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Friday, August 9, 2024

neither the disclosure statements made by the accused were proved as per law nor the same resulted into any discovery which could be accepted as incriminating inasmuch as the requisite link evidence was never presented by the prosecution so as to establish that the recovered articles remained in the self-safe condition from the date of the seizure till the same reached the FSL.

2024 INSC 590

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 2828-2829 OF 2023

ALLARAKHA HABIB MEMON ETC. ....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT ....RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 112 OF 2024

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. The instant criminal appeals have been filed by the appellants

namely, Allarakha Habib Memon, Amin @ Lalo Aarifbhai Memon and

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak Safibhai Memon, for assailing the common

judgment dated 18th February, 2019, passed by the Division Bench of

High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dismissing the Criminal Appeal

Nos. 94 of 2015, 450 of 2015 and 563 of 2015, preferred by the

1

accused appellants and affirming the judgment and order dated 13th

October, 2014 passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge,

Anand, in Sessions Case No. 84 of 2011(hereinafter being referred to

as ‘trial Court’). The trial Court had convicted the appellants for

offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 120B of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860(hereinafter, referred to as ‘IPC’) and

sentenced them to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 1,000/- each,

in default whereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of

three months. At the same time, the appellants were acquitted of the

charge for the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC.

Brief facts: -

3. The accused appellants are the residents of New Memon Colony,

Bhalej Road, Anand. There was some issue regarding the supply of

water in the residential blocks where the accused Mohmedfaruk @

Palak was residing. On 3rd May 2011, a meeting was convened in this

regard wherein, an altercation flared up between the accused

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak and Mohammad Sohail. It is alleged that

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak hurled abuses and used foul language against

Mohammad Sohail, who in turn intimated the society members that

he may be relieved from the duty of supplying water in the society. A

meeting with respect to the intimation given by Mohammad Sohail

2

was convened by the members of the society, wherein Mohammad

Sohail insulted accused Mohmedfaruk @ Palak, who started carrying

a grudge against Mohammad Sohail on this account. Resultantly,

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak conspired with the accused Amin @ Lalo

Aarifbhai Memon and Allarakha Habib Memon and hatched a plan to

eliminate Mohammad Sohail. As per the prosecution, acting in

furtherance of the above conspiracy, Mohmedfaruk @ Palak collected

arms like gupti, daggers etc., and concealed the same in the dicky of

his scooter. On 4th May, 2011 at around 8:00 pm, Mohammad Sohail,

along with his first cousin namely, Mohammad Arif Memon(the first

informant), had proceeded to Shah petrol pump on a two wheeler,

where they got the vehicle refuelled, and then both proceeded towards

their residence, by taking a turn towards Bhalej overbridge. On the

way, the accused Mohmedfaruk @ Palak stopped them on the pretext

of asking mobile number of one Mohammad Hussain. Taking

advantage of the situation, the accused appellants launched an

indiscriminate assault upon Mohammad Sohail with sharp edged

weapons, causing injuries on his head and chest regions. Mohammad

Arif Memon tried to intervene, upon which he was given a push by

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak and fell down. Mohmedfaruk @ Palak took out

a big knife and inflicted a blow with a sharp weapon on the back of

3

Mohammad Sohail. Upon hearing the noise of the commotion, people

from nearby gathered at the place of occurrence whereupon the

accused appellants fled away, abandoning their weapons at the crime

scene. Mohammad Sohail having been severely injured was shifted to

a hospital, where he was declared dead.

4. Incorporating the above allegations, the first informant

Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11), first cousin of Mohammed

Sohail(deceased) lodged a complaint(Exhibit P-79) being CR No. 141 of

2011 on 4th May, 2011 which came to be registered as FIR at Anand

Town Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 302

and 323 IPC read with Section 120B IPC. The investigation of the case

was assigned to Dhananjaysinh Surendrasinh Waghela, Police

Inspector(PW-18)(hereinafter being referred to as ‘Investigating

Officer’).

5. Inquest panchnama(Exhibit P-25) was prepared and the dead

body of Mohammad Sohail was sent for postmortem. Dr. Swapnil(PW1) conducted autopsy taking note of 29 injuries all over the body of

the deceased-Mohammad Sohail. He issued the post-mortem

report(Exhibit P-12) opining that the cause of death of Mohammad

Sohail was due to shock attributed to multiple injuries all over the

body. The first informant-Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) was

4

medically examined by the Medical Officer, Dr. Arvindbhai(PW-2) who

after examining him, issued a medical certificate(Exhibit P-17).

6. The Investigating Officer(PW-18) carried out the usual

investigation and prepared a site plan(Exhibit P-27) of the place of

occurrence. The accused appellants were arrested after about five

days from the date of incident. Clothes worn by the accused

appellants were collected by drawing panchnama(Exhibit P-40). The

Investigating Officer(PW-18) reconstructed the crime scene at the

instance of all accused-appellants and drew demonstration

panchnama(Exhibit P-50). The effected recovery of one big knife at the

instance of accused Mohmedfaruk @ Palak; the blood-stained clothes

of the deceased and the recovered weapons were forwarded to the

Forensic Science Laboratory(in short ‘FSL’) for chemical analysis. The

Investigating Officer(PW-18) also collected call detail records from

service provider i.e. Vodafone. After conclusion of the investigation, a

charge was filed against the accused appellants for the offences

punishable under Sections 302, 323 and 120B IPC.

7. The offence under Section 302 IPC being exclusively triable by

the Court of Sessions, the case was committed and made over for trial

to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Anand, where it came to be

registered as Sessions Case No. 84 of 2011. Charges were framed

5

against the accused appellants for the offences punishable under

Sections 302, 323 and 120B IPC. The accused-appellants pleaded

not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 18 witnesses

and exhibited 131 documents in order to bring home the charges. On

being questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973(hereinafter being referred to as ‘CrPC’) and upon

being confronted with the allegations as appearing in the prosecution

case, the accused appellants denied the same and took a categorical

stance that they had been falsely implicated in the case. However, no

evidence was led in defence.

8. After hearing the arguments put forth by the prosecution and

the defence counsel and upon appreciating the evidence available on

record, the trial Court, vide judgement and order dated 13th October,

2014 convicted and sentenced the accused appellants as mentioned

above. The judgment of conviction and the order of sentence was

challenged by the accused appellants before the Division Bench of

Gujarat High Court by filing separate criminal appeals, which came to

be rejected vide a common judgment dated 18th February, 2019, which

has been subjected to challenge in the instant batch of appeals by

special leave.

6

9. Since the appeals arise out of a common judgement, the same

were heard and are being decided by this judgement.

Submissions on behalf of the accused-appellants:-

10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused appellants

advanced the following submissions beseeching the Court to accept

the appeals, set aside the impugned judgments and acquit the

accused appellants of the charges: -

10.1 Demistalkumar, Police Constable(PW-12), projected to be an

eyewitness of the incident, was admittedly the first to reach the police

station with two weapons collected from the crime scene at 9:15 pm.

However, surprisingly, his statement was either not recorded or if

recorded, the same never saw the light of the day. The FIR(Exhibit P79) which ought to have been registered on the earliest version of

Demistalkumar(PW-12) was lodged at a much later point of time on

the basis of a statement given by the first informant, Mohammad Arif

Memon(PW-11) to S.N. Ghori, Police Sub-Inspector(PW-17) at 11:00

pm. The fact that Demistalkumar(PW-12) had reached the police

station at the earliest point of time along with the weapons used in

the crime is admitted by the prosecution and is fortified by the

evidence of panch witness, Mohammad Hussain(PW-5), who stated

7

that he was informed by the police that a person named

Demistalkumar(PW-12) had produced the weapons at 9:15 pm.

10.2 Demistalkumar(PW-12) admitted in his cross-examination

that after reaching the police station, an enquiry was made from him

by the higher officials. As Demistalkumar(PW-12) is projected to be

an eyewitness who had produced the weapons used in commission of

the crime and had also been questioned about the incident at the

police station at the earliest point of time, his statement which

presumably was the first detailed disclosure about the incident, would

have assumed the character of an FIR. However, his statement was

never brought on record, which tantamounted to deliberate

concealment by the prosecution. These proceedings which took place

at the police station would definitely have been recorded in the daily

diary(roznamcha) maintained at the police station. However, these

vital aspects of the case have been intentionally withheld by the

prosecution who failed to produce the corresponding daily diary entry

before the Court, warranting an adverse inference to be drawn. In

support of this contention, learned counsel placed reliance on a

judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Tomaso Bruno &

Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh1

. It was urged that the statement of

1

(2015) 7 SCC 178

8

Demistalkumar(PW-12) was legally required to be treated as the first

and foremost information.

10.3 That the explanation offered by Demistalkumar(PW-12), for

not lodging the FIR of the incident, stating that an another person

was already present there at the police station at 9:15 pm for giving

the complaint, is falsified by the testimony of S.N. Ghori, Police SubInspector(PW-17), who testified on oath that the statement of first

informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) was reduced into writing

by him at Krishna Medical Hospital, Karamsad at 11:00 pm.

10.4 That the evidence of Demistalkumar(PW-12) also creates

grave doubt about the very presence of the first informant,

Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) at the place of incident, as the

witness clearly stated in his evidence that he saw only the injured

lying at the crime scene in a profusely bleeding condition.

10.5 That Demistalkumar(PW-12) made gross improvements in

his evidence while identifying the three appellants in the dock for the

first time after a span of more than two and a half years. The witness

admitted in his cross-examination that he had not provided any

details in his statement, recorded under Section 161 CrPC, about the

identity of assailants. The identification in the dock without any Test

Identification Parade(TIP) is a weak and unreliable piece of evidence.

9

In support of this submission, learned counsel placed reliance on the

judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Amrik Singh v. State

of Punjab 2

.

10.6 That K.N. Waghela, Head Constable(PW-16), posted at the

Anand Town Police Station admitted in his cross-examination that a

telephonic wardhi about the incident was noted down by him.

However, the witness was not in a position to recollect the exact time

of recording of the telephonic wardhi. The witness stated that it was

mentioned in the telephonic wardhi, that an indiscriminate assault

with sword and other sharp weapons had been made upon

Mohammad Sohail(deceased). It was admitted by the witness in his

cross-examination, that no reference of a sword was made in the FIR.

It was also admitted that there was no reference of dagger and gupti in

the telephonic wardhi. It was contended that the daily dairy entry

pertaining to the recording of the telephonic wardhi was also not

produced on record by the prosecution which tantamounts to

concealment of vital facts requiring adverse inference to be drawn

against the prosecution.

10.7 That the information about the commission of crime had

been received at the police station at 9:15 pm, is clear from the

2

(2022) 9 SCC 402

10

evidence of Demistalkumar(PW-12) and therefore, the statement of the

first informant(PW-11) recorded by S.N. Ghori, PSI(PW-17) at a later

point of time, would tantamount to a statement under Section 161

CrPC and resultantly, it will be hit by Section 162 CrPC. In support of

this contention, learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment

rendered by this Court in the case of Animireddy Venkata Ramana

& Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh3

.

10.8 Mustaq(PW-13), another projected eyewitness to the

incident, deposed that he was also present at the place of occurrence

and had seen the accused appellants assaulting the deceased. The

witness, while deposing on oath, made grave improvements in his

testimony inasmuch as in his previous statement under Section 161

CrPC, he had clearly stated that he was at his house at the time of

alleged incident and that he received a call from the father of the

deceased, Mohammad Iqbal Memon(PW-14), about the attack made

on the deceased. Thus, Mustaq(PW-13) spoke a blatant lie in his

deposition while trying to assume the status of an eyewitness without

actually being present at the crime scene. His claim in this regard is

further belied by the testimony of Mohammad Iqbal Memon(PW-14),

who stated on oath that it was he who had informed Mustaq(PW-13)

3

(2008) 5 SCC 368

11

about the incident. It was contended that if at all Mustaq(PW-13) was

present at the place of incident, then he would have been the one to

inform the father of the deceased, Mohammad Iqbal Memon(PW-14)

about the incident and not the other way around.

10.9 That the evidence of Demistalkumar(PW-12) and K.N.

Waghela, Head Constable(PW-16) completely contradicts the evidence

of the so-called eyewitnesses Mustaq(PW-13) and first informant,

Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) and brings their presence at the

crime scene under a grave shadow of doubt.

10.10 That the first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11),

stated on oath that two other persons, namely, Mehboob Abdul

Rehman Memon and Irfanbhai Memon, being the colleagues of the

deceased were also present at the spot. However, these two persons

were not examined in evidence for reasons best known to the

prosecution.

10.11 That the first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) did

not make any claim in the FIR that he too had sustained an injury in

the alleged incident. However, he later claimed that he was also

injured in the incident, upon which he was medically examined on

the next day of the incident by Dr. Arvindbhai(PW-2). The doctor(PW12

2) admitted in his cross-examination that the injury No.2 could be the

result of itching and scratching.

10.12 That the first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11)

claimed in his evidence that he lifted the victim and placed him in a

rickshaw, after he had been indiscriminately assaulted by the accused

appellants using sharp weapons. However, he admitted not having

received any blood stains either on his person or on his clothes, which

was bound to happen if he had actually assisted in boarding the

profusely bleeding victim on to the rickshaw.

10.13 That none of the so-called eyewitnesses were actually

present at the crime scene; they never saw the incident and a case of

blind murder had been foisted upon the accused appellants because

of prior enmity.

10.14 That the trial Court and the High Court heavily relied on

the circumstance that the accused appellants had collected weapons

in the dicky of the scooter. However, neither any scooter was recovered

by the police nor did any witness gave evidence in support of the

above allegation. This circumstance which the prosecution banked

upon heavily in order to bring home the charge of criminal conspiracy

against the accused-appellant was not substantiated by any tangible

evidence.

13

10.15 That as per the prosecution, the accused appellants were

arrested by the police on 9th May, 2011 i.e. after 5 days from the date

of alleged incident at a short distance from Memon Colony, where the

accused-appellants reside, while they were trying to flee away on a

motorcycle. It is highly improbable that the accused-appellants, after

committing such a grave crime would continue to reside in close

vicinity of the crime scene. Had there been any iota of truth in the

prosecution case, the police would have arrested the accused

immediately after the incident because they were all along available at

their respective homes which are located just nearby to the place of

incident.

10.16 That the recoveries/discoveries made at the instance of

the accused-appellants are fabricated and were not proved by

convincing/tangible evidence.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent-State: -

11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State,

vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by the

learned counsel for the accused-appellants. Learned counsel for the

respondent-State advanced the following submissions craving

dismissals of the appeals:-

14

11.1 That the prosecution case is based on clinching testimony of

eyewitnesses which is corroborated in material particulars by the

evidence of Dr. Swapnil(PW-1) and so also the incriminating

recoveries effected by the Investigating Officer(PW-18).

11.2 That the FIR(Exhibit P-79) was lodged with utmost

promptitude i.e. within two and a half hours of the incident. The

accused appellants were named in the FIR. The first informant,

Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) had no motive whatsoever to falsely

implicate the accused appellants for the crime. The promptitude in

lodging of the FIR lends succour to the prosecution case.

11.3 That it is an admitted case that a day before the incident,

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak and Mohammad Sohail(deceased) had

indulged in a quarrel during a meeting owing to the issue of shortage

of water in the colony. Being enraged by this controversy,

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak conspired with Amin @ Lalo Aarifbhai Memon

and Allarakha Habib Memon and launched the pre-planned

indiscriminate attack upon Mohammad Sohail, causing fatal injuries,

leading to his death, and causing injuries to the first informant,

Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11).

11.4 That the attack on the deceased was pre-mediated and

gruesome, inasmuch as, 29 injuries were caused to the deceased by

15

sharp and blunt weapons and no part of his body was spared. The

injuries so inflicted upon Mohammed Sohail(deceased) proved

instantaneously fatal which fact was duly proved by Dr. Swapnil(PW1).

11.5 That Dr. Arvindbhai, Medical Officer(PW-2) proved the injuries

of the first informant Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) which

corroborates the presence of the witness(PW-11) with the deceased at

the crime scene. In addition, thereto, Dr. Arvindbhai(PW-2) also

examined and proved the injuries sustained by the accused

appellants during the incident which again corroborates the

prosecution case regarding active participation of the accused

appellants in the incident.

11.6 That the prosecution led clinching evidence to establish the

guilt of the accused and therefore, the trial Court was justified in

convicting the accused-appellants as above. The High Court too did

not commit any error while affirming the judgment of the trial Court

and upholding the conviction of the appellants herein.

11.7 That two competent Courts sifted and made detailed analysis

of the entire evidence and thereafter, have recorded concurrent

findings of facts, holding the accused appellants guilty of the charges,

and thus, this Court should not feel persuaded to exercise its

16

jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, so as to

interfere in the well-reasoned judgments rendered by the trial Court

and the High Court.

12. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions

advanced at bar and have perused the impugned judgments. We have

minutely scanned the record with the assistance of the learned

counsels representing the parties.

Discussion and Conclusions: -

13. As per the prosecution case, the FIR(Exhibit-79) was registered

on 4th May, 2011 at 11:00 pm on the basis of the oral statement given

by the first informant Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) to S.N. Ghori,

PSI(PW-17) at Krishna Medical Hospital, Karamsad. The first

informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) deposed in his testimony

that an incident had taken place on 3rd May, 2011 in their colony

wherein, allegedly Mohammad Sohail(deceased) made some

imputations against Mohmedfaruk, thereby annoying the accused

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak. On the next day, i.e., on 4th May, 2011 at

about 8:30 pm, the first informant(PW-11) along with his cousin

Mohammad Sohail(deceased) had gone to Shah petrol pump, near

Bhalej Road overbridge for filling petrol in their scooter. Having

refuelled the scooter, they proceeded towards the Bhalej overbridge for

17

going home. At that point of time, Mohmedfaruk @ Palak came

around and asked for the mobile number of Mohammad Hussain, a

friend of the first informant(PW-11) who used to reside at Bangalore.

The first informant(PW-11) stopped the vehicle and was trying to look

for the number of Mohammad Hussain saved in his mobile at which

point of time, the accused Amin@ Lalo Aarifbhai Memon and

Allarakha Habib Memom also reached there. Accused Mohmedfaruk

@ Palak insinuated as to why Mohammad Sohail had insulted him in

the meeting convened earlier in the Memon colony to discuss the

issue of water. Amin@ Lalo Aarifbhai Memon suddenly took out a big

knife concealed on his person and inflicted a blow thereof on the head

of Mohammad Sohail(deceased). Allarakha Habib Memon took out a

gupti and after removing the cover thereof, inflicted a blow on the

head of Mohammad Sohail who started running towards the petrol

pump in order to escape. Mohmedfaruk @ Palak also chased

Mohammad Sohail, whereupon, the first informant(PW-11) tried to

intervene, but he was given a push by Mohmedfaruk @ Palak and fell

down as a result. Accused Mohmedfaruk @ Palak also took out a big

knife being carried by him and inflicted a blow thereof on the back of

Mohammad Sohail after chasing him down. Having received multiple

injuries in the assault laid by the accused appellants, Mohammad

18

Sohail fell down on the road just outside the petrol pump. A

policeman was present near the petrol pump who came running

towards Mohammad Sohail and on seeing him, the three assailants

started running away with their weapons. In the intervening period,

Mehboob Abdul Rehman Memon and Irfanbhai Memon, colleagues of

Mohammad Sohail also arrived at the spot. Accused Allarakha Habib

Memon and Amin @ Lalo Aarifbhai Memon threw down their weapons

whereas, Mohmedfaruk @ Palak ran away carrying the knife held by

him. The first informant(PW-11) noticed large number of injuries on

the body of Mohammad Sohail. Someone stopped a rickshaw wherein;

Mohammad Sohail was boarded, and he was taken to Anand Nagar

Palika Hospital for treatment. On reaching the hospital, they came to

know that the doctor was on leave on which, the first informant(PW11) gave a call to his uncle Mohammed Iqbal Memon(father of the

deceased) who came to the Anand Nagar Palika Hospital with a

Maruti van. Mohammad Sohail was placed in the van and was taken

to Krishna Medical Hospital, Karamsad for treatment where the duty

Doctor examined him and declared that he had expired. The first

informant(PW-11) stated that when Mohammad Sohail was being

taken in the van, at that time, he, Mohammad Sohail’s father

Mohammed Iqbal Memon, Sikander Abdul Karim Chokshi, Munafbhai

19

Farooqbhai Memon and Mustaq Mohammad Siddiqbhai Memon were

also present in the vehicle. The aforesaid oral statement was treated

to be the complaint(Exhibit P-79) and came to be registered as the

formal FIR.

14. Apparently, going by the allegations made in the FIR(Exhibit P79), there were two eyewitnesses to the incident, namely, the first

informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11), and the Police Constable,

Demistalkumar(PW-12) who were present at the petrol pump.

15. Before dealing with the evidence of the first informant,

Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11), we would like to allude to the

testimony of the Police Constable, Demistalkumar(PW-12) who is

indisputably an independent witness having no interest either in the

complainant party or the accused party. The relevant extracts from

the evidence of Demistalkumar(PW-12) are reproduced hereinbelow

for the sake of ready reference: -

Examination-in-Chief:

“Since last 3 years I am discharging duty at Anand Town

Police Station at L.R. Police constable.

On 4/5/11, I was having my duty at Shah Petrol Pump

which is situated towards Anand at Bhalej bridge between

morning hours 10 to 2400(sic). At 8:30 o’ clock in the night, I

came to know that some scuffle has taken place opposite

Radhaswami Chamber. Hence I came on road from Shah

Petrol Pump. Once person was found lying there in bleeding

condition. He had fallen down at small garden near Mahendra

Shah Petrol Pump and 3 persons were running towards him to

20

beat him. They were having weapons like knife and Gupti.

Upon seeing me, 2 persons out of the 3 had thrown away their

weapons and 3rd person ran away towards the bridge.

Thereafter the person who was having bleeding was made to

sit in the rickshaw and was sent for treatment. His relative

came and the weapons were deposited at police station. I

came to know that the person who was having bleeding had

passed away at Shri Krusna hospital. Police had taken my

statement once only. I had presented one big knife and Gupti

at police station and I can recognise those weapons if I am

shown those weapons.”

“I can identify 3 persons which I have mentioned. Upon being

asked to 1st identified 2 accused out of the persons present in

the court today, he identifies 2 accused. One of them is Amin

Arif Memon and another one is Farooq Safi Memon.”

Cross-examination:

“One person told me that something wrong is going on and

hence I came to know about the things because of which I

went to the road and thereafter people got together. Within 3-

4 minutes people got together.”

“There was one person in the rickshaw along with the injured

person.”

“It was approximately 6 minutes between my having seen the

injured person and the injured person having gone in the

rickshaw. I had tried to help in keeping the injured person in

the rickshaw. That person was having severe bleeding.

During placing the injured person in the rickshaw, my clothes

got blood stains. Those clothes I had not handed over to the

police. Police had not asked those clothes. After that injured

person was taken to hospital, at about 9:15 o’ clock I had gone

to the police station. I had gone to Anand Town Police Station.

I had gone with the weapons. I had not gone with the weapons

not covered. Those weapons were given to Saheb. I was

enquired by the Saheb. I had not lodged any complaint.

Reason for not giving complaint was that, there was one

person sitting over there for giving the complaint. He was

sitting there at 9:15 o’ clock. I do not know what proceeding

was carried out after I had deposited those weapons. I stayed

at police station for nearly 20 minutes. It is true that, in this

regard I had not made any report to the police. On the day I

21

had gone to the police station my statement was not taken. It

is true that, my statement was taken the next day and in that

statement there is no description about the persons whom I

have seen or about their clothes.”

16. Demistalkumar(PW-12) was portrayed by the prosecution to be

an eyewitness of the incident. He categorically stated that on 4th May,

2011 at 8:30 pm, he came to know that a scuffle had taken place

opposite the Radha Swamy chamber and hence, he went to the said

location. There, he found one person lying down in a bleeding

condition near a garden adjacent to the Mahendar Shah petrol pump.

Three assailants brandishing weapons like knife and gupti were

approaching to beat the person. On seeing Demistalkumar(PW-12),

two of the three assailants threw away their weapons and ran away

towards the bridge. Thereafter, the injured was boarded on to a

rickshaw and was sent for treatment. His relatives came and the

weapons were deposited at the police station.

17. In cross-examination, Demistalkumar(PW-12) admitted that

someone told him about the untoward incident whereupon he

proceeded towards the road and within three to four minutes, people

gathered at the crime scene. He stayed with the injured for about

three to four minutes. One man accompanied the injured in the

rickshaw. The witness also helped in placing the injured in the

rickshaw and his clothes got stained with blood in this process. After

22

the injured person had been taken to the hospital, he proceeded to

the Anand Town Police Station carrying the two weapons abandoned

by the offenders with him and reached there at 9:15 pm. However, he

did not lodge any complaint of the incident. The witness explained the

reason for not giving the complaint stating that a person was already

sitting at the police station at 9:15 pm for giving the report.

18. Having carefully sifted through and analysed the evidence of

Demistalkumar(PW-12), we find that he did not utter a single word

about the presence of the first informant, Mohammad Arif

Memon(PW-11) at the scene of occurrence. He claimed to have picked

up two weapons used by the accused, i.e., one big knife and a gupti

and had presented them at the police station around 9:15 pm on the

very day of the incident. He also stated that he did not submit any

report/complaint of the incident because he saw that someone was

already sitting at the police station at 9:15 pm for giving the

report/complaint.

19. We find it improbable and totally unacceptable that a police

constable had seen the incident and had also brought the crime

weapons to the police station and yet his statement would not be

recorded and the factum of presentation of weapons would not be

entered in the daily diary(roznamcha) of the police station.

23

Demistalkumar(PW-12) explained in his cross-examination that he

did not give a report about the incident because he noticed the

presence of someone at the police station who was sitting there from

9:15 pm to give the report. However, as per the record, no report was

admittedly presented at the police station by any person from the

complainant side. No police personnel deployed at the Anand Town

Police Station corroborated the version of Demistalkumar(PW-12) that

someone had come to the police station at 9:15 pm for giving a report

of the incident.

20. Since the Police Constable, Demistalkumar(PW-12) claiming to be

an eyewitness to the heinous assault had reported at the police

station with the crime weapons, there was no reason whatsoever as to

why his statement would not have been recorded immediately on his

arrival at the police station. From the circumstances discussed above,

a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court that the

statement of Demistalkumar(PW-12) would definitely have been

recorded in the daily diary(roznamcha) but his version may not have

suited the prosecution case and that is why, the daily diary entry was

never brought on record. Non-production of the daily diary is a

serious omission on part of the prosecution.

24

21. There cannot be any doubt that the first version of the incident

as narrated by the Police Constable, Demistalkumar(PW-12) would be

required to be treated as the FIR and the complaint lodged by

Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) would be relegated to the category of

a statement under Section 161 CrPC and nothing beyond that. The

same could not have been treated to be the FIR as it would be hit by

Section 162 CrPC. Evidently thus, the prosecution is guilty of

concealing the initial version from the Court and hence, an adverse

inference deserves to be drawn against the prosecution on this count.

22. The FIR(Exhibit-79) was registered on the basis of the oral

statement of the first informant(PW-11) recorded at Krishna Medical

Hospital, Karamsad by S.N. Ghori, PSI(PW-17). The witness(PW-17)

stated in cross-examination that Demistalkumar(PW-12) met him at

the police station at around 2:30 am on 5th May, 2011. No information

about the incident was received at the police chowki. He came to

know at about 10:00 pm that some cognizable offence had been

committed. The said information was based on a wardhi received from

the hospital which was issued by Dr. Varun Patel. On receiving this

wardhi, he proceeded to the Krishna Medical Hosptial, Karamsad at

about 10:00 pm where he met the first informant. He stayed at the

hospital for about one and a half hours. The witness, S.N. Ghori,

25

PSI(PW-17) also admitted that the complainant did not mention in the

complaint that he had received any injuries in the incident. Thus,

there is a huge cloud of suspicion on the very threshold of the

prosecution case i.e. the time and manner of lodging of the

FIR(Exhibit-79).

23. Demistalkumar(PW-12) was also made to identify the accused

persons in the dock, but that is another story which we shall consider

at a later stage. The witness identified the accused appellants as the

offenders. However, we find that the lame attempt by PW-12 to make

dock identification of the accused in his deposition recorded after

nearly two and a half years of the incident is absolutely flimsy and

unacceptable. The witness had not given out either the names or the

description of the features of the accused in his police statement and

thus, if at all, the prosecution was desirous of getting the accused

identified at the hands of this witness, then he should have been

made to identify the accused persons in a Test Identification Parade

during the investigation. Thus, the identification of the accused by

Demistalkumar(PW-12) for the first time in the dock is totally

unbelievable and unacceptable.

24. Now, we shall proceed to discuss the evidence of the star

prosecution eyewitness, namely, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11), the

26

first informant. The witness(PW-11) narrated the details of the

incident as were stated by him in an oral statement given to S.N.

Ghori, PSI(PW-17) on 4th May, 2011 at the Krishna Medical Hospital,

Karamsad which was treated to be the FIR(Exhibit P-79). In addition

to the facts as set out in the FIR, the witness also alleged that he also

received an injury on his head when he fell down as a result of the

push given by Mohmedfaruk @ Palak. A very important fact which

emerges from the evidence of the first informant(PW-11) is that he

categorically stated that he gave a complaint of the incident by

personally appearing at the Anand Town Police Station. He further

stated that after he had given the complaint, the police called him

next morning after the incident and that he had pointed out the crime

scene to the police. Only thereafter, he signed the complaint.

Apparently thus, from the version set out in the examination-in-chief

of the first informant(PW-11), there is a grave discrepancy regarding

the time and place of lodging the complaint.

25. In cross-examination, the first informant(PW-11) stated that he

reached the Krishna Medical Hospital, Karamsad at around 9:00 pm.

He did not take any treatment for the injuries sustained by him in the

incident. By the time he reached Krishna Medical Hospital, his uncle

Mohammed Iqbal Memon, father of the deceased, was already present

27

there and he told the doctors that the attack was made by sharp

weapons. They proceeded from the hospital to the Anand Town Police

Station which is at a distance of about 10 kms from the hospital and

he gave the complaint at the Police Station. No police personnel

accompanied him when he proceeded from Krishna Hospital. When

he reached the hospital, he noticed the injuries suffered by the

deceased. They went to the police after meeting the doctor. The

witnesses referred to in the complaint were present with him when he

drafted the complaint which was submitted at the Police Station

about an hour, after his companions had reached there. He admitted

that before giving the complaint, a discussion was held amongst the

relatives as to the manner in which the complaint was to be drafted

and lodged. However, the witness explained that he drafted the

complaint describing the incident as he had seen it. A pertinent

suggestion was given to the witness(PW-11) in cross-examination that

he could not describe the number and location of the injuries caused

to the deceased because he was not present on the spot and did not

see the incident. He denied the said suggestion. He admitted that the

factum of his going to the petrol pump along with the deceased was

known only to him, Mohammad Sohail(deceased) and Mehboobbhai.

Approximately, five minutes after the assault, the injured was taken to

28

the hospital. He was bleeding from his head. He was lifted and made

to sit in the rickshaw. However, from the persons who lifted the

injured, only Irfanbhai Memon received blood stains on his clothes.

The witness(PW-11) admitted that neither he nor any other person

received blood stains on their clothes or elsewhere. He was confronted

with his previous version and admitted that he did not mention in the

complaint(Exhibit P-79) that he had received an injury on his head in

the incident. Going by the above version of the witness(PW-11),

manifestly, the complaint which he gave at the police station never

saw the light of the day and seems to have been intentionally

withheld. Furthermore, PW-11 categorically stated that he signed the

complaint on the morning after the incident and pursuant to the site

inspection by the police, which creates a genuine doubt in the mind of

the Court that the FIR(Exhibit-79) seems to have been created at a

later point of time.

26. As per the deposition of S.N. Ghori, PSI(PW-17), the oral

statement of Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) was taken down in

writing at the Krishna Medical Hospital, Karamsad and the same was

treated to be the complaint(Exhibit-79) which came to be registered as

CR No. 141 of 2011 for offences punishable under Sections 302, 120B

and 323 IPC. The formal FIR was exhibited during the deposition of

29

S.N. Ghori, PSI(PW-17) who stated that on 4th May, 2011, while

performing duty as Police Sub-Inspector(PSI) in the Sardar Bagh

Police Station of Anand Town, he got information that three persons

had caused injuries to Mohammad Sohail(deceased) near Shah petrol

pump on Bhalej Road at about 8:00 pm. He was apprised that the

injured was first taken to Nagar Palika Hospital, Anand in an

autorickshaw and from there, the father of the injured took him to

Krishna Medical Hospital, Karamsad in his van for further treatment.

Upon this, the PSI(PW-17) proceeded to Shri Krishna Medical

Hospital, Karamsad where he met the first informant Mohammad Arif

Memon(PW-11) who narrated the details of the incident which was

drawn up as the complaint. The witness marked Exhibit P-79 on the

complaint and proved his signature thereupon.

27. The complaint(Exhibit P-79) was registered as a formal FIR by

witness K.N. Waghela, Head Constable(PW-16) who testified that he

had been performing duties as a Head Constable in Anand Town

Police Station for last four years. He was present on duty on 4th May,

2011. The complainant Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) filed a

complaint against Mohmedfaruk @ Palak and others to S.N. Ghori,

PSI(PW-17) at 11:30 pm. The said complaint was forwarded to the

police station Anand Town and accordingly, CR No. 141/2011 was

30

registered, and investigation was assigned to DhananjaySinh Waghela,

Police Inspector(PW-18). The station diary of the Anand Town Police

Station was proved as Exhibit P-97 wherein, the factum of registration

of the FIR is recorded. The witness also stated that a telephonic

wardhi forwarded by Dr. Varun Patel, Shri Krishna Medical Hospital,

Karamsad was also entered in the station diary on which the

witness(PW-16) as well as S.N. Ghori, PSI(PW-17) had signed. The

said wardhi was prepared at 10:00 pm whereas, the complaint was

received at the police station at 11:30 pm.

28. Certain very significant incongruencies come to the fore on a

minute evaluation of the evidence of Mohammad Arif Memon, the first

informant(PW-11), K.N. Waghela, Head Constable(PW-16) and S.N.

Ghori, PSI(PW-17). Whilst Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11), the first

informant categorically stated that he drafted the complaint and

submitted it at the Anand Town Police Station, but in total

contradiction thereto, S.N. Ghori, PSI(PW-17) stated that the

complaint was registered on the basis of the oral statement of the first

informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) which he took down in

writing at the Krishna Medical Hospital, Karamsad. On a careful

perusal of the complaint(Exhibit P-79) which subsequently came to be

registered as the FIR, it is manifest that no time of recording is

31

mentioned thereupon. Another very relevant fact which manifests

from the complaint/FIR is that there is no endorsement as to the date

and time on which the said FIR reached the Court concerned. Going

by the highlighted excerpts(supra) from the testimony of Mohammad

Arif Memon(PW-11), the actual complaint filed by him at the police

station seems to have been withheld and there are genuine reasons to

hold that the FIR is a post investigation document.

29. This Court in the case of State of A.P. v. Punati Ramulu and

Others4 held that when the police officer does not deliberately record

the FIR on receipt of information about cognizable offence and the FIR

is prepared after reaching the spot after due deliberations,

consultations and discussion, such a complaint cannot be treated as

FIR and it would be a statement made during the investigation of a

case and is hit by Section 162 CrPC. The relevant paras of the

judgment in this regard are reproduced hereinbelow: -

“5. According to the evidence of PW 22, Circle Inspector, he

had received information of the incident from police constable

No. 1278, who was on ‘bandobast’ duty. On receiving the

information of the occurrence, PW 22 left for the village of

occurrence and started the investigation in the case. Before

proceeding to the village to take up the investigation, it is

conceded by PW 2 in his evidence, that he made no entry in

the daily diary or record in the general diary about the

information that had been given to him by constable 1278,

who was the first person to give information to him on the

basis of which he had proceeded to the spot and taken up the

investigation in hand. It was only when PW 1 returned from

4

 1994 Supp (1) SCC 590

32

the police station along with the written complaint to the

village that the same was registered by the Circle Inspector,

PW 22, during the investigation of the case at about 12.30

noon, as the FIR, Ex. P-1. In our opinion, the complaint, Ex.

P-1, could not be treated as the FIR in the case as it certainly

would be a statement made during the investigation of a case

and hit by Section 162 CrPC. As a matter of fact the High

Court recorded a categorical finding to the effect that Ex. P-1

had not been prepared at Narasaraopet and that it had “been

brought into existence at Pamaidipadu itself, after due

deliberation”. Once we find that the investigating officer

has deliberately failed to record the first information

report on receipt of the information of a cognizable

offence of the nature, as in this case, and had prepared

the first information report after reaching the spot after

due deliberations, consultations and discussion, the

conclusion becomes inescapable that the investigation is

tainted and it would, therefore, be unsafe to rely upon

such a tainted investigation, as one would not know where

the police officer would have stopped to fabricate evidence

and create false clues. Though we agree that mere

relationship of the witnesses PW 3 and PW 4, the children of

the deceased or of PW 1 and PW 2 who are also related to the

deceased, by itself is not enough to discard their testimony

and that the relationship or the partisan nature of the

evidence only puts the Court on its guard to scrutinise the

evidence more carefully, we find that in this case when the

bona fides of the investigation has been successfully assailed,

it would not be safe to rely upon the testimony of these

witnesses either in the absence of strong corroborative

evidence of a clinching nature, which is found wanting in this

case.”

 (emphasis supplied)

30. In this regard, we are also benefitted by a recent judgment of this

Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others

v. State of Karnataka5

, the relevant portion of which reads as

under: -

“47. Apparently, thus, the close relatives of the deceased had

gone to the police station in the late hours of 19th September

itself. If this version was true then, in natural course, these

5 2024 OnLine SC 561

33

persons were bound to divulge about the incident to the police

and their statement/s which would presumably be about an

incident of the homicidal death would have mandatorily been

entered in the Daily Dairy of the police station if not treated to

be the FIR. However, the Daily Diary or the Roznamcha entry

of the police station corresponding to the so called visit by the

relatives of the deceased to the police station was not brought

on record which creates a grave doubt on the genuineness of

the FIR(Exhibit P-10). The complainant(PW-1) admitted in

cross examination that the Poujadar came to his house and he

narrated the incident to the officer who scribed the same and

thereafter, the complainant appended his signatures on the

writing made by the Poujadar. However, ASI Tikota Police

Station(PW-18) testified on oath that complainant(PW-1) came

to the police station and submitted a written report which was

taken as the complaint of the incident. He did not state

anything about any complaint being recorded at the house

of the complainant prior to lodging of the report. Thus,

there is a grave contradiction on this important aspect as

to whether the report was submitted by the

complainant(PW-1) in the form of a written complaint or

whether the oral statement of complainant(PW-1) was

recorded by the police officials at his home leading to the

registration of FIR(Exhibit P-10). The non-production of

the Daily Dairy maintained at the police station assumes

great significance in the backdrop of these facts.

Apparently thus, the FIR(Exhibit P-10) is a post

investigation document and does not inspire confidence.”

 (emphasis supplied)

31. In addition to all the above noted inconsistencies and

contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, this

Court has to be conscious about the deposition of

Demistalkumar(PW-12) who has categorically stated that when he

reached the crime scene, he saw only the injured lying on the road

with the three assailants brandishing sharp weapons towards

Mohammed Sohail, and about four minutes later, some other people

34

came there. Thus, the evidence of Demistalkumar(PW-12) makes the

very presence of the first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11)

at the crime scene doubtful.

32. Had there been an iota of truth in the claim of the first

informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) that he was an eyewitness

to the occurrence then, there was no reason as to why he did not

divulge the details thereof to Police Constable, Demistalkumar (PW12) present at the spot. The natural reaction of any prudent man

would be to make a complaint of the incident to the policeman

present at the spot.

33. Furthermore, the Police Constable, Demistalkumar(PW-12),

stated that he got blood stains while placing the injured in the

rickshaw. On the other hand, the first informant, Mohammad Arif

Memon(PW-11), however, admitted that he did not receive any blood

stains either on his hands or on his clothes at the time when the

injured was placed inside the rickshaw. Rather, he did not

acknowledge that Demistalkumar(PW-12) also helped in placing the

victim on to the rickshaw. Had there been any iota of truth in the

version of the first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) that he

had seen the assault being made on his cousin brother, Mohammad

Sohail(deceased) and that he had helped in lifting the injured and

35

placing him in the rickshaw then, it is impossible that he would not

have received the blood stains from the blood oozing out from the

multiple sharp weapon injuries suffered by Mohammad Sohail. As per

Demistalkumar(PW-12), when he reached the crime scene, the victim

was lying on the ground and no one else was to be seen near him

other than the assailants. Thus, the first informant, Mohammad Arif

Memon(PW-11) seems to have abandoned his own cousin brother who

was lying on the road in gravely injured condition creating a further

doubt on his very presence at the spot when the incident occurred.

34. The first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) also stated

that after Mohammad Sohail had been assaulted by the accusedappellant with sharp weapons and had fallen on the ground, two

persons namely Mehboob Abdul Rehman Memon and Irfanbhai

Memon also came at the spot. The complainant and Irfanbhai Memon

took Mohammad Sohail to the Nagar Palika Hospital for treatment.

The said Mehboob Memon and Irfanbhai Memon were not examined

by the prosecution even though they were most material witness for

unfurling a true picture of the story which creates further doubt on

the truthfulness of the prosecution case.

35. In total contradiction to the above version of the first

informant(PW-11), Demistalkumar(PW-12) stated that he saw only one

36

person taking the injured in the rickshaw. Thus, the claim made by

Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) that he and Irfanbhai Memon both

took Mohammad Sohail to the hospital is contradicted by

Demistalkumar(PW-12) who is an independent witness. The first

informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) also stated that he lodged

the complaint at the Anand Town Police Station which fact is also

contradicted by the evidence of K.N. Waghela, Head Constable(PW-16)

and S.N. Ghori, PSI(PW-17) as noted above.

36. The first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) admitted in

his cross-examination that after Mohammad Sohail’s father Iqbalbhai,

Sikander Abdul Karim Chokshi, Munafbhai Farooqbhai Memon and

Mustaq Mohammad Siddiq Memon arrived at the Krishna Medical

Hospital, Karamsad, the incident was discussed in presence of all who

had gathered there. He had noticed the injuries caused to the

deceased when he reached Krishna Medical Hospital, Karamsad. In

the background of the discussion made above, these incongruencies,

even though minor, reinforce the doubt created in the mind of the

Court regarding the presence of the first informant, Mohammad Arif

Memon(PW-11) at the crime scene. Thus, the argument advanced by

learned counsel for the accused appellants that the star prosecution

37

eyewitness Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11) was not present at the

crime scene deserves acceptance.

37. Another important aspect which was elicited in the crossexamination of (PW-11) is that the fact regarding the deceased having

gone to the petrol pump for taking fuel was known only to two of them

and one Mehboob Abdul Rehman Memon. In this background, it is

highly improbable that the accused persons would have known in

advance that Mohammad Sohail would be available at the petrol

pump at that particular moment and that they got time and

opportunity to conspire together and made extensive preparations for

launching an assault on the victim by taking advantage of his

presence at the petrol pump. Thus, we are of the view that the

testimony of the first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon(PW-11), the

star witness of prosecution, is not trustworthy and reliable as the

same is contradicted on material aspects by numerous material facts

and circumstances which we have discussed above. There is no

option but to discard the testimony of the first informant, Mohammad

Arif Memon(PW-11).

38. The other eyewitness to the incident who was examined on

behalf of the prosecution was the Police Constable,

Demistalkumar(PW-12). We have already discussed his evidence and

38

have doubted the attempt made by the witness to identify the

accused-appellant for the first time in the dock. Hence, the testimony

of the Police Constable, Demistalkumar(PW-12) also does not help the

prosecution in linking the accused-appellant with the crime.

39. So far as Mustaq(PW-13) is concerned, who was treated to be an

eyewitness of the incident and whose testimony was relied upon by

the trial Court as well as the High Court, suffice it to say that there

are ample circumstances on record which deny the claim of the

eyewitness that he had seen the alleged assault been made on the

deceased. Firstly, the name of Mustaq(PW-13) does not figure in the

FIR(Exhibit P-79) as an eyewitness to the incident. Furthermore,

when he was examined under Section 161 CrPC, he categorically

stated that he was at his house and that the information of the

incident was given to him by the father of the deceased, Mohammad

Iqbal Memon(PW-14). In this background, when the witness was

confronted during cross-examination, he could not explain the grave

improvement. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that,

Mustaq(PW-13) was falsely portrayed to be an eyewitness of the

incident, and his testimony cannot be relied upon.

40. The trial Court as well as the High Court, placed extensive

reliance on the confessions of the accused appellants Mohmedfaruk @

39

Palak Safibhai Memon and Amin @ Lalo recorded by the Medical

Officer, Dr. Arvindbhai(PW-2) while preparing the injury reports of the

accused.

41. We find that these so-called confessions are ex-facie inadmissible

in evidence for the simple reason that the accused persons were

presented at the hospital by the police officers after having been

arrested in the present case. As such, the notings made by the

Medical Officer, Dr. Arvindbhai(PW-2) in the injury reports of

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak and Amin @ Lalo would be clearly hit by

Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872(hereinafter being referred

to as ‘Evidence Act’). As a consequence, we are not inclined to accept

the said admissions of the accused as incriminating pieces of

evidence relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. The

circumstance regarding identification of place of incident at the

instance of the accused is also inadmissible because the crime scene

was already known to the police and no new fact was discovered in

pursuance of the disclosure statements.

42. The trial Court as well as the High Court heavily relied upon the

FSL reports(Exhibits 111-115) to hold that blood group found on the

weapons of offence incriminated the accused for the crime as the

same matched with the blood group of the deceased. In this regard, it

40

is suffice to say that the two weapons which were picked up by

Demistalkumar(PW-12) from the place of occurrence were formally

seized at the Anand Town Police Station around 2:30 am on 5th May,

2011. Only one of the panchas Mohammad Hussain(PW-5) was

examined at the trial. The seizure panchnama(Exhibit -38) records

that the three accused who had inflicted deadly blows to the deceased

with dagger, gupti and knife, threw away their weapons near the

garden and fled away from the crime scene and that police personnel

brought all the weapons to the police station. However, the

panchnama(Exhibit P-38) does not bear the signatures of the police

constable, Demistalkumar(PW-12) who admittedly collected the

weapons from the crime scene and presented them to the police

station. Thus, no credence can be given to seizure panchnama(Exhibit

P-38) because it suffers from the lacuna of not being attested by the

witness who had actually presented the weapons at the police station.

In addition, thereto, we may further note that Demistalkumar(PW-12),

the police constable who deposited the weapons at the police station,

did not state in his evidence as to whom he had given the knife and

the gupti which he picked up from the crime scene. These weapons

were seized vide seizure panchnama(Exhibit-38) which was admittedly

prepared at 2:30 am. However, the Police Constable,

41

Demistalkumar(PW-12) stated that he reached the police station at

about 9:15 pm and stayed there for only 20 minutes. These

infirmities create a doubt on the very process of seizure of the

weapons.

43. The trial Court as well as the High Court heavily relied upon the

FSL reports(Exhibits 111-115) for finding corroboration to the

evidence of the eyewitnesses and in drawing a conclusion regarding

culpability of the appellants for the crime. We may reiterate that the

testimony of the so-called eyewitnesses has already been discarded

above by holding the same to be doubtful. Thus, even presuming that

the FSL reports(Exhibits 111-115) conclude that the blood group

found on the weapons recovered at the instance of the accused

matched with the blood group of the deceased, this circumstance in

isolation, cannot be considered sufficient so as to link the accused

with the crime. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment

of Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan6

, wherein this

Court held that sole circumstance of recovery of bloodstained weapon

cannot form the basis of conviction unless the same was connected

with the murder of the deceased by the accused. The relevant portion

is extracted hereinbelow:-

6

(2011) 11 SCC 724

42

“19. The AB blood group which was found on the clothes of the

deceased does not by itself establish the guilt of the appellant unless

the same was connected with the murder of the deceased by the

appellants. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could

establish that fact. The blood found on the sword recovered at the

instance of Mustkeem was not sufficient for test as the same had

already disintegrated. At any rate, due to the reasons elaborated in

the following paragraphs, the fact that the traces of blood found

on the deceased matched those found on the recovered weapons

cannot ipso facto enable us to arrive at the conclusion that the

latter were used for the murder.”

 (emphasis supplied)

44. On a perusal of the deposition of the Investigating Officer(PW18), we find his evidence on the aspect of disclosure statements made

by the accused-appellant leading to the recoveries to be totally

perfunctory and unacceptable. The witness did not elaborate upon

the words spoken by the accused-appellant at the time of making the

disclosure statements.

45. On a threadbare analysis of the entire record, we do not find that

the prosecution examined any witness who had deposed about the

link evidence/safe custody of the mudammal articles right from the

time they were received at the police station and seized till the time

the same reached the FSL. Hence, otherwise also, the FSL

report(Exhibits 111-115) pales into insignificance. Investigating

Officer(PW-18) deposed that he arrested the accused persons. A

detailed enquiry was made from all three accused-appellants, and

they were examined for the injuries found on their bodies. Thereafter,

43

all the accused-appellants conveyed their willingness to show the

place of the offence and thereafter, panchnama as per Section 27 of

the Evidence Act was prepared. Since the place of incident was also

known to police, this disclosure is irrelevant. Search of the houses of

the accused-appellant was undertaken in presence of the panch

witnesses and a big knife was seized from the house of the accused

Mohmedfaruk @ Palak, vide panchnama(Exhibit-52).

46. Hence, we are of the firm view that neither the disclosure

statements made by the accused were proved as per law nor the same

resulted into any discovery which could be accepted as incriminating

inasmuch as the requisite link evidence was never presented by the

prosecution so as to establish that the recovered articles remained in

the self-safe condition from the date of the seizure till the same

reached the FSL.

47. By and large, this Court while exercising jurisdiction under

Article 136 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with the

concurrent findings recorded by the courts below. But where the

evidence has not been properly appreciated, material aspects have

been ignored and the findings are perverse, this Court would certainly

interfere with the findings of the courts below though concurrent.

44

48. Upon an overall appreciation of the evidence available on record,

we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to

lead convincing evidence establishing the guilt of the accused

appellants beyond all manner of doubt so as to hold the accused

appellants responsible for the crime. Hence, the conviction of the

accused appellants as recorded by the trial Court and the sentences

awarded to them vide judgment and order dated 13th October, 2014

and so also the judgment dated 18th February, 2019 rendered by

learned Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat rejecting the

appeals preferred by the accused appellants do not stand to scrutiny.

The appellants deserve to be acquitted by giving them the benefit of

doubt.

49. Resultantly, the appeals are allowed, and the impugned

judgments dated 13th October, 2014 and 18th February, 2019 passed

by the trial Court and the High Court, respectively are hereby

quashed and set aside.

50. The accused appellants are acquitted of the charges. Accused

appellants Allarakha Habib Memon and Amin @ Lalo Aarifbhai

Memon are on bail and need not surrender. Their bail bonds are

discharged.

45

51. Accused-appellant Mohmedfaruk @ Palak Safibhai Memon, shall

be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

52. Pending application(s), if any, shall stands disposed of.

………………….……….J.

 (B.R. GAVAI)

 ………………………….J.

 (SANDEEP MEHTA)

New Delhi;

August 08, 2024

46

charges pertaining to non-handing over of full charge at the relevant point of time; appointing persons without permission from the Collector/Registrar; as also, returning the money after one and a half years by the respondent

2024 INSC 592

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8546-8549 OF 2024

 [ @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.12773-76 OF 2021]

THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. … APPELLANTS

A1: THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

A2: DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL

A3: REGISTRAR, COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES, JAIPUR

VERSUS

BHUPENDRA SINGH …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. Leave granted.

 

2

3. The present appeals are directed against the common Final

Judgment and Order dated 28.01.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the

“Impugned Judgment”) passed by the Division Bench of the High Court

of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench (hereinafter referred to as

the “High Court”) by which D.B. Special Appeal Writs No.1695/2008,

14/2009, 15/2009 and 65/2009 were dismissed.

BRIEF FACTUAL OVERVIEW:

4. The sole respondent was appointed as Inspector (Executive) in

the year 1960 and later appointed as Assistant Registrar on 05.04.1973

on selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (hereinafter

referred to as the “RPSC”). On 29.04.1976, the respondent granted

permission for construction of godown of Sadulshahar Jamidara Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. despite the Registrar having issued a direction to consult the Public Works Department to obtain a technical

opinion. The respondent, further, appointed two persons on 04.01.1977,

despite order to get the permission from the Registrar. On 06.05.1977,

the respondent was reverted to the post of Inspector and also directed

to handover charge to Mr. Amar Chand Dhaka but he did not comply

with the same and allegedly obstructed the other person from duty.

3

5. On 18.05.1977, the respondent issued an order nominating himself as Administrator of the Bharat Bus Transport Cooperative Society

Limited though he was reverted from that post and charge was taken

over from him by another person. During such period, the respondent

sold 9 shops without adopting the procedure of auction at very low

prices compared to the market value of the said shops. He is further

said to have made irregular payments on 30.05.1977. On 21.06.1977,

he withdrew an amount of Rs.9,025/- (Rupees Nine Thousand TwentyFive) from the account of the Bharat Bus Transport Cooperative Society

Limited as expenses incurred for purchase of stamps though the same

were recovered from the shop-buyers and thus, illegally kept by him.

On 01.08.1977, the Collector of the district asked the respondent to

hand over charge of Administrator of Hanumangarh Society but he did

not hand over the charge and cash balance etc. till 19.08.1977.

6. On 04.10.1979, he was placed under suspension in contemplation of departmental enquiry for having committed various irregularities.

As per the seniority list published on 05.10.1979, the respondent was at

Sl. No.39 as on 01.07.1978. On 07.02.1980, Appeal No.361/79 was

filed by the respondent seeking promotion which was dismissed on the

4

ground that there were adverse entries in his Annual Confidential Records (hereinafter referred to as “ACRs”) for the years 1975-1976,

1976-1977 and 1977-1978. However, it was observed that if the said

adverse entries were expunged, the respondent would have a case for

reconsideration.

7. On 03.10.1980, charge sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan

Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the “1958 Rules”) was issued against the respondent levelling 16 charges including sub-charges. The preliminary statement of the respondent was recorded on 23.05.1983 in connection with

the said enquiry. Examination of witnesses took place on various dates.

In the meantime, on 28.11.1983, in Appeal No.237/82, adverse entries

in the ACR were expunged. On 05.03.1984 and 04.06.1984, detailed

statement of the respondent was also recorded. Finally, the enquiry report was submitted on 19.04.1984. Thereafter, the Departmental Promotion Committee (hereinafter referred to as the “DPC”) in its meeting

held on 21.11.1984 did not find the respondent fit for promotion as he

was under suspension on that day. The respondent had moved the

High Court in Single Bench Civil Writ Petition No.590/1983, wherein

suspension order dated 04.10.1979 against the respondent was pro-

5

spectively stayed by the learned Single Judge. The respondent filed Appeal No.358/85 for consideration of his promotion to the posts of

Deputy Registrar with effect from 23.02.1979 and Joint Registrar with

effect from 06.04.1985.

8. After completion of the enquiry and the charges having been

proved, the respondent was removed from service by order dated

25.09.1985. Appeal No.358/85 preferred by the Respondent was partially allowed, by order dated 21.08.1991, directing the appellant to convene the DPC for the vacancies of the year 1984-1985 and review the

case of the respondent for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar.

The respondent had also moved against his order of removal before the

High Court in Single Bench Civil Writ Petition No.793/1986 wherein

vide order dated 18.12.1991, the order of removal was quashed granting liberty to the appellants to conduct enquiry and proceed after giving

the respondent a copy of the enquiry report and the opinion of the

RPSC. Compliance of the said order was made on 07.04.1992. The respondent submitted written representations on 25.05.1992 and

10.06.1992 denying all the charges levelled against him. On

11.09.1992, the DPC found the respondent suitable for 1980-81 but not

for 1979-80 for which the recommendation was kept in a sealed cover

6

in view of pendency of the departmental enquiry. In the challenge to the

decision of the DPC by the respondent in Contempt Petition

No.358/1985, by order dated 08.04.1993, the High Court upheld the decision of the DPC. On 28.09.1993, after affording an opportunity of

hearing to the respondent, an order for his removal was passed. Being

aggrieved, the respondent preferred a contempt petition in the High

Court which was dismissed and the D.B. Special Appeal No.36/94 filed

against the same was also rejected on 04.04.1994.

9. The respondent then filed four writ petitions being SBCWP

Nos.6486/1993; 5651/1994; 5752/1994, and; 846/1995 in the High

Court which were decided by a common judgment dated 22.02.2008,

wherein SBCWP Nos.6486/1993 and 5651/1994 were allowed, while

SBCWP Nos.5752/1994 and 846/1995 were partly allowed, and directions were issued to reconsider the respondent’s case for promotion.

Aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred D.B. Special Appeal Writs

No.1695/2008, 14/2009, 15/2009 and 65/2009 whereas the respondent

also filed D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.24/2009. The appeal filed by the

respondent was related to his claim for costs. Vide common Final Judgment and Order dated 28.01.2021, all these writ appeals were dis-

7

missed, which has given rise to the present four appeals at the instance

of the appellants.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:

10. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the respondent had a chequered history and proved himself unfit for being retained

in service. It was submitted that even during probation, the respondent

was found unsuitable and was reverted/asked to handover charge to

Mr. Amar Chand Dhaka by order dated 06.05.1977 but he disobeyed

and obstructed him from assuming charge of his office. It was submitted that even earlier, when the Registrar had issued directions to the respondent to consult the PWD for technical opinion with regard to permission for construction of godown of Sadulshahar Jamidara Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd., without doing so, he himself had given

such permission and had even appointed Mr. Dharam Chand and Mr.

Birbal on 04.01.1977 on his own, without permission from the Registrar.

Further, it was submitted that on 18.05.1977, the respondent had issued Order No.995-98 nominating himself as the Administrator of the

Bharat Bus Transport Cooperative Society Ltd. while he was reverted

from that post and charge was taken from him by Mr. Amar Chand

8

Dhaka. It was contended that during the said period, the respondent

sold 9 shops at a much lower price than the market price without following the due prescribed procedure. He submitted that on 30.05.1977

also, the respondent made irregular payments and on 21.06.1977, he

embezzled Rs.9025/- by withdrawing the said amount from the account

of the society on the head of expenses of stamps which were recovered

from shopkeepers and the amount was illegally kept with him.

11. Further, it was argued by learned counsel for the appellants that

on 05.07.1977, the respondent prepared a bill of Rs.4,600/- against rent

without obtaining clearance of the Collector and on 06.05.1977, he resumed the post from which he was reverted without authority of law.

Even the said amount of Rs.4,600/- was not paid by the respondent to

the landlord. He submitted that on 21.07.1977, the respondent embezzled Rs.4,000/- by making fake entry of returning deposit of the said

amount to Smt. Ganga Bai in the Cash Book, but kept the amount

without any authority. Similarly, it was submitted that on 25.07.1977, he

received Rs.7,766.83/- and kept it with him, which he returned only at

the time of inspection under compulsion. Further, on 30.07.1977,

learned counsel submitted that the respondent made irregular and

9

doubtful entries relating to payments made by him during the period for

which he stood demoted to the post of Inspector. It was submitted that

another glaring example of the respondent committing insubordination

was that despite the order of the Collector, Sh. Ganganagar dated

01.08.1977, directing the respondent to handover charge of Administrator, Hanumangarh Society, he did not handover the cash balance

and other charge till 19.08.1977.

12. Further contention was that the respondent temporarily embezzled an amount of Rs.4,764.36/- of the Bharat Bus Transport Cooperative Society Ltd. and the amount was returned only after the respondent got transferred to Bhilwara. It was submitted that even the

said amount which was due on 18.08.1977 itself was sent by the respondent in the shape of Demand Drafts of Rs.3,000/- on 07.02.1979,

Rs. 764.36/- on 09.02.1979 and Rs.1,000/- on 20.02.1979 i.e., after one

and a half years. He submitted that on 04.10.1978, the respondent took

advance of Rs.2,000/- to purchase material for godown while working

as Administrator of Ravla Sale-purchase Co-operative Society Ltd. but

did not deposit the same and in the meantime, he was transferred to

Bhilwara and upon repeated reminders and correspondence he sent

10

the amount under Demand Draft No.738095 on 20.03.1979. Another irregularity pointed out was that the respondent did not take any steps for

new appointment on 28% posts reserved for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidates on the one hand, while on the other hand he appointed one Rajkumar against reserved post on 07.10.1978 as a junior

clerk in violation of the order.

13. Learned counsel submitted that in the background of such conduct, the respondent was placed under suspension in contemplation of

departmental enquiry by order dated 04.10.1979.

14. Learned counsel submitted that on 03.10.1980, a Charge Sheet

under Rule 16 of the 1958 Rules was issued levelling 16 charges

against the respondent, inclusive of sub-charges. During the enquiry,

10 witnesses were examined, who deposed against the respondent,

whereafter, on 05.03.1984 and 04.06.1984, detailed statement(s) of the

respondent was also recorded. The enquiry report was finally submitted

on 19.04.1984. It was contended that, rightly, the DPC in its meeting

held on 21.11.1984 did not find the respondent suitable, on the ground

that he was under suspension at that time. It was submitted that though

on 22.02.1985 the learned Single Judge of the High Court in SBCWP

11

No.590/1983 stayed the operation of the order of suspension dated

04.10.1979 against the appellant, but the same was with prospective

effect and Appeal No.358/85 filed by the respondent for considering his

promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar w.e.f. 23.02.1979 and Joint

Registrar w.e.f. 06.04.1985, was partly allowed with the direction to

convene the DPC for the vacancies for the year 1984-85 to review the

case of the respondent for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar. In

the meantime, during the departmental proceeding against the respondent, charges were proved and by order dated 25.09.1985, he was

removed from service.

15. It was submitted that though the High Court by order dated

18.12.1991 in Single Bench Civil Writ Petition No.793/1986 quashed

the removal order against the respondent, liberty was granted to the appellants to conduct an enquiry after giving him a copy of the enquiry report and the opinion of the RPSC. In compliance of the said order, in

the departmental proceedings, the respondent submitted his written

representation denying all charges and was also heard on his representation. However, learned counsel submitted that on 11.09.1992, the

DPC found him suitable for 1980-1981 but not for 1979-1980, with the

12

recommendation kept under sealed cover in view of the pending departmental enquiry. It was submitted that in Contempt Petition

No.358/1985, preferred by the respondent, by order dated 08.04.1993,

the decision of the DPC was found to be proper.

16. Learned counsel submitted that after following all due procedure

under the law and after affording the respondent full opportunity of being heard, the removal order was passed on 28.09.1993, holding that in

light of the serious nature of the charges and partly/fully five charges

having been found to be proved by the enquiry officer, there were sufficient grounds for punishment. The Contempt Petition filed by the respondent was dismissed and Special Appeal No.36/94 before the Division Bench was also rejected.

17. It was submitted that in this background, when the respondent

filed four writ petitions challenging the removal order dated 28.09.1993,

the High Court quashed the removal order on the ground of violation of

principles of natural justice observing that though there was a reference

to the representation filed by the respondent but there was no discussion in the order. Further, as a consequence, the suspension order was

13

also quashed holding the respondent entitled for the remaining salary

from the date of his suspension till the date of fresh removal and stating

that the entire period will also be counted for the purpose of pension.

Moreover, the respondent having been found fit for promotion in 1980-

1981 but denied the same on the ground of pendency of departmental

enquiry by keeping the result in a sealed cover, the suspension as well

as the removal order having been quashed, the respondent was held

entitled for consideration for promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar

in the year 1979-1980 and 1980-1981 and all consequential benefits, in

the event he was so promoted.

18. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there has

been gross miscarriage of justice since despite five charges having

been proved documentarily, still, on hyper-technicality, the High Court

interfered. Further, it was contended that the view taken by the authorities cannot be said to be perverse as it was also a plausible view. It was

urged that in such matters, the settled law is that where two views are

possible, the one taken by the authorities ought not to be interfered

with, only because there can be another view. Learned counsel submitted that the act of the respondent stood admitted with regard to his conduct of financial irregularity(ies) and insubordination by not obeying or-

14

ders relating to his transfer, other directions given for permission of construction granted to a Cooperative society as also acting beyond jurisdiction of assuming power, both in appointing persons as well as appointing himself as an Administrator of a Co-operative Society. It was

submitted that the Division Bench totally erred in not appreciating the

points, both legal and factual, raised by the appellants. It was further

submitted that the Division Bench erroneously held that the enquiry proceedings were vitiated as they were based on no evidence and were

perverse, which finding, learned counsel contended, was itself perverse, as there were documents to prove the charges, which the respondent had not challenged as being forged and/or fabricated. Hence,

it was prayed that these appeals may be allowed.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT:

19. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that

both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have concurrently held that the enquiry was vitiated, and it was a case of no evid-

15

ence. Thus, this Court may also not interfere in the matter. It was submitted that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench

found that the charge relating to temporary embezzlement is illegal as

the same was not proved but still he has been found guilty. Moreover, it

was pointed out that though Charge 1-GA is with regard to embezzlement of Rs.9,025/- of the sale of shops, the Appellate Authority had exonerated the respondent and the Enquiry Officer did not find the respondent guilty of the said charge of embezzlement, but found sale of

those shops irregular which was not even the charge.

20. Similarly, it was pointed out that the learned Single Judge on the

issue of competence of the respondent to sell the shop at a lower price

held that despite the finding of the Enquiry Officer that no loss was

proved, still the charge has been found proved, which is improper and

there cannot be any dispute on this account. He submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge, which has been upheld by the Division

Bench, does not require interference. He, therefore, impressed upon us

that the appeals deserved dismissal.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

16

21. Having considered the matter, the Court finds that the Impugned

Judgment cannot be sustained. On a prefatory note, we would begin by

quoting what the Division Bench has noted on page No.7:

‘It is well settled preposition (sic) of law that

courts will not act as an Appellate Court and re-assess

the evidence led in domestic enquiry, nor interfere on

the ground that another view was possible on the

material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and

properly held and findings are based on evidence, the

question of adequacy of evidence or reliable nature of

the evidence will be no ground for interfering with the

finding in departmental enquiry. However, when the

finding of fact recorded in departmental enquiry is

based on no evidence or where it is clearly perverse

then it will invite the intervention of the court.’

22. The learned Single Judge held that the findings returned in the

enquiry were without evidence, contrary to the record, and as the

Removal Order based on the same was not reasoned, proceeded to

quash the same. This course of action adopted by the learned Single

Judge has been affirmed by the Division Bench. Surprisingly, despite

noticing the aforesaid position in law relating to non-interference by the

Appellate Court to re-assess the evidence led in an enquiry or to

interfere on the ground that another view was possible on the material

on record, the Division Bench went on to record that the learned Single

Judge had rightly held that the enquiry proceedings were vitiated as

17

they were based on no evidence and were perverse, without giving any

reasons of its own as to how the learned Single Judge had arrived at

such a conclusion, namely, that the enquiry was based on no evidence

and the findings rendered therein were perverse. Upon detailed

assistance from both sides on the factual prism, coupled with the

materials on record, we are of the considered opinion that the

judgments delivered by the learned Single Judge and the Division

Bench are unsustainable.

23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in

a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of

Andhra Pradesh v S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge

Bench stated:

‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a

proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a

Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities

holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant

: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is

held by an authority competent in that behalf, and

according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf,

and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.

Where there is some evidence, which the authority

entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has

accepted and which evidence may reasonably support

the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the

charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a

18

petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the

evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the

evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere

where the departmental authorities have held the

proceedings against the delinquent in a manner

inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in

violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of

enquiry or where the authorities have disabled

themselves from reaching a fair decision by some

considerations extraneous to the evidence and the

merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be

influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the

conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary

and capricious that no reasonable person could ever

have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds.

But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is

otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if

there be some legal evidence on which their findings

can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that

evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be

canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a

writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’

(emphasis supplied)

24 The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in State

Bank of India v Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249. Three learned

Judges of this Court stated as under in State of Andhra Pradesh v

Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557:

‘21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with

departmental inquiries has come up before this Court.

Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State

of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723:

(1964) 3 SCR 25: (1964) 2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no

warrant for the view that in considering whether a

public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against

19

him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is

not established unless proved by evidence beyond

reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must

be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic

tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under

Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to

declare the order of the authorities holding a

departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a

court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of

the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against

a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine

whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent

in that behalf and according to the procedure

prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of

natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is

some evidence which the authority entrusted with the

duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which

evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that

the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the

function of the High Court to review the evidence and

to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.

The High Court may interfere where the departmental

authorities have held the proceedings against the

delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of

natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules

prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the

authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a

fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the

evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing

themselves to be influenced by irrelevant

considerations or where the conclusion on the very

face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no

reasonable person could ever have arrived at that

conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the

enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of

facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their

findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of

that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to

be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for

a writ under Article 226.

20

xxx

23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari

under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The

Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The

findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal

as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not

reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of

law which is apparent on the face of the record can be

corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however

grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact

recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is

shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal

had erroneously refused to admit admissible and

material evidence, or had erroneously admitted

inadmissible evidence which has influenced the

impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on

no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law

which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding

of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged

on the ground that the relevant and material evidence

adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or

inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or

sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference

of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob

v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477: (1964) 5

SCR 64].

24. The High Court in the present case assessed

the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion.

The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from

the aspect that the High Court does not correct a

finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not

sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case

which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be

scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that

there is no evidence which would justify the finding of

the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the

journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions.

It is not possible for the High Court to say that no

21

reasonable person could have arrived at these

conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence,

reassessed the evidence and then rejected the

evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the

High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of

certiorari should not do.

xxx

26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the

High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal

order by reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The

appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is

set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.’

(emphasis supplied)

25. In State Bank of India v S K Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, two

learned Judges of this Court held:

‘28. The decisions cited above make one thing

clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be

reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said

in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109: 65

TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be

put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon

the context and the facts and circumstances of each

case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election

Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405: (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The

objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the

person whose rights are going to be affected.

(See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271:

1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton

Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As

pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of

India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] , the dividing line between

quasi-judicial function and administrative function

(affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin

and almost indistinguishable — a fact also emphasised

by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service

Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All

ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : 1985 AC 374, HL] where

22

the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were

treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from

the standpoint of fair hearing — applying the test of

prejudice, as it may be called — that any and every

complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem

should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations

where observance of the requirement of prior

notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding —

which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It

is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing

as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was

evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil

Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may

also be cases where the public interest or the interests

of the security of State or other similar considerations

may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi

alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations

contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to

Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a

particular action is being taken. There may indeed be

any number of varying situations which it is not

possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful

opinion, the principles emerging from the decided

cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to

the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction

ought to be made between violation of the principle of

natural justice, audi alteram partem, as

such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In

other words, distinction is between “no notice”/“no

hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in

different words, “no opportunity” and

“no adequate opportunity”. To illustrate — take a case

where the person is dismissed from service without

hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964

AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66: (1963) 2 WLR 935]). It

would be a case falling under the first category and the

order of dismissal would be invalid — or void, if one

chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [1980

AC 574: (1979) 2 All ER 440: (1979) 2 WLR 755, PC]).

But where the person is dismissed from service, say,

23

without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's

report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B.

Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184:

(1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due

opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L.

Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62] ) it

would be a case falling in the latter category —

violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice —

in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested

on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all,

the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing.

It would not be correct — in the light of the above

decisions to say that for any and every violation of a

facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such

facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to

be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the

approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4

SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704]

should govern all cases where the complaint is not that

there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no

hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e.,

adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a

procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry;

the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of

prejudice as aforesaid.’

26. In Union of India v K G Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794, it was opined:

‘14. The common thread running through in all

these decisions is that the court should not interfere

with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical

or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking

to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was

in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what

has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated

Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury

Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223: (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the

24

court would not go into the correctness of the choice

made by the administrator open to him and the court

should not substitute its decision to that of the

administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to

the deficiency in the decision-making process and not

the decision.

15. To put it differently, unless the punishment

imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate

Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal,

there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten

litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose

appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in

support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment

imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be

appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the

Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.’

(emphasis supplied)

27. The legal position was restated by two learned Judges in State

of Uttar Pradesh v Man Mohan Nath Sinha, (2009) 8 SCC 310:

‘15. The legal position is well settled that the

power of judicial review is not directed against the

decision but is confined to the decision-making

process. The court does not sit in judgment on merits

of the decision. It is not open to the High Court to

reappreciate and reappraise the evidence led before

the inquiry officer and examine the findings recorded by

the inquiry officer as a court of appeal and reach its

own conclusions. In the instant case, the High Court fell

into grave error in scanning the evidence as if it was a

court of appeal. The approach of the High Court in

consideration of the matter suffers from manifest error

and, in our thoughtful consideration, the matter requires

fresh consideration by the High Court in accordance

with law. On this short ground, we send the matter back

to the High Court.’

25

28. Turning our gaze back to the facts herein, we find that the

learned Single Judge and the Division Bench acted as Courts of Appeal

and went on to re-appreciate the evidence, which the aboveenumerated authorities caution against. The present coram, in Bharti

Airtel Limited v A S Raghavendra, (2024) 6 SCC 418, has laid down:

‘29. As regards the power of the High Court to

reappraise the facts, it cannot be said that the same is

completely impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of

the Constitution. However, there must be a level of

infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order,

which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court,

to justify interference. We do not think such a situation

prevailed in the present facts. Further, the ratio of the

judgments relied upon by the respondent in support of

his contentions, would not apply in the facts at hand.’

(emphasis supplied)

29. Evidently, while reappraisal of facts and evidence is not

impermissible by the High Court, the infirmity in the underlying order

has to be greater than ordinary. It is not the respondent’s case that due

to omissions by the appellants in substantive and/or procedural

compliances, prejudice has ensued to him. Let us examine the aspect

independently too. The facts reveal that an earlier removal order was

quashed, and a copy of the Enquiry Report alongwith the RPSC’s

opinion was supplied to the respondent. The respondent, thereafter,

received an opportunity to submit a written representation, which he

26

availed of. Further, he was afforded an opportunity of hearing as well. In

this view, we are unable to find any violation of the principles of natural

justice.

30. Before the Enquiry Officer, 13 witnesses and 75 documents were

exhibited on behalf of the Authority. 3 witnesses deposed in defence of

the delinquent employee-respondent. Considering the evidence on

record, the Enquiry Officer by his report held certain charges levelled

against the respondent to have been proved in full/part. Subsequently,

a fresh Removal Order was passed, agreeing with the conclusions

drawn by the enquiry officer. This Removal Order cannot be said to be

based on ‘no evidence’. On perusal thereof, we find that the Removal

Order is reasoned as on the aspects where the Disciplinary Authority

disagreed with the Enquiry Officer’s report, reasons therefor have been

assigned. On the areas of agreement, the Removal Order bears

discussion on the relevant evidence.

31. It is well-settled that if the Disciplinary Authority accepts findings

recorded by the Enquiry Officer and proceeds to impose punishment

basis the same, no elaborate reasons are required, as explained by

27

three learned Judges of this Court vide Boloram Bordoloi v Lakhimi

Gaolia Bank, (2021) 3 SCC 806:

‘11. ... Further, it is well settled that if the

disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by

the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed

reasons are required to be recorded in the order

imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed

based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as

such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be

given by the disciplinary authority. …’

32. The Removal Order makes it clear that the Disciplinary Authority

has considered the whole material before it and was satisfied to impose

punishment on the respondent.

33. The observation on page 7 by the Division Bench makes it

apparent that it was conscious of the proposition of law but still tried to

make a distinction, which we do not find just and proper. It runs

contrary to the record. Though arguments have been addressed by the

appellants with regard to each and every charge, we would not go

individually into the same as we are not re-appreciating the evidence.

Suffice it would be to say that broadly, the charges were proved based

on the factual position, which, in turn, was based on official

documentation, which at no point of time, the respondent has

28

controverted or denied. The respondent has not alleged that the

documents were non-existent/false/fabricated.

34. The learned Single Judge had also reasoned that there was no

difference between the earlier order of removal and the Removal Order

passed subsequently. The learned Single Judge was of the view that

simple reference to the respondent’s representation had been made,

but without discussion thereon, as such, the Removal Order was

passed mechanically and without reasons. Even though this ground has

not been taken by the respondent qua the Impugned Judgment, we

deem it fit to deal therewith. Upon a comparative overview of both the

orders of removal, the similarities between the two are inescapable.

35. Having said so, we may point out that the respondentemployee’s representation has been considered in the fresh Removal

Order, albeit not in as many words. Going forward, wherever and

whenever the Disciplinary Authorities concerned impose a major

punishment, it will be appropriate for their orders to better engage with

the representations/submissions of the delinquent employees

concerned. However, in the instant case, in view of the evidentiary

material and the process by which a fair opportunity was given to the

29

respondent to present his version, we are dissuaded from upholding the

Impugned Judgment on account of minor deficiency/ies in the process.

As noted hereinbefore, the same have not caused prejudice to the

respondent to the extent warranting judicial interdiction.

36. At this juncture, it would be relevant to point out that on a

specific query to the learned counsel for the respondent apropos the

charges pertaining to non-handing over of full charge at the relevant

point of time; appointing persons without permission from the

Collector/Registrar; as also, returning the money after one and a half

years by the respondent, learned counsel could not controvert the

factual position and only relied upon the judgment rendered by the

learned Single Judge and the Impugned Judgment. Moreover, looking

to the respondent’s conduct, we do not find any arbitrariness or

perversity in the punishment awarded to him.

37. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded above, the Impugned

Judgment is quashed and set aside, and the Removal Order dated

28.09.1993 passed by the Disciplinary Authority is restored.

Consequences in law to follow. However, by way of extraordinary

indulgence, keeping in mind the fact that the respondent has retired

30

and is aged, payments, if any, already made to him in the interregnum,

shall not be recovered by the appellants. The appeals are disposed of

in the above terms. No order as to costs.

………………..........................J.

 [HIMA KOHLI]



 …………………..................…..J.

 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

NEW DELHI

AUGUST 08, 2024

whether the High Court is right in reducing the percentage of disability suffered by the appellant from 25% as fixed by the Tribunal, to 20% while determining the compensation payable to him.- No

2024 INSC 598

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8614 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16897 of 2024)

(Arising out of Diary No.38687 of 2019)

Rahul ...Appellant

Versus

National Insurance Company Ltd.

and another ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

R. MAHADEVAN, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. In the present case, the appellant challenges the final judgment

dated 13.11.2018 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad

Bench, (hereinafter shortly referred to as "the High Court"), thereby partly

allowing MFA No.103118/2014 (MV) filed by the Respondent No.1

(hereinafter referred to as "the insurance company").

1

4. Originally, the appellant filed a claim petition in MAC No.1587 of

2013 before the Senior Civil Judge & MACT at Raibag (hereinafter

shortly referred to as "the Tribunal"), seeking a compensation of

Rs.20,00,000/- for the injuries sustained by him in a motor accident that

had occurred on 27.01.2013, while he was travelling as a pillion rider in

the motor cycle bearing registration No.KA-23/EC-6369 insured with the

insurance company. Based on the oral and documentary evidence, the

Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.5,38,872/- along with interest at 6% p.a.

from the date of petition till deposit, as compensation payable to the

appellant, after taking into account the disability sustained by him at

25%. Aggrieved by the same, the insurance company filed an appeal in

MFA No.103118 of 2014 (MV) before the High Court.

5. After hearing both sides, the High Court re-assessed the

compensation by reducing it to Rs.4,74,072/- by taking into

consideration, disability only at 20% and allowed the appeal in part, by

the final judgment dated 13.11.2018, which is under challenge before us.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant, drawing the attention of

this court to Exs.P56 to 60, medical records pertaining to the appellant,

2

submitted that the appellant sustained three injuries viz., fracture of right

radius, fracture of left radius and fracture of styloid process of ulna, for

which, he had undergone surgery and plates and screws were implanted

in his both hands. The doctor N.Y. Joshi gave Ex.P57, disability

certificate to the effect that the appellant suffered 50% disability, as a

whole. Based on the same, the Tribunal determined the compensation

under the head 'Loss of future income' by taking into account the

disability at 25%. However, the High Court re-determined the

compensation by reducing the disability suffered by the appellant to 20%,

by observing that the doctor who issued the disability certificate had not

been examined before the Tribunal, which is erroneous. It is also

submitted that the appellant, being an agriculturist, is unable to do

agricultural operations, due to the disability suffered by him. Therefore,

the learned counsel sought our interference in the judgment passed by

the High Court and thereby enhance the compensation payable to the

appellant.

7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the insurance

company submitted that the High Court has awarded a just and fair

compensation to the appellant, considering the facts and circumstances

3

of the case and hence, prayed for dismissal of this appeal.

8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused

the record.

9. The only issue that arises for our consideration is, whether the

High Court is right in reducing the percentage of disability suffered by the

appellant from 25% as fixed by the Tribunal, to 20% while determining

the compensation payable to him.

10. The factum of accident and the involvement of the motorcycle

insured with the insurance company, are not disputed. From a perusal of

the records, viz., Exs.P56 to P60 - medical records of the appellant, more

particularly, Ex.P56 wound certificate, it is evident that the appellant

sustained the following injuries in the accident:

(i)Displaced fracture upper 1/3rd of the shaft of right radius and

ulnar shafts and bone of the right forearm.

(ii)Fracture of ulnar stoiloid and evidence of angulated fracture of

distal end of left radius.

4

Further, for the above injuries, the appellant underwent a

surgery, in which, plates and screws were implanted in his hands. As per

Ex.P57 disability certificate issued by the doctor, N.Y. Joshi, the appellant

suffered 50% permanent disablement and the said doctor was also

examined as PW2. Considering all these oral and documentary

evidence, the Tribunal has taken the disability of the appellant only at

25% and determined the compensation payable to him. Without

assigning plausible reason, the High Court re-assessed the

compensation by reducing the disability suffered by the appellant to 20%.

We are of the view that the reduction of compensation was not required,

particularly, when there is no basis in support thereof. Therefore, the

judgment passed by the High Court is liable to be interfered with.

11. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 13.11.2018 passed

by the High Court in MFA No.103118 of 2014 (MV) is set aside and the

judgment dated 28.06.2014 passed by the Tribunal in MAC No.1587 of

2013 fixing the disability of the appellant at 25% is restored. The

insurance company is directed to deposit the entire compensation along

with interest as determined by the Tribunal, after adjusting the amounts

5

already deposited, before the Tribunal, within a period of four weeks from

the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. On such deposit being

made, the appellant is permitted to withdraw the same.

12. This Civil Appeal is allowed.

.....................................J.

 (Sudhanshu Dhulia)

.....................................J.

 (R. Mahadevan)

NEW DELHI,

9

th August, 2024.

6

Respondent cannot be made liable for the payment of arrears of property tax which arose prior to the acquisition of ownership,

2024 INSC 596

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 1 of 14

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7873 OF 2024

RAJKOT MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT

AND ORS. ... RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

1. This Appeal challenges the Order dated 07.07.2016

(hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Order”) in

Special Civil Application No. 4577 of 2016 passed by

High Court of Gujarat wherein the Appellant herein

being Rajkot Municipal Corporation (hereinafter

referred to as “Appellant-Corporation”) was directed

to refund a portion of the property tax, which was

paid by the Respondent No. 02 herein, namely,

Avenue Supermarts Limited. Respondent No. 02 had

assailed the demand raised by Appellant-Corporation

seeking payment of property tax for the Assessment 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 2 of 14

Year (hereinafter referred to as ‘AY’) 2015-16 along

with outstanding arrears of such tax dues amounting

to INR 2,97,02,324/- (Rupees Two Crores NinetySeven Lakhs Two Thousand Three Hundred and

Twenty-Four Only). As a consequence to the nonfulfilment of aforesaid payment of dues by the

predecessor-in-interest holder of the property, the

premises were sealed on 21.03.2016 with prior

indication to the Respondent No. 02.

2. The High Court of Gujarat vide Impugned Order had

allowed the Special Civil Application moved by the

Respondent No. 02 on the ground that the said

Respondent cannot be made liable for the payment of

arrears of property tax which arose prior to the

acquisition of ownership, that is, prior to 03.09.2015.

The High Court deprecated the approach of the

Appellant-Corporation in charging exorbitant

amount of dues from Respondent No. 02 as well as

the uncalled inclusion of further interest and penalty

on such outstanding arrears, which had already been

challenged by the predecessor and had been stayed

by the competent court. Considering the said

circumstances, the High Court directed the 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 3 of 14

Appellant-Corporation to retain a portion of the

property tax to the tune of INR 14,85,000/- (Rupees

Fourteen Lakhs and Eighty-Five Thousand Only)

relating to the relevant AY 2015-16 for which

Respondent No. 02 had acquired ownership and

possession, that is, from 03.09.2015 and to refund

the rest of the amount of property tax along with

simple interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date

of recovery till the actual payment of refund. In

compliance with the aforesaid direction qua refund

by the High Court, the Appellant-Corporation has

already refunded such quantum of excessive property

tax to the Respondent No. 02.

3. Aggrieved by the direction to make the refund of

accrued amount of property tax dues, the AppellantCorporation is assailing the Impugned Order before

this Court.

4. It is the case of the Appellant-Corporation that the

Impugned Order directing the refund of property tax

is contrary to the provisions of Sections 139 and 140

of the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporation Act,

1949 (hereinafter referred to as “GPMC Act 1949”). It

is argued that a Commissioner, by virtue of Sub-

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 4 of 14

Section (1) of Section 140 of the GPMC Act 1949, is

empowered to recover such outstanding property tax

dues from an occupier where a person primarily

liable to pay the tax, after being duly served with

demand notice, has failed to make the payment

thereof. Moreover, as per Sub-Section (4) of Section

140 of the GPMC Act 1949, such occupier may credit

the said payment from a person who was primarily

liable to discharge the liability of such dues. Thus, it

was argued that from a cumulative reading of

Sections 139 and 140 of the GPMC Act 1949, the

Appellant-Corporation was justified in recovering

arrears from Respondent No. 02.

5. Per contra, it is contended by Respondent No. 02 that

the property in question which is a commercial

complex known as Shivlink-IV bearing City Survey

No. 5095/1B, 5095/1C(P), Plot No. 68, situated at

Gondal Road, Rajkot, was acquired via Deed of

Conveyance dated 03.09.2015 from its predecessorin-interest, that is, Respondent Nos. 04 and 05.

Respondent No. 02 would be liable for the payment of

property tax from the date of acquisition of ownership

and not for any period before this date, as affirmed 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 5 of 14

by the High Court. Respondent No. 02 points out that

Respondent No. 03, the lessee of the property prior to

03.09.2015, has challenged similar tax demands for

earlier years in both civil court and the High Court,

resulting in a stay on recovery actions. Consequently,

it was argued that until the conclusion of

adjudication of such pending appeals pertaining to

the arrears of any period before 03.05.2015, the

Appellant-Corporation cannot make recovery of the

said amount from Respondent No. 02.

6. Furthermore, the Appellant-Corporation as well as

the Respondent Nos. 04 and 05 have relied on Letter

dated 18.01.2016, whereby it was stated that the

Respondent No. 02 had kept INR 2,50,00,000/-

(Rupees Two Crores and Fifty Lakhs only) as a token

of assurance from Respondent Nos. 04 and 05 for

clearing arrears of property tax. As argued, this letter

was intended to ensure that in case of failure of

payment of such arrears by the Respondent Nos. 04

and 05 (predecessor owners), it shall be incumbent

on the Respondent No. 02 (subsequent owner) to

make the payment thereof. Addressing this

argument, Respondent No. 02 contended that mere 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 6 of 14

deposit of security amount by Respondent Nos. 04

and 05 would not tantamount to assignment of

liability for payment of tax for a period for which

Respondent No. 02 did not have ownership.

Appellant-Corporation cannot be allowed to ascribe

obligation upon Respondent No. 02 to seek remedy of

refund from Respondent Nos. 04 and 05.

7. Having heard the Senior Counsel for the AppellantCorporation as well as the Respondents, it is

imperative to decipher the undisputed facts along

with the applicable provisions of the GPMC Act 1949.

8. The relevant factual backdrop leading to the present

Impugned Order commenced from the point where

the original owner of the said property, namely, M/s

Platinum Associates (hereinafter referred to as

“original owner”) entered into a Lease Agreement

dated 01.12.2007 with Respondent No. 03 herein,

namely, Reliance Communications Limited for an

office space. Subsequently, the original owner sold

the said property to Prabha Kantilal Pohkiya and

Jyoti Rakesh Gandhi (Respondent Nos. 04 and 05

respectively) vide Conveyance Deed dated

05.12.2007. It needs mention here that Respondent 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 7 of 14

No. 03 continued to occupy the premises, thereupon,

Respondent No. 02 purchased the said property from

Respondent Nos. 04 and 05 through a Deed of

Conveyance dated 03.09.2015.

9. Appellant-Corporation had raised several demand

notices for payment of outstanding property tax on

the premises starting from the year 2008. A Notice

dated 29.07.2010 was issued by the AppellantCorporation calling upon the Respondent No. 03,

being in possession of the said property, to pay

outstanding arrears of property tax along with

penalty and other charges to the tune of INR

1,33,48,898/- (Rupees One Crores Thirty-Three

Lakhs Forty-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and

Ninety-Eight Only) for the period commencing from

01.06.2008. The said demand was assailed by

Respondent No. 03 by filing Municipal Appeal No. 19

of 2010 before the Civil Court, Rajkot, wherein

Respondent No. 03 deposited 75% of the bill amount

in Court. Thereafter, for AY 2011-12, demand notice

was issued to the Respondent No. 03 seeking

payment of property tax for the said AY as well as the

arrears thereof, which was also challenged by 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 8 of 14

Respondent No. 03 before Civil Court in Municipal

Appeal No. 1639 of 2011, where again 75% of the bill

amount was deposited. It is pertinent to note that

both these appeals are pending before the Civil Court

with the stay on the deposit of the remaining 25% bill

amounts continues.

10. Similar were the demands for the AYs 2012-13 and

2013-14, which were challenged before the High

Court in Special Civil Application No. 3074 of 2014

on the ground of retrospectively charging of the

arrears of property tax by the Appellant-Corporation.

The said Application was disposed of vide Order

dated 04.04.2014 with a direction to the AppellantCorporation to serve a copy of the demand notices to

the Respondent No. 03 in view of the uncertainty

surrounding receipt of such notice. Further, the

Appellant-Corporation was directed to consider the

objections to be raised by Respondent No. 03 before

issuing fresh bills. The Appellant-Corporation

consequent to the above order proceeded to issue

another demand notice for the AY 2014-15 upon

Respondent No. 03 seeking payment of property tax

inclusive of earlier arrears to the tune of INR 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 9 of 14

2,51,09,857/- (Rupees Two Crores Fifty-One Lakhs

Nine Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty-Seven Only).

Respondent No. 03 then initiated a challenge against

the said demand notices issued for the AYs 2012-13,

2013-14 and 2014-15 before High Court in Special

Civil Application No. 3600 of 2015, wherein the High

Court vide its Order dated 07.07.2016, directed a

stay on the further recovery subject to payment of

INR 60,00,000/- (Rupees Sixty Lakhs Only) as an

interim measure, which would operate pending the

appeal challenging the said recovery for the aforesaid

three AYs. It was clarified that the said direction for

stay would automatically vacate in the event of nonfiling of an appeal assailing the demand for the said

AYs.

11. The present dispute arises from Demand Notice dated

11.03.2016 which was issued by the AppellantCorporation to Respondent No. 02, seeking not only

the payment of property tax for the AY 2015-16 but

also the outstanding dues amounting to INR

2,97,02,324/- (Rupees Two Crores Ninety-Seven

Lakhs Two Thousand Three Hundred and TwentyFour Only). It was also mentioned therein that on

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 10 of 14

failure to discharge the payment of the said liability,

the said property would be sealed. Because of nondischarge of the demand as raised, the property in

question which was now under the ownership and

possession of Respondent No. 02 with effect from

03.09.2015 was sealed on 21.03.2016 with prior

indication vide affixation of public notice on the said

property. Furthermore, a final notice dated

20.02.2016 was issued by the Appellant-Corporation

for attachment of the said property and for issuance

of warrant of sale owing to failure of payment of the

said outstanding arrears along with penalties and

charges within five days from the date of such notice.

12. It is in pursuance thereto, that the Respondent No.

02 proceeded to deposit the outstanding dues qua the

said property and challenged the aforesaid action of

the Appellant-Corporation before High Court on the

grounds as recorded above.

13. It is evident from the aforementioned factual strata

that the Respondent No. 02 would fall in the category

of Section 139(1)(b)(iii) of GPMC Act 1949 being the

owner of the said property. It is clear and undisputed

that the Respondent No. 02 had purchased the said 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 11 of 14

property from Respondent Nos. 04 and 05. Therefore,

till 03.09.2015, the “person primarily liable to make

payment” from a co-joint reading of Sections 139 and

140 of the GPMC Act 1949 was the lessor of the said

property, that is, Respondent Nos. 04 and 05. The

liability prior to 03.09.2015, thus, cannot be foisted

upon Respondent No. 02. The High Court was thus

correct in observing that Respondent No. 02 was

liable to pay property tax from the date of acquisition

of ownership. Further the High Court, had been

conscious enough while directing deduction of the

liability of the tax from Respondent No. 02 for the

relevant period, that is, subsequent to the date of

purchase being 03.09.2015, prior to making refund

of the remaining amount along with interest. It may

be added here that this Impugned Order has been

duly complied with by the Appellant-Corporation and

the amount has already been refunded as evidenced

from Communication dated 25.07.2016 and Letter

dated 28.07.2016.

14. Although considering the above factual matrix the

challenge against the direction for refund in the

Impugned Order in light of the provision of Section 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 12 of 14

140 of the GPMC Act 1949, has become a mere

academic exercise, yet we may proceed to look at it

from another perspective. Here, Respondent No. 03,

the lessee of the property, acknowledged the

demands raised by the Appellant-Corporation for the

period prior to 03.09.2015 and even challenged the

same in the statutory appeals. The said challenge

pertaining to the demands for previous three AYs,

that is, from 2012-13 to 2014-15 were disposed of via

an interim stay Order upon deposition of certain

amount. It is apposite to note herein that the

Appellant-Corporation has neither challenged the

said stay Order dated 07.07.2016 passed in Special

Civil Application No. 3600 of 2015 nor has contested

before us that the Respondent No. 02 has not filed

statutory appeals as directed therein. So, the

contention of the Respondent No. 02 that pending

such adjudication of appeals the AppellantCorporation cannot challenge the correctness of

directions of the High Court for refund of the

amounts as deposited by Respondent No. 02 cannot

be faulted with. 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 13 of 14

15. Another aspect which cannot be lost sight of is that

75% of the due amounts as per the bills raised by the

Appellant-Corporation for the AYs 2010-11 and

2011-12 stand deposited before Civil Court, Rajkot in

Municipal Appeal Nos. 19 of 2010 and 1639 of 2011,

securing a major portion of the liability subject to

outcome of the appeals where the AppellantCorporation, being a party thereto and is contesting,

cannot be permitted to take double benefit. Moreover,

in case the said appeals get dismissed, the deposited

amount would eventually be paid to the AppellantCorporation. This would result in a situation where

the Appellant-Corporation would have a sum

deposited in its favour equivalent to over and above

the actual outstanding amount. Thence, to obviate

such double payment in favour of the AppellantCorporation and causing disruption in the pending

litigation against the demands accrued prior to

03.09.2015, we are of the opinion that the order

directing refund by the High Court stands justified

considering the peculiarity of the aforesaid facts and

circumstances. 

Civil Appeal No. 7873 of 2024 Page 14 of 14

16. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any

ground to interfere with the Impugned Order dated

07.07.2016 passed by the High Court. The appeal is,

therefore, dismissed.

17. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

There will be no orders as to costs.

……………………………….J.

(ABHAY S. OKA)

……………………………………..J.

(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 09, 2024.