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Whether provisions of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act is applicable in respect of the appellant and whether the liquor vendors (contractors) who bought the vending rights from the appellant on auction, can be termed as “buyer” within the meaning of Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act or excluded from the said definition of “buyer” as per clause (iii) of Explanation (a) to Section 206C of the said Act. Relatable to the above core issue is the question as to, whether, the High Court was justified in rejecting the challenge to the said orders made by the appellant.

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 287 : 2024 INSC 484


The Excise Commissioner Karnataka & Anr. v. Mysore Sales International Ltd. & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 2168 of 2007)


08 July 2024


[B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Whether provisions of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act is applicable in respect of the appellant and whether the liquor vendors (contractors) who bought the vending rights from the appellant on auction, can be termed as “buyer” within the meaning of Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act or excluded from the said definition of “buyer” as per clause (iii) of Explanation (a) to Section 206C of the said Act. Relatable to the above core issue is the question as to, whether, the High Court was justified in rejecting the challenge to the said orders made by the appellant.


Headnotes


Income Tax Act, 1961 – Explanation(a)(iii) to section 206C – Karnataka Excise Act, 1965 – Karnataka Excise (Arrack Vend Special Conditions of Licenses) Rules, 1967 – Rule 4 – Karnataka Excise (Lease of the Right of Retail Vend of Liquors) Rules, 1969 – Karnataka Excise (Manufacture and Bottling of Arrack) Rules, 1987 – By the order dated 17.01.2001, the assessing officer held that the appellant is a “seller” and the liquor vendors are “buyers” in terms of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act and hence the appellant was under a legal obligation to collect income tax at source from the liquor vendors (contractors) – The challenge to the said order dated 17.01.2001 was negatived first by the Single Judge and then by the Division Bench of the High Court – Justified or not:


Held: Explanation(a)(iii) to section 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 visualizes two conditions for a person to be excluded from the meaning of “buyer” as per the definition in Explanation(a) – The first condition is that the goods are not obtained by him by way of auction – The second condition is that the sale price of such goods to be sold by the buyer is fixed under a state enactment – These two conditions are joined by the word ‘and’ – The word ‘and’ is conjunctive to mean that both the conditions must be fulfilled; it is not either of the two – Therefore, to be excluded from the ambit of the definition of “buyer” as per Explanation(a)(iii), both the conditions must be satisfied – In the instant case, Mysore Sales is the licensee for the manufacture and bottling of arrack for specified area(s) – By a process of auction or tender or auction-cum-tender etc., excise contractors are shortlisted who are thereafter granted permits to vend arrack by retail in their respective area(s) – These retail vendors i.e. excise contractors have to procure the arrack from the warehouse or depot maintained by Mysore Sales on payment of the issue price fixed by the Excise Commissioner – The arrack is procured in sealed bottles or in sealed polythene sachets – So, there are two transactions, each distinct – The first transaction is shortlisting of excise contractors by a process of auction etc. for the right to retail vend – The second transaction, which is contingent upon the first transaction, is obtaining of arrack for retail vending by the excise contractors on the strength of the permits issued to them post successful shortlisting following auction – Therefore, it is evidently clear that arrack is not obtained by the excise contractors by way of auction – What is obtained by way of auction is the right to vend the arrack on retail on the strength of permits granted, following successful shortlisting on the basis of auction – Thus, the first condition under clause (iii) is satisfied – Rule 4 of the 1967 Rules enables the excise contractor to sell the arrack in retail at a price within the range of minimum floor price and maximum ceiling price which is fixed by the Excise Commissioner – The price of arrack to be sold in retail is not dependent on the market forces but pre-determined within a range – Therefore, though price range is provided for by the statute, it cannot be said that because there is a price range providing for a minimum and a maximum, the sale price is not fixed – The sale price is fixed by the statute but within a particular range beyond which price, either on the higher side or on the lower side, the arrack cannot be sold by the excise contractor in retail – Since both the conditions as mandated under Explanation(a)(iii) are satisfied, the excise contractors or the liquor vendors selling arrack would not come within the ambit of “buyer” as defined under Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act – Thus, the question framed in issue for consideration, is answered in the negative by holding that Section 206C of the Income Tax Act is not applicable in respect of Mysore Sales and that the liquor vendors(contractors) who bought the vending rights from the appellant on auction cannot be termed as “buyers” within the meaning of Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act – Thus, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions and consequently, the writ appeal challenging the orders dated 17.01.2001. [Paras 14.5, 15, 15.2, 16]


Income Tax Act, 1961 – Karnataka Excise Act, 1965 – Karnataka Excise (Arrack Vend Special Conditions of Licenses) Rules, 1967 – Karnataka Excise (Lease of the Right of Retail Vend of Liquors) Rules, 1969 – Karnataka Excise (Manufacture and Bottling of Arrack) Rules, 1987 – Essentials of the Principle of Natural Justice to be followed:


Held: In the instant case, though show cause notice was issued to the assessee to which reply was also filed, the same would not be adequate having regard to the consequences that such an order passed under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act would entail. Even though the statute may be silent regarding notice and hearing, the court would read into such provision the inherent requirement of notice and hearing before a prejudicial order is passed – Therefore, it is held that before an order is passed under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, it is incumbent upon the assessing officer to put the person concerned to notice and afford him an adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing, including a personal hearing. [Para 19]


Case Law Cited


Union of India v. A. Sanyasi Rao [1996] 2 SCR 570 : (1996) 3 SCC 465; Gian Chand Ashok Kumar and Company v. Union of India (1991) 187 ITR 188 (HP); K.K. Mittal v. Union of India (1991) 187 ITR 208 (P&H); State of Bihar v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1993) 202 ITR 535 (PAT); M/s Naresh Kumar and Company v. Union of India ILR (2000) 2 P&H; Saini and Company v. Union of India (2000) 246 ITR 762 (HP); Chandigarh Distillers and Bottlers Ltd. v. Union of India (2002) 253 ITR 205 (P&H); Union of India v. Om Parkash S.S. and Company [2001] 1 SCR 1113 : (2001) 3 SCC 593 – referred to.


List of Acts


Income Tax Act, 1961; Karnataka Excise Act, 1965; Karnataka Excise (Arrack Vend Special Conditions of Licenses) Rules, 1967; Karnataka Excise (Lease of the Right of Retail Vend of Liquors) Rules, 1969; Karnataka Excise (Manufacture and Bottling of Arrack) Rules, 1987.


List of Keywords


Explanation(a)(iii) to section 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961; Buyer as defined under Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961; Liquor vendors; Process of auction or tender or auction-cum-tender; Retail vendors; Excise contractors; Rule 4 of the Karnataka Excise (Arrack Vend Special Conditions of Licenses) Rules, 1967; Principle of Natural Justice; Reasonable opportunity of hearing.


Case Arising From


CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2168 of 2007


From the Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2006 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in WA No. 7825, 7926 and 8021 of 2003


Appearances for Parties


Avishkar Singhvi, A.A.G., V. N. Raghupathy, Vivek Kumar Singh, Naved Ahmed, Bharat Garg, Manendra Pal Gupta, Advs. for the Appellants.


Balbir Singh, A.S.G. Arijit Prasad, Sr. Adv., Raj Bahadur Yadav, Mrs. Archana Pathak Dave, Anmol Chandan, Ms. Niranjna Singh, Prashant Singh Ii, Udai Khanna, Indrajit Prasad, Vijay Nand Tripathi, Deepak Kumar, Dr. Nanda Kishore, Rajesh Mahale, Advs. for the Respondents.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Ujjal Bhuyan, J.


Heard learned counsel for the parties.


2.This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 13.03.2006 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru (briefly “the High Court” hereinafter) in Writ Appeal No. 7926/2003. By the aforesaid judgment and order, the Division Bench had dismissed the writ appeal filed by the appellant as well as other writ appeals filed by Mysore Sales International, State of Karnataka and Mysore Sugar Company Limited assailing the common judgment and order dated 27.10.2003 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, dismissing Writ Petition Nos. 6869-6874 of 2001 filed by the appellant and other writ petitions filed by the above parties against the orders dated 17.01.2001 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS)–1, Bengaluru (referred to hereinafter as “the assessing officer” or “the revenue”) under Section 206C(6) of the Income tax Act, 1961 (referred to hereinafter as “the Income Tax Act”) for the assessment years 2000-2001, 1999-2000, 1998-1999, 1997-1998, 1996-1997 and 1995-1996 as well as the consequential demand notices of even date issued under Section 156 of the Income Tax Act. By the orders dated 17.01.2001, the assessing officer held that the appellant is a “seller” and the liquor vendors are “buyers” in terms of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act and hence the appellant was under a legal obligation to collect income tax at source from the liquor vendors (contractors) for the financial years relevant to the aforesaid assessment years. Accordingly, the assessing officer declared certain sums as income tax collectible at source by the appellant which it failed to do. Therefore, the appellant was directed to deposit the amounts so quantified as income tax deductible at source. Further, interest was also levied on the aforesaid amounts. This was followed by the demand notices. As noticed above, the challenge to the said orders dated 17.01.2001 by the appellant was negatived first by the learned Single Judge and then by the Division Bench of the High Court.


3.The short point for consideration in this appeal is whether provisions of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act is applicable in respect of the appellant and whether the liquor vendors (contractors) who bought the vending rights from the appellant on auction, can be termed as “buyer” within the meaning of Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act or excluded from the said definition of “buyer” as per clause (iii) of Explanation (a) to Section 206C of the said Act. Relatable to the above core issue is the question as to, whether, the High Court was justified in rejecting the challenge to the said orders made by the appellant.


4.Before attempting to answer the question(s) so framed above, it would be apposite to briefly narrate the relevant facts of the case. Mysore Sales International Limited (also referred to “Mysore Sales” hereinafter) is a Karnataka Government undertaking, inter alia, engaged in the business of manufacturing arrack. Mysore Sales is an assessee under the Income Tax Act. Appellant had entered the arrack trade in July, 1993 in terms of the excise laws of the State of Karnataka. Prior to 1993, there were several private bottling units in the State of Karnataka and they were manufacturing and selling arrack. Auctions were conducted periodically for the purpose of conferring lease right for retail vending of arrack. It was conducted with reference to designated areas. Successful bidders were entitled to procure arrack from the bottling units and then to sell it in retail trade within their respective allotted areas. The arrack trade is controlled by the state government.


4.1.The Karnataka Excise Act, 1965 (briefly “the Excise Act” hereinafter) has been enacted to provide for a uniform excise law in the State of Karnataka. Preamble to the Excise Act says that it is expedient to provide for a uniform law relating to production, manufacture, possession, import, export, transport, purchase and sale of liquor and intoxicating drugs and the levy of duties of excise thereon in the State of Karnataka and for certain matter related thereto. Under the Excise Act, several rules have been framed for appropriate enforcement of the excise law. These rules, inter alia, are:


(i)The Karnataka Excise (Arrack Vend Special Conditions of Licenses) Rules, 1967 (“the 1967 Rules” hereinafter);


(ii)The Karnataka Excise (Lease of the Right of Retail Vend of Liquors) Rules, 1969 (briefly “the 1969 Rules” hereinafter);


(iii)The Karnataka Excise (Manufacture and Bottling of Arrack) Rules, 1987 (“the 1987 Rules” hereinafter).


4.2.In the year 1993, the state government discontinued private bottling units from engaging in the manufacture or bottling of arrack and instead decided as a policy to restrict those operations in the hands of state government companies or undertakings, such as, Mysore Sales and Mysore Sugar Company Limited (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2169/2007 which was dismissed for non-prosecution by this Court on 12.10.2023). Thus, Mysore Sales and Mysore Sugar were entrusted with the task of bottling arrack and marketing it on behalf of the state government. Mysore Sales was entrusted with the above task for the northern districts of the State of Karnataka while for the rest of the state, Mysore Sugar was entrusted with the responsibility. It is the case of the appellant that the job entrusted i.e. bottling of arrack and marketing it on behalf of the state was in the nature of works contract.


4.3.Once arrack is manufactured and bottled, it becomes the property of the State of Karnataka in as much as the property vests with the state. The Excise Commissioner determines the amount realizable by the appellant from the excise (liquor) vendors or contractors taking into consideration the cost incurred by the appellant. The excise contractors are required to remit the requisite amount of excise duty into the state government treasury and then secure permit on production of which, appellant delivers arrack to them. The State of Karnataka controls the entire operation including the amount realizable by the assessee in terms of the Excise Act.


4.4.Successful excise contractors secure arrack from Mysore Sales and Mysore Sugar depending upon the areas allotted to them. The lease for the right to retail vend of liquor provides auctioning of such right with reference to a designated area. The retail sale price is fixed by the state government in terms of the 1967 Rules. The margin would depend upon various factors.


4.5.Section 206C was inserted in the Income Tax Act by the Finance Act, 1988 with effect from 01.06.1988. It casts an obligation on the “seller” of alcoholic liquor etc. of deducting tax at source (TDS) at the time of payment by the “buyer”. As per Explanation(a), certain persons were not included within, rather excluded from, the definition of “buyer”.


4.6.A circular came to be issued by the Excise Commissioner of Karnataka on 16.06.1998 to which an addendum was also issued. The circular clarified that since arrack was not obtained through auction and since the selling price of arrack was fixed by the Excise Commissioner, there was no question of recovery of TDS from the excise (liquor) vendors or contractors.


4.7.In view of the above, appellant did not deduct any TDS from the liquor vendors.


4.8.Assessing officer issued notices dated 26.10.2000 calling upon the assessee to show cause as to why it should not pay the requisite TDS amount which it had failed to collect from the “buyers” i.e. the excise contractors for the financial years relevant to the assessment years under consideration. It appears that the assessee had submitted its reply to such notice. Thereafter, the assessing officer passed orders dated 17.01.2001 under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act for the assessment years under consideration. As pointed out earlier, by the aforesaid orders, the assessee was directed to pay certain sums of money as TDS which it had failed to collect from the liquor vendors or contractors. Following such orders, consequential demand notices for the respective assessment years under Section 156 of the Income Tax Act were also issued to the assessee by the assessing officer.


4.9.Mysore Sales filed writ petitions before the High Court. While the main contention was that Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act was not applicable to it, a corollary issue raised was that before passing the order under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act, no opportunity of hearing was given to it. Therefore, there was violation of the principles of natural justice. Learned Single Judge vide the judgment and order dated 27.10.2023 dismissed the writ petitions confirming the orders passed under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act.


4.10.Thereafter, Mysore Sales and others preferred writ appeals before the Division Bench. However, by the judgment and order dated 13.03.2006, the writ appeals were dismissed by affirming the orders passed by the assessing officer and also that of the learned Single Judge.


5.Aggrieved by the aforesaid, SLP(C) No. 12524 of 2006 was preferred. After leave was granted on 23.04.2007, the same came to be registered as Civil Appeal No. 2168 of 2007.


6.Sh. Avishkar Singhvi, learned AAG appearing for the appellant submits that Section 206C of the Income Tax Act is not applicable in respect of Mysore Sales which is a public sector undertaking controlled by the Government of Karnataka. In fact, it is a government company. It is engaged in the manufacture of arrack. Arrack is bottled under the supervision of the Excise Commissioner. Whatever arrack is manufactured, the same belongs to the state government alone. Excise buyers i.e. liquor contractors do not obtain any arrack in auction. They only obtain the right/licence to carry out retail vending of arrack. Therefore, such contractors are not “buyers” as defined in the Explanation under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act.


6.1.Learned AAG argued that what is disposed of in the auction is the retail or vending right of arrack and not auctioning of the arrack itself. The final sale of arrack is carried out by the contractors at the retail price fixed by the government. He, therefore, submits that Section 206C is not applicable to a public sector undertaking like Mysore Sales. Both Explanations (a)(ii) and (iii) clearly exclude retail vendors from the ambit and purview of “buyers” as defined under the Explanation.


6.2.Elaborating further, he submits that “buyers” falling in the above exception were exempted from paying income tax at source at the time of obtaining licence for retail vending of arrack in their respective assigned areas as per the price fixed by the state government. The auction is only regarding transferring the right or privilege which is vested in the state to the liquor contractors who would thereafter operate the retail business of vending in arrack. Therefore, there is no sale involved in the auction transaction.


6.3.Assessing officer had wrongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. A. Sanyasi Rao1. In the said decision, the constitutional validity of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act was challenged and the same was negatived by this Court. However, the judgment clarifies that there are just exceptions carved out in Section 206C in which cases, income tax is not required to be collected at source.


6.4.Learned counsel further submits that the objective behind introduction of Section 206C in the Income Tax Act was to ensure proper tax collection in matters relating to profits and gains from the business of trading in alcoholic liquor etc. However, a taxing statute has to be interpreted strictly. It cannot be interpreted in an overly expansive and wide manner so as to bring persons within the tax net who are otherwise exempted from paying tax. Both the Single Bench and the Division Bench had erred in adopting such an interpretation and wrongly holding that Section 206C was applicable in respect of Mysore Sales and since it had not deducted TDS, the same was required to be recovered. Both the Benches had erred in taking the view that purchase of arrack was by way of public auction only and not in any other manner and that the “seller” (Mysore Sales) had an obligation to collect income tax at source from such “buyers” who would be further vending the same in retail.


6.5.Even if the view taken by the revenue and affirmed by the High Court is accepted, it cannot be said that there was sale of arrack by Mysore Sales to the licence holders. Such sale, if at all it can be said so, was at the price fixed by the state government under the Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The sale was wholly for the purpose of retail vending and not a sale within the meaning of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act; moreover, under the aforesaid provision, a sale must be made to a “buyer” defined under the Explanation to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act. As a matter of fact, it is the contention of the appellant that there is no sale between Mysore Sales and the excise contractors.


6.6.The revenue has wrongly taken the view that the act of auction and purchase of arrack by the successful liquor contractors is inextricably intertwined and is part of one collective action. In the auction, the excise contractors are granted permits/licences for retail sale of arrack by the successful excise contractors in their allotted areas. It is thereafter that sale of arrack is affected by the excise contractors at a price fixed by the government between a minimum floor value and maximum ceiling value. Therefore, such a transaction cannot be said to be a sale or purchase through auction.


6.7.Learned counsel also submitted that the assessing officer was not conferred the jurisdiction to pass the orders under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act. Jurisdiction was conferred upon the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS)-1, Bengaluru. This contention of the appellant regarding jurisdiction was rejected by the learned Single Judge as being merely a technical one.


6.8.Learned counsel also submits that orders dated 17.01.2001 passed by the assessing officer under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act were in breach of the principles of natural justice. No opportunity of hearing was given to the assessee. Without such hearing, the aforesaid orders were passed. Such orders being in violation of the principles of natural justice are void ab initio. This aspect was overlooked by the Single Bench as well as by the Division Bench of the High Court.


6.9.He therefore submits that both the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench are liable to be set aside. Orders dated 17.01.2001 passed by the assessing officer under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act for the assessment years under consideration are also liable to be set aside and quashed. The civil appeal may be allowed accordingly.


6.10.In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the following decisions:


(i)Gian Chand Ashok Kumar and Company Vs. Union of India 2;


(ii)K.K. Mittal Vs. Union of India 3;


(iii)State of Bihar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 4;


(iv)M/s Naresh Kumar and Company Vs. Union of India 5;


(v)Saini and Company Vs. Union of India 6;


(vi)Chandigarh Distillers and Bottlers Ltd. Vs. Union of India 7;


(vii)Union of India Vs. Om Parkash S.S. and Company 8.


7.Learned senior counsel for the revenue at the outset submits that the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court does not suffer from any error or infirmity to warrant interference. The civil appeal is misconceived and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.


7.1.Learned senior counsel submits that the assessing officer had issued notices to the assessee and had also verified relevant materials. Thereafter, the assessing officer held that the sale price of liquor was not fixed. What was fixed was only the range of minimum and maximum selling price. As per the gazette notification furnished by the Excise Department of the State of Karnataka for the year 2000, the minimum and maximum selling price was fixed at Rs. 55/- and Rs. 85/- per bulk litre respectively. Nowhere did it mention that liquor had to be sold at a specific fixed price. The contractors were at liberty to sell the liquor at any rate between the minimum and maximum price. There being a wide range within which the sale of liquor could be affected, the assessing officer has rightly held that the sale price of liquor was not fixed.


7.2.Learned senior counsel further submits that the assessing officer was right in taking the view that the excise vendors had obtained goods by way of auction because the goods(arrack) were obtained only on production of permits which were available on successful bidding in the auction.


7.3.Thus, the liquor contractors clearly came within the ambit of the meaning of “buyer” under Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act. Therefore, Mysore Sales was under an obligation to deduct income tax at source(TDS) from the liquor contractors. Since it failed to do so, the assessing officer was fully justified in passing the orders dated 17.01.2001 under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act.


7.4.Learned Single Judge had elaborately examined the entire gamut of the issues and rightly affirmed the orders dated 17.01.2001. Similarly, the Division Bench also made a threadbare examination of the entire issues and, thereafter, came to the conclusion that the assessing officer was fully justified in passing the orders dated 17.01.2001. That being the position, there is no reason why, at this stage, the concurrent findings of the assessing officer as affirmed by the Single and Division Benches of the High Court should be disturbed. As such, the civil appeal should be dismissed.


8.Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the Court.


9.Before we proceed to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, we may have a broad overview of the excise law framework in the State of Karnataka relevant for the purpose of the present lis. As already noted above, the parent enactment is the Excise Act which is an Act to provide for an uniform excise law in the State of Karnataka. It covers the entire spectrum from production to sale of liquor and intoxicating drugs and the levy of excise duty thereon. Section 2 defines various words and expressions used in the Excise Act. Section 2 (2) defines the expression “to bottle” to mean transferring liquor from a cask or other vessel to a bottle, jar, flask, polythene sachet or similar receptacle for the purpose of sale, whether any process of manufacture be employed or not and includes re-bottling. “Manufacture” is defined in Section 2 (19) to include every process whether natural or artificial, by which any fermented, spirituous or intoxicating liquor or intoxicating drug is produced or prepared and also redistillation and every process for the rectification of liquor. As per Section 3(1), the state government may appoint, by notification, an officer not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner as the Excise Commissioner in the State of Karnataka. He shall be the chief controlling authority in all matters connected with the administration of the Excise Act. Powers of the Excise Commissioner are dealt with in sub-section (2) of Section 3. He shall have the overall control of the administration of the Excise Department.


9.1.Section 17 deals with the power to grant lease of right to manufacture etc. Sub-section (1) thereof says that the state government may grant lease to any person on such conditions and for such period, as it may think fit, the exclusive or other right-


(a)of manufacturing or sale by wholesale or of both; or


(b)of selling by wholesale or by retail; or


(c)of manufacturing or supplying by wholesale, or of both and of selling by retail,


any Indian liquor or intoxicating drug within any specified area.


9.2.Though sub-section (1A) provides that no lease granted under sub-section (1) shall be transferred, the proviso thereto empowers the state government to grant permission to the lessee to transfer the lease or a part thereof in favour of any other person. As per sub-section (2), the licencing authority may grant to a lessee under sub-section (1) or to a transferee under sub-section (1A), a licence in terms of his lease. Sub-section (3) deals with determination of a lease for violation of the conditions mentioned therein. Under sub-section (4), when a lease is determined in terms of sub-section (3), the state government may direct the Deputy Commissioner to take over the right under his management and to lease it again by resale or otherwise.


9.3.Section 71 confers power on the state government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Excise Act.


10.The Karnataka Excise (Arrack Vend Special Conditions of Licenses) Rules, 1967 (already referred to “the 1967 Rules” hereinabove) have been framed by the Government of Karnataka in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 71 of the Excise Act. Rule 2 of the 1967 Rules deals with selling of arrack of prescribed strength etc. by the licensee. Rule 2(1) says that every licensee licensed to vend arrack by retail sale shall sell only arrack of prescribed strength. As per sub-rule (2), no arrack except in sealed bottles or in sealed polythene sachets obtained from a warehouse or depot shall be kept for sale or sold in the licensed premises. Rule 3 provides for construction of counter. As per Rule 3, the licensee to vend arrack shall construct a counter in the shop which is not more than one metre high. Rule 4 deals with retail price. It says that subject to such minimum and maximum price fixed by the Deputy Commissioner or by the Excise Commissioner, the licensee may vend arrack on such rates as he may deem fit. Heading of Rule 5 is, licensee to buy arrack only from warehouse, etc. As per sub-rule (1), the licensee to vend arrack by retail shall purchase the required quantity of arrack for sale only from the warehouse or depot authorized by the Excise Commissioner, on payment of issue price fixed by the Excise Commissioner from time to time. This provision, being relevant, is extracted hereunder:


5. Licensee to buy arrack only from Warehouse, etc.: -


(1) The licensee to vend arrack by retail shall purchase the required quantity of arrack for sale only from the warehouse or depot authorized by the Excise Commissioner, on payment of issue price fixed by the Excise Commissioner from time to time.


10.1.Rule 5(2) clarifies that no arrack except in sealed bottles of the approved sizes with the excise labels or in sealed polythene sachets obtained from the authorized warehouse or depot shall be sold in the licenced premises.


10.2.Rule 6 says that the consignment of arrack should be under seal. All the consignments of arrack issued from the warehouse or depot shall be sealed by the officer-in-charge of the warehouse or depot in such a manner that the letters of the seal are distinct. The licensees shall be responsible for any breakage of seal in transit. The arrack so transported may be packed by the licensee at his own cost for the purpose of sale in such containers as may be approved by the Excise Commissioner and under supervision of the officer-in-charge of the warehouse.


11.Government of Karnataka has also framed the Karnataka Excise (Lease of the Right of Retail Vend of Liquors) Rules, 1969 (already referred to as “the 1969 Rules” hereinabove) exercising powers under Section 71 of the Excise Act. As per Rule 2(c), the expression “right of retail vend of liquors” means the lease of the right of retail vend of liquors. Rule 3 deals with lease of retail vend. As per Rule 3(1), the right of retail vend of liquors may be disposed of either by tender or by auction or by tender-cum-auction or in any other manner as the state government may by order specify. Rule 3(3) provides that the right of retail vend of arrack shall be the exclusive right but in such districts as may be specified by the government and only bottled arrack or arrack in polythene sachet shall be sold to consumers. Rule 3A deals with grant of lease to government companies etc. As per sub-rule (1), notwithstanding anything contained in the 1969 Rules, the state government may, if it is considered expedient in the interest of government revenue or for any other reasons to be recorded in writing, grant the lease of right of retail vend of liquor in favour of any company or agency owned or controlled by the state government or a state government department on such terms and conditions as it deems fit.


11.1.Registration of excise contractors is provided for in Rule 4A. As per sub-rule (1), every application for registration as excise contractor shall be made to the Excise Commissioner in the prescribed format. After following the procedure prescribed in sub-rules (2) to (4), the Excise Commissioner under sub-rule (5) may register such an applicant as an excise contractor and grant a certificate of registration in the prescribed format which is not transferable. Sub-rule (8) clarifies that the registration certificate so issued shall be valid for participation in tender/auction for the disposal of the right of retail vend of liquor for the excise year specified in such certificate.


11.2.As per Rule 10(1), where the right of retail vend of liquor within a district is to be disposed of by auction, the Deputy Commissioner of that district and where the disposal of the right is in more than a district in a Division, the Divisional Commissioner of that Division shall hold the auction on the date, time and place as may be notified. The procedure to be followed in the auction is laid down in Rule 11.


12.Under Section 71 of the Excise Act, Government of Karnataka has framed another set of rules called the Karnataka Excise (Manufacturing and Bottling of Arrack) Rules, 1987 (already referred to as “the 1987 Rules” hereinabove). Rule 2(b) defines “arrack” to mean the spirit manufactured by blending or reducing the spirit and includes spiced arrack, but does not include Indian or foreign liquor. “Blending” is defined in Rule 2(c) to mean the mixing of spirits with other spirits of the same or different strengths. As per Rule 2(e), “commissioner” means the Excise Commissioner. Rule 2(n) defines “warehouse” to mean any distillery or other place where spirit is stored, blended, matured, fortified, diluted or flavoured to produce arrack and also a place for bottling such arrack, but does not include a manufactory where wine or Indian liquor, beer or toddy is manufactured.


12.1.As per Rule 3(1), a licence may be granted by the Excise Commissioner for the manufacture and bottling of arrack for any specified area or areas. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 was inserted subsequently w.e.f. 01.07.1993. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 clarifies that a licence under Rule 3 shall be issued only to a company or agency owned or controlled by the state government or to a state government department. This provision, being important, is extracted as under:


3. Licence to be granted only to a company etc : -


(1) A licence shall be granted by the Commissioner, whenever necessary for any specified area or areas for the manufacture and bottling of arrack.


(2) The licence under this rule shall be issued only to a company or agency owned or controlled by the state government or to a state government department.


12.2.Rule 8 provides that in case where a warehouse serves more than one district, the warehouse shall be deemed to be a depot for storing bottled arrack and for supply of arrack to the person holding a licence to sell arrack in retail. Under Rule 9, the Commissioner may fix the number of warehouses, the area to be served by each of the warehouse and their location. Removal of arrack from the warehouse is provided for in Rule 16. As per sub-rule (1), no arrack shall be removed from the warehouse without payment of excise duty. Sub-rule (2) says that arrack shall not be issued from the warehouse or depot except in bottles or in polythene sachets of approved capacity and design. As per sub-rule (3), the same shall be issued from the warehouse or depot only to the persons holding a licence to sell arrack in retail. Rule 17 says that the price to be paid by the government to the distillery for the rectified spirit supplied by the distillery to the warehouse, the price to be paid by the government to the warehouse for manufacture and bottling of arrack and the price to be paid by the lessees for the right of retail vend of arrack to the government for the supply of bottled arrack shall be fixed by the Excise Commissioner from time to time with prior approval of the government. Rule 17, being relevant, is extracted hereunder:


17. Fixation of price: -


The price to be paid by government to the distillery for the rectified spirit supplied by the distillery to the warehouse, the price to be paid by the government to the warehouse for manufacture and bottling of arrack and the price to be paid by the lessees for the right of retail vend of arrack to the government for the supply of bottled arrack shall be fixed by the Commissioner from time to time with prior approval of the government and the same shall be communicated to the persons concerned.


13.From the above conspectus, we find that under Section 17 of the Excise Act, the state government grants lease of right to any person for manufacture etc. of liquor, arrack in this case. The licencing authority i.e. Excise Commissioner may grant to the lessee a licence in terms of his lease. In supplement to the above provision, Rule 3(1) of the 1987 Rules provides that the Excise Commissioner shall grant a licence for any specified area or areas for the manufacture or bottling of arrack. From 01.07.1993, sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 has come into force as per which provision the licence under Rule 3 of the 1987 Rules shall be issued only to a company or agency owned or controlled by the state government or to a state government department. This is how Mysore Sales was granted licence for manufacture and bottling of arrack. Through a process of auction, excise contractors are shortlisted who are thereafter granted licence or permits to vend arrack by retail in their respective area(s). They are required to procure the arrack from the warehouse or depot on payment of the issue price fixed by the Excise Commissioner as per Rule 5(1) of the 1967 Rules. Rule 2 makes it very clear that no arrack in retail vend shall be sold except in sealed bottles or in sealed polythene sachets obtained from either a warehouse or a depot. For such retail vending, Rule 3 of the 1967 Rules requires the excise contractor to construct a counter in the shop. The right to retail vend of liquor is granted either by tender or by auction or by a combined process of tender-cum-auction etc. As per Rule 17 of the 1987 Rules, the price to be paid by the lessee for the right of retail vend of arrack to the government for the supply of bottled arrack shall be fixed by the Commissioner with prior approval of the government. In so far the retail price is concerned, Rule 4 of the 1967 Rules says that the excise contractor can sell the arrack at a price within the range of minimum floor price and maximum ceiling price that may be fixed by the Excise Commissioner.


14.Having broadly surveyed the statutory framework of the business of arrack in the State of Karnataka, let us now deal with Section 206C of the Income Tax Act. For ready reference, the said provision is extracted hereunder:


206-C. Profits and gains from the business of trading in alcoholic liquor, forest produce, scrap, etc.—(1) Every person, being a seller shall, at the time of debiting of the amount payable by the buyer to the account of the buyer or at the time of receipt of such amount from the said buyer in cash or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, collect from the buyer of any goods of the nature specified in column (2) of the Table below, a sum equal to the percentage, specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of the said Table, of such amount as income tax:


TABLE


SI. No.


Nature of Goods


Percentage


(i)


Alcoholic liquor for human consumption (other than India-made foreign liquor) and tendu leaves


Ten percent


(ii)


Timber obtained under a forest lease


Fifteen percent


(iii)


Timber obtained by any mode other than under a forest lease


Five percent


(iv)


Any other forest produce not being timber or tendu leaves


Fifteen percent


Provided that where the Assessing Officer, on an application made by the buyer, gives a certificate in the prescribed form that to the best of his belief any of the goods referred to in the aforesaid Table are to be utilized for the purposes of manufacturing, processing or producing articles or things and not for trading purposes, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply so long as the certificate is in force.


(2) The power to recover tax by collection under sub-section (1) shall be without prejudice to any other mode of recovery.


(3) Any person collecting any amount under sub-section (1) shall pay within seven days the amount so collected to the credit of the Central Government or as the Board directs.


(4) Any amount collected in accordance with the provisions of this section and paid under sub-section (3) shall be deemed as payment of tax on behalf of the person from whom the amount has been collected and credit shall be given to him for the amount so collected on the production of the certificate furnished under sub-section (5) in the assessment made under this Act for the assessment year for which such income is assessable.


(5) Every person collecting tax in accordance with the provisions of this section shall within ten days from the date of debit or receipt of the amount furnish to the buyer to whose account such amount is debited or from whom such payment is received, a certificate to the effect that tax has been collected, and specifying the sum so collected, the rate at which the tax has been collected and such other particulars as may be prescribed.


(5A) Every person collecting tax in accordance with the provisions of this section shall prepare half yearly returns for the period ending on 30th September and 31st March in each financial year, and deliver or cause to be delivered to the prescribed income-tax authority such returns in such form and verified in such manner and setting forth such particulars and within such time as may be prescribed.


(5B) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a return filed on a floppy, diskette, magnetic cartridge tape, CD-ROM or any other computer readable media as may be specified by the Board (hereinafter referred to as the computer media) shall be deemed to be a return for the purposes of sub-section (5A) and the rules made thereunder and shall be admissible in any proceedings thereunder, without further proof of production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein.


(5C) A return filed under sub-section (5B) shall fulfill the following conditions, namely:-


(a)while receiving returns on computer media, necessary checks by scanning the documents filed on computer media will be carried out and the media will be duly authenticated by the Assessing Officer; and


(b)the Assessing Officer shall also take due care to preserve the computer media by duplicating, transferring, mastering or storage without loss of data.


(6) Any person responsible for collecting the tax who fails to collect the tax in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall, notwithstanding such failure, be liable to pay the tax to the credit of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3).


(7) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (6), if the seller does not collect the tax or after collecting the tax fails to pay it as required under this section, he shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of one and one-fourth percent per month or part thereof on the amount of such tax from the date on which such tax was collectible to the date on which the tax was actually paid.


(8) Where the tax has not been paid as aforesaid, after it is collected, the amount of the tax together with the amount of simple interest thereon referred to in sub-section (7) shall be a charge upon all the assets of the seller.


(9) Where the Assessing Officer is satisfied that the total income of the buyer justifies the collection of the tax at any lower rate than the relevant rate specified in sub-section (1), the Assessing Officer shall, on an application made by the buyer in this behalf, give to him a certificate for collection of tax at such lower rate than the relevant rate specified in sub-section (1).


(10) Where a certificate under sub-section (9) is given, the person responsible for collecting the tax shall, until such certificate is cancelled by the Assessing Officer, collect the tax at the rates specified in such certificate.


(11) The Board may, having regard to the convenience of assessees and the interests of revenue, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules specifying the cases in which, and the circumstances under which, an application may be made for the grant of a certificate under sub-section (9) and the conditions subject to which such certificate may be granted and providing for all other matters connected therewith.


Explanation. – For the purposes of this section,-


(a)“buyer” means a person who obtains in any sale, by way of auction, tender or any other mode, goods of the nature specified in the table in sub-section (1) or the right to receive any such goods but does not include, -


(i)a public sector company,


(ii)a buyer in the further sale of such goods obtained in pursuance of such sale, or


(iii)a buyer where the goods are not obtained by him by way of auction and where the sale price of such goods to be sold by the buyer is fixed by or under any State Act;


(b)“seller” means the Central Government, a State Government or any local authority or corporation or authority established by or under a Central, State or Provincial Act, or any company or firm or co-operative society.


14.1.Sub-section (1) of Section 206C says that every person who is a seller shall collect from the buyer of the goods specified in the table, a sum equal to the percentage specified in the corresponding entry of the table. The collection is to be made at the time of debiting of the amount payable by the buyer to the account of the buyer or at the time of the receipt of such amount from the said buyer, be it in cash or by way of cheque or by way of draft etc. In so far alcoholic liquor for human consumption (other than India made foreign liquor i.e., IMFL), the amount to be collected is 10 percent. Sub-section (3) provides that any person collecting such amount under sub-section (1) shall pay the said amount within 7 days of the collection to the credit of the central government or as the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) directs. Sub-section (4) clarifies that any amount so collected under Section 206C(1) and paid under sub-section (3) shall be deemed as payment of income tax on behalf of the person from whom the amount has been collected and credit shall be given to such person for the amount so collected and paid at the time of assessment proceeding for the relevant assessment year. Sub-section (5) says that every person collecting such tax shall issue a certificate to the buyer within 10 days of debit or receipt of the amount. Sub-section (5A) requires the person collecting tax to prepare half yearly returns for the periods ending on 30th September and 31st March for each financial year and submit the same in the prescribed form before the competent income tax authority.


14.2.Sub-section (6) is relevant. Sub-section (6) says that any person responsible for collecting the tax but fails to collect the same shall notwithstanding such failure be liable to pay the tax which he ought to have collected to the credit of the central government in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3). Sub-section (7) deals with a situation where such tax is not collected in which event the seller is liable to pay interest at the prescribed rate. Sub-section (8) on the other hand deals with a situation where the seller does not deposit the amount even after collecting the tax. In such an event also, he would be liable to pay interest.


14.3.That brings us to the Explanation to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act. The Explanation defines “buyer” and “seller” for the purposes of Section 206C. While Explanation(a) defines “buyer”, (b) defines “seller”. As per Explanation(a), “buyer” means a person who obtains in any sale by way of auction, tender or by any other mode, goods of the nature specified in the table in sub-section (1) or the right to receive any such goods but “buyer” would not include:


(i)a public sector company;


(ii)a buyer in the further sale of such goods obtained in pursuance of such sale;


(iii)a buyer where the goods are not obtained by him by way of auction and where the sale price of such goods to be sold by the buyer is fixed by or under any State Act.


14.4.On the other hand, “seller” has been defined to mean the central government, a state government or any local authority or corporation or authority established by or under a central, state or provincial act or any company or firm or cooperative society.


14.5.Adverting to the definition of “buyer”, Explanation (a) says that a person who obtains in any sale by way of auction, tender or by any other mode, goods of the nature specified in the table in sub-section (1) or the right to receive any such goods is a buyer. But as we have seen above, there is an exclusion clause to the definition of “buyer”. If the buyer is a public sector company or it has obtained the goods in further sale or if the goods are not obtained by him by way of auction and where the sale price of such goods to be sold by the buyer is fixed by or under any state enactment, then such a person would not come within the ambit of “buyer” as per the definition in Explanation(a). Since much emphasis has been placed on Explanation(a)(iii), we may extract the same again to understand the significance thereof: a buyer where the goods are not obtained by him by way of auction and where the sale price of such goods to be sold by the buyer is fixed by or under any State Act. Thus, Explanation(a)(iii) visualizes two conditions for a person to be excluded from the meaning of “buyer” as per the definition in Explanation(a). The first condition is that the goods are not obtained by him by way of auction. The second condition is that the sale price of such goods to be sold by the buyer is fixed under a state enactment. These two conditions are joined by the word ‘and’. The word ‘and’ is conjunctive to mean that both the conditions must be fulfilled; it is not either of the two. Therefore, to be excluded from the ambit of the definition of “buyer” as per Explanation(a)(iii), both the conditions must be satisfied.


15.In view of the above, let us examine the position of an excise contractor. In the scheme under consideration which we have discussed above, would such an excise contractor be construed as a “buyer” within the meaning of Explanation(a) to the Section 206C of the Income Tax Act? Going back to the Excise Act and the rules framed thereunder, it is seen that Mysore Sales is the licensee for the manufacture and bottling of arrack for specified area(s). By a process of auction or tender or auction-cum-tender etc., excise contractors are shortlisted who are thereafter granted permits to vend arrack by retail in their respective area(s). These retail vendors i.e. excise contractors have to procure the arrack from the warehouse or depot maintained by Mysore Sales on payment of the issue price fixed by the Excise Commissioner. The arrack is procured in sealed bottles or in sealed polythene sachets. Pausing here for a moment, what is discernible is that by a process of auction etc., excise contractors are shortlisted. Thereafter, they are provided permits. On the strength of the permits, they obtain arrack in bottled condition (or in sealed polythene sachets) from the warehouse or depot on payment of issue price fixed by the Excise Commissioner. Such arrack either in sealed bottled condition or in sealed polythene sachets are then sold in retail by the excise contractors in the area or areas allotted to them. Therefore, by the process of auction etc., the excise contractors are only shortlisted and conferred the right to retail vend of arrack in their respective areas. It cannot be said that by virtue of the auction, certain quantities of arrack are purchased by the excise contractors. Thus, at this stage there are two transactions, each distinct. The first transaction is shortlisting of excise contractors by a process of auction etc. for the right to retail vend. The second transaction, which is contingent upon the first transaction, is obtaining of arrack for retail vending by the excise contractors on the strength of the permits issued to them post successful shortlisting following auction. Therefore, it is evidently clear that arrack is not obtained by the excise contractors by way of auction. What is obtained by way of auction is the right to vend the arrack on retail on the strength of permits granted, following successful shortlisting on the basis of auction. Thus, the first condition under clause (iii) is satisfied.


15.1.In Om Parkash (supra), this Court considered the issue of tax collection at source in respect of the liquor trade under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act and as to whether a licensee who is issued a licence by the government permitting him to carry on the liquor trade would be a “buyer” as defined in Explanation (a) to Section 206C (11) of the Income Tax Act. This Court held that “buyer” would mean a person who by virtue of the payment gets a right to receive specific goods and not where he is merely allowed/permitted to carry on business in that trade. On licences issued by the government permitting the licensee to carry on liquor trade, provisions of Section 206C are not attracted as the licensee does not fall within the concept of “buyer” referred to in that section. This Court emphasized that a buyer has to be a buyer of goods and not merely a person who acquires a licence to carry on the business.


15.2.After the arrack is obtained in the above manner by the excise contractor, the requirement of the second condition under Explanation(a)(iii) is that he has to sell the same in the area(s) allotted to him at the sale price fixed as per Rule 4 of the 1967 Rules. The language of the second condition is that the sale price of such goods to be sold by the buyer is fixed by or under any state statute. As already noted above, Rule 4 of the 1967 Rules enables the excise contractor to sell the arrack in retail at a price within the range of minimum floor price and maximum ceiling price which is fixed by the Excise Commissioner. A minimum price and a maximum price are fixed within which range the arrack has to be sold by the excise contractor. Thus, the price of arrack to be sold in retail is not dependent on the market forces but pre-determined within a range. Therefore, though price range is provided for by the statute, it cannot be said that because there is a price range providing for a minimum and a maximum, the sale price is not fixed. The sale price is fixed by the statute but within a particular range beyond which price, either on the higher side or on the lower side, the arrack cannot be sold by the excise contractor in retail. Therefore, the arrack is sold at a price which is fixed statutorily under Rule 4 of the 1967 Rules and thus the second condition stands satisfied.


16.Since both the conditions as mandated under Explanation(a)(iii) are satisfied, the excise contractors or the liquor vendors selling arrack would not come within the ambit of “buyer” as defined under Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act.


17.We have perused the orders dated 17.01.2001 passed by the assessing officer under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act. From a perusal of the said orders, more particularly the order in respect of the assessment year 2000-2001 which is the main order passed by the assessing officer followed in other assessment proceedings, it is seen that the same was passed under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act. By the said order dated 17.01.2001 for the assessment year 2000-01, the assessing officer declared that Mysore Sales had failed to collect and deposit an amount of Rs. 3,90,57,516.00 as TDS from the excise contractors and, therefore, directed the appellant to deposit the said amount to the credit of the central government. That apart, interest was also charged and levied under Section 206C(6) following which demand notice of even date under Section 156 of the Income Tax Act was issued. Before passing the said order, it is seen that the assessing officer had considered Section 206C of the Income Tax Act and the reply submitted by Mysore Sales to the show cause notice issued.


18.We have already analysed the various sub-sections of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act. As per sub-section (3), any person collecting TDS under sub-section (1) shall have to pay the same to the credit of the central government within seven days. Requirement under sub-section (5A) is that every person collecting TDS in terms of Section 206C (1) shall prepare half yearly returns for the periods ending on 30th September and 31st March respectively for each financial year and thereafter to submit the same before the competent assessing officer. Sub-rule (6) mandates that if any person responsible for collecting TDS fails to collect the same, he shall have to deposit the said amount to the credit of the central government notwithstanding failure to deduct TDS.


19.Though there is no express provision in sub-section (6) or any other provision of Section 206C of the Income Tax Act regarding issuance of notice and affording hearing to such a person before passing an order thereunder, nonetheless, it is evident that an order passed under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act, as in the present case, is prejudicial to the person concerned as such an order entails adverse civil consequences. It is trite law that when an order entails adverse civil consequences or is prejudicial to the person concerned, it is essential that principles of natural justice are followed. In the instant case, though show cause notice was issued to the assessee to which reply was also filed, the same would not be adequate having regard to the consequences that such an order passed under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act would entail. Even though the statute may be silent regarding notice and hearing, the court would read into such provision the inherent requirement of notice and hearing before a prejudicial order is passed. We, therefore, hold that before an order is passed under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, it is incumbent upon the assessing officer to put the person concerned to notice and afford him an adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing, including a personal hearing.


20.In view of the discussions made above and the conclusions reached, it is not necessary for us to delve into other contours of the lis. Thus, the question framed in paragraph 3 above, is answered in the negative by holding that Section 206C of the Income Tax Act is not applicable in respect of Mysore Sales and that the liquor vendors(contractors) who bought the vending rights from the appellant on auction cannot be termed as “buyers” within the meaning of Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act. We also hold that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions and consequently, the writ appeal challenging the orders dated 17.01.2001.


21.Having regard to the discussions made above, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed. Accordingly, we pass the following order:


(i)judgment and order dated 13.03.2006 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Appeal No. 7926/2003 and connected writ appeals, is hereby set aside;


(ii)judgment and order dated 27.10.2003 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Petition Nos. 6869-6874 of 2001 and other connected writ petitions, is hereby set aside; and


(iii)orders dated 17.01.2001 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS)–1, Bengaluru under Section 206C(6) of the Income Tax Act for the assessment years 2000-2001, 1999-2000, 1998-1999, 1997-1998, 1996-1997 and 1995-1996 as well as the consequential demand notices of even date issued under Section 156 of the Income Tax Act, are hereby set aside and quashed.


22.Civil Appeal accordingly stands allowed. However, there shall be no order as to cost.


Result of the case: Appeal allowed.


1 [1996] 2 SCR 570 : (1996) 3 SCC 465


2 (1991) 187 ITR 188 (HP)


3 (1991) 187 ITR 208 (P&H)


4 (1993) 202 ITR 535 (PAT)


5 ILR (2000) 2 P&H


6 (2000) 246 ITR 762 (HP)


7 (2002) 253 ITR 205 (P&H)


8 [2001] 1 SCR 1113 : (2001) 3 SCC 593


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Whether upon admission of an instrument in evidence and its marking as an exhibit by a court (despite the instrument being chargeable to duty but is insufficiently stamped), such a process can be recalled by the court in exercise of inherent powers saved by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 316 : 2024 INSC 493


G.M. Shahul Hameed v. Jayanthi R. Hegde

(Civil Appeal No. 1188 of 2015)


09 July 2024


[Dipankar Datta* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Whether upon admission of an instrument in evidence and its marking as an exhibit by a court (despite the instrument being chargeable to duty but is insufficiently stamped), such a process can be recalled by the court in exercise of inherent powers saved by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.


Headnotes


Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.151 – Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – ss.33-35, 58 – GPA insufficiently stamped, admitted in evidence and marked as exhibit – No objection from the appellant – Trial Court if can recall such process of admission and marking of the instrument in exercise of its inherent power saved by s.151 or the remedy available under the 1957 Act was required to be pursued by the appellant to fasten the respondent with the liability to pay the deficit duty and penalty:


Held: The presiding officer of a court being authorised in law to receive an instrument in evidence, is bound to give effect to the mandate of ss.33 and 34 and retains the authority to impound an instrument even in the absence of any objection from any party to the proceedings – Irrespective of whether objection is raised or not regarding admissibility of an instrument, owing to its insufficient stamping, the question of admissibility has to be decided according to law – The presiding officer of a court when confronted with the question of admitting an instrument chargeable with duty but which is either not stamped or is insufficiently stamped ought to judicially determine it – Application of judicial mind is a sine qua non having regard to the express language of ss.33 and 34 – However, once a decision on the objection is rendered- right or wrong, s.35 would kick in to bar any question being raised as to admissibility of the instrument on the ground that it is not duly stamped at any stage of the proceedings and the party aggrieved by alleged improper admission has to work out its remedy as provided by s.58 of the 1957 Act – On the date the GPA was admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the Trial Court did not deliberate on its admissibility, much less applied its judicial mind, resulting in an absence of judicial determination – Trial Court not having ‘decided’ whether the GPA was sufficiently stamped, s.35 of the 1957 Act cannot be called in aid by the respondent – For s.35 to come into operation, the instrument must have been “admitted in evidence” upon a judicial determination – The words “judicial determination” have to be read into s.35 – Once there is such a determination, whether the determination is right or wrong cannot be examined except in the manner ordained by s.35 – However, in a case of “no judicial determination”, s.35 is not attracted – No error in the order dated 19.10.2010 passed by the Trial Court in exercise of its inherent power saved by s.151, CPC to do justice as well as to prevent abuse of the process of court and allowing the interlocutory applications filed by the appellant and directing the respondent to pay the deficit stamp duty with penalty – Impugned order of the High Court set aside. [Paras 14, 18, 4, 22]


Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – s.35 – When not attracted – Discussed.


Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – s.33 – Examination and impounding of instruments – Duty of the court:


Held: s.33 has been inserted in the statute with a definite purpose – The revenue would stand the risk of suffering huge loss if the courts fail to discharge the duty placed on it per provisions like s.33 – The legislature has reposed responsibility on the courts and trusted them to ensure that requisite stamp duty, along with penalty, is duly paid if an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument is placed before it for admission in support of the case of a party – It is incumbent upon the courts to uphold the sanctity of the legal framework governing stamp duty, as the same are crucial for the authenticity and enforceability of instruments – Allowing an instrument with insufficient stamp duty to pass unchallenged, merely due to technicalities, would undermine the legislative intent and the fiscal interests of the State – The courts ought to ensure that compliance with all substantive and procedural requirements of a statute akin to the 1957 Act are adhered to by the interested parties – This duty of the court is paramount, and any deviation would set a detrimental precedent, eroding the integrity of the legal system. [Para 21]


Case Law Cited


Javer Chand and Others v. Pukhraj Surana [1962] 2 SCR 333; Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal [1978] 3 SCR 963 : (1978) 3 SCC 236 – referred to.


List of Acts


Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957; Indian Stamp Act, 1899; Constitution of India.


List of Keywords


Inherent powers; Inherent powers saved by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Stamp duty; Instrument chargeable with duty; Instrument not stamped/insufficiently stamped; Admission of instrument in evidence; Objection to the instrument’s insufficient stamping; Objection regarding admissibility of instrument owing to its insufficient stamping; Question of admitting instrument chargeable with duty but not stamped/insufficiently stamped; General Power of Attorney; GPA; GPA insufficiently stamped; GPA admitted in evidence and marked as exhibit; Instrument marked as exhibit; Recall of process of admission of instrument in evidence and marking of the instrument; Impounding of instruments; Liability to pay the deficit duty and penalty; Application of judicial mind; Judicial determination; Prevent abuse of the process of the court.


Case Arising From


CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1188 of 2015


From the Judgment and Order dated 26.09.2011 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in WP No. 11653 of 2011


Appearances for Parties


D.P. Chaturvedi, Tarun Kumar Thakur, Ms. Parvati Bhat, Vivek Ram, Abhay Choudhary M, Ms. Anuradha Mutatkar, Advs. for the Appellant.


Mrs. Rekha Pandey, Suyash Mohan Guru, Ms. Sharmistha Choudhury, Raghav Pandey, Ms. Gauri Pandey, Advs. for the Respondent.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Dipankar Datta, J.


1.The substantial question arising for decision in this civil appeal is whether upon admission of an instrument in evidence and its marking as an exhibit by a court (despite the instrument being chargeable to duty but is insufficiently stamped), such a process can be recalled by the court in exercise of inherent powers saved by section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure1 for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.


2.Assail in this civil appeal is to the judgment and order dated 26th September, 20112 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru3 whereby His Lordship set aside the order dated 19th October, 2010 passed by the Court of Additional Senior Judge-III, Mangalore4 and allowed the petition5 preferred by the respondent under Article 227 of the Constitution.


3.The facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, are adverted to in brief hereunder:


a.First Sale Agreement and Sale Deed: On 3rd October, 2003, a Sale Deed was executed regarding the suit property by one B. Ramesh Hegde in favour of his wife, who is the respondent here. This Sale Deed was executed on the strength of a General Power of Attorney6 dated 16th September, 2003, which was allegedly executed by one Praveen Shetty in favour of B. Ramesh Hegde in respect of the suit property, authorizing him with power to sell the suit property.


b.Second Sale Agreement and Sale Deed: An agreement to sell the suit property was executed between the appellant and Praveen Shetty on 11th September, 2003. The appellant paid the consideration, and a Sale Deed was executed on 8th October, 2003 between the appellant and Praveen Shetty.


c.Civil Suit by the appellant: The appellant instituted a civil suit7 against the respondent, B. Ramesh Hegde, and Praveen Shetty, seeking a declaration that the Sale Deed dated 3rd October, 2003 was null and void, and not binding on the appellant.


d.Civil Suit by the respondent: Conversely, the respondent also instituted a civil suit8 against the appellant and Praveen Shetty, seeking a declaration that the Sale Deed dated 8th October, 2003 was null and void, and not binding on the respondent.


e.Filing of GPA before the Trial Court: In the suit instituted by the respondent, witness action commenced. B. Ramesh Hegde, in whose favour the GPA was executed by the respondent, on 6th June, 2010 tendered the GPA in course of his examination-in-chief. The appellant’s counsel was engaged in another court; hence, he was unable to appear. The junior counsel did not object that the GPA was insufficiently stamped and, thus, inadmissible in evidence. The Trial Court, in the absence of objection, admitted the GPA in evidence and marked it as an exhibit whereafter the matter stood adjourned for cross-examination.


f.Interlocutory Applications: On the next hearing date, 25th June, 2010 to be precise, the appellant filed two interlocutory applications9 in the suit filed by the respondent. In I.A. No. IX, the appellant sought a review of the order dated 6th June, 2010, and in I.A. No. X, it was prayed that the GPA be impounded on the ground that it has been insufficiently stamped. The appellant contended that since the GPA was executed in favour of a third party with power to sell the property, article 41 of the Schedule to the Karnataka Stamp Act, 195710 was applicable, necessitating payment of requisite stamp duty based on the market value of the property. The GPA was prepared only on a stamp paper worth Rs.100, rendering it insufficiently stamped and in accordance with section 34 of the 1957 Act, an insufficiently stamped document had to be impounded and a penalty of ten times the duty value paid.


g.The respondent objected to the I.A.s asserting that the appellant had to avail his remedy under section 58 of the 1957 Act and that being available, the appellant could not seek a review. Further, it was claimed that no proof had been furnished that the appellant’s counsel was otherwise engaged at that time. Lastly, it was contended that once a document had been admitted in evidence, the stamp duty could not subsequently be questioned on the ground that it has been insufficiently stamped, as per section 35 of the 1957 Act.


4.Vide order dated 19th October, 2010, the Trial Court allowed the I.A.s and directed the respondent to pay the deficit stamp duty, along with the penalty, as required for a power of attorney under article 41(eb) of the Schedule to the 1957 Act.


5.Dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of the Trial Court, the respondent approached the High Court whereupon the petition was allowed by the impugned order, inter alia, recording that:


“2. It is evident from the material that the document has been marked and admitted in evidence and exhibited. It is the contention of the respondent under order 13 rule 4 there should be a specific statement to the effect that the document has been so admitted and endorsement shall be signed and initialed by the Judge. In the absence of the said requirement, marking of document does not mean admission of document in evidence. The argument of the counsel for the respondent is untenable. In the normal procedure when the document is produced, it is marked and exhibit number has assigned and beneath the said exhibit Judge puts his initial. This procedure fully complies with the requirement under Order 13 Rule 4 of the Act. Therefore, the contention that the document has not been properly marked and it should be rejected in evidence on the ground of insufficiently stamped is untenable. The trial court will have no jurisdiction to reconsider the issue. The remedy available for the respondent is only under section 58 of the Stamp Act. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.”


6.It is the legality of the impugned order that we are tasked to examine while answering the question formulated at the beginning of this judgment.


7.Mr. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the appellant, while laying a challenge to the impugned order argued that admission of an insufficiently stamped instrument in a casual manner by mechanically marking it as an exhibit, without any application of judicial mind, should not preclude the court seized of the proceedings from reconsidering whether such document is sufficiently stamped and could have at all been admitted in evidence. Various provisions of the 1957 Act were referred to by him for persuading us to hold that the view taken by the High Court was grossly erroneous. Accordingly, it was prayed by him that the impugned order be set aside and the civil appeal be allowed with liberty to the respondent to take steps in accordance with the order of the Trial Court.


8.Mr. Guru, learned counsel for the respondent, defended the impugned order by asserting that it is correct both in law as well as on facts. It was argued that setting aside of the Trial Court’s order by the impugned order was indeed justified since the GPA having been admitted in evidence, such admission could not have been reviewed by the same court under any circumstance. Emphasis was placed on the need for an objection to the document’s admissibility being raised when it was first tendered for being admitted and then marked as an exhibit. Citing section 35 of the 1957 Act, it was contended that once an instrument is admitted in evidence, the admission cannot be questioned by the trial court or any appellate or revisional court; and that the only remedy that the 1957 Act provides is a revision under section 58 thereof in the manner as provided. Thus, he submitted that the civil appeal being devoid of any merit deserved outright dismissal.


9.A short but interesting question has engaged our consideration. There is no doubt that the GPA is insufficiently stamped. What we need to consider on facts and in the circumstances is, which of the two conflicting views taken by the Trial Court and the High Court is right.


10.Despite the GPA having been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit without objection from the side of the appellant, we propose to hold for the reasons to follow that the Trial Court did have the authority to revisit and recall the process of admission and marking of the instrument, not in the sense of exercising a power of review under section 114 read with Order XLVII, CPC but in exercise of its inherent power saved by section 151 thereof, and that the other remedy made available by the 1957 Act was not required to be pursued by the appellant to fasten the respondent with the liability to pay the deficit duty and penalty.


11.We may refer to the statutory framework of the 1957 Act. Sections 33, 34, 35 and 58, to the extent relevant for a decision on this appeal, read as follows:


“33. Examination and impounding of instruments.-


(1) Every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, and every person in charge of a public office, except an officer of police, before whom any instrument, chargeable in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same.


(2) For that purpose every such person shall examine every instrument so chargeable and so produced or coming before him, in order to ascertain whether it is stamped with a stamp of the value and description required by the law in force in the State of Karnataka when such instrument was executed or first executed:


Provided that,—


(a) ***


(b) ***


(3) For the purposes of this section, in cases of doubt, the Government may determine,—


(a) what offices shall be deemed to be public offices; and


(b) who shall be deemed to be persons in charge of public offices.


34. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc.- No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped:


Provided that,—


(a) ***


(b) ***


(c) ***


(d) ***


35. Admission of instrument where not to be questioned. – Where an instrument has been admitted in evidence such admission shall not, except as provided in section 58, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped.


58. Revision of certain decisions of Courts regarding the sufficiency of stamps. –


(1) When any Court in the exercise of its Civil or Revenue jurisdiction or any Criminal Court in any proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, makes any order admitting any instrument in evidence as duly stamped or as not requiring a stamp, or upon payment of duty and a penalty under Section 34, the Court to which appeals lie from, or references are made by, such first mentioned Court may, of its own motion or on the application of the Deputy Commissioner, take such order into consideration.


(2) If such Court, after such consideration, is of opinion that such instrument should not have been admitted in evidence without the payment of duty and penalty under Section 34, or without the payment of a higher duty and penalty than those paid, it may record a declaration to that effect, and determine the amount of duty with which such instrument is chargeable, and may require any person in whose possession or power such instrument then is, to produce the same, and may impound the same when produced.


(3) When any declaration has been recorded under sub-section (2), the Court recording the same shall send a copy thereof to the Deputy Commissioner and, where the instrument to which it relates has been impounded or is otherwise in the possession of such Court, shall also send him such instrument.


(4) The Deputy Commissioner may thereupon, notwithstanding anything contained in the order admitting such instrument in evidence, or in any certificate granted under Section 41, or in Section 42, prosecute any person for any offence against the stamp law which the Deputy Commissioner considers him to have committed in respect of such instrument.


Provided that, -


(a)no such prosecution shall be instituted where the amount (including duty and penalty) which, according to the determination of such Court, was payable in respect of the instrument under Section 34, is paid the Deputy Commissioner, unless he thinks that the offence was committed with an intention of evading payment of the proper duty;


(b)except for the purpose of such prosecution, no declaration made under this section shall affect the validity of any order admitting any instrument in evidence, or of any certificate granted under Section 41.”


(emphasis ours)


12.Read in isolation, a literal interpretation of section 35 of the 1957 Act seems to make the position in law clear that once an instrument has been admitted in evidence, then its admissibility cannot be contested at any stage of the proceedings on the ground of it not being duly stamped. A fortiori, it would follow that any objection pertaining to the instrument’s insufficient stamping must be raised prior to its admission.


13.However, section 35 of the 1957 Act is not the only relevant section. It is preceded by sections 33 and 34 and all such sections are part of Chapter IV, tiled “Instruments Not Duly Stamped”. Certain obligations are cast by section 33 on persons/officials named therein. Should the presiding officer of the court find the instrument to be chargeable with duty but it is either not stamped or is insufficiently stamped, he is bound by section 33 to impound the same. Section 34 places a fetter on the court’s authority to admit an instrument which, though chargeable with duty, is not duly stamped. The statutory mandate is that no such instrument shall be admitted in evidence unless it is duly stamped.


14.The presiding officer of a court being authorised in law to receive an instrument in evidence, is bound to give effect to the mandate of sections 33 and 34 and retains the authority to impound an instrument even in the absence of any objection from any party to the proceedings. Such an absence of any objection would not clothe the presiding officer of the court with power to mechanically admit a document that is tendered for admission in evidence. The same limitation would apply even in case of an objection regarding admissibility of an instrument, owing to its insufficient stamping, being raised before a court of law. Irrespective of whether objection is raised or not, the question of admissibility has to be decided according to law. The presiding officer of a court when confronted with the question of admitting an instrument chargeable with duty but which is either not stamped or is insufficiently stamped ought to judicially determine it. Application of judicial mind is a sine qua non having regard to the express language of sections 33 and 34 and interpretation of pari materia provisions in the Indian Stamp Act, 189911 by this Court. However, once a decision on the objection is rendered – be it right or wrong – section 35 would kick in to bar any question being raised as to admissibility of the instrument on the ground that it is not duly stamped at any stage of the proceedings and the party aggrieved by alleged improper admission has to work out its remedy as provided by section 58 of the 1957 Act.


15.Profitable reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Javer Chand and others v. Pukhraj Surana12. There, provisions of section 36 of the 1899 Act, which is pari materia section 35 of the 1957 Act, came up for consideration. A Bench of four Hon’ble Judges of this Court held that when a document’s admissibility is questioned due to improper stamping, it must be decided immediately when presented as evidence. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder:


“4. *** Where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped, or has not been properly stamped, it has to be decided then and there when the document is tendered in evidence. Once the court, rightly or wrongly, decides to admit the document in evidence, so far as the parties are concerned, the matter is closed. Section 35 is in the nature of a penal provision and has far-reaching effects. Parties to a litigation, where such a controversy is raised, have to be circumspect and the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the court. The court has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case. The record in this case discloses the fact that the hundis were marked as Exts. P-1 and P-2 and bore the endorsement ‘admitted in evidence’ under the signature of the court. It is not, therefore, one of those cases where a document has been inadvertently admitted, without the court applying its mind to the question of its admissibility. Once a document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and the trial has proceeded all along on the footing that the document was an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties in examination and cross-examination of their witnesses, Section 36 of the Stamp Act comes into operation. Once a document has been admitted in evidence, as aforesaid, it is not open either to the trial court itself or to a court of appeal or revision to go behind that order. Such an order is not one of those judicial orders which are liable to be reviewed or revised by the same court or a court of superior jurisdiction.”


(emphasis ours)


16.Once again, addressing a matter concerning section 36 of the 1899 Act, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal13 held as follows:


“6. When the document was tendered in evidence by the plaintiff while in witness box, objection having been raised by the defendants that the document was inadmissible in evidence as it was not duly stamped and for want of registration, it was obligatory upon the learned trial Judge to apply his mind to the objection raised and to decide the objects in accordance with law. Tendency sometimes is to postpone the decision to avoid interruption in the process of recording evidence and, therefore, a very convenient device is resorted to, of marking the document in evidence subject to objection. This, however would not mean that the objection as to admissibility on the ground that the instrument is not duly stamped is judicially decided; it is merely postponed. In such a situation at a later stage before the suit is finally disposed of it would none-the-less be obligatory upon the court to decide the objection. If after applying mind to the rival contentions the trial court admits a document in evidence, Section 36 of the Stamp Act would come into play and such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. The court, and of necessity it would be trial court before which the objection is taken about admissibility of document on the ground that it is not duly stamped, has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case and where a document has been inadvertently admitted without the court applying its mind as to the question of admissibility, the instrument could not be said to have been admitted in evidence with a view to attracting Section 36 (see Javer Chand v. Pukhraj Surana) [AIR 1961 SC 1655] . The endorsement made by the learned trial Judge that ‘Objected, allowed subject to objection’, clearly indicates that when the objection was raised it was not judicially determined and the document was merely tentatively marked and in such a situation Section 36 would not be attracted.”


(emphasis ours)


17.The pivotal aspect emerging for consideration on the terms of sections 33 and 34 of the 1957 Act, with which we are concerned, is that whether the Trial Court did judicially determine the question of admissibility. It is here that we need to ascertain the rationale behind the Trial Court’s approach to go behind admission of the GPA in evidence and marking thereof as an exhibit, leading to the order under challenge before the High Court. Relevant portions of the order of the Trial Court read thus:


“2. *** There are two suits before this court, one is the present suit and another suit is OS No. 301/03. In the present suit, the GPA holder of plaintiff filed an affidavit by way of chief examination in the morning session and the documents were marked. While marking the documents he was held up in the court of Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), Mangalore and hence no objection regarding the deficiency of stamp duty on GPA could be raised before this court. Accordingly the matter has been adjourned for cross examination of PW1. The alleged GPA is in favour of third party with power to sell the property and hence article 41 of the Karnataka Stamp Act 1957 is applicable and stamp duty on the market value has to be paid on the same. The GPA is executed on a stamp paper of value of Rs.100/- only. As per Section 33 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, the court shall impound the said GPA even without the objections by the advocate for 1st defendant. His absence at the time of chief examination of PW1 is not intentional but as he was held up in another court.


3. The 1st defendant has also filed IA No. IX under Sec. 114, R/w. Sec. 151 of CPC to review the order of marking Ex.P2 which is insufficiently stamped and to hear the objections regarding inadequacy of stamp duty on the similar grounds.


7. The points that arise for consideration are:-


1. Whether Ex.P2 GPA is insufficiently stamped and plaintiff is liable to pay deficit duty and penalty?


2. Whether the order permitting the plaintiff to mark the document requires to be reviewed?


8. The points are answered in affirmative for the following:


Reasons


9. *** The clauses are very specific that the power of attorney has been given powers to sell the properties and the power of attorney has acted upon the GPA and has execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff as per Ex.P3. Under Article 41(e), when the power of attorney is given for consideration and authorizing the attorney to sell the immovable property, the duty payable is same duty as a conveyance for a market value equal to the amount of the consideration. As stated above, no consideration has been mentioned in the GPA., but the GPA has been given authorizing to sell the immovable property. The GPA has been issued to a third party, … article 41(ab) is applicable. The learned counsel for plaintiff objected for considering these applications on the ground that document is already marked with out any objections and hence the question of reviewing the order considering the question of stamp duty at this stage does not arise. As seen from the order sheet, the plaintiff was examined on 6.6.2010 and document was marked on same day. Immediately on the next date of hearing the counsel has filed IA No. IX and X to consider the aspect of payment of stamp duty and penalty i.e., on the day on which the matter was posted for cross examination of PW1. It is certain that the senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff was not present at the time of examination of PW1 in chief as the court remembers that the junior counsel was present and probably being unaware of the question of stamp duty has not raised any objections. The court has marked the document as an exhibit and has put the seal for having marked the document as to who has produced the document and admitted through which witness and marked for plaintiff. No doubt, there is mention that the document is admitted through PW1 and Ex.P2, but the court has not applied its mind while marking the document as to whether document is sufficiently stamped or insufficiently stamped.


10. *** The circumstances under which the application is being filed and circumstances under which the document came to be marked, clearly show that the document was marked without application of the mind of the court and without objection of the other side and this court is of the view that the admissibility of the document could be considered at this stage.


ORDER


The IA Nos. IX and X are allowed.”


18.On the face of such an order, it does not leave any scope for doubt that on the date the GPA was admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the Trial Court did not deliberate on its admissibility, much less applied its judicial mind, resulting in an absence of judicial determination. In the absence of a ‘decision’ on the question of admissibility or, in other words, the Trial Court not having ‘decided’ whether the GPA was sufficiently stamped, section 35 of the 1957 Act cannot be called in aid by the respondent. For section 35 to come into operation, the instrument must have been “admitted in evidence” upon a judicial determination. The words “judicial determination” have to be read into section 35. Once there is such a determination, whether the determination is right or wrong cannot be examined except in the manner ordained by section 35. However, in a case of “no judicial determination”, section 35 is not attracted.


19.In the light of the aforesaid reasoning of the Trial Court of admitted failure on its part to apply judicial mind coupled with the absence of the counsel for the appellant before it when the GPA was admitted in evidence and marked exhibit, a factor which weighed with the Trial Court, we have no hesitation to hold that for all purposes and intents the Trial Court passed the order dated 19th October, 2010 in exercise of its inherent power saved by section 151, CPC, to do justice as well as to prevent abuse of the process of court, to which inadvertently it became a party by not applying judicial mind as required in terms of sections 33 and 34 of the 1857 Act. We appreciate the approach of the Trial Court in its judicious exercise of inherent power.


20.Reference to section 58 of the 1957 Act by learned counsel for the respondent is without substance. The clear language of section 58 refers to a situation, where an order is passed admitting an instrument in evidence as duly stamped or as one not requiring a stamp, for its attraction. As evident from a bare reading of the order dated 19th October, 2010, the Trial Court did neither hold the GPA as duly stamped or as not requiring a stamp and, therefore, its applicability was not attracted.


21.We may not turn a blind eye to the fact that the revenue would stand the risk of suffering huge loss if the courts fail to discharge the duty placed on it per provisions like section 33 of the 1957 Act. Such provision has been inserted in the statute with a definite purpose. The legislature has reposed responsibility on the courts and trusted them to ensure that requisite stamp duty, along with penalty, is duly paid if an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument is placed before it for admission in support of the case of a party. It is incumbent upon the courts to uphold the sanctity of the legal framework governing stamp duty, as the same are crucial for the authenticity and enforceability of instruments. Allowing an instrument with insufficient stamp duty to pass unchallenged, merely due to technicalities, would undermine the legislative intent and the fiscal interests of the state. The courts ought to ensure that compliance with all substantive and procedural requirements of a statute akin to the 1957 Act are adhered to by the interested parties. This duty of the court is paramount, and any deviation would set a detrimental precedent, eroding the integrity of the legal system. Thus, the court must vigilantly prevent any circumvention of these legal obligations, ensuring due compliance and strict adherence for upholding the rule of law.


22.Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, we answer the substantial question in the affirmative. Finding no error in the order of the Trial Court dated 19th October, 2010, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 26th September, 2011, meaning thereby that the order of the Trial Court is restored. Since proceedings of the civil suit remained stalled because of pendency of this appeal, we expect the Trial Court to proceed expeditiously and in accordance with law.


23.The appeal is, accordingly, allowed without any order for costs.


Result of the case: Appeal allowed.


1 CPC, hereafter


2 impugned order, hereafter


3 High Court, hereafter


4 Trial Court, hereafter


5 Writ Petition No. 11653 of 2011 (GM-CPC)


6 GPA, hereafter


7 O.S. No. 301 of 2003


8 O.S. No. 134 of 2005


9 I.A.s, hereafter


10 1957 Act, hereafter


11 1899 Act, hereafter


12 [1962] 2 SCR 333


13 [1978] 3 SCR 963 : (1978) 3 SCC 236


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Thursday, July 25, 2024

Is Rule 13(v) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008 , insofar as it provides age relaxation to the persons serving under educational projects discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India; Was the award of bonus marks to the project employed applicants discriminatory and ultra vires the Rules; Were the guidelines sanctioning the award of bonus marks on a differential basis for applicants with project experience and other applicants invalid for any other reason.

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 196 : 2024 INSC 466

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr.

v.

State of Rajasthan & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 7906 of 2010)

08 July 2024

[Surya Kant and K. V. Viswanathan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Is Rule 13(v) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service

Rules, 2008 , insofar as it provides age relaxation to the persons

serving under educational projects discriminatory and contrary to

Article 14 of the Constitution of India; Was the award of bonus

marks to the project employed applicants discriminatory and ultra

vires the Rules; Were the guidelines sanctioning the award of bonus

marks on a differential basis for applicants with project experience

and other applicants invalid for any other reason.

Headnotes†

Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008 –

r.13(v) – Age relaxation – Selection to the post of Prabodhak

(Teacher) – Constitution of India – Article 14 – r.13(v), if

discriminatory and contrary to Article 14:

Held: Validity of r.13(v) is upheld – The relaxation provided for in

r.13(v) is not arbitrary or unreasonable – Fixing of minimum and

maximum age requirement is a policy decision – r.13 reveals that

the minimum age required was 23 years and the maximum outer

limit was 35 years – In the proviso there were several categories

to which relaxation was granted – The challenge of the appellants

is only to sub clause (v) – Insofar as the clause (v) is concerned,

the historical background leading to the enactment of the Rules

itself provides a justification for granting relaxation to the persons

serving under the educational project, if they fulfil the condition that

they were within the age limit when they were initially engaged –

The projects were designed to deal with absentee teachers in

the far flung areas which was causing a serious jeopardy to the

education of the rural children – The para teachers worked under

difficult circumstances – They had the advantage of interacting

personally with the children of the far-flung areas – They only

received an honorarium – The projects themselves played a large

* Author

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 197

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

part in uplifting the elementary education programme in the State

of Rajasthan – The para teachers motivated the children to come

to school – It was in this background that the grade of ‘Prabodhak’

(teacher) and Senior ‘Prabodhak’ were encadred and separate rules

enacted – Those who served in projects formed a separate class –

There was a valid classification based on intelligible differentia which

distinguished applicants with project experience and those who

lacked project experience – The differentia had a rational relation

to the object sought to be achieved by the Rules – The job of a

Prabodhak was exactly the job that the para teachers carried out in

the projects and if the Government felt that the experience gained

by them should not be lost and in that regard granted them age

relaxation, provided they fulfil the condition of being within the age

limit at the time of their initial appointment in the project, no fault can

be found with the same – No error, perversity or mala fide in the

criterion adopted on the peculiar facts of the present case – Also,

there is no illegality in the prescription of additional marks for those

applicants who had experience of working in projects, while recruiting

Prabhodhaks – The statutory rules in r.13(v) recognize that project

employed applicants were a class apart with the idea being that

their experience should not be wasted Before the advertisement

was issued, the guidelines setting out various aspects including

the aspect of bonus marks were issued and no infirmity can be

found with the same – Opportunity was given to all, with the only

difference being that by an executive instruction additional marks

were granted for project experience – The executive guidelines only

supplemented the Rules and did not supplant them – No illegality

in the award of bonus marks. [Paras 20, 22-25, 28, 29, 37]

Case Law Cited

Union of India & Ors v. Shivbachan Rai (2001) 9 SCC 356; Srinivas

K. Gouda v. Karnataka Institute of Medical Sciences and Others

[2021] 6 SCR 1144 : (2022) 1 SCC 49 – relied on.

Satya Dev Bhagaur & Ors. Vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.

(2022) 5 SCC 314 – held applicable.

Bedanga Talukdar vs. Saifudaullah Khan & Ors. [2011] 11 SCR

635 : (2011) 12 SCC 85; State of Maharashtra vs. Raj Kumar

(1982) 3 SCC 313; Kailash Chand Sharma vs State of Rajasthan

& Ors. [2002] Supp. 1 SCR 317 : (2002) 6 SCC 562; Official

Liquidator vs. Dayanand & Ors. [2008] 15 SCR 331 : (2008) 10 

198 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

SCC 1; State of Rajasthan vs. Archana (2017) 11 SCC 421; Manoj

Kumar Acharya vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (Civil Appeal 12335

of 2016 dated 18.01.2022) – held inapplicable.

List of Acts

Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008;

Constitution of India; Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994.

List of Keywords

Rule 13(v) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service

Rules, 2008; Service Rules; Prabodhak; Senior Prabodhak;

Teachers; Advertisement; Recruitment; Service conditions;

Age relaxation not discriminatory and contrary to Article 14;

Age relaxation to persons serving under educational projects;

Educational projects; Fixing of minimum and maximum age

requirement; Within the age limit at the time of initial appointment;

Direct recruitment; Policy decision; Project employed applicants;

Bonus marks; Bonus marks to project employed applicants;

Bonus marks for teaching experience; Far flung areas; Children

of the far-flung areas; Encouraging/motivating children to attend

schools; Absentee teachers; Education of rural children; Para

teachers; Difficult circumstances; Honorarium; Dropouts; Drop

out of students; Dropouts from schools; Elementary education

programme; Separate class; Valid classification; Valid classification

based on intelligible differentia; Intelligible differentia; Project

experience; Guidelines sanctioning the award of bonus marks

on differential basis; Lack of Project experience; Differentia

had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved;

Executive instruction; Executive guidelines; Executive guidelines

supplemented the Rules and did not supplant them; Rajiv Gandhi

Pathshala; Shiksha Karmi Board; Lok Jumbish Pariyojana;

Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan; District Primary Education Programme;

Guidelines in public domain; Rules of the game were not changed

after the match had begun; Error; Perversity; Mala fide.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7906 of 2010

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.05.2010 of the High court of

Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBSAW No. 402 of 2009

With

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 199

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 7250 of 2024, Civil Appeal Nos. 8656-8668, 9618,

10709, 10712, 10711 and 10710 of 2011, Civil Appeal Nos. 6898, 1668

and 1038 of 2012, Civil Appeal Nos. 11332, 11442 and 11407 of 2011,

Civil Appeal Nos. 4559, 6096-6104 and 8661 of 2012, Civil Appeal Nos.

7251-7252 of 2024, Civil Appeal No. 322 of 2013, Civil Appeal Nos.

9328-9331 and 10281 of 2010, Civil Appeal Nos. 2800-2802, 2806-2808,

2803, 2804-2805, 2980, 2978, 2979, 2976, 2977, 4569, 3732, 5180,

5183, 3731, 5182 and 7646 of 2011, Civil Appeal No. 1210 of 2012,

Civil Appeal No. 8302 of 2010, Civil Appeal Nos. 2982, 2981, 2921,

3730, 4688, 4745 and 5258 of 2011 and Civil Appeal No. 8215 of 2013

Appearances for Parties

Sushil Kumar Jain, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Dr. Manish Singhvi,

Sr. Advs., Puneet Jain, Mrs. Christi Jain, Ms. Akriti Sharma, Mann

Arora, Ms. Lisha Bhati, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara,

Aishwary Mishra, Dhananjai Shekhwat, Dashrath Singh, Anirudh

Singh, Rakesh Dahiya, Aditya Dahiya, Kapil Dahiya, Satyavan

Kudalwal, Praveen Swarup, Sarad Kumar Singhania, P. K. Jain,

Ajay Choudhary, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Abhijeet Singh, Anjali

Saxena, Gp. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati, Bankey Bihari Sharma, Ajit

Kumar Thakur, R N Verma, Sanjay Misra, Mukul Kumar, H. D.

Thanvi, Rishi Matoliya, Nikhil Kumar Singh, Raghuveer Pujari, Ms.

Sumati Sharma, Ms. Parul Shukla, Udayaditya Banerjee, Ms. Tanvi

Chuphal, Ms. Shubhangi Pandey, Abhishek Kumar, Ms. Deeksha

Saggi, Rituparn Uniyal, B Tyagi, Nayyar Siddiqui, Ram Lal Roy,

Milind Kumar, Ms. Shubhangi Agarwal, Apurv Singhvi, Rohan Darade,

Nikilesh Ramachandran, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Sandeep Kumar Jha, Ranbir

Singh Yadav, Prateek Yadav, Puran Mal Saini, Pati Raj Yadav, Ms.

Akansha Singh Yadav, Ankit Yadav, Dr. Nirmal Chopra, Ms. Pragati

Neekhra, Ram Nath, Ms. Kalpana Kumari, Dr. Sushil Balwada, R.K.

Rathore, Sandeep Singh Dingra, Amit Kumar Chawla, Ms. Tanishka

Grover, Niharika Dewivedi, Mahi Pal Singh, Ms. Manisha Chawla, T.R.

Meena, Vijay Rathore, Satpal Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1. Leave granted in SLP (Civil) No. 34742 of 2013 and SLP (Civil) No.

34663 of 2013.

200 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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2. This batch of 47 appeals involves common questions of law. They

arise from the judgments of the Division Bench of the High Court of

Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The main appeal,

namely, Civil Appeal 7906 of 2010 (Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr.

Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Mahesh

Chand Bareth’) arises out of a judgment of the Division Bench of

the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur

in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 402 of 2009 dated 21.05.2010.

The other matters arise out of the same batch as Mahesh Chand

Bareth or out of the judgments relying on Mahesh Chand Bareth or

based on the judgments which, in turn, relied on Mahesh Chand

Bareth. By virtue of the said judgments, the appellants were denied

relief. The appellants challenged the selection of candidates to the

post of “Prabodhak” (teacher) by virtue of advertisement issued on

31.05.2008. Recruitment and other service conditions for the post of

Prabodhak are governed by the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak

Service Rules, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’).

3. About 20060 vacancies were advertised and the vacancies came to

be filled up soon thereafter. The grievance of the appellants is that

their candidature should also be considered for the appointment on

the post of ‘Prabodhak’, by adopting similar criteria in the grant of

bonus marks for teaching experience as was done in the case of the

applicants who had experience of working in Government educational

projects. Their further grievance is that Rule 13(v) of the Rules

insofar as it provides for age relaxation to those persons serving

under educational projects is a provision which is unconstitutional

and invalid.

Background facts:

4. A brief narration of the background facts is essential for appreciating

the issues involved in this case. The Shiksha Karmi Project was a

unique initiative launched in the State of Rajasthan in 1987 with

assistance from the Swedish International Development Cooperation

Agency (SIDA). The object was to seek to reach out to children

in remote rural areas where the formal primary schools are either

not in existence or dysfunctional. Local youth with some basic

educational qualifications were identified, trained and provided

continuous educational support to teach children in Shiksha Karmi

Day Schools, Prehar Pathshalas (Schools of convenient timings)

and Angan Pathshalas (Courtyard Schools). 

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 201

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

5. The concept of Shiksha Karmi Project (as is clear to us from the

document containing a study, placed on record by the appellants)

indicates that the Shiksha Karmi Project rested on the assumption

that barefoot teachers belonging to the local community, who enjoy

local community support if intensively trained, can overcome lack of

formal educational qualification.

6. They were selected through an established procedure laid out in the

manuals and once the Gram Sabha voted on the creation of a Shiksha

Karmi School, spot tests were held to identify Shiksha Karmis. The

Shiksha Karmi Project had significant overlaps with the Lok Jumbish

Project and the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP).

7. The Shiksha Karmi Project was fairly successful in reaching out

to children from disadvantaged communities. A person serving in

various educational projects possessed rich experience of teaching

and motivating people for education in rural areas. The workers were

engaged in the name of Shiksha Karmis to address the problem

of teacher absenteeism, poor enrolment, high dropout trends and

inadequate access to education. The workers were to get only

a fixed honorarium. The projects were introduced to accelerate

universalization of elementary education. After the passage of the

83rd Constitutional Amendment and the setting up of an elected

Panchayat structure, the project worked in tandem with the elected

representative members of the Panchayat.

Formulation of Rules:

8. When matters stood thus, a Cabinet note was prepared which set

out that to provide access to education to children living in far-flung

areas/difficult terrain/small villages (Hamlet) called Dhanis, a new

regular cadre in the name of Prabodhak and Senior Prabodhak be

created. As a first step, Section 89 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj

Act, 1994 was amended and in 89(2)(v) ‘Prabodhak’ and ‘Senior

Prabodhak’ were added as one of the grades. Section 89(2)(v), (5)

& 6B reads as under:

“89. Constitution of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti

and Zila Parishad Service.

(2) The Service may be divided into different categories,

such category being divided into different grades, and

shall consist of -

202 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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(v) Prabodhak and Senior Prabodhak.

(5) All appointed to posts in the service shall be made-

(a) by direct recruitment; or

(b) By promotion ; or

(c) by transfer.

6B. Appointed on the posts specified in clause (v) of Subsection (2) Shall be made by additional Chief Executive

Office-cum-District Education officer (ElementaryEducation) of the District concerned in accordance with

the rules made in this behalf by the State Government,

from out of persons selected for the posts by the

recruitment committee constituted by the Government in

accordance with the rules made by the State Government

in this Behalf:

9. Thereafter, in accordance with Section 102 of the Rajasthan

Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 were framed the Rajasthan Panchayati

Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008. Certain relevant clauses of

the Rules are extracted hereunder:

“2. Definitions.

In these rules unless the context otherwise requires,-

(c) “Direct recruitment” means recruitment made in

accordance with Part IV of these rules;

(k) “Teaching Experience” for the purpose of direct

recruitment includes the experience gained in supervisory

capacity in any recognized educational institution or

project;

6. Methods of Recruitment.

Recruitment to the service after the commencement of

the rules shall be made by the following methods:-

(a) by direct recruitment in accordance with Part IV of

these rules,

(b) by promotion in accordance with Part V of these rules.

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 203

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

13 Age.

A candidate for direct recruitment to a post enumerated

in the Schedule must have attained the age of 23 years

and must not have attained the age of 35 years on the

first day of January following the last date fixed for receipt

of applications:

Provided

(v) that the person serving under the educational project

in the State viz Rajiv Gandhi Pathshala/Shiksha Karmi

Board/Lok Jumbish Pariyojana/Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan/

District Primary Education Programme shall be deemed

to be within age limit, had they been within the age limit

when they were initially engaged even though they may

have crossed the age limit at the time of direct recruitment.

14. Academic and Professional Qualifications.

A candidate for direct recruitment to the posts specified

in the Schedule shall, in addition to such experience as

is required shall possess –

(i) the qualification and experience given in column 6

of the schedule, and

(ii) working knowledge of Hindi written in Devnagri Scripts

and knowledge of Rajasthani culture.

25. Recommendation of the Committee:-

The committee shall prepare a list of the candidates

whom, they consider suitable for appointment to the posts

concerned, arranged in the order of merit and forward the

same to the Appointing Authority:

Provided that the Committee may, to the extent of 50%

of the advertised vacancies, keep names of suitable

candidates on the reserve list. The names of such

candidates may, on requisition, be recommended in the

order of merit to the Appointing Authority within 6 months

from the date on which the Committee forwards the original

list to the Appointing Authority.

204 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Schedule

S.

No.

Name of

Post

Method of

Recruitment

with

percentage

Post from

which

promotion

is to be

made

Qualifications

and

experience

for Promotion

Qualification

and

experience

for direct

Recruitment

Remarks

2 Prabodhak

(4500-

7000)

100% by

Direct

Recruitment

- - Senior

Secondary

School

Certificate or

Intermediate or

its equivalent,

with Diploma

or certificate in

basic teachers

training of a

duration of

not less than

two years of

Diploma or

certificate in

elementary

teachers

training of a

duration of not

less than two

years.

OR

Bachelor of

Elementary

Education (B.

El. Ed.)

OR

Graduation

with Bachelor

of Education

(B. Ed.) or its

equivalent

AND

Must have at

least 5 years

continuous

teaching

experience

without any

break in any

recognized

educational

institution/

educational

project.

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 205

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

Guidelines of 27.05.2008 & advertisement of 31.05.2008:

10. Before the advertisement was issued on 31.05.2008, appropriate

guidelines were formulated on 27.05.2008 for the purpose of

selection of Prabodhak. The guidelines dealt with various aspects

including award of bonus marks. Among the matters dealt with

apart from educational qualifications and emoluments were also

matters pertaining to disqualification if the applicant had more than

two children on or after 01.06.2002; disqualification with regard

to persons having more than one spouse and of persons who

had obtained dowry during their weddings. The guidelines also

dealt with the requirements with regard to community certificate;

reservation of 30% for women of which 5% was to be for widows;

requirements of age limit and relaxation. One of the clauses

provided as under :

“Selection Process: -

Selection will be done entirely through interview for which

a total of 100 marks have been allotted.

The classification of these numbers is as follows: -

General Knowledge – maximum 40 marks

Personality – maximum 35 marks

Experience - maximum 25 marks

A maximum of 10 marks will be given according to 2 marks

per year for a maximum of 5 years of teaching/supervision

experience. If the experience is for the employee receiving

honorarium under the projects run by the state government,

then he will be given 5 marks for each academic session,

maximum 25 marks.”

11. Thereafter, on 31.05.2008, advertisement for district-wise recruitment

for the post of Prabodhak was issued and selection came to be

made. The appellants, who are teachers in recognized educational

institutions filed writ petitions aggrieved by the award of excess

bonus marks for the candidate with project experience. In some

writ petitions, the age relaxation granted to the project employed

applicants were also challenged. 

206 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Contentions of Appellants:

12. The appellants contend that Rule 13 (v) of the Rules providing age

relaxation only to a few categories of teachers of certain government

projects and denial of the same to other similarly situated teachers is

discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Insofar as the award of bonus marks is concerned, learned counsels

relying on Rule 2(k) which deals with teaching experience, point

out that granting additional marks to para teachers having teaching

experience from government projects is ultra vires the Rules.

13. Learned counsels also contend that the advertisement of 31.05.2008

did not sanction the grant of bonus marks and the administrative

guidelines dated 27.05.2008 were not brought in public domain. It

was argued that the rules of the game have been changed after

the match has begun. It was contended that if the intention of the

legislature was to create the said post only for para teachers working

in project, the same would not have been offered to private and other

teachers at all. Learned counsels further contend that the Rules do

not provide for grant of any bonus marks. Learned counsels for the

appellants argued that the effect of awarding extra bonus marks for

project experience has the effect of an indirect absorption of all the

project appointees and this, according to learned counsels, was

contrary to the Rules. Learned counsels for the appellants relied

on the judgment in Bedanga Talukdar vs. Saifudaullah Khan &

Ors., (2011) 12 SCC 85 to argue that the selection process should

be strictly in accordance with the stipulated selection procedure.

Learned counsels also cited State of Maharashtra vs. Raj Kumar,

(1982) 3 SCC 313.

Contentions of the State:

14. The State contended that there was a historical background to the

introduction of the Rules; that there was a laudable objective of

achieving the universalization of elementary education and such

educational projects initiatives had led to significant increase in

literacy rate in Rajasthan from 38% to 66% between 1991 to 2011;

that persons who had worked in the aforesaid educational projects

were having valuable experience working in far flung areas and had

direct interaction and connection with children. That the projects

were started to mitigate the absenteeism of teachers in the rural

areas especially in small villages. Added to this, there were dropouts 

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 207

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

from schools and to tackle all these several initiatives in the form of

educational projects were introduced.

15. According to the State, ‘Prabodhak’ was to facilitate and encourage

children to attend schools. The State contended that as part of the

selection process guidelines for the purpose of giving marks for

experience can always be legally prescribed. All the Prabodhaks who

were recruited possessed the minimum educational qualification and

according to the State that was clear from the advertisement, which

contained a specific clause with regard to the minimum qualification of

Basic School Teaching Certificate (BSTC) for primary and Bachelor of

Education (B.Ed) for imparting education for middle school students.

16. The State contended that the experience gained in the projects has

reasonable nexus with the concept of Prabodhak for which the newly

framed Prabodhak Rules and Cadre were created. Insofar as age

relaxation was concerned, it was contended by the State that it was

meant for persons who worked in the projects after joining within the

age limit but have now become over age. According to the State,

the idea was not to oust from consideration these persons who had

worked in the education projects for significant number of years. Hence

age relaxation was provided to them. According to the State, there

was nothing discriminatory about it. In support of the submission,

learned counsels for the State relied on Satya Dev Bhagaur & Ors.

Vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2022) 5 SCC 314.

17. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench declined relief to

the appellants. Aggrieved the appellants are before us. We have

also heard the learned counsels for the parties proposing to implead

or intervene.

Questions for consideration:

18. The two questions that arise for consideration are:

i. Is Rule 13(v) of the Rules, insofar as it provides age relaxation

to the persons serving under educational projects discriminatory

and contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

ii. Is the award of bonus marks to the project employed applicants

discriminatory and ultra vires the Rules? Are the guidelines

of 27.05.2008 sanctioning the award of bonus marks on a

differential basis for applicants with project experience and

other applicants invalid for any other reason?

208 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Question No. 1:

19. To answer this, a full look at Rule 13 is essential:

“13. Age.

A candidate for direct recruitment to a post enumerated

in the Schedule must have attained the age of 23 years

and must not have attained the age of 35 years on the

first day of January following the last date fixed for receipt

of applications :

Provided -

(i) that the upper age limit mentioned above, shall be

relaxed by 5 years in the case of male candidates

belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes

and the Other Backward classes.

(ii) that the upper age limit mentioned above shall be

relaxed by 5 years in case of women candidates

belonging to General Category.

(iii) that the upper age limit mentioned above shall be

relaxed by 10 years in the case of women candidates

belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes

and the Other Backward classes.

(iv) that the upper age limit mentioned above shall be 50

years in the case of Ex-service personnel and the

reservists, namely the Defence Service Personnel

who were transferred to the reserve.

(v) that the person serving under the educational project

in the State viz Rajiv Gandhi Pathshala/Shiksha

Karmi Board/Lok Jumbish Pariyojana/Sarva Shiksha

Abhiyan/District Primary Education Programme shall

be deemed to be within age limit, had they been within

the age limit when they were initially engaged even

though they may have crossed the age limit at the

time of direct recruitment.

(vi) that the upper age limit mentioned above shall be

relaxed by a period equal to the service rendered

in the NCC in the case of Cadet instructors and if 

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 209

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

the resultant age does not exceed the prescribed

maximum age limit by more than three years, they

shall be deemed to be within the prescribed age limit.

(vii) that the Released Emergency Commissioned Officers

and Short Service Commissioned Officers after

release from the Army shall be deemed to be within

the age limit even though they have crossed the age

limit when they appear before the Committee had

they been eligible as such at the time of their joining

the Commission in the Army.

(viii) that there shall be no upper age limit in the case of

widows and divorced women.”

20. Fixing of minimum and maximum age requirement is a policy decision.

In this case, the said decision is engrafted in Rule 13. A careful

perusal of the Rule reveals that the minimum age required was 23

years and the maximum outer limit was 35 years. In the proviso

there are several categories to which relaxation has been granted.

Under clause (i) of the proviso, a relaxation of 5 years is granted

to male candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled

Tribes and the Other Backward classes. Under clause (ii) of the

proviso, the upper age limit is relaxed by 5 years in case of women

candidates belonging to General Category and under clause (iii) it is

relaxed by 10 years in the case of women candidates belonging to

the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward

classes. Under Clause (iv), the age relaxation is of 50 years in the

case of Ex-service Personnel and the reservists, namely the Defence

Service Personnel who were transferred to the reserve.

21. Thereafter, we have clause (v) which states that the person serving

under the educational project in the State, namely, Rajiv Gandhi

Pathshala/Shiksha Karmi Board/Lok Jumbish Pariyojana/Sarva

Shiksha Abhiyan/District Primary Education Programme shall be

deemed to be within age limit, had they been within the age limit

when they were initially engaged even though they may have crossed

the age limit at the time of direct recruitment. Thereafter, we have

clause (vi) which states that the upper age limit mentioned above

shall be relaxed by a period equal to the service rendered in the

NCC in the case of Cadet instructors and if the resultant age does

not exceed the prescribed maximum age limit by more than three 

210 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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years, they shall be deemed to be within the prescribed age limit.

In clause (vii) the Released Emergency Commissioned Officers and

Short Service Commissioned Officers after release from the Army

shall be deemed to be within the age limit even though they have

crossed the age limit when they appear before the Committee had

they been eligible as such at the time of their joining the Commission

in the Army. So finally in clause (viii) it is provided that there shall

be no upper age limit in the case of widows and divorced women.

22. The challenge of the appellants is only to sub clause (v). We find

that the provisions generally including sub clause (v) are not arbitrary

or discriminatory. Insofar as the clause (v) is concerned, as has

been mentioned hereinabove, the historical background leading to

the enactment of the Rules itself provides a justification for granting

relaxation to the persons serving under the educational project, if

they fulfil the condition that they were within the age limit when they

were initially engaged.

23. As the counter affidavit of the State indicates that the projects were

designed to deal with absentee teachers in the far flung areas which

was causing a serious jeopardy to the education of the rural children.

The para teachers, as they were called, worked under difficult

circumstances. They had the advantage of interacting personally

with the children of the far-flung areas. They only received an

honorarium. The projects themselves played a large part in uplifting

the elementary education programme in the State. The para teachers

motivated the children to come to school. It was in this background

that the grade of ‘Prabodhak’ and Senior ‘Prabodhak’ were encadred

and separate rules enacted.

24. No doubt, under the Rules, opportunity to apply was also given to all

those who possess the essential qualifications and who had teaching

experience in any recognized educational institutions apart from the

educational projects. This, however, does not mean that those who

served in projects did not form a separate class. There was a valid

classification based on intelligible differentia which distinguished

applicants with project experience and those who lacked project

experience. Further the differentia had a rational relation to the

object sought to be achieved by the Rules. In fact, the job of a

Prabodhak was exactly the job that the para teachers carried out in

the projects and if the Government felt that the experience gained 

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 211

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

by them should not be lost and in that regard granted them age

relaxation, provided they fulfil the condition of being within the age

limit at the time of their initial appointment in the project, no fault

can be found with the same.

25. Dealing with the similar challenge in Union of India & Ors v.

Shivbachan Rai, (2001) 9 SCC 356, this Court held that the

prescribing of any age limit for a given post, as also deciding the

extent to which any relaxation can be given to the said age limit

are essentially matters of policy. It was further held that it was open

for the Government while framing the rules to prescribe such age

limits or to prescribe the extent to which any relaxation can be given.

Applying the said principle to this case, we find that the relaxation

provided for in Rule 13(v) is not arbitrary or unreasonable.

Question No.2:

26. Insofar as the award of bonus marks is concerned, a careful perusal

of the guidelines indicates that it was issued before the advertisement

and all that it provided was out of the allotted maximum marks of

25 for the experience, ordinarily 2 marks were to be given for every

year with a cap of 10 marks. However, if the experience is for the

employee receiving honorarium under the projects run by the State

Government, then he was to be given 5 marks for each academic

session with the maximum of 25 marks. Even if part of the experience

was in a project to that extent extra marks were provided to all the

applicants.

27. In the application form, there was a specific column, namely, column

fourteen which asked about details of the experience. The form also

asked for the name of the employer and the address of the institution

employed. Thereafter, there was another column asking for the

post in which they were employed and the period during which the

emoluments were received.

28. Apart from this, the justification offered for defending the age relaxation

is also available for the grant of excess bonus marks. In fact, as is

clear from the background set out above, the creation of the post

of ‘Prabodhak’ and ‘Senior Prabodhak’ was to get the advantage of

the benefits that the projects gave to the State. At the same time,

opportunity was given to all, with the only difference being that by

an executive instruction additional marks were granted for project 

212 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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experience. The executive guidelines only supplemented the Rules

and did not supplant them.

29. Moreover, intrinsically from Rule 13(v) the validity of which we have

upheld, evidence is available to show that the Rule recognized the

experience gathered from project work stood on a higher pedestal

because it was in tune with the nature of the work of Prabodhak.

Further, under Rule 25, the Committee was to prepare a list of

candidates whom they consider suitable for appointment.

30. In Srinivas K. Gouda v. Karnataka Institute of Medical Sciences

and Others (2022) 1 SCC 49, a notification was issued inviting

applications for the post of Junior Lab Technician. Eligibility and

requirements were prescribed. At the time of selection, the Selection

Committee decided that out of the 15% marks for interview, 10% of

the marks were to be set apart for the length of work experience and/

or additional training in teaching hospitals of the medical college, with

special preference to those who had worked in teaching hospitals

of Government/autonomous medical colleges and the remaining

5% marks were to be assigned to the personality of the candidates

based on viva voice. In the minutes, it was set out as under:

“4. …. It was decided that in order to select the most

suitable candidates, proportionate weightage based on the

length of experience and/or additional training to the extent

of 10 marks be given to those candidates who had work

experience and/or additional training in medical college

teaching hospitals and especially those who had worked

in government/autonomous medical college teaching

hospitals. It was agreed that the type of work in these

institutions most closely resembled the working conditions

at Karnataka Institute of Medical Sciences, Hubli and hence

the candidates who had experience in such institutions

would be the most suitable. It was also decided to set

apart a maximum of 5 marks for the personality of the

candidate and his/her presentation and performance….”

(Emphasis supplied)

31. The appellant in that case was selected and the selection had

been set aside by the Division Bench of the High Court. The

appellant secured 9.5 marks in the experience category while the 

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 213

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

writ petitioner who had challenged his appointment had secured

one (1) mark under the component of experience. On appeal, the

appellant contended that the selection committee, an expert body,

was entitled to apportion marks, and that the appellant had experience

in Government/Autonomous medical institutions. The writ petitioner

had contended that no explanation was furnished for dividing the

marks and bifurcating the same. This Court while allowing the appeal

in para 19 held as under:

“19. It is in this background that we need to determine

whether the marks allotted to the appellant in the

category of experience and personality are arbitrary. The

appellant at the time of submitting the application had

a one year work experience in Bapuji Medical College,

Devanagere (a private institution) and three years of work

experience with the first respondent. On the other hand,

the respondent at the time of the application, had six

months’ experience of working under a doctor who was

undertaking private practice. Not only did the appellant have

more years of work experience, he had work experience

in a governmental institution. Hence, the marks awarded

to the third respondent and the appellant bore a nexus to

the yardstick determined by the Selection Committee. It

is not the case of the third respondent that the appellant

was given more marks for experience despite having less

work experience. On a comparison of the marks allotted

to both the candidates with reference to the yardstick

determined by the Selection Committee, no mala fides

could be imputed to the Selection Committee. Nor is

there an obvious or glaring error or perversity. The Court

does not sit in appeal over the decision of the Selection

Committee.”

32. In the present case too, we find no glaring error or perversity in the

criterion adopted on the peculiar facts of the present case. No mala

fide could also be attributed to the State and the Selection Committee.

33. Satya Dev Bhagaur (supra) was a case wherein the State of

Rajasthan had issued a notification providing that such of the

candidate who had worked under the Government, Chief Minister

BPL Life Saving Fund, NRHM Medicare Relief Society, AIDS Control 

214 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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Society, National TB Control Program, Jhalawar Hospital and

Medical College Society, Samekit Rog Nirgrani Pariyojna or State

Institute of Health Family Welfare would be entitled to bonus marks

as per the experience attained. It was provided that for one year of

experience, the bonus marks will be 10, for two years of experience

the bonus marks will be 20 and for three years of experience it will

be 30. This notification was challenged by certain persons who

had experience of working in NRHM Scheme on contract basis

in States other than Rajasthan. They sought a direction to accept

their experience certificate so as to entitle them to obtain the bonus

marks. While the Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions, the Division

Bench reversed the same and the aggrieved Writ Petitioners were

in Appeal. Examining the question whether bonus marks would

be available to employees of NRHM Scheme in other States, this

Court while repelling the contention held that in matters of policy,

Courts should be slow in interfering, unless the policy is found to

be palpably discriminatory and arbitrary. It was further held that the

court would not interfere with the policy decision when the State was

in a position to point out that there was an intelligible differentia in

the application of the policy and that such intelligible differentia had

a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. On the facts of that

case, the Court held as follows:

“20. It could thus clearly be seen that the Division Bench

in Jagdish Prasad [Jagdish Prasad v. State of Rajasthan,

2016 SCC OnLine Raj 646] after considering the record,

has come to the finding that the Government of Rajasthan

has conducted several training programmes for the persons

working with it on contractual basis, as well as under

different schemes. The training programmes mainly pertain

to the peculiar working pattern in the rural areas of the State

of Rajasthan including tribal and arid zones. The Division

Bench has further come to a finding that participation in

such a training is mandatory and non-joining of the same

would result in non-renewal of service contracts. It has been

held that persons having special knowledge in working

in the State of Rajasthan form a class different than the

persons not having such experience of working in the

State. It was found that the benefit extended by the State

policy was only that of giving a little more weightage on the 

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 215

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

basis of experience and all the candidates were required

to undergo the rigor of selection process. The Division

Bench has clearly held that the experienced candidates

in other States cannot be compared with the candidates

working in the State of Rajasthan, as every State has

its own problems and issues and the persons trained to

meet such circumstances, stand on a different pedestal.”

34. We find that the ratio laid down in the said judgment is applicable to

the facts of the present case also to uphold the action of the State.

35. The judgment of this Court in Raj Kumar (supra) cited by the learned

counsel for the appellants is clearly distinguishable. That case dealt

with the Rule which provided that any person who has passed the

SSC examination and is supposed to be a rural candidate was to

be given weightage by the Public Service Commission by awarding

10% marks in each subject for such a candidate. It was also provided

that the Viva Voce Board was to put relevant questions to judge

the suitability of the candidate for working in rural areas and to test

whether or not they had sufficient knowledge of rural problems. Rural

candidate was defined to mean a candidate who comes from the

rural area and who has passed SSC examination which is held from

a village or a town having only a ‘C’ type Municipality. The purported

object of the Rule was to take officers who had full knowledge of rural

life, its problems, aptitudes and working of the people in villages. This

Court held that the Rule did not fulfil or carry out the object sought

to be achieved since as the Rules stood any person who may not

have lived in a village at all can appear for SSC Examination from

a village and yet become eligible for selection. The Court found

that there was no nexus between the classification and the object

sought to be achieved. The Court also faulted the weightage marks

given by holding that since in the viva voce questions to judge the

suitability of the candidate for working in rural areas were anyway

being put, there was absolutely no occasion for giving weightage

which would convert demerit into merit and merit into demerit. On

the facts of that case, the Court found the rule of weightage to be

manifestly unreasonable and wholly arbitrary. The said case has no

application to the facts of the present case.

36. Equally the judgment in Kailash Chand Sharma vs State of

Rajasthan & Ors., (2002) 6 SCC 562 has also no application. 

216 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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This Court in that case held that the award of bonus marks to the

residents of the district and residents of the rural areas of the district

amounts to impermissible discrimination. The Court found that there

was no rational basis for such preferential treatment on the material

placed before the Court. The Court found that the ostensible reasons

advanced by the State were non-existent or irrelevant, having no

nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It also found that no

criteria was set out for determining as to residents in rural areas.

The Court in Kailash Chand Sharma (supra) followed the judgment

in Raj Kumar (Supra).

37. The judgment in Official Liquidator vs. Dayanand & Ors. (2008)

10 SCC 1 cited by the appellants has no connection at all with the

issues raised in the present case. Yet another case cited by the

appellants is Bedanga Talukdar (supra). The appellants relied on

the said judgment to contend that there could be no relaxation in

the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement and even if

there was power of relaxation the same will have to be specifically

indicated in the advertisement. The case is wholly inapplicable. In

this case, before the advertisement was issued, the guidelines setting

out various aspects including the aspect of bonus marks were issued

and, as discussed earlier, no infirmity can be found with the same.

38. Similarly, the judgment in State of Rajasthan vs. Archana (2017)

11 SCC 421 and the judgment in Civil Appeal 12335 of 2016 dated

18.01.2022 in Manoj Kumar Acharya vs. State of Rajasthan

& Ors., cited by the State have no application to the facts of the

present case.

39. The argument that the guideline was not in public domain was not

an argument canvassed either before the learned Single Judge or

before the Division Bench. In any event, the contention does not

impress us on the facts of the present case. The guideline setting

out the selection process was issued before the advertisement and

it was applied uniformly and across the board to all the applicants.

No prejudice has been caused to the applicants even assuming

that the guideline was not in the public domain. It was a procedure

adopted by the recruiting Authority and endorsed by the Selection

Committee. The appellants have had the opportunity to assail the

validity of the prescription of the award of bonus marks and as such

have had a fora to ventilate their grievance. They have failed in the 

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 217

Mahesh Chand Bareth & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

process. Hence, we cannot jettison the guideline on the alleged

ground that it was not in public domain. Equally, since the guidelines

of 27.05.2008 preceded the advertisement of 31.05.2008, there is

no merit in the argument feebly advanced that the rules of the game

had been changed after the match had begun.

40. On the special facts of this case, considering the peculiarity that

obtained in the State of Rajasthan with regard to absentee teachers

and drop out of students and the introduction of the projects with para

legals to address the situation, we find no illegality in the prescription

of additional marks for those applicants who had experience of

working in projects, while recruiting Prabhodhaks. The statutory rules

itself in Rule 13(v) recognize that project employed applicants were

a class apart and the idea being that their experience should not

be wasted. In view of the above, we find no illegality in the award

of bonus marks.

41. In view of the above, we find no merit in the appeals and all the

appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs. All applications for

impleadment and intervention are closed.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey