

or reconsider the decision in Ext.P3 proceedings dated

26.09.2014 was intimated to the 2nd petitioner Trust; and

Ext.P9 notice dated 27.11.2020 issued by the 2nd

respondent Secretary of the Board, whereby the Trust was

directed to remit a sum of Rs.20,46,788/- towards arrears of

licence fee at the rate of Rs.1.50 lakhs per annum, penal

interest and GST, within a period of 14 days.

53. In the result, this writ petition fails and the same is

accordingly dismissed. It is for the 1st respondent Cochin

Devaswom Board to recover the arrears of licence fee in

terms of Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 and Ext.P9

notice dated 27.11.2020 by initiating appropriate

proceedings, if found necessary, by initiating proceedings

under the Revenue Recovery Act in terms of the

G.O.(P)No.22/2021/RD dated 09.02.2021 published in

Kerala Gazette Extra Ordinary No.668 dated 11.02.2021….”

17. In view of the statement of the learned Senior Counsel

for the appellants there is no need to discuss the correctness

of the reasons why the High Court upheld the enhancement

1 2022 (5) KHC SN 8

Page 12 of 20

of license fee. The learned Senior Counsel has fairly

submitted that the appellants are ready to deposit the license

fee as enhanced along with arrears as claimed inter alia in

the notice of 27.11.2020.

18. However, the appellants have been completely taken

by surprise with the High Court proceeding further and

directing fixation of the license fee in respect of the land in

question by applying the law laid down in T. Krishnakumar

(supra). Further, the High Court directed the first respondent

Board to conduct an inquiry through the Chief Vigilance

Officer with regard to the transaction between the Board and

the appellants and take necessary action based on the

report.

19. When the matter came up for admission, this Court on

30.10.2023 granted stay of operation of the order on

condition that the appellants deposit a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-

with the first respondent.

20. We are of the opinion that the High Court was not

justified in passing the directions extracted at Para 3

Page 13 of 20

hereinabove. The directions were far beyond the scope of

the writ petition. The appellants could not have been

rendered worse off in their own writ petition. What is more,

the directions have been made without putting the appellants

on notice.

21. A party invokes the jurisdiction of courts being

aggrieved by a certain course of action taken against him/it

by the respondent. In this case, the appellants were

aggrieved by the unilateral hike of the annual charges to

Rs.1,50,000/- per annum from Rs.227.25/- which they were

paying. The High Court was justified in examining the

correctness or otherwise of the said decision. In this case, the

High Court found that the respondents were justified in

enhancing the annual license fee to Rs.1,50,000/-. Having

done so, it should have disposed of the writ petition by

simply dismissing it.

22. It is well settled that if in an exceptional case the Court

feels the need to travel beyond the scope of the writ petition 

Page 14 of 20

and make observations, the least a party is entitled to, is an

opportunity to explain and defend themselves.

23. Disapproving the practice of catching parties by

surprise by the writ courts travelling beyond the scope of the

issues in question, this Court in V.K. Majotra vs. Union of

India and Others2, made the following telling observations:-

“8. …. The writ courts would be well advised to decide the

petitions on the points raised in the petition and if in a rare case

keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case any

additional points are to be raised then the concerned and

affected parties should be put to notice on the additional points

to satisfy the principles of natural justice. The parties cannot be

taken by surprise. We leave the discussion here.”

24. Though said in the context of expunging adverse

comments in an order or judgment, the following paragraphs

from State of U.P. Vs. Mohammad Naim3,repays study: -

“11. The last question is, is the present case a case of an

exceptional nature in which the learned Judge should

have exercised his inherent jurisdiction under Section

561-A CrPC in respect of the observations complained

of by the State Government? If there is one principle of

cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is

this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges

and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be

allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly

and without undue interference by any body, even by

2

(2003) 8 SCC 40

3 1964 2 SCR 363

Page 15 of 20

this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that

in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates

must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play

and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping

generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they

are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the

matter of making disparaging remarks against persons

or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration

before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is

relevant to consider

(a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is

before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or

defending himself;

(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on

that conduct, justifying the remarks; and

(c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case,

as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that

conduct.

It has also been recognised that judicial

pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should

not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and

reserve.”

25. No doubt, what the High Court has done in the present

matter is to direct the fixing of the license fee, keeping in

mind, the judgment of the Court in T. Krishnakumar (supra).

The appellant had no opportunity to explain whether T.

Krishnakumar (supra) had application to the transaction in

question or not. Further, to direct the Chief Vigilance Officer

to hold an inquiry in the “matter relating to leasing out the

land to the appellant” was not warranted on the facts and 

Page 16 of 20

circumstances of the case. Directions of this nature for a

fishing and roving enquiry can seriously impinge upon

reputation and character of the parties. Even in a given case

if the High Court was constrained to pass such directions it

ought to have put the appellants on notice.

26. The directions extracted in Para 3 above have rendered

the appellants worse off in their own writ petition. In Ashok

Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P.4, this Court held as under:-

“2. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. D.K. Singh,

strenuously argued that the High Court had misdirected

itself in issuing a notice of enhancement of the punishment

awarded to the appellant. He submitted that by doing so,

the High Court had placed the appellant in a worse-off

position, simply because he had challenged the

punishment awarded to him. That was, according to Mr.

Singh, legally impermissible. In support of his submissions,

Mr. Singh placed reliance upon two decisions of this Court

in Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India and Others - (2005) 12

SCC 219 and Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of

Allahabad and Another - (2007) 4 SCC 247.

4. The legal position, as to the powers of the High Court to

direct enhancement of punishment in a writ petition arising

out of disciplinary action taken against an employee,

stands concluded by the decisions of this Court, referred to

above. In Pradeep Kumar's case (supra), in a somewhat

similar circumstances, a similar question had arisen for

consideration before this Court. In that case too the High

Court had found the punishment of reduction in pay and

denial of increments awarded to the appellant to be

4

(2016) 12 SCC 797

Page 17 of 20

inadequate, for the gravity of the misconduct. The High

Court had accordingly remanded the matter back to the

disciplinary authority to award the maximum punishment

of dismissal from service which direction was then assailed

before this Court on the ground that the High Court had no

such power to direct enhancement of punishment either by

itself or by remanding the matter to the disciplinary

authority. An employee complaining against the

punishment awarded to him could not, observed this Court,

be placed in a worse-off position for coming to the Court.

7. We have, in the light of the above decisions, no

hesitation in holding that the High Court had fallen in a

palpable error in directing issuance of a show cause notice

to the appellant. The appellant could not, as observed

earlier, be placed in a worse-off situation because of

his having sought redress against the punishment

awarded to him by the disciplinary authority which in

the instant case is the High Court itself.”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. In Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India5, the Court held: -

“4. Irrespective of the crime/offence with which the

appellant may have been charged, it was not open to the

High Court to have issued such a direction. The scope of

judicial review did not allow the High Court to have

interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary

authorities on the appellant. Besides, a writ petitioner

cannot be put in a worse position by coming to court.

The directions of the High Court are not sustainable and

must be set aside. We are told by the learned counsel for

the appellant that the respondent authority pursuant to the

directions issued by the High Court initiated proceedings

against the appellant for the purpose of imposing the

penalty of dismissal from service. We have held that the

direction of the High Court was wholly outside its

jurisdiction. The appeals are thus allowed and the High

Courts directions are set aside. The disciplinary enquiry

initiated on the basis of the High Court's order is

5

(2005) 12 SCC 219

Page 18 of 20

consequently also quashed. However, the writ petitions will

stand dismissed. There is no order as to costs.”

(Emphasis supplied)

28. Litigants go to court for vindicating their rights when

they perceive that there is an infringement. The court may,

after hearing both parties, grant or deny them relief

depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. As

pointed out in V.K. Majotra (supra) and Mohammad Naim

(supra), if without putting parties on notice (even in the rare

and exceptional case where facts warrant) the court travels

beyond the scope of the petition, takes parties by surprise

and makes any strong observations and directions, it will

create a chilling effect on other prospective litigants too.

They will be left to wonder whether by going to court in

matters where they perceive injustice has resulted, they will

be rendered worse off than what they were, before initiating

the proceedings. This could seriously impact access to

justice and consequently the very rule of law. Hence, in such

matters, courts must exercise great caution and

circumspection. 

Page 19 of 20

29. We are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances

of the case, the observations extracted hereinabove at para 3

are absolutely unjustified apart from the fact that they were

made in violation of principles of natural justice.

30. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, we partly

allow the appeal by expunging and setting aside the

following portion of the impugned order:-

“The 1st respondent Board shall take necessary steps to fix

the licence fee in respect of the land covered by Exts.P13

to P16 orders, taking note of the law laid down by this

Court in T. Krishnakumar [2022 (4) KLT 798: 2022 (5)

KHC SN 8] and also the law laid down in this judgment,

with notice to the 2nd petitioner Chinmaya Mission

Educational and Cultural Trust, as expeditiously as

possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the

date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.”

“In view of the facts noticed by this Court in paragraphs 36

and 37 of this judgment and also the stand taken by the 1st

respondent Board before this Court that other than the

copy of Exts.P13 to P16 orders, no other documents are

seen in the relevant files, we deem it appropriate to direct

the 1st respondent Board to conduct an enquiry by the

Chief Vigilance Officer (Superintendent of Police), Cochin

Devaswom Board in the matter relating to leasing out the

land of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom to the 2nd petitioner

Trust and take necessary action, if found necessary, based

on the report of the Chief Vigilance Officer”

Page 20 of 20

31. However, notwithstanding the expunction of the above

paragraphs, if the respondent-Board has legitimate rights to

enhance the licence fee, they may do so independently and

in accordance with law.

32. By our interim order of 30.10.2023, we directed the

appellants to deposit a sum of Rs.10 Lakhs with the first

respondent. The amount has since been deposited. In view

of the judgment passed today, we direct that the balance

amount be paid by the appellants to the first respondent, as

undertaken before us within three months from today.

33. No order as to costs.

……….........................J.

 [DIPANKAR DATTA]

……….........................J.

 [K. V. VISWANATHAN]

New Delhi;

06th October, 2025

Civil Law – Injunction simpliciter – Maintainability – Absence of declaration of title and recovery of possession – Effect of plaintiff admitting possession of property with defendant – Will proved, but possession not established – Suit for injunction without prayer for declaration or recovery of possession – Not maintainable. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining alienation and interference with possession, claiming absolute ownership of the suit property under a Will dated 30.09.1985 executed by her father, Rangaswamy Naidu, in her and her brother Govindarajan’s favour. The defendant (her brother, Munuswamy) claimed co-ownership and an earlier division of properties in 1983 between himself and Govindarajan, asserting continuous possession. The trial court found the Will proved and decreed injunctions. The first appellate court reversed, holding that the property was ancestral and that the testator had no authority to execute the Will. The High Court restored the trial court’s decree, holding the property to be the father’s self-acquired property and the Will to have been proved. Held, by the Supreme Court: Although the Will was proved, the testator’s right to bequeath remained under a cloud; the title was not conclusively established. The plaintiff, having admitted that the defendant was in possession, could not seek an injunction simpliciter without a prayer for declaration of title or recovery of possession. In suits where possession is with the defendant and the plaintiff relies on ownership by Will, the proper relief should include declaration of title and recovery of possession, not mere injunction. The trial court and High Court erred in granting injunction restraining interference with possession when plaintiff herself admitted defendant’s possession. However, injunction restraining alienation of the property is proper, as neither party’s title has been declared. Liberty granted to either party to institute appropriate proceedings for declaration of title and recovery of possession within three months. Till then, no alienation or encumbrance of the suit property shall be effected by either party. Held: Even if a Will is proved, when possession is admitted to be with the defendant and the plaintiff does not seek declaration of title or recovery of possession, a suit for injunction simpliciter is not maintainable. Result: Appeal disposed of. Liberty reserved to parties to seek declaration of title and possession. No alienation or encumbrance to be made meanwhile.

Civil Law – Injunction simpliciter – Maintainability – Absence of declaration of title and recovery of possession – Effect of plaintiff admitting possession of property with defendant – Will proved, but possession not established – Suit for injunction without prayer for declaration or recovery of possession – Not maintainable.

The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining alienation and interference with possession, claiming absolute ownership of the suit property under a Will dated 30.09.1985 executed by her father, Rangaswamy Naidu, in her and her brother Govindarajan’s favour.

The defendant (her brother, Munuswamy) claimed co-ownership and an earlier division of properties in 1983 between himself and Govindarajan, asserting continuous possession.

The trial court found the Will proved and decreed injunctions.

The first appellate court reversed, holding that the property was ancestral and that the testator had no authority to execute the Will.

The High Court restored the trial court’s decree, holding the property to be the father’s self-acquired property and the Will to have been proved.

Held, by the Supreme Court:

Although the Will was proved, the testator’s right to bequeath remained under a cloud; the title was not conclusively established.

The plaintiff, having admitted that the defendant was in possession, could not seek an injunction simpliciter without a prayer for declaration of title or recovery of possession.

In suits where possession is with the defendant and the plaintiff relies on ownership by Will, the proper relief should include declaration of title and recovery of possession, not mere injunction.

The trial court and High Court erred in granting injunction restraining interference with possession when plaintiff herself admitted defendant’s possession.

However, injunction restraining alienation of the property is proper, as neither party’s title has been declared.

Liberty granted to either party to institute appropriate proceedings for declaration of title and recovery of possession within three months.

Till then, no alienation or encumbrance of the suit property shall be effected by either party.

Held:

Even if a Will is proved, when possession is admitted to be with the defendant and the plaintiff does not seek declaration of title or recovery of possession, a suit for injunction simpliciter is not maintainable.

Result:

Appeal disposed of.

Liberty reserved to parties to seek declaration of title and possession.

No alienation or encumbrance to be made meanwhile.

2025 INSC 1197

Page 1 of 10

CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. ____ of 2025

(@Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18943 of 2024)

S. Santhana Lakshmi & Ors.

...Appellants

Versus

D. Rajammal

...Respondent

J U D G M E N T

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal arises from a suit filed by

Rajammal against Munuswamy, her brother, for injunction

simpliciter, one, to restrain alienation or encumbrance of the

suit property and the other to restrain interference with the

peaceful possession & enjoyment of the plaint schedule

property. The plaintiff claimed absolute right over the

property being half share of 1.74½ acres coming to 0.87¼ 

Page 2 of 10

CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

acres of dry landed property with all appurtenances

attached thereto. The claim was made specifically on the

ground that by a Will dated 30.09.1985, Rangaswamy Naidu,

their father had bequeathed the said property equally in

favour of the plaintiff and another brother, Govindarajan.

The plaintiff’s contention itself was that the defendant was

continuing in the property as a tenant while the defendant

claimed that he came into possession as a co-owner and

later there was an arrangement, by which in the lifetime of

his father, the property was equally divided between the

brothers i.e. the defendant and Govindarajan.

3. The trial court found the Will to have been proved and

decreed the suit injuncting the defendant from alienating the

property and from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful

possession. On appeal, the appellate court found that the

bequest was made of an ancestral land, on which the testator

had no right to execute the Will. The trial court judgment

was upset and the suit was dismissed. In the second appeal, 

Page 3 of 10

CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

the High Court formulated two questions of law as to

whether the appellate court was correct in finding the suit

property to be a joint family property and whether Ex.B5

document produced by the defendant was properly

construed.

4. The property was found to be the absolute property of

the plaintiff’s father though it was purchased by the

grandmother of the plaintiff. The title of the plaintiff’s father

was neither questioned by the grandmother in her lifetime

nor did she claim a right over the said property. Ex. A6 Will

was found to have been proved since the signature of the

testator was affirmed by PW1, the plaintiff and the signature

of one of the testators, who was deceased, was affirmed by

his own son, PW2. In the context of both the testators having

passed away, the evidence was found to be sufficient to

prove the Will. Based on the above findings, the right of the

plaintiff over the property was established and the

possession was found to follow title thus enabling both the 

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CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

injunctions sought for. The first appellate court’s order was

set aside, and the suit was allowed restoring the trial court’s

judgment & decree.

5. Before us, the legal heirs of the defendant, the

appellants, contended that they have been always in

possession of the land, as admitted by the plaintiff. The suit

was filed without any prayer for declaration and the

injunction simpliciter ought not to have been granted. It was

contended that by Ex. B1 agreement entered into by

Rangaswamy Naidu, Govindarajan and the original

defendant, there was a division of the properties in the year

1983 itself. The plaintiff was unable to produce any ocular or

documentary evidence to establish possession. The

plaintiff’s own admission was that the defendant was in

possession of the property.

6. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

respondent-plaintiff, however, would point out that there are

two different properties, as has been noticed by the High 

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CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

Court, one purchased in the year 1934 and another in the

year 1984. The house property is said to have been

purchased in the year 1984 with which the plaintiff was not

concerned in the suit. In fact, a specific pleading was made

reserving her right to take action against the house property

separately. The appellants as of now is concerned only with

the property more fully described in the plaint which does

not contain a house, is the contention.

7. We have gone through the suit in which clear

statements are made as to the defendant having been

inducted into the property as a tenant by the father. The

father is said to have filed OS No. 895 of 1984 to obtain

possession of the suit property and arrears of rent, which,

after the death of the father, stood dismissed allegedly for

reason of the defendant having agreed to pay the rent.

Immediately, we have to notice that Annexure P7 dismissed

OS No.895 of 1984 filed by Rangaswamy Naidu, after his

death, substituting Govindarajan and the plaintiff as the 

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CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

legal heirs. The suit was dismissed for default without any

observation of an agreement regarding payment of rent. It is

also pertinent to observe that even at that stage a written

statement was filed by the original defendant, Munuswamy

contending that in the suit property, the defendant had put

up a structure in which he was residing with his family. He

claimed possession of the property as a co-owner and not as

a tenant; which relationship was asserted to be not existing

since there was no such tenancy created orally or on the

strength of documents. The original plaintiff having died, the

siblings who got impleaded as his legal heirs, filed an

amended plaint again alleging tenancy and claiming the

property as per the registered Will dated 30.09.1985. The

substituted plaintiffs despite taking up a plea of the Will

executed by the deceased father in the amended plaint, the

proceedings were not continued and the suit stood

dismissed for default.

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CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

8. It was after a few years that the present suit was

instituted in the year 2003 wherein also the possession of the

defendant was admitted, again on the contention of a

tenancy arrangement. In the present suit also, the defendant

took up a contention that it was a joint family property later

set apart to his share.

9. More pertinent is the fact that the plaintiff in her

evidence clearly stated that property covered by the Will is

in the possession of Munuswamy and Govindrajan, her

brothers. The total extent of the property even according to

the plaintiff is 1.74½ acres and her share is 87.25 cents. The

property on the four sides of her share is stated to be in the

hands of third parties; which cannot be correct since when

half of the property is claimed, at least on one side the

property bequeathed to Govindrajan should have been

mentioned. In fact, even in evidence, it is repeated that in

the suit property the father and Munuswamy, the defendant

were staying in half portions of the house and Govindrajan 

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CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

was staying in the ancestral house. As of now, with respect to

the suit property, it is contended that Munuswamy is

enjoying the western portion and Govindrajan is enjoying

the eastern portion of the house.

10. It is also significant that though the plaintiff did not

have possession, she had not claimed recovery of

possession. While asserting a Will and title on its strength,

there should have been a declaration of title sought,

especially when the contention of the defendant was that he

came into the property as a co-owner and then occupies it

with absolute rights, making valuable improvements. The

defendant also did not seek to get a declaration on the basis

of an arrangement entered into with the father and the other

brother or seek a partition on the strength of a counter

claim.

11. In the above circumstances, we cannot but find the

‘Will’ is proved but the right of the testator to bequeath the

property is still under a cloud. Even if the title is established, 

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CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

there should have been a recovery of possession sought by

the plaintiff. The ill-drafted plaint and the clear admissions

made in the witness box ought to have restricted the trial

court and the High Court from granting an injunction against

the interference of peaceful enjoyment of the property,

especially when the possession was admitted to be with the

defendant, in the pleadings as also the oral evidence. The

injunction against alienation is perfectly in order since the

defendant too has not sought for a declaration of title.

12. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff sought for

agitating the cause afresh. We are of the opinion that since a

stalemate is created; with the ownership not having been

declared in favour of either of the parties, also considering

the relationship, we reserve liberty to either of the parties to

seek declaration of title and consequential possession or

recovery of possession, if they desire, which proceedings

will be instituted within a period of three months from today.

If a fresh proceeding is initiated then the same would be 

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CA @ SLP (C) No.18943 of 2024

considered afresh untrammelled by the findings in the

present proceedings, which shall not govern the rights of

the parties. However, we make it clear that no alienation

shall be made by both parties or the subject property

encumbered.

13. The appeal is disposed of with the above reservation of

liberty.

14. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

…..….…………………….….. J.

 (Ahsanuddin Amanullah)

.….….…………………….….. J.

 (K. Vinod Chandran)

New Delhi;

October 07, 2025.

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34 — Murder — Identity of assailants — Proof — Acquittal by Trial Court — Reversal by High Court — Sustainability The appellants (father, son and son-in-law) were tried for the murder of Pushpendra Singh. The Trial Court acquitted all three, but the High Court, in government appeal, convicted them under S. 302 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Held, the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal. The identity of the appellants as the persons who chased and killed the deceased was not established either by ocular evidence or by recovery of weapons. The only independent eyewitness (PW-7, Amarjeet Kaur) saw three unknown persons enter her house and assault the deceased but could not identify them. No test identification parade was held, and she was never asked to identify the appellants. The father of the deceased (PW-1), who claimed to be an eyewitness, reached the scene half an hour after the incident, as shown by the trustworthy testimony of PW-7, and was therefore not an actual eyewitness. His conduct in washing bloodstained clothes was unnatural. His presence at the scene was doubtful; he was a chance witness, as the diversion where he allegedly saw the appellants was not on his way home. PW-2 (Jwala Singh) was also a chance witness, following PW-1. No independent witness from the locality was examined. The recovery of weapons on the disclosure of the appellants was made from open spaces, and no effort was made to match the blood on those weapons with that of the deceased. The forensic report was not produced. The alleged statement of the appellants that the recovered weapons were the weapons of offence was inadmissible under Ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act; only that part of information which led to the discovery of weapons was admissible under S. 27. Consequently, neither the ocular evidence nor the recovery evidence established the identity of the appellants as the assailants. The findings of the Trial Court acquitting the appellants were not shown to be perverse or erroneous. The High Court manifestly erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants. Held, further, that the Trial Court having seen the demeanour of witnesses, its findings were entitled to due weight. Unless perverse, such findings ought not to be interfered with by the First Appellate Court. Result: Appeals allowed. Conviction and sentence set aside. Appellants acquitted by extending benefit of doubt. Bail bonds discharged. Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 25, 26 and 27 — Confession to police — Admissibility — Scope of S. 27 as exception to Ss. 25 and 26 — Extent of admissible portion Held, S. 27 is an exception to Ss. 25 and 26. Only that portion of information given by an accused in custody which distinctly relates to the discovery of a fact is admissible in evidence. The part of statement asserting that the weapons so discovered were those used in commission of the offence is not admissible. Applied: Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor, 1947 MWN Cr 45 (PC) — followed. Followed: Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421. Criminal Procedure — Appeal against acquittal — Interference by appellate court — Principles Held, an order of acquittal is not open to interference unless findings of the Trial Court are per se perverse or manifestly erroneous. It is safer and more appropriate to rely upon findings of the Trial Court which has seen the demeanour of the witnesses. The High Court, without recording a finding that the Trial Court’s view was perverse, erred in reversing acquittal. Result Appeals allowed — Conviction set aside — Appellants acquitted — Bail bonds discharged.

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34 — Murder — Identity of assailants — Proof — Acquittal by Trial Court — Reversal by High Court — Sustainability

The appellants (father, son and son-in-law) were tried for the murder of Pushpendra Singh. The Trial Court acquitted all three, but the High Court, in government appeal, convicted them under S. 302 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

Held, the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal. The identity of the appellants as the persons who chased and killed the deceased was not established either by ocular evidence or by recovery of weapons. The only independent eyewitness (PW-7, Amarjeet Kaur) saw three unknown persons enter her house and assault the deceased but could not identify them. No test identification parade was held, and she was never asked to identify the appellants. The father of the deceased (PW-1), who claimed to be an eyewitness, reached the scene half an hour after the incident, as shown by the trustworthy testimony of PW-7, and was therefore not an actual eyewitness. His conduct in washing bloodstained clothes was unnatural. His presence at the scene was doubtful; he was a chance witness, as the diversion where he allegedly saw the appellants was not on his way home. PW-2 (Jwala Singh) was also a chance witness, following PW-1. No independent witness from the locality was examined.

The recovery of weapons on the disclosure of the appellants was made from open spaces, and no effort was made to match the blood on those weapons with that of the deceased. The forensic report was not produced. The alleged statement of the appellants that the recovered weapons were the weapons of offence was inadmissible under Ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act; only that part of information which led to the discovery of weapons was admissible under S. 27.

Consequently, neither the ocular evidence nor the recovery evidence established the identity of the appellants as the assailants. The findings of the Trial Court acquitting the appellants were not shown to be perverse or erroneous. The High Court manifestly erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants.

Held, further, that the Trial Court having seen the demeanour of witnesses, its findings were entitled to due weight. Unless perverse, such findings ought not to be interfered with by the First Appellate Court.

Result: Appeals allowed. Conviction and sentence set aside. Appellants acquitted by extending benefit of doubt. Bail bonds discharged.

Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 25, 26 and 27 — Confession to police — Admissibility — Scope of S. 27 as exception to Ss. 25 and 26 — Extent of admissible portion

Held, S. 27 is an exception to Ss. 25 and 26. Only that portion of information given by an accused in custody which distinctly relates to the discovery of a fact is admissible in evidence. The part of statement asserting that the weapons so discovered were those used in commission of the offence is not admissible.

Applied: Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor, 1947 MWN Cr 45 (PC) — followed.

Followed: Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421.

Criminal Procedure — Appeal against acquittal — Interference by appellate court — Principles

Held, an order of acquittal is not open to interference unless findings of the Trial Court are per se perverse or manifestly erroneous. It is safer and more appropriate to rely upon findings of the Trial Court which has seen the demeanour of the witnesses. The High Court, without recording a finding that the Trial Court’s view was perverse, erred in reversing acquittal.

Result

Appeals allowed — Conviction set aside — Appellants acquitted — Bail bonds discharged.2025 INSC 1193

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 476-477 OF 2013

RAJENDRA SINGH AND ORS. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARANCHAL ETC. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

 PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. All the three appellants, father, son and son-in-law are

accused in Session Trial No.215 of 2000 for the murder of

Pushpendra Singh, son of Diler Singh.

2. They were acquitted by the Trial Court but have been

convicted under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code (for short,

‘IPC’) with life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/- each

by the High Court vide the judgment and order dated

02.01.2013 passed in Government Appeal No.347 of 2007

(State of Uttaranchal vs. Rajendra Singh and Ors.).

1

3. All the three accused have challenged the aforesaid

judgment and order of their conviction and sentence by

means of this appeal.

4. The prosecution story in brief is that on the morning of

03.06.2000, the appellant no.1 – Rajendra Singh and his

son appellant no.2 – Bhupender Singh started digging the

field of Diler Singh, the father of the deceased, for laying

down plinth. Due to the aforesaid action of the appellants,

an altercation took place between them and Diler Singh.

5. On the same day at about 1.30 p.m. when the deceased –

Pushpendra Singh was sitting at the Jogither diversion

(Tiraha), his father – Diler Singh who had gone to the flour

mill of Kakka Singh, while returning accompanied by his

brother-in-law - Papender Singh, saw the appellants coming

on the motorcycle driven by the appellant no.3 – Ranjeet

Singh at the said spot. They parked their vehicle and

exhorted the deceased who started running followed by all

the three accused persons armed with swords and carrying

a kanta (a sharp edged weapon).

2

6. The deceased ran for some time towards the northern fields

raising an alarm. Witnessing the same, Diler Singh,

Papender Singh and some other persons including Jwala

Singh started running behind the accused persons to save

the deceased. The deceased, attempting to save his life,

entered into the house of one Mukhtyar Singh. The

appellants also entered the said premises and inflicted

blows with swords and Kanta upon the deceased who

ultimately died on the spot. The father of the deceased Diler

Singh (PW-1) on the same day lodged an FIR at 02.50 p.m.

at Police Station, Nanak Matta under Section 302 of IPC

(Section 103(1) BNS). The panchnama was prepared,

statement of the witnesses were recorded, site plan was also

prepared and the dead body was sent for post-mortem,

which was conducted the next day.

7. The appellant nos.1 and 3 were arrested on 05.06.2000 and

one sword and the Kanta, the alleged weapons of crime,

were recovered as per the disclosure made by the

appellants.

3

8. The appellant no.2 was arrested on 07.06.2000 and the

sword used by him in the commission of the offence was

recovered based on his disclosure.

9. Upon completion of investigation, the police submitted the

chargesheet on 14.06.2000 charging all the three accused

for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the

IPC.

10. We had heard Shri Rajul Bhargava, senior advocate and

Shri Siddharth Agarwal, senior advocate along with Shri

Vivek Singh, advocate-on-record from the side of the

appellants and Shri Kuldeep Parihar, D.A.G and Ms.

Anubha Dhulia, advocate for the State of Uttarakhand.

11. The primary submission on behalf of the appellants is that

they have been falsely implicated. There is no reliable

evidence to establish the identity of the appellants as the

alleged assailants. There is no eyewitness to the incident,

except the lady of the house into which the deceased had

entered to save his life. There are large contradictions in the

statements of the witnesses and that the discovery of the

4

weapons of crime is false and otherwise also has no

relevance to establish the identity of the accused with that

of the assailants.

12. The State counsel has stoutly opposed the submissions

advanced from the side of the appellants and has submitted

that all the three accused were seen by the witnesses

chasing the deceased, who had entered the house of

Mukhtyar Singh, and assaulted him with the swords and

the kanta which fact was witnessed by the lady of the

house, Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7). The clothes of PW-7 which

had blood stains were sealed by the police and the FSL

report confirmed the presence of blood on the clothes. On

the disclosure of the appellants, the weapons of crime were

recovered, and they admitted to having committed the crime

with the same. The above evidence leaves no scope for

doubt about the commission of the offence at the hands of

the appellants. Therefore, the High Court rightly reversed

the decision of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, so as

5

to convict the appellants for the offence under Section 302

of IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

13. There is no dispute to the fact that on the morning of the

fateful day, appellant nos.1 and 2 had a quarrel with the

father of the deceased – Diler Singh, as they were stopped

from digging the field for laying the plinth. The aforesaid

altercation between the two groups may be a motive to

attack and kill the son of Diler Singh, but that by itself

would not be sufficient to rope in the appellants unless their

involvement in the offence is established by cogent evidence.

Therefore, the primary issue which arises for our

consideration is, whether the appellants are the real

persons who chased the deceased and killed him. This has

to be ascertained on the basis of the ocular evidence.

14. In this connection, the primary evidence is of the lady of the

house Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7). The said witness, who is the

wife of Mukhtyar Singh, the owner of the house, clearly

deposed that the three accused persons killed the boy in

the house. They entered carrying swords and other weapons

6

in their hands. She tried to refrain them from assaulting

the boy, and in that process, her kurta received blood

stains. The victim fell down on the dewan after sustaining

injuries. Nobody inflicted any injury after the victim fell on

the dewan. The victim’s father and other people came there

within half an hour of the departure of the assailants. The

police took her blood-stained kurta and even the bedsheet

in their possession, which she identified as Exhibit-1 and

Exhibit-2. She categorically stated that she did not know

the name of the accused persons.

15. The aforesaid testimony of PW-7 clearly reflects that she had

seen three unknown persons, assaulting the deceased with

weapons like swords and that the deceased fell down on the

dewan, whereafter the assailants left without inflicting

further injuries upon him. The father of the deceased and

other persons came there only after about half an hour. A

careful reading of the testimony of PW-7, as a whole, would

indicate that she did not know the names of the accused

persons and thus, could not disclose their identity. She had

7

only seen three persons attacking and assaulting the boy

but could not identify those persons.

16. No identification parade was carried out and PW-7 was not

even asked to confirm whether the appellants were the

accused persons. The police failed to get the appellants

identified by her. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the

persons who assaulted the deceased were actually the

appellants.

17. The prosecution sought to establish the identity of the

accused persons with the help of testimony of Diler Singh

(PW-1) and Jwala Singh (PW-2).

18. A close look at the testimony of PW-1 would reveal that on

03.06.2000 at about 1.30 p.m., on returning from the flour

mill of Kakka Singh, he saw his deceased son sitting at

Jogither diversion on a bench, when all the three appellants

came on motorcycle carrying naked swords. They parked

the motorcycle and threatened/provoked his son,

whereupon his son started running towards the fields. The

appellants chased him with swords and kanta. His son kept

8

crying “Save Me, Save Me”. Thereupon, on hearing the

scream, he and his brother-in-law - Papender Singh, ran

after the accused persons to save the deceased. They were

followed by Jwala Singh, Bachan Singh and Bhagat Singh.

The deceased entered the house of Mukhtyar Singh to save

himself. The appellants also went inside. He saw the

appellants striking his son with weapons. His son fell on the

dewan and died due to the injuries. The appellants,

thereafter, fled from the scene.

19. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the Jogither

diversion is about 1.5 kms. away from his house and that

there are three to four shops at the diversion itself. The

house of Mukhtyar Singh is also at a distance of 1.25 kms.

At the time of the incident, people were working in the fields

and they also saw the appellants chasing his son. He also

stated that he chased the appellants for about 10-15

minutes towards the house of Mukhtyar Singh and was

about 40 to 50 steps behind them when his son entered the

house of Mukhtyar Singh. The appellants attacked his son

9

with swords and Kanta even after he fell down on the

dewan. They kept hitting him, mainly on the head, for

about a minute. Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7) had tried to save his

son and, in the process, her clothes got blood stains.

Thereafter, he hugged his son due to which his clothes also

got blood stains. He went to the police station in those very

clothes, but the clothes were neither taken nor seized by the

police.

20. If the testimony of PW-1 is seen in the light of the testimony

of PW-7, there are striking contradictions in the statements

of the two witnesses. The testimony of PW-7 is quite

trustworthy and natural. She is an independent witness

and therefore, it is safer to rely upon her statement. She has

categorically stated that the father of the deceased and

other persons had arrived at her house about half an hour

after the incident or after the accused had left the place.

The testimony of PW-7 is apparently quite trustworthy as

there is no reason to disbelieve it. It is clear from her

statement that PW-1 had reached the place of incident after

10

half an hour of the incident. He is, therefore, not actually an

eyewitness who was present at the time when the

appellants allegedly attacked the deceased. He had come

there after about half an hour and as such cannot be an

eyewitness to the incident of attack. Secondly, PW-1

categorically stated that when his son fell down on the

dewan, he hugged him and, in the process, his clothes were

stained with blood. He never offered his blood-stained

clothes to the police for investigation, nor did the police

seized the same, despite the fact that he had gone to the

police station wearing them. Rather, he stated that he

washed them and wore them again. This is quite unnatural

and an indicator to the fact that the PW-1 was not actually

present when the incident of assault took place in the

house of Mukhtyar Singh, and that the story of hugging the

deceased is concocted.

21. It is also very unnatural for PW-1 to go to the Jogither

diversion while returning from the flour mill of Kakka Singh

as admittedly the said diversion is not on the way back to

11

his home. He is, therefore, a chance witness and probably

may not have seen the appellants coming on the bike or

even chasing the deceased. In these circumstances, PW-1

cannot be treated as a trustworthy witness and his evidence

cannot be relied upon to identify the appellants as the

persons who have attacked and assaulted the deceased.

22. PW-2 - Jwala Singh also appears to be a chance witness. He

was going to Jogither Diversion to purchase a soap but

when he found the PW-1 chasing the appellants, he also ran

behind him in order to help him and save the life of the

deceased. He categorically stated that he was 60-70 steps

behind PW-1. Naturally, his entry in the house of Mukhtyar

Singh would have been only after PW-1, who had entered

the house as per the ocular evidence of PW-7, about half an

hour after the incident. In the above situation, PW-1 could

not have been an actual eyewitness of the incident of

assault or the person who would have seen the appellants

well enough to recognize them as the real assailants.

12

Therefore, his evidence also could not have established the

identity of the appellants.

23. Furthermore, no independent person of the area, the

shopkeepers or the labourers working in the fields, who

allegedly saw the appellants chasing the deceased, were

called upon to enter the witness box to corroborate the

evidence of PW-1 and PW-2.

24. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the ocular

evidence of PW-7, PW-1 and PW-2, if read together, is not

sufficient to identify the appellants as the persons who

attacked and assaulted the deceased resulting in his death.

It may be pertinent to mention here that even PW-4 - Kakka

Singh, to whose flour mill PW-1 had allegedly gone and was

said to be returning from there also did not support the

statement of PW-1. He has nowhere stated that PW-1 had

been to his flour mill, as alleged by him. Therefore, the

presence of PW-1 at the scene of crime becomes doubtful.

Once his presence is doubtful, the presence of PW-2 also

13

stands belied, because he categorically stated that he was

following PW-1 and was 60-70 steps behind him.

25. The prosecution did not ask any of these witnesses to

identify the accused persons.

26. This Court, in several decisions, while considering the

evidentiary value of a chance witness, has held that the

deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place

of incident is doubtful should be discarded, or at least be

treated with great caution and close scrutiny. Such a

chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the

place of incident, which has not been satisfactorily done in

the instant case.

27. Now, what remains before us is the recovery of the weapons

of crime to establish the identity of the appellants as the

persons involved in the crime. On the basis of the recovery

of the said weapons, we have to determine if the said

recoveries are good enough to connect the appellants with

the crime.

14

28. Undoubtedly, the recovery of one of the swords was made

from a garage, and the recovery of another sword and the

Kanta was made from bushes in sugarcane field, which was

an open space. The weapons were no doubt recovered

allegedly on the pointing out of the appellants. However, no

effort was made to match the blood on the said weapons

with that of the deceased. The weapons were sent for

forensic examination but no report of the forensic

laboratory was produced to establish that the weapons so

recovered were smeared with the blood of the deceased to

prove that they were actually used in the murder of the

deceased.

29. We are afraid that the submission of the State counsel, that

as the appellants themselves stated that they took the police

to the place where they hid the weapons, by which they

committed the offence indicates that the appellants

admitted to have committed the offence with the above

weapons, cannot be accepted. The statement of the

appellants that the weapons recovered were the weapons of

15

crime cannot be read against them in view of Sections 25

and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,

1872. Only that part of the statement which leads the police

to the recovery of the weapons is admissible, and not the

part which alleges that the weapons recovered were actually

the weapons of crime.

30. The above three provisions of the Evidence Act are

beneficial to bring home the point. They read as under:

“25. Confession to police officer not to be

proved.––No confession made to a police

officer, shall be proved as against a person

accused of any offence.

26. Confession by accused while in custody

of police not to be proved against him.––No

confession made by any person whilst he is in

the custody of a police officer, unless it be

made in the immediate presence of a

Magistrate, shall be proved as against such

person.

Explanation.––In this section “Magistrate”

does not include the head of a village

discharging magisterial functions in the

Presidency of Fort St. George or elsewhere,

unless such headman is a Magistrate

exercising the powers of a Magistrate under

16

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 (10 of

1882)

27. How much of information received from

accused may be proved.––Provided that,

when any fact is deposed to as discovered in

consequence of information received from a

person accused of any offence, in the custody

of a police officer, so much of such

information, whether it amounts to a

confession or not, as relates distinctly to the

fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”

31. A simple reading of all the three provisions conjointly

reveals that the first two provisions are substantive,

whereas Section 27 is in the nature of an exception.

Sections 25 and 26, at one hand, provide that no confession

made to a police officer or to any person while in custody of

the police, shall be admissible against a person accused of

any offence, on the other hand, Section 27 provides an

exception to the above provisions. It states that so much of

the information, received from an accused person in

custody of the police, whether in the nature of confession or

otherwise, as related distinctly to the fact thereby

discovered, may be admissible. This means that not all

17

information disclosed by a person in police custody is

required to be proved as against the accused person; only

that part which distinctly relates to the discovery of a fact is

admissible and can be proved.

32. In Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. vs. The King Emperor1

,

the Privy Council while analysing the aforesaid three

provisions of the Evidence Act, held that the fact of

discovery, on information supplied by the accused is a

relevant fact except in a case in which the possession or

concealment of an object constitute the gist of the offence

charged. Information supplied by a person in custody such

as “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house”,

only leads to the discovery of the knife concealed in the

house of the informant, but whether the knife is proved to

have been used in the commission of an offence is another

question. So if the above information is followed by the

words, “with which I stabbed A”, those words would be

inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the

knife from the house of the informant, but are rather

1 1947 MWN CR 45

18

independent in nature, amounting to confession of the

crime which cannot be used against the person making it

i.e. the accused, in view of prohibition contained under

Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.

33. The aforesaid decision has recently been followed with

approval by the Division Bench of this Court in Manjunath

and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka2

 wherein it has been

said that only “so much of the information” as relates

distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible, and

the rest of the information stands excluded. In other words,

the information leading to the recovery of the weapons of

crime is admissible, but not the information that the crime

was actually committed by the said weapons.

34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the

identity of the appellants as the persons involved in the

offence has not been established either by any ocular

evidence or from the recovery of the weapons of crime.

2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421

19

35. It is important to note that the order of acquittal passed by

the Trial Court was not open to interference by the First

Appellate Court until and unless the findings recorded by

the Trial Court were per se perverse or erroneous. It is safer

and more appropriate to rely upon the findings of the Trial

Court which has seen the demeanor of the witnesses rather

than to rely upon the findings of the First Appellate Court.

In our opinion, the High Court erred in reversing the finding

of the Trial Court without coming to the conclusion that the

findings of the Trial Court were perverse.

36. Thus, in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case,

we are of the view that High Court manifestly erred in

interfering with the findings of acquittal recorded by the

Trial Court and reversing the judgment so as to convict the

appellants. It is doubtful whether the offence has been

committed by the appellants. The conviction of the

appellants is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed,

and the appellants are acquitted of the alleged offence by

granting them the benefit of doubt.

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37. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds stand

discharged.

.............……………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

.............……………………………….. J.

(PRASANNA B. VARALE)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 7, 2025.

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