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Thursday, May 16, 2024

Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 – Rajasthan Stamp Rules, 1955 – Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – s.3; Schedule I – Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 – Constitution of India – Entry 44 of List III, Entry 91 of List I – Power of the State to levy and collect stamp duty on insurance policies executed within the State – Appellant issued various insurance policies within the State of Rajasthan however, purchased insurance stamps from the State of Maharashtra – Demand for payment of stamp duty by the State of Rajasthan – Validity:

* Author

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 241 : 2024 INSC 358

Life Insurance Corporation of India

v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 3391 of 2011)

30 April 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 or the

Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 applies to the facts of the present case;

whether the state government has the legislative competence to

impose and collect stamp duty on policies of insurance as per

Entry 91 of List I r/w Entry 44 of List III; whether the 1952 Act

requires the purchase of insurance stamps from and payment of

stamp duty to the Rajasthan government for insurance policies

issued within the state; whether, in the facts of the present case,

the appellant is liable to pay stamp duty.

Headnotes

Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 – Rajasthan

Stamp Rules, 1955 – Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – s.3; Schedule

I – Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 – Constitution of India – Entry

44 of List III, Entry 91 of List I – Power of the State to levy

and collect stamp duty on insurance policies executed within

the State – Appellant issued various insurance policies within

the State of Rajasthan however, purchased insurance stamps

from the State of Maharashtra – Demand for payment of stamp

duty by the State of Rajasthan – Validity:

Held: State of Rajasthan has the power to impose and collect stamp

duty on insurance policies under Entry 44 of List III, albeit such duty

must be imposed as per the rate prescribed by a Parliamentary

legislation under Entry 91 of List I – For the execution of insurance

policies within the state of Rajasthan, the appellant is bound to

purchase India Insurance Stamps and pay the stamp duty to the

State of Rajasthan – s.3 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as adapted to

the State of Rajasthan is the charging provision as per which the

appellant must pay stamp duty to the state government on insurance

policies executed within the state – The rate at which stamp duty

is payable on policies of insurance under the 1952 Act has been 

242 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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adopted from Schedule I of the central Act, in accordance with Entry

91 of List I – The charging provision has thus been validly enacted

by the state government under Entry 44 of List III – Therefore, the

state government in the present case can impose stamp duty on

the issuance of insurance policies within its territory and require

the payment of such stamp duty by the appellant – Hence, the

commencement of proceedings for recovery of stamp duty under

the state law and the rules made thereunder was legal, valid, and

justified – However, in the facts and circumstances of the present

case, the state government shall not demand and collect the stamp

duty as per the orders dtd.16.09.2004, 16.10.2004, 11.10.2004,

01.11.2004, and 28.10.2004 – Impugned judgment of the High

Court affirmed. [Paras 16, 37, 31, 38]

Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 – Rajasthan

Stamp Act, 1998 – s.3 – Insurance policies issued between

1993-94 to 2001-02 – Stamp duty leviable under the 1952 Act

or the 1998 Act:

Held: Stamp duty must be levied as per the law in force as on

the date of execution of the instrument – The charging provision

i.e. s.3 of the 1998 Act, imposed stamp duty on every instrument

mentioned in the Schedule that is executed in the state on or

after the date of commencement of the Act – 1998 Act came into

force only on 27.05.2004 – Hence, at the time that the relevant

instruments were executed, the 1952 Act was still in force and the

stamp duty was leviable under the same. [Para 8]

Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 – ss.2, 3(v),

(vi) – Application of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Adaptations

– Schedule I of the 1899 Act – Rajasthan Stamp Rules, 1955

– rr.2 (d), 3 – Liability to pay stamp duty under the 1952 Act:

Held: r.3, r/w r.2(d), provides that the stamps issued by the State

government will indicate the payment of stamp duty chargeable on an

instrument – Therefore, the stamp must be issued by and the stamp

duty must be paid to the State government for an instrument to be

‘duly stamped’ under the 1952 Act – State has the power to collect

stamp duty under s.3 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as adapted

to the state of Rajasthan that provides that an instrument shall be

chargeable with the duty of the amount indicated in the Schedule if

it is executed within the state of Rajasthan – The mandate of s.3 is

also found in r.3 that provides for “mode of payment” – r.3, read with

r.2(d), provides that the duty with which any instrument is chargeable 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 243

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

shall be paid by means of a stamp issued by the state government –

The relevant event flowing from s.3 and r.3 authorising the levy and

imposition of stamp duty is the execution of the policy of insurance

within the state – The liability to purchase the stamps from the state

of Rajasthan is therefore clear and unambiguous – Consequently,

for instruments executed within the state, the purchase of stamps

from outside the state will equate to evasion of stamp duty and the

instrument will not be ‘duly stamped’. [Paras 22, 26]

Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 – s.3A(1) –

Appellant issued various insurance policies within the state

of Rajasthan and was required to affix stamps by paying

stamp duty on such policies – It wrote to the Collector, Jaipur

regarding the non-availability of ‘Agents License Fee stamps’

– Plea of the appellant that in view of the letter of the Treasury

Officer, Jaipur dated 07.10.1991 stating that ‘India Insurance

Stamps’ are the property of the central government and their

supply and distribution is not related to their department, they

were compelled to purchase the stamps from Maharashtra,

without which they could not have issued the insurance

policies in the state of Rajasthan – High Court without taking

note of the aforesaid letter held that the correspondence of

the appellant with the department pertained to Agents License

Fee stamps and even if the stamps were unavailable, the

appellant was duty-bound to pay the stamp duty to the state

government in cash as provided under s.3A(1) – Propriety:

Held: High Court evidently did not take note of the letter dated

07.10.1991 – Further, it entirely failed to consider sub-section

(4) which excludes instruments under Entry 91, List I from the

application of s.3A – Therefore, the High Court also erred in holding

that the appellant could have paid the stamp duty in cash – In view

of the above circumstances, the appellant had no choice but to

purchase the insurance stamps from outside the state – While it

made every endeavour to purchase the stamp from within the state,

due to the letter by the department and the lack of mechanism for

payment of stamp duty under the 1952 Act in case of unavailability

of insurance stamps, it was unable to purchase the stamps and

pay the stamp duty to the Rajasthan government. [Para 36]

Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule – Stamp duty –

Entry 91 of List I, Entry 63 of List II, and Entry 44 of List III

– Distribution of legislative competence:

244 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Held: A combined reading of the constitutional scheme shows

that the power to prescribe the rate of duty is mutually exclusive

and has been clearly demarcated between the Parliament and the

legislatures of the state – Insurance policies, which are the relevant

instrument for the purpose of the present case, fall under Entry

91 of List I for the purpose of prescription of rate of duty – This

means that only the Parliament holds the exclusive power and the

legislative competence under the Constitution to prescribe the rate

of stamp duty on insurance policies. [Para 12]

Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 – Indian Stamp

Act, 1899 – Constitution of India – Article 254; Entry 44, List III:

Held: In the present case, the imposition of stamp duty by the

state government was under the 1952 Act, which is a state law

that has been enacted under Entry 44 of List III, and has received

Presidential assent as contemplated under Article 254 – Article

254(2) clearly stipulates that when a state law with respect to a

matter in the Concurrent List is repugnant to the provisions of an

earlier law made by the Parliament or an existing law with respect

to that matter, then the law passed by the state shall prevail in that

state “if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President

and has received his assent” – The 1952 Act that occupies the

field in the present case has undisputedly received Presidential

assent and hence it prevails over the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 so

far as the state of Rajasthan is concerned. [Para 29]

Tax/Taxation – Tax law – Plea that the rate of taxation is an

essential component for a valid imposition of tax and since

the State legislature cannot prescribe the rate of stamp duty

on insurance policies, there can be no valid imposition of

stamp duty on these instruments by way of a state enactment:

Held: Rejected – Even if the State legislature cannot prescribe the

rate of stamp duty, it can levy such duty at the rate as provided by

the Parliament – In the present case, while it is true that the State

cannot prescribe the rate of duty on insurance policies, that by itself

does not mean that there is ambiguity or lack of clarity regarding

the rate of such duty – Rather, the rate of duty is unambiguous,

clear, and defined by the Parliament and is adopted by the state

to levy and collect stamp duty. [Para 18]

Constitution of India – Entry 44 of List III; Entry 91 of List

I – Contention as regards whether Entry 44 of List III is a

taxation entry:

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 245

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

Held: Entry 44 of List III is a taxation entry that falls under the

Concurrent List – State legislature has the legislative competence

to impose and collect stamp duty on policies of insurance under

Entry 44 of List III, as per the rate prescribed by the Parliament

under Entry 91 of List I. [Para 19]

Case Law Cited

VVS Rama Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2009] 5

SCR 1159 : (2009) 7 SCC 234; Govind Saran Ganga

Saran v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1985] 3 SCR 985 :

(1985) Supp SCC 205; Mathuram Agrawal v. State of

Madhya Pradesh [1999] Supp. 4 SCR 195 : (1999) 8

SCC 667 – distinguished.

State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries [2004] 1 SCR

564 : 7 (2004) 10 SCC 201; State of Karnataka v. State

of Meghalaya [2022] 18 SCR 516 : (2023) 4 SCC 416;

Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh

[1973] 2 SCR 1073 : (1973) 1 SCC 261; Vijay v. Union of

India [2023] 15 SCR 293 : (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1585

: 2023 INSC 1030; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P.

Laxmi Devi [2008] 3 SCR 330 : (2008) 4 SCC 720; UP

Electric Supply Co Ltd v. R.K. Shukla [1970] 1 SCR 507

(1969) 2 SCC 400; M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India [1979]

3 SCR 254 : (1979) 3 SCC 431; Balaji v. ITO [1962] 2

SCR 983 : AIR (1962) SC 123; Municipal Council, Kota,

Rajasthan v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd, Delhi

[2001] 2 SCR 287 : (2001) 3 SCC 654 – referred to.

List of Acts

Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952; Indian Stamp Act,

1899; Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998; Rajasthan Stamp Rules, 1955;

Constitution of India.

List of Keywords

Stamp duty; Liability to pay stamp duty; Evasion of stamp duty;

Imposition and collection of stamp duty on policies of insurance;

Purchase of insurance stamps; Payment of stamp duty; Insurance

policies issued/executed within the State; Recovery of stamp duty;

Stamp duty chargeable on instrument; Rate of stamp duty on

insurance policies; Purchase of stamps from outside the State;

‘duly stamped’; Taxation entry.

246 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3391 of 2011

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.02.2011 of the High Court of

Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBCSA No. 670 of 2004

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 3849, 3393, 3394 and 3395 of 2011

Appearances for Parties

N. Venkatraman, A.S.G., C.Paramasivam, Nishant Sharma,

V. Chandrasekara Bharthi, Ms. Amitha Chandramouli, Rahul

Vijayakumar, Shivshankar G., Rakesh K. Sharma, Advs. for the

Appellant.

Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Ms. Shubhangi Agarwal, Apurv Singhvi,

Rohan Darade, Milind Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

1. The issue for consideration is whether the state of Rajasthan has

the power and jurisdiction to levy and collect stamp duty on policies

of insurance issued within the state. For the reasons to follow, we

have rejected the contention of the Life Insurance Corporation, the

appellant herein, regarding the lack of legislative competence of the

state and have also affirmed the power to levy and collect stamp

duty under the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 19521

 and

the rules made thereunder. While dismissing the appeal, we have

however set aside certain findings of the High Court and granted

relief to the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case. We

will first refer to the necessary facts before analysing the provisions

and drawing our conclusions.

2. Facts: The appellant issued various insurance policies within the state

of Rajasthan between 1993-94 and 2001-02. As per the prevailing

law relating to stamp duty, the appellant was required to affix stamps

1 Hereinafter ‘1952 Act’.

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 247

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

by paying stamp duty on the policies of insurance issued by it in

accordance with the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as adapted to the state

of Rajasthan by the 1952 Act.

2.1 On 19.08.1991, the appellant wrote to the Collector, Jaipur

regarding the non-availability of ‘Agents License Fee stamps’. On

07.10.1991, the Treasury Officer, Jaipur replied to the appellant

that ‘India Insurance Stamps’ are the property of the central

government and their supply and distribution is not related to

their department.

2.2 On 15.04.2004 and 06.05.2004, the Inspector General

(Registration and Stamps) Rajasthan, Ajmer issued a letter to

the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 1.19 crores for causing

loss of revenue to the state of Rajasthan as it had purchased

insurance stamps between 1993-94 and 2001-02 from the state

of Maharashtra for insurance policies that were issued within the

state of Rajasthan. Pursuantly, the Additional Collector (Stamps),

Jaipur issued a show-cause notice under Section 37(5) of the

Rajasthan Stamp Act, 19982

 for payment of the amount.

2.3 By order dated 16.09.2004, the Additional Collector (Stamps),

Jaipur confirmed the show-cause notice and directed

the appellant to deposit the amount. It was held that the

correspondence between the appellant and the department

pertained to Agents Fee Stamps and not India Insurance stamps

that are affixed on insurance policies and were available at the

relevant time. Similar orders were passed on 16.10.2004 for

Rs. 1.07 crores, 11.10.2004 for Rs. 1.18 crores, 01.11.2004

for Rs. 1.87 crores, and 28.10.2004 for Rs. 43.68 lakhs. The

appellant also challenged these orders by way of separate

writ petitions, which have been disposed of in the judgment

impugned before us.3

2.4 The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the order of

the Additional Collector dated 16.09.2004, which came to be

2 Hereinafter ‘1998 Act’.

3 In D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3418/2006, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3419/2006, and D.B. Civil Writ

Petition No. 3420/2006, and D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8187/2004, judgment dated 21.02.2011

(‘impugned judgment’). 

248 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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dismissed by the High Court single judge4

 on the ground that

the appellant has an alternative efficacious remedy of filing a

revision under Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act.

2.5 The appellant preferred a writ appeal before the division bench,

which was initially disposed of by an order dated 11.12.2004

wherein the High Court directed the Chief Secretary of the

Rajasthan government to constitute a High Powered Committee

under his chairmanship to decide the matter by a reasoned

order. It was also held that if either party is dissatisfied with

the decision of the committee, they could file for revival of the

writ appeal. The Committee constituted pursuant to this order

rejected the appellant’s representation, due to which the writ

appeal was restored and decided in the impugned judgment5

.

3. Reasoning of the High Court: It is necessary to briefly discuss

the reasoning of the High Court in dismissing the writ appeal and

confirming the imposition of stamp duty. The High Court relied

on Sections 2, 3(v), and 3A of the 1952 Act read with Rules 2(d)

and 3 of the Rajasthan Stamp Rules, 1955. Section 2 provides that

subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Indian Stamp Act, 1899

shall apply to the whole state of Rajasthan on and from 01.04.1958.

Section 3(v) provides that reference in the Indian Act to ‘government’

shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed as reference

to the state government. Section 3A(1) provides for payment of stamp

duty in cash when stamps are not available for sale.

3.1 Rule 2(d) of the Rajasthan Stamp Rules, 1955 defines

government as state government and Rule 3 provides for the

mode of payment of stamp duty to the state government.

3.2 Relying on these provisions, specifically Section 3A(1), the High

Court held that the appellant should have paid the stamp duty

in cash and the receipt would be affixed on the instrument as

envisaged under this provision. It was also held that there was

no legal sanction under the scheme of the Act that permits the

appellant to purchase such stamps from outside the state in case

4 In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7013 of 2004, judgment dated 08.10.2004

5 In D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 670/2004, judgment dated 21.02.2011 (‘impugned judgment).

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 249

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

of non-availability.6

 It further held that in any case, only Agents

License Fee stamps were unavailable while the imposition of

stamp duty was on India Insurance Stamps.7

3.3 Relying on Rule 2(d) that defines ‘government’ as meaning

government of Rajasthan and Rule 3 that mandates payment

of stamp duty to the state government, the High Court held

that the stamps must only be purchased from the Rajasthan

government.8

 The only exception provided is under Section 3A

when the person can deposit cash with the government treasury

in case of non-availability of stamps and affix the receipt of

challan with the instrument.9

 The 1952 Act and the 1955 Rules

do not permit the appellant to purchase stamps from outside

the state that do not bear the superimposition of the words

‘Rajasthan’ or letters ‘RAJ’ as provided in the Explanation to

Rule 3.10 On such reading of the law and facts, the High Court

upheld the order of the Collector dated 16.09.2004.

4. The High Court also dealt with the arguments by the parties on

the competence of the state government to impose stamp duty

on insurance policies based on the distribution of legislative fields

in the Seventh Schedule on stamp duty. The High Court held that

Entry 91 of List I (Union List) empowers the Parliament to enact a

law relating to rate of stamp duty in respect of various instruments,

including policies of insurance. Entry 44 of List III (Concurrent List)

empowers both the Parliament and state legislatures to enact laws

with respect to “stamp duties other than duties or fees collected by

means of judicial stamps, but not including rates of stamp duty”.

4.1 The High Court held that the 1952 Act has been enacted under

Entry 44, List III and has received Presidential assent. It does

not occupy the field covered by Entry 91 of List I as it does

not fix or prescribe the rate of duty for insurance stamps but

only provides for the collection of stamp duty. The High Court

6 Impugned judgment, p. 15

7 ibid.

8 ibid, p.17

9 ibid.

10 ibid.

250 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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hence rejected the submission by the appellant that the state

government does not have the power to demand payment for

insurance stamps as they fall under the Union List.

4.2 It also rejected the appellant’s reliance on this Court’s judgment in

VVS Rama Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh11 by differentiating

it as in that case, there was no state law that had received

Presidential assent and instead the consideration was under

Rule 115A of the UP Stamp Rules, 1942.12 Since the 1952 Act

had received Presidential assent, it was held to be a special law

that has overriding effect, which was not the case in VVS Rama

Sharma (supra) where the Indian Stamp Act read with rules

framed by the state of UP was applicable.13 It also differentiated

the case on facts as VVS Rama Sharma (supra) pertained to

the commission of criminal offences under the Indian Penal

Code and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.14

5. Submissions by the appellant: The learned ASG, Mr. N. Venkataraman,

appeared on behalf of the appellant and has made two primary

arguments. The gist of his submission is: First, that on the basis

of Entry 91 of List I, Entry 63 of List II, and Entry 44 of List III, the

state of Rajasthan does not have the legislative competence to

impose and collect stamp duty on insurance policies as the same

falls under the Union List. Second, that the show-cause notice and

the proceedings are under the 1998 Act, which does not provide

for imposition of stamp duty by the state on policies of insurance.

Alternatively, even if the 1952 Act applies, the appellant had no

option but to purchase the stamps from Maharashtra due to their

admitted unavailability and in view of Section 3A(4) of the 1952 Act.

The detailed arguments are as follows:

5.1 Learned ASG has relied on Entry 47 of List I on insurance and

Entry 91 of List I that empowers the Parliament to prescribe

the rate of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange, cheques,

promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of credit, policies of

insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies and receipts.

11 [2009] 5 SCR 1159 : (2009) 7 SCC 234

12 Impugned judgment, p. 19

13 ibid, p. 20

14 ibid.

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 251

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

He has argued that since insurance falls under the Union list

and more specifically, since only the Union can prescribe the

rate of stamp duty on insurance policies, the state government

cannot demand that the stamp duty on insurance policies

must necessarily be paid to it and that the stamps cannot be

purchased from other states. He relied on VVS Rama Sharma

(supra) on the point that a state cannot require that insurance

stamps, which are property of the central government, must be

purchased only from that particular state when the insurance

policy is issued within its territory. Challenging the imposition

of stamp duty by the state government, the learned ASG has

further submitted that a levy of stamp duty is in the nature of

tax and that there is no valid imposition of tax unless there is

a rate of taxation. Relying on Govind Saran Ganga Saran v.

Commissioner of Sales Tax15 and Mathuram Agrawal v. State

of Madhya Pradesh16, he has submitted that the rate of stamp

duty must be clearly and unambiguously ascertainable, without

which there is no valid tax law. Since the state does not have

the domain competence to prescribe the rate of stamp duty

in the present case, it cannot validly impose and demand the

payment of such duty. Lastly, the learned ASG has argued that

Entry 44 of List III is not in the nature of a taxation entry by

relying on State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries17 and

State of Karnataka v. State of Meghalaya18. He submits that it is

well-settled in taxation law that entries pertaining to taxation are

clearly demarcated between the Union List and the State List.

There is no head of taxation in the Concurrent List. Hence, the

state government cannot impose stamp duty on the appellant

by claiming legislative competence under Entry 44 of List III.

5.2 Apart from arguing that levy of stamp duty by the state is

contrary to the constitutional scheme, the learned ASG has

also argued that stamp duty cannot be imposed in the present

case under the specific state enactments. He has argued that

the 1998 Act applies in the present case as the notice for

15 [1985] 3 SCR 985 : 1985 Supp SCC 205, para 6

16 [1999] Supp. 4 SCR.195 : (1999) 8 SCC 667, para 12

17 [2004] 1 SCR 564 : (2004) 10 SCC 201

18 [2022] 18 SCR 516 : (2023) 4 SCC 416, para 92

252 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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recovery has been issued under Section 37(5) of the 1998 Act.

Section 3 of the 1998 Act is the charging provision that provides

that instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount

indicated in the Schedule. By comparing entry 47 of Schedule

I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (which provides the rates of

stamp duty for various kinds of policies of insurance) and the

Schedule under the 1998 Act, he has argued that there is no

parallel entry in the Schedule of the 1998 Act that provides the

rate of stamp duty on insurance policies. Since Section 3 only

provides for imposition of stamp duty as per rates prescribed

in the Schedule and there is no such rate of duty indicated,

the state government cannot demand stamp duty from the

appellant on insurance policies. Alternatively, the learned ASG

has argued that even if the 1952 Act applies, as considered

by the High Court in the impugned judgment, the stamp duty

could not have been paid to the Rajasthan government in

the present case due to the admitted unavailability of India

Insurance stamps with the treasury. Relying on the letter from

the department dated 07.10.1991, he argued that the High Court

erred in holding that only Agents License Fee stamps were

unavailable when the letter clearly mentioned India Insurance

stamps. Further, the letter also stated that these stamps are

central government property and their supply and sale is not

related to the state government. Relying on this letter by the

department, the learned ASG has submitted that the government

could not have then demanded payment of stamp duty in 2004.

Lastly, he has argued that the High Court’s reliance on Section

3A to hold that the duty could have been paid in cash in case

of unavailability of stamps is misplaced as sub-clause (4) of

Section 3A clearly stipulates that the provision does not apply

to payment of stamp duty chargeable on instruments specified

in Entry 91 of List I. Since insurance policies are an instrument

that fall under this entry, Section 3A does not apply to it and

the appellant could not have paid the stamp duty in cash. The

High Court erred in its conclusion as it had entirely failed to

consider this sub-clause. A similar provision is also contained

in Section 4(4) of the 1998 Act. Hence, he concluded that there

was no way for the appellant to have paid stamp duty to the

Rajasthan government and they had to purchase the stamps 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 253

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

from outside the state as non-payment of duty would lead to

evasion and an unstamped insurance policy would not be

admissible in evidence.

6. Submissions by the respondent: Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned senior

counsel for the state, has argued that the state has the power to

impose and collect stamp duty on insurance policies under Entry

44 of List III. He has argued that while the power to prescribe the

rate of such duty falls within the exclusive domain of the Parliament,

the power to collect and impose the duty and to frame a charging

provision lies with the Parliament and the state legislatures under

Entry 44 of the Concurrent List, which is a sui generis provision. The

legislative competence of the states extends to collecting stamp duty

on instruments specified in Entry 91 of List I but does not extend

to prescribing the rate of duty for such instruments. The power to

prescribe the rate of stamp duty is clearly demarcated between the

Union and the states through Entry 91 of List I and Entry 63 of List

II. The state government can impose the duty at such rate that is

prescribed by the Parliament. He has also argued that Entry 44 of

List III is a taxation provision, as has been clearly held in Bar Council

of Uttar Pradesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh19.

6.1 Dr. Manish Singhvi further submits that the 1952 Act applies

since the period of levy is for policies issued between 1993-94

to 2001-02, which is prior to the 1998 Act coming into force

(on 27.05.2004). The 1952 Act received Presidential assent

and hence prevailed over the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 in the

state as per Article 254(2). Section 3(vi) of this Act adopts

the Schedule from the central Act for the purpose of rate of

stamp duty. Hence, the stamp duty must be paid to the state

government for insurance transactions occurring within the

territory of the state after the 1952 Act came into force as

per the rate prescribed in entry 47 of Schedule I of the Indian

Stamp Act. Alternatively, he has argued that even if the 1998

Act applies, Sections 90 and 91 of that Act have the effect

of adopting the Indian Stamp Act with respect to instruments

contained in Entry 91 of List I. Lastly, he has differentiated the

present case from VVS Rama Sharma (supra) as that case

19 [1973] 2 SCR 1073 : (1973) 1 SCC 261

254 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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pertained to the registration of a criminal case against the

officers of LIC for non-payment of stamp duty and the lack of

criminal intent, leading to the quashing of FIR.

7. Issues: Having heard the learned ASG for the appellant and Dr.

Manish Singhvi for the respondent, the following issues arise for

our consideration:

I. Whether the 1952 Act or the 1998 Act applies to the facts of

the present case?

II. Whether the state government has the legislative competence

to impose and collect stamp duty on policies of insurance as

per Entry 91 of List I read with Entry 44 of List III?

III. Whether the 1952 Act requires the purchase of insurance stamps

from and payment of stamp duty to the Rajasthan government

for insurance policies issued within the state?

IV. Whether, in the facts of the present case, the appellant is liable

to pay stamp duty?

I. Applicable Law

8. It is first important to determine whether stamp duty in the present

case can be imposed under the 1952 Act or the 1998 Act. The High

Court has relied on the provisions of the 1952 Act while arriving at

its conclusion. We agree with the High Court on this aspect as the

stamp duty must be levied as per the law in force as on the date

of execution of the instrument.20 In the present case, the insurance

policies were issued between 1993-94 to 2001-02. Section 3 of the

1998 Act21, which is the charging provision, imposes stamp duty on

every instrument mentioned in the Schedule that is executed in the

state on or after the date of commencement of the Act. The 1998 Act

came into force only on 27.05.2004 by way of a notification. Hence,

20 Vijay v. Union of India [2023] 15 SCR 293 2023 : SCC OnLine SC 1585, 2023 INSC 1030, para 11

21 The relevant portion of Section 3 of the 1998 Act reads:

“3. Instrument chargeable with duty.— Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions

contained in the Schedule, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount

indicated in the Schedule as the proper duty therefor respectively, that is to say,—

(a) every instrument mentioned in that Schedule, which, not having been previously executed by any

person, is executed in the State on or after the date of commencement of this Act;

(b) every instrument mentioned in that Schedule, which, not having been previously executed by any

person, is executed out of the State on or after the said date, relates to any matter or thing done or to be

done in the State and is received in the State, or relates to any property situate in the State.”

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 255

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

at the time that the relevant instruments were executed, the 1952

Act was still in force and the stamp duty is leviable under the same.

II. Legislative Competence

9. The learned ASG has forcefully contended that the state does not

have the power to collect and levy stamp duty on insurance policies

under the state enactment as only the Union can prescribe the rate

of stamp duty for such instruments. He has taken us through the

constitutional scheme on the fields of legislation under the Seventh

Schedule on matters of stamp duty. The relevant entries are Entry

91 of List I, Entry 63 of List II, and Entry 44 of List III, which have

been extracted here for reference:

Entry 91 of List I:

“91. Rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange,

cheques, promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of credit,

policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures,

proxies and receipts.”

Entry 63 of List II:

“63. Rates of stamp duty in respect of documents other

than those specified in the provisions of List I with regard

to rates of stamp duty.”

Entry 44 of List III:

“44. Stamp duties other than duties or fees collected by

means of judicial stamps, but not including rates of stamp

duty.”

10. Article 246 of the Constitution states that the Parliament has the

exclusive power to make laws with respect to any matter in List I,

the Parliament and the legislatures of any state have the power to

make laws with respect to any matter in List III, and the legislature

of any state has the exclusive power to make laws for such state or

any part thereof with respect to any matter in List II.22

22 Article 246 reads:

“246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.—(1)

Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with

respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred

to as the “Union List”).

(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of 

256 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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11. Reading the relevant entries of the Seventh Schedule in the context

of Article 246, the distribution of legislative competence with respect

to legislation on stamp duty is as follows. The Parliament has the

exclusive power to legislate on the rate of stamp duty with respect to

certain instruments, namely: bills of exchange, cheques, promissory

notes, bills of lading, letters of credit, policies of insurance, transfer

of shares, debentures, proxies and receipts, under Entry 91 of List

I. As per Entry 63 of List II, the legislatures of the states have the

exclusive power to legislate on the rate of stamp duty with respect

to documents other than those specified in Entry 91 of List I for their

state or any part of their state. In other words, there is a distribution

of instruments between the Parliament and the state legislatures as

regards the legislative competence to fix rates of stamp duty. However,

as per Entry 44 of List III, the Parliament and the legislatures of the

states have concurrent powers to legislate on stamp duties (other

than duties or fees collected by means of judicial stamps), but not

including rates of stamp duty.

12. A combined reading of the constitutional scheme shows that the

power to prescribe the rate of duty is mutually exclusive and has

been clearly demarcated between the Parliament and the legislatures

of the state.23 Insurance policies, which are the relevant instrument

for the purpose of the present case, fall under Entry 91 of List I

for the purpose of prescription of rate of duty. This means that

only the Parliament holds the exclusive power and the legislative

competence under the Constitution to prescribe the rate of stamp

duty on insurance policies. There is no dispute regarding this point.

13. The issue however that falls for our consideration is whether the state

government can enact a law that imposes stamp duty on insurance

policies by using the rate prescribed by the Parliament by sourcing

legislative competence through Entry 44 of List III.

any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the

Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”).

(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such

State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule

(in this Constitution referred to as the “State List”).

(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not

included 2

 [in a State] notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.”

23 VVS Rama Sharma (supra), paras 14-15

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 257

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

14. This Court in VVS Rama Sharma (supra) has answered this question

in the affirmative and has held that under Entry 44 of List III, “the power

to levy stamp duty on all documents, is concurrent. But the power

to prescribe the rate of such levy is excluded from Entry 44 of List

III and is divided between Parliament and the State Legislatures.”24

Therefore, the charging provision for imposition of stamp duty, even

on documents contained in Entry 91 of List I, can be enacted by both

the Parliament and the state legislatures, subject to the provisions

of Article 254.25 These principles have been summarised in VVS

Rama Sharma (supra) as follows:

“23. As mentioned earlier, under Entry 44 of List III, the

power to levy stamp duty on all documents is concurrent.

But the power to prescribe the rate of such levy is excluded

from Entry 44 of List III and is divided between Parliament

and the State Legislatures. If the instrument falls under

the categories mentioned in Entry 91 of List I, the power

to prescribe the rate will belong to Parliament, and for all

other instruments or documents, the power to prescribe

the rate belongs to the State Legislature under Entry 63

of List II. Therefore, the meaning of Entry 44 of List III is

that excluding the power to prescribe the rate, the charging

provisions of a law relating to stamp duty can be made both

by the Union and the State Legislature, in the concurrent

sphere, subject to Article 254 in case of repugnancy. So,

in the case at hand, it is Entry 91 of List I of the Seventh

Schedule which would be applicable and the States do

not have the power to circumvent a Central law.”

15. In a recent judgment in Vijay v. Union of India,

26 this Court has again

held that the power to levy stamp duty on all documents is concurrent

under Entry 44 of List III. Only the power to prescribe the rate of

such duty is with the Parliament, and subject to Entry 91 of List I,

with the state legislatures.27

24 ibid, para 14

25 ibid, para 15

26 [2023] 15 SCR 293 : 2023 SCC Online SC 1585, 2023 INSC 1030

27 ibid, para 12

258 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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16. From the above precedents, it is clear that the state of Rajasthan has

the power to impose and collect stamp duty on insurance policies

under Entry 44 of List III, albeit such duty must be imposed as per the

rate prescribed by a Parliamentary legislation under Entry 91 of List I.

17. In view of the above explanation, the issue relating to legislative

competence raised by the learned ASG conclusively ends. However,

the learned ASG has raised additional arguments regarding the

requirements of a valid tax law and on whether Entry 44 of List III is a

taxation entry. Although we find these submissions to be unnecessary,

we will deal with them as they have been raised.

18. Relying on this Court’s decisions in Govind Saran Ganga Saran (supra)

and Mathuram Agarwal (supra), the learned ASG has argued that

the rate of taxation is an essential component for a valid imposition

of tax. Since the state legislature cannot prescribe the rate of stamp

duty on insurance policies, he has argued that there can be no valid

imposition of stamp duty on these instruments by way of a state

enactment. This argument must be rejected in view of the above

conclusion that even if the state legislature cannot prescribe the rate

of stamp duty, it can levy such duty at the rate as provided by the

Parliament. Both the decisions relied on by the learned ASG pertain

to cases where the charging provision was ambiguous in defining

an essential component of a valid tax law, i.e., the subject of the tax,

the person who is liable to pay the tax, and the rate at which the tax

is to be paid28. In the present case, while it is certainly true that the

state cannot prescribe the rate of duty on insurance policies, that by

itself does not mean that there is ambiguity or lack of clarity regarding

the rate of such duty. Rather, the rate of duty is unambiguous, clear,

and defined by the Parliament and is adopted by the state to levy

and collect stamp duty. Hence, this submission must be rejected.

19. The other submission by the learned ASG that there is no taxation entry

in the Concurrent List is based on this Court’s decisions in Kesoram

Industries (supra) and State of Karnataka v. State of Meghalaya

(supra). The learned ASG has pointed us to relevant portions of these

judgments. However, it must be noted that these judgments pertain

to taxation entries, rather than to entries on stamp duty. While stamp

28 Mathuram Agarwal (supra), para 6

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 259

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

duty is certainly in the nature of a tax,29 it has not been specifically

considered by this Court in these judgments. A three-judge bench of

this Court in Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh v. State of UP (supra) held

that payment of stamp duty pertains to the domain of taxation and

the imposition of such duty falls in pith and substance under Entry

44 of List III.30 This judgment came prior to the decisions relied on by

the learned ASG but has not been considered by the Court in those

cases as they did not pertain to stamp duty. Hence, it is clear that

Entry 44 of List III is a taxation entry that falls under the Concurrent

List and this submission must also be rejected. We hold that the

state legislature has the legislative competence to impose and collect

stamp duty on policies of insurance under Entry 44 of List III, as per

the rate prescribed by the Parliament under Entry 91 of List I.

III. Liability to Pay Stamp Duty Under the 1952 Act:

20. Provisions and Imposition of Stamp Duty Under the 1952 Act: Section

2 of the 1952 Act reads as follows:

“2. Application of Indian Act.–Subject to the other

provisions of this Act, the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (II of

1899) of the Central Legislature as amended from time to

time, hereinafter referred to as the Indian Act shall apply

to the whole of the State of Rajasthan on and from the

1st day of April, 1958.”

(emphasis supplied)

21. Section 2 of the 1952 Act adopts the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and

makes it applicable to the state of Rajasthan subject to certain

adaptations that are contained in Section 3. Sections 3(v) and 3(vi)

are relevant for our purpose, and are as follows:

“3. Adaptations.–For the purposes of section 2,–

(v) references in the Indian Act to any Government shall,

unless the context otherwise requires, be construed as

references to the State Government, that is to say, to

the Government of the State of Rajasthan as formed by

29 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi, [2008] 3 SCR 330 : (2008) 4 SCC 720, para 19

30 Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh (supra), para 14

260 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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section 10 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 (Central

Act 37 of 1956):

Provided that in clause (i) of section 3 of the Indian Act,

the word “Government” wherever occurring shall mean

the State Government as well as the Central Government.

(vi) references in the Indian Act to Schedule I shall be

construed as references to the Second Schedule of the

Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 (Rajasthan

Act VII of 1952)”

22. Further, Rules 2(d) and 3 of the Rajasthan Stamp Rules, 1955 read

as follows:

“2(d) “Government” means the Government of the State

of Rajasthan”

“3. Mode of payment of duty-Except as otherwise provided

by the Act, or by these rules, -

(1) all duties with which any instrument is chargeable

shall be paid, and such payment shall be indicated on

such instruments, by means of stamps issued by the

Government for the purpose of the Act and these Rules; and

(2) a stamp which by any word or words on the face of it

is appropriated to any particular kind of instrument shall

not be used for any instrument of any other kind.

Explanation: - For the purpose of clause (1), a stamp

of the central Government or of the Government of

any covenanting State shall be deemed to have been

superimposed with word “Rajasthan” or with the letters

“RAJ”.”

Rule 3, read with Rule 2(d), provides that the stamps issued by the

state government will indicate the payment of stamp duty that is

chargeable on an instrument. Therefore, the stamp must be issued

by and the stamp duty must be paid to the state government for an

instrument to be ‘duly stamped’31 under the 1952 Act.

31 Section 2(11) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as adapted to the state of Rajasthan reads:

“2. Definitions. — In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, —

(11) “Duly stamped”. — “duly stamped”, as applied to an instrument, means that the instrument bears an 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 261

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

23. Pursuant to the adaptations by the 1952 Act, the relevant portion of

Section 3 and Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as adapted

to the state of Rajasthan by the 1952 Act is as follows:

“3. Instruments chargeable with duty.—Subject to the

provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in

Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable

with duty of the amount indicated in that Schedule as the

proper duty therefore respectively, that is to say—

(a) every instrument mentioned in that Schedule which, not

having been previously executed by any person, is executed

in India on or after the day on which the Act comes into force

in the State of Rajasthan;

(b) every bill of exchange payable otherwise than on demand,

or promissory note drawn or made out of India on or after

that day and accepted or paid or presented for acceptance

or payment, or endorsed, transferred or otherwise negotiated,

in India; and

(c) every instrument (other than a bill of exchange or

promissory note) mentioned in that Schedule, which, not

having been previously executed by any person, is executed

out of India on or after that day, relates to any property situate,

or to any matter or thing done or to be done, in India and is

received in India:”

Schedule I of the central Act, as adapted to the state of Rajasthan,

reads as follows:

“SCHEDULE I

Stamp Duty on Instruments

(See section 3)

[In this Schedule, given under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, only

those articles are reproduced for which no specific provision

is made in the Rajasthan Amending Act, No. 7 of 1952.]

***

adhesive or impressed stamp of not less than the proper amount and that such stamp has been affixed

or used in accordance with the law for the time being in force in India”

262 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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47. Policy of insurance–

D- LIFE INSURANCE OR GROUP

INSURANCE OR OTHER INSURANCE NOT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR, except

such a RE-INSURANCE, as

is described in Division E of

this article—

If drawn

singly

If drawn

in

duplicate

for each

part.

(i) for every sum insured not

exceeding Rs. 250;

Ten paise. Five

paise.

(ii) for every sum insured

exceeding Rs. 250 but

not exceeding Rs. 500;

Ten paise. Five

paise.

(iii) for every sum insured

exceeding Rs. 500 but

not exceeding Rs. 1,000

and also for every Rs.

1,000/- or part thereof in

excess of Rs. 1,000.

Twenty

paise.

Ten

paise.

N.B.- If a policy of

group insurance is

renewed or otherwise

modified whereby the

sum insured exceeds

the sum previously

insured on which

stamp-duty has been

paid, the proper stamp

must be borne on the

excess sum so insured.

Exemption

Policies of life-insurance granted by

the Director-General of Post Offices in

accordance with rules for Postal LifeInsurance issued under the authority

of the Central Government

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 263

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

24. From reading the above provisions, rules, and the Schedule together,

it can be seen that Section 2 of the 1952 Act provides that the Indian

Stamp Act, 1899 will apply in the state of Rajasthan subject to certain

adaptations. The relevant adaptations for our purpose are that

‘government’ shall refer to state government (as per Section 3(v) of

the 1952 Act) and that reference to Schedule I of the central Act shall

be construed as reference to the Second Schedule of the 1952 Act

(as per Section 3(vi) of the 1952 Act). The Second Schedule of the

1952 Act prescribes the rates of stamp duty on certain instruments.

However, since policies of insurance are specified in Entry 91 of List

I, only the Parliament has the legislative competence to prescribe

the rate of stamp duty to be imposed on them. Consequently, the

Second Schedule to the 1952 Act does not contain any entry on

rates of duty for policies of insurance, and rightly so. Rather, when

we read Entry 47(D) of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899

as adapted to the state of Rajasthan, we see that the rate that has

been prescribed under the central law has been adopted within the

state as well.

25. The power to levy and collect stamp duty is relatable to the legislative

competence of the state, followed by clear authority of law through

statutory prescription. Having recognised the legislative competence

of the state of Rajasthan, the state has the power to collect stamp

duty under Section 3 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as adapted

to the state of Rajasthan that provides that an instrument shall be

chargeable with the duty of the amount indicated in the Schedule if

it is executed within the state of Rajasthan.

26. The mandate of Section 3 is also found in Rule 3 of the Rajasthan

Stamp Rules, 1955 that provides for “mode of payment”. Rule 3,

read with Rule 2(d), provides that the duty with which any instrument

is chargeable shall be paid by means of a stamp issued by the

state government. The relevant event flowing from Section 3 and

Rule 3 authorising the levy and imposition of stamp duty is the

execution of the policy of insurance within the state. The liability

to purchase the stamps from the state of Rajasthan is therefore

clear and unambiguous. Consequently, for instruments executed

within the state, the purchase of stamps from outside the state

will equate to evasion of stamp duty and the instrument will not

be ‘duly stamped’. 

264 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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27. Differentiating VVS Rama Sharma (supra): The learned ASG has

placed reliance on the following portions of VVS Rama Sharma

(supra) to contend that the state government cannot demand that

insurance stamps must only be purchased from it for policies issued

within the state:

“29. In the case at hand, it has been stated in the

FIR that the Divisional Office of LIC, Varanasi has not

purchased the insurance stamps from the Treasury

Office of U.P. but the same were purchased from the

stamp vendors, outside of State, which caused loss to

the State exchequer to the tune of Rs 1,67,21,520.00 to

the State Government. So, the sole allegation against

the appellants is that they have purchased the insurance

stamps from outside the State of U.P. However, as we

have already noted that the said act of the appellants

cannot be said to be inconsistent with any provisions

of the Stamp Act or any other rules. So, the allegation

made in the FIR even if proved by the prosecution does

not constitute any offence.

32. It is wholly immaterial whether the appellants are

purchasing the insurance stamps from the State of U.P.

or from any other State. In fact, as mentioned earlier, Rule

115-A of the U.P. Stamp Rules itself declares that “Stamps

which are the property of the Central Government”. That

being the legal position, it is legally untenable to contend

that the insurance stamps must be purchased from the

State of U.P. only.”

(emphasis supplied)

28. These portions of the judgment must be seen in the context of the facts

and the law applicable in that case. While arriving at its conclusion,

this Court in VVS Rama Sharma (supra) interpretated Rule 115A of

the UP Stamp Rules, 194232 (these Rules were framed by the state

32 Rule 115A of the UP Stamp Rules, 1942 has been extracted in VVS Rama Sharma (supra), para 20 that

reads as follows:

“20. Further, Rule 115-A of the Stamp Rules provides for the mode of sale of such stamps. It reads as

follows:

“115-A. Stamps which are the property of the Central Government and which are required to be sold 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 265

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

government pursuant to rule-making powers given to states under

Sections 74 and 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 189933) read with the

provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.34 It was held that since

the Stamp Rules have been framed under the central Act, their

scope is only to the extent provided in Sections 74 and 75 and they

cannot circumvent the provisions of the central Act.35 In these facts,

this Court held that the State of UP could not require that stamps

on insurance policies must only be purchased within the state and

cannot be validly purchased from other states.

29. The law under consideration in the facts of the present case is

different. In the present case, the imposition of stamp duty by the

state government is under the 1952 Act, which is a state law that

has been enacted under Entry 44 of List III, and has received

Presidential assent as contemplated under Article 254.36 Article

254(2) clearly stipulates that when a state law with respect to a

to the public through post offices e.g. Central excise revenue stamps, defence (or national) savings

stamps, shall be obtained by post offices from local and branch depots and sold to the public in the same

manner as ordinary postage stamps.

Tobacco excise duty labels and insurance agent licence fee stamps shall be sold to the public at local

and branch depots at which they are stocked.”

33 Sections 74 and 75 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 read as follows:

“74. Powers to make rules relating to sale of stamps. –– The State Government may make rules for

regulating–(a) the supply and sale of stamps an stamped papers,

(b) the persons by whom alone such sale is to be conducted, and

(c) the duties and remuneration of such persons:

Provided that such rules shall not restrict the sale of ten naye paise or five naya paise adhesive stamps.

75. Power to make rules generally to carry out Act. ––The State Government may make rules to carry

out generally the purposes of this Act, and may by such rules prescribe the fines, which shall in no case

exceed five hundred rupees, to be incurred on breach thereof.”

34 VVS Rama Sharma (supra), paras 18-23

35 ibid.

36 Article 254 of the Constitution reads as follows:

“254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of

States.—(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of

a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law

with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of

clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature

of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature

of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.

(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the

Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament

or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State

shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail

in that State:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with

respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made

by the Legislature of the State.”

266 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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matter in the Concurrent List is repugnant to the provisions of an

earlier law made by the Parliament or an existing law with respect

to that matter, then the law passed by the state shall prevail in that

state “if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President

and has received his assent”. The 1952 Act that occupies the field

in the present case has undisputedly received Presidential assent

and hence it prevails over the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 so far as the

state of Rajasthan is concerned.37

30. This Court in VVS Rama Sharma (supra) did not consider any such

law enacted by the state legislature that received Presidential assent

and was applicable within the state over the central Act. Further, a

stamp duty is a tax,38 and hence under Article 26539, its levy and

collection must be by the ‘authority of law’40. In VVS Rama Sharma

(supra), there was no charging provision that was considered by the

Court that required the payment of stamp duty on insurance policies

to the government of UP. Rather, the case was concerned with the

interpretation of Rules framed by the state under the central Act.

Hence, the final conclusion in that case is differentiable on facts and

law from the present case.

31. Conclusions on this issue: We have undertaken a detailed analysis

of the provisions of the 1952 Act and the Rajasthan Stamp Rules,

1955 that impose stamp duty on insurance policies issued by the

appellant within the state. Section 3 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as

adapted to the state of Rajasthan is the charging provision as per

which the appellant must pay stamp duty to the state government on

insurance policies executed within the state. The rate at which stamp

duty is payable on policies of insurance under the 1952 Act has been

adopted from Schedule I of the central Act, in accordance with Entry

91 of List I. The charging provision has thus been validly enacted by

the state government under Entry 44 of List III. Therefore, the state

government in the present case can impose stamp duty on the issuance

37 UP Electric Supply Co Ltd v. R.K. Shukla [1970] 1 SCR 507 : (1969) 2 SCC 400, para 9; M. Karunanidhi

v. Union of India [1979] 3 SCR 254 : (1979) 3 SCC 431, paras 7-8

38 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi (supra), para 19

39 Article 265 reads as follows:

“265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law.—No tax shall be levied or collected except

by authority of law.”

40 Balaji v. ITO [1962] 2 SCR 983 : AIR 1962 SC 123; Municipal Council, Kota, Rajasthan v. Delhi Cloth and

General Mills Co. Ltd, Delhi [2001] 2 SCR 287 : (2001) 3 SCC 654

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 267

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

of insurance policies within its territory and require the payment of

such stamp duty by the appellant. Under these circumstances, the

commencement of proceedings for recovery of stamp duty under the

state law and the rules made thereunder is legal, valid, and justified.

IV. Liability of the Appellant in the Facts of the Present Case:

32. The learned ASG has relied on the letter by the Treasury Officer,

Jaipur dated 07.10.1991, the contents of which have been extracted

hereinunder:

“In reference to above it is to submit that Government

of India Insurance Stamp is the property of Central

Government, whose supply and distribution is not related

with this Department.”

33. From the contents of the letter, it is clear that the department

has admitted the non-availability of India Insurance stamps and

has also stated that it is not concerned with their supply and

distribution as they are the property of the central government.

The appellant submits that due to such representation by the

respondent-government, they were compelled to purchase the

stamps from Maharashtra, without which they could not have issued

the insurance policies in the state of Rajasthan. The High Court,

in the impugned judgment, has held that the correspondence of

the appellant with the department pertained to Agents License Fee

stamps.41 However, it has evidently not taken note of the letter

dated 07.10.1991 while arriving at such finding. The High Court

has therefore erred in this regard.

34. Further, the High Court has held that even if the stamps were

unavailable, the appellant was duty-bound to pay the stamp duty

to the state government in cash as provided under Section 3A(1)

of the 1952 Act.42 The relevant portions of Section 3A have been

extracted:

“3A. Payment of stamp duty in cash.— (1) Where the

State Government or the Collector under instructions of

the State Government, by order published in the Official

41 Impugned judgment, p. 15

42 Impugned judgment, p. 15

268 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Gazette, declares that adhesive or impressed stamps of

any denomination are not in stock for sale in sufficient

quantity; then, notwithstanding anything contained in this

Act or the rules made thereunder and during the period

the said order remains in force,—

(i) any instrument chargeable with the stamp duty under

this Act may be executed on an unstamped paper;

(ii) the stamp duty chargeable on such instrument under

this Act may be paid to or collected by any Government

treasury in cash and a receipt or challan therefor shall be

duly given by the officer receiving the cash;

(iii) the officer-in-charge of the Government treasury

shall, as soon as may be, after the stamp duty chargeable

on any such instrument under this Act has been received

in cash, make on the instrument for which the stamp

duty has been paid in cash, the following endorsement,

after due verification that the stamp duty had been

paid in cash for such instrument, and after cancelling

such receipt or challan so that it cannot be used again,

namely:-

‘Stamp duty of Rs. ……………………paid in cash, vide

receipt/challan No. …………………….dated…………………

(iv) the instrument endorsed under clause (iii) shall be

deemed to be duly stamped under this Act and may be used

or acted upon as such to all intents and for all purposes;

Explanation.- For the purposes of sub-section (1)

“Government treasury” includes a Government subtreasury and any other place as the State Government may

by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf.

***

(4) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to the

payment of stamp duty chargeable on the instruments

specified in entry 91 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to

the Constitution of India.”

35. However, the High Court entirely failed to consider sub-section (4), 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 269

Life Insurance Corporation of India v.

The State of Rajasthan and Ors.

despite quoting it, which excludes instruments under Entry 91, List

I from the application of Section 3A. Therefore, the High Court has

committed an error in holding that the appellant could have paid the

stamp duty in cash.

36. In view of the above circumstances, the appellant had no choice but

to purchase the insurance stamps from outside the state. While it

made every endeavour to purchase the stamp from within the state,

due to the letter by the department and the lack of mechanism for

payment of stamp duty under the 1952 Act in case of unavailability

of insurance stamps, it was unable to purchase the stamps and pay

the stamp duty to the Rajasthan government.

37. Therefore, having considered the matter in detail, we finally hold that:

I. The preliminary issue relating to the applicability of the relevant

state law, i.e., the 1952 Act or the 1998 Act, is answered by

holding that the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaption) Act, 1952

applies to the present case.

II. We hold that the state legislature has the legislative competence

to impose and collect stamp duty on policies of insurance under

Entry 44 of List III, as per the rate prescribed by the Parliament

under Entry 91 of List I.

III. We hold that for the execution of insurance policies within the

state of Rajasthan, the appellant is bound to purchase India

Insurance Stamps and pay the stamp duty to the state of

Rajasthan.

IV. While we have upheld the power and jurisdiction of the state to

levy and collect stamp duty on insurance policies, in the facts

and circumstances of the case as indicated hereinabove, we

direct that the state government shall not demand and collect

the stamp duty as per the orders dated 16.09.2004, 16.10.2004,

11.10.2004, 01.11.2004, and 28.10.2004.

38. In conclusion, we dismiss the appeals and affirm the judgment of

the High Court dated 21.02.2011 in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ)

No. 670 of 2004, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3418 of 2006, D.B. Civil

Writ Petition No. 3419 of 2006, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3420 of

2006 and D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8187 of 2004. We also set

aside certain findings of the High Court to the extent indicated in 

270 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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issue no. IV and direct the State Government not to demand and

collect stamp duty as per the orders dated 16.09.2004, 16.10.2004,

11.10.2004, 01.11.2004, and 28.10.2004.

39. Parties shall bear their own costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:

Appeals dismissed.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Whether there can be debt within the meaning of sub-section (11) of section 5 of the 2016 Code. Held: There cannot be a debt within the meaning of sub-section (11) of section 5 of the IB Code unless there is a claim within the meaning of sub-section (6) of section 5 of thereof. [Para 20 (a)] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – sub-section (8) of s. 5 – What is the test to determine whether a debt is a financial debt within the meaning of sub-section (8) of section 5 of the 2016 Code.

* Author

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 215 : 2024 INSC 340

Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr.

v.

Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

(Civil Appeal No. 1143 of 2022)

25 April 2024

[Abhay S. Oka* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

(i) Whether there can be debt within the meaning of sub-section

(11) of section 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016;

(ii) What is the test to determine whether a debt is a financial debt

within the meaning of sub-section (8) of section 5 of the 2016

Code; (iii) Is it necessary to ascertain what is the real nature of

the transaction reflected in the writing, while deciding the issue

whether a debt is a financial debt or an operational debt; (iv) When

is the debt, an operational debt.

Headnotes

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Whether there can

be debt within the meaning of sub-section (11) of section 5

of the 2016 Code.

Held: There cannot be a debt within the meaning of sub-section

(11) of section 5 of the IB Code unless there is a claim within the

meaning of sub-section (6) of section 5 of thereof. [Para 20 (a)]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – sub-section (8) of s.

5 – What is the test to determine whether a debt is a financial

debt within the meaning of sub-section (8) of section 5 of the

2016 Code.

Held: Sub-section (8) of section 5 defines “financial debt” – The

definition incorporates the expression “means and includes” – The

first part of the definition, which starts with the word “means”,

provides that there has to be a debt along with interest, if any,

which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value

of money – The word “and” appears after the word “money”

– Before the words “and includes”, the legislature has not

incorporated a comma – After the word “includes”, the legislature

has incorporated categories (a) to (i) of financial debts – Thus,

the test to determine whether a debt is a financial debt within 

216 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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the meaning of sub-section (8) of section 5 is the existence of

a debt along with interest, if any, which is disbursed against the

consideration for the time value of money – The cases covered

by categories (a) to (i) of sub-section (8) must satisfy the said

test laid down by the earlier part of sub-section (8) of section 5.

[Paras 12 and 20 (b)]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Is it necessary to

ascertain what is the real nature of the transaction reflected

in the writing, while deciding the issue whether a debt is a

financial debt or an operational debt.

Held: While deciding the issue of whether a debt is a financial

debt or an operational debt arising out of a transaction covered

by an agreement or arrangement in writing, it is necessary to

ascertain what is the real nature of the transaction reflected in the

writing – The written document cannot be taken for its face value.

[Paras 20 (c) and 14]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – When is the debt,

an operational debt:

Held: Where one party owes a debt to another and when the creditor

is claiming under a written agreement/ arrangement providing for

rendering ‘service’, the debt is an operational debt only if the claim

subject matter of the debt has some connection or co-relation with

the ‘service’ subject matter of the transaction. [Para 20 (d)]

Case Law Cited

Anuj Jain, Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee

Infratech Limited v. Axis Bank Limited & Ors. [2020] 8

SCR 291 : (2020) 8 SCC 401; Phoenix ARC Private

Limited v. Spade Financial Services Limited & Ors.

[2021] 15 SCR 1079 : (2021) 3 SCC 475; Pioneer

Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of

India & Ors. [2019] 10 SCR 381 : (2019) 8 SCC 416

– relied on.

Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Anr. v. Union of

India & Ors [2019] 3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17;

Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals & Fertilisers Ltd., Madras v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras [1997] Supp. 1

SCR 528 : (1997) 6 SCC 117; Consolidated Construction

Consortium Limited v. Hitro Energy Solutions Private 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 217

Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

Limited [2022] 2 SCR 212 : (2022) 7 SCC 164; New

Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Anand

Sonbhadra [2022] 5 SCR 319 : (2023) 1 SCC 724;

V.E.A. Annamalai Chettiar & Ors. v. S.V.V.S. Veerappa

Chettiar & Ors. AIR 1956 SC 12 – referred to.

List of Acts

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

List of Keywords

sub-section (11) of section 5 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,

2016; sub-section (8) of section 5 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Code, 2016; Means and include in sub-section (8) of section 5

of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Debt; Financial debt;

Operational debt; Nature of transaction; Written agreement; Service;

Debt connection or co-relation with service; Time value of money.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1143 of 2022

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.10.2021 of the National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal in CAAT (I) No.180 of 2021

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 6991-6994 of 2022

Appearances for Parties

Gopal Jain, Sr. Adv., Ms. Mithu Jain, Advs. for the Appellants.

C.U. Singh, Sr. Adv., N.P.S. Chawla, Sujoy Datta, Ms. Kinjal Goyal,

Ms. Kashish Chhabra, Ms. Bidya Mohan, Ashish Rana, Abhishek

Anand, Mohak Sharma, Karan Batura, Siddharth Naidu, Ms. Anusuya

Sadhu Sinha, M/s. KSN & Co., Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Abhay S. Oka, J.

1. These appeals take exception to the separate impugned judgments

and orders dated 7th October 2021 and 29th October 2021 passed

by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (for short, ‘the 

218 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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NCLAT’). In Civil Appeal no.1143 of 2022, the issue involved is

whether the first respondent is a financial creditor within the meaning

of sub-section (7) of Section 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Code, 2016 (for short, ‘the IBC’). The corporate debtor, in this case,

is M/s. Mount Shivalik Industries Limited. The impugned judgment

and order dated 7th October 2021 holds that the first respondent is a

financial creditor. As far as Civil Appeal nos.6991-6994 of 2022 are

concerned, the issue is whether the 1st to 4th respondents therein are

financial creditors of the same corporate debtor - M/s. Mount Shivalik

Industries Limited. The impugned judgment dated 29th October 2021

follows the impugned judgment in Civil Appeal no.1143 of 2022.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

2. A brief reference to the factual aspects of Civil Appeal no.1143 of

2022 must be made to understand the controversy. There were

two agreements of 1st April 2014 and 1st April 2015 between the

corporate debtor and the first respondent. The agreements were

in the form of letters addressed by the corporate debtor to the

first respondent. By the agreement/letter dated 1st April 2014, the

corporate debtor appointed the first respondent as a ‘Sales Promoter’

to promote beer manufactured by the corporate debtor at Ranchi

(Jharkhand) for twelve months. One of the conditions incorporated

by the corporate debtor in the said letter/agreement was that the first

respondent should deposit a minimum security of Rs.53,15,000/- with

the corporate debtor, which will carry interest @21% per annum.

The letter provided that the corporate debtor will pay the interest on

Rs.7,85,850/- @21% per annum. The terms of the agreement/letter

dated 1st April 2015 are identical. The only difference is that under

the second agreement/letter, the corporate debtor was to pay the

interest on Rs.32,85,850/- @21% per annum.

3. The Oriental Bank of Commerce invoked the provisions of Section

7 of the IBC against the corporate debtor. The National Company

Law Tribunal (for short, ‘the NCLT’) admitted the application under

Section 7 of the IBC by the order dated 12th June 2018. It imposed

a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC. The second respondent

was appointed as the Interim Resolution Professional. Initially, the

first respondent filed a claim with the second respondent as an

operational creditor. The claim was withdrawn, and on 19th September

2018, the first respondent filed a claim with the second respondent 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 219

Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

as a financial creditor. By a communication dated 7th October 2018,

the second respondent informed the first respondent that the first

respondent’s claim was accepted partly as an operational debt and

partly as a financial debt. After the first respondent submitted Form-B,

the second respondent rejected the claim on the ground that the first

respondent could not be considered a financial creditor. Therefore,

an application was moved before the NCLT under sub-section (5)

of Section 60 of the IBC by the first respondent seeking a direction

to the second respondent to admit the first respondent’s claim as a

financial creditor. During the pendency of the said application before

the NCLT, the Committee of Creditors approved a resolution plan

submitted by M/s. Kals Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. The second respondent

applied to the NCLT to approve the resolution plan based on the

approval. On 18th January 2021, the NCLT rejected the application

made by the first respondent. Aggrieved by the said order, the first

respondent preferred an appeal before the NCLAT. By the impugned

judgment and order dated 7th October 2021, the NCLAT held that

the first respondent was a financial creditor and not an operational

creditor. The NCLT, on 13th October 2021 approved the resolution

plan of M/s. Kals Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent no.6 in Civil

Appeal nos.6991-6994 of 2022) in the CIRP of the corporate debtor.

4. In Civil Appeal nos.6991-6994 of 2022, the second respondent is the

resolution professional. The corporate debtor is the same as in the

other appeal. The fifth respondent had provided financial assistance to

the corporate debtor of Rs.75,00,000/-. The fourth respondent provided

financial assistance to the corporate debtor of Rs.1,62,00,000/-. The

first respondent advanced a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- to the corporate

debtor. The third respondent advanced a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- to the

corporate debtor. The Resolution Professional rejected the claims of

the four creditors as financial creditors. Therefore, they filed separate

applications before the NCLT by invoking sub-section (5) of Section

60 of the IBC. The NCLT rejected the applications. In the appeals

preferred by them before the NCLAT, the NCLAT allowed the appeals

by relying upon its judgment, which is the subject matter of challenge

in Civil Appeal no.1143 of 2022.

SUBMISSIONS

5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in support

of Civil Appeal no. 1143 of 2022 submitted that the first respondent 

220 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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is an operational creditor going by the agreements dated 1st April

2014 and 1st April 2015. The reason is that the agreements indicate

that the corporate debtor appointed the first respondent to render

services to promote the beer manufactured by the corporate debtor.

He relied upon the definition of “operational debt” under sub-section

(21) of Section 5 of the IBC. He submitted that both the agreements

provided for paying a minimum security deposit by the first respondent

as a condition for being appointed as Sales Promoter of the corporate

debtor. He submitted that there was no intention on the part of the

corporate debtor to avail any financial facility from the first respondent.

He submitted that the amount paid towards the security deposit is

not the money disbursed to the corporate debtor towards financial

facilities availed by the corporate debtor. He submitted that the security

deposit paid by the first respondent would not qualify as a financial

debt defined under sub-section (8) of Section 5 of the IBC. The learned

senior counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of

Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.1

.

He also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Pioneer

Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India &

Ors.2

. He submitted that the NCLAT was unnecessarily impressed by

the acknowledgement of liability and booking of interest component

towards the security deposit, despite the fact that it cannot be given

the overriding effect over the law. He relied upon the decisions of

this Court in the cases of Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals & Fertilisers

Ltd., Madras v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras3 and

Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Hitro Energy

Solutions Private Limited4

. He submitted that booking or payment

of interest is not the only criterion for ascertaining whether the debt

is a financial debt. The learned senior counsel, therefore, urged that

the view taken by the NCLAT in the impugned judgment is entirely

fallacious. He submitted that the NCLAT has virtually rewritten the

concepts of financial and operational debts incorporated in the IBC.

6. On facts, the learned senior counsel submitted that the payment of

the security deposit by the first respondent is a condition precedent

1 [2019] 3 SCR 535 : (2019) 4 SCC 17

2 [2019] 10 SCR 381 : (2019) 8 SCC 416

3 [1997] Supp. 1 SCR 528 : (1997) 6 SCC 117

4 [2022] 2 SCR 212 : (2022) 7 SCC 164

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 221

Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

for being appointed as a Sales Promoter of the corporate debtor.

The intent of the agreements is to appoint the first respondent as

the Sales Promoter and not to avail any financial facilities from the

first respondent. The amount paid by the first respondent does not

constitute financial facilities extended to the corporate debtor. There

was no intention to raise finance from the first respondent, who was

appointed as a Sales Promoter. The learned senior counsel also relied

upon the decisions of this court in the cases of Anuj Jain, Interim

Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech Limited v. Axis Bank

Limited & Ors.5

, Phoenix ARC Private Limited v. Spade Financial

Services Limited & Ors.6 and New Okhla Industrial Development

Authority v. Anand Sonbhadra7

. Lastly, it is submitted that in the

case of an invoice involving any transaction, the delay in payment

attracts interest liability. Therefore, the payment of interest is not the

sole criterion for ascertaining whether a debt is a financial debt. He

would, thus, submit that the appeals deserve to be allowed.

7. The learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent

submitted that the true nature of the agreements will have to be

examined for deciding the nature of the debt. He pointed out several

factual aspects, including the corporate debtor’s acknowledgement

of the liability of payment of interest on security deposit for the

Financial Years 2014-2015, 2015-2016, 2016-2017 and 2017-2018.

The corporate debtor deducted TDS on the interest payable to the

first respondent for three financial years. He submitted that the three

criteria, namely, disbursal, time value of money and commercial effect

of borrowing, are satisfied in the case of the present transaction. He

also relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Anuj Jain,

Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech Limited5

.

He submitted that it was very clear from the terms of the agreement

that the money was repayable after a fixed tenure without a deduction

or provision for forfeiture. An interest @21% per annum was the

consideration for the time value of money. The learned counsel

submitted that the NCLAT was right in going into the issue of the

true nature and effect of the transaction reflected in the agreements.

Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Pioneer Urban

5 [2020] 8 SCR 291 : (2020) 8 SCC 401

6 [2021] 15 SCR 1079 : (2021) 3 SCC 475

7 [2022] 5 SCR 319 : (2023) 1 SCC 724

222 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Land and Infrastructure Ltd2

, the learned counsel submitted that

clause (f) of sub-section (8) of Section 5 of the IBC is a “catch all”

and “residuary” provision which includes any transaction having the

commercial effect of borrowing and any transaction which is used

as a tool for raising finance.

8. The learned senior counsel submitted that the agreements entered

into were the tools for raising finance, and no actual services

have ever been rendered to the first respondent or other lenders.

Therefore, in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case

of V.E.A. Annamalai Chettiar & Ors. v. S.V.V.S. Veerappa

Chettiar & Ors.8

, the true effect of the transaction has been taken

into consideration. It is pointed out that the corporate debtor has

established a practice of raising finance through private entities in

the garb of security deposit under various services agreements.

The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that no fault can be

found with the impugned judgment.

9. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent-Resolution

Professional, supported the appellants by contending that the

money advanced by the first respondent cannot be categorised as

a financial debt. Therefore, the first respondent was an operational

creditor. He relied upon the definition of “operational debt” under

sub-section (21) of Section 5 of the IBC. He submitted that the

security deposit was not meant to reorganize the corporate debtor’s

debts. He submitted that the agreements are service agreements

by which the corporate debtor agreed to take services from the first

respondent for consideration. Therefore, the security deposit was

obviously to ensure the performance of the terms of the agreements

by the first respondent. He submitted that accounting treatment

cannot override the law and the definition of “operational debt” under

the IBC. He submitted that none of the ingredients of clauses (a) to

(f) of sub-section (8) of Section 5 are present in the case at hand.

In this case, there is no disbursal of debt. He submitted that there

was no financial contract between the corporate debtor and the first

respondent. Lastly, he submitted that in view of the judgment dated

29th September 2018 of the NCLAT on an application filed by M/s.

New View Consultants Pvt. Ltd., the second respondent categorised

8 AIR 1956 SC 12

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 223

Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

the first respondent as operational creditor. He would, therefore,

submit that the view taken by the NCLAT was not correct.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF

FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL DEBT

10. Sub-section (11) of Section 3 of the IBC defines ‘debt’, which reads

thus:

“3. In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires,-

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

(11) “debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a

claim which is due from any person and includes a financial

debt and operational debt;

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .”

Thus, a debt has to be a liability or obligation in respect of a claim

that is due from any person. Sub-section (11) uses the words “means”

and “includes”. Financial debt and operational debt are included in

the definition of debt. Thus, financial debt or operational debt must

arise out of a liability or obligation in respect of a claim.

11. “Claim” is defined under sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the IBC,

which reads thus:

“3. In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires,-

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

(6) “claim” means –

(a) a right to payment, whether or not such right is

reduced to judgment, fixed, disputed, undisputed,

legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;

(b) right to remedy for breach of contract under any

law for the time being in force, if such breach

gives rise to a right to payment, whether or

not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed,

matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,

secured or unsecured;

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .”

224 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Clause (a) shows that every right to receive payment is a claim,

whether or not such right is reduced to a judgment. A right to

receive payment is a claim, even if disputed, undisputed, secured,

or unsecured. The right to receive payment can be either legal or

equitable. Clause (b) includes the right to remedy for a breach of

contract under any law for the time being in force. Thus, a liability

or obligation is not covered by the definition of “debt” unless it is

in respect of a claim covered by sub-section (6) of Section 3 of

the IBC.

12. Sub-section (8) of Section 5 of the IBC defines “financial debt”,

which reads thus:

“5. In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,-

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

(8) “financial debt” means a debt alongwith interest, if

any, which is disbursed against the consideration

for the time value of money and includes–

(a) money borrowed against the payment of interest;

(b) any amount raised by acceptance under any

acceptance credit facility or its dematerialised

equivalent;

(c) any amount raised pursuant to any note purchase

facility or the issue of bonds, notes, debentures, loan

stock or any similar instrument;

(d) the amount of any liability in respect of any lease

or hire purchase contract which is deemed as a

finance or capital lease under the Indian Accounting

Standards or such other accounting standards as

may be prescribed;

(e) receivables sold or discounted other than any

receivables sold on non-recourse basis;

(f) any amount raised under any other transaction,

including any forward sale or purchase agreement,

having the commercial effect of a borrowing;

[Explanation. -For the purposes of this sub-clause,-

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 225

Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

(i) any amount raised from an allottee under

a real estate project shall be deemed to be

an amount having the commercial effect

of a borrowing; and

(ii) the expressions, “allottee” and “real

estate project” shall have the meanings

respectively assigned to them in clauses

(d) and (zn) of section 2 of the Real Estate

(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

(16 of 2016);]

(g) any derivative transaction entered into in connection

with protection against or benefit from fluctuation in

any rate or price and for calculating the value of any

derivative transaction, only the market value of such

transaction shall be taken into account;

(h) any counter-indemnity obligation in respect of a

guarantee, indemnity, bond, documentary letter of

credit or any other instrument issued by a bank or

financial institution;

(i) the amount of any liability in respect of any of the

guarantee or indemnity for any of the items referred

to in sub-clause (a) to (h) of this clause.”

(emphasis added)

The definition incorporates the expression “means and includes”.

The first part of the definition, which starts with the word “means”,

provides that there has to be a debt along with interest, if any, which

is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money.

The word “and” appears after the word “money”. Before the words

“and includes”, the legislature has not incorporated a comma. After

the word “includes”, the legislature has incorporated categories (a)

to (i) of financial debts. Hence, the cases covered by categories

(a) to (i) must satisfy the test laid down by the earlier part of the

sub-section (8). The test laid down therein is that there has to be

a debt along with interest, if any, and it must be disbursed against

the consideration for the time value of money. This Court had an

occasion to deal with the definition of “financial debt” in its various 

226 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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decisions. The first decision is in the case of Anuj Jain, Interim

Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech Limited5

. Paragraphs

46 to 50 read thus:

“The essentials for financial debt and financial creditor

46. Applying the aforementioned fundamental principles

to the definition occurring in Section 5(8) of the Code,

we have not an iota of doubt that for a debt to become

“financial debt” for the purpose of Part II of the Code, the

basic elements are that it ought to be a disbursal against

the consideration for time value of money. It may include

any of the methods for raising money or incurring liability

by the modes prescribed in clauses (a) to (f) of Section

5(8); it may also include any derivative transaction or

counter-indemnity obligation as per clauses (g) and (h)

of Section 5(8); and it may also be the amount of any

liability in respect of any of the guarantee or indemnity

for any of the items referred to in clauses (a) to (h). The

requirement of existence of a debt, which is disbursed

against the consideration for the time value of money,

in our view, remains an essential part even in respect

of any of the transactions/dealings stated in clauses

(a) to (i) of Section 5(8), even if it is not necessarily

stated therein. In any case, the definition, by its very

frame, cannot be read so expansive, rather infinitely

wide, that the root requirements of “disbursement” against

“the consideration for the time value of money” could be

forsaken in the manner that any transaction could stand

alone to become a financial debt. In other words, any

of the transactions stated in the said clauses (a) to

(i) of Section 5(8) would be falling within the ambit

of “financial debt” only if it carries the essential

elements stated in the principal clause or at least

has the features which could be traced to such

essential elements in the principal clause. In yet

other words, the essential element of disbursal, and

that too against the consideration for time value of

money, needs to be found in the genesis of any debt

before it may be treated as “financial debt” within 

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the meaning of Section 5(8) of the Code. This debt

may be of any nature but a part of it is always required

to be carrying, or corresponding to, or at least having

some traces of disbursal against consideration for the

time value of money.

47. As noticed, the root requirement for a creditor to

become financial creditor for the purpose of Part II of the

Code, there must be a financial debt which is owed to

that person. He may be the principal creditor to whom

the financial debt is owed or he may be an assignee in

terms of extended meaning of this definition but, and

nevertheless, the requirement of existence of a debt being

owed is not forsaken.

48. It is also evident that what is being dealt with and

described in Section 5(7) and in Section 5(8) is the

transaction vis-à-vis the corporate debtor. Therefore, for

a person to be designated as a financial creditor of the

corporate debtor, it has to be shown that the corporate

debtor owes a financial debt to such person. Understood

this way, it becomes clear that a third party to whom the

corporate debtor does not owe a financial debt cannot

become its financial creditor for the purpose of Part II of

the Code.

49. Expounding yet further, in our view, the peculiar elements

of these expressions “financial creditor” and “financial debt”,

as occurring in Sections 5(7) and 5(8), when visualised

and compared with the generic expressions “creditor” and

“debt” respectively, as occurring in Sections 3(10) and 3(11)

of the Code, the scheme of things envisaged by the Code

becomes clearer. The generic term “creditor” is defined

to mean any person to whom the debt is owed and then,

it has also been made clear that it includes a “financial

creditor”, a “secured creditor”, an “unsecured creditor”, an

“operational creditor”, and a “decree-holder”. Similarly, a

“debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim

which is due from any person and this expression has also

been given an extended meaning to include a “financial

debt” and an “operational debt”.

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49.1. The use of the expression “means and includes”

in these clauses, on the very same principles of

interpretation as indicated above, makes it clear that

for a person to become a creditor, there has to be a

debt i.e. a liability or obligation in respect of a claim

which may be due from any person. A “secured creditor”

in terms of Section 3(30) means a creditor in whose favour

a security interest is created; and “security interest”, in terms

of Section 3(31), means a right, title or interest or claim

of property created in favour of or provided for a secured

creditor by a transaction which secures payment for the

purpose of an obligation and it includes, amongst others, a

mortgage. Thus, any mortgage created in favour of a creditor

leads to a security interest being created and thereby, the

creditor becomes a secured creditor. However, when all

the defining clauses are read together and harmoniously,

it is clear that the legislature has maintained a distinction

amongst the expressions “financial creditor”, “operational

creditor”, “secured creditor” and “unsecured creditor”. Every

secured creditor would be a creditor; and every financial

creditor would also be a creditor but every secured creditor

may not be a financial creditor. As noticed, the expressions

“financial debt” and “financial creditor”, having their specific

and distinct connotations and roles in insolvency and

liquidation process of corporate persons, have only been

defined in Part II whereas the expressions “secured creditor”

and “security interest” are defined in Part I.

50. A conjoint reading of the statutory provisions with

the enunciation of this Court in Swiss Ribbons [Swiss

Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17] ,

leaves nothing to doubt that in the scheme of the IBC,

what is intended by the expression “financial creditor” is

a person who has direct engagement in the functioning

of the corporate debtor; who is involved right from the

beginning while assessing the viability of the corporate

debtor; who would engage in restructuring of the loan

as well as in reorganisation of the corporate debtor's

business when there is financial stress. In other words,

the financial creditor, by its own direct involvement in a 

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Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

functional existence of corporate debtor, acquires unique

position, who could be entrusted with the task of ensuring

the sustenance and growth of the corporate debtor,

akin to that of a guardian. In the context of insolvency

resolution process, this class of stakeholders, namely,

financial creditors, is entrusted by the legislature with

such a role that it would look forward to ensure that

the corporate debtor is rejuvenated and gets back to its

wheels with reasonable capacity of repaying its debts

and to attend on its other obligations. Protection of the

rights of all other stakeholders, including other creditors,

would obviously be concomitant of such resurgence of

the corporate debtor.

50.1. Keeping the objectives of the Code in view, the

position and role of a person having only security interest

over the assets of the corporate debtor could easily be

contrasted with the role of a financial creditor because

the former shall have only the interest of realising the

value of its security (there being no other stakes involved

and least any stake in the corporate debtor's growth or

equitable liquidation) while the latter would, apart from

looking at safeguards of its own interests, would also and

simultaneously be interested in rejuvenation, revival and

growth of the corporate debtor. Thus understood, it is clear

that if the former i.e. a person having only security interest

over the assets of the corporate debtor is also included

as a financial creditor and thereby allowed to have its say

in the processes contemplated by Part II of the Code, the

growth and revival of the corporate debtor may be the

casualty. Such result would defeat the very objective and

purpose of the Code, particularly of the provisions aimed

at corporate insolvency resolution.

50.2. Therefore, we have no hesitation in saying that a

person having only security interest over the assets of

corporate debtor (like the instant third-party securities),

even if falling within the description of “secured creditor”

by virtue of collateral security extended by the corporate

debtor, would nevertheless stand outside the sect of 

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“financial creditors” as per the definitions contained

in sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 5 of the Code.

Differently put, if a corporate debtor has given its property

in mortgage to secure the debts of a third party, it may

lead to a mortgage debt and, therefore, it may fall within

the definition of “debt” under Section 3(10) of the Code.

However, it would remain a debt alone and cannot partake

the character of a “financial debt” within the meaning of

Section 5(8) of the Code.”

(emphasis added)

A Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in the case of Phoenix

ARC Private Limited6 dealt with the issue in greater detail. It also

dealt with the concept of the time value of money. In paragraphs 44

to 47 of the said decision, this Court held thus:

“44. Section 5(8) IBC provides a definition of “financial

debt” in the following terms:

XXX XXX XXX

G.3.2. Financial creditor and financial debt

45. Under Section 5(7) IBC, a person can be categorised

as a financial creditor if a financial debt is owed to it.

Section 5(8) IBC stipulates that the essential ingredient

of a financial debt is disbursal against consideration for

the time value of money. This Court, speaking through

Rohinton F. Nariman, J., in Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union

of India [Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019)

4 SCC 17] has held : (SCC p. 64, para 42)

“42. A perusal of the definition of “financial

creditor” and “financial debt” makes it clear that

a financial debt is a debt together with interest, if

any, which is disbursed against the consideration

for time value of money. It may further be money

that is borrowed or raised in any of the manners

prescribed in Section 5(8) or otherwise, as

Section 5(8) is an inclusive definition. On the

other hand, an “operational debt” would include

a claim in respect of the provision of goods or 

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Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

services, including employment, or a debt in

respect of payment of dues arising under any

law and payable to the Government or any

local authority.”

(emphasis supplied)

46. In this context, it would be relevant to discuss the

meaning of the terms “disburse” and “time value of money”

used in the principal clause of Section 5(8) IBC. This Court

has interpreted the term “disbursal” in Pioneer Urban Land

& Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India [Pioneer Urban Land

& Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416

: (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 1] in the following terms : (SCC p.

511, paras 70-71)

“70. The definition of “financial debt” in Section

5(8) then goes on to state that a “debt” must be

“disbursed” against the consideration for time

value of money. “Disbursement” is defined in

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Edn.) to mean:

‘1. The act of paying out money, commonly from

a fund or in settlement of a debt or account

payable. 2. The money so paid; an amount of

money given for a particular purpose.’

71. In the present context, it is clear that the expression

“disburse” would refer to the payment of instalments by the

allottee to the real estate developer for the particular purpose

of funding the real estate project in which the allottee is

to be allotted a flat/apartment. The expression “disbursed”

refers to money which has been paid against consideration

for the “time value of money”. In short, the “disbursal” must

be money and must be against consideration for the “time

value of money”, meaning thereby, the fact that such money

is now no longer with the lender, but is with the borrower,

who then utilises the money.”

47. The report of the Insolvency Law Committee dated

26-3-2018 has discussed the interpretation of the term

“time value of money” and stated:

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“1.4. The current definition of “financial debt”

under Section 5(8) of the Code uses the words

“ [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has

been emphasised in original.] includes [Ed. :

The matter between two asterisks has been

emphasised in original.] ”, thus the kinds of

financial debts illustrated are not exhaustive.

The phrase “ [Ed. : The matter between two

asterisks has been emphasised in original.]

disbursed against the consideration for the time

value of money [Ed. : The matter between two

asterisks has been emphasised in original.]

” has been the subject of interpretation only

in a handful of cases under the Code. The

words “time value” have been interpreted

to mean compensation or the price paid for

the length of time for which the money has

been disbursed. This may be in the form of

interest paid on the money, or factoring of

a discount in the payment.”

(emphasis added)”

In the case of Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr2

,

this issue was dealt with in paragraphs 76 and 77, which read thus:

“76. Sub-clause (f) Section 5(8) thus read would

subsume within it amounts raised under transactions

which are not necessarily loan transactions, so long

as they have the commercial effect of a borrowing. We

were referred to Collins English Dictionary & Thesaurus

(2nd Edn., 2000) for the meaning of the expression “borrow”

and the meaning of the expression “commercial”. They

are set out hereinbelow:

“borrow.—vb 1. to obtain or receive (something,

such as money) on loan for temporary use,

intending to give it, or something equivalent

back to the lender. 2. to adopt (ideas, words,

etc.) from another source; appropriate. 3. Not

standard. to lend. 4. (intr) Golf. To putt the ball 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 233

Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

uphill of the direct path to the hole:make sure

you borrow enough.”

***

“commercial.—adj. 1. of or engaged in

commerce. 2. sponsored or paid for by an

advertiser: commercial television. 3. having

profit as the main aim: commercial music. 4.(of

chemicals, etc.) unrefined and produced in bulk

for use in industry. 5. a commercially sponsored

advertisement on radio or television.”

77. A perusal of these definitions would show that even

though the petitioners may be right in stating that a

“borrowing” is a loan of money for temporary use, they are

not necessarily right in stating that the transaction must

culminate in money being given back to the lender. The

expression “borrow” is wide enough to include an advance

given by the homebuyers to a real estate developer for

“temporary use” i.e. for use in the construction project so

long as it is intended by the agreement to give “something

equivalent” to money back to the homebuyers. The

“something equivalent” in these matters is obviously the

flat/apartment. Also of importance is the expression

“commercial effect”. “Commercial” would generally

involve transactions having profit as their main aim.

Piecing the threads together, therefore, so long as an

amount is “raised” under a real estate agreement, which

is done with profit as the main aim, such amount would

be subsumed within Section 5(8)(f) as the sale agreement

between developer and home buyer would have the

“commercial effect” of a borrowing, in that, money is paid

in advance for temporary use so that a flat/apartment is

given back to the lender. Both parties have “commercial”

interests in the same—the real estate developer seeking

to make a profit on the sale of the apartment, and the flat/

apartment purchaser profiting by the sale of the apartment.

Thus construed, there can be no difficulty in stating that the

amounts raised from allottees under real estate projects

would, in fact, be subsumed within Section 5(8)(f) even 

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without adverting to the Explanation introduced by the

Amendment Act.”

(emphasis added)

FINDINGS ON FACTUAL ASPECTS

13. In light of the interpretation put by this Court to the definition of

financial debt, it is necessary to come back to the facts of the case.

The relevant agreements for our consideration are in the form of

letters dated 1st April 2014 and 1st April 2015. The corporate debtor

addressed the letters to the first respondent. The relevant part of

the agreement/letter dated 1st April 2014 reads thus:

“.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

SACH MARKETING PVT LTD

JHARKHAND

Dear Sir,

We are pleased to appoint you as our SALES PROMOTER

for promotion of Beer at Ranchi (Jharkhand) on the

following terms and conditions:

1. You will be allowed Rs.4,000/- per month for your

promote work.

2. You will be working in close coordination with

company’s Marketing Manager for the aforementioned

area, who shall convey the instructions in writing to

you.

3. The selling rates of our beer shall be decided by the

company from time to time and you will not change

them without prior confirmation from the company.

Further, you shall not commit to any party about any

rebate or any discount etc without prior authorization

from us.

4. The appointment shall be w.e.f. 1st April, 2014 for a

period of 12 months ending 31st March, 2015.

5. The settlement of commission as stated above in

point no.1 shall be on quarterly basis.

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Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

6. Notwithstanding anything provided above this

appointment in terms hereof may be terminated by

us during the term of appointment aforesaid by giving

to you thirty days notice in writing in this behalf from

the date of dispatch of notice.

7. You shall not be entitled upon termination of this

agreement or appointment within the terms hereof to

claim any damages or compensation from the company

for such termination or consequent thereupon or

otherwise relative thereto against the other.

8. Forthwith upon determination of this agreement

appointment you shall cease all dealings on behalf

of the company and shall deliver custody of all

premises, stock, cash negotiable instruments,

papers and documents and other items and things

of the company coming into the custody of these

presents.

9. The company reserve the right to appoint any, other

party as Sales Promoter for, areas mentioned above.

10. You have to deposit minimum security of

Rs.53,15,000/- with the Company which will carry

interest @21% p.a. We will provide you interest

on Rs.7,85,850/- @21% per annum.

Please acknowledge receipt and as a token of your

acceptance of above terms conditions.

Please sign duplicate copy of this letter and return the

same to us for our records.

Thanking you,

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .”

(emphasis added)

As seen from clause (4), the agreement was only for twelve months

ending on 31st March 2015. Therefore, on 1st April 2015, another

letter was issued by the corporate debtor to the first respondent,

incorporating identical terms and conditions. The only difference is 

236 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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that the agreement’s duration was up to 31st March 2016. Clause

(10) of the agreement/letter dated 1st April 2015 reads thus:

“.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

#10 You have to deposit minimum security of Rs.53,15,000/-

with the Company which will carry interest @21% per

annum.

We will provide you interest on Rs.32,85,850/- @21% per

annum. Please acknowledge receipt and as a token of

your acceptance of above terms and conditions.

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .”

14. Where one party owes a debt to another and when the creditor

is claiming under a written agreement/arrangement providing for

rendering ‘service’, the debt is an operational debt only if the claim

subject matter of the debt has some connection or co-relation with

the ‘service’ subject matter of the transaction. The written document

cannot be taken for its face value. Therefore, it is necessary to

determine the real nature of the transaction on a plain reading of

the agreements. What is surprising is that for acting as a Sales

Promoter of the beer manufactured by a corporate debtor, only a sum

of Rs.4,000/- per month was made payable to the first respondent.

Apart from the sum of Rs.4,000/- per month, there is no commission

payable to the first respondent on the quantity of sales. Clause (6)

provides for termination of the appointment by giving thirty days’

notice. Though clause (10) provides for the payment of the security

deposit by the first respondent, it is pertinent to note that there is no

clause for the forfeiture of the security deposit. The amount specified

in clause (10) has no correlation whatsoever with the performance

of the other conditions of the contract by the first respondent. As

there is no clause regarding forfeiture of the security deposit or part

thereof, the corporate debtor was liable to refund the security deposit

after the period specified therein was over with interest @21% per

annum. Since the security deposit payment had no correlation with

any other clause under the agreements, as held by the NCLAT, the

security deposit amounts represent debts covered by sub-section

(11) of Section 3 of the IBC. The reason is that the right of the first

respondent to seek a refund of the security deposit with interest is a

claim within the meaning of sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the IBC 

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Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

as the first respondent is seeking a right to payment of the deposit

amount with interest. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt that

there is a debt in the form of a security deposit mentioned in the

said two agreements.

15. Sub-section (21) of Section 5 defines “operational debt”, which

reads thus:

“5. In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,-

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

(21) “operational debt” means a claim in respect of the

provision of goods or services including employment or

a debt in respect of the payment of dues arising under

any law for the time being in force and payable to the

Central Government, any State Government or any local

authority;

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .”

The second part of the definition which deals with the payment

of dues arising under any law, will not apply. However, for the

applicability of the first part, the claim must be concerning the

provisions of goods or services. Therefore, in the case of a contract

of service, there must be a correlation between the service as agreed

to be provided under the agreement and the claim. The reason is

that the definition uses the phraseology “a claim in respect of the

provision of goods or services”. Assuming that both the agreements

are genuine in the sense that they reflect the true nature of the

transaction, the only claim under the agreements which will have

any connection with the services rendered by the first respondent

will be the claim of Rs.4,000/- per month as provided in clause

(1) of both the agreements. Only this claim can be said to be

concerning the provision of services. Therefore, by no stretch of

imagination, the debt claimed by the first respondent can be an

operational debt. We are conscious of the fact that the provision

for payment of interest by the corporate debtor by itself is not the

only material factor in deciding the nature of the debt. But, in the

facts of the case, the payment of the amount mentioned in clause

(10) of the letter has no relation with the service supposed to be

rendered by the first respondent. 

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16. Now, coming back to the definition of a financial debt under subsection (8) of Section 5 of the IBC, in the facts of the case, there

is no doubt that there is a debt with interest @21% per annum.

The provision made for interest payment shows that it represents

consideration for the time value of money. Now, we come to clause

(f) of sub-section (8) of Section 5 of the IBC. The first condition of

applicability of clause (f) is that the amount must be raised under

any other transaction. Any other transaction means a transaction

which is not covered by clauses (a) to (e). Clause (f) covers all

those transactions not covered by any of these sub-clauses of subsection (8) that satisfy the test in the first part of Section 8. The

condition for the applicability of clause (f) is that the transaction

must have the commercial effect of borrowing. “Transaction” has

been defined in sub-section (33) of Section 3 of the IBC, which

includes an agreement or arrangement in writing for the transfer of

assets, funds, goods, etc., from or to the corporate debtor. In this

case, there is an arrangement in writing for the transfer of funds to

the corporate debtor. Therefore, the first condition incorporated in

clause (f) is fulfilled.

17. To decide whether the second condition had been fulfilled, it is

necessary to refer to the factual findings recorded in the impugned

judgment. The NCLAT has referred to the letter dated 26th October

2017 addressed by the corporate debtor to the first respondent. We

have perused a copy of the said letter annexed to the counter. By

the said letter, the corporate debtor informed the first respondent

that for the year 2016-2017, the corporate debtor had provided the

interest amounting to Rs.18,06,000/- in the books of the corporate

debtor and that the sum will be credited to the account of the first

respondent on the date of payment of TDS. In paragraph 21 of the

impugned judgment, it is held that the financial statement of the first

respondent for the Financial Year 2017-2018 shows revenue from

the interest on the security deposit. It is also held that the amounts

were treated as long-term loans and advances in the financial

statement of the corporate debtor for the Financial Year 2015-2016.

Moreover, in the financial statement of the corporate debtor for the

Financial Year 2016-17, the amounts paid by the first respondent

were shown as “other long-term liabilities”. Therefore, if the letter

mentioned above and the financial statements of the corporate 

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Global Credit Capital Limited & Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

debtor are considered, it is evident that the amount raised under

the said two agreements has the commercial effect of borrowing

as the corporate debtor treated the said amount as borrowed from

the first respondent.

CONCLUSION

18. Therefore, we have no hesitation in concurring with the NCLAT’s view

that the amounts covered by security deposits under the agreements

constitute financial debt. As it is a financial debt owed by the first

respondent, sub-section (7) of Section 5 of the IBC makes the first

respondent a financial creditor.

19. The contracts subject matter of the Civil Appeal Nos. 6991 to 6994

of 2022 are in the form of letters, which provide for similar clauses

as in the case of agreements subject matter of Civil Appeal No.

1143 of 2022.

SUMMARY

20. Subject to what is held above, we summarize our legal conclusions:

a. There cannot be a debt within the meaning of sub-section (11)

of section 5 of the IB Code unless there is a claim within the

meaning of sub-section (6) of section 5 of thereof;

b. The test to determine whether a debt is a financial debt within

the meaning of sub-section (8) of section 5 is the existence of

a debt along with interest, if any, which is disbursed against the

consideration for the time value of money. The cases covered

by categories (a) to (i) of sub-section (8) must satisfy the said

test laid down by the earlier part of sub-section (8) of section 5;

c. While deciding the issue of whether a debt is a financial debt

or an operational debt arising out of a transaction covered by

an agreement or arrangement in writing, it is necessary to

ascertain what is the real nature of the transaction reflected in

the writing; and

d. Where one party owes a debt to another and when the creditor

is claiming under a written agreement/ arrangement providing

for rendering ‘service’, the debt is an operational debt only if

the claim subject matter of the debt has some connection or

co-relation with the ‘service’ subject matter of the transaction.

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OPERATIVE PART

21. For the reasons recorded earlier, we hold that the view taken by the

NCLAT under the impugned judgments and orders is correct and will

have to be upheld. Therefore, we confirm the impugned judgments

and dismiss the appeals with no order as to costs. The Resolution

Professional shall continue with the CIRP process in accordance

with the impugned judgments.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeals dismissed.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Compounding of offence – “Consent”: Held: Even though the complainant was duly compensated by the accused yet the complainant does not agree for the compounding of the offence, the courts cannot compel the complainant to give ‘consent’ for compounding of the matter – Mere repayment of the amount cannot mean that the appellant is absolved from the criminal liabilities u/s.138 – However, in the present case, the appellant was in jail for more than 1 year before being released on bail and had also compensated the complainant and in compliance of the order passed by this Court, he deposited an additional amount of Rs.10 lacs towards interest for delayed payment – Thus, there is no purpose now to keep the proceedings pending in appeal before the lower appellate court – Even though the complainant is unwilling to compound the case but, in the facts and circumstances of the present case the proceedings must come to an end – Quashing of a case is different from compounding – All the criminal proceedings qua appellant arising out of FIR No.35 of 2014 pending before Chief Judicial Magistrate, quashed – Since, criminal appeals filed by appellant against his conviction u/s.138 are also pending, said proceedings also quashed – Hence, all the pending criminal appeals 204 [2024] 5 S.C.R. Digital Supreme Court Reports against the appellant in the present matter quashed in exercise powers u/Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Impugned order of High Court as also the conviction

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 203 : 2024 INSC 347

Raj Reddy Kallem

v.

The State of Haryana & Anr.

(Criminal Appeal No. 2210 of 2024)

08 April 2024

[A.S. Bopanna and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Appellant was convicted u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881. Additionally, an FIR was also filed against the appellant u/

ss.406, 420, 120B, IPC. Parties agreed to compound the offence

at the appellate stage and a settlement was reached. But, the

appellant could not pay the amount within the time stipulated in

the settlement agreement. However, eventually, entire amount was

paid by him but, the complainant did not agree for compounding

of the offence. Complainant, if can be compelled by the courts to

give consent for compounding of the matter.

Headnotes

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Compounding of

offence – “Consent”:

Held: Even though the complainant was duly compensated by the

accused yet the complainant does not agree for the compounding

of the offence, the courts cannot compel the complainant to give

‘consent’ for compounding of the matter – Mere repayment of the

amount cannot mean that the appellant is absolved from the criminal

liabilities u/s.138 – However, in the present case, the appellant

was in jail for more than 1 year before being released on bail and

had also compensated the complainant and in compliance of the

order passed by this Court, he deposited an additional amount of

Rs.10 lacs towards interest for delayed payment – Thus, there is

no purpose now to keep the proceedings pending in appeal before

the lower appellate court – Even though the complainant is unwilling

to compound the case but, in the facts and circumstances of the

present case the proceedings must come to an end – Quashing of

a case is different from compounding – All the criminal proceedings

qua appellant arising out of FIR No.35 of 2014 pending before

Chief Judicial Magistrate, quashed – Since, criminal appeals filed

by appellant against his conviction u/s.138 are also pending, said

proceedings also quashed – Hence, all the pending criminal appeals 

204 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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against the appellant in the present matter quashed in exercise

powers u/Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Impugned order

of High Court as also the conviction and sentence awarded by

trial court, set aside. [Paras 12,14]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.406, 420, 120B – Appellant took advance

money from the complainant but failed to supply the machine

– FIR against the appellant in addition to proceedings u/s.138,

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Allegations that from the

very beginning the appellant had the intention of cheating

the complainant:

Held: As far as FIR case u/ss.406, 420, 120B is concerned,

there is no merit in the allegations that the appellant from the

very beginning had the intention of cheating the complainant –

Though, the appellant failed to procure and supply the machine

even after taking the advance money from the complainant but

there is nothing on record to show that the appellant had any ill

intention of cheating or defrauding the complainant from the very

inception – Transaction between the parties was purely civil in

nature which does not attract criminal law in any way. [Para 13]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.147, 138 – Offences to

be compoundable:

Held: As per s.147, all offences punishable under the Negotiable

Instruments Act are compoundable – However, unlike s.320 of

CrPC, the NI Act does not elaborate upon the manner in which

offences should be compounded – In cases of s.138, the accused

must try for compounding at the initial stages instead of the later

stage, however, there is no bar to seek the compounding of the

offence at later stages of criminal proceedings including after

conviction, like the present case. [Para 12]

Case Law Cited

Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. [2010] 5 SCR

678 : (2010) 5 SCC 663; K.M Ibrahim v. K.P Mohammed

& Anr. [2009] 15 SCR 1300 : (2010) 1 SCC 798; O.P

Dholakia v. State of Haryana & Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 762;

JIK Industries Limited & Ors. v. Amarlal V. Jamuni &

Anr. [2012] 3 SCR 114 : (2012) 3 SCC 255; Meters and

Instruments Private Ltd. And Another. v. Kanchan Mehta

[2017] 10 SCR 66 : (2018) 1 SCC 560 – referred to.

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 205

Raj Reddy Kallem v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

List of Acts

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Penal Code, 1860; Constitution

of India.

List of Keywords

Compounding of offence; Consent for compounding of offences

under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Unwillingness

to compound the case; Quashing; Complete justice; Transaction

civil in nature; Intention of cheating or defrauding.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2210

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2022 of the High Court

of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRMM No.54820 of 2022

Appearances for Parties

Ashish Kumar Tiwari, Adv. for the Appellant.

Birender Bikram, DAG, Samar Vijay Singh, Keshav Mittal, Ms. Sabarni

Som, Fateh Singh, M. K. Dua, Shantanu Sagar, Anil Kumar, Gunjesh

Ranjan, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

Leave granted.

2. The brief facts leading to this appeal are that in the year 2012

Respondent No.2-complainant placed a purchase order for the supply

of “Promotec Fiber Laser Cutting Machine” to the company (M/s

Farmax) of the appellant. For the said purchase, an advance amount

of Rs.1,55,00,000 was paid to the company of the appellant. All the

same, for some reasons, M/s Farmax failed to procure and supply this

machine to respondent No.2-complainant. Thereafter, the appellant

issued 5 cheques to the complainant towards return of the advance

money. Admittedly, some of these cheques were dishonoured and in

Nov-Dec 2013 the complainant initiated proceedings under section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as “NI

Act”). Additionally, in January 2014 complainant filed a complaint 

206 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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under Section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred

to as ‘CrPC’) which led to an FIR No.35 of 2014 at Police Station

Mahesh Nagar (Ambala) under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of Indian

Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) against the appellant,

wherein it was said that the appellant had wrongfully retained the

hard-earned money of the complainant and had cheated her. The

charge sheet dated 21.07.2014 under Sections 406, 420 r/w 120B

of IPC was filed against the appellant and trial commenced in the

said FIR case.

3. In NI Act case, the trial court vide order dated 25.05.2015/29.05.2015

convicted the appellant under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced

him to 2 years of rigorous imprisonment along with direction to pay

the amount of cheques. In the appeal filed by appellant before the

Additional Sessions Judge, both sides made an effort to settle the

dispute and consequently the matter was placed before the Lok Adalat,

where after negotiations, parties reached a settlement. Consequently,

the Additional Session Judge, Pre-Lok Adalat, Amabala passed the

settlement order dated 05.12.2015 where the appellant agreed to

pay back the entire amount of Rs.1.55 crore, which was to be paid

within a period of about 16 months. Once the entire amount was

paid, the entire proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act as well as

offences under Section 406, 420 read with 120B of IPC arising out

of the FIR had to be compounded. This was also mentioned in the

settlement order dated 05.12.2015, the relevant portion of the said

order is reproduced below:

“That if appellant shall pay entire amount as per settlement,

then the offence u/s 138 of NI Act shall be compounded

and FIR bearing No.35 of 2014 u/s 420, 406, 120-B, PS

Mahesh Nagar, Ambala Cantt. shall be treated either as

quashed or offences shall be treated as compounded.”

However, the appellant could not discharge his liability in terms of

the settlement and the Additional Sessions Judge passed an order

dated 11.07.2016 holding that the settlement dated 05.12.2015

stood frustrated.

4. During 2016-2020, appellant approached various courts including

this Court seeking an extension of time to pay back the amount and

meanwhile a substantial amount has been paid to the complainant.

Finally, this matter came before this Court in SLP(Crl) No.10560 of 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 207

Raj Reddy Kallem v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

2019 filed by the appellant’s wife and this court vide order dated

29.11.2019 passed an order directing the appellant’s wife to deposit

Rs.20 lacs before the trial court within three weeks as only Rs.20

lacs was the outstanding amount out of the total amount of Rs.1.55

crore at that relevant time. Appellant’s wife failed to comply with this

Court’s order dated 29.11.2019 and that SLP was dismissed vide

order dated 14.02.2020.

5. Thereafter, the appellant approached the trial court and presented

a Demand Draft dated 12.02.2020 of Rs.20 lacs in favour of the

complainant as repayment towards the remaining amount of Rs.20

lacs. In this application, the appellant prayed that criminal proceedings

pending against the appellant, initiated on the instance of the

complainant, should either be compounded or quashed. However,

considering the submission of counsel of the complainant that SLP in

which the appellant’s wife was directed to deposit the amount before

the trial court has already been dismissed, the trial court vide order

dated 09.02.2021 refused to accept the Demand Draft presented by

the appellant by noting that such an application is not maintainable.

6. This order dated 09.02.2021, where the trial court refused to accept

the DD for the remaining Rs.20 lacs, was challenged by the appellant

before the High Court through an application under Section 482

of CrPC. Vide impugned order dated 29.11.2022, the High Court

dismissed the application of appellant on the ground that the appellant

failed to deposit the remaining Rs. 20 lacs within the time stipulated

(3 weeks) in the Supreme Court order dated 29.11.2019. Now, the

appellant is before us in the present appeal.

7. On 14.03.2023, this Court passed an interim order directing the

appellant to deposit Rs.20 lacs before the trial court and sought

a compliance report from the trial court. This Court order dated

14.03.2023 reads as follows:

“The petitioner shall deposit the sum of ₹ 20 lakhs before

the trial court within two weeks. The trial court shall pass

an order recording the deposit and also indicate whether

the petitioner has duly complied with the present order.

A copy of this order shall be communicated directly to the

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambala (seized of Criminal

Case No. 78 of 2014 arising out of FIR 35 of 2014).

208 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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The trial court shall then report compliance to the Registry

to this Court.

List after three weeks.”

Pursuant to the aforesaid order of this Court, appellant submitted two

cheques of amount Rs.10 lacs each before the trial court and the trial

court forwarded a compliance report to this Court mentioning that

appellant has duly complied with the interim order dated 14.03.2023

Thereafter, on the next date of hearing on 08.08.2023, this Court

recorded the compliance of its previous order and directed the

appellant to further deposit Rs.10 lacs towards interest for delayed

payment. To make the matter clear, we would like to reproduce that

interim order of this Court, which read as follows:

“It is submitted that the petitioner has deposited ₹20 lakhs in

trial court, having regard to the delay in payment (8 years).

In the circumstances of the case, justice would demand that

the petitioner deposits a further sum of ₹10 lakhs towards

interest for the delayed payment (working out to 6% p.a. for

the last 8 years). This amount shall be deposited in Court

within four weeks from today. The demand draft which has

been deposited before the trial court shall be re-validated,

in case it has expired in the meanwhile.

List after six weeks.”

8. Trial Court vide order dated 01.09.2023 noted the compliance of

the above order of this Court. In this way, the appellant has by now

returned the entire due amount and also paid Rs.10 lacs more towards

the interest for the delayed payment. When the matter again came

up for hearing on 12.02.2024, this Court recorded that the entire

amount had been paid and, at the request of both sides, granted

time to both sides to draw a settlement. Later on, 11.03.2024, the

counsel representing the appellant stated that a settlement had

been reached between the parties whereas counsel for respondents

sought some time to verify the same, and consequently, the matter

was adjourned for today.

9. Today, we heard both sides again. The counsel of Respondent No.2

i.e., the complainant states that there is no settlement between 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 209

Raj Reddy Kallem v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

the parties and the complainant is not willing to compromise the

matter. After the passing of the previous order dated 11.03.2024,

Respondent No.2 (Complainant) has also filed an affidavit stating

that no settlement has been reached between the parties as alleged

by the appellant. On the other side, the counsel of the appellant

contended that since the appellant has paid back the entire amount

of Rs.1.55 crore and has also paid a further sum of Rs.10 lacs

towards the interest, there is no ground left for continuing criminal

proceedings against the appellant.

10. The significant fact here is that pending appeals before Additional

Sessions Judge against the appellant’s conviction under Section 138

of the NI Act, initially both the sides had entered into a settlement in

the Lok Adalat, where they agreed that if the appellant compensates

the complainant by repaying the entire amount of Rs.1.55 crore then

they would get the offences compounded or quashed. However,

the trial court by order dated 11.07.2016 declared the settlement

as frustrated on the ground that the appellant could not pay the

complainant on the deadlines stipulated in the said settlement and

the trial court might have been right in doing so because settlement

itself had a clause which read as follows:

“5. That in case of default of making payment well in time

according to dates mentioned above, the settlement shall

be frustrated with immediate effect and then appeal shall

be decided on merit.”

Be that as it may, it is also true that the complainant had accepted

the amount from the appellant later when the appellant approached

higher courts showing his willingness to pay the amount as agreed

between the parties.

11. As per section 147 of the NI Act, all offences punishable under the

Negotiable Instruments Act are compoundable. However, unlike

Section 320 of CrPC, the NI Act does not elaborate upon the manner

in which offences should be compounded. To fill up this legislative

gap, three Judges Bench of this Court in Damodar S. Prabhu v.

Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663, passed some guidelines under

Article 142 of the Constitution of India regarding compounding of

offence under Section 138 of NI Act. But most importantly, in that

case, this Court discussed the importance of compounding offence 

210 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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under Section 138 of the NI Act and also the legislative intent behind

making the dishonour of cheque a crime by enacting a special law.

This Court had observed that:

“4. …………. What must be remembered is that the

dishonour of a cheque can be best described as a

regulatory offence that has been created to serve the public

interest in ensuring the reliability of these instruments. The

impact of this offence is usually confined to the private

parties involved in commercial transactions.

5. Invariably, the provision of a strong criminal remedy has

encouraged the institution of a large number of cases that

are relatable to the offence contemplated by Section 138

of the Act. So much so, that at present a disproportionately

large number of cases involving the dishonour of cheques

is choking our criminal justice system, especially at the

level of Magistrates' Courts……..”

Further, after citing authors pointing towards compensatory

jurisprudence within the NI Act, this Court observed that:

“18. It is quite obvious that with respect to the offence

of dishonour of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect

of the remedy which should be given priority over the

punitive aspect.”

12. This Court has time and again reiterated that in cases of section

138 of NI Act, the accused must try for compounding at the initial

stages instead of the later stage, however, there is no bar to seek the

compounding of the offence at later stages of criminal proceedings

including after conviction, like the present case (See: K.M Ibrahim

v. K.P Mohammed & Anr. (2010) 1 SCC 798 and O.P Dholakia v.

State of Haryana & Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 762).

In the case at hand, initially, both sides agreed to compound

the offence at the appellate stage but the appellant could not

pay the amount within the time stipulated in the agreement

and the complainant now has shown her unwillingness towards

compounding of the offence, despite receiving the entire amount.

The appellant has paid the entire Rs.1.55 crore and further Rs.10

lacs as interest. 

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 211

Raj Reddy Kallem v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

As far the requirement of ‘consent’ in compounding of offence under

section 138 of NI Act is concerned, this Court in JIK Industries

Limited & Ors. v. Amarlal V. Jamuni & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 255

denied the suggestion of the appellant therein that ‘consent’ is not

mandatory in compounding of offences under Section 138 of NI

Act. This Court observed that:

“57. Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act reads

as follows:

“147.Offences to be compoundable.—Notwithstanding

anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this

Act shall be compoundable.”

58. Relying on the aforesaid non obstante clause in

Section 147 of the NI Act, the learned counsel for the

appellant argued that a three-Judge Bench decision of

this Court in Damodar [(2010) 5 SCC 663 : (2010) 2

SCC (Civ) 520 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1328] , held that in

view of non obstante clause in Section 147 of the NI Act,

which is a special statute, the requirement of consent of

the person compounding in Section 320 of the Code is

not required in the case of compounding of an offence

under the NI Act.

59. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention

for various reasons……”

Further this Court observed in para 89 of the said judgement that:

“Section 147 of the NI Act must be reasonably construed

to mean that as a result of the said section the offences

under the NI Act are made compoundable, but the main

principle of such compounding, namely, the consent of the

person aggrieved or the person injured or the complainant

cannot be wished away nor can the same be substituted

by virtue of Section 147 of the NI Act.”

This Court in Meters and Instruments private Ltd. And Another.

v. Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560 after discussing the series

of judgments including the JIK Industries Ltd. (supra) observed

that even in the absence of ‘consent’ court can close criminal 

212 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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proceedings against an accused in cases of section 138 of NI Act

if accused has compensated the complainant. The exact words of

this Court were as follows:

“18.3. Though compounding requires consent of both

parties, even in absence of such consent, the court, in the

interests of justice, on being satisfied that the complainant

has been duly compensated, can in its discretion close

the proceedings and discharge the accused.”

In our opinion, Kanchan Mehta (supra) nowhere contemplates

that ‘compounding’ can be done without the ‘consent’ of the parties

and even the above observation of Kanchan Mehta (supra) giving

discretion to the trial court to ‘close the proceedings and discharge

the accused’, by reading section 2581

 of CrPC, has been held to

be ‘not a good law’ by this Court in the subsequent 5 judges bench

judgement in Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section 138 of

NI Act, 1881, In re, (2021) 16 SCC 1162

.

All the same, in this particular given case even though the complainant

has been duly compensated by the accused yet the complainant

does not agree for the compounding of the offence, the courts cannot

compel the complainant to give ‘consent’ for compounding of the

matter. It is also true that mere repayment of the amount cannot

mean that the appellant is absolved from the criminal liabilities under

Section 138 of the NI Act. But this case has some peculiar facts

as well. In the present case, the appellant has already been in jail

for more than 1 year before being released on bail and has also

compensated the complainant. Further, in compliance of the order

dated 08.08.2023, the appellant has deposited an additional amount

of Rs.10 lacs. There is no purpose now to keep the proceedings

pending in appeal before the lower appellate court. Here, we would

like to point out that quashing of a case is different from compounding.

1 258. Power to stop proceedings in certain cases.—In any summons-case instituted otherwise

than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class or, with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings

at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made after

the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in

any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge.

2 Para 20.

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 213

Raj Reddy Kallem v. The State of Haryana & Anr.

This Court in JIK Industries Ltd.3

(Supra) distinguished the quashing

of case from compounding in the following words:

“Quashing of a case is different from compounding. In

quashing the court applies it but in compounding it is

primarily based on consent of the injured party. Therefore,

the two cannot be equated.”

In our opinion, if we allow the continuance of criminal appeals

pending before Additional Sessions Judge against the appellant’s

conviction then it would defeat all the efforts of this Court in the last

year where this Court had monitored this matter and ensured that

the complainant gets her money back.

13. As far as FIR case under Sections 406, 420, 120B of IPC against

the appellant is concerned, in any case we do not find any merit in

the allegations that the appellant from the very beginning had the

intention of cheating the complainant. It is a fact that the appellant

failed to procure and supply the ‘machine’ even after taking the

advance money from the complainant but there is nothing on record to

show that the appellant had any ill intention of cheating or defrauding

the complainant from the very inception. The transaction between

the parties was purely civil in nature which does not attract criminal

law in any way.

14. Even though complainant is unwilling to compound the case but,

considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the present

case which we have referred above, we are of the considered view

that these proceedings must come to an end. We, therefore, allow

this appeal and set aside the impugned order of High Court dated

29.11.2022. We also quash all the criminal proceedings qua appellant

arising out of FIR No.35 of 2014 at P.S Mahesh Nagar, Ambala pending

before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala. Since, criminal appeals

filed by present appellant against his conviction under Section 138

of the NI Act are also pending, we deem it appropriate that the said

proceedings should also be quashed. Hence, in order to do complete

justice, we exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution

of India, and hereby quash all the pending criminal appeals on the file

3 [2012] 3 SCR 114 : Para 43.

214 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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of Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala Cantt., against the appellant

in the present matter, and set aside the conviction and sentence

awarded to the appellant by the trial court.

15. We also direct the trial court to hand over the Demand Drafts totalling

the amount of Rs.30 lacs to the complainant which were deposited

in the trial court in pursuance of this Court’s orders, if not handedover till now.

Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.