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Sunday, April 20, 2025

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4 – Complainant made specific allegations against her husband and her mother-in-law for demand of dowry and harassment – However, as regards the appellants (complainant’s mother-in-law’s younger sister and her son), the allegation was that they pressurized her to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes – High Court declined to quash criminal proceedings against the appellants – Challenge to: Held: Impugned judgements set aside – Charges against the accused including the appellants were sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders – Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning cruelty, the demands of dowry or her physical and mental harassment except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details – Nothing on record to show that the parents or the two witnesses witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants – Statements of the Panchayat elder is based on the information provided by the complainant’s father and is hearsay evidence – No prima facie case made out against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial – Pending criminal proceedings quashed qua the two appellants – Constitution of India – Article 142. [Paras 37, 23, 40] Matrimonial/domestic disputes – Criminalisation of domestic disputes, effect on the institution of family – Tendency to implicate family members/relatives – Duty of Court, discussed – In criminal cases of domestic violence, complaints and charges to be specific. [Paras 31-35]

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 160


Geddam Jhansi & Anr. v. The State of Telangana & Ors.

(Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2025)


07 February 2025


[B.V. Nagarathna and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Whether the criminal proceedings against the appellant(s) under Sections 498A, 506, Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ought to be quashed.


Headnotes


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4 – Complainant made specific allegations against her husband and her mother-in-law for demand of dowry and harassment – However, as regards the appellants (complainant’s mother-in-law’s younger sister and her son), the allegation was that they pressurized her to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes – High Court declined to quash criminal proceedings against the appellants – Challenge to:


Held: Impugned judgements set aside – Charges against the accused including the appellants were sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders – Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning cruelty, the demands of dowry or her physical and mental harassment except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details – Nothing on record to show that the parents or the two witnesses witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants – Statements of the Panchayat elder is based on the information provided by the complainant’s father and is hearsay evidence – No prima facie case made out against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial – Pending criminal proceedings quashed qua the two appellants – Constitution of India – Article 142. [Paras 37, 23, 40]


Matrimonial/domestic disputes – Criminalisation of domestic disputes, effect on the institution of family – Tendency to implicate family members/relatives – Duty of Court, discussed – In criminal cases of domestic violence, complaints and charges to be specific. [Paras 31-35]


Case Law Cited


State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) 1 Supp. SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2018] 13 SCR 1028 : (2019) 11 SCC 706 – referred to.


List of Acts


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.


List of Keywords


Quashing; Cruelty; Demand for dowry; Physical and mental Harassment; Domestic violence; Harassment; Criminal intimidation; Panchayat witnesses; Identical statements of the witnesses; Generalised allegations; Matrimonial/domestic disputes; Criminal cases relating to domestic violence; Tendency to implicate family members/relatives; Institution of family; Abuse of the process of the law; Charge-sheet; Hearsay evidence.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2025


From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2022 of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLP No. 3105 of 2022


With


Criminal Appeal No. 610 of 2025


Appearances for Parties


Nitin Tambwekar, Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, Shaik Mohammad Haneef, Abdul Mannan, Irshad Ahmad, Advs. for the Appellants.


Ms. Devina Sehgal, Vineet George, Beno Bencigar, Parijat Kishore, Advs. for the Respondents.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.


1.Leave granted in both the SLPs.


2.This common order disposes of both the Criminal Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9556 of 2022 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 428 of 2024 as both these appeals relate to similar and connected incidents.


3.Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9556 of 2022 was filed against the judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 whereunder the High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 46 of 2022 under Section 498A, 506 Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short “Dowry Act”) pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) by holding that, prima facie, there are certain allegations against both the appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali, and that these are triable issues for which the appellants have to face trial and prove their innocence.


4.Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 428 of 2024 has been preferred against the judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 whereunder the High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short “DV Act”) in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of CrPC on similar ground by holding that, prima facie, there are specific allegations against the sole appellant, Geddam Jhansi, and the same have to be decided only after enquiry.


5.Being aggrieved by the refusal of the High Court to quash the aforesaid criminal proceedings pending before the concerned Magistrates, the present appeals have been preferred.


6.The gravamen of the plea of the appellants in both the appeals is that the allegations against them are vague and are of a generalised nature without any specific overt act attributed to them, thus, incapable of being fastened with criminal liability, which unfortunately, the High Court had failed to appreciate.


7.The relevant facts in brief as may be culled from the pleadings is that a written complaint was filed before the Mahila Police Station Bhuvanagiri on 17.09.2021 by one Premlata (hereinafter referred to as “complainant”) in which it was mentioned that she was married to one Samuel Suresh, a doctor by profession and a resident of Chennai on 17.08.2016 and at the time of marriage her mother-in-law, Pathagadda, had demanded a sum of Rs.30 Lakhs and accordingly, the complainant’s mother had given Rs.10 Lakhs by way of cash and 15 tolas of gold as dowry to her mother-in-law. It was stated that for about five months after the marriage, the complainant’s husband had treated her well and took care of her properly. Unfortunately, later, her husband suspecting her character started harassing her mentally and physically to get additional dowry of Rs.10 Lakhs, for which her mother-in-law, the younger sister of her mother-in-law, namely, Geddam Jhansi (Appellant No.1), her brother-in-law, Sudheer, and the son of Geddam Jhansi, namely, Geddam Sathyakama Jabali (Appellant No.2) pressurized her to act according to her husband’s and mother in law’s wishes and also threatened to kill her if the demand for dowry was not met. It was also alleged that because of their behaviour, the complainant’s mother organised panchayat several times before the elders and other family members. It was alleged that in front of the elders, her husband had agreed to take care of her properly but as usual after sometime he started harassing her because of which she ultimately approached the police for counselling but there was no change in their behaviour leaving her no alternative but to file the aforesaid complaint.


8.On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, FIR No. 54 of 2021 was registered at Bhongir Women PS, Rahakonda District, under Sections 498A, 506 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act against the complainant’s husband, complainant’s mother-in-law, complainant’s brother in law and the present two appellants. On completion of the investigation, Charge Sheet No. 46 of 2021 was filed before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Sections 498A, 506 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act against the aforesaid accused including the present two appellants, which is now pending before the aforesaid court in C.C. No. 46 of 2022.


9.Apart from the aforesaid complaint filed before the Mahila Police Station, another complaint was filed by the complainant on 20.09.2021 before the Protection Officer, Bhuvanagari alleging cruelty and criminal intimidation under the DV Act, 2005 making similar allegations with the additional allegations that on one occasion, her husband asked her not to touch his clothes and to go away from the kitchen and that he tried to burn his socks because the complainant had washed them. It was also alleged that her husband had influenced his friends to talk ill of her, who in turn used to call the complainant and ask her to leave her husband, further telling her that her husband has a girlfriend who had taken divorce to marry him. It was also alleged that on 17.10.2020 at around 10:00 p.m, the complainant was beaten and pushed out of the matrimonial house by her husband.


10.The complainant accordingly, approached the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhongir where a case under DV Act, being DVC No. 25 of 2021 was registered and is now pending.


11.At this stage it may be apposite to mention herein that the allegations are not one way and the husband had made counter allegations against the complainant. Before the aforesaid complaints were filed by the complainant, the husband of the complainant instituted a divorce proceeding before the Court of the Principal District Judge at Kanchipuram, which was registered as I.D.O.P. No. 44 of 2021 under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 alleging neglect, insensitivity to the needs of the husband, incompatibility, concealment of facts, showing hostile attitude towards the husband, refusal to consummate the marriage, causing mental and physical harassment and desertion since 10 April 2018.


12.As we proceed to examine the issues involved, we may briefly allude to the law relating to quashing of FIRs/criminal proceedings, which is well-settled and summarised by this Court in the State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 in which this Court held as below:


“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.


(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.


(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.


(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.


(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.


(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.


(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party


(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”


13.In the present case, the charge-sheet has been filed before the Court of the Magistrate in C.C. No. 46 of 2022 after investigation was completed by the police on the basis of the complaint/FIR lodged by the complainant and another proceeding is also pending under the DV Act before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate. However, this will not preclude this Court from interfering with the criminal proceedings, if upon perusal of the complaints, the materials gathered during the investigation and in the charge-sheet, it is found that no prima facie case has been made out against the appellants and the criminal proceedings amount to abuse of the process of law. As mentioned above, the common plea of the appellants in both the proceedings is that allegations against them are of a generalized nature devoid of specific offending acts to constitute offences punishable under law.


14.In this regard, we may recall what this Court has held in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706 as regards permissibility of quashing of proceeding once charge-sheet is filed as follows:


“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge-sheet is filed, petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] , this Court while deciding the question whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR, when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16)


“16. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge-sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”


15. Even otherwise also, it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 of the CrPC and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 of the CrPC. Section 482 of the CrPC reads as follows:


“482. Saving of inherent powers of the High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”


16. There is nothing in the words of this section which restricts the exercise of inherent powers by the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only up to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7, Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20]. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced and the allegations have materialised into a charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by the registration of the FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of any court.


15.Keeping the aforesaid legal position in mind, we will examine whether the facts/materials obtaining in the present case would warrant interference of this Court under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing the said criminal proceedings pending before the concerned courts.


16.As far as the first complaint is concerned, out of which the criminal proceeding in “C.C. No.46 of 2022” has arisen, which is pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir, where the charge-sheet has been filed, the relevant portions of the said complaint read as follows: -


“xxxxxx


On 17.08.2016, I was married to Samuel Suresh. S/o. Late Janardhan Rao, aged 38 years, Caste: SC (Madiga). Occupation: Doctor, R/o Pondicherry in Chennai. At the time of marriage, my mother-in-law demanded Rs. 30,00,000/- and accordingly my mother has given Rs. 10.00.000/- by way of cash and 15 tulas gold as dowry to my mother-in-law. After the marriage for a period of 5 months or so, my husband has taken care of me properly. Thereafter my husband started suspecting my character and harassed mentally and physically to get additional dowry of Rs.10,00,000/-. I submit that my mother-in-law Pathagadda Bharathi and younger sister of my Mother-in-Law namely Geddam Jhansi, my brother-in-law Sudheer and son of younger sister of my Mother-in-law namely Geddam Satya Rama Jabili all the persons referred above used to pressurize to act according to my husband’s and Mother-in-law’s wish, otherwise they threatened to kill me. In this regard my mother organized Panchayathi several times, before the elders and family members. In front of the elders, my husband agreed to take care of me properly but as usual, after sometime, he started harassing me. Thereafter. I have approached Bhongiri Mahila Police Station and have given a complaint. Thereafter, Police personnel called them for counselling, but there was no change in the behaviour. In view of the above I request to take legal action, on all persons mentioned above.”


(emphasis added)


17.Charge-sheet is filed only on culmination of the investigation during which time the investigating agency collects all the relevant evidence in support of the complaint on the basis of which a clear prima facie case indicating commission of the offence must be made out against the accused warranting trial. The investigation may uncover/throw up more detailed and additional facts and evidence that would support the complaint/FIR. Accordingly, this Court will examine the charge-sheet filed and examine the evidence which has been gathered in the present case relating to “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” to see if any new facts or evidence had been disclosed.


18.In this regard we may refer to the charge-sheet filed in connection with the aforesaid case, relevant portions of which are reproduced hereinbelow: -


“As per the evidence collected, during the course of the investigation and as per detailed and discreet enquiries, prima-facie care is made out against the A-1 to A-5 for the offence punishable U/s 498-(A). 406, 506 IPC & Sec 3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act-1961.


During the further course of the Investigation, since the prima-facie offence is proved against the accused A-1. A-2 & A-4 on 23.09.2021 the LW-07 has Register post under sub-section (1) of Section 41 A of Criminal Procedure Code to them, but A-1, A-2 & A-4 was Rejected the Post, after that A-1 received anticipatory bail Hon’ble court of 5 additional district and sessions judge at Bhongir Cri.M.P.No.410/2021 on 27-11-2021 A-3 & A-5 on 02.11.2021 the LW-07 has served the notices them under sub-section (1) of Section 41.A of Criminal Procedure Code with directions to appear before me. Accordingly, on 03.12.2021, the accused A-3 & A-5 have complied with the instructions of LW-07 by appearing before her. As such, as per the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and since the offence is having the punishment of less than seven years Imprisonment, the LW. 07 has served notices under sub-section (3) of section 41 A of Criminal Procedure to the accused A-3 & A-5 directing them to appear before the Hon’ble trial court as when they received the summons.


Investigation done so far in this case it well established that LW-1 Panthagadda Premalatha is the complainant & victim legally wedded of the A-1 is resident of H No 1-11-14. Near By Meg Market. Jangaon (V&M&D), Present at Yadagirigutta (V&M). Yadadri-Bhongir (Dist), the LW-2 S Potta Chandralah, the Lw-3. Smt Potta Bharathamma are parents respectively of victim and circumstant witness to the incident, the LW.4, Sri Eppialapally Narendar, the LW-5 Sri Bollepally Janardhan are panchayath elders & circumstantial witness to the incident. Whereas the accused A-1 Panthagadda Shymul Suresh is the son of A-2, the A-2. Panthagadda Bharathi, are resident of Thiruvikanagar. Madhaliya Pet. Pondicherry, the A-3 /Geddam Jhand. Small Mother-in-law of A-1, the A-4 Panthagadda Sudheer, the AS Geddam Sathyakama Jabal @Amancherla Jabali are Brothers of A-1 are resident of Jawaharagar, Hyderabad.


The LW-1 marriage was performed on 17.08.2016 with the A-1 as per customs prevailing in their community and the presence of their relatives. At the time of LW-1 marriage. her in-laws.


Demand Rs. 30,00,000/-Cash for dowry, in which, LW-2 & 3 have gave Rs. 10,00,000/- cash, 15 Thule’s Gold to them as dowry, After marriage the couple had lead happy conjugal life of 5 Months. thereafter A-1 suspecting the Lw-1 character and also used to harassed mentally and physically to bring Additional Rs.10.00.000/- dowry from her parent’s house otherwise A-1 do the 2 marriage with other women, A-2 to A-5 are supported to A-1 Due to such harassment, the LWs 26 3 was placed the matter before the elders LW1-4 & 5 who are circumstantial witness & Panchayath elders. On request of the LWs 2 & 3, the elders held a panchayath 2018 May month 2 times at Chennai, 2018 July month one time at Hyderabad A-3 House, 2019 February Month one time. 2019 August Month one time convinced them, A-1 to A-5 says in front of panchayath elders take good care of Lw-1. but A-1 to A 5) are again harassed her. Later 2 years ago A1 to A-5 beaten the Lw-1 and necked out in the house to bring additional Rs. 10,00,000/ dowry if not bring the amount they would kill the LW-1. Later Lw-1 filed a complaint against them in Woman PS Bhongir. Police are given counselling them, but A1 to A 5 did not change their · attitude. Thus the A1 to A5 noted in Col. No 12 of this charge sheet committed an offence punishable U/s 498-A. 406, 506 IPC & Sec 3 & 4 DP Act.”


19.Perusal of the charge-sheet would show that the investigating agency had relied on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two other witnesses who are Panchayat elders to substantiate the allegations. As far as the statement of the complainant is concerned, it is in the form of the complaint which has been already reproduced hereinabove. We will now examine whether any new or fresh evidence has been revealed in the course of the investigation from the examination of other witnesses, namely, the complainant’s parents and the two panchayat witnesses.


20.The statements of the parents are carbon copy of each other and as such we may refer to the statement of the father only, relevant portions of which read as follows: -


“I am resident of Yadadri Bhuvangiri district, Bibinagar, Brahmanapalli road. We married our daughter Premalatha in 2016 to Panthagadda SamuelSuresh, s/o Janardhan Rao, resident of Pondicherry. Our son-in-law works as a Doctor. At the time of marriage, the Mother-in-law of my daughter demanded Rs.30,00,000 cash as dowry and we gave Rs. 10,00,000/ cash and 15 sovereigns of gold as per her wish. Five months after marriage, my daughter came to our house and told me: that her husband-was suspecting her with every person she spoke further he told her that he doesn’t like her as she did not get the dowry as demanded by them and asked her to get additional dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/ for his needs or else asked her to leave him so that, he can marry again. He was harassing my daughter mentally and physically. My daughter’s Mother-in-law Bharathi, my daughter’s mother-in-law’s younger sister Geddam Jhansi and her son Geddam Sathyacama, my daughter’s husband’s brother Sudhir, Jabali, all of them supported my daughter’s husband and told that as she brought less dowry they warned her to listen to her husband or else they will kill her. They used to say insulting words and used to abuse her and beat her. In this regard we held panchayat with elders. When the elders convinced them, they used to say they will look after her well and taken her with them, but used to harass her again. These type of panchayats took place 4 times in Chennai and 5 times in Hyderabad. Approximately about 2 years ago my daughter came to our house and told me that when she questioned why they were doing like this, they said, how dare you to raise your voice against us and all of them together abused her and beat her and pushed her out of house. They threatened her saying that, if she comes home without getting money of Rs.10,00,000/- they will kill her. After that, my daughter has given a complaint against them in Bhuvanagiri Mahila Police Station and the police called them and counselled them, but there was no change in them is what he stated.”


(emphasis added)


21.The other evidence is in the form of the statements of the two panchayat witnesses, namely, Sri Eppala Pally Narendar and Sri Bollepally Janardhan. It is also noticed that their statements too are reproduction of the other and as such examination of only one of the statements will suffice, for which we may examine the statement of Sri Eppala Pally Narendar, relevant portions of which read as follows: -


“I am a resident of Yadadri-Bhuvanagiri district…….After 5 months of their marriage Chandraiah came to me and told me that his daughter came home and told him that her husband is suspecting her with every person she spoke Further he told he doesn’t like her, as she did not get the dowry that they asked for he asked her to get additional dowry of Rs 10,00,000 for his needs or else asked her to leave him so that he can marry again. He used to harass mentally and physically. Premalatha’s Mother-in-law Bharathi, her Mother-in-law’s younger sister Geddam Jhansi and her son Geddam Sathyacama, Jabali, her husband’s brother Subir, all of them together supported her husband and told her that she brought less dowry and warned her to listen to her husband or else they will kill her. They used to say insulting words and used abuse her and beat her Premalatha’s father told me that in this regard, they were holding a panchayat with elders and asked me to come an panchayat elder. Then I along with a few other elders went to the panchayat. We told them to be good and they said we will look after Premalatha well and has taken her with them, but again harassed her in the same way. In May 2018, one time in July 2018, one time in February 2019, one time in 2019 August, in panchayats were held in Chennai and Hyderabad (Jhansi’s house). In the panchayat all the above persons, collectively told that, if they give the dowry they asked for only, they will take Premalatha or else we will get their boy married again. 1 came to know that at about 2 years ago all of them together abused and beat Premalatha and pushed her out of house and threatened her to get Rs.5,00,000 and then only they will allow her enter the house or else they will kill her-is the statement given by him”


22.When we minutely examine the statements of the father and the mother of the complainant, what can be seen is that as far as the demand for dowry of Rs. 30 Lakhs and giving of Rs. 10 lakhs and 15 sovereigns of gold at the time of marriage of the complainant is concerned, it can be said that it was within their direct knowledge. Being the father and mother, the complainant daughter would naturally convey to them what had transpired with her in relation to her husband and family. Thus, as regards other allegations of harassment, the same were informed to them by their daughter but they were not witness to the same.


It may also be noted that as regards the alleged act of beating of the complainant by her husband and other relatives mentioned by the parents, the complainant herself does not mention so in her complaints. Therefore, this allegation of beating of the complainant is something which has been added by the father and the mother of the complainant though they did not themselves witness the same.


23.As regards the statement of Sri Eppala Pally Narender, the Panchayat elder, regarding the incidents of harassment which are the subject matter of the complaint, the same has been stated by him after he was informed by the father of the complainant. Thus, his evidence is nothing but hearsay evidence. As far as the statement regarding holding of panchayat at Hyderabad and Chennai is concerned, where the family members of the husband had allegedly stated that if the dowry is not given as demanded, the complainant would not be taken back and they would get the husband married again, the said statement is of a very generalised nature and vague in the sense that it does not mention exactly when and in which Panchayat the aforesaid incident took place and what roles the appellants played. Further, it is noticed that this witness as well as the other Panchayat witness are residents of Bhongir which is in Telangana. It is not stated how they were also present in the Panchayat meetings held in Chennai.


The aforesaid Panchayat witness mentioned about the alleged demand of dowry and threat meted out to the complainant of being killed if the demand for dowry of Rs. 5 lakhs was not met, and about the threat of the complainant being thrown out of the matrimonial house, but the said statement is based on the information provided to him by the father of the complainant and is not based on personal knowledge of the witness.


24.When the aforesaid statements are examined, it is evident that there certainly are specific allegations made against the husband of the complainant, his mother (mother-in-law of the complainant) about demand of dowry and harassment meted out to the complainant. However, as regards the present appellants, the allegation against them is that they along with the other accused family members used to pressurize the complainant to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes. Apart from this generalised allegation, there are no specific or overt acts attributed to the appellants which would tantamount to acts of cruelty or physical or mental harassment or being active participants in the demands for dowry.


25.From the above what is clearly evident is that the statements of the witnesses though support the case of the complainant, do not disclose any new fact or provide better particulars beyond what had already been stated by the complainant. As far as the present appellants are concerned, these witnesses including the complainant merely make generalised allegations without any specific evidence against them.


26.Thus, if the evidence of the complainant as well as the witnesses are taken at their face value, what can be said to have been made out against the appellants is that the appellants and other members of the family used to pressurize the complainant to act according to the wishes of her husband and mother-in-law which is a very generalised allegation devoid of specific particulars.


27.As mentioned above, the statements of the mother and the father of the complainant as annexed in the charge-sheet are carbon copies. Similarly, the same is in respect of the statements of the other two independent witnesses, Epalla Pally Narender and Bollepally Janardhan. Under these circumstances, discussed above, we have no hesitation to say that the identical statements of the witnesses do not inspire confidence of this Court for continuation of the criminal proceedings with regard to the present appellants.


28.Coming to the other case relating to domestic violence pending before the Court of Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir in DVC No. 25 of 2021, the same is based on the second complaint dated 20.09.2021 filed by the complainant, relevant portions of which read as follows:-


“xxxxxx


On 17.08.2016, I was married to Samuel Suresh….


After the, marriage for a period of 5 months or so, my husband has taken care of me properly. Thereafter 1. My husband Samuel Suresh, 2. My mother-in-law Bharati Janardhan. 3. Younger sister of my mother-in law Jhansi Geddam 4. My brother-in-law Pathagadda Sudheer 5. Son of my mother-in-law’s sister Geddam Sathyakama Jabill, all the above referred persons, with a plan, started harassing me physically and mentally and demanded to get additional dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/-. When I informed the same thing to my parents, my parents organized a panchayat before my family members and elders. My husband agreed to take care of me properly, before the elders, but as usual after some days he started harassing me along with his family members. They made me to pay the house rent. At times my husband stayed away from the house during nights. My husband used to tell each and everything to my mother-in-law and he used to act as per her directions. Further my mother-in-law used to pressurize me to purchase a new house and a car. They also tried to get a false report from the psychiatrist, by taking an appointment with the doctor. Thereafter they forced me to address a letter stating that, I was responsible for all the mistakes happened in our marital life. They have taken money from me and have spent for their personal uses.


I submit that when meeting was held at the residence of younger sister of my mother-in-law, my husband promised before my parents that he will take care of me properly. After that when I holded his hand, he pushed me down and used to scold me for every small issue. Further he asked not to touch his clothes and go away from the kitchen. Once he tried to burn his socks. because I washed them. My husband has not supported me, even when requested him, that there is a problem in my job and finally lost the job. My parents have invited my husband for my brother’s marriage, but he refused to attend the marriage and used to pressurize me to sign the letter. He used to tell bad about me to his friends and they used to call me and asked me to leave my husband. One day, a girl called me and said that my husband is having a girlfriend earlier and now she has taken divorce from her husband and therefore he is planning to marry her. They have tortured me in many ways, but I patiently tolerated their ill-treatment for a smooth marriage, but he has not understood me. He tortured me mentally by scolding me and he used to go out with his friends and used to come at 3 or 4 in the early morning. On 17.10.20 at around 10:00 pm he necked me out of the house, therefore I request you to take legal action on my husband Samuel Suresh and other family members for torturing me physically and mentally. Further I request you to take action as per Domestic Violence and see that protection order and residence order is provided in my favor. Further, see that every month Rs.30,000/- is given to me, for my maintenance.”


(emphasis added)


The said second complaint is more or less the reiteration of the allegations made in her first complaint with some additional incidents. Perusal of the second complaint shows that no specific allegations about harassment have been made against the appellants.


29.As far as the allegation of the complainant of being thrown out of her matrimonial house on 17.10.2020 is concerned, she made the specific allegation only against her husband and she did not attribute any role of the appellants except for making a general allegation of harassing her physically and mentally without specifying the actual role of the appellants.


30.It may be also noted that in the second complaint, the complainant had specifically stated that when a meeting was held at the residence of the younger sister of her mother-in-law (Appellant No.1), her husband promised before her parents that he would take care of her properly. This statement shows that the Appellant No. 1 was trying to mediate and broker peace between the complainant, her husband and her mother-in-law, which is inconsistent with the allegation that the appellants were pressurising the complainant in support of the mother-in-law and the husband.


31.Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal consequences involving coercive measures, which can be permitted only when specific act(s) which constitute offences punishable under the penal code or any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific allegations and credible materials to support the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. Institution of family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as those between family members, are guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural expectations. These relationships are often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of respect, commitment, and emotional investment compared to other social or professional associations. For the aforesaid reason, preservation of family relationship has always been emphasised upon. Thus, when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and judicious, and should allow invocation of criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials which clearly constitute criminal offences.


32.We have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other members of the family who do not come to the rescue of the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean that such domestic disputes should be given the colour of criminality.


33.It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and violence in domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence typically happens within the four walls of the house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed by public at large, except perhaps by the immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence by the victim of domestic violence may not be easily forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that domestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been enacted with very expansive meaning and scope of what amounts to domestic violence. Since, violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now criminalised entailing serious consequences on the perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with such cases by examining whether there are specific allegations with instances against the perpetrators and not generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of the law to protect the victims of domestic violence is of paramount importance, and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to book, all the family members or relatives are not indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in a sweeping manner.


34.For a matrimonial relationship which is founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to make a partner to hurl allegations of domestic violence and harassment against the other partner, would normally not happen at the spur of the moment and such acrimonious relationship would develop only in course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmination of a series of acts which turns, otherwise an amicable relationship, into a fractured one. Thus, in such cases involving allegations of domestic violence or harassment, there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by the complainant against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general allegation of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.


35.We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating to domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and every member of the family who are accused of such offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by indiscriminately dragging all the members of the family. There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.


36.Our observations, however, should not be generalised to mean that relatives cannot be brought under the purview of the aforesaid penal provisions when they have actively participated in inflicting cruelty on the daughter-in-law/victim. What needs to be assessed is whether such allegations are genuine with specific criminal role assigned to such members of the family or whether it is merely a spill over and side-effect of a matrimonial discord and allegations made by an emotionally disturbed person. Each and every case of domestic violence will thus depend on the peculiar facts obtaining in each case.


37.In the present case, the charges against the accused including the appellants are sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders.


As discussed above, the statements of the two elders are based on the information provided by the father of the complainant. These two witnesses did not witness any of the incidents of physical harassment by the appellants. Though they were present in the panchayat to resolve the dispute between the parties, their account of harassment of the complainant is based on what they had learnt from the father of the complainant. As regards their knowledge of demand of dowry by the appellants, the same is quite vague and without specific details.


Similarly, the statements of the parents of the complainant are based on the information provided by the complainant/daughter. There is also nothing on record to show that the parents witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants.


Thus, the evidence against the appellants in these proceedings boils down to the evidence of the complainant. The complainant in her complaints as mentioned above, did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning the demands of dowry and physical and mental harassment of the complainant, except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details. The evidence of the complainant is the foundation for the criminal proceedings against the appellants. As discussed above, the evidence of the other witnesses do not disclose anything new as far as the appellants are concerned.


In our considered view, the aforesaid materials do not constitute a prima facie case against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial.


38.We have also noted that the appellants do not live with the principal accused. While the marriage took place in Pondicherry and the complainant lived with her husband and mother-in-law in Chennai, the appellants are residents of Hyderabad. As the appellants do not stay together with the complainant and her husband and mother-in-law, to make the appellants as co-accused for alleged offences committed in the matrimonial house of the complainant on the basis of very generalised allegations does not appear to be tenable.


39.Under these circumstances, for the reasons discussed above, we are satisfied that the appellants have been able to make out a case for interference in these proceedings qua the present appellants as in our opinion no prima facie case has been made out against the appellants to continue with the criminal proceedings against them and allowing these to continue would amount to abuse of the process of the law.


40.Accordingly, we allow both the present Criminal Appeals as below:


(i)The impugned judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is quashed qua the two appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali.


(ii)The impugned judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir is quashed qua the appellant, Geddam Jhansi. This is having regard to the criminal proceeding against her being quashed as above and as identical allegation (paragraph 28 above) are made against her in DVC No. 25 of 2021, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This is also by bearing in mind the relationship of the appellant Geddam Jhansi to the complainant, being the latters’s mother-in-law’s sister.


41.However, it is made clear that the observations and findings recorded herein by this Court are in the respect of the allegations made against the present appellants and the same will have no bearing on the criminal proceedings against the other accused persons and the trial courts will not be swayed by the observations and findings recorded herein by this Court and the trial courts are expected to proceed with the criminal proceedings pending against the other accused persons after proper appreciation of evidence and in accordance with law.


Result of the case: Appeals allowed.


Sentence/Sentencing – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss.42, 42A – Interpretation – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) – Appellant convicted for offences u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO Act, life imprisonment awarded – Appeal rejected by High Court with certain modification – Plea of the appellant that as the offences were overlapping, POCSO Act being special law would prevail over IPC and hence, the appellant could not have been convicted for both the offences: Held: Conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO Act is wholly justified – Under s.42, POCSO Act, when the alleged acts or omissions constitute offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act then, the law which prescribes the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied – s.42 and s.42A, POCSO Act operate in completely different spheres – s.42A, POCSO Act cannot be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., s.42, POCSO Act – Since, ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC provide for a higher sentence as compared to ss.3/4, POCSO Act, the trial Court was justified in choosing the former to award punishment in terms of s.42, POCSO Act – However, the High Court erred in directing that the appellant would have to serve life imprisonment for remainder of his natural life as provided u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC – Under these provisions it is not mandated that the convict must be awarded life imprisonment – The sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial Court for the offence u/ss.3/4, POCSO Act revived – For offences punishable u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC, the accused to undergo imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial Court, without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the natural life of the appellant and fine, as directed. [Paras 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 31]

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 490 : 2025 INSC 335


Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P.

(Criminal Appeal No(s). 1257 of 2025)


07 March 2025


[Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Whether the conviction of the appellant ought to have been recorded under the IPC or whether the provisions of the Special law, i.e., Section 42A of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, would prevail thereby, vitiating the sentence awarded to the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC.


Headnotes


Sentence/Sentencing – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss.42, 42A – Interpretation – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) – Appellant convicted for offences u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO Act, life imprisonment awarded – Appeal rejected by High Court with certain modification – Plea of the appellant that as the offences were overlapping, POCSO Act being special law would prevail over IPC and hence, the appellant could not have been convicted for both the offences:


Held: Conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO Act is wholly justified – Under s.42, POCSO Act, when the alleged acts or omissions constitute offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act then, the law which prescribes the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied – s.42 and s.42A, POCSO Act operate in completely different spheres – s.42A, POCSO Act cannot be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., s.42, POCSO Act – Since, ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC provide for a higher sentence as compared to ss.3/4, POCSO Act, the trial Court was justified in choosing the former to award punishment in terms of s.42, POCSO Act – However, the High Court erred in directing that the appellant would have to serve life imprisonment for remainder of his natural life as provided u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC – Under these provisions it is not mandated that the convict must be awarded life imprisonment – The sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial Court for the offence u/ss.3/4, POCSO Act revived – For offences punishable u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC, the accused to undergo imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial Court, without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the natural life of the appellant and fine, as directed. [Paras 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 31]


Case Law Cited


Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka [2023] 4 SCR 669 : (2023) 9 SCC 817; Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala [2024] 3 SCR 913 : 2024 SCC Online SC 315; Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 4 SCR 225; Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93 : (2008) 13 SCC 767 – referred to.


List of Acts


Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.


List of Keywords


Sections 42, 42A of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of Penal Code, 1860; Offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act; Punishment of greater degree; Sentence of life imprisonment; Imprisonment for remainder of person’s natural life; Rigour of the sentence awarded increased; Sentence of life imprisonment; Life term; Till the natural life; Special law; General law.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1257 of 2025


From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2019 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in JA No. 6590 of 2016


Appearances for Parties


Advs. for the Appellant:


R Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Santosh Kumar Pandey, B Venkatraman, Debasish Mishra.


Adv. for the Respondent:


Adarsh Upadhyay, Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Shashank Pachauri.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Mehta, J.


1.Heard.


2.Delay condoned.


3.Leave granted.


4.This appeal, preferred on behalf of the appellant-accused1, takes an exception to the judgment dated 2nd August, 2019, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad2 dismissing Jail Appeal No. 6590 of 2016 preferred by the appellant.


5.The Division Bench, while dismissing the appeal, affirmed the judgment and order dated 16th September, 2016, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Court No.2, Fatehpur3 in Sessions Trial No. 06 of 2016, arising out of Case Crime No. 236 of 2015 registered at Police Station Chandpur, District Fatehpur, convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 18604 and Sections 3/4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 20125. The appellant was awarded punishment of imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 25,000/-. In default of payment of aforesaid fine, it was ordered that the appellant was to undergo two months of additional imprisonment on each count.


6.Brief facts of the case are that the appellant, Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh, is the father of victim (PW-2) who was of about 9 years at the time of the incident. On 28th October,2015, an FIR6 came to be lodged by the wife of the appellant, Smt. Rajani, at P.S. Chandpur, District Fatehpur, alleging inter alia, that she had gone to her parental house about two months ago with her youngest son Krishna, aged about 2 years, leaving her minor daughter, the victim herein, aged about 9 years, and a son named Vishnu, aged about 4 years at her matrimonial house in the custody of her husband, i.e., the appellant. On 22nd October, 2015 at about 8:00 p.m., the appellant enticed the minor victim (PW-2) and took her to the rooftop and committed sexual assault upon the child. She was detained on the roof by threatening her. The minor victim came down from the roof in the morning and narrated the whole incident to her grandfather, Ram Naresh Singh (PW-3), who, in turn, telephonically informed the informant about the occurrence. The appellant went absconding after the incident. The informant (PW-1) got frightened because of the incident and did not go to her matrimonial home. She somehow mustered the courage and approached the police station along with her father Ranjeet Singh and father-in-law, Ram Naresh Singh (PW-3), as well as the victim and filed the FIR7 against the appellant. It was, inter alia, urged in the FIR that the child victim should be medically examined. It was also stated in the FIR that a day prior to the lodging of the report, the informant had approached the District Headquarter, Fatehpur from where she was redirected to approach P.S. Chandpur for lodging the FIR.


7.Investigation was undertaken by Rajesh Kumar Singh (PW-7), Investigating Officer (I.O.). The minor victim was subjected to medical examination by Dr. Manisha Shukla (PW-4) who opined that no external injury was found on the body of the victim. On internal examination, redness was seen present over the labia minora in the vagina of the victim and her hymen was intact. Forensic material was collected from the oral, vaginal, vulval and anal swab of the minor victim, slide was prepared and sent for pathological examination, D.N.A. mapping and examination of presence of spermatozoa. The place of the incident was inspected, the site plan was prepared and accordingly, the appellant was arrested.


8.The certificate of date of birth was collected from the school. The child was examined under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 19738 wherein she made an emphatic allegation of penetrative sexual assault against the appellant.


9.Investigation was concluded and the charge-sheet was filed against the appellant in the trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC and Sections 3/4/5 of the POCSO Act. The trial Court framed charges against the appellant for the said offences, who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. As many as 9 witnesses were examined and 8 documents were exhibited by the prosecution in its evidence. After the completion of prosecution evidence, the appellant was questioned under Section 313 CrPC and was confronted with the allegations as appearing in the prosecution case, which the appellant denied and claimed to have been falsely implicated. The appellant stated that he had earlier lodged an FIR against his wife, the informant herein, and his father (PW-3) and therefore, a false case had been registered against him. He further stated that at the time of the incident, the child was residing with his sister. No evidence was led from the side of the defence.


10.Upon hearing the arguments advanced by the defence counsel and the public prosecutor and appreciating the evidence available on record, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated above.9 The appeal preferred by the appellant was rejected by the High Court vide judgment dated 2nd August, 2019, which is assailed in this appeal by special leave.


11.While entertaining the special leave petition, notice limited to the question of sentence was issued by this Court vide order dated 2nd September, 2024.


12.Shri R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant advanced a solitary submission urging that the trial Court ought not to have convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) IPC because the acts alleged are defined as offences in both category of laws, i.e., the general laws, i.e., the IPC, as well as in the special law, i.e., the POCSO Act. Since the offences are overlapping, the special law would prevail over the general law and hence, conviction of the appellant could not have been recorded by the trial Court for both the offences. He placed reliance on Section 42A of the POCSO Act and urged that the said provision makes it clear that the provisions of the POCSO Act are not in derogation of any other law and that the provisions of the POCSO Act have an overriding effect on the provisions of any other law to the extent of inconsistency.


13.Shri R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel, further urged that the trial Court awarded sentence of life imprisonment to the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC, but the High Court in the appeal against conviction, has modified the judgment of the trial Court and has increased the rigor of the punishment by directing that the appellant would have to undergo life imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life as provided under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC and that there would be no requirement of a separate sentence for the offence punishable under Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act. The learned counsel submitted that without there being any appeal for enhancement of sentence, the High Court, in an appeal against conviction filed by the appellant, ought not to have enhanced the rigor of the punishment awarded to the appellant and, to this extent, the judgment of the High Court is illegal and deserves to be set aside.


14.Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by the appellant’s counsel. He urged that the appellant has been convicted for a reprehensible act and the heinous offence of subjecting his own minor daughter to forcible sexual assault and as such, the High Court10 was fully justified in awarding the enhanced punishment to the appellant under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC. On these grounds, he implored this Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the High Court.


15.We have gone through the submissions advanced at the Bar and have gone through the material placed on record.


16.Shri R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel for the appellant, fairly did not assail the guilt of the appellant as recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court but in spite thereof, we have carefully scrutinized the material available on record and find that there is wholesome evidence justifying the conviction of the appellant for the offences as alleged.


17.The only moot question which thus, requires adjudication is whether the conviction of the appellant ought to have been recorded under the IPC or whether the provisions of the Special law, i.e., Section 42A of POCSO Act, would prevail thereby, vitiating the sentence awarded to the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC.


18.Sections 42 and 42A of the POCSO Act would be relevant to adjudicate this issue and are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: -


“42. Alternate punishment.— Where an act or omission constitutes an offence punishable under this Act and also under sections 166A, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 370, 370A, 375, 376, [376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB], [376E, section 509 of the Indian Penal Code or section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000)], then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to punishment only under this Act or under the Indian Penal Code as provides for punishment which is greater in degree.


42A. Act not in derogation of any other law.— The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency.”


19.A bare perusal of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, would make it clear that when the alleged acts or omissions constitute offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act then, the law which prescribes the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied.


20.Shri R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel, tried to draw a distinction by urging that Section 42A of the POCSO Act, provides that where there is an inconsistency between the provisions of the POCSO Act and any other law, the provisions of the special law would have an overriding effect to the extent of the inconsistency. He submitted that since the offence under Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act does not carry punishment of imprisonment for life, which means imprisonment for remainder of person’s natural life, the accused could only have been punished under the said provision and not under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC, looking to the inconsistency in the sentence provided.


21.We feel that the said submission lacks merit. On the face of it, the fields of operation of Section 42 and Section 42A are in completely different spheres. Section 42 specifically deals with the quantum of punishment mandating that when a particular act or omission constitutes an offence, both under the POCSO Act and also under the provisions of the IPC or the Information Technology Act, 2000 then, the offender found guilty of the offence would be liable to punishment under the POCSO Act or under the provisions of the IPC whichever provides a punishment of a greater degree.


22.Section 42A of POSCO Act, on the other hand, deals with the procedural aspects and gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO Act over any other law for the time being in force where, the two acts are inconsistent with each other. Hence, the provisions of Section 42A of POSCO Act, by no stretch of imagination, can be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., Section 42 of POCSO Act.


23.Consequently, we are of the view that conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC and Sections 3/4 of POCSO Act is wholly justified. However, we feel that the High Court erred while directing that the appellant would have to serve life imprisonment for remainder of his natural life as provided under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC.


24.We may note that the said direction was passed in an appeal against conviction filed by the appellant. Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), are punishable as below: -


“376. Punishment for rape.— (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which [shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine].


(2) Whoever,—


(a)-(e )….


(f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman; or


(g)-(h)….


(i)11 commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent; or shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.”


(emphasis supplied)


25.Thus, under this provision, the Courts have been given discretion to award punishment for a term sentence of minimum 10 years or of imprisonment for life. Where the sentence awarded in the discretion of the Court is for life, the same shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life. Hence, there is no mandate of law that under these provisions, the convict must be awarded life imprisonment.


26.The trial Court, however, had awarded imprisonment for life to the appellant while convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC. Since, the said Sections of IPC provides for a higher sentence as compared to Sections 3/4 of POCSO Act, the trial Court was justified in choosing the former to award punishment in terms of Section 42 of POCSO Act. However, we have to consider whether the award of imprisonment for life, which means imprisonment for remainder of person’s natural life, was warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. This Court in case of Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka12, held as below:-


“14. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that even in a case where capital punishment is not imposed or is not proposed, the Constitutional Courts can always exercise the power of imposing a modified or fixed-term sentence by directing that a life sentence, as contemplated by “secondly” in Section 53 of the IPC, shall be of a fixed period of more than fourteen years, for example, of twenty years, thirty years and so on. The fixed punishment cannot be for a period less than 14 years in view of the mandate of Section 433-A CrPC.”


27.The High Court, while deciding the appeal against conviction preferred by the appellant, observed that the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC would extend to the remainder of the natural life of the appellant. This direction was merely a clarification to keep the sentence in tune with the language of the sentencing provision. Nevertheless, the fact remains that because of this clarification, the rigour of the sentence awarded has been increased to the effect that the appellant would have to spend the remainder of his natural life in prison without any possibility of early release.


28.Hon’ble Shri K.V. Vishwanathan, J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court, in Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala13 considered the issue of sentencing beyond the period of 14 years and held as below:-


“17. The question before us is what should be the appropriate sentence and whether the High Court was justified in adopting the Swamy Shraddhananda v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 line of cases and even it was justified whether the fixing of the quantum at 30 years without remission was the appropriate sentence, in the facts and circumstances of the case?


. . .


25. Swamy Shraddananda (supra), since affirmed subsequently in Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1, resolved a judge’s dilemma. Often it happens that a case that falls short of the rarest of the rare category may also be one where a mere sentence of 14 years (the normal benchmark for life imprisonment) may be grossly disproportionate and inadequate. The Court may find that while death penalty may not be warranted keeping in mind the overall circumstances, a proportionate penalty would be to fix the period between 14 years and for the imprisonment till rest of the life without remission. Addressing this issue felicitously in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) Justice Aftab Alam speaking for the court, held as follows:


“92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different angle. The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant comes to this Court carrying a death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court, this Court may find, as in the present appeal, that the case just falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence. But at the same time, having regard to the nature of the crime, the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life imprisonment subject to remission normally works out to a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate and inadequate. What then should the Court do? If the Court’s option is limited only to two punishments, one a sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more than 14 years and the other death, the Court may feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus between 14 years’ imprisonment and death. It needs to be emphasised that the Court would take recourse to the expanded option primarily because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all.”


(emphasis supplied)


29.In the case of Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, this Court, while considering the case involving the offences under the POCSO Act as well as under 376(2)(i) of the IPC, confined the life imprisonment to mean actual imprisonment for a period of 30 years. While doing so, the Bench relied upon the celebrated judgment of this Court in the case of Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka.14


30.Keeping in view the aforesaid exposition of the law, we thus, direct that the ends of justice would be served by restoring the judgment of the trial Court and directing that the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the accused, by the trial Court, for the offence under Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act shall stand revived.


31.For the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC, the accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial Court, without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the natural life of the appellant and a fine of Rs. 5,00,000/- and in default, to further undergo imprisonment of two years. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.


32.The fine, upon being deposited, shall be paid to the victim.


33.The appeal is partially allowed in these terms.


34.Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.


Result of the case: Appeal partially allowed.


1 For short, ‘appellant’.


2 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘High Court’.


3 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘trial Court’.


4 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘IPC’.


5 Hereinafter referred to as ‘POCSO Act’.


6 (Exh. Ka.1) FIR Case Crime No. 236 of 2015.


7 Supra note 4.


8 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CrPC’.


9 Refer, Para 5 of this judgment.


10 Vide its order dated 02.08.2019, in the case no. Jail Appeal No. 6590 of 2016


11 Clause (i) omitted by Act 22 of 2018 S.4. (w.e.f. 21-4-2018).


12 (2023) 9 SCC 817


13 2024 SCC Online SC 315


14 (2008) 13 SCC 767

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.227 – Discharge – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.34, 304 Part II, 304A – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Appellant no.1 was doing interior decoration of the shop on contract basis and the appellant no.2 was the Store Manager of the company which had taken the said shop on lease – Two employees of appellant no.1 while working on the sign board of the shop at a height of 12 feet from the ground level, struck by electricity, got electrocuted, and fell from iron ladder resulting in multiple injuries, leading to their death – Registration of FIR – Chargesheet against the appellants for committing an offence u/ss.304A/182/201 rw s.34 IPC since the appellants did not provide any safety equipments to the deceased employees – Appellants sought their discharge u/s. 227 which was dismissed – Revision applications thereagainst dismissed by the High Court – Correctness: Held: Basic ingredient of s.304 Part II is presence of knowledge and absence of intention – Doer must have the knowledge that the act performed by him would likely cause death etc. but there should not be any intention to cause death – No prima facie case can be said to have been made out against the appellants for committing an offence u/s.304 Part II – No intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees – Also, the appellants had no knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to work on the sign board that such act was likely to cause death – Thus, the basic ingredients for commission of offence u/s.304 Part II are absent – Furthermore, at the stage of consideration of discharge, the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the prosecution – It is only to be seen that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused – On facts, the incident was purely accidental, and no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence u/ss.304A and 304 Part II – In any case, the trial court only considered culpability of the appellants qua s.304 Part II as the Magistrate had committed the case to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the appellant to s. 304 Part II and not s.304A – Both the trial court and High Court erred in rejecting the discharge applications of the appellants – Order of the trial court and impugned order set aside and quashed, and the discharge applications are allowed. [Paras 12.3, 12.4, 14-16, 17.3, 18]

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 502 : 2025 INSC 338


Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra

(Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024)


07 March 2025


[Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Issue arose as to whether the High Court was correct in dismissing the revision application filed by the appellants assailing the order of the trial court dismissing their discharge applications u/s.227 CrPC.


Headnotes


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.227 – Discharge – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.34, 304 Part II, 304A – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Appellant no.1 was doing interior decoration of the shop on contract basis and the appellant no.2 was the Store Manager of the company which had taken the said shop on lease – Two employees of appellant no.1 while working on the sign board of the shop at a height of 12 feet from the ground level, struck by electricity, got electrocuted, and fell from iron ladder resulting in multiple injuries, leading to their death – Registration of FIR – Chargesheet against the appellants for committing an offence u/ss.304A/182/201 rw s.34 IPC since the appellants did not provide any safety equipments to the deceased employees – Appellants sought their discharge u/s. 227 which was dismissed – Revision applications thereagainst dismissed by the High Court – Correctness:


Held: Basic ingredient of s.304 Part II is presence of knowledge and absence of intention – Doer must have the knowledge that the act performed by him would likely cause death etc. but there should not be any intention to cause death – No prima facie case can be said to have been made out against the appellants for committing an offence u/s.304 Part II – No intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees – Also, the appellants had no knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to work on the sign board that such act was likely to cause death – Thus, the basic ingredients for commission of offence u/s.304 Part II are absent – Furthermore, at the stage of consideration of discharge, the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the prosecution – It is only to be seen that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused – On facts, the incident was purely accidental, and no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence u/ss.304A and 304 Part II – In any case, the trial court only considered culpability of the appellants qua s.304 Part II as the Magistrate had committed the case to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the appellant to s. 304 Part II and not s.304A – Both the trial court and High Court erred in rejecting the discharge applications of the appellants – Order of the trial court and impugned order set aside and quashed, and the discharge applications are allowed. [Paras 12.3, 12.4, 14-16, 17.3, 18]


Case Law Cited


Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P. [1996] Supp. 6 SCR 285 : (1996) 6 SCC 129 – distinguished.


List of Acts


Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.


List of Keywords


Discharge; Culpable homicide not amounting to murder; Knowledge; Intention; Fall from iron ladder; Electrocution; Safety equipments; Murder; Prima facie case of culpable homicide; Unnatural death.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024


From the Judgment and Order dated 02.11.2017 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in CRRA No. 269 of 2017


Appearances for Parties


Advs. for the Appellants:


Gaurav Agarwal, Sr. Adv., S S Ray, Ms. Praveena Gautam, Pawan Shukla, Ms. Kanika Kalyan, Ms. Akanksha Tyagi, Ms. Rakhi Ray.


Advs. for the Respondent:


Shrirang B. Varma, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Ujjal Bhuyan, J.


This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 02.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (briefly ‘the High Court’ hereinafter) in Criminal Revision Application No. 269 of 2017.


2.By the aforesaid judgment and order dated 02.11.2017, the revision application filed by the appellants assailing the order dated 01.04.2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014 came to be dismissed.


2.1.Be it stated that by the aforesaid order dated 01.04.2017, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune dismissed the discharge applications filed by the appellants being Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 in Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.


3.Appellants are Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and Nimesh Pravinchandra Shah.


4.Appellant No. 1 was doing interior decoration of the concerned shop in Pune on contract basis. Appellant No. 2 was the Store Operation Manager of M/s. lntergold Gems Private Limited which had taken the concerned shop on lease.


4.1.On 27.09.2013, at about 09:00 PM, the work of decoration of the front side of the shop was being undertaken by two employees of appellant No.1, Salauddin Shaikh and Arun Sharma. It is alleged that both the employees viz. Salauddin Shaikh and Arun Sharma were provided with an iron ladder and they were working on the sign board which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. While they were working on the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and fell down. Due to the fall, they suffered head injuries as well as injuries on their arms. They were taken to Pune Hospital and Research Centre where they were declared dead on arrival.


4.2.Accidental reports bearing Nos. 67/23 and 68/23 under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) were registered.


4.3.After more than two months, on 04.12.2013, FIR was lodged at Vishrambag Police Station, Pune by the Police Sub-Inspector Shri S.G. Patil against the appellants which was registered as FIR No. 316/2013. It was stated that the appellants did not provide any safety equipments like belt, helmet, rubber shoes etc to the two deceased employees. According to the investigating officer, the two accused persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though the work assigned to them was quite risky. Informant opined that both the appellants were responsible for the unnatural death of the two employees since they had knowledge that there was risk to the lives of the employees. Therefore, the first informant summed up by saying that both the accused persons were responsible for the unnatural death of the two deceased persons. Accordingly, it was alleged that appellants had committed offences under Sections 304 and 304A IPC.


4.4.On 04.12.2013 itself both the appellants were arrested in connection with the aforesaid FIR. They were subsequently released on the same day. After completion of investigation, police submitted chargesheet in which the two appellants were arrayed as accused. Appellants were chargesheeted for committing an offence under Sections 304A/182/201 read with Section 34 IPC.


4.5.Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pune, before whom the chargesheet was filed, was of the view that there were material to attract Section 304 Part II IPC. Since it became a sessions triable case, the same was committed to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune where it was registered as Sessions Case No.749 of 2014.


5.Appellants filed Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 applications in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Pune seeking their discharge under Section 227 of CrPC.


5.1.Contention of the appellants in the discharge applications was that there were no materials to show that the appellants had committed the alleged offence. Ingredients of the alleged offence charged were not even prima facie established against the appellants. Charge levelled by the prosecution against the appellants was groundless. FIR was totally silent about any overt act of the appellants. Appellants were not present at the place of occurrence when the incident took place. There was no negligence on the part of the appellants; not to speak of having any knowledge or intention to cause the death of the two employees or such bodily injury as would likely cause their death.


5.2.Even if all the statements of the witnesses were considered and accepted as correct, the trial would not end in conviction of the appellants. Going ahead with the trial would be a futile exercise. There were no materials to show that appellants had committed the offence as charged. In the circumstances, appellants sought for discharge as contemplated under Section 227 of the CrPC.


6.Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune vide his order dated 01.04.2017 dismissed both the discharge applications. He held that the two appellants were certainly not oblivious of the fact that they had not provided safety gear to the employees which was certainly dangerous to them as they got exposed to electrocution risk. Learned Additional Sessions Judge was also of the view that there was much force in the argument advanced on behalf of the prosecution that there was sufficient material justifying framing of charge against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC. In that view of the matter, the discharge applications were dismissed.


7.Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, appellants preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 269 of 2017 before the High Court. After going through the materials on record and after hearing the parties, High Court was of the view that there was strong suspicion against both the appellants for committing the offence for which they were charged. It could not be said that there were no grounds to proceed against the appellants. No case for interference was made out. Hence, the revision petition was dismissed vide the judgment and order dated 02.11.2017.


8.Assailing the aforesaid judgment and order dated 02.11.2017 of the High Court, appellants preferred the related SLP(Crl.) No. 9928 of 2017. By order dated 09.01.2018, this Court had issued notice and granted stay of further proceedings in Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014 pending on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune.


8.1.The matter was heard on 30.04.2024 when leave was granted. Hence, the appeal.


9.Learned counsel for the appellants submits that both the Trial Court and the High Court fell in error in rejecting the discharge applications filed by the appellants. Though the prosecution had submitted chargesheet alleging commission of offence under Sections 304A/182/201 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, learned Magistrate while committing the case to the Court of Sessions concluded that there was material to invoke Section 304 Part II IPC. Trial Court took the view that there is sufficient material justifying framing of charge against the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC. Interestingly, High Court proceeded on the basis that appellants were accused of committing offences under Sections 304 and 304A IPC while dismissing the revision application of the appellants.


9.1.Learned counsel submits that no offence is made out against the appellants under Section 304 Part II IPC or even under Section 304A IPC. The two deceased employees of appellant No. 1 were working on the sign board as part of cleaning the front side of the shop. It was an accident that they got electrocuted and fell down because of which they suffered multiple injuries leading to their death.


9.2.The only reason for filing of chargesheet against the appellants is that according to the prosecution, appellants had not provided safety equipments to the two deceased employees such as rubber shoes, safety belt etc. He submits that non-furnishing of such equipments would not make it a criminal offence.


9.3.Adverting to the order of the High Court, learned counsel submits that the High Court proceeded on the basis that it was expected from a prudent person to have provided the deceased employees wooden scaffolding instead of an iron ladder. Therefore, by applying the test of a prudent person, High Court found shortcomings on the conduct of the appellants. Therefore, it observed that a strong suspicion could be inferred against the appellants that they had knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to work in the manner in which they did would cause their death.


9.4.Learned counsel submits that such observations by the High Court are way off the mark and cannot justify initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellants. Neither any negligent or rash act was committed by the appellants nor any specific overt act can be attributed to the appellants. It was a case of sudden accident.


9.5.Learned counsel also submits that appellants have paid compensation to the legal heirs of the two deceased employees to the extent of Rs. 5,91,180.00 (Arun Sharma) and Rs. 5,20,584.00 (Salauddin Shaikh). Appellant No. 1 has also provided employment to the brother of the deceased Salauddin Shaikh. That apart, educational expenses of the children of Arun Sharma have been taken care of by appellant No. 1.


9.6.In that view of the matter, learned counsel for the appellants submits that there is no material to justify launch of criminal trial against the appellants. Therefore, the appellants should be discharged.


10.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that appellants knew fully well about the risk that the two deceased employees had to undertake to do the work assigned to them. Yet the appellants did not provide any safety equipments to them. The two deceased employees sustained electric shock and fell down because of which they suffered multiple injuries causing their death. There is, thus, a strong prima facie case made out against the appellants.


10.1.Learned counsel submits that there is sufficient material to justify framing of charge against the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 Part II IPC read with Section 34 thereof. In any case, police had filed the charge-sheet alleging commission of offence under Section 304A IPC by the appellants. There are sufficient materials to substantiate such a charge. In this connection, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Keshub Mahindra Vs. State of M.P.1


10.2.Finally, learned counsel for the respondent submits that there is no merit in the appeal and, therefore, the same should be dismissed.


11.Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the court.


11.1.At the outset, it would apposite to deal with the relevant legal provisions.


12.We have noted above that the appellants have been charged for committing offence under Section 304 Part II IPC read with Section 34 IPC. Since Section 34 IPC covers common intention, the substantive charge against the appellants is under Section 304 Part II IPC which reads as under:


Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder –


Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years or with fine or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death; but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.


12.1.The ingredients constituting an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC are as follows:


(i) he must commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder;


(ii) the act must be done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death;


(iii) but such act is done without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.


12.2.Therefore, the first important expression is ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. Culpable homicide is defined in Section 299 IPC. It says that whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.


12.3.All culpable homicides are murders except in the cases excepted under Section 300 IPC. Thus, except the cases specifically exempted under Section 300 IPC, all other acts within the meaning of Section 299 IPC would amount to committing the offence of culpable homicide. However, what is important to note is that for committing the offence of culpable homicide, a positive act must be done by the doer with the intention that such act would cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or he having the knowledge that by such an act, death may be caused. What, therefore, is significant is that the doer of the act must have the intention of causing death or the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or has the knowledge that by doing such an act he is likely to cause death. Therefore, to commit the offence of culpable homicide, intention or knowledge is of crucial importance.


12.4.Coming back to Section 304 Part II IPC, we find that the said section would be attracted if anyone commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, the requirement of Section 304 Part II IPC is that the doer must have the knowledge that the act performed is likely to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death. Thus, the basic ingredient of Section 304 Part II IPC is presence of knowledge and absence of intention. The doer must have the knowledge that the act performed by him would likely cause death etc but there should not be any intention to cause death.


13.This being the legal framework, let us now deal with the charge against the appellants taking the same as correct. According to the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court and the High Court, the two accused persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though they were asked to perform the job of working on the sign board as part of decorating the front side of the shop which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. The accused persons had provided only an iron ladder to the two employees but while working they were struck by electricity as a result of which they suffered electrocution and fell down. They suffered multiple injuries which led to their death. Therefore, both the accused persons were declared to be responsible for the unnatural death of the two deceased employees.


14.Even if we take the allegation against the appellants as correct, we are afraid no prima facie case can be said to have been made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. From the record of the case, it is evident that there was no intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees. It cannot also be said that the appellants had knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to work on the sign board as part of the work of decoration of the frontage of the shop, they had the knowledge that such an act was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees. As such, no prima facie case of culpable homicide can be said to have been made out against the appellants. If that be so, the subsequent requirement of having knowledge that the act was likely to cause the death but not having any intention to cause death would become irrelevant though we may hasten to add that nothing is discernible from the record of the case that the appellants had the knowledge that by asking the two employees to work on the sign board would likely cause their death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause their death.


15.Therefore, the basic ingredients for commission of offence under Section 304 Part II IPC are absent in the present case.


16.Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section 227 CrPC contemplates is that if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of discharge, the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this stage is that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the accused may still be acquitted. At the stage of discharge, court is only required to consider as to whether there are sufficient materials which can justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or the prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer an accused.


17.Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Keshub Mahindra (supra). However, on going through the aforesaid judgment, we are of the view that facts in Keshub Mahindra and facts in the present case are poles apart. Keshub Mahindra arose out of the in-famous Bhopal Gas tragedy. A highly dangerous and toxic gas escaped from a tank in the Bhopal factory belonging to Union Carbide India Limited. As a result of such leakage, 3828 human beings lost their lives; 18922 suffered permanent injuries; 7172 suffered temporary disablement; 1313 suffered temporary disablement caused by permanent injuries; and permanent partial disablement was suffered by 2680 persons. While 40 human beings suffered from permanent total disablement, a total of 2544 animals died. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the company and officials belonging to the company. Charges were framed under Sections 304 Part II/324/326/429 IPC read with Section 35 IPC. Some of the accused persons challenged such framing of charge before the High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur. However, the High Court dismissed the criminal revision application whereafter the matter came up before this Court. In Keshub Mahindra (supra), this Court upon perusal of the material on record held that charges under Section 304 Part II, 324, 326 and 429 of IPC were not attracted at all. Framing of such charges against the concerned accused persons fell short of even prima-facie case. It was observed that mere act of running a plant as per permission granted by the authorities would not be a criminal act. This Court held that:


20. …….Consequently in our view taking the entire material as aforesaid on its face value and assuming it to represent the correct factual position in connection with the operation of the plant at Bhopal on that fateful night it could not be said that the said material even prima facie called for framing of a charge against the accused concerned under Section 304 Part II IPC on the specious plea that the said act of the accused amounted to culpable homicide only because the operation of the plant on that night ultimately resulted in deaths of a number of human beings and cattle.


17.1.However, considering the gravity of the incident, this Court exercised power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and examined the question as to whether the material led by the prosecution could prima facie support a charge under Section 304A IPC against the concerned accused persons. This Court thereafter opined as under:


22. ……..It cannot be gainsaid that the voluminous evidence led by the prosecution in this connection at least prima facie shows that the accused concerned who operated the plant on that fateful night at Bhopal could be alleged to be at least guilty of rash and negligent act in the way this highly volatile substance MIC was handled by them and which ultimately escaped in vaporous form and extinguished the lives of thousands of human beings and animals apart from causing serious bodily injuries to thousands of others.


*


*


*


*


*


*


However for framing charge under Section 304-A on the aforesaid material it cannot be said that the said material even prima facie did not point out the culpability of the accused concerned in running a defective plant having a number of operational defects and in being prima facie guilty of illegal omissions to take safety measures in running such a limping plant on that fateful night which resulted into this colossal tragedy. The aforesaid conclusion of ours, therefore, would make out a prima facie case against accused 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 who were in actual charge of running of the Bhopal Plant and would require them to face the trial for charge under Section 304-A of the IPC.


17.2.The aforesaid conclusion of this Court and the consequential directions issued was in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India considering the gravity and magnitude of the incident.


17.3.In so far facts of the present case is concerned, the two deceased employees of appellant No. 1 were undertaking the work of decoration of the front side of the shop. As part of the said work, they were working on the sign board which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. For this purpose, they were provided with an iron ladder. While working on the sign board, they were struck by electricity as a result of which they got electrocuted and fell down resulting in multiple injuries leading to their death. It was purely accidental. On these basic facts, no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304A IPC, not to speak of Section 304 Part II IPC. In any case, the Trial Court only considered culpability of the appellants qua Section 304 Part II IPC as the committing Magistrate had committed the case to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the appellant to Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 304A IPC.


17.4.Therefore, Keshub Mahindra (supra) can be of no assistance to the respondent.


18.That being the position and having regard to the discussions made above, we are of the view that both the Trial Court and the High Court fell in error in rejecting the discharge applications of the appellants. For the reasons stated above, the order of the Trial Court dated 01.04.2017 and that of the High Court dated 02.11.2017 are hereby set aside and quashed. Consequently, the discharge applications being Exhibit Nos. 6 and 10 in Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014 are hereby allowed. Appellants are discharged from Sessions Case No. 749 of 2014. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024 is allowed.


Result of the case: Appeal allowed.


1 (1996) 6 SCC 129

Contempt of Court – When – Appellants gave undertaking before the Trial Court to not alienate the property which was the subject matter of the suit – Respondents filed application alleging violation thereof – Trial Court held that the Appellants were not guilty of wilful disobedience of the undertaking given by them – Order set aside by High Court – Correctness: Held: Plea of the appellants that the undertaking to not alienate the subject matter property was given by the lawyer without requisite authority, not accepted – The undertaking in question was given in July 2007 and reiterated in August 2007 –Trial Court made such an undertaking into an order of the Court in November 2007, which was extended at regular intervals – The application for violation of the undertaking/order of the Court under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was made in 2011 i.e., after a period of four and a half years – Had the undertaking been without requisite authority, the appellants were well within their rights to seek discharge of that order, however, no such step was taken – Alienation of the subject matter property was despite express orders of the Court and thus, in violation thereof – High Court rightly punished the appellants for contempt of Court – However, order modified, as directed – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. XXXIX R. 2A. [Paras 6, 11, 12, 14] Legal Profession – Relationship between Advocate and client – Nature: Held: A lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and the former is cast in terms of agency of the latter – The lawyer must respect the decision-making right of the client – Any undertaking given to a Court cannot be without requisite authority from the client. [Para 9]

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 450 : 2025 INSC 325


Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v. Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 13999 of 2024)


05 March 2025


[Pankaj Mithal and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of the Trial Court holding the appellants not guilty of wilful disobedience of their undertaking given to the Court.


Headnotes


Contempt of Court – When – Appellants gave undertaking before the Trial Court to not alienate the property which was the subject matter of the suit – Respondents filed application alleging violation thereof – Trial Court held that the Appellants were not guilty of wilful disobedience of the undertaking given by them – Order set aside by High Court – Correctness:


Held: Plea of the appellants that the undertaking to not alienate the subject matter property was given by the lawyer without requisite authority, not accepted – The undertaking in question was given in July 2007 and reiterated in August 2007 –Trial Court made such an undertaking into an order of the Court in November 2007, which was extended at regular intervals – The application for violation of the undertaking/order of the Court under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was made in 2011 i.e., after a period of four and a half years – Had the undertaking been without requisite authority, the appellants were well within their rights to seek discharge of that order, however, no such step was taken – Alienation of the subject matter property was despite express orders of the Court and thus, in violation thereof – High Court rightly punished the appellants for contempt of Court – However, order modified, as directed – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. XXXIX R. 2A. [Paras 6, 11, 12, 14]


Legal Profession – Relationship between Advocate and client – Nature:


Held: A lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and the former is cast in terms of agency of the latter – The lawyer must respect the decision-making right of the client – Any undertaking given to a Court cannot be without requisite authority from the client. [Para 9]


Case Law Cited


Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 244 : (1998) 7 SCC 59; Wander Limited & Anr. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. (1990) Supp. 1 SCC 727; Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 SCC OnLine 3538; Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 472 : (1992) 1 SCC 719; Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi [2011] 15 SCR 972 : (2012) 4 SCC 307; Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi [2011] 4 SCR 417 : (2011) 12 SCC 600; State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers' Assn. [1994] 1 SCR 348 : (1994) 2 SCC 204; Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh [2015] 4 SCR 616 : (2015) 7 SCC 373; Bar of Indian Lawyers v. National Institute of Communicable Diseases (2024) 8 SCC 430; Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 409 – referred to.


List of Acts


Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.


List of Keywords


Contempt of Court; Express violation of order of Court; Disobedience of Undertaking; Or. XXXIX R. 2A of Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Civil contempt; Fiduciary relationship between Advocate and client; Undertaking without requisite authority from client; Alienation of subject matter property; Disobedience of an order of temporary injunction.


Case Arising From


CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13999 of 2024


From the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2021 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in MFA No. 7055 of 2013


Appearances for Parties


Advs. for the Appellants:


Radhakrishna S Hegde, Rajeev Singh.


Advs. for the Respondents:


Vikram Hegde, Abhinav Hansaraman.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Sanjay Karol J.


1.This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated 23rd February 2021/16th March, 2021 passed in Miscellaneous First Appeal No.7055/2013(CPC) by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, whereby the respondents before the High Court, appellants herein (defendants in Trial Court), were held guilty of disobedience of their undertaking before the Trial Court of not alienating the property, subject matter of the suit.


The original defendants in the Trial Court through their counsel gave an undertaking which was allegedly disobeyed. The plaintiffs aggrieved thereby filed the case, which was dismissed, and they appealed to the High Court, ultimately resulting in a favourable order. The original defendants now aggrieved by being held in contempt, are appellants herein.


2.A brief resume of facts leading to the appeal are :


2.1The respondents herein were the original plaintiffs in Original Suit No.4191 of 2007 seeking a declaration to the effect that agreement between the parties dated 30th April 2004, i.e., ‘Joint Development Agreement’1 to be “revoked rescinded and terminated.” The JDA was entered into regarding the construction of residential apartments within a period of 24 months, on a turnkey basis.


2.2Said construction was to be completed by 31st October 2006. However, the same could not be done. Legal notice intimating the cancellation of the JDA was issued on 23rd March 2007, and eventually, the subject Original Suit came to be filed.


2.3The learned Trial Court eventually concluded vide judgment and order dated 2nd January 2017 that the plaintiffs could not prove that the construction made was in violation of the JDA and instead, the defendants proved that the construction made by them was in accordance thereof. It was held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the declaration and permanent injunction, as prayed for.


2.4In the pendency of the above proceedings, record reveals that the counsel for the defendants undertook, on two occasions, i.e., 11th July 2007 and 13th August 2007 that they will not alienate the subject property to any third person. Allegedly, however, such undertaking was not abided by, which led to the filing of Interlocutory Application No.3 that came to be registered as Civil Misc. Application No.38 of 2011 under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, 19082.


2.5The concerned Court framed the following issues :


"1)Whether the petitioners have made out a case of breach or willful disobedience by the respondents of order passed by this court in pursuance of undertaking given by the defendant and order of injunction dated 17.11.2007 beyond all reasonable doubts?


2)What order?”


2.6The Court considered the jurisdiction which has been agitated, observing that the said power is punitive in nature and akin to imposing punishment for civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It was concluded as under :


“38. It is significant to note that advocate for petitioners have produced 10 photos of suit property, which depict that suit property is still vacant and foundation is lying. But, here in this case, the petitioners have contended that the flats were sold by the respondents inspite of Court Order. Moreover,, the description of the suit property is incomplete and ambiguous. Therefore, the averment/contention of the petitioners is not believable.


39. In view of aforesaid reasons and observations made, I can safely conclude that the petitioners are failed to prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt that the respondents are knowingly and willfully disobeyed the injunction order of this Court. : There is no sufficient and satisfactory materials on record to come to conclusion that the respondents have knowingly and willfully disobeyed and committed the breach of order of this Court. Hence, respondents are entitled for benefit of doubt. Therefore, I answer aforesaid point No.1 in Negative.


40. Point No.2 : For the foregoing reasons and in view of my findings and discussions, I proceed to pas the following :


ORDER


In the result, therefore this Civil Misc. petition (I.A. No.3) filed by the petitioners U/o XXXIX Rule 2A and U/s.151 of CPC against the respondents is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, it is dismissed.


Parties shall bear their own costs.”


2.7Aggrieved by this order, the High Court was approached by way of Misc. First Appeal No.7055 of 2013 (CPC) under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) read with 104(i) of CPC. The question to be considered was whether the lower Court’s order is sustainable in law.


Impugned Judgment


3.A question of maintainability of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was raised. With reference to Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan,3 it was held that even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience thereof is not erased. The subsequent dismissal of a suit does not absolve the party of liability of breach of injunction order. That apart, it was observed that an appeal against the Trial Court’s dismissal of the Original Suit was also pending before the High Court bearing R.F.A.No.592/2017.


3.1The substance of the dispute is that on 11th July 2007, the counsel for the appellants herein filed memo as follows :


“The undersigned counsel undertake that the defendants have not alienate the suit schedule property to any third person”


3.2Subsequently, on two dates 13th August and 17th November, 2007 the proceedings of the Trial Court have been taken note of by the Trial Court in paras 26 to 28, which read as follows :


“26. Then the matter was adjourned to 13.08.2007. On 13.08.2007, the advocate for the defendants filed another memo which reads as follows :


“The undersigned counsel undertake that they have not alienate the suit schedule property in the above case.”


27. Then the trial Court ordered to list the matter on 17.11.2007. On 17.11.2007, the defendants’ Counsel failed to appear before the Court. The plaintiffs’ Counsel submitted to the Court about the undertaking given by the defendants’ Counsel. Under such circumstances, the trial Court passed the following order:


“Parties to the suit called out. Absent. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff is present. Learned Counsel for the defendant is absent. On the last date the learned Counsel for the defendants had undertaken that the defendants will not alienate suit property. Today neither defendants nor learned Counsel for the defendants are present. I.A. I & II cannot be heard as the defendants and learned Counsel for defendant Nos.1 to 3 are absent. Hence, it is hereby ordered that defendants 1 to 3 shall not alienate the suit property till next date. For hearing of IA I & II and to call the parties under Section 89 of CPC. Call on 08.12.2007.”


28. That order was extended from time to time. Subsequent to 17.11.2007, the defendants executed the sale deeds under Exs.P3 to P5, Ex.P7 to P13, the dates of which are as follows :


Ex.P3–19.11.2007 Ex.P4-03.12.2008


Ex.P5–01.07.2008 Ex.P7-15.06.2009


Ex.P8–06.08.2008 Ex.P9-13.12.2011


Ex.P10–19.11.2007Ex.P11-01.07.2008


Ex.P12-03.12.2008 Ex.P13-15.06.2009”


3.3The Court citing various judicial pronouncements observed that there was no merit in the contention that injunction order is invalid. The order of the lower Court was set aside, and the appellants herein were held guilty of disobedience of their undertaking made before the Trial Court.


3.4Vide order dated 16th March 2021 the appellants were held guilty of contempt of Court. Contemnor No.3, namely, Chalsani R.B. who is the second appellant herein, was directed to be detained in a civil prison for a period of three months and his property, subject matter of suit, to be attached for a period of one year. Contemnor No.2, namely, Smt. Lavanya C., the first appellant herein, qua her it was directed that the subject matter property be attached for a period of one year. It was further directed that both the contemnors shall pay a sum of Rs.10 lakhs within four weeks, as compensation for the hardship caused to the respondents herein. The part of the order directing attachment was stayed for a period of 60 days.


Our Consideration


4.It is this order of the High Court which is sought to be challenged in this appeal. By way of the special leave petition, it has been urged, inter alia :


a)In the prayers made in the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2, no specific prayer, restraining the parties from creating third party rights, has been made. The Trial Court has observed that the description of property is ambiguous, incomplete and that no satisfactory material has been brought on record to show wilful disobedience on the part of the appellants, hence, they are entitled to the benefit of doubt.


b)There has been deliberate suppression of facts on the part of the respondents herein regarding construction of apartments and selling off a part thereof, even prior to filing of the original Suit.


c)An unconditional apology has been tendered before the Court and the appellants herein have no intent or desire to disrespect any order passed by a competent Court.


d)The sentence imposed, in the attending facts and circumstances, is unjustified given that the second appellant is a person of advanced years and suffers from various ailments.


5.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The question to be considered is whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of the Court below, holding the appellants herein not guilty of wilful disobedience of their undertaking given to the Court.


6.A few dates require immediate recall. The undertaking subject matter of controversy was given by the counsel on 11th July 2007 and reiterated on 13th August 2007. The Trial Court made such an undertaking into an order of the Court on 17th November 2007. The same was extended at regular intervals. The application for violation of the undertaking/order of the Court under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was made in 2011. An order was made dismissing the application on 2nd August 2013. Immediately thereafter, an appeal was filed before the High Court. In the pendency of this appeal, the Original Suit came to be decided on 2nd January 2017. An appeal against such dismissal of the Original Suit was pending before the High Court on the date that the impugned judgment came to be passed.


7.Although of primary concern, in this appeal is the sentence of imprisonment and compensation to be paid by the appellants herein, it would be apposite to take note of the contours of Order XXXIX Rule 1, Rule 2 and Rule 2A.


7.1A Three-Judge Bench in Wander Limited & Anr. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd.4 observed as follows :


“9. .....


“...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the ‘balance of convenience’ lies.”


x


x


x


x


14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [(1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC 1156] : (SCR 721)


“... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’.”


The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.”


(Emphasis supplied)


7.2A recent judgment of this Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi,5 referring to Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh6 has reiterated the principles governing the grant of temporary injunction.


7.3The aspect of disobedience of an order of temporary injunction has been discussed in detail in Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi,7 in the following terms :


“17. Application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC lies only where disobedience/breach of an injunction granted or order complained of was one that is granted by the court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which is naturally to enure during the pendency of the suit. However, once a suit is decreed, the interim order, if any, merges into the final order. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. (Vide A.R. Sircar v. State of U.P. [1993 Supp (2) SCC 734 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 896 : (1993) 24 ATC 832], Shiv Shanker v. U.P. SRTC [1995 Supp (2) SCC 726 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1018 : (1995) 30 ATC 317], Arya Nagar Inter College v. Sree Kumar Tiwary [(1997) 4 SCC 388 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 967 : AIR 1997 SC 3071], GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [(1998) 3 SCC 376 : AIR 1998 SC 1566] and Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v. C.L. Mishra [(2005) 8 SCC 423].)


18. In case there is a grievance of non-compliance with the terms of the decree passed in the civil suit, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to approach the execution court under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC which provides for elaborate proceedings in which the parties can adduce their evidence and can examine and cross-examine the witnesses as opposed to the proceedings in contempt which are summary in nature. Application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC is not maintainable once the suit stood decreed. Law does not permit to skip the remedies available under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC and resort to the contempt proceedings for the reason that the court has to exercise its discretion under the 1971 Act when an effective and alternative remedy is not available to the person concerned. Thus, when the matter relates to the infringement of a decree or decretal order embodies rights, as between the parties, it is not expedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction, in essence, as a mode of executing the decree or merely because other remedies may take time or are more circumlocutory in character. Thus, the violation of permanent injunction can be set right in executing the proceedings and not the contempt proceedings. There is a complete fallacy in the argument that the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC would also include the case of violation or breach of permanent injunction granted at the time of passing of the decree.”


7.4In Samee Khan (supra), it was observed that :


“12. But the position under Rule 2-A of Order 39 is different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience does not get erased. It may be a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience may be toned down if the order is subsequently set aside. For what purpose is the property to be attached in the case of disobedience of the order of injunction? Sub-rule (2) provides that if the disobedience or breach continues beyond one year from the date of attachment, the court is empowered to sell the property under attachment and compensate the affected party from such sale proceeds.”


8.There is no question as to the maintainability of the application before this Court. It is also true that the order, in the challenge against which the impugned judgment was passed, was made in the pendency of the original suit and, therefore, it is saved from that bar as well. No error, therefore, can be found on the exercise of such jurisdiction.


9.The next point which needs consideration is the relationship between an advocate and his client. The appellants have cast certain aspersions on their counsel to the effect that he, allegedly, gave the undertaking, germane to the instant controversy, without express authorization. This Court has, time and again, taken note of the fiduciary relationship between an advocate and his client. We may notice a few decisions as follows:


9.1In Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi,8 it was held :


“12. At this stage, we may also advert to the nature of relationship between a lawyer and his client, which is solely founded on trust and confidence. A lawyer cannot pass on the confidential information to anyone else. This is so because he is a fiduciary of his client, who reposes trust and confidence in the lawyer. Therefore, he has a duty to fulfil all his obligations towards his client with care and act in good faith. Since the client entrusts the whole obligation of handling legal proceedings to an advocate, he has to act according to the principles of uberrima fides i.e. the utmost good faith, integrity, fairness and loyalty.


x


x


x


14. An analysis of the above reproduced Rules shows that one of the most important duties imposed upon an advocate is to uphold the interest of the client fearlessly by all fair and honourable means. An advocate cannot ordinarily withdraw from engagement without sufficient cause and without giving reasonable and sufficient notice to the client. If he has reason to believe that he will be a witness in the case, the advocate should not accept a brief or appear in the case.”


9.2The nature of the profession was highlighted by a Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers’ Assn.,9 in the following terms :


“14. Legal profession is essentially a service-oriented profession. The ancestor of today’s lawyer was no more than a spokesman who rendered his services to the needy members of the society by articulating their case before the authorities that be. The services were rendered without regard to the remuneration received or to be received. With the growth of litigation, lawyering became a full-time occupation and most of the lawyers came to depend upon it as the sole source of livelihood. The nature of the service rendered by the lawyers was private till the Government and the public bodies started engaging them to conduct cases on their behalf. The Government and the public bodies engaged the services of the lawyers purely on a contractual basis either for a specified case or for a specified or an unspecified period. Although the contract in some cases prohibited the lawyers from accepting private briefs, the nature of the contract did not alter from one of professional engagement to that of employment. The lawyer of the Government or a public body was not its employee but was a professional practitioner engaged to do the specified work. This is so even today, though the lawyers on the full-time rolls of the Government and the public bodies are described as their law officers. It is precisely for this reason that in the case of such law officers, the saving clause of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules waives the prohibition imposed by the said rule against the acceptance by a lawyer of a full-time employment.


15. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is one of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer for personal reasons and is at liberty to leave him also, for the same reasons. He is under no obligation to give reasons for withdrawing his brief from his lawyer. The lawyer in turn is not an agent of his client but his dignified, responsible spokesman. He is not bound to tell the court every fact or urge every proposition of law which his client wants him to do, however irrelevant it may be. He is essentially an adviser to his client and is rightly called a counsel in some jurisdictions. Once acquainted with the facts of the case, it is the lawyer’s discretion to choose the facts and the points of law which he would advance. Being a responsible officer of the court and an important adjunct of the administration of justice, the lawyer also owes a duty to the court as well as to the opposite side. He has to be fair to ensure that justice is done. He demeans himself if he acts merely as a mouthpiece of his client. This relationship between the lawyer and the private client is equally valid between him and the public bodies.”


9.3Observations made in Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh,10 by a Bench of three Judges are also instructive for our purposes presently :


“22. Apart from the above, in our view lawyers are perceived to be their client’s agents. The law of agency may not strictly apply to the client-lawyer’s relationship as lawyers or agents, lawyers have certain authority and certain duties. Because lawyers are also fiduciaries, their duties will sometimes be more demanding than those imposed on other agents. The authority-agency status affords the lawyers to act for the client on the subject-matter of the retainer. One of the most basic principles of the lawyer-client relationship is that lawyers owe fiduciary duties to their clients. As part of those duties, lawyers assume all the traditional duties that agents owe to their principals and, thus, have to respect the client’s autonomy to make decisions at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation. Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that of the client. The law is now well settled that a lawyer must be specifically authorised to settle and compromise a claim, that merely on the basis of his employment he has no implied or ostensible authority to bind his client to a compromise/settlement. To put it alternatively that a lawyer by virtue of retention, has the authority to choose the means for achieving the client’s legal goal, while the client has the right to decide on what the goal will be. If the decision in question falls within those that clearly belong to the client, the lawyer’s conduct in failing to consult the client or in making the decision for the client, is more likely to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.


x


x


x


30. The Privy Council in Sourendra Nath Mitra v. Tarubala Dasi [(1929-30) 57 IA 133 : (1930) 31 LW 803 : AIR 1930 PC 158] , has made the following two observations which hold relevance to the present discussion : (IA pp. 140-41)


“Two observations may be added. First, the implied authority of counsel is not an appendage of office, a dignity added by the courts to the status of barrister or advocate at law. It is implied in the interests of the client, to give the fullest beneficial effect to his employment of the advocate. Secondly, the implied authority can always be countermanded by the express directions of the client. No advocate has actual authority to settle a case against the express instructions of his client. If he considers such express instructions contrary to the interests of his client, his remedy is to return his brief.”


(See: Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand [(1975) 2 SCC 609] and Svenska Handelsbanken v. Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. [(1994) 2 SCC 155])


31. Therefore, it is the solemn duty of an advocate not to transgress the authority conferred on him by the client. It is always better to seek appropriate instructions from the client or his authorised agent before making any concession which may, directly or remotely, affect the rightful legal right of the client. The advocate represents the client before the court and conducts proceedings on behalf of the client. He is the only link between the court and the client. Therefore his responsibility is onerous. He is expected to follow the instructions of his client rather than substitute his judgment.


32. Generally, admissions of fact made by a counsel are binding upon their principals as long as they are unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a purported admission, the court should be wary to accept such admissions until and unless the counsel or the advocate is authorised by his principal to make such admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound by a statement or admission which he or his lawyer was not authorised to make. A lawyer generally has no implied or apparent authority to make an admission or statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial legal rights of the client unless such an admission or statement is clearly a proper step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer was employed. We hasten to add neither the client nor the court is bound by the lawyer’s statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions. Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that of the client. We may add that in some cases, lawyers can make decisions without consulting the client. While in others, the decision is reserved for the client. It is often said that the lawyer can make decisions as to tactics without consulting the client, while the client has a right to make decisions that can affect his rights.”


(Emphasis supplied)


9.4Recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Bar of Indian Lawyers v. National Institute of Communicable Diseases,11 which also comprised one of us (Mithal J.) speaking through Trivedi J., observed :


“51. When we examine the relationship between an advocate and his client from this point of view, the following unique attributes become clear:


51.1. Advocates are generally perceived to be their client’s agents and owe fiduciary duties to their clients.


51.2. Advocates are fastened with all the traditional duties that agents owe to their principals. For example, advocates have to respect the client’s autonomy to make decisions at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation.


51.3. Advocates are not entitled to make concessions or give any undertaking to the court without express instructions from the client.


51.4. It is the solemn duty of an advocate not to transgress the authority conferred on him by his client.


51.5. An advocate is bound to seek appropriate instructions from the client or his authorised agent before taking any action or making any statement or concession which may, directly or remotely, affect the legal rights of the client.


51.6. The Advocate represents the client before the court and conducts proceedings on behalf of the client. He is the only link between the court and the client. Therefore, his responsibility is onerous. He is expected to follow the instructions of his client rather than substitute his judgment.”


(Emphasis supplied)


10.The above judgments make clear that a lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and the former is cast in terms of agency of the latter. It is also clear that the lawyer is to respect the decision-making right of the client. It flows from this that any undertaking given to a Court cannot be without requisite authority from the client.


11.The appellants herein would have us believe that the undertaking to not alienate the subject matter property, which, undoubtedly, has far-reaching implications, extending over a large period of time. We find such a situation difficult to accept. The undertaking, subject matter of controversy, was given in July 2007 and the miscellaneous application was filed in the year 2011, i.e., after a period of four and a half years. Had the situation been that the said undertaking was without requisite authority, the clients were perfectly within their rights to seek discharge of that order, however, no such step was taken.


12.The same undertaking was re-emphasized a month later, on 13th August 2007 and was later made into an order of the Court which, as already observed supra, was extended from time to time. Alienation of the subject matter property despite express orders of the Court, in our view, entirely justify the stand taken by the High Court in punishing the appellants for contempt of Court.


13.The powers of contempt of Court have been provided for the purposes of ensuring that the dignity and majesty of law is always maintained. Such purpose is aptly captured in the words of the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India12, as follows:


“42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions. This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of adversely affects the majesty of law or dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining “the jury, the judge and the hangman” and it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In the general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of courts should not be imperilled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice. It is a matter between the court and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is exercised in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the majesty of law and the dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted which may have the tendency to shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice.”


When there has been an express violation of an order of a Court, as is in the present case, the exercise of contempt jurisdiction cannot be faulted with. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, confirmed.


14.In the attending facts and circumstances, keeping in view the fact that at the time of filing of this appeal, the appellant No.1 herein, who was the contemnor No.3 before the High Court, was 63 years of age and today must approximately be of 68 years of age, we modify the impugned order to the extent that the three months confinement in civil prison shall stand deleted. The rest of the order regarding attachment of property remains undisturbed. Additionally, the amount of compensation payable by the appellants herein shall stand enhanced from a sum of Rs.10 lakhs to Rs.13 lakhs.


15.The appeal is partly allowed and disposed of with the above modification to the impugned order. The amount of compensation shall also carry simple interest @6% from the date of the judgment of the lower Court, i.e., 2nd August 2013.


Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.


Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.


1 ‘JDA’, for short


2 Hereafter ‘CPC’


3 (1998) 7 SCC 59


4 (1990) Supp. 1 SCC 727


5 2024 SCC OnLine 3538


6 (1992) 1 SCC 719


7 (2012) 4 SCC 307


8 (2011) 12 SCC 600


9 1994 (2) SCC 204


10 (2015) 7 SCC 373


11 (2024) 8 SCC 430


12 (1998) 4 SCC 409