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Thursday, May 16, 2024

Whether an auction/ sale under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFESI Act) carried out without issuing the mandatory 30-day notice to the borrower under Rules 8(6) and 8 (7) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 is liable to be set aside. If so, can the bona fide purchaser, who was originally the tenant, be forced to hand over the physical possession of the premises in order get the refund. Whether the bona fide purchaser would be entitled to refund of the auction money and interest, and compensation for improvement/ investments made by him.

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 633 : 2024 INSC 326

Govind Kumar Sharma & Anr.

v.

Bank of Baroda & Ors.

(SLP (C) No. 24155 of 2018)

18 April 2024

[Vikram Nath* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether an auction/ sale under the Securitisation and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security

Interest Act, 2002 (SARFESI Act) carried out without issuing

the mandatory 30-day notice to the borrower under Rules 8(6)

and 8 (7) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 is

liable to be set aside. If so, can the bona fide purchaser, who

was originally the tenant, be forced to hand over the physical

possession of the premises in order get the refund. Whether

the bona fide purchaser would be entitled to refund of the

auction money and interest, and compensation for improvement/

investments made by him.

Headnotes

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and

Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – Security Interest

(Enforcement) Rules, 2002 – Appellants/ Original tenants in

physical possession of premises – Appellants were issued

sale certificate after auction- Bank admitted to procedural

lapse – DRT set aside sale and directed Bank to refund auction

money with interest as applicable to fixed deposit only after

receiving the possession of the premises – DRT found no

proof of improvements/investments – DRAT and High Court

confirmed.

Held: Supreme Court upheld the setting aside of the auction/sale

in view of concurrent findings and Bank’s admission- Supreme

Court modified DRT’s directions – Appellants were allowed to

retain physical possession in the capacity of tenants and borrower/

landlord could to evict as per law and Bank was directed to return

the auction money with 12% per annum compound interest.

[Paras 12-15]

634 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

List of Acts

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and

Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; Security Interest

(Enforcement) Rules, 2002.

List of Keywords

Rule 8(6), Rule 8 (7) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002;

Mandatory notice; Default; Non-compliance of statutory provisions;

Setting aside of auction/ sale; Refund; Physical possession.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5028 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.07.2018 of the High Court

of Judicature at Allahabad in WC No. 20266 of 2018

Appearances for Parties

R. P. Shukla, Dhruv Shukla, Ms. Upasena Shukla, Ms. Aeishwarya

Sharma, Gaurav Chauhan, Ms. Megha Gaur, Piyush Kumarendra,

Vibhav Mishra, Vijay K. Jain, Advs. for the Appellants.

Arun Aggarwal, Ms. Anshika Agarwal, Deepti Jain, Shivam Saini,

Praful Rawat, Pramod Kumar Singh, Vijay Pal, Shiv Dutt Sharma,

Ms. Rekha Agarwal, Rajvir Singh, Bikash Chandra, Rameshwar

Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellants herein have assailed the correctness of the

judgment and order dated 02.07.2018 passed by the Allahabad

High Court dismissing the Writ Petition of the appellants, confirming

the orders passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal1 as also the

1 DRT

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 635

Govind Kumar Sharma & Anr. v. Bank of Baroda & Ors.

Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal2, whereby the auction sale held

in favour of the appellants had been set aside and the appeal

was dismissed.

Brief facts in nutshell are as follows:

3. The firm-respondent no.3, had taken a loan from the respondent no.1-

Bank. However, as it went into default, the Bank initiated proceedings

under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and

Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 20023

. In the said recovery

proceedings, the Recovery Officer conducted an open auction. The

appellants were the highest bidder. Their bid was accepted and they

made good the deposits as per the terms of this auction. Accordingly,

a sale certificate was issued in their favour on 30.03.2009. It may

be noted here that the appellants were tenants of the borrower in

the premises in question which had been put to auction. As such

the status of the appellants changed from that of tenants to that of

owners after the sale was confirmed and sale certificate was issued.

4. The borrower-respondent nos.3 and 4 filed a securitization application

under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act for setting aside the sale on

the ground that the Bank had not followed the statutory procedure

prescribed under the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 20024

,

in particular, the notice as required under Rules 8(6) and 8(7) which

required a mandatory notice of 30 days to the borrower, had neither

been issued nor served upon the borrower.

5. The DRT, after examining the matter, came to the conclusion that

the Bank itself had admitted that the statutory compliance under the

above rules had not been made and as such proceeded to set aside

the sale vide order dated 21.04.2015. The operative portion of the

order passed by the DRT is reproduced hereunder:

“…The sale as pointed out earlier is liable to be quashed

for the non-compliance of Rule 8(6) and 8(7) of the

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. The auction

purchaser set up his case that he has spent huge money

on improvement of property in question. The auction

2 DRAT

3 SARFAESI Act

4 2002 Rules

636 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

purchaser has not place on record any material to prove

the alleged improvements in the property. The auction

purchaser is enjoying this property since 2009 as such

auction purchaser is not entitled to any extra compensation.

However, Bank will be under obligation to refund the auction

money with interest as applicable to fixed deposit. The sale

is accordingly set aside and it is made clear that Bank will

refund the auction money only after receiving possession

of property from auction purchaser within 15 days from the

delivery of auction purchaser to the Bank. The applicant

is directed to pay the dues of the sic within 15 days with

upto date interest, failing which Bank will be at liberty to

proceed further under Securitization and Reconstruction

of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest

Act 2002 to recover its dues.

xxx xxx xxx”

6. In effect the DRT, after setting aside the sale, further proceeded to

direct the Bank to refund the auction money with interest as applicable

to fixed deposits only after receiving possession of the property from

the auction purchaser within 15 days thereof. The borrower was

directed to pay the dues of the Bank within 15 days with up to date

interest, failing which the Bank would be at liberty to proceed further

under the SARFAESI Act for recovery of its dues.

7. The appellants preferred an appeal before the DRAT registered

as Appeal No. R-57 of 2015, which came to be dismissed, vide

order dated 19.04.2018. Thereafter the appellants approached the

High Court by way of a Writ Petition registered as Writ Petition (C)

No.20266 of 2018, which has since been dismissed by the impugned

judgment and order, giving rise to the present appeal.

8. The submission advanced by learned counsel for the appellants is

two-fold: firstly, that they were bonafide purchasers for value and,

therefore, the DRT, the DRAT and the High Court erred in setting

aside the sale and confirming it. The second submission advanced

is that after the sale certificate was issued, the appellants have

developed the suit property and have invested approximately Rs.60

lacs and in case the sale is to be set aside, the appellants should

be suitably compensated not only by refund of the auction money 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 637

Govind Kumar Sharma & Anr. v. Bank of Baroda & Ors.

along with interest but also for the improvements made by them in

developing the property and investment made therein.

9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank

submitted that although it had followed the procedure prescribed

but could not substantiate with any material to rebut the findings

recorded by the DRT, DRAT and the High Court that the Bank had

failed to follow the statutory provisions of notice under Rules 8(6)

and 8(7) of the 2002 Rules. It was further submitted that as the

appellants have enjoyed the property as it was already in their

possession, they cannot claim any additional compensation for the

improvements made by them as they were well aware of the litigation

initiated by the borrower by filing an application under Section 17 of

the SARFAESI Act and whatever improvements have been made

were at their own risk.

10. Further, learned counsel for the borrower (respondent nos.3 and 4)

submitted that they have already paid the entire outstanding dues

of the Bank without adjusting the auction money received by the

Bank which is lying separately in an escrow account because of

the litigation. It was also submitted that the Bank admits that the

entire dues have been paid but at the same time it has declined

to issue the No Dues Certificate because of pendency of the

litigation. It was also submitted that the Bank, without following

due procedure, had conducted the auction and, therefore, the DRT

rightly set aside the sale which has been confirmed by the DRAT

and the High Court.

11. From the facts, as narrated above and the arguments advanced,

the following is the admitted position:

(i). The appellants were tenants in the premises in question which

had been put up for auction. Their possession and status as

tenants were converted into that of owners after the sale was

confirmed and the sale certificate issued;

(ii). The borrowers have admitted that they were in default and that

the Bank had a right to recover its dues in accordance to law;

(iii). After the auction sale, the borrowers have deposited the entire

outstanding amount independent of the auction money which

is additionally lying with the Bank;

638 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(iv). The Bank has admitted that there was non-compliance of the

statutory provisions in conducting the sale and as such had

conceded before the DRT that the sale in question may be

set aside and the Bank be granted liberty to proceed afresh;

(v). The Bank has admitted that the auction money of Rs.12.40

lacs is lying in a separate fixed deposit and this amount is in

addition to the outstanding amount deposited by the borrower

after the auction sale.

12. Considering the above facts and circumstances and the arguments

advanced, we proceed to deal with the same:

(i). In view of the concurrent finding based on the admission by

the Bank that mandatory notice of 30 days was not given to

the Borrower before holding the auction/sale, the setting aside

of the auction/sale cannot be faulted with. The same has to be

approved.

(ii). Once the sale is set aside, the status of the appellants as

owners would automatically revert to that of tenants. The status

of possession at best could have been altered from that of an

owner to that of tenants but Bank would not have any right to

claim actual physical possession from the appellants nor would

the appellants be under any obligation to handover physical

possession to the Bank. The DRT fell in error on the said issue.

Therefore, the direction issued by the DRT that the Bank will first

take possession and thereafter refund the auction money with

interest applicable to fixed deposits, is not a correct direction;

(iii). The entire controversy has arisen because of the Bank not

following the prescribed mandatory procedure for conducting

the auction sale and, therefore, the Bank must suffer and

should be put to terms for unnecessarily creating litigation. As

of date the dues of the Bank have been fully discharged and an

additional amount of the auction money is lying with the Bank

since 2009. This amount is to be returned to the appellants. In

such facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view

that the award of interest on the auction money at the rate

applicable to fixed deposits is not a correct view. The rate of

interest deserves to be enhanced.

(iv). We could have considered awarding 24 per cent per annum

compound interest on the auction money to be refunded to the 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 639

Govind Kumar Sharma & Anr. v. Bank of Baroda & Ors.

appellants in view of serious illegality committed by the Bank

in conducting the auction and driving the parties to litigation.

Considering the fact that the money of the Bank is also public

money, we feel that interest of justice would be best served if the

auction money with 12 per cent per annum compound interest

is returned to the appellants. Such interest be calculated from

the date of deposit till the date it is actually paid.

(v). There was some dispute between the Bank and the borrower

that there could be minor adjustments still left. We are of the

view that if any additional amount is lying with the Bank, the

same would be returned to the borrower and if any amount is

still due to be paid, the borrower would pay the said amount

to the Bank. The Bank and the borrower have both agreed for

making the said adjustments.

13. In view of the above discussion and analysis, the following directions

are issued:

a) setting aside of the auction sale is affirmed.

b) The status of the appellants as tenants shall stand restored

leaving it open for the borrower as owner of the property to

evict the appellants in accordance to law.

c) The entire auction/sale money lying with the Bank (R-1 & 2)

shall be returned to the appellants along with compound interest

@12 per cent per annum to be calculated from the date of

deposit till the date of payment.

d) The Borrower Respondent nos.3 and 4 and the Bank–

Respondent nos.1 and 2, would streamline their accounts and

the Bank upon settlement of the same will issue a No Dues

Certificate to the Borrower.

14. The impugned order shall stand modified as above. The appeal

stands disposed of accordingly.

15. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Aishani Narain, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal disposed of.

(Verified by: Abhinav Mukerji, Sr. Adv.)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Quashing of FIR – Territorial jurisdiction for registration of FIR – FIR registered at Arunachal Pradesh for offences u/ss. 420/120B/34 IPC by the complainant against accused persons – Complainant’s case that accused refused to hand over the property despite full payment for the sale of the land/building made by complainant – Said property situated in Rajasthan as also the address of accused is that of Rajasthan whereas address of the complainant was address of the company in Arunachal Pradesh – Three of the accused filed petition for quashing the FIR before the Gauhati High Court and the same was dismissed – Five others filed writ petitions for quashing of the same FIR before the Rajasthan High Court and the same was allowed – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 624 : 2024 INSC 317

The State of Arunachal Pradesh

v.

Kamal Agarwal & Ors. Etc.

(Criminal Appeal No. 2136 of 2024)

18 April 2024

[Vikram Nath* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Matter pertains to correctness of the order passed by the

Rajasthan High Court quashing the FIR registered in Arunachal

Pradesh.

Headnotes

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Quashing of FIR

– Territorial jurisdiction for registration of FIR – FIR registered

at Arunachal Pradesh for offences u/ss. 420/120B/34 IPC by

the complainant against accused persons – Complainant’s

case that accused refused to hand over the property despite

full payment for the sale of the land/building made by

complainant – Said property situated in Rajasthan as also the

address of accused is that of Rajasthan whereas address of

the complainant was address of the company in Arunachal

Pradesh – Three of the accused filed petition for quashing

the FIR before the Gauhati High Court and the same was

dismissed – Five others filed writ petitions for quashing of

the same FIR before the Rajasthan High Court and the same

was allowed – Correctness:

Held: Matter was purely civil in nature – It could not be said to

be a case of cheating – Simple reading of the FIR itself does

not disclose any cognizable offence for which the FIR should

be registered and maintained – Complaint lodged was not

worth being registered as a complaint and that too in the State

of Arunachal Pradesh – High Court of Rajasthan rightly found

considering all aspects of the matter that the offence, if any,

although no offence is made out, would be within the territorial

jurisdiction of Rajasthan and not Arunachal Pradesh – Normally,

in a given case where issue is of territorial jurisdiction, direction

could have been issued to transfer the investigation or the trial to 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 625

The State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Kamal Agarwal & Ors. Etc.

the State where the cause of action would lie but in the instant

case, no offence as such is made out – Entire FIR is quashed

and the consequential proceedings thereto – Rajasthan High

Court, in the subsequent petition moved by the respondent has

after noticing the proceedings initiated in Gauhati High Court

has given relief to the respondent and other respondents on

the ground that no cause of action arose in Arunachal Pradesh

– Hence, in exercise of the power under Art. 136, no inclination

to disturb the findings in favour of the respondent in the writ

petition by Rajasthan High Court – Order of the Gauhati High

Court set aside and the entire proceedings arising out of the

FIR quashed. [Paras 12-17]

Case Law Cited

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992] Supp. 3 SCR

735 : (1992) Suppl. 1 SCC 335 – referred to.

List of Acts

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1980.

List of Keywords

Quashing of FIR; Territorial jurisdiction for registration of FIR;

Dispute civil in nature; Cheating; Cognizable offence; Transfer the

investigation or the trial; Cause of action.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.

2136-2138 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2023 of the High Court

of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCRWP No. 987, 988 and

989 of 2022

Appearances for Parties

Siddharth Dave, Ms. Liz Mathew, Sr. Advs., Navneet R., P. Dalvi, Ms.

Mallika Aggarwal, N. Bhardwaj, Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar,

Shree Pal Singh, Ms. Sanya Kaushal I, Ms. A Kaul, Vishal Meghwal,

Milind Kumar, Mrs. Padhmalakshmi Iyengar, Ms. Yashika Bum, Ms.

Neha Kapoor, Jagdish Chandra Solanki, Anuj Bhandari, Yuvraj Singh

R., Rajat Gupta, Advs. for the appearing parties.

626 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

Leave granted.

2. Both the above appeals arise out of the First Information Report1

registered as FIR Case No.227 of 2017 at Police Station Pasi Ghat,

District Siang East, Arunachal Pradesh for offences under section

420/120B/34 Indian Penal Code, 18602

 lodged by Mr. Anil Agarwal

attorney holder for Mr. Okep Tayeng, the proprietor of M/s Shiv

Bhandar. This FIR was registered against several named accused,

details of which will be dealt with at a later stage and additional

names surfaced during investigation.

3. Three of the accused namely Chandra Mohan Badaya and

Respondent Nos.3 and 4 namely Shashi Natani and Rajesh Natani

filed a petition for quashing the FIR before the Gauhati High Court

registered as Criminal Petition No.91 of 2021. The said petition

was dismissed by Gauhati High Court by judgment and order dated

24.06.2022. Aggrieved by the same, SLP (Crl.) No.7301 of 2022 has

been filed by Chandra Mohan Badaya. Five other co-accused filed writ

petitions before the Rajasthan High Court also praying for quashing

of the same FIR No.227 of 2017. The details of three petitions filed

before the Rajasthan High Court are as follows:

Accused Writ Petition No.

1. Kamal Agrawal Writ Petition No.987 of 2022

2. Hemani Agrawal Pg. No.227 of SLP(Crl.) No.8663-

8665 of 2023

3. Manish Kumar Tambi Writ Petition No.988 of 2022

4. Alpana Tambi Pg. no.246 of SLP (Crl.) No.

8663-8665 of 2023

5. Pawan Agrawal Writ Petition No.989 of 2022

Pg. no.265 of SLP (Crl.) No.

8663-8665 of 2023

1 FIR

2 IPC

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 627

The State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Kamal Agarwal & Ors. Etc.

4. These three petitions were allowed by the Rajasthan High Court vide

judgment dated 23.05.2023. Aggrieved by the same, the State of

Arunachal Pradesh has filed three Special Leave Petition Nos.8663-

8665 of 2023. Interestingly the complainant did not come forward

to challenge the order of the Rajasthan High Court quashing the

proceedings. Since both the set of matters relate to same FIR, the

same have been taken up together and are being decided by this

common order.

5. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeals are as follows:

5.1. M/s Shiv Bhandar, the proprietorship concerned transferred

an amount of Rs.1 Crore in the year 2016 in the account of

Chandra Mohan Badaya, two of his proprietorships concerned

and Rajesh Natani in four equal transactions of 25 lakhs

each. According to the appellant Chandra Mohan Badaya,

the amount was transferred as a loan, however, according to

the complainant the said payments were made for purchase

of land/building situate between plot No.A-47 to A-55, Sikar

House, near Chandpole, Jaipur, Rajasthan. Relevant to

mention here that there is no written agreement with respect

to the purpose of the transfer of said amount, whether it

was a loan or an advance towards purchase of land/building

referred to above.

5.2. According to Chandra Mohan Badaya, out of Rs.75 lakhs

received by him and his two concerns, he repaid Rs.37 lakhs to

the complainant from his personal and proprietorship accounts

by way of bank transfer. This amount was repaid in 2016-2017.

Further, according to Chandra Mohan Badaya, he executed two

sale deeds with respect to two properties situate in Chaksu,

Jaipur in favour of wife (Smt. Shalini Agarwal) and sister-in-law

(Smt. Jaya Agarwal) , Shri Anil Agarwal, Power of Attorney

holder of the complainant proprietor. Although the total sale

consideration for both the sale deeds was Rs.1.08 Crores,

out of which an amount of Rs.27 lakhs each i.e. total Rs.54

lakhs only was received by the petitioner. These sale deeds

are dated 10.10.2016. It was much after all these transactions

that the FIR in question was lodged on 23.11.2017 against the

following persons:

628 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

i) Sh. Chandra Mohan Badaya

ii) Sh. Rajesh Natani

iii) Smt. Shashi natani

iv) Sh. Kishan Badaya

v) Smt. Tina Badaya

vi) Smt. Sushila Devi Badaya

5.3. During investigation, some of the names mentioned in the FIR

were dropped and others were added. Finally, chargesheet was

submitted against eight persons:

i) Sh. Chandra Mohan Badaya

ii) Smt. Tina Badaya

iii) Sh. Rajesh Natani

iv) Sh. Pawan Agrawal

v) Sh. Kamal Agrawal

vi) Smt. Hemani Agrawal

vii) Sh. Manish Kumar tambi

viii) Ms. Alpana Tambi

5.4. On the basis of the said chargesheet, cognizance was taken

by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Senior Division, Pasighat,

East Siang district, Arunachal Pradesh, and a case bearing

GR No.225 of 2017 was registered.

5.5. As already noted above, two sets of petitions were filed before

two different High Courts namely Gauhati High Court and

Rajasthan High Court. The challenge before the High Court

was primarily on two grounds, firstly, that no part of offence

had been committed in Arunachal Pradesh as such there was

lack of complete territorial jurisdiction for registration of FIR in

Arunachal Pradesh. The Police ought not to have investigated

the said matter for the reason that all the accused persons

were residents of Rajasthan, the properties were situated in

Rajasthan, the transfer by the sale deed with respect to the 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 629

The State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Kamal Agarwal & Ors. Etc.

property was also in Rajasthan, even the power of attorney

holder and the complainant were residents of Rajasthan and

therefore, the FIR ought to be quashed on this ground alone.

5.6. The second ground taken was that even if it is assumed that

the State of Arunachal Pradesh would have jurisdiction to

entertain the FIR and investigate, it was purely a civil dispute

relating to transaction of funds and transfer of properties and

being purely a civil/commercial dispute, the lodging of the FIR

was just a misuse of the process of law and the same ought

to be quashed, in view of the law laid down in case of State of

Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal3

. The Gauhati High Court dismissed

the petition for quashing which has given rise to the appeal

filed by Chandra Mohan Badaya whereas Rajasthan High Court

quashed the proceedings which has given rise to the appeals

filed by the State of Arunachal Pradesh.

6. Before entering into the arguments advanced by the parties, we

may briefly refer to the contents of the complaint being FIR No.227

of 2017. According to the complaint, Rajesh Natani and Chandra

Mohan Badaya contacted the complainant firm requesting for amount

of Rs.1 Crore for consideration /exchange of land/building situated

between Plot No.A-47 to A55, Sikar House, near Chandpole, Jaipur,

Rajasthan. The said amount was deposited in four instalments

on 19.07.2016, 20.07.2016, 22.07.2016 and 25.07.2016 in the

accounts of Shri Ram Enterprises, A.R. Properties and Colonisers,

Shashi Natani w/o Rajesh Natani and Chandra Mohan Badaya, as

full payment for the sale of the aforesaid land/building. Thereafter,

when the complainant visited the place of land/building, the accused

persons refused to hand over the same. As such, it was clear that the

accused persons had cheated resulting into suffering, mental agony,

and financial loss. The accused persons failed to fulfil the above

conditions of transferring the land. All the accused persons have

conspired to cheat/commit fraud with the applicant. All the accused

persons have earned huge amount through unlawful means and

instead of fulfilling their promises, they threatened the complainant

with consequences. Finding no other alternative, the FIR had been

lodged for taking appropriate action against the accused persons.

3 [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Suppl. 1 SCC 335

630 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

7. The FIR mentions the address of the complainant Mr. Anil Agrawal

to be the address of the firm M/s Shiv Bhandar in Pasighat, East

Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh. The residential address of the

complainant Anil Agrawal is not given in the FIR. The address of all

the six accused named in the FIR is that of Jaipur City, Rajasthan.

The property for which the alleged payment of Rs.1 Crore is said to

have been made is also situate in Jaipur, Rajasthan. The transaction

of bank details is not mentioned in the FIR.

8. Apart from the fact that the complainant is said to be placed at

Arunachal Pradesh, no other fact relevant to the alleged offence is

said to be in or within the State of Arunachal Pradesh but still the FIR

had been registered there. Clearly, the reason for lodging the FIR

was that the accused persons were not willing to execute the sale

deed for which they had taken the sale consideration of Rs.1 Crore.

9. The Gauhati High Court dismissed the petitions for quashing on the

finding that no exceptional circumstances exist calling for quashing

of the proceedings. Whereas, the Rajasthan High Court proceeded

to quash the proceedings on the ground that no part of the cause

of action had arisen in the State of Arunachal Pradesh rather entire

cause of action was in the state of Rajasthan, hence, the Police/

Court in Arunachal Pradesh lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain

the FIR and all subsequent proceedings.

10. Surprisingly, the complainant M/s Shiv Bhandar has not come forward

to challenge the order of the Rajasthan High Court. It is the State of

Arunachal Pradesh which has challenged the order of the Rajasthan

High Court.

11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material on record in both the cases.

12. We are of the view that the matter was purely civil in nature. It was

a case of money advancing for which no written document was

executed to indicate its purpose or import as such whether it was a

loan advance or an advance payment for transfer of property being

land/building situate in Jaipur, is not borne out from any records.

Such claim of the complainant that it was for transfer of property

for land/building prescribed above, would be a matter of evidence

to be led and established in the Court of law rather than the police

investigating the same and finding out. It is not the case of complainant 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 631

The State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Kamal Agarwal & Ors. Etc.

as stated in FIR that the plot/land as alleged by them which was to

be transferred to them did not exist or had been sold or transferred

to somebody else and therefore, there was an element of cheating

by the accused persons. If the accused persons were not transferring

the land and if the complainant could establish an agreement/contract

with respect to the same in a Court of law, it ought to have filed a

civil suit for appropriate relief. Appellant Chandra Mohan Badaya

had already explained as to how he had already repaid Rs.37 lacs

through bank transaction and also transferred two properties worth

more than Rupees One Crore. All these aspects could be thrashed

out before a competent Civil Court. It could not be said to be a case

of cheating.

13. A simple reading of the FIR itself does not disclose any cognizable

offence for which the FIR should be registered and maintained.

Although Chandra Mohan Badaya appellant has sought to explain

that he had already returned Rs.37 lakhs by bank transfer to the

complainant and had further executed two transfer deeds in favour

of the wife and sister-in-law of Anil Agrawal, the power of attorney

holder which valued at total amount of more than Rs.1.45 Crores.

Even if we do not accept this contention as the same would be subject

matter of evidence, what we find is that the complaint lodged by the

respondent No.2 was not worth being registered as a complaint and

that too in the State of Arunachal Pradesh.

14. The High Court of Rajasthan had rightly found as a matter of fact

considering all aspects of the matter that the offence, if any, although

according to us, no offence is made out, would be within the territorial

jurisdiction of Rajasthan and not Arunachal Pradesh.

15. The State of Arunachal Pradesh ought to have been happy getting

rid of an unnecessary Criminal Case being registered and tried

in Arunachal Pradesh Why the State of Arunachal Pradesh has

approached this Court is also a question to be answered by the said

State when the complainant in a matter relating to civil/commercial

dispute is not coming forward to defend its FIR which has been

quashed by the Rajasthan High Court. Normally, in a given case

where issue is of territorial jurisdiction we could have directed to

transfer the investigation or the trial to the State where the cause

of action would lie but in the present case, we find that no offence

as such is made out. 

632 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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16. We are conscious of the fact that Pawan Agarwal, one of the

Respondents herein in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP No.

8663-8665/2023, had earlier filed Criminal Petition No. 110/2021

under section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. before the

Gauhati High Court and the said petition was dismissed vide order

dated 26.11.2021. We are also conscious of the fact that SLP (Crl.)

No. 999/2022 filed by him was dismissed as not pressed before

this Court. However, today we are quashing the entire FIR Case

No. 227/2017 registered at Police Station Pasi Ghat, District Siang

East, Arunachal Pradesh and the consequential proceedings thereto.

Rajasthan High Court, in the subsequent petition moved by Pawan

Agarwal, has after noticing the proceedings initiated in Gauhati High

Court has given relief to Pawan Agarwal and other respondents on

the ground that no cause of action arose in Arunachal Pradesh.

It is also important to note that after the Gauhati High Court had

dismissed the Criminal Petition No. 110/2021 chargesheet was filed

and we have considered the same. We have found the dispute to

be of a civil nature and have quashed the FIR Case No. 227/2017.

Hence, in exercise of the power under Article 136 of the Constitution

of India we are not inclined to disturb the findings in favour of Pawan

Agarwal in SB Criminal Writ Petition No. 989/2022 by Rajasthan High

Court. Once proceedings are being quashed against all the other

accused named in the FIR and in the chargesheet and considering

the nature of findings we have recorded, proceedings against Pawan

Agarwal cannot alone continue.

17. We accordingly set aside the order of the Gauhati High Court and

allow the appeal of Chandra Mohan Badaya and quash the entire

proceedings arising out of FIR No.227 of 2017. We further dismiss

the three appeals filed by the State of Arunachal Pradesh.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeals disposed of.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order IX Rule 7 – Application filed after delay of 14 years – Limitation Act, 1963, s. 5 – Condonation of delay is discretionary power of the court – Power to be exercised judiciously – Not in cases of gross negligence on part of litigant – 14 years delay cannot be condoned – ‘Sufficient cause’ not shown – Gross negligence on part of appellant in pursuing the matter.

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 616 : 2024 INSC 281

K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal)

v.

Gyanendra Pratap & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 4785 of 2024)

08 April 2024

[Sudhanshu Dhulia* And Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether there was sufficient cause for delay of fourteen years in

filing an application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

Headnotes

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order IX Rule 7 – Application

filed after delay of 14 years – Limitation Act, 1963, s. 5 –

Condonation of delay is discretionary power of the court

– Power to be exercised judiciously – Not in cases of gross

negligence on part of litigant – 14 years delay cannot be

condoned – ‘Sufficient cause’ not shown – Gross negligence

on part of appellant in pursuing the matter.

Held: Appellant took 14 years to challenge an order of Trial Court

to proceed ex parte against him – No satisfactory explanation for

delay in filing application under Order IX Rule 7, CPC – Appellant

grossly negligent in pursuing the matter before the Trial Court – Trial

Court, revisional court and the High Court correct in dismissing

claim – ‘Sufficient cause’ not defined in s. 5, Limitation Act – Has

to be construed liberally and in order to meet ends of justice –

Deserving and meritorious cases should not be dismissed solely

on the ground of delay – Discretionary power of a court to condone

delay must be exercised judiciously – Delay due to gross negligence

and/or want of due diligence on the part of the litigant not to be

condoned – ‘Sufficient cause’ can be given liberal construction when

no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to

the litigant [Paras 9, 10]

Case Law Cited

Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi &

Ors. [2021] 9 SCR 476 : (2021) 18 SCC 384; P.K.

Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. [1997] Supp. 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 617

K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors.

4 SCR 204 : (1997) 7 SCC 556; Basawaraj and Anr. v.

Special Land Acquisition Officer. [2013] 8 SCR 227 :

(2013) 14 SCC 81; Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing

Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.

[2013] 9 SCR 782 : (2013) 12 SCC 649 – relied on.

List of Acts

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act, 1963.

List of Keywords

Sufficient cause; Condonation of delay; Inordinate delay; Good

cause; Discretionary power; Negligence.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4785 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.05.2022 of the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in MUA227 No. 1575 of 2022

Appearances for Parties

Sunil Kumar Jain, Ms. Rashika Swarup, Advs. for the Appellant.

Mukesh Kumar Sharma, Kartikey, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant before this court has challenged the order dated

19.05.2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,

by which the petition filed by the appellant under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India was dismissed. The appellant had invoked

the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of

the Constitution of India, against the order dated 28.03.2022 of the

Additional District Judge, Barabanki, who had upheld the order dated

07.10.2021 of the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Barabanki.

3. The dispute between the parties to this appeal relates to a piece of

land situated in village Gharsaniya, Pargana Dewa, Tehsil-Nawabganj,

District - Barabanki, which was sold by one Kalawati (Respondent 

618 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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No. 4 herein) to one Mansa Ram (Respondent No. 5 herein), vide

sale deed dated 30.03.2006. Thereafter, the property was sold by

Respondent No. 5 to the appellant herein vide a registered sale

deed dt. 13.04.2006.

4. On 22.04.2006, Civil Suit for permanent injunction and cancellation

of the sale deed dated 30.03.2006, was filed by the Respondent

Nos. 1, 2 & 3 herein before the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Barabanki.

The appellant was impleaded as Defendant No. 3 in the suit. It was

contended before the Trial Court by Respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3 that

Respondent No. 4 had no transferrable right or title over the property

when the sale deed dated 30.03.2006 was executed in favour of

Respondent No. 5 and thus, the property could not have been sold

to Respondent No. 5. Respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3 asserted their

claim over the property before the Trial Court stating that they were

the bhumidhar & joint owners of the suit property and were also in

possession of the same because the predecessor-in-interest of the

property was their uncle and he had executed a will deed dated

20.05.1997 in their favour.

5. After service of notice, vakalatnama of the appellant’s counsel was

filed on 22.04.2006. During the course of the hearing, an order dated

06.09.2006 was passed by the trial court, by which the suit was to

proceed ex-parte against the appellant. In the order dated 06.09.2006,

it was recorded by the Trial Court that a perusal of the record would

indicate that the appellant was duly served, but he did not file any

written statements, and thus, it would be appropriate to proceed exparte against him. It is this order of the trial court, which was sought

to be recalled by the appellant by filing an application under Order

IX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC”).

However, this application was filed by the appellant on 01.09.2017,

i.e. after an inordinate delay of almost 11 years. To explain the

delay, the appellant argued that the summons and notice of the case

were not received by him and that the advocate appointed by him

belonged to another city, who did not pursue the case diligently, and

it was only in the year 2011, when he inspected the case file that he

came to know about the order dated 06.09.2006. Even here as to

why it took him another 6 years to file the application, as he had the

knowledge in any case in the year 2011, has not been explained. But

this is not enough. Even this application, filed in the year 2017, was

admittedly not pressed before the Trial Court by the appellant, for 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 619

K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors.

the reason that correct facts were not mentioned in the application.

Finally, another application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC came

to be filed yet again by the appellant on 23.11.2020.

6. This second application filed by the appellant was dismissed by the

trial court vide order dated 07.10.2021. What weighed in with the trial

court, while dismissing the appellant’s application under Order IX,

Rule 7 of the CPC, was the fact that the appellant was duly served

and had filed vakalatnama of his counsel in April 2006 but did not file

written statements in time and on 12.07.2011 an application was filed

by the appellant, seeking permission to file the written statements.

It was noted by the Trial Court that the explanation tendered by the

appellant for the delay in filing the application under Order IX, Rule

7 of the CPC was that the advocate appointed by him at the time

of receiving summons, i.e., April 2006, did not pursue the matter

diligently and had defrauded the appellant. Thus, the appellant

appointed another advocate, namely Shri R.D. Rastogi in May

2006. This explanation, as noted by the trial court, was based on

contradictory statements and wrong facts, and no reasonable cause

was given for the delay caused. Hence, it was dismissed.

7. Aggrieved by order dated 07.10.2021 by which his application

under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC for setting aside the order dated

06.09.2006 was dismissed by the trial court, the appellant preferred

a Revision, which came before Additional District Judge, Barabanki

(hereinafter referred to as “Revisional Court”). Vide order dated

28.03.2022, the revisional court dismissed the Civil Revision filed by

the appellant. The revisional court, upon examination of the material

on record, found that the first application under Order IX, Rule 7 of

the CPC which was filed by the appellant on 01.09.2017, was not

pressed, owing to the fact that initially he had appointed an advocate

who did not attend the case, and wrong facts were mentioned by

a ‘junior advocate’ in the first application. Hence, another advocate

filed the second application on 23.11.2020, mentioning the correct

facts. Yet, the signature on the first application filed in the year

2017 and on that of the second application filed in the year 2020

were of the same advocate, namely, Shri R.D. Rastogi. It was also

observed by the revisional court that although it was averred by the

appellant that he was put in dark by the counsel earlier engaged by

him, there is no reference to his name. Thus, upon consideration of

the entire material on the record, it was held by the revisional court 

620 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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that the application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC for recalling

order dated 06.09.2006 was filed by the appellant not only after a

long delay of 14 years, but also without assigning any satisfactory

reasons for the delay, hence, the revisional court found no error in

the order dated 07.10.2021 of the trial court and accordingly, the

Civil Revision preferred by the appellant was dismissed.

8. Assailing the order of the revisional court, the appellant filed a

petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, invoking the

supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

The High Court, vide impugned order dated 19.05.2022, affirmed

the orders of both the courts below and dismissed the petition filed

by the appellant. The High Court, while dismissing the said petition,

took note of the fact that the suit was filed before the trial court in

the 2006, by the respondent-plaintiffs and the appellant-defendant

appeared and filed the vakalatnama of his counsel on 22.04.2006

and in the year 2011, moved an application seeking permission

to file written statements. Upon consideration of the fact that the

appellant’s counsel remained the same throughout, the High Court

was of the opinion that while filing the application in the year 2011,

the appellant’s counsel would definitely have come to know about

the order dated 06.09.2006, by which the trial court had decided

to proceed ex-parte against the appellant. Despite this, the first

application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC was moved only

on 01.09.2017, which was also not pressed for 3 years, and then

the second application was moved on 23.11.2020 without showing

any “good cause”, as required under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC.

Thus, no perversity was found by the High Court in the orders of

both the courts below. The High Court hence refused to exercise

its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, and

in our opinion, rightly so.

In this case the main question is of delay. Should an inordinate delay,

which has no reasonable explanation be condoned?

9. Whether an application filed by the appellant, under Order IX, Rule

7 of the CPC can be allowed, after a delay of almost 14 years, is

the only question before us. Was there a sufficient cause for filing

such a belated application?

Although the term ‘sufficient cause’ has not been defined in the

Limitation Act, it is now well-settled through a catena of decisions that 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 621

K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors.

the term has to be construed liberally and in order to meet the ends

of justice. The reason for giving the term a wide and comprehensive

meaning is quite simple. It is to ensure that deserving and meritorious

cases are not dismissed solely on the ground of delay.

10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a

court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not

to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or

want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma

@ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The

discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of

any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay

(See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC

556). Thus, it is apparent that the words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section

5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when

no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to

the litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition

Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81). The principles which are to be kept

in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by

this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of

Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and

are reproduced as under:

“21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with

an application for condonation of delay, for the courts

are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged

to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood

in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard

being had to the fact that these terms are basically

elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective

to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal

the technical considerations should not be given

undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate

causation of delay but, gross negligence on the

part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

622 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking

condonation of delay is a significant and relevant

fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict

proof should not affect public justice and cause

public mischief because the courts are required to

be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is

no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to

encapsulate the conception of reasonableness

and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free

play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate

delay and a delay of short duration or few days,

for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted

whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.

That apart, the first one warrants strict approach

whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party

relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant

factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as

the fundamental principle is that the courts are

required to weigh the scale of balance of justice

in respect of both parties and the said principle

cannot be given a total go by in the name of

liberal approach.

21.10.(x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or

the grounds urged in the application are fanciful,

the courts should be vigilant not to expose the

other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

………………………..”

(emphasis supplied)

Having perused the application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC

dated 23.11.2020, filed by the appellant, and the accompanying

affidavit, wherein the appellant had sought the benefit of Section 5

of the Limitation Act, for condonation of a delay of almost 14 years, 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 623

K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors.

we find there was no satisfactory or reasonable ground given by the

appellant explaining the delay. We say this for two reasons. First, it is

an admitted position by the appellant himself that upon an inspection

of the case file in the year 2011, he came to know about the order

dated 06.09.2006, by which the Trial Court had decided to proceed

ex-parte against him. What prevented the appellant from filing the

application under Order IX, Rule 7 that year itself has not been

satisfactorily explained at all, as the first application was only filed

in the year 2017. Secondly, the explanation offered by the appellant,

which is that the advocate appointed by him did not pursue the

matter diligently, and then another advocate was appointed by him

who inadvertently forgot to file the application does not find support

from the records. What is clear is that the appellant has been grossly

negligent in pursuing the matter before the trial court. Thus, the trial

court, the revisional court as well as the High Court, were correct

in dismissing the belated claim of the appellant. We find no reason

to interfere with the impugned order dated 19.05.2022 of the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

The appeal stands dismissed.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Mukund P Unny, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal dismissed.

(Verified by: Shibani Ghosh, Adv.)

Appellant’s vehicle was seized under the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949 as the driver of the vehicle was found carrying liquor beyond permissible limit. Appellant approached the High Court by filing Special Criminal Application under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution seeking release of the seized vehicle, without first approaching concerned court under Section 451 CrPC. Whether High Court was justified in dismissing the Special Criminal Application filed by the Appellant under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 606 : 2024 INSC 285

Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala

v.

The State of Gujarat

(Criminal Appeal No. 1547 of 2024)

08 April 2024

[Bela M. Trivedi* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Appellant’s vehicle was seized under the Gujarat Prohibition

Act, 1949 as the driver of the vehicle was found carrying liquor

beyond permissible limit. Appellant approached the High Court by

filing Special Criminal Application under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution seeking release of the seized vehicle, without first

approaching concerned court under Section 451 CrPC. Whether

High Court was justified in dismissing the Special Criminal

Application filed by the Appellant under Article 226/227 of the

Constitution of India.

Headnotes

Directly invoking writ jurisdiction of High Court for release of

seized property – Propriety of:

Held: The criminal court, before whom the property in question

is sought to be produced, would have the jurisdiction and the

power to pass appropriate orders for the proper custody of such

property or for selling or disposing of such property, having

regard to the nature of the property in question, after recording

the evidence in that regard – In the instant case, the appellant

without approaching the concerned court under Section 451,

Cr.P.C, directly approached the High Court by filing Special

Criminal Application under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of

India, which could not be said to be the proper course of action

for getting the custody of the property – When there is a specific

statutory provision contained in the Cr.P.C. empowering the

criminal court to pass appropriate order for the proper custody

and disposal of the property pending the inquiry or trial, the

appellant could not have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction

of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 607

Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat

seeking release of his vehicle – There is nothing on record to

suggest as to whether the said vehicle was sought to be produced

before the concerned court so as to invoke Section 451 of Cr.P.C

or whether such vehicle was forwarded by the police officer to the

concerned Magistrate as contemplated in Clause (a) of Section

132 of the said Act – In absence of any such factual material

placed on record, it is difficult to release the vehicle in question

in favour of the appellant. [Paras 5,6,15 and 16]

Use of conjunction “but” in a provision – Implication of:

Held: When the conjunction “but” is used in a provision, after the

punctuation mark “comma”, it is deemed that such conjunction is

used to carve out an exception or proviso to the main provision

– Meaning thereby, when the entire provision is divided into two

parts by using the punctuation mark “comma” followed by the

conjunctive word “but”, the second part is required to be construed

as an exception or proviso to the first part. [Para 9]

“Confiscation” and “seizure” – Meaning of:

Held: As per the Black’s Law Dictionary in the 11th Edition, the

word “confiscation” means seizure of property for the public

treasury or seizure of property by actual or supposed authority,

and the word “seizure” means an act or an instance of taking

possession of a person or property by legal right or process –

Having regard to the said meanings, it is clear that “seizure”

would be a preliminary step that would lead to confiscation of an

article seized – The power to seize an article may be exercised

by the statutory authorities like police personnel, prohibition

officers, revenue authorities etc. in accordance with the concerned

Statutes, whereas the power of confiscation is normally exercised

by the jurisdictional Courts in accordance with the provisions of

the concerned Statutes. [Para 10]

Sections 98 and 132 of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949 and

Section 451 of CrPC operate in different fields:

Held: On the conjoint reading of the provisions contained in

Section 98 and 132 of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949 and

of Section 451 Cr.PC, it is discernible that all these provisions

operate in different fields – Section 98 deals with the Confiscation

of the Articles whenever any offence punishable under the Act 

608 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

has been committed – The second part of sub-section (2) thereof

would come into play when the Prohibition Officer or Police

Officer sends the seized article liable to be confiscated but not

required as an evidence, to the Collector as per Clause (b) of

Section 132 – However, Section 451 of the Cr.P.C. would come

into play when the article property seized during the course

of inquiry or investigation is produced before the jurisdictional

Court as per Clause (a) of Section 132 and the Court is called

upon to pass appropriate orders for the proper custody of such

article/property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or the trial.

[Paras 9 and 14]

Case Law Cited

Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat [2002]

Supp. 3 SCR 39 : (2002) 10 SCC 283 – referred to.

List of Acts

Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure,1973; Gujarat

Prohibition Act, 1949, Indian Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords

Articles 226/227 of Constitution of India; Section 451 of Cr.P.C;

Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949; Specific statutory provision; Seizure

and confiscation of property; Mudammal article; Implication of the

word “but”; Harmonious construction.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1547

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.06.2023 of the High Court

of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in SCRA No. 6465 of 2023

Appearances for Parties

Ms. Disha Singh, Shivendu Gaur, Mrs. Nidhi Sharma, Mohit,

Madhusudan Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.

Parshant Bhagwati, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Ms. Devyani Bhatt, Ms.

Neha Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 609

Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Bela M. Trivedi, J.

1. The appellant, claiming to be the owner of the vehicle being

Eicher 10.80 (Blue) bearing no. GJ 05-BT-0899, seized as

Muddamal Article in connection with the FIR bearing Criminal

No.11200038231465/2023, for the offence Under Section 65-(a)

(e),81,98(2),116(2) of Gujarat Prohibition Act and U/s 465, 468, 471,

114 of IPC registered with the Pardi Police Station, District Valasad,

had filed the Special Criminal Application No.6465 of 2023 before

the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad seeking release of the

said vehicle. The said Application having been dismissed by the

High Court vide the impugned order dated 08.06.2023, the present

Appeal has been filed.

2. In the instant case, it appears that the police personnel when they

were on patrolling duty had intercepted the vehicle in question on the

basis of a secret information received by them. It was alleged that

the driver of the said vehicle was carrying English Liquor (1240.200

litres) worth of rupees 7 lakhs in the said vehicle without any pass

or permit. The said vehicle along with the liquor was seized and

the aforestated FIR was registered against the accused Lakhabhai

Khengarbhai (the son of the present appellant), and others on

29.04.2023 at the Police Station Pardi, Valasad.

3. The respondent – State of Gujarat by filing the counter-affidavit has

contented inter alia that Section 98 (2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act

1949 (hereinafter referred to as the said ‘Act’) forbids the release of

such vehicle till the final judgment of the Court, where the quantity

of seized liquor is exceeding the quantity prescribed by the Rules.

In the instant case, the seized quantity of liquor was 1240 litres as

against the prescribed quantity of 20 litres as per the Notification

dated 02.07.2019, and hence the said vehicle was liable for the

confiscation and could not be released on bond or surety till the

final judgment of the court.

4. At the outset, it may be noted that Chapter XXXIV of Cr.P.C deals

with the disposal of the property. Section 451 thereof pertains to the

order to be passed by the Criminal Court for custody and disposal

of the property produced before the court pending an inquiry or 

610 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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trial, whereas Section 452 pertains to the order to be passed for

the disposal or confiscation of the property at the conclusion of the

trial. Section 451 reads as under: -

“451. Order for custody and disposal of property

pending trial in certain cases. —

When any property is produced before any Criminal Court

during any inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order

as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property

pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial, and, if the

property is subject to speedy and natural decay, or if it is

otherwise expedient so to do, the Court may, after recording

such evidence as it thinks necessary, order it to be sold

or otherwise disposed of.

Explanation. —For the purposes of this section, “property”

includes—

(a) property of any kind or document which is produced

before the Court or which is in its custody;

(b) any property regarding which an offence appears to

have been committed or which appears to have been

used for the commission of any offence.”

5. From the bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it clearly transpires

that when any property is produced before any criminal court during

the course of inquiry or trial, the Court is required to make such

order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending

the conclusion of the inquiry or the trial. If the property is subject to

speedy and natural decay, or if it is otherwise expedient so to do,

the Court may after recording such evidence as it thinks necessary,

order it to be sold or otherwise disposed of. Thus, it is the criminal

court, before whom the property in question is sought to be produced,

would have the jurisdiction and the power to pass appropriate orders

for the proper custody of such property or for selling or disposing of

such property, having regard to the nature of the property in question,

after recording the evidence in that regard.

6. In the instant case, the appellant without approaching the concerned

court under Section 451, Cr.P.C, directly approached the High Court

by filing Special Criminal Application under Article 226/227 of the

Constitution of India, which could not be said to be the proper course 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 611

Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat

of action for getting the custody of the property i.e. the vehicle in

question in this case. When there is a specific statutory provision

contained in the Cr.P.C. empowering the criminal court to pass

appropriate order for the proper custody and disposal of the property

pending the inquiry or trial, the appellant could not have invoked the

extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India seeking release of his vehicle.

7. The respondent State has also raised the contention that Section

98(2) of the said Act puts an embargo against release of the vehicle

till the final judgment of the court if the quantity of seized liquor is

more than the prescribed quantity. Since, such contention is often

raised, we deem it necessary to deal with the provisions contained

in Section 98 of the Act also. Section 98 reads as under: -

“98. Things liable to confiscation- (1) Whenever any

offence punishable under this Act has been committed,

(a) any intoxicant, hemp, mhowra flowers, molasses,

materials, still, utensil, implement or apparatus in

respect of which the offence has been committed,

(b) where, in the case of an offence involving illegal

possession, the offender has in his lawful possession

any intoxicant, hemp, mhowra flowers or molasses

other than those in respect of which an offence under

this Act has been committed, the entire stock of such

intoxicant, hemp, mhowra flowers, or molasses,

(c) where, in the case of an offence of illegal import,

export or transport, the offender has attempted to

import, export or transport any intoxicant, hemp,

mhowra flowers or molasses, in contravention of the

provisions of this Act, rule, regulation or order or in

breach of a condition of a licence, permit, pass or

authorization, the whole quantity of such intoxicant,

hemp, mhowra flowers or molasses which he has

attempted to import, export or transport,

(d) where, in the case of an offence of illegal sale, the

offender has in his lawful possession any intoxicant,

hemp, mhowra flowers or molasses other than that

in respect of which an offence has been committed, 

612 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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the whole of such other intoxicant, hemp, mhowra

flowers or molasses, shall be confiscated by the

order of the Court.

(2) Any receptacle, package or covering in which any of

the articles liable to confiscation under sub-section (1) is

found and the other contents of such receptacle, package

or covering and the animals, carts, vessels or other

conveyances used in, carrying any such article shall likewise be liable to confiscation by the order of the Court. [

but it shall not be released on bond or surety till the final

judgement of the Court where the quantity of the seized

liquor is exceeding the quantity as may be prescribed by

the rules.]”

8. Sub-section (1) of Section 98 deals with the articles liable to

confiscation, whenever any offence punishable under the Act has

been committed. However, sub-section (2) of Section 98 is in two

parts. The first part upto the conjunctive word “but”, states about the

confiscation of the articles like receptacle, package or covering and

about the confiscation of the animals, carts, vessels or any other

conveyances used in carrying any such article, and the second

part starting with the conjunctive word “but” is perceived to be an

embargo against release of the conveyance used for carrying the

article liable to be confiscated if the quantity of the seized liquor

carried in such conveyance is more than the prescribed quantity,

till the final judgment of the court. It may be noted that the second

part of sub-section (2) of Section 98 was incorporated by the Gujarat

Act 29 of 2011. However, in our opinion, this incorporation of the

second part by amendment in 2011 is not very happily worded, and

therefore, it is seen as an embargo.

9. When the conjunction “but” is used in a provision, after the punctuation

mark “comma”, it is deemed that such conjunction is used to carve

out an exception or proviso to the main provision. Meaning thereby,

when the entire provision is divided into two parts by using the

punctuation mark “comma” followed by the conjunctive word “but”, the

second part is required to be construed as an exception or proviso

to the first part. However, so far as sub-section (2) of Section 98 is

concerned though it is in two parts connected with the conjunctive

word “but”, there is hardly any co-relation between the first part and 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 613

Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat

the second part thereof. It is difficult to comprehend the second part

of sub-section (2) as an exception or proviso to the first part thereof.

Since it is not happily worded, applying the doctrine of harmonious

construction, we will have to harmonise the provisions contained

therein with the other provisions of the Act and with the provisions

contained in the Cr.P.C.

10. It is pertinent to note that the words “confiscation” or “seizure” are

not defined either in the said Act or in the Cr.P.C. As per the Black’s

Law Dictionary in the 11th Edition, the word “confiscation” means

seizure of property for the public treasury or seizure of property

by actual or supposed authority, and the word “seizure” means an

act or an instance of taking possession of a person or property by

legal right or process. Having regard to the said meanings, it is

clear that “seizure” would be a preliminary step that would lead to

confiscation of an article seized. The power to seize an article may be

exercised by the statutory authorities like police personnel, prohibition

officers, revenue authorities etc. in accordance with the concerned

Statutes, whereas the power of confiscation is normally exercised

by the jurisdictional Courts in accordance with the provisions of the

concerned Statutes.

11. Coming back to the Gujarat Prohibition Act, provisions with regard

to the articles liable to be confiscated and the powers of the court

to confiscate such articles have been incorporated in Section 98,

whereas the powers of the authorised Prohibition Officer or police

officer to arrest the offender and seize the contraband articles are

contained in Section 123, followed by other provisions with regard

to the procedure to be followed after the seizure of the articles as

contained in Section 132 of the said act.

12. Section 132 reads as under: -

“132. Article seized - [When anything has been seized,

under the provisions of this Act by a Prohibition Officer

exercising powers under section 129 or by an Officer incharge of a Police Station], or has been sent to him in

accordance with the provisions of this Act, such officer,

after such inquiry as may be deemed necessary, —

(a) if it appears that such thing is required as evidence

in the case of any person arrested, shall forward it to 

614 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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the Magistrate to whom such person is forwarded or

for his appearance before whom bail has been taken,

(b) if it appears that such thing is liable to confiscation

but is not required as evidence as aforesaid, shall

send it with a full report of the particulars of seizure

to the Collector,

(c) if no offence appears to have been committed shall

return it to the person from whose possession it was

taken.”

13. As could be seen from the bare reading of Section 132, the authorised

Prohibition Officer or the officer in charge of Police Station may

after such inquiry as may be necessary either (a) forward the article

seized to the jurisdictional Magistrate where the person arrested is

forwarded, if it appears to him that such seized article is required

as an evidence; or (b) send the seized article to the collector with

the full report, if it appears to him that such seized article is liable

to confiscation but is not required as an evidence; or (c) return such

seized article to the person from whose possession it was taken, if

no offence appears to have been committed.

14. Thus, on the conjoint reading of the provisions contained in Section

98 and 132 of the said Act and of Section 451 Cr.PC, it is discernible

that all these provisions operate in different fields. Section 98 deals

with the Confiscation of the Articles whenever any offence punishable

under the Act has been committed. The second part of sub-section

(2) thereof would come into play when the Prohibition Officer or

Police Officer sends the seized article liable to be confiscated but

not required as an evidence, to the Collector as per Clause (b) of

Section 132. However, Section 451 of the Cr.P.C. would come into

play when the article property seized during the course of inquiry or

investigation is produced before the jurisdictional Court as per Clause

(a) of Section 132 and the Court is called upon to pass appropriate

orders for the proper custody of such article/property pending the

conclusion of the inquiry or the trial.

15. So far as the facts of this case are concerned, the vehicle in question

appears to have been seized as it was allegedly carrying huge

quantity of liquor exceeding the prescribed quantity. However, there

is nothing on record to suggest as to whether the said vehicle was 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 615

Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat

sought to be produced before the concerned court so as to invoke

Section 451 of Cr.P.C or whether such vehicle was forwarded by

the police officer to the concerned Magistrate as contemplated in

Clause (a) of Section 132 of the said Act. In absence of any such

factual material placed on record, it is difficult to release the vehicle

in question in favour of the appellant.

16. It is true that when the property/vehicle is seized during the course

of investigation and the same is produced before the concerned

Criminal Court, it is incumbent on the part of the concerned Court

to pass appropriate orders for keeping the vehicle in proper custody

pending the trial. It is also true that as held by this Court in case of

Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai vs. State of Gujarat1

, it is of no use

to keep the seized vehicles at the police stations for a long period

and it is for the magistrate to pass appropriate orders for the proper

custody of the said such vehicles during the pendency of the trial.

However, as observed earlier, the appellant without approaching the

concerned criminal court under Section 451 of the Cr.P.C seeking

custody of the vehicle in question, directly approached the High

Court by filing Special Criminal Application under Article 226/227

of the Constitution of India, which was not the proper course as

adopted by the appellant.

17. In that view of the matter, the present Appeal deserves to be

dismissed and is hereby dismissed. It is however clarified that it shall

be open for the Appellant to approach the concerned Court where

the property/vehicle in question is sought to be produced during the

course of inquiry or trial.

18. The Appeal stands dismissed accordingly.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Adeeba Mujahid, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal dismissed.

(Verified by: Shadan Farasat, Adv.)

1 [2002] Supp. 3 SCR 39 : (2002) 10 SCC 283

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Clause (y) of sub-Section (1) of s. 2 – Scheduled Offence – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 120B – Complaint filed by the Directorate of Enforcement on the basis of the offences which were not scheduled offences, except s. 120-B of IPC – Challenge to:

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 591 : 2024 INSC 301

Yash Tuteja & Anr.

v.

Union of India & Ors.

(Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 153 of 2023)

08 April 2024

[Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ]

Issue for Consideration

The issue for consideration was a challenge to the Complaint

filed by the Directorate of Enforcement under Section 44(1)(b)

of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, mainly on the

ground that apart from s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code, no other

offences were scheduled offences, within the meaning of clause

(y) of sub-section (1) of s. 2 of PMLA.`

Headnotes

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Clause (y) of

sub-Section (1) of s. 2 – Scheduled Offence – Penal Code,

1860 – s. 120B – Complaint filed by the Directorate of

Enforcement on the basis of the offences which were not

scheduled offences, except s. 120-B of IPC – Challenge to:

Held: Offence punishable under Section 120B of the IPC could

become a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged is of

committing an offence which is specifically included in the Schedule

to the PMLA – Admittedly, the offences alleged in the complaint

except Section 120-B of IPC are not the scheduled offences –

Conspiracy to commit any of the offences included in the Schedule

has not been alleged in the complaint – ECIR/RPZO/11/2022, which

is the subject matter of the complaint, is based on the offences

relied upon in the complaint – As the conspiracy alleged is of the

commission of offences which are not the scheduled offences, the

offences mentioned in the complaint are not scheduled offences

within the meaning of clause (y) of sub-Section (1) of Section 2

of the PMLA – Complaint arising out of ECIR filed by Directorate

of Enforecement accordingly quashed. [Paras 3, 9]

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Special Court –

Cognizance – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 200 to

s. 204 – Procedure thereof:

592 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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Held: The only mode by which the cognizance of the offence under

Section 3, punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA, can be taken

by the Special Court is upon a complaint filed by the Authority

authorized on this behalf – Section 46 of PMLA provides that the

provisions of the Cr.PC shall apply to proceedings before a Special

Court and for the purposes of the Cr.PC provisions, the Special

Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions – However, subsection (1) of Section 46 starts with the words “save as otherwise

provided in this Act” – Considering the provisions of Section 46(1) of

the PMLA, save as otherwise provided in the PMLA, the provisions

of the Cr.PC shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court

– Therefore, once a complaint is filed before the Special Court, the

provisions of Sections 200 to 204 of the Cr.PC will apply to the

Complaint – There is no provision in the PMLA which overrides the

provisions of Sections 200 to Sections 204 of Cr.PC – Hence, the

Special Court will have to apply its mind to the question of whether

a prima facie case of a commission of an offence under Section 3

of the PMLA is made out in a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of

the PMLA – If the Special Court is of the view that no prima facie

case of an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is made out, it

must exercise the power under Section 203 of the Cr.PC to dismiss

the complaint – If a prima facie case is made out, the Special Court

can take recourse to Section 204 of the Cr.PC. [Para 6]

Case Law Cited

Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement [2023] 13

SCR 1049 : 2023 INSC 1029 – relied on.

List of Acts

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords

Proceeds of Crime; Scheduled Offence.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No.

153 of 2023

(Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)

With

Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 208, 216 and 217 of 2023

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 593

Yash Tuteja & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors

Appearances for Parties

Mukul Rohatgi, Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Advs., Arshdeep Singh

Khurana, Malak Manish Bhatt, Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Harsh Srivastava,

Mandeep Singh, Sidak Anand, Gharote Anurag A, Mrs. Kalyani Bhide,

Aljo K. Joseph, Advs. for the Petitioners.

Suryaprakash V Raju, K.M. Nataraj, A.S.Gs., Avdhesh Kumar Singh,

A.A.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Zoheb Hussain, Annam Venkatesh,

Mrs. Sairica Raju, Kanu Agarwal, Arkaj Kumar, Apoorv Kurup, Ravi

Sharma, Ms. Prerna Dhall, Piyush Yadav, Prashant Singh, Nikhilesh

Kumar, Srinivasan M Bogisam,M/S. VMZ CHAMBERS, Advs. for

the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Abhay S. Oka, J.

1. Taken up for final hearing as notice has already been issued on the

petitions. In substance, in these Writ Petitions, the only challenge that

survives is to the complaint filed by the Directorate of Enforcement

under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act,

2002 (for short, “the PMLA”) concerning ECIR/RPZO/11/2022.

2. It is not in dispute that the alleged scheduled offences on which the

complaint is based are under various sections of the Income-tax

Act, 1961, read with Sections 120B, 191, 199, 200 and 204 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “the IPC”). It is also not in dispute

that except for Section 120B of the IPC, none of the offences are

scheduled offences within the meaning of clause (y) of sub-Section

(1) of Section 2 of the PMLA. This Court, in the decision in the case

of Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement1

, recorded its

conclusions in paragraph 31, which reads thus:

“CONCLUSIONS

31. While we reject the first and second submissions

canvassed by the learned senior counsel appearing for

the appellant, the third submission must be upheld. Our

conclusions are:

1 [2023] 13 SCR 1049 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1586

594 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

a. It is not necessary that a person against whom the

offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is alleged, must

have been shown as the accused in the scheduled

offence;

b. Even if an accused shown in the complaint under the

PMLA is not an accused in the scheduled offence,

he will benefit from the acquittal of all the accused in

the scheduled offence or discharge of all the accused

in the scheduled offence. Similarly, he will get the

benefit of the order of quashing the proceedings of

the scheduled offence;

c. The first property cannot be said to have any

connection with the proceeds of the crime as the

acts constituting scheduled offence were committed

after the property was acquired;

d. The issue of whether the appellant has used tainted

money forming part of the proceeds of crime for

acquiring the second property can be decided only

at the time of trial; and

e. The offence punishable under Section 120-B of the

IPC will become a scheduled offence only if the

conspiracy alleged is of committing an offence which

is specifically included in the Schedule.”

(underline supplied)

3. Hence, the offence punishable under Section 120B of the IPC

could become a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged

is of committing an offence which is specifically included in the

Schedule to the PMLA. In this case, admittedly, the offences

alleged in the complaint except Section 120-B of IPC are not the

scheduled offences. Conspiracy to commit any of the offences

included in the Schedule has not been alleged in the complaint.

ECIR/RPZO/11/2022, which is the subject matter of the complaint,

is based on the offences relied upon in the complaint. As the

conspiracy alleged is of the commission of offences which are not

the scheduled offences, the offences mentioned in the complaint

are not scheduled offences within the meaning of clause (y) of subSection (1) of Section 2 of the PMLA. 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 595

Yash Tuteja & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors

4. In paragraph 15 of the decision in the case of Pavana Dibbur1

, this

Court held that:

“The condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of

crime is the existence of a scheduled offence.”

Therefore, in the absence of the scheduled offence, as held in

the decision mentioned above of this Court, there cannot be any

proceeds of crime within the meaning of clause (u) of sub-Section

(1) of Section 2 of the PMLA. If there are no proceeds of crime, the

offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is not made out. The reason

is that existence of the proceeds of crime is a condition precedent

for the applicability of Section 3 of the PMLA.

5. There is some controversy about whether the Special Court has

taken cognizance on the basis of the complaint. The learned ASG, on

instructions, states that cognizance has not been taken. The learned

ASG submits that as the cognizance is not taken, this Court should

not entertain the prayer for quashing the complaint.

6. The only mode by which the cognizance of the offence under

Section 3, punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA, can be taken

by the Special Court is upon a complaint filed by the Authority

authorized on this behalf. Section 46 of PMLA provides that the

provisions of the Cr.PC (including the provisions as to bails or

bonds) shall apply to proceedings before a Special Court and

for the purposes of the Cr.PC provisions, the Special Court shall

be deemed to be a Court of Sessions. However, sub-section (1)

of Section 46 starts with the words “save as otherwise provided

in this Act.” Considering the provisions of Section 46(1) of the

PMLA, save as otherwise provided in the PMLA, the provisions

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, Cr. PC) shall

apply to the proceedings before a Special Court. Therefore, once

a complaint is filed before the Special Court, the provisions of

Sections 200 to 204 of the Cr.PC will apply to the Complaint.

There is no provision in the PMLA which overrides the provisions

of Sections 200 to Sections 204 of Cr.PC. Hence, the Special

Court will have to apply its mind to the question of whether a prima

facie case of a commission of an offence under Section 3 of the

PMLA is made out in a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the

PMLA. If the Special Court is of the view that no prima facie case

of an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is made out, it must 

596 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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exercise the power under Section 203 of the Cr.PC to dismiss the

complaint. If a prima facie case is made out, the Special Court

can take recourse to Section 204 of the Cr. PC.

7. In this case, no scheduled offence is made out the basis of the

complaint as the offences relied upon therein are not scheduled

offences. Therefore, there cannot be any proceeds of crime. Hence,

there cannot be an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA. Therefore,

no purpose will be served by directing the Special Court to apply its

mind in accordance with Section 203 read with Section 204 of the

Cr.PC. That will only be an empty formality.

8. We may note that the petitioners in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.153/2023

and the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.217/2023 have not been

shown as accused in the complaint. Only the second petitioner in

Writ Petition (Crl.) No.208/2023 and the petitioner in Writ Petition

No.216/2023 have been shown as accused in the complaint. In

the case of those petitioners who are not shown as accused in the

complaint, it is unnecessary to entertain the Writ Petitions since the

complaint itself is being quashed.

9. Hence, we pass the following order:

(i) Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos.153/2023 and 217/2023 are disposed of;

(ii) The complaint based on ECIR/RPZO/11/2022, as far as

the second petitioner (Anwar Dhebar) in Writ Petition (Crl.)

No.208/2023 is concerned, is hereby quashed. The Writ Petition

is, accordingly, partly allowed;

(iii) The complaint based on ECIR/RPZO/11/2022, as far as the

petitioner (Arun Pati Tripathi) in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.216/2023 is

concerned, is hereby quashed. The Writ Petition is, accordingly,

allowed;

(iv) There will be no order as to costs; and

(v) Pending applications, including those seeking impleadment,

are disposed of accordingly.

10. At this stage, the learned ASG stated that, based on another First

Information Report, which, according to him, involves a scheduled

offence, criminal proceedings under the PMLA are likely to be initiated

against the petitioners. It is not necessary for us to go into the issue

of the legality and validity of the proceedings that are likely to be 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 597

Yash Tuteja & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors

initiated at this stage. Therefore, all the contentions in that regard

are left open to be decided in appropriate proceedings.

11. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in Writ

Petition (Crl.) Nos.153/2023 and 208/2023 seeks continuation of

the interim order dated 7th August 2023 passed by this Court in

these two Writ Petitions to enable the petitioners to take recourse

to appropriate proceedings before the appropriate Court.

12. By keeping the rights and contention of the parties open, we direct

that the interim order dated 7th August 2023 passed in Writ Petition

(Crl.) Nos.153/2023 and 208/2023 shall continue to operate for three

weeks from today.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Prastut Mahesh Dalvi, WP(Crl) Nos. 153/2023 and

Hony. Associate Editor 217/2023 disposed of

(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.) WP(Crl) No. 208/2023 partly allowed

WP(Crl) No. 216/2023 allowed