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Thursday, July 25, 2024

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 r/w s.34 – Non-compliance of s.313 – Non-questioning on the twin incriminating circumstances to the appellant convicted u/s.302 r/w s. 34, IPC during his examination u/s.313, when the finding of common intention was based on the aforesaid twin incriminating circumstances, if caused material prejudice vitiating the trial qua him: Held: Yes – Non-questioning or inadequate questioning on incriminating circumstances to an accused by itself would not vitiate the trial qua the accused concerned and to hold that the trial qua him is vitiated it is to be established further that it resulted in material prejudice to the accused – Examination of the appellant u/s.313 reveals that both the incriminating circumstances appearing against the appellant in the prosecution evidence viz., exhortation to do away with the lives of the deceased and others in his family and the evidence that the appellant had caught hold of the hands of the deceased to enable his brother-co-accused to stab him repeatedly with knife, were not directly or even indirectly put to him while being examined u/s.313 – The conclusion that the appellant had shared the common intention to commit murder of the deceased was based only on the aforesaid two incriminating circumstances which were not put to him while being questioned u/s.313 – There was no charge of commission of an offence u/s. 300, IPC, punishable u/s. 302, IPC, simplicitor against the appellant, he was charged thereunder with the aid of s.34, IPC – Thus, when the finding of common intention was based on the twin incriminating circumstances and when they were not put to the appellant while he was being questioned u/s.313, and when they ultimately culminated in his conviction u/s.302 with the aid of s.34, IPC, and when he was awarded with the life imprisonment, the appellant was materially prejudiced and it had resulted in blatant miscarriage of justice – The failure is not a curable defect and it is a patent illegality vitiating the trial qua the appellant – Appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained, acquitted – Impugned judgments set aside qua the appellant. [Paras 20, 21, 24, 26, 27] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Non-questioning/inadequate questioning on incriminating circumstances – Prejudice or miscarriage of justice – Onus to establish: Held: Onus to establish the prejudice or miscarriage on account of non-questioning or inadequate questioning on any incriminating circumstance(s), during the examination u/s. 313 is on the convict concerned. [Para 21] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009) – s.313(5) – “actus curiae neminem gravabit” – Contention as regards the non-examination/inadequate examination u/s.313 causing material prejudice to the appellant was not appropriately raised and argued before the High Court and was raised for the first time before Supreme Court – Said contention if can be maintained at this stage: Held: s.313 would reveal the irrecusable obligation coupled with duty on Court concerned to put the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence against accused concerned facing the trial providing him an opportunity to explain – Sub-Section (5) of Section 313 inserted under 2008 Amendment Act lends support to this view – Also, the act of court shall prejudice no one – In a charge for commission of a serious offence where extreme penalty alone is imposable in case the accused is found guilty, procedural safeguards ensuring protection of right(s) of accused must be followed and at any rate, in such cases when non-compliance of the mandatory procedure capable of vitiating trial qua the convict concerned is raised and revealed from records, irrespective of the fact it was not raised appropriately, it must be considered lest the byproduct of consideration of the case would result in miscarriage of justice – Being the Court existing for dispensation of justice, this Court is bound to consider and correct the mistake committed by the Court by looking into the question whether non-examination or inadequate examination of accused concerned caused material prejudice or miscarriage of justice. [Paras 15, 16] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Object: Held: s.313 embodies salutary principle of natural justice viz., audi alteram partem and empowering the Court to examine the accused thereunder is to give the accused concerned an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence – The general position is that if any incriminating circumstance, appearing against an accused in the prosecution evidence, is not put to him it should not be used against him and must be excluded from consideration – At the same time, it is a well-settled position that non-examination or inadequate examination u/s.313 on any incriminating circumstance, by itself, would not vitiate a trial qua the convict concerned unless it has resulted in material prejudice to him or in miscarriage of justice. [Para 11] Practice and Procedure – Judgment not containing discussion on a particular point – Said point is to be prima facie assumed not to have been argued unless contrary is shown – Contention of the appellant as regards non-examination/inadequate examination u/s.313 causing material prejudice to him, if was argued before the High Court: Held: Normally, it has to be presumed that all the arguments actually pressed at the hearing in the High Court were noticed and appropriately dealt with and if the judgment of the High Court does not contain discussion on a point, then that point should be assumed prima facie not to have been argued at the bar unless the contrary is specifically shown – In the present case, though grounds A to Z and AA to GG were taken in this appeal, there was absolute absence of any contention in any one of them to the effect that despite being pressed into, the contention as regards non-examination u/s. 313 was not taken into consideration and appropriately dealt with by the High Court – Hence, the conclusion can only be that it was not argued. [Para 12]

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 178 : 2024 INSC 464


Naresh Kumar v. State of Delhi

(Criminal Appeal No.1751 of 2017)


08 July 2024


[C.T. Ravikumar* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Non-questioning the appellant convicted u/s.302 r/w s.34, Penal Code, 1860 on the twin incriminating circumstances during his examination u/s.313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if caused material prejudice to him vitiating the trial qua him.


Headnotes


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 r/w s.34 – Non-compliance of s.313 – Non-questioning on the twin incriminating circumstances to the appellant convicted u/s.302 r/w s. 34, IPC during his examination u/s.313, when the finding of common intention was based on the aforesaid twin incriminating circumstances, if caused material prejudice vitiating the trial qua him:


Held: Yes – Non-questioning or inadequate questioning on incriminating circumstances to an accused by itself would not vitiate the trial qua the accused concerned and to hold that the trial qua him is vitiated it is to be established further that it resulted in material prejudice to the accused – Examination of the appellant u/s.313 reveals that both the incriminating circumstances appearing against the appellant in the prosecution evidence viz., exhortation to do away with the lives of the deceased and others in his family and the evidence that the appellant had caught hold of the hands of the deceased to enable his brother-co-accused to stab him repeatedly with knife, were not directly or even indirectly put to him while being examined u/s.313 – The conclusion that the appellant had shared the common intention to commit murder of the deceased was based only on the aforesaid two incriminating circumstances which were not put to him while being questioned u/s.313 – There was no charge of commission of an offence u/s. 300, IPC, punishable u/s. 302, IPC, simplicitor against the appellant, he was charged thereunder with the aid of s.34, IPC – Thus, when the finding of common intention was based on the twin incriminating circumstances and when they were not put to the appellant while he was being questioned u/s.313, and when they ultimately culminated in his conviction u/s.302 with the aid of s.34, IPC, and when he was awarded with the life imprisonment, the appellant was materially prejudiced and it had resulted in blatant miscarriage of justice – The failure is not a curable defect and it is a patent illegality vitiating the trial qua the appellant – Appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained, acquitted – Impugned judgments set aside qua the appellant. [Paras 20, 21, 24, 26, 27]


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Non-questioning/inadequate questioning on incriminating circumstances – Prejudice or miscarriage of justice – Onus to establish:


Held: Onus to establish the prejudice or miscarriage on account of non-questioning or inadequate questioning on any incriminating circumstance(s), during the examination u/s. 313 is on the convict concerned. [Para 21]


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009) – s.313(5) – “actus curiae neminem gravabit” – Contention as regards the non-examination/inadequate examination u/s.313 causing material prejudice to the appellant was not appropriately raised and argued before the High Court and was raised for the first time before Supreme Court – Said contention if can be maintained at this stage:


Held: s.313 would reveal the irrecusable obligation coupled with duty on Court concerned to put the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence against accused concerned facing the trial providing him an opportunity to explain – Sub-Section (5) of Section 313 inserted under 2008 Amendment Act lends support to this view – Also, the act of court shall prejudice no one – In a charge for commission of a serious offence where extreme penalty alone is imposable in case the accused is found guilty, procedural safeguards ensuring protection of right(s) of accused must be followed and at any rate, in such cases when non-compliance of the mandatory procedure capable of vitiating trial qua the convict concerned is raised and revealed from records, irrespective of the fact it was not raised appropriately, it must be considered lest the byproduct of consideration of the case would result in miscarriage of justice – Being the Court existing for dispensation of justice, this Court is bound to consider and correct the mistake committed by the Court by looking into the question whether non-examination or inadequate examination of accused concerned caused material prejudice or miscarriage of justice. [Paras 15, 16]


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313 – Object:


Held: s.313 embodies salutary principle of natural justice viz., audi alteram partem and empowering the Court to examine the accused thereunder is to give the accused concerned an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence – The general position is that if any incriminating circumstance, appearing against an accused in the prosecution evidence, is not put to him it should not be used against him and must be excluded from consideration – At the same time, it is a well-settled position that non-examination or inadequate examination u/s.313 on any incriminating circumstance, by itself, would not vitiate a trial qua the convict concerned unless it has resulted in material prejudice to him or in miscarriage of justice. [Para 11]


Practice and Procedure – Judgment not containing discussion on a particular point – Said point is to be prima facie assumed not to have been argued unless contrary is shown – Contention of the appellant as regards non-examination/inadequate examination u/s.313 causing material prejudice to him, if was argued before the High Court:


Held: Normally, it has to be presumed that all the arguments actually pressed at the hearing in the High Court were noticed and appropriately dealt with and if the judgment of the High Court does not contain discussion on a point, then that point should be assumed prima facie not to have been argued at the bar unless the contrary is specifically shown – In the present case, though grounds A to Z and AA to GG were taken in this appeal, there was absolute absence of any contention in any one of them to the effect that despite being pressed into, the contention as regards non-examination u/s. 313 was not taken into consideration and appropriately dealt with by the High Court – Hence, the conclusion can only be that it was not argued. [Para 12]


Case Law Cited


V.K. Sasikala v. State [2012] 10 SCR 641 : (2012) 9 SCC 771; Suresh Chandra Bihari v. State of Bihar [1994] Supp. 1 SCR 483 : AIR 1994 SC 2420; Wariyam Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. [1995] Supp. 3 SCR 807 : AIR 1996 SC 305; Amanullah v. State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 1370; Shobit Chamar & Anr. v. State of Bihar [1998] 2 SCR 117 : AIR 1998 SC 1693; Oil and Natural Gas Company Limited v. Modern Construction and Company [2013] 10 SCR 466 : (2014) 1 SCC 648; Raj Kumar @ Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2023] 5 SCR 754 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 609; State of Punjab v. Swaran Singh 2005 Supp. 1 SCR 786 : (2005) 6 SCC 101 – referred to.


List of Acts


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009).


List of Keywords


Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Questioning under clause (b) Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is mandatory; Conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code, 1860; Examination under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Incriminating circumstances; Non-questioning/inadequate questioning on incriminating circumstances; Material prejudice or blatant miscarriage of justice; Procedural safeguards; Protection of rights of accused; non-compliance of the mandatory procedure; Finding of common intention based on the incriminating circumstances; Exhortation; Non-curable defect; Patent illegality; Trial vitiated; Principle of natural justice viz., “audi alteram partem”; “actus curiae neminem gravabit”; Act of court shall prejudice no one; Contention not argued before the High Court; Contention not raised appropriately.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1751 of 2017


From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.2016 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No. 540 of 2000


Appearances for Parties


S. D. Singh, Ms. Bharti Tyagi, Ms. Shweta Sinha, Ram Kripal Singh, Dhiraj Kumar, Siddharth Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.


Ms. Sonia Mathur, Sr. Adv., Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Ms. Noor Rampal, Shantnu Sharma, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Advs. for the Respondent.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


C.T. Ravikumar, J.


1.Births of crimes and culprits concerned, occur together. Yet, under the criminal justice delivery system only on concluding findings on commission of the crime concerned in the affirmative, the question whether the accused is its culprit would arise. Culpability can be fixed, if at all it is to be fixed, on the accused upon conclusive proof of the same established by the prosecution only after following various procedural safeguards recognizing certain rights of an accused. Failure to comply with such mandatory procedures may even vitiate the very trial, subject to the satisfaction of conditions, therefor. Foremost among one such right is embedded in Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the ‘Cr.PC’). Though questioning under clause (a) of sub-Section (1) of Section 313, Cr.PC, is discretionary, the questioning under clause (b) thereof is mandatory. Needless to say, a fatal non-compliance in the matter of questioning under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) thereof, in case resulted in material prejudice to any convict in a criminal case the trial concerned, qua that convict should stand vitiated. This prelude becomes necessary as in the captioned appeal the main thrust of the argument advanced is founded on fatal, non-compliance in the matter of questioning under Section 313, Cr.PC, qua the appellant who is a life convict. We will dilate on this a little later.


2.The appellant, who was accused No.4 in Sessions Case No.3/97 is challenging the confirmation of his conviction under Section 302, IPC, with the aid of Section 34, IPC, under the impugned judgment in Criminal Appeal No.540/2000 dated 20.12.2016 passed by the High Court of Delhi. As per the prosecution, an argy-bargy over spilling of drops of water over the roof of the appellant’s house while Laxmi, the sister of the deceased-Arun Kumar was cleaning the chajja (parapet) of their house resulted in the accurst incident, where the said Arun Kumar lost his life on 14.06.1995 at 08.45 pm. The case of the prosecution is that enraged by the dropping of water over the roof, the wife of the appellant, namely, Meena, hurled filthy words at Laxmi. Then the appellant came out and he, too, started abusing. Thereupon, the deceased asked him to stop abusing his sister and then the appellant exhorted his brother Mahinder Kumar to come out and finish them. Soon, Mahinder came out with a knife and the appellant-Naresh Kumar caught hold of Arun Kumar and Mahinder stabbed on his chest repeatedly with the knife. The necroscopic evidence in this case consists of the oral testimony of PW-17, Dr. LK Baruah and the postmortem report Ext.PW7/A, which disclosed that the deceased had sustained the following antemortem injuries:


"1.Incised wound size 1.3 cm x 0.5 cm. On the left side front of chest. There is 1-1/2 medial to the left nipple placed abliquely.


2.Incised wound size .3 cm x 0.5 cm.x? on the middle of chest situated 1.5 cm. Right to the mid line and below a line drawn between two nipples.


3.Two incised wounds size 1.3 cm. And other 1.5 cm. In the right epigeastric region.


4.Incised wounds left side lower part of chest 9 cm. Below left nipple size 1.4 cm x 2.3 cm.


5.Abrasion on the dorsom left forearm and hand


6.Abrasion seen below left eye.”


3.Taking note of the said necroscopic evidence corroborating the events unfolded through the oral testimonies of the eye-witnesses viz., Anil Kumar (PW-7), Smt. Prem Devi (PW-8), Sanjay (PW-20), who are respectively the brother, mother and one cousin of the deceased and Smt. Madhu (PW-19) and Anand Kumar (PW-22) besides the other evidences, the trial Court found that the homicidal death of Arun Kumar amounts to murder and culpability was fixed on Mahinder Kumar, the first accused. We make it clear that we are not going to make any observation in respect of Sri Mahinder Kumar in this appeal and reference about him was made solely for the purpose of disposing this appeal.


4.As noticed earlier, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC, was then made with the aid of Section 34, IPC, and upon which he was awarded imprisonment for life. The conviction of the appellant herein was confirmed under the impugned common judgment dated 20.12.2016 in Criminal Appeal No.540/2000 (filed by the appellant herein), and Criminal Appeal No.764/2000 (filed by Mahinder Kumar).


5.Heard Sh. S.D. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent State.


6.As noticed earlier, the thrust of the argument for the appellant was founded on prejudicial non-compliance of Section 313, Cr.PC, during the examination thereunder, qua the appellant. Before going into its details, we think it appropriate to consider whether the appellant is raising this contention for the first time before this Court. In this context, it is to be noted that there is nothing on record which would reveal that specific contention in this regard was raised before the High Court in the appeal. True, that in the appeal before the High Court a ground in this regard was raised as ‘ground No.13’ as hereunder: -


“13. That has been no proper examination of the appellant u/s. 313 Cr.P.C. which has caused material prejudice to the appellant.”


7.There is nothing in the impugned judgment to reveal that this point was argued with specific details establishing prejudice, before the High Court. The innumerable grounds (grounds A to Z and AA to GG) raised in this appeal would reveal that neither directly nor indirectly, this core contention was taken in any of them. At any rate, no ground was raised to the effect that despite raising this ground, the High Court had failed to consider it. Be that as it may, the order dated 21.07.2017 of this Court would reveal that the learned counsel for the appellant argued before this Court that while recording the statement of the appellant under Section 313, Cr.PC, no incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence against him, were put to him and that vitiated the whole trial. Obviously, thereupon notice was issued in the Special Leave Petition from which this appeal arose. Later, only in the first application for bail, a contention on the following lines was taken and it was reiterated in the second application for bail as well:


“7. That on completion of the evidence statement of accused under Section 313 Cr. PC have been recorded on 6.6.2000 and the mere perusal of the statement would show that no incriminating evidence which had been subsequently considered for the conviction of the appellant by the Ld. Trial Court as well as Hon’ble High Court had been put to the Appellant. Therefore, the entire trial against the Appellant is vitiated.”


8.During the course of the arguments by the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that this contention is based on non-questioning on two incriminating circumstances appeared against the appellant in the prosecution evidence viz., exhortation to do away with their lives (aaj inko jaan se hi khatam karde) and the evidence that ‘the appellant had caught hold of the hands of the deceased Arun Kumar to enable Mahinder Kumar to stab him repeatedly with knife’ and they formed the foundation for holding that the appellant had shared common intention with the first accused and ultimately, for holding the appellant guilty with the aid of Section 34, IPC, for the offence under Section 300, IPC, punishable under Section 302, IPC.


9.In view of the aforementioned core contentions, we are of the considered view that we need to consider the other grounds taken up in the appeal on the merits only if the appellant could not succeed based on non-examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, qua the appellant. We may consider any other relevant aspect, circumstance or evidence if we find that it is required for a proper consideration and appreciation of the above-mentioned core contention.


10.We have taken note of the absence of materials to show that the aforesaid core contention was appropriately raised and argued before the High Court. In the captioned appeal, it was not taken at all. In view of the circumstances the contention is resurrected, we are of the considered view that to entertain the same, it is essential to have a short survey on the authorities on the scope of maintaining such a contention at this stage in the aforementioned circumstances. Subject to its answer, we may also have to consider the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice due to the non-compliance with mandate for questioning under Section 313, Cr.PC.


11.In the context of the issues thus involved, it is only proper to look into the very object of Section 313, Cr.PC. This aspect has been considered many a times by this Court to hold that it embodies one salutary principle of natural justice viz., audi alteram partem and empowering the Court to examine the accused thereunder is to give the accused concerned an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. In the decision in V.K. Sasikala v. State 1, this Court held that examination of an accused under Section 313, Cr.PC, would not only provide an opportunity to him to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence against him, but also would permit him to forward his own version with regard to his alleged involvement in the crime. Furthermore, it was held that such an examination would have a fair nexus with a defence he might choose to bring and, therefore, any failure in such examination might take the effect of curtailing his right in the event he took up a specific defence. The general position is that if any incriminating circumstance, appearing against an accused in the prosecution evidence, is not put to him it should not be used against him and must be excluded from consideration. At the same time, we may hasten to add that it is a well-neigh settled position that non-examination or inadequate examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, on any incriminating circumstance, by itself, would not vitiate a trial qua the convict concerned unless it has resulted in material prejudice to him or in miscarriage of justice. In the decision in Suresh Chandra Bihari v. State of Bihar 2 and in Wariyam Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. 3, this Court held that mere defective/improper examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, would be no ground to set aside a conviction of the accused unless it has resulted in prejudice to the accused. In view of the said position which is being followed with alacrity we do not think it necessary to multiply the authorities on it.


12.We have already noted that ‘ground No.13’ raised in the appeal before the High Court was too vague, in the sense without clarity whatsoever, as to what were the incriminating circumstances that appeared in the prosecution evidence not being put to the appellant while being examined and what is the material prejudice or miscarriage of justice caused consequent to such failure. To make matters worse, a scanning of the impugned judgment of the High Court would not disclose whether before the High Court, the said contention was pressed into service much-less whether it was argued with precision on quintessential materials to establish that the trial qua the appellant was vitiated. In the contextual situation it is relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in Amanullah v. State of U.P.4. Normally, it has to be presumed that all the arguments actually pressed at the hearing in the High Court were noticed and appropriately dealt with and if the judgment of the High Court does not contain discussion on a point, then that point should be assumed prima facie not to have been argued at the bar unless the contrary is specifically shown, it was so, held in the said judgment. In the case on hand though grounds A to Z and AA to GG were taken in this appeal, there is absolute absence of any contention in any one of them to the effect that despite being pressed into the said contention was not taken into consideration and appropriately dealt with by the High Court. Hence, the conclusion can only be that it was not argued.


13.This position takes us to the next question as to whether in such circumstances the contention based on non-examination/inadequate examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, causing material prejudice qua the appellant can be maintained at this stage. In this context, it is only appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Shobit Chamar & Anr. v. State of Bihar 5. It was held therein that where the plea as to non-compliance of the provisions of Section 313, Cr.PC, was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court, in case no prejudice had resulted to the accused was proved, the trial could not be held as vitiated. In that case, though the non-compliance was taken for the first time before the Supreme Court, the records showed that the relevant portion of the statement of witnesses were put to the accused in examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, and, thereupon, the plea was rejected. It is to be noted that was also a case of murder.


14.In the light of the aforesaid question posed for consideration, it is only appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions under Section 313 (1), (4) and (5).


“313. Power to examine the accused. — (1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court—


(a) may at any stage, without previously warning the accused put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary;


(b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case:


Provided that in a summons-case, where the Court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b).


(2) …


(3) …


(4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.


(5) The Court may take help of Prosecutor and Defence Counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be put to the accused and the Court may permit filing of written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance of this section.”


15.A bare perusal of the provisions under Section 313, Cr.PC, extracted above, would undoubtedly reveal the irrecusable obligation coupled with duty on Court concerned to put the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence against accused concerned facing the trial providing him an opportunity to explain. Sub-Section (5) of Section 313, Cr.PC, which was inserted under Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009) with effect from 31.12.2009, would lend support to this view. It reads thus:-


“Section 313. Power to examine the accused.


*** *** *** ***


(5) The Court may take help of Prosecutor and Defence Counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be put to the accused and the Court may permit filing of written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance of this section.”


16.In this context, the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” – “the act of court shall prejudice no one”, has also to be looked into. In the decision in Oil and Natural Gas Company Limited v. Modern Construction and Company 6, this Court held that the court has to correct the mistake it has done, rather than to ask the affected party to seek his remedy elsewhere. In the context of the decisions referred above, there can be no doubt that in a charge for commission of a serious offence where extreme penalty alone is imposable in case the accused is found guilty, procedural safeguards ensuring protection of right(s) of accused must be followed and at any rate, in such cases when non-compliance of the mandatory procedure capable of vitiating trial qua the convict concerned is raised and revealed from records, irrespective of the fact it was not raised appropriately, it must be considered lest the byproduct of consideration of the case would result in miscarriage of justice. Being the Court existing for dispensation of justice, this Court is bound to consider and correct the mistake committed by the Court by looking into the question whether non-examination or inadequate examination of accused concerned caused material prejudice or miscarriage of justice. We may hasten to add here, that we shall not be understood to have held that always such a mistake has to be corrected by this Court by examining the question whether material prejudice or miscarriage of justice had been caused. In this context, the summarization of law on the subject of consequence of omission to make questioning on incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence and the ways of curing the same, if it is called for, by this Court in the decision in Raj Kumar @ Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi) 7, assumes relevance. Paragraph 16 of the said decision reads thus:-


“17. The law consistently laid down by this Court can be summarized as under:


(i)It is the duty of the Trial Court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction;”


(ii)The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence;


(iii)The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused;


(iv)The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused;


(v)If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident;


(vi)In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him; and


(vii)In a given case, the case can be remanded to the Trial Court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the concerned accused under Section 313 of CrPC.


(viii)While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered.”


17.In view of the circumstances obtained in this case, factually and legally, it is also relevant to refer to paragraph 20 of the decision in Raj Kumar’s case (supra) and it reads thus:-


“21. Even assuming that the defect or irregularity was curable, the question is whether today, the appellant-accused can be called upon to explain the said circumstance. More than 27 years have passed since the date of the incident. Considering the passage of time, we are of the view that it will be unjust now at this stage to remit the case to the Trial Court for recording further statement of the appellant under Section 313 of CrPC. In the facts of the case, the appellant cannot be called upon to answer something which has transpired 27 years back. There is one more aspect of the matter which persuaded us not to pass an order of remand. The said factor is that the appellant has already undergone incarceration for a period of 10 years and 4 months.”


18.In this case, the incident in question occurred on 14.06.1995 and thus, obviously, more than 29 years have passed by. The appellant has already undergone incarceration for a period of more than 12 years. In the circumstances, we are inclined to proceed with the consideration of the contentions bearing in mind the aforesaid authorities laying down the position of law on various aspects of Section 313, Cr.PC.


19.In the case on hand, the appellant was convicted for the offence under Section 300, IPC, punishable under Section 302, IPC, with the aid of Section 34, IPC. In other words, the conviction was not under Section 302, Cr.PC, simpliciter. Upon finding guilty for commission of murder only one of two extreme penalties viz., death or imprisonment for life could be imposed on the convict. When this be the consequence of finding an accused to have committed murder or in any other serious offence where extreme punishment of like nature alone is imposable, the failure to comply with the mandatory questioning on incriminating circumstance(s) appearing in the prosecution case, if made out, the plea of non-examination or inadequate examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, whether resulted in material prejudice to the accused or total miscarriage of justice, shall not be ignored or declined to be taken into account by the Court.


20.We have already noted that crucial incriminating circumstances viz., (1) pertaining to the exhortation of the appellant to kill Arun Kumar and others in his family (2) he had caught hold of the deceased to enable Mahinder Kumar to stab on his chest repeatedly, were not allegedly put to the appellant while being examined under Section 313, Cr.PC. The first among the twin incriminating circumstances not to put to the appellant was virtually the charge framed against him to the effect that in furtherance of the common intention of Mohinder Kumar and the appellant caught hold of deceased Arun Kumar and the other accused Mohinder Kumar inflicted knife blows on deceased Arun Kumar and murdered him. The former incriminating circumstance relating to exhortation by the appellant did not form part of the charge against the appellant. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that the question whether the aforementioned twin incriminating circumstances appeared in the prosecution evidence and whether they were put to the appellant while being examined under Section 313, Cr.PC, to enable him an opportunity to offer explanation are not matters of argument as a bare perusal of the materials on record viz., the oral testimonies of the eyewitnesses and Section 313, Cr.PC, examination of the appellant would reveal the verity or otherwise of the said contentions. The oral testimonies of Anil Kumar (PW-7), Smt. Prem Devi (PW-8), Mrs. Madhu (PW-19) and Anand Kumar (PW-22) would reveal that they have deposed regarding the exhortation from the appellant though in slightly different manner, and also about the fact that he had caught hold of the deceased to enable Mohinder Kumar to stab on the chest of the deceased repeatedly. The examination of the appellant under Section 313, Cr.PC, which is available on record, would reveal that both the incriminating circumstances were not directly or even indirectly put to the appellant while being examined under Section 313, Cr.PC. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent would fairly admit that the said material on record would reveal the correctness of the contentions of the appellant.


21.We have already held that whether non-questioning or inadequate questioning on incriminating circumstances to an accused by itself would not vitiate the trial qua the accused concerned and to hold the trial qua him is vitiated it is to be established further that it resulted in material prejudice to the accused. True that the onus to establish the prejudice or miscarriage on account of non-questioning or inadequate questioning on any incriminating circumstance(s), during the examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, is on the convict concerned. We say so, because if an accused is ultimately acquitted, he could not have a case that he was prejudiced or miscarriage of justice had occurred owing to such non-questioning or inadequate questioning.


22.In the light of the above view of the matter, we are inclined to consider the further question whether the non-questioning on the aforesaid twin incriminating circumstances to the appellant during his examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, had caused material prejudice to him. The decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Swaran Singh 8, constrain us to consider one another factor while considering the question of prejudice. In Swaran Singh’s case (supra), this Court held that where the evidence of the witnesses is recorded in the presence of the accused who had the opportunity to cross examine them but did not cross examine them in respect of facts deposed, then, omission to put question to the accused regarding the evidence of such witnesses would not cause prejudice to such an accused and, therefore, could not be held as grounds vitiating the trial qua the convict concerned. We have already found that Anil Kumar (PW-7), Smt. Prem Devi (PW-8), Mrs. Madhu (PW-19) and Anand Kumar (PW-22) have deposed about the said circumstances. A scanning of their oral testimonies, available on record, would undoubtedly reveal that on both the points, on behalf of the appellants they were cross examined.


23.The position, as above, would take us to the last question whether material prejudice was caused to the appellant on account of non-questioning him on the aforesaid incriminating circumstances and thereby depriving him an opportunity to explain. This question can better be considered by referring to paragraph 31 of the judgment of the Trial Court, which virtually got confirmance from the High Court under the impugned judgment. It reads thus:-


“31. As far the part played by accused Naresh is concerned, this has come in the evidence of PWs that he (Naresh) is the man, who called his brother Mahinder and exhorted “Mahender came out and kill them today” and thereafter his taking part in the incident, by catching hold of deceased Arun Kumar, clearly goes to show the common’ intention of the two, i.e. Naresh and Mahinder and even the Learned Defence Counsel, cannot be benefited from the above noted authorities.”


24.It is evident from the afore-extracted paragraph from the judgment of the Trial Court that the said conclusion that appellant had shared the common intention to commit murder of the deceased Arun Kumar was based only on the aforesaid two incriminating circumstances which were not put to the appellant while being questioned under Section 313, Cr.PC. When the very charge framed against him, as referred as above, would reveal that there was no charge of commission of an offence under Section 300, IPC, punishable under Section 302, IPC, simplicitor against the appellant whereas the said charge thereunder with the aid of Section 34, IPC. In such circumstances, when the finding of common intention was based on the twin incriminating circumstances and when they were not put to the appellant while he was being questioned under Section 313, Cr.PC, and when they ultimately culminated in his conviction under Section 302, IPC, with the aid of Section 34, IPC, and when he was awarded with the life imprisonment consequently, it can only be held that the appellant was materially prejudiced and it had resulted in blatant miscarriage of justice. The failure as above is not a curable defect and it is nothing but a patent illegality vitiating the trial qua the appellant.


25.Once, the upshot of the discussion is above, we do not think it proper to deal with the innumerable grounds raised by the appellant, not only because it has become unnecessary but also such consideration may adversely affect the co-accused whose appeal was also decided under the very same common judgment impugned in this appeal.


26.As noticed hereinbefore, the incident in question occurred more than 29 years ago and the appellant had already undergone incarceration more than 12 years. In such circumstances, if he is again subjected to examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, it would cause further prejudice to him in view of the patent illegality occurred qua the appellant. Hence, the conviction of the appellant could not be sustained.


27.For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal must succeed. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the trial Court and the High Court are set aside qua the appellant. We make it clear that this judgment would not disturb the conviction of the other accused. We also make it clear that this observation shall not be taken as confirmation of his conviction as it is a matter which may be dealt with in an appeal, if any, filed by him. The appellant herein stands acquitted of the offences alleged against him. If his detention is not required in connection with any other case, he shall be released, forthwith.


28.The appeal is allowed on the above terms.


29.Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.


Result of the case: Appeal allowed.


1 [2012] 10 SCR 641 : (2012) 9 SCC 771


2 [1994] Supp. 1 SCR 483 : AIR 1994 SC 2420


3 [1995] Supp. 3 SCR 807 : AIR 1996 SC 305


4 AIR 1973 SC 1370


5 [1998] 2 SCR 117 : AIR 1998 SC 1693


6 [2013] 10 SCR 466 : (2014) 1 SCC 648


7 [2023] 5 SCR 754 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 609


8 [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 786 : (2005) 6 SCC 101


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Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 302 and 307, s. 300 exception 1 – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder, when – Plea of self-defence – Prosecution case that the appellant-police guard committed murder of the deceased inside the police station while he was on duty – Deceased was having illicit relationship with the appellant’s wife – Deceased and the appellant last seen together in conversation with each other inside the police station by more than one witnesses even minutes before these witnesses saw the appellant killing the deceased with his official 9 m.m. carbine – Plea of self defence by the appellant that the death of the deceased was caused by the appellant when the appellant was deprived of his power of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation caused by the deceased which resulted in his death by accident – Conviction and sentence of the appellant for offences ss. 302 and 307 by the courts below – Justification: Held: All the evidences are unassailable – Prosecution case stands secured on these evidences – It is a clear case of murder – Motive for the appellant that the deceased was having an affair with his wife, and the execution of the crime at the Police Station, all point towards the murder committed inside the police station by the appellant – One fire arm injury with blackening at the entry point also explains that the deceased was first shot from a close range – Remaining injuries also correlate with the testimony of the eye witnesses – Plea of self-defence and in the alternative the plea of grave and sudden provocation taken by the appellant that it was the deceased who came to the police station in full speed in his car thereby first hitting the gate of the police station and then making an attempt to snatch the weapon from the appellant in order to kill him, do not hold any ground – Defence not been able to establish a case of private defence by any evidence – Eye witness accounts of police personnels who were all present at the Police Station at that point of time, establish a case of murder beyond any reasonable doubt – Thus, the nature of weapon used; number of gun shots fired at the deceased; part of the body where gun shots are fired, all point towards the fact that the appellant was determined to kill the deceased and ultimately, he achieved his task – Not a case of any lesser magnitude, and definitely not culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Facts do not even remotely make out any case under exception 1 to s. 300, or under any other exceptions to s. 300 IPC – Interferance with the findings of the courts below not called for – Evidence Act, 1872 – s. 105. [Paras 19-26] Penal Code, 1860 – s. 300 exception 1 – Culpable homicide when not amounting to murder – Provocation when grave and sudden to bring the case under exception 1 to s. 300: Held: In order to convert a case of murder to a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, provocation must be such that would temporarily deprive the power of self-control of a “reasonable person” – Provocation itself is not enough to reduce the crime from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Time gap between this alleged provocation and the act of homicide; the kind of weapon used; the number of blows, etc, is also to be seen – These are again all questions of facts – There is no standard or test as to what reasonableness should be in these circumstances as this would again be a question of fact to be determined by a Court. [Para 25] Criminal trial – Cross-examination of witness deferred by two months – Effect: Held: Such long adjournment after examination-in-chief, should never be given – This may affect the fairness of the trial and may even endanger, in a given case, the safety of the witness – As far as possible, the defence should be asked to cross examine the witness the same day or the following day – Only in very exceptional cases, and for reasons to be recorded, the cross examination should be deferred and a short adjournment can be given after taking precautions and care, for the witness, if it is required – Courts should be slow in deferring these matters – This practice is not a healthy practice – Mandate of s. 231 Cr.PC and the law laid down on the subject to be followed in its letter and spirit – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 231.[Paras11,13]

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 163 : 2024 INSC 424


Surender Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)

(Criminal Appeal No. 597 of 2012)


03 July 2024


[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Correctness of the order of the High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant for offences under ss. 302 and 307 IPC .


Headnotes


Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 302 and 307, s. 300 exception 1 – Murder  – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder, when  – Plea of self-defence – Prosecution case that the appellant-police guard committed murder of the deceased inside the police station while he was on duty – Deceased was having illicit relationship with the appellant’s wife – Deceased and the appellant last seen together in conversation with each other inside the police station by more than one witnesses even minutes before these witnesses saw the appellant killing the deceased with his official 9 m.m. carbine – Plea of self defence by the appellant that the death of the deceased was caused by the appellant when the appellant was deprived of his power of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation caused by the deceased which resulted in his death by accident – Conviction and sentence of the appellant for offences ss. 302 and 307 by the courts below – Justification:


Held: All the evidences are unassailable – Prosecution case stands secured on these evidences – It is a clear case of murder – Motive for the appellant that the deceased was having an affair with his wife, and the execution of the crime at the Police Station, all point towards the murder committed inside the police station by the appellant – One fire arm injury with blackening at the entry point also explains that the deceased was first shot from a close range – Remaining injuries also correlate with the testimony of the eye witnesses – Plea of self-defence and in the alternative the plea of grave and sudden provocation taken by the appellant that it was the deceased who came to the police station in full speed in his car thereby first hitting the gate of the police station and then making an attempt to snatch the weapon from the appellant in order to kill him, do not hold any ground – Defence not been able to establish a case of private defence by any evidence – Eye witness accounts of police personnels who were all present at the Police Station at that point of time, establish a case of murder beyond any reasonable doubt – Thus, the nature of weapon used; number of gun shots fired at the deceased; part of the body where gun shots are fired, all point towards the fact that the appellant was determined to kill the deceased and ultimately, he achieved his task – Not a case of any lesser magnitude, and definitely not culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Facts do not even remotely make out any case under exception 1 to s. 300, or under any other exceptions to s. 300 IPC – Interferance with the findings of the courts below not called for – Evidence Act, 1872 – s. 105. [Paras 19-26]


Penal Code, 1860 – s. 300 exception 1 – Culpable homicide when not amounting to murder – Provocation when grave and sudden to bring the case under exception 1 to s. 300:


Held: In order to convert a case of murder to a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, provocation must be such that would temporarily deprive the power of self-control of a “reasonable person” – Provocation itself is not enough to reduce the crime from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Time gap between this alleged provocation and the act of homicide; the kind of weapon used; the number of blows, etc, is also to be seen – These are again all questions of facts – There is no standard or test as to what reasonableness should be in these circumstances as this would again be a question of fact to be determined by a Court. [Para 25]


Criminal trial – Cross-examination of witness deferred by two months – Effect:


Held: Such long adjournment after examination-in-chief, should never be given – This may affect the fairness of the trial and may even endanger, in a given case, the safety of the witness – As far as possible, the defence should be asked to cross examine the witness the same day or the following day – Only in very exceptional cases, and for reasons to be recorded, the cross examination should be deferred and a short adjournment can be given after taking precautions and care, for the witness, if it is required – Courts should be slow in deferring these matters – This practice is not a healthy practice – Mandate of s. 231 Cr.PC and the law laid down on the subject to be followed in its letter and spirit – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 231.[Paras11,13]


Case Law Cited


State of U.P v. Shambhu Nath Singh [2001] 2 SCR 854 : (2001) 4 SCC 667; Ambika Prasad v. State (Delhi Admn.) [2000] 1 SCR 342 : (2000) 2 SCC 646; Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. [2002] Suppl. 2 SCR 31 : (2002) 7 SCC 334; State of Kerala v. Rasheed [2018] 13 SCR 587 : (2019) 13 SCC 297; State of M.P. v. Ramesh [2004] Suppl. 6 SCR 152 : (2005) 9 SCC 705; Salim Zia v. State of U.P. [1979] 2 SCR 394 : (1979) 2 SCC 648; K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra [1961] 1 SCR 497 : AIR 1962 SC 605 – referred to.


List of Acts


Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.


List of Keywords


Murder; Culpable homicide not amounting to murder; Plea of self defence; Power of self-control; Grave and sudden provocation; Motive; Testimony of the eye witnesses; Private defence; Burden of proof; Case under exception 1 to s. 300 IPC; Deferring of cross-examination of witness; Long adjournment after examination-in-chief; Fairness of the trial.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.597 of 2012


From the Judgment and Order dated 18.05.2011 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No.202 of 2008


Appearances for Parties


S K Agarwal, Sr. Adv., Arun K. Sinha, Rakesh Singh, Ms. Anjali Rajput, Sumit Sinha, Rohan Goel, Abhinav Mutyalwar, Vijay Raj Singh Chouhan, Advs. for the Appellant.


Satyajit A. Desai, Adv. (Amicus Curiae)


Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ms. Ameya Vikrama Thanvi, Mrs. Chitrangda Rastaravara, Santosh Kumar, Ms. Sweksha, Ms. Poornina Singh, Chinmay Mehta, Advs. for the Respondent.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.


1.The appellant before this Court has challenged the order of the High Court (dated 18.05.2011) which has dismissed his appeal while upholding his conviction and sentence by the Trial Court for offences under Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, for which he has been sentenced for life imprisonment and 7 years of rigorous imprisonment respectively.


2.We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as for the State at length.


3.As the facts of the case would reveal the present case is of a brazen murder, committed inside a Police Station in Delhi. The prosecution case is that the appellant, who was posted as a police guard at Mayur Vihar Police Station, Delhi, executed this murder inside the police station, while he was on duty!


4.The deceased was married to the appellant’s first cousin and was also his neighbour. The prosecution case is that the deceased had an illicit relationship with the wife of the appellant. There are more than one witnesses to the fact that the deceased and the appellant were last seen together in conversation with each other inside the police station even minutes before these witnesses saw the appellant killing the deceased with his official 9 m.m. carbine.


5.An FIR was lodged at Police Station Mayur Vihar, New Delhi on 30.06.2002 at 2:30 pm, under Sections 302/307 IPC on the narration of PW-2 who was posted at the Police Station, Mayur Vihar, New Delhi as Head Constable at the relevant point of time. PW-2 states that on the date of the incident she reached the Police Station at around 11.30 am and saw the appellant talking to the deceased. She further states that at around 11.40 am, she heard sounds of fire and then saw the deceased running towards the Duty Officer’s room; he was bleeding with his hands held up in the air. The appellant was seen firing at the deceased from his Carbine. When the firing stopped, the deceased was seen lying outside the duty officer’s room, bleeding profusely. The appellant was apprehended along with his carbine by the police staff, and PW-2 who was also injured in the firing was taken to the LBS Hospital where she received medical aid, and later lodged the FIR.


6.The police after its investigation filed chargesheet and the case was committed to Sessions, where charges were framed under Sections 302/307 of IPC against the present appellant. The prosecution examined as many as 27 witnesses. The accused, after giving his statement under Section 313 CrPC, had also examined a witness as DW-1. The Trial Court ultimately convicted and sentenced the appellant under Sections 302 and 307 IPC as already stated above.


7.Strangely, and for reasons best known to the prosecution, it examined PW-6 who is the brother of the appellant and PW-25 who is wife of the appellant, as prosecution witnesses. Although these two witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution to the extent that they establish that the deceased was having an extra marital affair with the appellant’s wife, yet both of them added in their testimony that it was the deceased who was determined to kill the appellant!


8.PW-25, who is the wife of the appellant, says that, minutes prior to the incident, the deceased had come to her place and had warned her that he was going to the Police Station to kill her husband! PW-6 is also a witness to this expression on the part of the deceased.


9.The accused/appellant who as we shall see, has neither denied the incident nor the fact that he killed the deceased. His argument is that he did it as a matter of self-defence, and in the alternative if self-defence is not accepted by the Court, then it was a case of grave and sudden provocation at best, which led to the death of the deceased at the hands of the appellant. In other words, if at all, the appellant can be punished only for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.


It has been argued before us that on the fateful day (i.e. 30.06.2002), it was the deceased who had come to the police station to kill the appellant and the appellant used his weapon only in self defence, but unfortunately the deceased was killed.


The evidence of PW-25 and PW-6 which we have just referred apparently supports this theory, to the extent that the deceased was determined to kill the appellant. The appellant states in his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement as under :-


“…I was doing my duty as a santari. At about11.40 Satish (deceased) who was my relative came there. I had half closed the doors of PS as per directions of SHO. He opened the doors by hitting car against these. He parked his car inside the PS. He started shouting at me. I took him towards near police quarters. He pounced at me. I forbade him from doing so. I took him towards duty officer’s room. I tried to snatch my carbine from his hand. In that process firing took place. Magazine fell down. I tried to pick it up and fit in the carbine. In that process it fired four-five times in air. Satish tried to snatch said carbine from me and in that process was hit by bullets. The carbine fired in rapid action from gate of PS up to police quarters. When we were near duty officer’s room the carbine was set at automatic mode. It fired which hit deceased Satish as well as walls, tube lights and windows of duty officer’s room.”


The entire case of the defence is built on the above statement of the accused appellant, which is that it was the deceased who had come rushing to the Police Station on that fateful day knowing very well that the appellant was posted there as a guard. He then tried to snatch the weapon from the appellant and in this scuffle, shots were fired from the weapon, which was an accident, which ultimately led to the death of the deceased. This, in short is the case of the defence.


All the same, this trumped up story did not find favour with the trial court and the appellate court and understandably so as the prosecution has an overwhelming evidence to the contrary, which only points towards a dastardly murder at the hands of the present appellant.


The prosecution case is primarily based on the statement of the eye witnesses present in the Police Station itself and mainly PW-2 who is a lady head constable and also the complainant. This witness has remained steadfast to her version of the incident, which was given in the first information report lodged by her; and later in her examination-in-chief and cross-examination, during the trial. She is an extremely credible and trustworthy witness and the veracity of her statement and deposition establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and has its corroboration with other evidences, including ocular evidences of PW-1, PW-14 and PW-17, who were also constables or head Constables posted at Police Station Mayur Vihar, New Delhi, and were present at the Police Station at the relevant time. Additionally, this is also confirmed by the forensic evidence which was gathered by the Police during investigation from the site itself, to which we shall refer in a while.


PW-2 was put to a lengthy cross-examination by the defence. In the cross-examination the defence made every possible attempt to cast doubt on the presence of this witness at the Police Station, but this was all in vain since there are more than one witnesses in this case which clearly establish the presence of PW-2 at the Police Station. Her presence is established by the other witnesses such as PW-1, PW-14 and PW-17, who were also Police constables posted at the same Police Station. Most importantly her presence is established by the fact that this witness (PW-2) is also an injured witness as she had sustained bullet injuries on her left shoulder. Her medical examination was done on the same day and the following injuries were found :


1.Lacerated wound 2x2 cm over left (L) shoulder near lateral end of clavicle, penetrating anterior aspect, fresh, oozing of blood.


2.Lacerated wound left (L) shoulder, posterior aspect near lateral end of clavicle, 3x3 cm, fresh, oozing of blood.


PW-11, Head Constable Jai Prakash, is the one who took PW-2 to the LBS hospital and also testified before the court in this regard. PW-27, the SHO of the police station who investigated the case, also testified that he reached the police station right after the incident and then rushed to the hospital where he recorded the statement of PW-2.


10.In her examination-in-chief PW-2 says that on 30.06.2002, she was posted at Police Station, Mayur Vihar where she was to work as duty officer from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., but as she had some personal work in the morning that day, she had taken prior permission from the SHO to arrive late. She hence reached the P.S. at 11.35 a.m. and at the gate, she saw the appellant-Surender (whom she identifies in the court), and who was posted as guard in the same Police Station, talking to a stranger near a corner of the premises. She then went straight to her duty room and while she was talking to the Head Constable Om Pal (PW-1) from whom she had to take the charge, and where constable Vinod (PW-17) and DHG Jai Singh (PW-5) were also present along with Munshi Gulzari Lal, she suddenly heard sounds of bullet shots in the compound of the Police Station. Then she saw the person with whom the appellant was having a conversation (i.e. the deceased) rushing towards the duty officers’ room with his hands up in the air; and he was bleeding. She also saw Constable Surender (i.e. the appellant before this Court), chasing this person from behind, still firing from his 9mm carbine, aiming at the deceased. She as well as the head Constable Om Prakash, Constable Vinod and DHG Jai Singh bent down and took shield in order to avoid stray bullets. She then saw the deceased lying outside the room, bleeding profusely. By this time, she had realized that she too had received bullet injuries on her left shoulder. She was then taken to LBS Hospital by Head Constable Jai Prakash. It was in the hospital that she was informed that the deceased (Satish) was a relative of Surender and that he is now dead, due to the bullet injuries sustained in the firing.


11.The defence did not cross-examine this witness immediately after her examination-in-chief, but sought that the cross examination be deferred, which was done and she was cross-examined only on 30.11.2004, which is more than two months after her examination-in-chief. We may just stop here for a while only to sound a note of caution. Such long adjournment as was given in this case after examination-in-chief, should never have been given. Reasons for this are many, but to our mind the main reason would be that this may affect the fairness of the trial and may even endanger, in a given case, the safety of the witness. As far as possible, the defence should be asked to cross examine the witness the same day or the following day. Only in very exceptional cases, and for reasons to be recorded, the cross examination should be deferred and a short adjournment can be given after taking precautions and care, for the witness, if it is required. We are constrained to make this observation as we have noticed in case after case that cross examinations are being adjourned routinely which can seriously prejudice a fair trial.


12.This Court had, on more than one occasion, condemned this practice of the trial court where examinations are deferred without sufficient reasons. We may refer here to some cases, which are State of U.P v. Shambhu Nath Singh (2001) 4 SCC 667; Ambika Prasad v. State (Delhi Admn.) (2000) 2 SCC 646; Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B. (2002) 7 SCC 334.


13.As we have said cross examination can be deferred in exceptional cases and for reasons to be recorded by the Court, such as under sub-section 2 of Section 231 of CrPC1 but even here the adjournment is not to be given as a matter of right and ultimately it is the discretion of the Court. In State of Kerala v. Rasheed (2019) 13 SCC 297, this Court has set certain guidelines under which such an adjournment can be given. The emphasis again is on the fact that a request for deferral must be premised on sufficient reasons, justifying the deferral of cross-examination of the witness.


As we could see from the records in the present case the cross examination of PW-2 was deferred precisely on grounds referred in sub-section (2) of Section 231 of CrPC. The defence requested to examine PW-2 with another prosecution witness (Vinod-PW-17). Yet the records of the case also reveal that though the cross-examination was deferred yet the other witness (PW-17) was examined much later, nearly a year after the cross examination of PW-2. We only wanted to record this cautionary note to make our point that this practice is not a healthy practice and the Courts should be slow in deferring these matters. The mandate of Section 231 of Cr.PC and the law laid down on the subject referred above must be followed in its letter and spirit.


Thankfully, in the case at hand, the deferred cross-examination of PW-2 has not affected the course of the trial. This witness has remained consistent.


14.PW-19 is Dr. S.B. Jangpangi, Casualty Medical Officer posted at LBS Hospital Delhi, who had examined PW-2 as she had received bullet injuries on that fateful day. PW-19 in his statement mentions that two injuries were found on Panwati’s (PW-2) body. PW-19 had also examined the deceased who was declared dead by him and found his body riddled with bullet injuries.


15.PW-1, Ompal Singh, who was posted as head constable in P.S. Mayur Vihar is another key prosecution witness. He says that he was working as duty officer on 30.06.2002 in place of WHC Panwati (PW2). After PW-2 reported for her duties Constable Vinod (PW-17), DHG Jai Singh and PW-1 were also in the duty officers’ room. He recounts that on the day of the incident he heard sounds of firing at about 11.35 a.m. and saw a person with blood-stained clothes (i.e. the deceased) trying to reach the duty officers’ room. He was being chased by the appellant, who was identified by this witness in court. He states that the police staff tried to save their own life in the duty officer’s room and then saw the deceased lying on the ground. Constable Panwati (PW-2) also sustained bullet injuries in this firing. He then gave a wireless message of the incident to the SHO. This witness was cross examined later but again nothing has come in the cross to doubt the statement of this witness.


16.PW-11 and PW-17 were again, Head Constable and Constable respectively, who were posted at this police station on that fateful day of June 30, 2002. They were also witness to the crime and their deposition states similar facts as narrated by PW-1 and PW-2.


17.The post-mortem was conducted on 01.07.2002 by Dr. Vinay Kumar Singh (PW18) of LBS Hospital. He found 17 ante mortem injuries on the body of the deceased. He confirms his post-mortem report, in his deposition, where in his opinion the cause of death was shock resulting from fire arm injuries. He states that the injuries on the chest and on the back of the deceased were sufficient to cause his death. He also mentions that bullets were also recovered from the chest cavity of the deceased and one bullet was recovered from the right side of the back. There were 6 fire-arm entry wounds corresponding to 6 fire-arm exit wounds. At least one fire-arm entry wound has a blackening at the entry point which shows that this was fired at a point-blank range.


18.In all, the deceased had received 8 to 9 shots from the carbine of the appellant which are spread all over his body. Entry wounds exist on the front as well as on the back of the deceased’s body, which makes it clear that the deceased was shot not only from the front but also from the back, while he was trying to escape. The nature of these injuries corroborates with the ocular testimony of PW-2. It is PW-2 who had said that when she came to the Police Station, she had seen the deceased talking to the appellant at the gate of the police station and that the appellant was armed with a carbine. PW-21, Constable Devender Kumar who had to take the charge of ‘sentry’/guard at 12 noon, also states that he saw the appellant talking to the deceased before the incident. PW-2 heard the sound of firing few minutes later and then saw the deceased (who was bleeding) rushing towards the duty room with his hands in the air, and the appellant was seen firing at him from behind.


19.Taken together, all these evidences are unassailable. The case of the prosecution stands secured on these evidences. It is a clear case of murder. The motive for the appellant (admittedly the deceased was having an affair with the appellant’s wife), and the execution of the crime at the Police Station, all point towards the murder committed inside the police station by the present appellant. The one fire arm injury with blackening at the entry point also explains that the deceased was first shot from a close range. The remaining injuries also correlate with the testimony of the eye witnesses referred above.


20.The plea of self-defence and in the alternative the plea of grave and sudden provocation taken by the appellant is based on the theory that it was the deceased who came to the police station in full speed in his car thereby first hitting the gate of the police station and then making an attempt to snatch the weapon from the appellant in order to kill him. But these arguments do not hold any ground and most importantly there is not even an iota of evidence to sustain this bizarre line of defence.


21.Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act 2, the burden of proof that the accused’s case falls within the general exception is upon the accused himself. This Court in State of M.P. v. Ramesh, (2005) 9 SCC 705 observed that:


“Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”), the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the court to presume the truth of the plea of self-defence. The court shall presume the absence of such circumstances……Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying the court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding off the attack or for forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused.”


This burden of proof though is not as onerous as the burden of proof beyond all reasonable doubts which is on the prosecution, nevertheless some degree of reasonable satisfaction has to be established by the defence, when this plea is taken. (See : Salim Zia v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 648).


22.In the case at hand, the defence has not been able to establish a case of private defence by any evidence. There is no evidence on this aspect and therefore this plea was rightly rejected by the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court.


23.In fact, the plea of self-defence taken by the accused/appellant is childish to say the least, in the light of the facts of the case, and on the weight of the evidence of the prosecution. The case of the defence that the deceased came to the Police Station “unarmed” to kill the appellant knowing very well that the appellant was armed with a weapon is an awkward attempt to present the deceased as the aggressor. It does not make any sense. What is most important here is the eye-witness accounts of PW-2, PW-1, PW-11 & PW-17, which prove that the appellant did not stop at the initial firing of the shot, which he had fired from a close range (the entry wound of gun shot with blackening). Instead, he continued to spray bullets on the deceased even when he was trying to escape. The eye witness accounts of four police personnels who were all present at the Police Station at that point of time, establish a case of murder beyond any reasonable doubt.


24.The defence again has not even been able to discharge its burden by showing that it is a case of grave and sudden provocation, though an attempt has been made by the defence to bring the case under Exception I to Section 300 IPC. There is however, nothing on record to show that the deceased hit the car at the gate of the Police Station, which was found parked inside that Police Station with no scratch on its body, thus disproving that it had hit the gate as was the case of the defence. Moreover, all the facts which have been placed before the Court show that it was the appellant who had a motive to kill the deceased as the deceased was having an illicit relationship with his wife. In spite of best efforts by the family members of the appellant and the deceased, the deceased continued with this relationship with the wife of the appellant. This was hence the motive for the appellant to kill the deceased.


25.The appellant would argue that the Act attributable to him would fall under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as under:


“Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.


The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—

First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.


Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.


Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.


Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.”


According to the defence, the death of the deceased was caused by the appellant when the appellant was deprived of his power of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation caused by the deceased which resulted in his death by accident.


This court has reiterated in more than one cases right from K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605 onwards that provocation itself is not enough to reduce the crime from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In order to convert a case of murder to a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, provocation must me such that would temporarily deprive the power of self-control of a “reasonable person”. What has also to be seen is the time gap between this alleged provocation and the act of homicide; the kind of weapon used; the number of blows, etc. These are again all questions of facts. There is no standard or test as to what reasonableness should be in these circumstances as this would again be a question of fact to be determined by a Court. Nanavati (supra) answers this question as follows:


“84. Is there any standard of a reasonable man for the application of the doctrine of “grave and sudden” provocation? No abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any standard with precision : it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the relevant circumstances. It is not necessary in this case to ascertain whether a reasonable man placed in the position of the accused would have lost his self-control momentarily or even temporarily when his wife confessed to him of her illicit intimacy with another, for we are satisfied on the evidence that the accused regained his self-control and killed Ahuja deliberately.


85. The Indian law, relevant to the present enquiry, may be stated thus : (1) The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India, words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. (4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.”


In the present case on every possible count the case is nothing but a case of murder. The nature of weapon used; the number of gun shots fired at the deceased; the part of the body where gun shots are fired, all point towards the fact that the appellant was determined to kill the deceased. Ultimately, he achieved his task and made sure that the deceased is dead. By no stretch of logic is it a case of any lesser magnitude, and definitely not culpable homicide not amounting to murder.


The facts of the present case do not even remotely make out any case under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC, or under any other Exception(s) to Section 300 of IPC.


26.In view of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. The interim order dated 02.04.2012 granting bail to the appellant, hereby, stands vacated and the appellant is hereby directed to surrender before the trial court within four weeks from today. A copy of this Judgment shall be sent to the Trial Court to ensure that the appellant surrenders and undergoes the remaining part of his sentence.


Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.


1 231. Evidence for prosecution.—(1) On the date so fixed, the Judge shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution.

(2) The Judge may, in his discretion, permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross-examination.


2 105. Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions.—When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.


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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34 and s.37 – An award was passed by the Tribunal – Appellant filed a petition u/s. 34 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court to challenge the award – The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition u/s. 34 and proceeded to set aside the award on various grounds, such as perversity, patent illegality, etc. – Appeal by the respondent u/s. 37 of the Arbitration Act challenging the judgment of the single Judge of the High Court –The Division Bench of the High Court passed an order of remand to the single Judge on the ground that the single Judge of the High Court did not consider several issues – Correctness: Held: In the facts of the case in hand, while deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Single Judge has made a very elaborate consideration of the submissions made across the Bar, the findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal and the issue of illegality or perversity of the award – Detailed reasons while dealing with the alleged patent illegalities associated with the directions issued under the arbitral award have been recorded – Considering the nature of the findings recorded by the Single Judge, the job of the Appellate Court was to scrutinise the said findings and to decide, one way or the other, on merits – In this case, the finding of the Appellate Bench that the impugned judgment of the Single Judge does not address several issues raised by the parties cannot be sustained at all – As far as the power of the Appellate Court under Section 37(1)(c) to pass an order of remand is concerned, the Appellate Court can exercise the power of remand only when exceptional circumstances make an order of remand unavoidable – Some of the exceptional cases can be stated by way of illustration: a) Summary disposal of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is made without consideration of merits; b) Without service of notice to the respondent in a petition under Section 34, interference is made with the award; and c) Decision in proceedings under Section 34 is rendered when one or more contesting parties are dead, and their legal representatives have not been brought on record – In the facts of the case, the remand was completely unwarranted – The reason is that the Single Judge has elaborately dealt with the merits of the challenge in the Section 34 petition – This Court should benefit from reasoned judgment rendered by the Court under Section 37 – In the instant case, this Court does not have the benefit of a decision of the Appellate Court dealing with all the issues dealt with by the Single Judge while deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act – Therefore, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and the Divison Bench of the High Court is directed to decide the appeal on merits after considering the arbitral award and the decision under section 34. [Paras 17, 18, 20 ] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s. 34 and s.37 – Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal u/s. 37 against the judgment in a petition u/s. 34: Held: The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37 against the judgment in a petition under Section 34 is more constrained than the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with a petition under Section 34 – It is the duty of the Appellate Court to consider whether Section 34 Court has remained confined to the grounds of challenge that are available in a petition under Section 34 – The ultimate function of the Appellate Court under Section 37 is to decide whether the jurisdiction under Section 34 has been exercised rightly or wrongly – While doing so, the Appellate Court can exercise the same power and jurisdiction that Section 34 Court possesses with the same constraints. [Para 16] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s. 34, s.37 and s.19 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Applicability of the provisions of CPC to the proceedings before the Arbitrator and the Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act: Held: The provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings before the learned Arbitrator and the Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act – The legislature’s intention is reflected in Section 19(1) of the Arbitration Act, which provides that an Arbitral Tribunal is not bound by the provision of the CPC – That is why the provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37(1)(c). [Para 18] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Object of: Held: The object of the Arbitration Act is to provide an arbitral procedure that is fair, efficient, and capable of meeting the needs of specific arbitration – The object is to ensure that the arbitral proceedings and proceedings filed for challenging the award are concluded expeditiously – The proceedings have to be cost-effective – The supervisory role of the Courts is very restricted – Moreover, one cannot ignore that arbitration is one of the modes of Alternative Disputes Redressal Mechanism provided in Section 89 of the CPC. [Para 19] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.37 – Consequences of passing routinely order of remand: Held: If the Courts dealing with appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act start routinely passing the orders of remand, the arbitral procedure will cease to be efficient – It will cease to be cost-effective – Such orders will delay the conclusion of the proceedings, thereby defeating the very object of the Arbitration Act – Therefore, an order of remand by Section 37 Court can be made only in exceptional cases where remand is unavoidable. [Para 19] Constitution of India – Art.136 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s. 34 and s.37: Held: An order of remand by Section 37 Court can be made only in exceptional cases where remand is unavoidable – The scope of interference in a petition under Section 34 is very narrow – The jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is narrower – Looking to the objects of the Arbitration Act and the limited scope available to the Courts to interfere with the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, this Court, while dealing with the decisions under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act, in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, has to be circumspect – By their own volition, the parties choose to go before the Arbitral Tribunal instead of availing remedy before the traditional civil courts – Therefore, the Courts must be very conservative when dealing with arbitral awards and confine themselves to the grounds strictly available under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. [Para 19] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Bulky pleadings – Time-consuming submissions, leading to very lengthy awards – Bar to show restraint: Held: The arbitral proceedings have become synonymous with very bulky pleadings and evidence and very long, time-consuming submissions, leading to very lengthy awards – Moreover, there is a tendency to rely upon a large number of precedents, relevant or irrelevant – The result of all this is that there are very long hearings before the Courts in Sections 34 and 37 proceedings – In many cases, the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 are being treated as if the same are appeals under Section 96 of the CPC – When members of the bar take up so many grounds in petitions under Section 34, which are not covered by Section 34, there is a tendency to urge all those grounds which are not available in law and waste the Court’s time – The members of the Bar should show restraint by incorporating only legally permissible grounds in petitions under Section 34 and the appeals under Section 37 – Brevity will make the arbitral proceedings and the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 more effective – Arbitration must become a tool for expeditious, effective, and cost-effective dispute resolution. [Para 23]

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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 136 : 2024 INSC 478


Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v. Samir Narain Bhojwani

(Civil Appeal No. 7247 of 2024)


08 July 2024


[Abhay S. Oka* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


In the instant case, issue revolves around the power of the Appellate Court dealing with the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to pass an order of remand to Section 34 Court.


Headnotes


Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34 and s.37 – An award was passed by the Tribunal – Appellant filed a petition u/s. 34 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court to challenge the award – The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition u/s. 34 and proceeded to set aside the award on various grounds, such as perversity, patent illegality, etc. – Appeal by the respondent u/s. 37 of the Arbitration Act challenging the judgment of the single Judge of the High Court –The Division Bench of the High Court passed an order of remand to the single Judge on the ground that the single Judge of the High Court did not consider several issues – Correctness:


Held: In the facts of the case in hand, while deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Single Judge has made a very elaborate consideration of the submissions made across the Bar, the findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal and the issue of illegality or perversity of the award – Detailed reasons while dealing with the alleged patent illegalities associated with the directions issued under the arbitral award have been recorded – Considering the nature of the findings recorded by the Single Judge, the job of the Appellate Court was to scrutinise the said findings and to decide, one way or the other, on merits – In this case, the finding of the Appellate Bench that the impugned judgment of the Single Judge does not address several issues raised by the parties cannot be sustained at all – As far as the power of the Appellate Court under Section 37(1)(c) to pass an order of remand is concerned, the Appellate Court can exercise the power of remand only when exceptional circumstances make an order of remand unavoidable – Some of the exceptional cases can be stated by way of illustration: a) Summary disposal of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is made without consideration of merits; b) Without service of notice to the respondent in a petition under Section 34, interference is made with the award; and c) Decision in proceedings under Section 34 is rendered when one or more contesting parties are dead, and their legal representatives have not been brought on record – In the facts of the case, the remand was completely unwarranted – The reason is that the Single Judge has elaborately dealt with the merits of the challenge in the Section 34 petition – This Court should benefit from reasoned judgment rendered by the Court under Section 37 – In the instant case, this Court does not have the benefit of a decision of the Appellate Court dealing with all the issues dealt with by the Single Judge while deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act – Therefore, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and the Divison Bench of the High Court is directed to decide the appeal on merits after considering the arbitral award and the decision under section 34. [Paras 17, 18, 20 ]


Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s. 34 and s.37 – Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal u/s. 37 against the judgment in a petition u/s. 34:


Held: The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37 against the judgment in a petition under Section 34 is more constrained than the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with a petition under Section 34 – It is the duty of the Appellate Court to consider whether Section 34 Court has remained confined to the grounds of challenge that are available in a petition under Section 34 – The ultimate function of the Appellate Court under Section 37 is to decide whether the jurisdiction under Section 34 has been exercised rightly or wrongly – While doing so, the Appellate Court can exercise the same power and jurisdiction that Section 34 Court possesses with the same constraints. [Para 16]


Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s. 34, s.37 and s.19 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Applicability of the provisions of CPC to the proceedings before the Arbitrator and the Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act:


Held: The provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings before the learned Arbitrator and the Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act – The legislature’s intention is reflected in Section 19(1) of the Arbitration Act, which provides that an Arbitral Tribunal is not bound by the provision of the CPC – That is why the provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37(1)(c). [Para 18]


Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Object of:


Held: The object of the Arbitration Act is to provide an arbitral procedure that is fair, efficient, and capable of meeting the needs of specific arbitration – The object is to ensure that the arbitral proceedings and proceedings filed for challenging the award are concluded expeditiously – The proceedings have to be cost-effective – The supervisory role of the Courts is very restricted – Moreover, one cannot ignore that arbitration is one of the modes of Alternative Disputes Redressal Mechanism provided in Section 89 of the CPC. [Para 19]


Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.37 – Consequences of passing routinely order of remand:


Held: If the Courts dealing with appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act start routinely passing the orders of remand, the arbitral procedure will cease to be efficient – It will cease to be cost-effective – Such orders will delay the conclusion of the proceedings, thereby defeating the very object of the Arbitration Act – Therefore, an order of remand by Section 37 Court can be made only in exceptional cases where remand is unavoidable. [Para 19]


Constitution of India – Art.136 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s. 34 and s.37:


Held: An order of remand by Section 37 Court can be made only in exceptional cases where remand is unavoidable – The scope of interference in a petition under Section 34 is very narrow – The jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is narrower – Looking to the objects of the Arbitration Act and the limited scope available to the Courts to interfere with the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, this Court, while dealing with the decisions under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act, in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, has to be circumspect – By their own volition, the parties choose to go before the Arbitral Tribunal instead of availing remedy before the traditional civil courts – Therefore, the Courts must be very conservative when dealing with arbitral awards and confine themselves to the grounds strictly available under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. [Para 19]


Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Bulky pleadings – Time-consuming submissions, leading to very lengthy awards – Bar to show restraint:


Held: The arbitral proceedings have become synonymous with very bulky pleadings and evidence and very long, time-consuming submissions, leading to very lengthy awards – Moreover, there is a tendency to rely upon a large number of precedents, relevant or irrelevant – The result of all this is that there are very long hearings before the Courts in Sections 34 and 37 proceedings – In many cases, the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 are being treated as if the same are appeals under Section 96 of the CPC – When members of the bar take up so many grounds in petitions under Section 34, which are not covered by Section 34, there is a tendency to urge all those grounds which are not available in law and waste the Court’s time – The members of the Bar should show restraint by incorporating only legally permissible grounds in petitions under Section 34 and the appeals under Section 37 – Brevity will make the arbitral proceedings and the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 more effective – Arbitration must become a tool for expeditious, effective, and cost-effective dispute resolution. [Para 23]


Case Law Cited


MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited [2019] 3 SCR 1023 : (2019) 4 SCC 163; UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2022] 1 SCR 1 : (2022) 4 SCC 116; Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking [2023] 11 SCR 215 : (2023) 9 SCC 85 – relied on.


List of Acts


Constitution of India; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.


List of Keywords


Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Order of remand passed under section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Illegality or perversity of the award; Object of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Consequences of passing routinely order of remand; Article 136 of the Constitution of India; Bulky pleadings; Time-consuming submissions, leading to very lengthy awards; Arbitration; Cost-effective dispute resolution; Exceptional cases of remand under section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.


Case Arising From


CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.7247 of 2024


From the Judgment and Order dated 07.07.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in CA No.30 of 2023


With


Civil Appeal Nos. 7248 and 7249 of 2024


Appearances for Parties


A.M. Singhvi, Ramesh Singh, Mukul Rohatgi, C. U. Singh, Ritin Rai, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advs., Mohit D. Ram, Atman Mehta, Anand Pai, Vipul Patel, Ms. Monisha Handa, Rajul Shrivastav, Rachit Bharwada, Anubhav Sharma, Mahesh Agarwal, Parimal K. Shroff, Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Anirudh Bhatia, Devansh Srivastava, Ms. Vidisha Swarup, E. C. Agrawala, R. Gopalakrishnan, Murtaza Kanchwalla, S. M. Algaus, Palash Moolchandani, Ms. Ekta Basin, Ms. Anushree Prashit Kapadia, Nishant Chothani, Ms. Ruchi Krishna Chauhan, Murtaza Kachwalla, Parimal Shroff, Victor Das, Anup Jain, Advs. for the appearing parties.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Abhay S. Oka, J.


1.The application for permission to file special leave petition is allowed. Leave granted.


FACTUAL ASPECTS


2.These appeals take exception to the same judgment and order dated 7th July 2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Therefore, the same are being decided together. We are setting out a few factual aspects necessary for deciding the appeals.


3.On 31st March 1993, the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) executed a lease agreement in respect of the subject property in favour of Andheri Kamgar Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited (for short, ‘the Society’). It is stated to be a society of slum dwellers. The Society, by the agreement dated 6th October 1996, appointed M/s. Aurora Properties and Investments (for short, ‘M/s. Aurora’) as the property developer to implement a slum rehabilitation scheme. M/s. Aurora was to construct 237 rehabilitation tenements for slum dwellers and 40 tenements for project-affected persons (PAPs) free of cost and develop the property using the available Floor Space Index (FSI) and dispose of the same. It appears that M/s. Aurora could not discharge its obligations. Therefore, by the agreement dated 22nd September 1999 (described as an agreement for the grant of sub-development rights), the society appointed Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited (the appellant) as the developer. Apart from taking over the obligations of M/s. Aurora under the development agreement dated 6th October 1996, the appellant corporation agreed to hand over 15,000 square feet of built-up area in the redeveloped property to M/s.Aurora against M/s. Aurora paying the cost of construction at Rs.600 per square foot. After that, the appellant started the development of the property. On 10th March 2003, an agreement was executed by and between the appellant and one Samir Narain Bhojwani (the respondent), under which the appellant retained 45% of the total available FSI and permitted the respondent to construct the free sale area by allotting him FSI to the extent of the remaining 55%. According to the appellant’s case, the respondent was appointed as a contractor to carry out the construction activities of the said building on the site. On 3rd July 2004, a deed of confirmation was executed to register the agreement dated 10th March 2003. Thereafter, on 11th September 2009, there was a letter/tripartite agreement executed, to which M/s. Aurora, the appellant and the respondent were parties under which it was agreed that the appellant would provide 22,500 square feet of constructed area to M/s. Aurora instead of 15,000 square feet, which was agreed to be allotted under the agreement dated 22nd September 1999.


4.The dispute began on 22nd March 2012 when the respondent, by his letter, alleged default against the appellant as set out in the said letter. After the letter was sent, there was a prolonged correspondence, exchange of drafts of the sale agreements, etc. Ultimately, the respondent filed a petition before the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Arbitration Act’). An Arbitrator was appointed. The arbitral proceedings concluded in the form of an award made by the Arbitral Tribunal on 7th September 2018 in favour of the respondent (the claimant before the Arbitral Tribunal). Most of the claims made by the respondent were granted. The counter-claim made by the appellant was rejected. The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court to challenge the award. By the judgment dated 13th September 2019, the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and proceeded to set aside the award on various grounds, such as perversity, patent illegality, etc. The respondent filed an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act to challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge. By the impugned judgment, which set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench of the High Court passed an order of remand to the learned Single Judge on the ground that the learned Single Judge did not consider several issues. The Division Bench referred to an application made by the third parties. It directed that the interim arrangements made earlier by making an appointment of the Court Receiver shall continue for four weeks with a liberty to the parties to seek appropriate interim orders in the restored petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Both the parties to the appeal under Section 37 have preferred these cross-appeals.


SUBMISSIONS


5.We have heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the parties in these appeals. The learned senior counsel representing the appellant submitted that an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is essentially a continuation of the proceedings under Section 34. The scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) is narrower than what is available under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Reliance was placed on various decisions of this Court in support of the said submissions. Another contention is that while deciding the appeal under Section 37(1)(c), the Court can either set aside the award or affirm the award but cannot remand the petition under Section 34 for a fresh hearing. The submission is that the provisions of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the CPC’) concerning remand do not apply to an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act as the provisions of the CPC do not apply to such an appeal. Inviting our attention to the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, the learned senior counsel submitted that while allowing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Single Judge, by a detailed judgment, has dealt with all the issues canvassed by the parties. Pointing out the findings recorded by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment, he submitted that it cannot be said that the reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge are not elaborate. The reasons are very detailed and more than elaborate. In short, the submission is that the remand order is wholly unwarranted, and the Division Bench ought to have decided the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act on merits.


6.The appellant was the respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal. Even the claimant Samir Narain Bhojwani (described in this judgment as the respondent) has filed the Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.20359 of 2023. The intervenor before the Division Bench in the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act has preferred a Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (C)Diary No.40494 of 2023. The plea by the respondent is naturally for restoration of the award of the Arbitral Tribunal. We have heard the detailed submissions of the learned senior counsel representing the respondent (the claimant) and the intervenors. We are not referring to the submissions made by them relating to the merits of the Award, considering the limited scope of these appeals.


CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS


7.After considering the submissions made across the Bar, we find that the issue revolves around the power of the Appellate Court dealing with the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act to pass an order of remand to Section 34 Court. Before we address the issue regarding the power of the Appellate Court, we will need to refer to the award made by the Arbitral Tribunal. There are six different parts of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal. The operative part of the award of the Arbitral Tribunal reads thus:


“.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..


203. In view of the foregoing discussion, the following Award is made:


I


(a)It is declared that the Development Agreement dated 10th March 2003 is valid, subsisting and binding upon the Claimant and the Respondent;


(b)It is declared that the Claimant is entitled to retain possession of 15 Flats in Wing A (earmarked for the Respondent) and 0.63 Flat in Wing B (earmarked for the Respondent), till the Respondent complies with all the directions being given in this Award;


(c)The Respondent is directed to construct at its own cost 107 PAP tenements (or any higher number as may be specified by SRA) at Shiv Shakti Nagar, Kandivali, relatable to the Andheri Kamgar Nagar CHS Scheme and handover the same to SRA within 2 months from the date of this Award;


(d)The Respondent is further directed to obtain from SRA a certificate of discharge of the Respondent from its obligation of constructing 107 (or any higher number of) PAP tenements relatable to Andheri Kamgar Nagar CHS Scheme, and handing over the same to SRA, within 3 months from the date of this Award;


(e)The Respondent is directed to obtain further Commencement Certificate for construction of 6th to 22nd floors of Wing C (further CC for Wing C) on the basis of sanctioned building plans dated 21st October 2010, within 4 months from the date of this Award;


(f)In case SRA requires the Respondent to comply with any condition under any Letter of Intent or under any Regulation or Circular, including payment of any premium, before issuance of further CC for Wing C, the Respondent shall comply with such condition or direction with utmost expedition and within one month from the date of receipt of such communication;


(g)Once the Respondent obtains further CC for Wing C as aforesaid, the Claimant shall at its own cost construct 6th to 22nd floors of Wing C as per the sanctioned building plans dated 2ist October 2010, within 18 months from the date of receiving further CC for Wing C and after completion of construction of Wing C, give intimation thereof to the Respondent for applying to SRA for Occupation Certificate (OC) for Wing C;


(h)The Respondent shall obtain from SRA OC for Wing C, within 2 months from the date of receipt of intimation from the Claimant as per the above direction;


(i)In case SRA requires the Respondent to comply with any condition under any Letter of Intent or under any Regulation or Circular, including payment of any premium, before issuance of OC for Wing C, the Respondent shall comply with such condition or direction with utmost expedition and within one month from the date of receipt of such communication;


II


(j)The Respondent shall pay the Claimant Rs.67,00,000/- (Rupees Sixty Seven lakhs) along with Rs.26,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs) being interest @ 18% p.a. from 19th July, 2016 till the date of this Award and further interest @ 18% p.a. from the date of this Award till the date of payment / realization, within 3 months from the date of this Award;


(k)The Respondent shall also pay the Claimant Rs.53,00,00,000/(Rupees Fifty Three Crores) as compensation for the period from 19th July 2016 till the date of this Award, being compensation for the delay on the part of the Respondent in not obtaining further CC for Wing C, within 4 months from the date of this Award;


(l)The Respondent shall further pay the Claimant Rs.50,00,00,000/(Rupees Fifty Crores) as compensation for delay in obtaining further CC for Wing C for the period of 24 months from the date of this Award till issuance of OC for Wing C, within 4 months from the date of issuance of OC for Wing C;


III


(m)The Respondent is directed to remove all encroachments from 9.15 mtr wide road to the South Side of the property under the said project; (n) The Respondent is also directed to obtain at its own cost, all necessary permissions for separate Lease and/or Assignment from MHADA in respect of the free sale component area in favour of the Andheri Kamgar Nagar Society, and, thereafter, in favour of the purchasers of the Apartments or their Association under the Indenture of Lease dated 31st March 1993 from MHADA;


(o)The Respondent is further directed to pay Stamp Duty on the Indenture of Lease dated 31st March 1993 executed by MHADA and on the Development Agreement for Development dated 6th October 1996 between Andheri Kamgar Nagar CHS and Aurora Properties & Investments and also on the Agreement for Sub Development dated


22nd September 1999 between Aurora Properties & Investments and the Respondent;


IV


(p)Till the OC is received for Wing C, neither the Claimant nor the Respondent shall sell, or in any other manner dispose of, encumber, or create any third party rights in any flat or any parking space in Wing C;


(q)Till the OC is received for Wing C and till the Respondent complies with the other directions given in Part II of the operative portion of this Award, the Respondent and the persons claiming through the Respondent shall not sell/ re-sell or in any other manner dispose of or encumber or create any third party rights in any of the 15 flats in Wing A (earmarked for the Respondent) and the parking spaces related thereto;


V


(r)It is declared that the Letters of Allotment purportedly issued by the Respondent in respect of 31 flats in Wings A and B (earmarked for the Respondent) are sham, bogus, illegal and null and void ab-initio and not binding on the Claimant;


(s)It is further declared that the Agreements for Sale of 15 flats in Wing A (earmarked for the Respondent) purportedly executed by the Respondent in favor of the Managing Director and Directors of the Respondent Company and their family members are also sham and null and void ab-initio and not binding on the Claimant;


(t)In case, within 4 months from the date of this Award, the Respondent does not pay the Claimant the aforesaid amount of Rs.54.03 crores or does not surrender 3.63 flats in Wing B ( out of those earmarked for the Respondent), the Claimant shall be entitled to sell 0.63 flat in Wing


B (Flat No.4 on the pt floor) and 3 flats in Wing B, out of the following 9 flats:-


●2 Flats purportedly transferred by the Respondent to Mr. Kiran H.Hemani - M.D. of the Respondent,


●7 flats purportedly transferred by the Respondent to Mr. Priyank K. Hemani - Director of the Respondent;


(u)The Respondent and the persons claiming through the Respondent are hereby restrained from selling/reselling, or in any other manner disposing of or encumbering or parting with possession of or creating any third party rights, in the flats in Wing B purportedly transferred to Mr. Kiran H. Hemani and Mr. Priyank K. Hemai till identification and intimation of 3 flats out of those 9 flats in Wing B is conveyed by the Respondent to the Claimant for the purpose of being available for sale by the Claimant for recovery Rs.54.03 crores as directed in (h), (i) & (r) hereinabove and explained in detail para 199 hereinabove;


(v)In case the Respondent does not obtain further CC for Wing C within 4 months from the date of this Award, the Claimant shall be entitled to sell the 15 flats in Wing A (earmarked for the Respondent) and adjust the sale proceeds thereof against the loss of profit from Wing C;


(w)In case the Respondent obtains further CC for Wing C and also obtains OC for Wing C within the time limits stipulated in this Award, but the Respondent does not pay the Claimant Rs.SO crores, as directed in (j) above within 4 months from the date of obtaining OC for Wing C, or does not surrender 3.37 flats to the Claimant and the parking spaces related thereto, within the said period, the Claimant shall be entitled to sell off 3.37 flats earmarked for the Respondent in Wing C and the parking spaces related thereto;


VI


(x)The Respondent shall pay the Claimant costs of this proceeding quantified at Rs.1,50,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Fifty Lakhs), within 4 months from the date of this Award. The Respondent shall bear its own costs for this proceeding.


205. The claims made by the Claimant for the other reliefs not granted in this Award are hereby rejected. All the Counter Claims made by the Respondent are also rejected.


206. It is clarified that this Award does not deal with any of the 5 flats in Wing A, 3 flats in Wing B and 4 flats in Wing C, earmarked for Aurora Properties & Investments, for which orders of injunction were passed by the Bombay High Court on 3rd and 17th December 2013 in Notice of Motion 147 of 2013, and which injunction orders have been restored by the Supreme Court by judgment and order dated 2ist August 2018 in Civil Appeal No. 7079 of 2018.


.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..”


8.While deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Single Judge has made an in-depth discussion on the factual aspects and the submissions of the learned counsel representing the parties. Paragraphs 1 to 35 of his judgment deal with the factual aspects and details about the directions issued by the Arbitral Tribunal under the award. Paragraphs 36 to 125, spanning over 45 pages, record the submissions made by the parties, and paragraphs 126 to 194, covering 37 pages, are the reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge. There is a discussion about the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties. From paragraphs 140 onwards, the learned Single Judge discussed the issue of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to pass the award against the third parties who were not parties to the arbitral proceedings. The learned Single Judge referred to the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal that 31 agreements/allotment letters for the sale of flats were sham and bogus and were not binding on the respondent. The learned Single Judge found that no persons shown as purchasers under the agreement were parties to the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal. The learned Single Judge also noted that these 31 flats were mortgaged in favour of various Banks and Financial Institutions. Therefore, the learned Single Judge held that even the Banks and Financial Institutions would be affected by the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal that 31 flats under the sale agreements were sham, bogus, null, and void. Therefore, the learned Single Judge held that the Arbitral Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge also held that the respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal (the appellant herein) was entitled to sell the said 31 flats, and the purchasers thereof were neither parties to the agreement containing the arbitration clause nor claiming under the said agreement.


9.The learned Single Judge also referred to that part of the arbitral award, which provided that there would be a charge over the flats held by the appellant herein. The learned Single Judge held that the charge on the properties could be either created by operation of law or by agreement of the parties, and in this case, there was no such agreement. Therefore, the learned Single Judge held that the direction to create the charge was ex-facie without the jurisdiction. Thereafter, the learned Single Judge referred to the reliefs granted by the Arbitral Tribunal in clauses (c) to (l), (m) to (q), (t), (u) and (v) of paragraph 203 of the award. According to the learned Single Judge, some of the reliefs could have been granted only in the execution of the award. Further, the learned Single Judge held that under clauses (c) to (l) and (m) to (q) of paragraph 203 of the award, the appellant herein was directed to carry out various acts to obtain multiple permissions from the authorities within the prescribed time and based on such compliance, further directions were issued for the execution of multiple documents, etc. The authorities from whom the appellant was directed to obtain various permissions were admittedly not parties before the arbitral proceedings. The learned Single Judge also noted that the directions issued in the abovementioned clauses required continuous supervision by the Court. Therefore, in view of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, such reliefs ought not to have been granted by the Arbitral Tribunal.


10.The learned Single Judge also held that though specific performance was sought in the claim made before the Arbitral Tribunal based on the Letter of Intent dated 7th March 2012, the Arbitral Tribunal granted specific performance based on the Letter of Intent of 2010. The learned Single Judge also held that the learned Arbitrator or the Court could not supervise whether the appellant can shift 107 PAPs in its other properties as directed under the award. Further, it was observed that the direction to construct the 6th to 22nd floors could be implemented only upon completing the entire chain of events, such as obtaining permissions, shifting of PAPs, etc. The learned Single Judge held that the grant of specific performance in the present case would be hit by Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the enforcement of such a contract involves continuous supervision by the Court. On perusing the material on record, the learned Single Judge also held that the respondent herein had not proved his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations. The learned Single Judge held that since the relief of specific performance is discretionary, the conduct of the respondent ought to have been taken into consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal.


11.The learned Single Judge dealt with the award of damages in the sum of Rs.53 crores for the period from 19th July 2016 till the date of the award on account of the alleged delay by the respondent. The learned Single Judge held that the evidence on record had been completely overlooked while granting the relief of damages in the sum of Rs.53 crores. The learned Single Judge recorded that the Arbitral Tribunal referred to only a part of the depositions of the witnesses and ignored the rest. Further, the learned Single Judge held that the delay on the part of the appellant in completing other projects was neither pleaded nor proved. Moreover, the learned Single Judge held that even assuming that there was a delay in completion of other projects on the part of the appellant, that would be no ground for grant of relief for specific performance. The learned Single Judge recorded something about the approach of the Arbitral Tribunal in paragraph 168. The learned Single Judge objected to the learned Arbitrator relying on the news report of some other developer’s project in the Times of India. The learned Single Judge noted that the news article was published after the arguments were concluded. Moreover, the learned Single Judge found that relying upon the material, not forming part of the record, amounts to a breach of the principles of natural justice. A clear finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is that the learned Arbitrator has applied different yardsticks to the evidence adduced by both parties. Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal did not treat the parties as equals.


12.The learned Judge held that while dealing with the per square feet rate of the flats for awarding a claim for damages, the Arbitral Tribunal completely ignored the evidence on record, which showed that the respondent had sold the flats at much lower rates. The learned Single Judge also discussed the finding recorded while rejecting the counterclaim. The learned Single Judge held that though the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the building did not have a load-bearing capacity of 22 floors, the respondent neither pleaded nor proved the load-bearing capacity of the building. The learned Single Judge also held that awarding payment of interest on interest-free deposit was contrary to the terms of the contract, which shows patent illegality. However, the learned Single Judge rejected the allegation of bias made by the appellant against the learned Arbitrator.


13.We have referred to only material findings of the learned Single Judge by way of illustration to emphasise that there is a very elaborate consideration of the merits of the challenge to the award in the judgment of the learned Single Judge.


14.Now, we turn to the judgment of the Division Bench in the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The approach of the Division Bench is reflected in paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus:


“4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we were of the opinion that the impugned order is required to be set aside and the matter needs to be remanded to the learned Single Judge for de novo consideration. We had put it to the counsel for the parties that the appeal can be remanded, without detailed reasons, by consent, keeping all contentions open. The Appellant was ready but the Respondent was not ready. Therefore, we are required to give elaborate reason why remand is necessary. In this context, we have briefly referred to the core facts of the case, the rival contentions, the award and the impugned order. The factual backdrop leading to the dispute is narrated in detail in the Award and by the learned Single Judge. The summary of the factual position is as follows.


.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..”


(emphasis added)


In paragraphs 42 and 43, the Division Bench held thus:


“42. Even otherwise, question would arise as to whether such a detailed factual enquiry can be made to set aside the award. To reach such a conclusion that it suffers from perversity, the Award had to be carefully analyzed to rule out other possibilities. It is not enough to merely state a conclusion. Further, when such a conclusion can be reached under Section 34 of the Act is a debatable issue that also needs to be addressed.


43. In the impugned order in paragraphs 161 and 162 reference is made to the principle of law governing the discretion to be used for grant of specific performance. In paragraph 163, it is stated that ‘perusal of the record’ will indicate that the Appellant has not proved that he was ready and willing. When the Appellant sought to argue that the Appellant was ready and willing, the same was dealt with in paragraph 164. The submission of the Appellant that unless the Respondent would have fully satisfied the Appellant that he had made appropriate provision for shifting 107 PAPs to some other plot the Appellant was not required to proceed with the construction of building, was not accepted. However, there is no discussion as to why this stand of the Appellant was rejected.


.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. … ..”


(emphasis added)


In the impugned judgment, certain findings recorded by the learned Single Judge have been criticised. Ultimately, in paragraphs 61 and 62 of the impugned judgment, the Division Bench held thus:


“61. Considering that the impugned order has not addressed several issues raised by both parties before setting aside the Award, for the above reasons we are inclined to set aside the impugned order to remand the proceedings to the learned Single Judge. Further under the Award itself. question now will remain for damages.


62. Since we are of the opinion that the petition filed by the Respondent needs to be reconsidered, we refrain from going deeper into the controversy and in our discussion, which have only highlighted as to why the impugned order is unreasoned and therefore needs to be set aside for reconsideration.


.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..”


Thus, eventually, an order of remand was passed directing the learned Single Judge to hear the petition under Section 34 afresh.


15.We need not dwell on the limited scope of the interference in the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. That position is very well settled. However, as far as the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act is concerned, in the case of MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited 1, in paragraph 14, this Court held thus:


“14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the court under Section 34 and by the court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.”


(emphasis added)


In another decision of this Court in the case of UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh 2, in paragraph 16, it was held thus:


“16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293] , the reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act have been explained in the following words : (SCC pp. 166-67, para 11)


“11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.”


(emphasis added)


In the decision of this Court in the case of Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking 3, in paragraph 18, it was held thus:


“18. At the outset, we may state that the jurisdiction of the court under Section 37 of the Act, as clarified by this Court in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293], is akin to the jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the Act. [Id, SCC p. 167, para 14:“14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision.”] Scope of interference by a court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is restricted and subject to the same grounds as the challenge under Section 34 of the Act.”


(emphasis added)


16.The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37 against the judgment in a petition under Section 34 is more constrained than the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with a petition under Section 34. It is the duty of the Appellate Court to consider whether Section 34 Court has remained confined to the grounds of challenge that are available in a petition under Section 34. The ultimate function of the Appellate Court under Section 37 is to decide whether the jurisdiction under Section 34 has been exercised rightly or wrongly. While doing so, the Appellate Court can exercise the same power and jurisdiction that Section 34 Court possesses with the same constraints.


17.In the facts of the case in hand, while deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Single Judge has made a very elaborate consideration of the submissions made across the Bar, the findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal and the issue of illegality or perversity of the award. Detailed reasons while dealing with the alleged patent illegalities associated with the directions issued under the arbitral award have been recorded. Considering the nature of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, the job of the Appellate Court was to scrutinise the said findings and to decide, one way or the other, on merits. In this case, the finding of the Appellate Bench that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge does not address several issues raised by the parties cannot be sustained at all.


18.The provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings before the learned Arbitrator and the Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. The legislature’s intention is reflected in Section 19(1) of the Arbitration Act, which provides that an Arbitral Tribunal is not bound by the provision of the CPC. That is why the provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37(1)(c). We are not even suggesting that because the provisions of the CPC are not applicable, the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) is powerless to pass an order of remand. The remedy of an appeal will not be effective unless there is a power of remand vesting in the appellate authority. In the Arbitration Act, there is no statutory embargo on the power of the Appellate Court under Section 37(1)(c) to pass an order of remand. However, looking at the scheme of the Arbitration Act, the Appellate Court can exercise the power of remand only when exceptional circumstances make an order of remand unavoidable. There may be exceptional cases where remand in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act may be warranted. Some of the exceptional cases can be stated by way of illustration:


a.Summary disposal of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is made without consideration of merits;


b.Without service of notice to the respondent in a petition under Section 34, interference is made with the award; and


c.Decision in proceedings under Section 34 is rendered when one or more contesting parties are dead, and their legal representatives have not been brought on record.


19.Some of the objectives mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Arbitration Act are very relevant which are as follows:


“4. The main objectives of the Bill are as under:-


(i)to comprehensively cover international commercial arbitration and conciliation as also domestic arbitration and conciliation;


(ii)to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration;


(iii)to provide that the arbitral tribunal gives reasons for its arbitral award;


(iv)to ensure that the arbitral tribunal remains within the limits of its jurisdiction;


(v)to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process;


…………………………………”


(emphasis added)


While coming out with the 2015 Amendment Bill, the legislature has noted in the objects and reasons that a lot of delay is involved in concluding the arbitral proceedings. In paragraphs 6 and 7 of the objects and reasons of the Bill, the Legislature has stated thus:


“6. It is proposed to introduce the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2015, to replace the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, which inter alia, provides for the following, namely—


(i)to amend the definition of “Court” to provide that in the case of international commercial arbitrations, the Court should be the High Court;


(ii)to ensure that an Indian Court can exercise jurisdiction to grant interim measures, etc., even where the seat of the arbitration is outside India;


(iii)an application for appointment of an arbitrator shall be disposed of by the High Court or Supreme Court, as the case may be, as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour should be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days;


(iv)to provide that while considering any application for appointment of arbitrator, the High Court or the Supreme Court shall examine the existence of a prima facie arbitration agreement and not other issues;


(v)to provide that the arbitral tribunal shall make its award within a period of twelve months from the date it enters upon the reference and that the parties may, however, extend such period up to six months, beyond which period any extension can only be granted by the Court, on sufficient cause;


(vi)to provide that a model fee Schedule on the basis of which High Courts may frame rules for the purpose of determination of fees of arbitral tribunal, where a High Court appoints arbitrator in terms of Section 11 of the Act;


(vii)to provide that the parties to dispute may at any stage agree in writing that their dispute be resolved through fast track procedure and the award in such cases shall be made within a period of six months;


(viii)to provide for neutrality of arbitrators, when a person is approached in connection with possible appointment as an arbitrator;


(ix)to provide that application to challenge the award is to be disposed of by the Court within one year.


7. The amendments proposed in the Bill will ensure that arbitration process becomes more user friendly, cost effective and lead to expeditious disposal of cases.”


(emphasis added)


The object of the Arbitration Act is to provide an arbitral procedure that is fair, efficient, and capable of meeting the needs of specific arbitration. The object is to ensure that the arbitral proceedings and proceedings filed for challenging the award are concluded expeditiously. The proceedings have to be cost-effective. The supervisory role of the Courts is very restricted. Moreover, we cannot ignore that arbitration is one of the modes of Alternative Disputes Redressal Mechanism provided in Section 89 of the CPC. If the Courts dealing with appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act start routinely passing the orders of remand, the arbitral procedure will cease to be efficient. It will cease to be cost-effective. Such orders will delay the conclusion of the proceedings, thereby defeating the very object of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, an order of remand by Section 37 Court can be made only in exceptional cases where remand is unavoidable. As observed earlier, the scope of interference in a petition under Section 34 is very narrow. The jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is narrower. Looking to the objects of the Arbitration Act and the limited scope available to the Courts to interfere with the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, this Court, while dealing with the decisions under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act, in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, has to be circumspect. By their own volition, the parties choose to go before the Arbitral Tribunal instead of availing remedy before the traditional civil courts. Therefore, the Courts must be very conservative when dealing with arbitral awards and confine themselves to the grounds strictly available under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.


20.In the facts of the case, the remand was completely unwarranted. The reason is that the learned Single Judge has elaborately dealt with the merits of the challenge in the Section 34 petition. This Court should benefit from reasoned judgment rendered by the Court under Section 37. In this case, we do not have the benefit of a decision of the Appellate Court dealing with all the issues dealt with by the learned Single Judge while deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, it will not be appropriate for this Court to look at the arbitral award and the findings recorded by the Section 34 Court and exercise the jurisdiction of the Section 37 Court. If we do something which Section 37 Court was required to do, it will be unjust to the parties as the unsuccessful party before us will be deprived of one forum of challenge. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and request the Division Bench to decide the appeals on merits after considering the arbitral award and the decision of Section 34 Court.


21.Before we part with the judgment, we must record some serious concerns based on our judicial experience. Case after case, we find that the arbitral proceedings have become synonymous with very bulky pleadings and evidence and very long, time-consuming submissions, leading to very lengthy awards. Moreover, there is a tendency to rely upon a large number of precedents, relevant or irrelevant. The result of all this is that we have very long hearings before the Courts in Sections 34 and 37 proceedings.


22.By way of illustration, we are referring to the factual aspects of the present case. The award runs into 139 pages. The petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act runs into 93 pages and incorporates 151 grounds. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dealing with the petition under Section 34 consists of 101 pages. One of the contributing factors is that more than 35 decisions were relied upon by the parties before the learned Single Judge. On the same point, multiple judgments have been cited, taking similar views. As per the practice in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, a memorandum of appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act does not contain the facts but only the grounds of challenge. In the memorandum of appeal preferred by the respondent consisting of 46 pages, 164 grounds have been incorporated. Considering the narrow scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act, we cannot comprehend how there could be 151 grounds in a petition under Section 34 and 164 grounds in an appeal under Section 37. It is not surprising that this appeal has a synopsis running into 45 pages, and it contains as many as 54 grounds of challenge.


23.In many cases, the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 are being treated as if the same are appeals under Section 96 of the CPC. When members of the bar take up so many grounds in petitions under Section 34, which are not covered by Section 34, there is a tendency to urge all those grounds which are not available in law and waste the Court’s time. The time of our Courts is precious, considering the huge pendency. This is happening in a large number of cases. All this makes the arbitral procedure inefficient and unfair. It is high time that the members of the Bar show restraint by incorporating only legally permissible grounds in petitions under Section 34 and the appeals under Section 37. Everyone associated with the arbitral proceedings must remember that brevity will make the arbitral proceedings and the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 more effective. All that we say is that all the stakeholders need to introspect. Otherwise, the very object of adopting the UNCITRAL model will be frustrated. We are not called upon to consider whether the arbitral proceedings are cost-effective. In an appropriate case, the issue will have to be considered. Arbitration must become a tool for expeditious, effective, and cost-effective dispute resolution.


24.As we are directing the rehearing of the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, it is necessary to extend the interim relief that was operative during the pendency of these appeals.


25.Accordingly, we pass the following order:


a.The impugned judgment dated 7th July 2023 in Commercial Appeal no.31 of 2023 is, hereby, set aside, and Commercial Appeal no.30 of 2023 is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay;


b.The restored appeal shall be placed before the roster Bench on 29th July 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The parties to the appeal before this Court shall be under an obligation to appear before the concerned Bench on that day, and no fresh notice shall be served to the parties. The High Court will permit the appellants to file an amended memorandum of appeal containing only the relevant and permissible grounds. The concerned Division Bench shall fix a schedule for hearing of the appeal;


c.The Registry of this Court shall forward a copy of this judgment to the Prothonotary and Senior Master of the High Court of Bombay, who shall ensure that the appeal is listed before the roster Bench as directed above;


d.The interim relief, granted by this Court on 11th August 2023, shall continue to operate till the disposal of the remanded appeal;


e.We make it clear that we have made no adjudication on the merits of the arbitral award and the judgment of the learned Single Judge and all the issues arising in the remanded appeal are left open to be decided by the High Court; and


f.The appeals are, accordingly, partly allowed with no orders as to costs.


Result of the case: Appeals partly allowed.


1 [2019] 3 SCR 1023 : (2019) 4 SCC 163


2 [2022] 1 SCR 1 : (2022) 4 SCC 116


3 [2023] 11 SCR 215 : (2023) 9 SCC 85


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