Criminal liability under Section 138 NI Act survives even against sick companies, subject to trial proof.

• Case Title: Shree Nagani Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. L.D. Industries Ltd. & Ors.

• Citation: 2025 INSC 1064

• Court: Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

• Appeal No.: Criminal Appeal No. 3821 of 2025 & connected appeals

• Date of Judgment: 02 September 2025

• Bench: Manoj Misra, J. and Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

---

Facts

1. The appellant (Shree Nagani Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd.) filed multiple complaints under Section 138 read with Section 141 NI Act, 1881 against L.D. Textile Industries (accused company) and its directors.

2. The cheques (all dated 25.04.2001) totaling over ₹1.61 crores were dishonoured for “insufficient funds.”

3. Notices were issued; payment was not made.

4. The Magistrate took cognizance and issued process.

5. The accused argued:

   • The company had already been declared “SICK” under SICA, 1985.

   • A BIFR restraint order (21.08.2000) prohibited disposal of assets without consent.

   • Hence, prosecution under Section 138 NI Act was not maintainable.

6. Magistrate dismissed recall applications.

   • Revisional Court allowed discharge.

   • High Court (Bombay) affirmed discharge (05.10.2023).

   • Hence, appeal to Supreme Court.

---

Issues

1. Whether recall of process by the Magistrate was permissible?

2. Whether proceedings under Section 138 NI Act are barred when a company has been declared SICK and is under a BIFR restraint order u/s 22A SICA?

3. At what stage can the impact of a BIFR restraint order be examined – threshold or after trial?

---

Arguments

Appellant:

• Recall of process is impermissible (Adalat Prasad; In re: Expeditious Trial of 138 cases).

• Kusum Ingots does not bar all prosecutions; only requires examining facts if a restraint order exists.

• Presumption u/s 118(b) NI Act that cheque date is genuine.

• Cheques may have been issued for day-to-day operations, which the restraint order itself allowed.

Respondent:

• Once company declared “SICK,” and BIFR issued restraint, complaint proceedings were not maintainable.

• Cheques were post-dated; hence liability could not arise.

---

Held (Supreme Court Findings)

1. On Recall of Process:

   • No power of recall lies with Magistrate (Adalat Prasad; Constitution Bench, 2021).

   • Revisional Court erred in interfering.

2. On BIFR Restraint Orders & NI Act:

   • Section 22 SICA: No bar on instituting criminal cases under Section 138 NI Act.

   • Section 22A SICA: Restrains disposal of assets, but does not automatically bar prosecution.

   • Whether cheques were issued for day-to-day operations is a factual issue, to be decided at trial after evidence.

   • Kusum Ingots clarifies: only in exceptional circumstances can restraint orders defeat prosecution, and that too fact-dependent.

3. On High Court & Revisional Court:

   • Both misapplied Kusum Ingots.

   • They wrongly discharged accused at threshold.

   • Proper stage to consider impact of restraint order is after evidence, not at process stage.

---

Decision

• Appeals allowed.

• Orders of High Court & Revisional Court set aside.

• Complaints under Section 138 NI Act restored before Magistrate.

• Magistrate directed to proceed with trial and bring matters to logical end.

2025 INSC 1064

 SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 1 of 19

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3821 OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024)

SHREE NAGANI SILK MILLS PVT. LTD.…APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

L.D. INDUSTRIES LTD. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3822 OF 2025

(@ SLP (Crl.) No.1551/2024)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3823 OF 2025

(@ SLP (Crl.) No.1552/2024)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3824 OF 2025

(@ SLP (Crl.) No.1553/2024)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3825 OF 2025

(@ SLP (Crl.) No.530/2024)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3826 OF 2025

(@ SLP (Crl.) No.1554/2024)

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 2 of 19

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3827 OF 2025

(@ SLP (Crl.) No.1555/2024)

J U D G M E N T

MANOJ MISRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These seven appeals arise from identical

judgment(s) and order(s) of the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay (for short the High Court),

dated 5.10.2023, passed on separate petitions, under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India, impugning

revisional court order(s) emanating from separate

complaint(s) filed by the appellant against the

respondent(s) under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 18811. As common questions of law

and fact arise for our consideration, between same

set of parties, these appeals were heard together and

are being decided by a common order.

Factual matrix

3. Appellant is the original complainant who had

lodged separate complaints, under Section 138 read

with Section 141 of N.I. Act, against L.D. Textile

Industries (for short the accused company – first

respondent) and four others (other respondents) in

1 N.I.Act

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 3 of 19

respect of dishonour of cheques issued by the

accused company. Details of those cheques with

reference to corresponding SLP (Crl.) No. and

complaint number(s) are given in the table below:

Special

Leave

Petition

No.

Complaint

No.

Cheque

Date

Cheque No. Cheque

Amount (In

Rs.)

SLP

(CRL)

No. 1550

of 2024

1164/5/2001 25.04.2001 Cheque No.

948365

Rs.

20,00,000/-

SLP

(CRL)

No. 1551

of 2024

1162/5/2001 25.04.2001

25.04.2001

20.04.2001

Cheque No.

948367

Cheque No.

948368

Cheque No.

948369

Rs.

20,00,000/-

Rs.

20,00,000/-

Rs.

20,00,000/-

SLP

(CRL)

No. 1552

of 2024

1167/5/2001 25.04.2001 Cheque No.

948363

Rs.

20,00,000/-

SLP

(CRL)

No. 1553

of 2024

1168/5/2001 25.04.2001 Cheque No.

948362

Rs.

20,00,000/-

SLP

(CRL)

No. 530

of 2024

1163/5/2001 25.04.2001 Cheque No.

948364

Rs.

20,00,000/-

SLP

(CRL)

No. 1554

of 2024

1166/5/2001 25.04.2001 Cheque No.

948361

Rs.

20,00,000/-

SLP

(CRL)

No. 1555

of 2024

1165/2001 25.04.2001

25.04.2001

Cheque No.

948366

Cheque No.

948388

Rs.

20,00,000/-

Rs.

1,61,646/-

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 4 of 19

4. Allegations in each complaint, inter alia, are:

(a) that the accused company, towards part payment

for supplies made by the complainant, issued

cheque(s) in favour of the complainant; (b) those

cheque(s) were deposited for collection but they

returned for “insufficient funds” in the drawer’s

account; (c) complainant thereafter served notice on

all the accused calling upon them to pay to the

complainant the cheque amount; (d) despite service

of notice, the amount was not paid; and (e) therefore,

the accused company including respondents 2 to 5,

who were in-charge of and responsible for day-to-day

business affairs of the accused company, are liable to

be punished for offence punishable under Section

138 read with Section 141 of N.I. Act.

5. Based on the complaint and the affidavit filed in

support thereof, the accused were summoned by

Magistrate concerned.

6. On being summoned, the accused applied to

the learned Magistrate to recall the processes issued

against them and prayed that proceedings against

them be dropped and they be discharged. In their

application, it was claimed that the accused company

was not only declared ‘SICK’ by the Board of

Industrial and Financial Reconstruction2 under the

2 BIFR

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 5 of 19

provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special

Provisions) Act, 19853 but it was restrained from

disposing of any of its assets without the consent of

BIFR. In such circumstances, when a legal embargo

was imposed on disposal of its assets, it could not

have responded to the demand notice. Therefore,

proceedings qua them, under Section 138 of N.I. Act,

were not sustainable. In support of its plea, the

accused relied on a decision of this Court in M/s.

Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. M/s. Pennar

Peterson Securities Ltd. and others4.

7. The learned Magistrate dismissed the

application seeking recall of the processes. Against

which, the accused filed a revision before the Court of

Session. The revisional court allowed the revision and

set aside the order of the learned Magistrate thereby

discharging the accused of offences punishable under

Section 138 read with Sections 141 and 142 of N.I.

Act. Aggrieved by orders of the revisional court,

appellant filed Criminal Writ Petition Nos.767, 768,

769, 770, 776, 777 and 779 of 2005 before the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay, which came to be

dismissed by impugned order(s) dated 5.10.2023.

3

SICA

4

(2000) 2 SCC 745

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 6 of 19

8. Aggrieved therewith, these appeals have been

filed.

9. We have heard Sri Ninad Laud for the

appellants and Sri Rishi Bhuta for the respondents.

Submissions on behalf of the appellant

10. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted:

(i) Recall of processes is not permissible

in view of law laid down by this Court in

Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal5

and Constitution Bench decision In Re:

Expeditious Trial of Cases under

Section 138 of NI Act, 18816.

Therefore, the learned Magistrate was

justified in rejecting the recall

application. In such circumstances, the

revisional court ought not to have

interfered with the order of learned

Magistrate. Thus, the High Court erred

in not correcting the mistake committed

by the revisional court.

(ii) High Court misconstrued the law

laid down by this Court in Kusum

Ingots (supra) where, in paragraph 18,

5

(2004) 7 SCC 338

6

(2021) 16 SCC 116

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 7 of 19

it was held that Section 22 of SICA does

not create any legal impediment for

instituting and proceeding with a

criminal case on the allegations of an

offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act

against a company or its Directors.

Further, in paragraph 19 of the said

judgment, it was clarified that where

BIFR has issued a restraint order under

Section 22A the Court would have to

examine whether proceedings under

Section 138 of N.I. Act can be instituted

during the period in which the restraint

order remains operative. Therefore, such

issue would have to be decided on the

facts of each case, that is, by taking into

account the nature of the restraint

order, the date when the cheque is

issued and the reason for which it is

issued. It was also urged that the

restraint order issued by BIFR clearly

provided that if the company was

running, the current assets could be

drawn to the extent required for day-today operations which meant that the

embargo was not absolute and if 

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 8 of 19

cheques were issued for running day to

day operations, the restraint order

would not hit the proceedings under

Section 138 of N.I. Act.

(iii) Restraint order of BIFR is dated

21.08.2000 whereas the cheques in

question were issued in 2001 as is clear

from the date on the face of the cheque.

Further, the date on the cheque raises a

rebuttable presumption, under Section

118(b) of N.I. Act, that it was issued on

the date which the cheque bears. In

such circumstances, if the cheque was

issued in 2001 to meet day-to-day

expenses of the accused-company, the

restraint order of BIFR cannot stifle the

proceedings under Section 138 of N.I.

Act.

11. In a nutshell, the submission of learned

counsel for the appellant is that whether the

proceedings under Section 138 of N.I. Act are barred

on account of restraint order of BIFR, is a mixed

question of law and fact which has to be decided on

the facts of each case based on the evidence led by

the parties. Therefore, restraint order cannot be used

to stifle a legitimate prosecution without giving 

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 9 of 19

opportunity to the complainant to lead evidence.

Further, the power to recall the summoning order

does not exist. Hence, the learned Magistrate’s order

rejecting the recall application required no

interference by the revisional court. In such

circumstances, the High Court ought to have

corrected the error committed by the revisional court.

Submissions on behalf of accused-respondent(s)

12. Per contra, learned counsel for the accusedrespondent(s) supported the judgment of the High

Court and submitted that the cheques sought to be

encashed by the complainant were all post-dated and

once the accused company was declared ‘SICK’ and a

restraint order was passed, the complaint

proceedings were liable to be quashed and, therefore,

order of the revisional court as well as the High Court

calls for no interference.

Analysis/ Discussion

13. We have considered the submissions and

have perused the materials on record.

14. Before we address the rival submissions, it

would be apposite to notice the allegations which are

common in all the complaints. In all complaints, it is

alleged that cheques were issued in 2001 against

supplies made to the accused company. No doubt, a

plea has been raised on behalf of accused that those 

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 10 of 19

were post-dated cheques. However, the law raises a

presumption that every negotiable instrument

bearing a date was made or drawn on such date7. In

such circumstances, to rebut the said presumption,

evidence would have to be led. Therefore, at this

stage, while dealing with validity of the processes

issued, based on complaint allegations and affidavit

filed in support thereof, in absence of any evidence

led by the accused, it would not be permissible to

pre-judge the issue and record a finding that cheque

was post-dated.

15. Section 228 of SICA, inter-alia, deals with

suspension of legal proceedings etc against a ‘SICK’

7 118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.—

Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:—

(a) of consideration — that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that

every such instrument, when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted,

endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;

(b) as to date —that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date;

8 22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts etc - (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an

inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or

consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section

25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in

the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of

the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no

proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against

any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof

(and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company) shall lie

or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate

Authority.

(2) Where the management of the sick industrial company is taken over or changed (in pursuance of any

scheme sanctioned under section 18), notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act,

1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or in the memorandum and articles of association of such company or

any instrument having effect under the said Act or other law -

(a) it shall not be lawful for the shareholders of such company or any other person to nominate or

appoint any person to be a director of the company;

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 11 of 19

company. Section 22A9 empowers BIFR to direct the

Sick Industrial Company not to dispose of, except

with the consent of the Board, any of its assets:

(b) no resolution passed at any meeting of the shareholders of such company shall be given effect to

unless approved by the Board.

(3) Where an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to in section 17 is under

preparation or during the period) or consideration of any scheme under section 18 or where any such

scheme is sanctioned thereunder, for due implementation of the scheme, the Board may by order

declare with respect to the sick industrial company concerned that the operation of all or any of the

contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other

instruments in force, to which such sick industrial company is a party or which may be applicable to such

sick industrial company immediately before the date of such order, shall remain suspended or that all or

any of the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said

date, shall remain suspended or shall be enforceable with such adoptions and in such manner as may be

specified by the Board :

Provided that such declaration shall not be made for a period exceeding two years which may be

extended by one year at a time so, however, that the total period shall not exceed seven years in the

aggregate.

(4) Any declaration made under sub-section (3) with respect to a sick industrial company shall have

effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law, the

memorandum and articles of association of the company or any instrument having effect under the said

Act or other law or any agreement or any decree or order of a court, tribunal, officer of other authority

or of any submission, settlement or standing order and, accordingly, -

(a) any remedy for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation and liability suspended or modified

by such declaration, and all proceedings relating thereto pending before any court, tribunal, officer or

other authority shall remain stayed or be continued subject to such declaration;

and

(b) on the declaration ceasing to have effect -

(i) any right, privilege, obligation or liability so remaining suspended or modified, shall become revived

and enforceable as if the declaration had never been made; and

(ii) any proceeding so remaining stayed shall be proceeded with, subject to the provisions of any law

which may then be in force, from the stage which had been reached when the proceedings became

stayed.

(5) In computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or

liability, the period during which it or the remedy for the enforcement thereof remains suspended under

this section shall be excluded.

922-A - Direction not to dispose of assets - The Board may, if it is of opinion that any direction is

necessary in the interest of the sick industrial company or creditors or shareholders or in the public

interest, by order in writing direct the sick industrial company not to dispose of, except with the consent

of the Board, any of its assets -

(a) during the period of preparation or consideration of the scheme under section 18; and

(b) during the period beginning with the recording of opinion by the Board for winding up of the

company under sub-section (1) of section 20 and up to commencement of the proceedings relating to

the winding up before the High Court concerned.

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 12 of 19

(a) during the period of preparation or

consideration of the scheme under Section 18; and

(b) during the period beginning with the recording

of opinion by the Board for winding up of the

company under sub-section (1) of Section 20 and

up to commencement of the proceedings relating to

the winding up before the High Court concerned.

16. In the instant case, the restraint order passed

by BIFR, dated 21.08.2000, extracted in paragraph

10 of the impugned judgment of the High Court,

reads thus:

“The company/promoters were directed u/s.

22-A of the Act not to dispose of any fixed or

current assets of the company without the

consent of the BIFR. In case the company

was running, the current assets could be

drawn to the extent required for day-to-day

operations, proper account of which should

be maintained.”

17. The afore-quoted restraint order would

indicate that there was no embargo on drawing from

the assets of the company to the extent required for

day-to-day operations.

18. In the instant case, according to the

complaint allegations, the complainant company had

made supplies and in lieu thereof the cheques in

question were issued. In such circumstances, in our

view, as there would be a presumption regarding the

date on which those cheques were issued, the 

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 13 of 19

question as to whether those cheques were issued for

running day-to-day operations of the company is an

issue, which would have to be addressed on the basis

of evidence led in trial.

19. The decision of this Court in Kusum Ingots

(supra) does not propound a complete bar on

proceedings against a “SICK” company under Section

138 of N.I. Act. Paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of Kusum

Ingots are relevant, and are reproduced below:

“18. In our considered view section

22 SICA does not create any legal impediment

for instituting and proceeding with a criminal

case on the allegations of an offence

under section 138 of the NI Act against a

company or its Directors. The section as we

read it only creates an embargo against

disposal of assets of the company for recovery

of its debts. The purpose of such an embargo

is to preserve the assets of the company from

being attached or sold for realisation of dues of

the creditors. The section does not bar

payment of money by the company or its

directors to other persons for satisfaction of

their legally enforceable dues.

19. The question that remains to be

considered is whether section 22A of SICA

affects a criminal case for an offence

under section 138 NI Act. In the said section

provision is made enabling the Board to make

an order in writing to direct the sick industrial

company not to dispose of, except with the

consent of the Board, any of its assets - (a)

during the period of preparation or

consideration of the scheme under section 18;

and (b) during the period beginning with the

recording of opinion by the Board for winding 

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 14 of 19

up of the company under sub-section (1)

of section 20 and up to commencement of the

proceedings relating to the winding up before

the concerned High Court. This exercise of the

power by the Board is conditioned by the

prescription that the Board is of the opinion

that such a direction is necessary in the

interest of the sick industrial company or its

creditors or shareholders or in the public

interest. In a case in which the BIFR has

submitted its report declaring a company as

'sick' and has also issued a direction under

section 22-A restraining the company or its

directors not to dispose of any of its assets

except with consent of the Board then the

contention raised on behalf of the appellants

that a criminal case for the alleged offence

under section 138 NI Act cannot be instituted

during the period in which the restraint order

passed by the BIFR remains operative cannot

be rejected outright. Whether the contention

can be accepted or not will depend on the facts

and circumstances of the case. Take for

instance, before the date on which the cheque

was drawn or before expiry of the statutory

period of 15 days after notice, a restraint order

of the BIFR under Section 22-A was passed

against the company then it cannot be said

that the offence under section 138 NI Act was

completed. In such a case it may reasonably

be said that the dishonouring of the cheque by

the bank and failure to make payment of the

amount by the company and/or its Directors

is for reasons beyond the control of the

accused. It may also be contended that the

amount claimed by the complainant is not

recoverable from the assets of the company in

view of the ban order passed by the BIFR. In

such circumstances it would be unjust and

unfair and against the intent and purpose of

the statute to hold that the Directors should

be compelled to face trial in a criminal case.

20. Except in the circumstances noted

above we do not find any good reason for 

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 15 of 19

accepting the contentions raised by the

learned counsel for the appellants in favour of

the prayer for quashing the criminal

proceedings or for keeping the proceedings in

abeyance. It will be open to the appellants to

place relevant materials in this regard before

the learned Magistrate before whom the cases

are pending and the learned Magistrate will

examine the matter keeping in mind the

discussions made in this judgment. We make

it clear that we have not considered the

question whether in the facts and

circumstances of a particular case Section

138 NI Act is attracted or not, for that is a

question to be considered by the Court at the

appropriate stage of the case in the light

evidence on record. The appeals are disposed

of on the terms aforesaid.”

(Emphasis supplied)

20. A careful reading of the aforesaid extracts

from Kusum Ingots (supra) would make it clear that

Section 22 of SICA does not create any legal

impediment for instituting and proceeding with a

criminal case on the allegations of an offence under

Section 138 of the N.I. Act against a sick company or

its Directors. However, where a direction is issued by

BIFR, under Section 22A of SICA, restraining the

company or its Directors not to dispose of any of its

assets except with consent of the Board, whether a

criminal complaint for the alleged offence under

Section 138 N.I. Act can be instituted during the

period in which the restraint order remains operative,

is a plea which would have to be considered, and 

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 16 of 19

whether that plea is to be accepted or not will depend

on the facts and circumstances of the case.

21. In Southern Steel Ltd. and Others vs.

Jindal Vijayanagar Steel Ltd.

10, this Court had an

occasion to consider whether proceedings against a

company, under Sections 138 and 141 of N.I. Act,

should be interdicted only because the company has

been declared ‘SICK’ under SICA. In the said case,

the accused-company, after being declared ‘SICK’, in

lieu of purchases made from the complainant, had

issued a cheque which got dishonoured. Those

purchases were made holding out that goods will be

paid for. On non-payment of cheque amount, despite

notice, the complainant initiated criminal proceeding

against the accused-company under Section 138 of

N.I. Act. Aggrieved by the proceeding under Section

138 of N.I. Act, accused-company filed petition under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

197311. The High Court dismissed the petition.

Thereafter, the accused-company approached the

trial court and sought discharge, under Section 258

of Cr.P.C., by placing order passed by BIFR under

Section 22A. The trial court dismissed the

application. The accused, thereafter, approached the

10 (2008) 5 SCC 762

11 Cr.P.C.

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 17 of 19

High Court. The High Court dismissed the

application and refused to quash the proceedings.

Aggrieved therewith, the accused approached this

Court by placing reliance on Kusum Ingots (supra).

Dismissing the appeal, this Court held:-

“9. According to the High Court, admittedly

the purchase orders in question were entered

into and the purchases were made by the

appellants with full knowledge of the

proceedings that the company was declared

sick under the SICA, the appellants clearly all

through gave the impression to the respondent

company that the outstanding amount

towards the purchase of the goods would be

shortly cleared. The fact that the purchases

were made with the clear promise to repay

could not be disputed by the appellants. The

Directors had in fact issued the cheques for

discharging their liability with the full

knowledge, would not only clearly show that

there was an undisputed debt, but would also

show that, right from the inception, the

appellants in fact had no intention of paying

the amount for the purchases made by them.

The intention of the appellants can be

gathered by their subsequent acts, conduct

and behaviour of taking a shelter under the

provisions of SICA. Hence, the appellants are

not entitled to any indulgence of this court

under its extraordinary jurisdiction under

Article 136 of the Constitution. The appellants

had lost their total credibility because of their

conduct. When the appellant company was

declared sick, then without disclosing this fact

the appellants ought not to have made huge

purchases from the respondent company.

Ultimately, the appellant company did not pay

for the purchases. This clearly indicates that

the appellants had no intention of making

payment of the purchases made by it.”

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 18 of 19

22. Legal principles deducible from the decisions

above, inter alia, are, (a) there is no embargo on filing

a complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act against a

‘SICK’ company; (b) even if there is a restraint order

under Section 22A of SICA, the nature of the

restraint order and the facts of that case would have

to be considered before taking a decision whether the

proceeding under Section 138 could continue or not;

and, (c) the appropriate stage for taking such a

decision would, ordinarily, be after parties have led

their evidence.

23. In the instant case, the restraint order under

Section 22A of SICA did not restrain the accusedcompany to draw on its assets to meet its day-to-day

operations and, according to the complaint

allegations, the cheques in question were issued to

discharge the liability of the accused-company

against supplies made by the complainant company.

In such circumstances, the revisional court fell in

error by recalling the processes and discharging the

accused at the threshold of the proceeding and the

High Court erred in not correcting the error so

committed by wrongly relying on Kusum Ingots &

Alloys Ltd. (supra).

24. Besides above, the prayer to recall the

processes was not maintainable in view of the 

SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2024 & connected matters Page 19 of 19

decision of this Court in Adalat Prasad (supra),

which has been affirmed by a Constitution Bench of

this Court In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under

Section 138 of NI Act, 1881 (supra)12.

25. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are

allowed. The impugned judgment(s) and order(s) of

the High Court as well as of the revisional court are

set aside. The proceeding(s) on the complaints of the

appellant, under Section 138 read with Section 141

of N.I. Act, shall stand restored on the file of the

learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate shall now

proceed in accordance with law and bring the

proceedings to its logical end.

26. Pending applications, if any, shall stand

disposed of.

 ….………….......................................J.

 (MANOJ MISRA)

……………......................................J.

 (UJJAL BHUYAN)

New Delhi;

September 02, 2025

12 24.6. The Judgments of this Court in Adalat Prasad (supra) and Subramanium Sethuraman (supra) have

interpreted the law correctly and we reiterate that there is no inherent power of Trial Courts to review or

recall the issue of summons. This does not affect the power of the Trial Court under Section 322 of the

Code to revisit the order of issue of process in case it is brought to the court’s notice that it lacks

jurisdiction to try the complaint.

Where the victim’s testimony is consistent, corroborated by medical and documentary evidence (including pregnancy and abortion records) and the accused were not misled by a defective charge, mere procedural irregularity (defective charge, non-compliance with s.223) will not vitiate conviction unless actual prejudice or failure of justice is shown. Joint trial irregularity alone does not automatically occasion miscarriage; appellate court must demonstrate real prejudice. Conviction and life sentences restored.

Case: Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.
Court / Bench: Supreme Court of India; Bench: Sanjay Kumar J. & Satish Chandra Sharma J.
Citation / File ref: 2025 INSC 1061; SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 (arising)
Date of Judgment: 01 September 2025
Result: Appeal allowed; High Court acquittal set aside; Trial Court conviction and sentence restored. Respondents (convicts) to surrender within two weeks.

Short headnote (suggested)

The High Court erred in acquitting two accused of rape and POCSO offences primarily on the basis of procedural non-compliance (misjoinder under Section 223 Cr.P.C.) and alleged evidentiary lacunae. Where the victim’s testimony is consistent, corroborated by medical and documentary evidence (including pregnancy and abortion records) and the accused were not misled by a defective charge, mere procedural irregularity (defective charge, non-compliance with s.223) will not vitiate conviction unless actual prejudice or failure of justice is shown. Joint trial irregularity alone does not automatically occasion miscarriage; appellate court must demonstrate real prejudice. Conviction and life sentences restored.

Facts in two lines

Victim (minor female) discovered pregnant in July 2016; alleged rapes by two local men (respondents) occurring after Holi, over a period in which threats were made. FIR lodged 02/07/2016; trial court convicted both under IPC §376 and POCSO §§4 & 6; High Court acquitted mainly citing procedural defects and inconsistencies; Supreme Court restored trial court judgment.

Procedural history

• FIR / Cr. Case No. 209/2016 (PS Piro) — investigation & chargesheet.

• Trial Court (Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, POCSO) — conviction: life imprisonment + fines (for IPC §376 and POCSO §§4 & 6; sentences concurrent).

• High Court — acquittal (procedural defects: date/time, age, proof of pregnancy/abortion, defective charge phrasing, and invalid joint trial under s.223 Cr.P.C.; found prejudice).

• Supreme Court — allowed appeal by State / father-appellant; restored conviction & sentence.

Issues framed by Supreme Court

1. Whether the High Court erred in acquitting by holding prosecution evidence was inconsistent/contradictory.

2. Whether non-compliance with Section 223 Cr.P.C. (joinder of trial) caused prejudice/failure of justice.

Key holdings / ratio (with pointers)

1. Victim’s testimony & corroboration — sufficient. Victim’s statements (trial, s.164 Cr.P.C.), medical reports (ultrasound 01/07/2016 showing ~15 weeks), school transfer certificate, parents’ testimony — taken together show she was a minor (approx. 12–15) and the prosecution case was consistent. Minor variations do not automatically create reasonable doubt. (Paras 15–19, 23)

2. Pregnancy & abortion proved. Ultrasound reports and discharge/abortion papers and corroborating oral testimony proved pregnancy and abortion; High Court overlooked this material evidence. (Paras 20–21)

3. Delay in FIR explained. Delay explained by intimidation and fear raised by accused; FIR lodged immediately after discovery of pregnancy. (Para 21)

4. Defective charge not fatal absent failure of justice. Charge saying “on or about 02.07.2016” (FIR date) was erroneous, but under s.464 & s.215 Cr.P.C. an error in charge vitiates conviction only if it occasioned failure of justice or misled accused. Here accused were aware of time-frame via chargesheet/trial and had no prejudice. (Paras 25–28)

5. Non-compliance with Section 223 Cr.P.C. not fatal without showing prejudice. Appellate courts must test whether the misjoinder/joinder caused actual prejudice or failure of justice. High Court stopped at misjoinder and failed to show prejudice; Supreme Court will not set aside convictions without proof of prejudice. (Paras 29–36, 33–35)

6. DNA not fatal omission here. Although better investigation (DNA tests) would be preferable, absence of DNA did not create reasonable doubt here because the victim correctly and consistently identified the accused and identity was unrebutted. (Para 24)

7. Principle on reasonable doubt. Not every minor inconsistency converts into a reasonable doubt; reasonable doubt must be supported by reason and must make prosecution’s case improbable. (Para 36)

Orders / Relief

• High Court judgment of acquittal set aside. Trial Court judgment of conviction and sentence restored.

• Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 to surrender to trial court within two weeks; otherwise trial court to take steps to take them into custody. Registry to communicate the order. (Paras 38–39)

2025 INSC 1061

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 1 of 35

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _______/2025

(arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 18377 of 2024)

SUSHIL KUMAR TIWARI ….APPELLANT

VERSUS

HARE RAM SAH & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The struggle for sensitivity towards offences against

women, children and other marginalized groups passes through

various phases of evolution. Whereas, the end goal is most

desirable, the journey is not always a pleasant one. At times, the

victims find themselves pitched against a system full of

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 2 of 35

insensitive stakeholders and at other times, the victims find

themselves in conflict with the procedural intricacies of the laws

in place. Despite the importance of procedural sanctity, it is

always a matter of utter failure for the system as a whole when a

culprit, that too of a heinous sexual offence, manages to walk free

by entangling the victim in misapplication of procedural rules,

without the knowledge of the victim and without any control of

the victim. The present case presents one such illustration from a

place called Piro, District Bhojpur, Bihar.

3. In 2016, a few months after the festival of Holi, the victim

- the appellant’s daughter – started feeling unwell. Upon finding

that her health was constantly deteriorating, the appellant’s wife

took their daughter to her native place in Ballia, Uttar Pradesh for

treatment. There, she was taken to Zila Mahila Chikitsalaya on

01.07.2016 and upon examination, the victim was found to be 3

months pregnant. Upon questioning, she disclosed that she was

raped by the respondents, namely, Hare Ram Sah and Manish

Tiwari about 3-4 months ago, sometime after the festival of Holi.

On the strength of this disclosure, the appellant lodged a

complaint at PS Piro, District Bhojpur, Bihar on 02.07.2016,

which culminated into FIR/Criminal Case No. 209/2016.

Investigation commenced and chargesheet was filed in the

concerned Court.

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 3 of 35

4. After trial, Learned Additional District & Sessions Judgecum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhojpur at Ara found the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 guilty for the commission of offences

under Sections 376(2) of Indian Penal Code, 18601

, and Sections

4 & 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO)

Act, 20122

. For the commission of the offence under Section 376

IPC, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo

rigorous life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 50,000/- each.

In default of payment of fine, additional sentence of

imprisonment for one year was imposed. For the commission of

the offence under Section 6 of POCSO Act, the Respondent Nos.

1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo rigorous life imprisonment

along with a fine of Rs. 25,000/- each. In default of payment of

fine, additional sentence of imprisonment for one year was

imposed. For the commission of the offence under Section 4 of

POCSO Act, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were sentenced to

undergo rigorous imprisonment of 7 years along with a fine of

Rs. 10,000/- each. In default of payment of fine, additional

sentence of imprisonment for three months was imposed. The

sentences were directed to run concurrently.

1 Hereinafter referred as “IPC”

2 Hereinafter referred as “POCSO Act”

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 4 of 35

IMPUGNED JUDGMENT

5. In appeal, the High Court examined the entire evidence on

record and came to the conclusion that the prosecution did not

succeed in proving the case against the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

In doing so, the High Court primarily found the following

infirmities in the prosecution case:

i. The date and time of the alleged incident were not

proved;

ii. The determination of age of the victim was not

carried out;

iii. No proof of abortion of the victim was placed on

record;

iv. The charge was not framed properly as it recorded

the date as 02.07.2016, whereas the incident was

reported on 01.07.2016 and offence was committed

3-4 months prior to its reporting;

v. The Trial Court committed an error in conducting

the joint trial of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2,

despite the case not falling within the conditions

stipulated in Section 223 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 19733

for conducting joint trial. The

3 Hereinafter referred as “Cr.P.C.”

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 5 of 35

High Court observed that the trial was bad in law, as

the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were accused of

committing different offences committed at

different points of time, and the joinder of trial had

caused grave prejudice to them and led to

miscarriage of justice.

6. The High Court emphasized that in addition to the

procedural infirmities that resulted from the non-compliance of

Section 223 Cr.P.C., there were major inconsistencies in the

deposition of prosecution witnesses. However, it clarified that the

conviction was not set aside solely due to procedural lapses. The

relevant para reads thus:

“42. As per the principles laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the two pronged test

satisfies this case that the joint trial conducted has

prejudiced the defence of the accused and has

successfully proven to cause a miscarriage of

justice. In view of the aforesaid facts and

circumstances of the present case, we are of the

view that the prosecution has failed to prove the

case on various grounds. The conviction of the

present appellants is not being set aside on the

mere ground that the procedure of Section 223 of

the Code has not been adhered to but there are

numerous laches on the part of the prosecution in

proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. The

learned Trial Court has also failed to consider the

fact that Section 223 was applicable in this matter,

but the same has not been considered in this case

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 6 of 35

and the appellants have been tried jointly, causing

prejudice to the appellants, despite which, the

learned Trial Court has recorded the impugned

judgment of conviction and the order of sentence.

As such, the same are required to be quashed and

set aside.”

THE CHALLENGE

7. Taking exception to the impugned judgment, Learned

Counsel on behalf of the appellant submits that the High Court

fell in a grave error in concluding that prejudice was caused to

the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 due to non-compliance of Section

223 Cr.P.C. He submits that the ground qua non-compliance of

Section 223 was never taken by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and

the High Court examined the same on its own. To buttress the

submission, it is submitted that even if Section 223 was not

complied, it did not cause any prejudice to the Respondent Nos.

1 and 2 and they had sufficient opportunity to participate and

defend themselves during the trial.

8. It is further submitted that the age of the victim was

established to be under 18 years without any doubt, on the

strength of the school transfer certificate, statement of the victim

under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the medical report dated

01.07.2016. It is further submitted that there was no reason to

doubt the testimony of the victim and in a case of this nature, the

testimony of the victim could form the sole basis of conviction.

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 7 of 35

It is further submitted that the aspects of pregnancy and abortion

were duly proved in the case on the basis of the medical reports

and abortion papers.

9. It is further submitted that there was no enmity between

the victim and the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and thus, there was

no motive to implicate the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is further

submitted that even if the High Court had found any procedural

irregularity, it ought to have remanded the matter back for fresh

adjudication instead of acquitting the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

To buttress, it is submitted that the impugned decision

completely disregarded the rights of the victim.

10. Per contra, the respondents advanced submissions in

support of the impugned decision. On their behalf, it is submitted

that the investigation was carried out in a completely casual and

negligent manner and the same cause prejudice to the Respondent

Nos. 1 and 2. The submissions draw attention to the aspects of

age determination, absence of proof of pregnancy and abortion,

lack of investigation qua the date, time and place of the incidents,

etc. It is further submitted that the charges framed by the Trial

Court were defective and the entire trial was conducted on the

basis of defective charges, thereby disentitling the Respondent

Nos. 1 and 2 from a fair participation.

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 8 of 35

11. It is furthersubmitted that the Trial Court conducted a joint

trial of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in utter violation of Section

223 Cr.P.C. and without fulfilment of the conditions

contemplated thereunder. It is further submitted that even at the

stage of Section 313 Cr.P.C., the incriminating evidence was not

put properly to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and consequently,

the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were prevented from explaining the

evidence against them in a proper manner. Further, it is submitted

that the version of the prosecution witnesses, especially that of

the victim, was not consistent and the Trial Court committed an

error in placing reliance upon their testimonies. It is further

submitted that the defence witnesses presented a valid defence

and the same out to have been considered.

12. Both the parties have filed written submissions and

compilation of judgments in support of their case. We have

considered the same.

DISCUSSION

13. We have carefully considered the contentions advanced by

the parties, impugned judgment, judgment of the Trial Court and

the decisions relied upon by the parties. In light of the

controversy involved in the matter, the following two issues arise

for our consideration:

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 9 of 35

i. Whether the High Court fell in a grave error in

acquitting the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by holding

that the prosecution failed to discharge its

evidentiary burden as the evidence led by the

prosecution was full of inconsistencies and

contradictions?

ii. Whether the High Court erred in its finding that the

trial was carried out in violation of Section 223

Cr.P.C. and non-adherence to the same had caused

prejudice to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, thereby

leading to miscarriage of justice?

14. We may first consider the issue regarding inconsistencies

and contradictions in the prosecution evidence, which would

require some degree of examination of the evidence on record.

At the outset, it needsto be noted that the High Court has outlined

a few specific issues in the case i.e. victim’s age, date and time

of the incident, proof of pregnancy and abortion, and delay in

lodging the FIR.

15. Before appreciation of evidence led on these aspects, we

may first traverse through the testimony of the victim, examined

before the Trial Court as PW-2, in order to understand the precise

allegations. After the discovery of pregnancy, PW-2 deposed that

the incident took place in 2016, a few days after the festival of

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 10 of 35

Holi. She deposed that one afternoon, her mother and father were

not at home and she was sleeping alone in the house. Respondent

No. 2 Manish Tiwari entered the house and raped her, and before

leaving, he threatened her saying that should she tell anyone

about it, she would be killed. Two or three days after this

incident, the victim went near Shivala in the evening hours to

look for her brother Himanshu. On the way, she passed

respondent No. 1 Hare Ram Sah’s room and inquired if he had

seen her brother. The said respondent pointed towards an inner

room (used as coaching center) and suggested to the victim that

her brother had gone in that direction. She went to check inside

the room and found no one there. At the same time, Hare Ram

Sah came from behind and grabbed her. She deposed that he took

her inside and raped her. He also threatened her by saying that

should she tell anyone about it, she would be killed. The victim

further deposed that she got scared and told no one about it. The

story does not end here. She further deposed that after this

incident, for two-three successive months, the Respondent

Nos. 1 and 2 took turns and raped her multiple times. Thereafter,

she fell sick and started experiencing stomach pain and vomiting.

She informed her mother and her mother firstly took her to a

doctor in Ara. Despite administration of medicines, her health did

not improve. Thereafter, the victim was taken to her maternal

uncle’s house in Ballia, Uttar Pradesh, where an ultrasound was

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 11 of 35

conducted and the pregnancy was discovered. It is noteworthy

that the statement of the victim recorded by the police, statement

recorded by the concerned Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

and the deposition recorded in the Court, are fairly consistent.

There appears to be no variance insofar as the material aspects of

the offence are concerned.

16. As regards the first issue concerning the age of the victim,

it is quite understandable that for an offence under the POCSO

Act, the victim must be aged under 18 years. In order to prove so,

the prosecution has relied upon both oral and documentary

evidence. The oral testimony of the mother of the victim,

examined before the Trial Court as PW-3, reveals that the victim

was 12 years old at the time of incident. Further, the statement of

victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. also bears an endorsement

regarding her age. The concerned ACJM, examined as PW-4, has

recorded her age as 13 years. The father of the victim, examined

as PW-5, has deposed that the victim’s age at the time of incident

was 12 years. Insofar as the documentary evidence is concerned,

the Transfer Certificate (Annexure P-10) issued by the

government school attended by the victim records her date of

birth as 03.10.2004, thereby meaning that during the concerned

time-frame of the year 2016, the victim was around 12 years old.

The medical report dated 01.07.2016 (Annexure P-1) is also

relevant on this aspect. The said medical report pertains to the

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 12 of 35

ultrasound examination of the victim and records her age as 15

years.

17. It cannot be denied that there are slight variations in the

age of the victim at the relevant point of time, as discernible from

the oral and documentary evidence. However, we do not find

ourselves in agreement with the High Court that the age was not

proved during trial. The oral testimonies of PW-3, PW-5 and PW6 are consistent inter-se as well as with the Transfer Certificate

issued by the government school. The age of the victim appears

to be within the range of 12-13 years at the relevant point of time.

The medical report records the age as 15 years. However, we

cannot lose sight of the fact that the age of the victim was not

challenged during cross-examination of any of the witnesses

mentioned above. Their testimonies, on the point of age, have

largely remained unrebutted, thereby meaning that the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had no claim that she was not a minor

at the relevant point. We do not mean to say in cases involving

POCSO Act or Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015,

the determination of age is not required. Most certainly, the

determination of minority is essential to extend the protection of

these legislations, however, as long as the age conclusively

appears to be under 18 years, the special protections carved out

in favour of children cannot be diluted by insisting upon a rigid

determination of the age, that too when it was not even

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 13 of 35

questioned at the right time. In the present case, even if it is

believed that the age of the victim was not determined to the hilt,

the Trial Court had concluded that the victim was aged between

12 to 15 years at the relevant point of time and thus, was a minor.

Thus, it could not be stated that the Trial Court had not

determined the minority of the victim. It was done and, in our

opinion, rightly so, on the basis of the unrebutted oral and

documentary evidence.

18. Interestingly, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 neither claimed

that the victim was not a minor at any point of time nor led any

evidence to that effect. We find that the High Court has erred in

raising a doubt where none existed, even inter-se the parties to

the case. We are also of the opinion that once the minority of the

victim was beyond doubt, the special protection of POCSO Act

ought not to have been diluted by raising a fictious doubt

regarding the precise age of the victim. For, the Courts must

remain alive to the socio-economic circumstances of the victims,

especially those who are based in remoter regions of the country.

In rural regions, discrepancies in the educational and

identification documents are not unknown and, in such

circumstances, the Courts must be sensitive to the ground

realities of the society, so as to ensure that the intent of the law is

not suppressed and protections created by the legislature reach

the intended persons in their right spirit.

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 14 of 35

19. As regards the issue regarding date and time of the

incident, the High Court has observed that the prosecution had

failed to prove the date and time of the offence. In order to

examine this aspect, we must appreciate the circumstances in

which the offence was committed and discovered. The main

witness pertaining to the commission of the offence is the victim

herself, examined as PW-2. She has expressed the entire chain in

a consistent manner and her version is also consistent with other

PWs. She has deposed that the offence took place in the days

following the festival of Holi and the same is corroborated by the

medical report dated 01.07.2016, which indicates that she was 3-

4 months pregnant as on 01.07.2016. The medical report

corroborates the time frame stated by the victim. Further, as

regards the time, the victim has deposed that the first incident

took place during the afternoon and the second incident took

place in the evening. Importantly, it is not a case wherein the

victim reported the offence immediately after its commission.

The victim was scared to report the incident to anyone as she was

threatened by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and probably, if not

for the pregnancy and deterioration of health, she would not have

reported either. Therefore, the inability of the victim, a minor girl,

to recollect the precise time and date of the offence is completely

natural. Furthermore, the victim has specified the places used for

the commission of the alleged offence, including her house and

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 15 of 35

coaching center of Respondent No. 1-Hare Ram Sah, and has also

correctly identified both the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. during trial.

Therefore, the victim has deposed in a completely natural manner

and her inability to depose about some facts in precise terms is

not only natural, but is also inconsequential as the medical report

has corroborated the time-frame of the offence. The testimony of

the victim is fairly consistent and there is no reasonable ground

to doubt the same. Moreover, this deficiency has not caused any

prejudice to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

20. As regards the proof of pregnancy and abortion, we find

that the High Court has fell in a grave error by failing to

acknowledge the evidence on record. The medical report dated

01.07.2016 categorically indicates that at the time of ultrasound,

the victim was 15 weeks pregnant. In the subsequent examination

conducted on 02.07.2016 at Ara, the victim was again found to

be 16 weeks pregnant and in support of the same, PW-7 has

deposed before the Trial Court. No infirmity has been pointed out

in the examination of PW-7. The factum of abortion has been

proved on the basis of the medical documents/Discharge Ticket

dated 30.07.2016 issued by Sadar Hospital, Ara. Further, the

Trial Court has noted that the letter dated 28.07.2016 bearing

Letter No. 60/BSLSA/AccT/2472 issued by the Bihar State Legal

Services Authority indicated that the victim’s father had sought

permission for her abortion. The said letter is Annexure P-4 and

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 16 of 35

it aligns with the observation of the Trial Court. It is also averred

that abortion was conducted after the constitution of medical

board by the Executive Chairman, BSLSA, Patna High Court, a

fact which has not been disputed. Thus, it appears preposterous

to hold that the prosecution could not prove the elements of

pregnancy and abortion. There is ample documentary and oral

evidence to prove these elements and we feel that the High Court

has overlooked relevant evidence in arriving at its finding. This

fact was duly proved in the common course of natural events, but

the natural events were overlooked.

21. As regards the delay in lodging the FIR, we feel that the

same has been appropriately explained. The incident came to

light only after the ultrasound conducted on 01.07.2016 and the

FIR was lodged on the very next day. Before the discovery of

offence, the delay of 3-4 months was a consequence of the

intimidation made by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, which

prevented the victim from opening up before her parents. It is

completely natural and understandable. We do not find that the

victim could be faulted in any manner on account of delay.

22. On an examination of the concerns, which formed the basis

of the impugned decision, we are of the view that undue emphasis

has been laid on these aspects by the High Court. One of the

foremost principles of appreciation of evidence is that natural

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 17 of 35

variations, errors and inconsistencies are not to be elevated to the

standard of a reasonable doubt or to hold that the prosecution has

failed. There is nothing like perfect evidence in a Court and in

fact, perfection is often suggestive of tutoring and manufacturing

of evidence. The availability of evidence as well as the quality of

evidence are not open to judgment on any pre-determined

parameters. For, these aspects not only depend upon the quality

of investigation but also upon the societal circumstances

prevalent in the area of crime. They also depend upon the level

of awareness, not only of the persons involved in the case but also

of the members of the locality who often appear as witnesses.

Therefore, the Courts must be alive to the state of affairs on the

ground and in that backdrop, it must examine whether the

inconsistencies and gaps have been properly explained or not. If

so, such inconsistencies and gaps may not affect the case of the

prosecution. However, if the prosecution fails to explain the

inconsistencies in its case, an adverse inference may be drawn

against it.

23. Be that as it may, the present case does not fall in such

category, as the prosecution witnesses have invariably deposed

in support of the version put across by the victim. The medical

reports and other documentary evidence have corroborated the

oral statement of the victim. Moreover, the oral statement of the

victim has remained fairly consistent at all levels of the

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 18 of 35

proceeding, including before the Magistrate who recorded her

statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the Trial Court where

she was subjected to cross examination. The version of the victim

has remained completely natural and consistent with the chain of

circumstances of the case. Despite cross-examination, there is

nothing to suggest that she is not creditworthy as a witness.

24. Having said so, we do agree that better investigation could

have been conducted in the present matter on certain aspects. For

instance, the accused persons ought to have been tested for DNA

analysis as it could have enabled more fool-proofing of the

prosecution’s case. This argument has been taken by the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the written submissions and reliance

has been placed upon the decision of this Court in Krishan

Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana4

. We have carefully

considered this aspect and are of the opinion that despite this

error, the case of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be

advanced as it does not give rise to any reasonable doubt. It is so

because the factual matrix of the present case is substantially

distinct from that in Krishan Kumar Malik. In the said case, the

version of the prosecutrix was found to be doubtful as she had

failed to disclose the name of the accused in the FIR, despite

admitting that she knew his name. She had also failed to explain

4

(2011) 7 SCC 130

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 19 of 35

the identity of the accused in an accurate manner and in fact,

stated that the accused was a short-structured person, which was

found to be contrary to his appearance. The prosecutrix had also

concealed and falsely presented certain material aspects of the

case. Thus, in this backdrop, the Court had observed that the

prosecution had failed to prove the identity of the accused therein

and DNA test ought to have been carried out to obtain scientific

evidence of identification. However, in the present case, the

victim has correctly named and identified both the Respondent

Nos. 1 and 2 right from the beginning of the case. In the Trial

Court as well, she had correctly identified them and no doubt qua

identity was raised at that stage. On the point of identity, the

victim has not even been rebutted at any stage. The Respondent

Nos. 1 and 2 have not shown any circumstance which could

enable this Court to raise a question on the identification of the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by the victim. Perhaps, there is none.

Therefore, merely on account of non-availability of DNA

analysis, the case of the prosecution cannot be discarded,

especially because the purpose of identification has been fulfilled

on the strength of other credible evidence. The reliance placed on

Krishan Kumar Malik (supra) is, thus, wholly misplaced.

25. Another important aspect that has weighed

with the High Court is the manner of framing 

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 20 of 35

of charge by the Trial Court. On this aspect, the High Court has

noted thus:

“25. The Code lays down various provisions with

regard to the framing of charges against an

accused. On perusal of charge sheet dated

06.12.2017, it is mentioned that the date of

occurrence of the incident was on 02.07.2016, but

the ferdbeyan dated 02.07.2016, states that the

daughter of the informant was pregnant for three

months and few days as according to the treatment

of the victim which was done on 01.07.2016.

Further, on perusal of the F.I.R and case diary,

the statement of the victim which is in para-3 of

the case diary dated 02.07.2016, she has stated

that the first incident, where Manish Tiwary

(appellant no. 2) raped her three to four months

back during the time of Holi and after a few days,

the victim stated that Hare Ram Sah (appellant no.

1) raped her while she was searching for her

brother. It is factually impossible that the incident

was reported on 01.07.2016 and the charge was

framed for the occurrence of incident dated

02.07.2016, but the ferdbeyan and the statement

of the victim itself states that the incident had

occurred three to four months before the F.I.R was

filed.

26. Thus, it is clear to us that the charges framed

are not in accordance with law and, thus, causing

prejudice to the accused persons / appellants as

mentioned in the trial court record. The framing

of charge is the most basic step of the process of

initiation of a trial in a criminal proceeding.

Utmost care must be taken while the charges are

being framed as wrong framing may lead to denial

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 21 of 35

of justice. Therefore, one should abstain from

wrongful framing and joinder of charges as such

an inefficiency would vitiate the very basic

essence of a fair trial.”

26. A perusal of the charge framed by the Trial Court in this

matter reveals that the charge stated to the Respondent Nos. 1 and

2 pertained to the commission of offences “on or about the 2

nd

day of July 2016”. It is an admitted position that the date of

offence was a few days after the festival of Holi and 3-4 months

prior to the date of discovery of the offence i.e. 01.07.2016. In

fact, 2

nd July, 2016 was the date of registration of FIR and the

same has been put to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as the date of

commission of the offences. We have no doubt in observing that

the charge stated to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was not free

from defects. Even if the exact date of commission of the offence

was not known, the charge ought to have stated that the offences

was committed before 2

nd July 2016 and a few days after the

festival of Holi, so as to correctly state the time frame. The Trial

Court clearly fell in error in not doing so. However, the

consequence of error or defect in charge is to be determined in a

nuanced manner. Section 464 Cr.P.C. is of instructive value in

this regard and it provides that no finding, sentence or order of

any Court shall be deemed invalid merely on account of any

error, omission or irregularity in the framing of charge, unless the

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 22 of 35

same has occasioned any failure of justice. Sub-section (1) of

Section 464 Cr.P.C. reads thus:

“464. Effect of omission to frame, or absence of,

or error in, charge.— (1) No finding, sentence or

order by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be

deemed invalid merely on the ground that no

charge was framed or on the ground of any error,

omission or irregularity in the charge including

any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion

of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a

failure of justice has in fact been occasioned

thereby.”

Thus, mere discovery of an error, irregularity or omission in the

framing of charge does not ipso facto render the decision of the

Court as invalid. In fact, even a case of non-framing of charge is

not liable to be discarded on that ground alone. In order to vitiate

the decision, what is necessary is the failure of justice as a result

of such error or omission or irregularity. Thus, the quintessential

issue that requires an answer is whether the defect in the framing

of charge in the instant matter has occasioned a failure of justice

for the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In other words, has it prevented

the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from having a fair trial or has denied

them any opportunity to present a valid defence before the Trial

Court? We feel not.

27. Ordinarily, in a criminal trial, the stage of charge is

sandwiched between the stages of investigation and trial. It is the

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 23 of 35

gateway to trial and prior to this stage, the stages of registration

of FIR, filing of chargesheet and arguments on charge occur.

During all these stages, the accused has a right to be informed,

and is informed, about the allegations against him and the

chargesheet finally culminates the entire case of the prosecution

and makes it clearly known to the accused persons the colour and

content of the allegations. Thus, on receipt of the chargesheet, the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were conscious of the allegations.

Merely for non-statement of the correct date in the formal charge,

it could not be said that the accused persons have been robbed of

a fair trial or that failure of justice has been occasioned.

Throughout the trial, there was no confusion regarding the date

or time frame of the commission of the offence. Had there been

so, the error in charge could have been suitably corrected under

Section 216 Cr.P.C. However, the error in question did not have

the effect of misleading the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in any

manner during the trial. Section 215 Cr.P.C., which finds place

in the chapter of “Charge” and deals with the effect of errors, also

provides that no error in the framing of charge shall be regarded

as material, unless it has the effect of misleading the accused and

results into failure of justice. In this matter, there is no

explanation as to how the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2were misled

by the charge or had suffered any failure of justice. During their

statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and defence evidence as

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 24 of 35

well, the allegations were fully addressed by the Respondent Nos.

1 and 2 without any confusion with respect to the time-frame of

offence. The time frame alleged by the victim was well known to

the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and there was no occasion for any

confusion on that count, let aside any failure of justice. The

decision relied upon by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, rendered

by this Court in Soundarajan v. State (Represented by the

Inspector of Police, Vigilance Anti-Corruption, Dindigul)5

, is

of no consequence in the present matter. Ironically, in the said

decision, the contention regarding failure of justice due to

defective framing of charge was turned down by the Court.

Despite finding that non-statement of correct date in the charge

had rendered the charge as defective, the Court went on to hold

that it had not occasioned any failure of justice.

28. Nevertheless, we consider it a fit matter to call upon the

Trial Courts to be vigilant and cautious in framing of charges.

The prosecutors representing the State are also duty bound to

render suitable assistance during the trial and to remain vigilant

in identifying the errors in statement of charges. For, timely

intervention is always better in a trial and the criminal procedure

provides ample provisions for rectifying the mistakes in framing

of charges during the trial itself. The identification of such

5

(2023) 16 SCC 141

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 25 of 35

mistakes at appellate stages, which could have easily been

spotted and corrected during the trial, does not only affect the

finality of cases but also affects the credibility of the criminal

justice system as a whole. The Trial Court does the job of raising

the building from the scratch, brick by brick. In the performance

of this onerous task, some mistakes are quite natural. While

finding defects in the building, the Appellate Court must

carefully weigh the mistakes and analyze their consequence on

the outcome of the trial. We may suffice to observe that not every

mistake is fatal.

29. As an extension of the same discussion, we must also refer

to the next ground of contention i.e. non-compliance of Section

223 Cr.P.C. The High Court has observed that the joinder of trial

of both the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was impermissible and

consequently, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have been prejudiced

before the Trial Court. Ordinarily, distinct offences committed by

different persons are to be tried separately. The principle

becomes clear from a reading of Section 218 Cr.P.C. However,

from Sections 219 to 223 of Cr.P.C., various situations are

envisaged wherein multiple offences committed by the same

person could be tried together or different offences committed by

different persons could be tried together. Whereas, a joint trial of

different offences committed by the same person is contingent

upon the fulfilment of the conditions envisaged in Sections 219

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 26 of 35

to 221; a joint trial of different offences committed by different

persons is solely governed by Section 223. In the present case,

we are concerned with the second scenario.

30. Section 223 lays down various conditions wherein

different persons who have committed different offences could

be charged and tried jointly. Amongst other things, it provides

that the persons alleged of committing different offences, but as

a part of the same transaction, could be charged and tried jointly.

It is contended that the offences alleged upon the Respondent

Nos. 1 and 2 pertained to two completely independent acts and

thus, they could not be considered to have formed part of the

same transaction. It has also been contended that there was no

allegation qua commission of any offence jointly by the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is stated that the incidents took place

at different points of time and there was no unity between them.

The High Court has accepted this factual position. The statement

of the victim reveals that allegations pertain to two specific

instances of rape along with a general allegation that for 2-3

months, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 continued to rape her.

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that there is no direct

allegation that the offences were committed together by the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and on a plain view of the matter, it is

not a case wherein the principles of common intention under

Section 34 of IPC or conspiracy would be attracted. The only

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 27 of 35

question is whether the offences committed by the Respondent

Nos. 1 and 2 formed part of the same transaction, so as to attract

clause (d) of Section 223 Cr.P.C., which permits joint trial of

persons accused of different offences committed in the course of

the same transaction.

31. In criminal law, the question whether certain acts and

omissions form part of the same transaction often troubles the

Courts. There is no definition of “same transaction” in the Code

and more often than not, this determination is contingent upon

the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. To make it

judicially determinable, we have often applied the three tests of

“unity of purpose and design”, “proximity of time or place” and

“continuity of action”. Reference may be drawn to the decision

of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Cheemalapati

Ganeswara Rao and another6

. Let us have a look at some

admitted facts. The victim and the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were

residing in the same village, the house of respondent No. 2-

Manish Tiwari was situated one house away from that of the

victim, respondent No. 2-Manish had taken the victim’s father to

hospital a few days prior to the incident, respondent No. 1-Hare

Ram Sah was running a coaching center adjacent to his house and

in the same vicinity, and both the respondents threatened the

6 AIR 1963 SC 1850

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 28 of 35

victim of similar consequences if she dared to disclose their acts

to anyone. Evidently, the nature of acts committed by the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein and subsequent intimidation to

keep the victim silent were of a similar design. Further, there was

a certain proximity of time and place as the incidents were

committed within a continuous time-frame and at different places

in the same village. However, it is also admitted that they never

committed the acts together and always acted separately.

Therefore, there is no direct evidence of commission of offences

in the same transaction, however, an inference may be drawn. Be

that as it may, we need not render a finding on this aspect and we

are not inclined to disturb the factual finding of the High Court.

For, even if the conclusion of the High Court, that the joint trial

was conducted in violation of Section 223 Cr.P.C., is accepted,

the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 would still have to further show that

the joint trial had caused prejudice to them and had occasioned a

failure of justice. Mere irregular conduct of a joint or separate

trial does not vitiate the trial as a whole and the proof of failure

of justice is sine qua non for holding the trial as invalid.

32. The legal position on Section 223 could not be termed as

res integra, especially in light of the pronouncement in Nasib

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 29 of 35

Singh v. State of Punjab and another7

, also relied upon by the

High Court. The relevant extract of the decision reads thus:

“51. From the decisions of this Court on joint trial

and separate trials, the following principles can

be formulated:

51.1 Section 218 provides that separate trials

shall be conducted for distinct offences alleged to

be committed by a person. Sections 219 - 221

provide exceptions to this general rule. If a person

falls under these exceptions, then a joint trial for

the offences which a person is charged with may

be conducted. Similarly, under Section 223, a joint

trial may be held for persons charged with

different offences if any of the clauses in the

provision are separately or on a combination

satisfied;

51.2 While applying the principles

enunciated in Sections 218 - 223 on conducting

joint and separate trials, the trial court should

apply a two-pronged test, namely, (i) whether

conducting a joint/separate trial will prejudice the

defence of the accused; and/or (ii) whether

conducting a joint/separate trial would cause

judicial delay.

51.3 The possibility of conducting a joint trial

will have to be determined at the beginning of the

trial and not after the trial based on the result of

the trial. The Appellate Court may determine the

validity of the argument that there ought to have

been a separate/joint trial only based on whether

7 2021 INSC 642

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 30 of 35

the trial had prejudiced the right of accused or the

prosecutrix;

51.4 Since the provisions which engraft an

exception use the phrase ‘may’ with reference to

conducting a joint trial, a separate trial is usually

not contrary to law even if a joint trial could be

conducted, unless proven to cause a miscarriage

of justice; and

51.5 A conviction or acquittal of the accused

cannot be set aside on the mere ground that there

was a possibility of a joint or a separate trial. To

set aside the order of conviction or acquittal, it

must be proved that the rights of the parties were

prejudiced because of the joint or separate trial,

as the case may be.”

(emphasis supplied)

33. On a reading of the provision as well as the exposition

reproduced above, it is discernible that when a ground of nonjoinder or misjoinder of charges/trial is taken before an Appellate

Court, the test to be applied is whether such non-joinder or

misjoinder has resulted into a failure or miscarriage of justice and

has prejudiced the accused. It is not enough for the Appellate

Court to merely hold that the Trial Court ought to have tried

certain persons jointly or separately in the facts and

circumstances of the case. That is where the High Court has

clearly fell in error in the present case.

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 31 of 35

34. In its appellate capacity, the High Court was required to

address two aspects – first, whether the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2

ought to have been tried separately and second, whether the

misjoinder of trials had caused prejudice to the Respondent Nos.

1 and 2 and resulted in failure of justice. We are afraid, the High

Court restricted itself to the first aspect and did not deal with the

second aspect in the manner required by law. On the first aspect,

as already expressed above, we refrain from disturbing the factual

finding rendered by the High Court that the offences were not

committed in the same transaction. We feel that both views

appear to be possible on that aspect and therefore, we do not

consider it necessary to disturb the finding. On the second aspect,

which is more important, the observation of the High Court reads

thus:

“33. Considering the above provision of the Code,

the present case of the appellants is nowhere

applicable for joint trial and learned trial Court

has convicted both the accused persons through a

joint trial. For a joint trial to be conducted for two

persons committing an offence at different place

and at different time, the trial Court shall mention

this on record or an application should be moved

for conducting a joint trial, and the learned Trial

Court shall apply a judicial mind while

considering the matter, and the Judicial Officer

while performing the duties shall make sure that

the procedure prescribed in the Code is followed

and no prejudice be caused to any person. But, in

the present case, on perusal of the entire record,

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 32 of 35

no such application or mention of conducting joint

trial has been brought on record. This causes a

great prejudice on the accused persons as the

victim herself states in para-30 of her deposition

that both the appellants raped her at different

time at different places and they never raped her

together …”

(emphasis supplied)

35. It could be seen that the sole basis of the High Court’s

reasoning in arriving at a finding of prejudice in the impugned

decision is that a joint trial was not permissible. The finding is

unsustainable and in fact, there is no finding of actual prejudice

or failure of justice as a result of the joint trial, as necessitated by

law. As noted above, the High Court ought to have analyzed the

facts of the case to return a finding of actual prejudice. Mere noncompliance of the procedure contemplated under Section 223

does not ipso facto render the trial as invalid, and the same cannot

form the basis of returning a finding of prejudice and failure of

justice. The said conclusion must emanate from the facts of the

case, after a thorough examination of the facts and evidence on

record. It is not a case wherein the joint trial precluded the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from presenting a valid defence. It is

also not a case wherein separate evidence of the prosecution

witnesses could have made any difference to the end result. There

is no explanation as to how separate trials could have made any

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 33 of 35

difference to the outcome of the case, except causing harassment

to the victim by compelling her to face her offenders twice in the

witness box for explaining the same version. Thus, we are of the

considered view that the joint trial of the Respondent Nos. 1 and

2 did not cause any prejudice to them and no case for failure of

justice, on account of the said irregularity, appears to be made

out.

36. Before closing, we deem it fit to observe that noticeably,

the principle of beyond reasonable doubt has been misunderstood

to mean any and every doubt in the case of the prosecution. Often,

we come across cases wherein loose acquittals are recorded on

the basis of minor inconsistencies, contradictions and

deficiencies, by elevating them to the standard of reasonable

doubts. A reasonable doubt is one that renders the version of the

prosecution as improbable, and leads the Court to believe in the

existence and probability of an alternate version of the facts. It is

a serious doubt which must be backed by reason. The underlying

foundation of the principle of beyond reasonable doubt is that no

innocent should face punishment for a crime that he has not done.

But a flipside of the same, of which we are conscious, is that at

times, owing to a mis-application of this principle, actual culprits

manage to find their way out of the clutches of law. Such

misapplication of this principle, resulting into culprits walking

free by taking benefit of doubt, is equally dangerous for the

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 34 of 35

society. Every instance of acquittal of an actual culprit revolt

against the sense of security of the society and acts as a blot on

the criminal justice system. Therefore, not only should no

innocent face punishment for something that he has not done, but

equally, no culprit should manage an acquittal on the basis of

unreasonable doubts and misapplication of procedure.

37. In the present case, a fairly consistent and creditworthy

case of the prosecution has been discarded on what could only be

termed as misapplication of procedure. It takes us back to the first

principle that procedure is not supposed to control justice.

38. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the

considered view that the impugned judgment is liable to be set

aside being unsustainable. The view taken by the Trial Court was

correct and we find no infirmity in the same. The judgment of the

Trial Court stands restored, both on conviction and sentence.

39. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall surrender before the

trial court within a period of two weeks from today. In case the

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 do not surrender within the stipulated

time, the trial court shall take appropriate recourse to take them

into custody for serving the remaining part of sentence. Registry

is directed to suitably communicate this judgment to ensure due

compliance.

SLP(Crl.) No. 18377/2024 Page 35 of 35

40. The captioned appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid

terms. Interim application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

……………………………….J.

[ SANJAY KUMAR ]

……………………………….J.

[ SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA ]

NEW DELHI

SEPTEMBER 01, 2025

A criminal conviction under a penal provision introduced after the offence cannot apply retrospectively. However, surviving conviction under Sec. 506-B IPC stands. Family may still get terminal benefits, subject to government’s fresh decision with humanitarian consideration.

Jameela & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3641–3642 of 2025

(2025 INSC 1121, decided 15 Sept. 2025)

Bench

Justice Dipankar Datta

Justice Augustine George Masih

Facts

Sheikh Akhtar (Naib Nazir in court) was convicted in 2007 for offences under Sections 305 (abetment of suicide of child) & 506-B IPC (criminal intimidation).

He was sentenced to 10 years (Sec. 305) and 2 years (Sec. 506-B).

Akhtar appealed to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, but died in 2015 during pendency. His wife (Jameela) and children continued the appeal to secure his terminal benefits (30+ years service).

In 2024, the High Court:

Set aside conviction under Sec. 305 IPC,

Convicted him instead under Sec. 195-A IPC (threatening a person to give false evidence) and maintained 506-B IPC conviction.

Family appealed to Supreme Court.

Issues

Could Akhtar be convicted under Section 195-A IPC, introduced in 2006, for an incident of 1999?

Was the conviction under Section 506-B IPC sustainable?

Could his family still claim terminal service benefits after his death?

Supreme Court Findings

Section 195-A IPC (added in 2006) cannot apply retrospectively to an offence in 1999 (Article 20(1) Constitution). High Court erred.

However, evidence of PWs 2, 3 & 4 clearly proved Akhtar threatened the victim; thus, conviction under Section 506-B IPC was upheld.

Defence evidence (attendance records claiming Akhtar was in court) was considered unreliable by trial court; not raised in High Court appeal, so not accepted.

Since conviction under Section 305 IPC (abetment of suicide) was overturned, and only Section 506-B IPC survives, the termination of service requires reconsideration.

Court directed the Madhya Pradesh Government to reconsider de novo whether terminal benefits should be denied solely on the basis of Sec. 506-B conviction.

Authorities must take a humanitarian approach considering widow’s financial condition.

Final Order

Conviction under Sec. 195-A IPC set aside.

Conviction under Sec. 506-B IPC maintained.

High Court judgment partly modified.

State Govt. directed to reconsider Akhtar’s service termination and widow’s entitlement to terminal benefits within 3 months.

2025 INSC 1121

1

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.3641-3642 OF 2025

JAMEELA & ORS. … APPELLANTS

VS.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Sheikh Akhtar1 (since deceased) was convicted by the Sessions Court

in S.T. No.378/2005 for commission of offence punishable under

sections 305 and 506-B, Indian Penal Code 18602 and sentenced to

rigorous imprisonment for ten years and two years, respectively, with

fine together with default stipulations vide judgment and order dated

28th March, 2007.

2. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence was carried in

appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Bench, at

Jabalpur3 under section 374(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 19734 by

1 Akhtar

2

IPC

3 High Court

4 Cr.PC

2

Akhtar in 2007 itself. During the pendency of the appeal, Akhtar

passed away on 23rd April, 2015.

3. Prior to conviction, Akhtar was a public servant. He was the ‘Naib

Nazir’ in the local court. He suffered an order of termination of service

soon after the aforesaid conviction. In the normal course, the appeal

preferred by Akhtar should abate in view of section 394, Cr.PC.

However, the widow of Akhtar (Jameela) and their children (Amreen

Khan, Naaz Khan, Aftab, and Shreen Khan) continued the appeal with

the fervent hope that should the conviction and sentence be set aside,

they would be entitled to the terminal benefits which had accrued to

Akhtar by reason of his rendering more than 30 years of service.

4. Upon hearing the parties, the High Court vide its judgment and order

dated 25th April, 2024 held that Akhtar cannot be held guilty for

commission of offence under section 305 IPC; however, by reason of

his acts of threatening the victim (a minor girl), Akhtar was guilty of

the offence under section 195-A IPC. Accordingly, while setting aside

the conviction under section 305 IPC, the High Court convicted Akhtar,

in the alternative, under section 195-A IPC as well as section 506-B

thereof and maintained the sentence imposed by the Sessions Court.

The appeal was, accordingly, disposed of.

5. An application5

for modification of the judgment and order dated 25th

April, 2024 did not meet success. It was dismissed by an order dated

2

nd August, 2024.

5

 I.A. No.12367 of 2024

3

6. Aggrieved by the outcome of the appeal and the application before

the High Court, the widow and children of Akhtar appealed to this

Court whereupon leave was granted by us on 19th August, 2025.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the respondentState at some length.

8. The offence alleged in the First Information Report6

lodged by the

victim’s mother (PW-4) is that the victim had been molested by coconvict Munna; that, Akhtar along with Munna, Bhadde and Mamu

Gudda had been threatening the victim with dire consequences if she

deposed in court against Munna; that, Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and

Mamu Gudda had threatened to kill the victim and her father, unless

they compromised the matter; and that, the victim could not bear and

withstand such threat for which she took the extreme step of putting

an end to her life to save her father by setting herself ablaze on 19th

February, 1999. The victim, unfortunately, passed away on 23rd

February, 1999. While in hospital, the victim’s dying declaration was

recorded by the local Deputy Tehsildar (PW-2). The dying declaration

is, however, not on record.

9. From the version of PW-2, we find that the victim was threatened

between 10-11 am of 19th February, 1999, while she was on the way

to the court by Akhtar and the co-convicts.

10. According to PW-4, who was accompanying the victim while on the

way to the court, Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and Mamu Gudda

6

 FIR

4

threatened them around 11 am. This matches with the version of the

victim as spoken by her to PW-2 and supposedly recorded in the dying

declaration. However, PW-4 went a step further. She deposed that

while she had been away from the court to call a witness (Khima bai)

leaving the victim alone in the court and ultimately brought Khima bai

– in the interregnum, Akhtar and the co-convicts had again

threatened the victim. This was heard by PW-4 from the victim later,

after she set herself ablaze.

11. It was further in the evidence of PW-4 that since the court had

adjourned proceedings, she had returned home with the victim and

had left to go to a shop after a while. PW-4 was informed by one Bhuri

bai that the victim had suffered burn injury. Having heard it, PW-4

immediately returned home and saw the victim lying on the ground

with burns. At that point, the disclosure as aforesaid of the victim

having been threatened a second time by Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and

Mamu Gudda was made to PW-4 by the victim. The victim was

threatened to change her statement or else she and her father would

be killed. Since the victim did not want her father to die, she had set

herself on fire.

12. This second incident of threat spoken to by PW-4, however, does not

appear in the FIR.

13. PW-3, the victim’s elder sister, had also deposed at the trial. When

the victim had set herself ablaze and attempt was being made to

douse the fire, she had told PW-3 that while going to appear in the 

5

court and while returning, Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and Mamu Gudda

stopped her and threatened her that compromise must be made

otherwise they would kill her and her father; and it is due to this threat

that the victim set herself on fire to end her life and, thereby, save

her father.

14. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued before us that there is

gross inconsistency in the version of PW-4, as recorded in the FIR, the

victim’s dying declaration recorded by PW-2 and the depositions of

PWs 3 and 4 as regards the number of times the victim was

threatened on 19th February, 1999.

15. True it is, PW-4 did not refer to the second act of threatening in the

FIR. However, the omission is not considered too material. PW-4, we

can presume, must have been under severe emotional stress when

information of the offence was given to the police. That apart, it is not

the requirement of law that an FIR while disclosing a cognizable

offence must also reveal all facts preceding and following the incident

of offence with precision. Having considered the contentions and

looking at the materials on record, we do not see reason to hold that

the inconsistency, as pointed out, is such that the same would lead us

to discredit the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 that Akhtar, along with the

co-convicts, had not threatened the victim.

16. Next, it has been urged on behalf of the appellants that although the

victim, PW-3 and PW-4 had spoken about Akhtar and the other coconvicts having threatened the victim, the versions of the other 

6

prosecution witnesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) is that the victim had taken

the names of Munna, Bhadde, and Mamu Gudda but not Akhtar as

those who had also threatened her.

17. Having read the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 as well as considering what

was recorded by PW-2 as the dying declaration of the victim, we have

no hesitation to overrule this contention. Merely because PWs 5, 6

and 7 had not taken the name of Akhtar while referring to what they

heard the victim say about the identity of those who had threatened

her would in no way render the version of the victim, as recorded by

PW-2, unreliable. In fact, narration of the version of the victim in the

dying declaration by PW-2 finds support from the evidence of PWs 3

and 4.

18. Next, it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the High

Court grossly erred in convicting Akhtar under section 195-A IPC. The

incident which resulted in unfortunate death of the victim, as noticed

earlier, occurred on 19th February, 1999. Section 195-A IPC was

inserted by Act No.2 of 2006 with effect from 16th April, 2006. As on

date of the offence, section 195-A IPC was not on the statute book.

The High Court, therefore, fell in error in not noticing the date of

offence and the date of insertion of section 195-A in the IPC and

proceeded to hold Akhtar guilty under that section in clear breach of

clause (1) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India.

19. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State, while not

making any attempt to justify the High Court’s conviction of Akhtar 

7

under section 195-A IPC, pointed out to us that Akhtar was held guilty

of the offence under section 506-B IPC and the finding of the trial

court, since affirmed by the High Court in this regard, does not suffer

from any infirmity.

20. We are in agreement with learned counsel for the appellants that the

High Court could not have found Akhtar guilty of Section 195-A IPC.

However, what cannot be ignored is that Akhtar was also found guilty

of an offence under section 506(B) IPC.

21. We have found from the memo of appeal filed before the High Court

that the convictions recorded both under sections 305 and 506-B IPC

were under challenge in the appeal. In the entirety of the appellate

judgment and order, impugned before us, we do not find any

discussion made by the High Court in respect of the conviction

recorded against Akhtar under section 506-B IPC. We are inclined to

the view that since the High Court had embarked on a process of

reasoning to convict Akhtar under section 195-A IPC, it did not

consider it necessary to make any further discussion regarding the

offence under section 506-B IPC. Had we upheld the conviction under

section 195-A IPC, obviously the omission of the High Court to

independently deal with the offence under section 506-B thereof with

reference to the evidence on record would not have been rendered

vulnerable. However, in the changed circumstances where we are

unable to uphold the conviction under section 195-A IPC, the omission

does assume significance and requires us to independently examine 

8

whether, on the evidence on record, the offence under section 506-B

IPC stands proved.

22. Considering the evidence on record and in view of our discussions as

above relatable to the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 4, we have no

hesitation in holding that Akhtar was one of four who threatened the

victim and, therefore, his conviction under section 506-B warrants no

interference.

23. At this stage, as a last-ditch effort, learned counsel for the appellants

has invited our attention to one other aspect.

24. Referring to the evidence of a staff of the court where Akhtar was

posted (DW-4), it was sought to be highlighted that DW-4 had spoken

of Akhtar, the Naib Nazir, to be present in the court for the entire day

on 19th February, 1999. According to DW-4, Akhtar usually came to

court at about 10 am and returned at 6/6.30 pm without leaving the

court. It was also his specific version that on the fateful day, i.e., 19th

February, 1999, Akhtar had come to the court at about 10 am and

had returned at around 6/6.30 pm; also, that Akhtar and DW-4 did

not go anywhere during the duty hours on that day.

25. The evidence of DW-3, the Deputy Nazir of the concerned court, would

also reveal that he had produced the attendance register from August

1997 to April 1999 to show that on 19th February, 1999, Akhtar was

at his work place.

26. According to learned counsel for the appellants, for whatever it is

worth, the defence evidence of DWs 3 and 4 should have been 

9

considered by the High Court. He sounded critical of the omission of

the High Court to spare a single sentence in regard to the defence

evidence.

27. We had the occasion to peruse the judgment of conviction of the

Sessions Court. The depositions of DWs 3 and 4 were noted in

paragraphs 34 and 35 in the judgment and the Sessions Court appears

to have assigned good reasons as to why the defence evidence did

not appeal to him to be creditworthy for discrediting the versions of

PWs 2, 3 and 4 and for returning a finding of acquittal in favour of

Akhtar. We need not advert to the reasons assigned here, having also

noted that there is not a single ground urged in the memo of appeal

filed by Akhtar in the High Court assailing the reasoning of the

Sessions Court in this regard. It is quite possible that in course of

hearing of the appeal before the High Court too, no point of objection

was raised with regard to evaluation and assessment by the Sessions

Court of the evidence of DWs 3 and 4 for which the High Court did

not consider it necessary to discuss such evidence.

28. There is, therefore, no strong reason for which the recording of

conviction of Akhtar for the offence under section 506-B IPC in the

judgment passed by the Sessions Court can be faulted; and, by

extension, we do not see reason to interfere with the judgment and

order of the High Court affirming such conviction.

29. In our view, conviction of Akhtar under section 506-B IPC cannot be

interfered with on any valid ground, although his conviction under 

10

section 195-A IPC by the High Court is unsustainable in law. Also, the

respondent-State not having carried acquittal of Akhtar for the offence

under section 305 IPC in appeal, such acquittal has attained finality.

30. Having regard to the nature of offence proved to have been committed

by Akhtar and also bearing in mind the evidence on record revealing

that a minor girl, to save her father, had to take the extreme step of

doing away with her own life, we could not have in the present

circumstances extend the provisions relating to release on probation

to Akhtar, had he been alive. Dismissal of the appeal, albeit setting

aside the conviction under section 195-A IPC but maintaining the

conviction under section 506-B thereof, is the obvious result. We order

accordingly.

31. However, unfortunately, Akhtar is no longer alive. He left behind him

the appellants as his surviving heirs. The appellants have brought the

lis to this Court only for the purpose of staking a claim to the terminal

benefits that had accrued to Akhtar for rendering three decades of

service.

32. Akhtar’s service was terminated on consideration of his conviction not

only for the offence under section 506-B IPC but also the graver

offence under section 305 thereof. Since the High Court has set aside

the conviction under section 305 IPC and the alternative conviction

under section 195-A thereof too stands set aside by us, only the

conviction against Akhtar for the offence under section 506-B IPC

survives. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that 

11

interests of justice would be best served if the respondent-State

considers the matter of termination of service of Akhtar de novo and

decides, whether for his conviction only under section 506-B IPC, the

right to terminal benefits accruing for rendering three decades of

service would stand forfeited for all times to come.

33. Accordingly, while disposing of these appeals, we request the

appropriate department in the Government of Madhya Pradesh to

effect consideration of the matter as indicated in the preceding

paragraph upon taking into account the financial status of the

appellant no.1 and her liability, if any, adopting a humanitarian

approach. Such consideration may be effected as early as possible,

but preferably within three months from date.

34. Connected applications, if pending, shall also stand disposed of.

……………….…………………………J.

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

……………………..…………………..J.

(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 15, 2025.