Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 – s. 157 – Protection of action taken under this Act – Interim order by the High Court, criticising the prolonged stay of the search party at the residence of the respondents as unauthorized and illegal – Observation by the High Court that statutory protection contemplated u/s. 157, in the nature of a good faith clause, may not be available to the officers of the State conducting search as their conduct, “may not” justify protection – Challenged to:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1141 : 2024 INSC 277

The State of Gujarat & Anr.

v.

Paresh Nathalal Chauhan

(Civil Appeal No 4618 of 2024)

12 March 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Matter pertains to expunction of the observation by the High Court

in an interim order that statutory protection contemplated u/s. 157

of the GST Act, in the nature of a good faith clause, not available

to the officers of the State conducting search as their conduct,

“may not” justify protection.

Headnotes

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 – s. 157 – Protection

of action taken under this Act – Interim order by the High

Court, criticising the prolonged stay of the search party at

the residence of the respondents as unauthorized and illegal

– Observation by the High Court that statutory protection

contemplated u/s. 157, in the nature of a good faith clause, may

not be available to the officers of the State conducting search

as their conduct, “may not” justify protection – Challenged to:

Held: Statutory functionary is equally entitled to take a defense of

good faith – It is for the court to adjudicate and decide – High Court

was not conducting a suit, prosecution, or other legal proceeding

against a statutory functionary – High Court was conscious of

the principles governing good faith clauses and thus, couched its

displeasure and distress by stating that such officials “may not”

be protected or that it “may be difficult” to accept the contention of

good faith – Observations were in the nature of advance rulings,

because even before the initiation of a suit, prosecution or legal

proceeding, the High Court expressed a tentative opinion – If

such observations remain, they would affect the integrity and

independence of that adjudication, compromising the prosecution

and the defence equally – Observation of the High Court is

expunged since the context as well as the conclusions of the High

Court were wrong. [Paras 9-12]

1142 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Words and phrases – Good faith – Scope and ambit of:

Held: Good faith clauses in statutes, explained in the vocabulary

of the rights and duties regime, can be said to be a provision

of immunity to a statutory functionary – Such provisions are in

recognition of public interest in protecting a statutory functionary

against suits, prosecution or legal proceedings against officials

exercising statutory power– This immunity is limited – It is confined

to acts done honestly and in furtherance of achieving the statutory

purpose and objective – s. 3(22) explains ‘good faith’ as an act

done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not – Good faith

clause in a statute will be a defense – If successfully pleaded,

it not only legitimises the action but also protects the statutory

functionary from any legal action – If statutory functionary invokes

the defence of good faith, it is for the court or a judicial body to

adjudicate and determine whether the action was done in good

faith or not – Such scrutiny or examination is done only in a

proceeding against the statutory functionary, which would depend

upon the facts and circumstances of each case – General Clauses

Act,1897 – s. 3(22) – Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

– s. 157. [Paras 8, 9]

Case Law Cited

Goondla Venkateswarlu v. State of AP [2008] 12 SCR

608 : (2008) 9 SCC 613; Army Headquarters v. CBI

[2012] 5 SCR 599 : (2012) 6 SCC 228 – referred to.

List of Acts

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; General Clauses Act,

1897.

List of Keywords

Expunction; Expunction of the observation by the High Court;

Interim order; Statutory protection; Good faith clause; Statutory

functionary; Tentative opinion; Rights and duties regime; Immunity

to a statutory functionary; Defence of good faith.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.4618 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.12.2019 of the High Court

of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in SCA No. 18463 of 2019

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1143

The State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Paresh Nathalal Chauhan

Appearances for Parties

Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Adv. for the Appellants.

Rahul Narayan, Ms. Harshita Malik, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. We are called upon to expunge a portion from the interim order of

the High Court and dispose of the appeal as it is represented to us

that the respondent is not interested in initiating proceedings against

the officers in the present matter. We have accepted the request

and hereby dispose of the appeal.

3. The portion sought to be expunged is the observation of the High

Court that the good faith clause in Section 157 of the GST Act1

,

may not be available to the officers of the State as their conduct,

according to the High Court, “may not” justify protection. We have

expunged that portion of the order because the context as well as

the conclusions of the High Court are wrong. We will explain this

after indicating the relevant facts.

4. This civil appeal arises out of an interim order passed by the High

Court of Gujarat2

 in a writ petition filed by the respondent seeking

a direction for protection from arrest under section 69 read with

section 132 of the GST Act. The High Court is still examining the

writ petition, but by the interim order impugned herein, it criticised

the prolonged stay of the search party at the residence of the

respondents as unauthorized and illegal. We need not deal with

the merits of the issue as the matter is still pending before the High

Court, more so when the respondent has submitted that he is not

1 “157. Protection of action taken under this Act.—(1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings

shall lie against the President, State President, Members, officers or other employees of the Appellate

Tribunal or any other person authorised by the said Appellate Tribunal for anything which is in good faith

done or intended to be done under this Act or the rules made thereunder.

(2) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any officer appointed or authorised

under this Act for anything which is done or intended to be done in good faith under this Act or the rules

made thereunder.”

2 In Special Civil Application No. 18463 of 2019, order dated 24.12.2019.

1144 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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interested in proceeding against the officers and seeks a quietus

to the issue.

5. In fact, while issuing notice in the appeal on 16.07.2021, this Court

passed the following order. The order is indicative of the limited scrutiny

sought to be made by this Court and it is evident from the following:

“Without in any manner condoning the conduct of the

officers which has been commented upon, what persuades

us to issue notice is the fact that there are observations

to the effect that the statutory protection available to the

officers would not be a defence in case proceedings were to

be initiated against those officers by the original petitioners

or their family members and such an observation has been

made in the absence of the officers.

Issue notice limited to the aforesaid aspect returnable in

six weeks.”

6. The relevant portion in the order of the High Court that the statutory

protection should not be made available to the officers is in paragraph

28 and it is relevant for us to extract the same.

“28. Lastly the court may sound a word of caution to

the authorities exercising powers under the GST Acts.

Sub-section (2) of section 157 of the GST Acts says that

no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie

against any officer appointed or authorized under the Act

for anything which is done or intended to be done in good

faith under the Act or the rules made thereunder. An action

like the present one which is not contemplated under any

statutory provision and which infringes the fundamental

rights’ of citizens under article 21 of the Constitution of

India may not be protected under this section. An action

taken may be said to be in good faith if the officer is

otherwise so empowered and he exceeds the scope of his

authority. However, in a case like the present one where

the authorization was for search and seizure of goods

liable to confiscation, documents, books or things and the

concerned officer converted it into a search for a person

and in investigation, which is not otherwise backed by

any statutory provision, it may be difficult to accept that 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1145

The State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Paresh Nathalal Chauhan

such action was in good faith. Protection of such action

under section 157 of the GST Acts may unleash a regime

of terror insofar as the taxable persons are concerned.”

7. In the above-referred paragraph, the High Court was of the view

that the protection contemplated under section 157 of the GST Act,

which is in the nature of a good faith clause, “may not” be available

to the officers. This is the issue with which we are concerned, and

we will dwell upon it.

8. A good faith clause, explained in the vocabulary of the rights and

duties regime, can be said to be a provision of immunity to a

statutory functionary. Such provisions are in recognition of public

interest in protecting a statutory functionary against prosecution or

legal proceedings. This immunity is limited. It is confined to acts

done honestly and in furtherance of achieving the statutory purpose

and objective. Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 best

explains ‘good faith’ as an act done honestly, whether it is done

negligently or not.

3

 Good faith clauses in statutes providing immunity

against suits, prosecution or other legal proceedings against officials

exercising statutory power are therefore limited by their very nature,

that far, and no further. The scope and ambit of good faith has been

explained in a number of decisions of this Court,4

 which need not

be elaborated herein again.

9. A good faith clause in a statute will therefore be a defense. If

successfully pleaded, it not only legitimises the action but also

protects the statutory functionary from any legal action. If a statutory

functionary invokes the defence of good faith in a suit, prosecution

or other legal proceedings initiated against him, it is for the court

or a judicial body to consider, adjudicate, and determine whether

the claim that the action was done in good faith is made out or not.

Such a scrutiny, enquiry, or examination is done only in a proceeding

against the statutory functionary. This Court has held that the scrutiny

3 Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines ‘good faith’ as follows:

“3. Definitions.—In this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement

of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—

(22) a thing shall be deemed to be done in “good faith” where it is in fact done honestly, whether it

is done negligently or not;”

4 See Goondla Venkateswarlu v. State of AP, [2008] 12 SCR 608 : (2008) 9 SCC 613, paras 22 and 23;

Army Headquarters v. CBI [2012] 5 SCR 599 : (2012) 6 SCC 228, paras 69-78

1146 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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whether the act is done in good faith or not would depend upon the

facts and circumstances of each case.5

10. It is in the above referred context that we have examined the

observations made by the High Court in Paragraph 28 extracted

hereinabove. The High Court was not conducting a suit, prosecution,

or other legal proceeding against a statutory functionary. We have no

doubt that the High Court was conscious of the principles governing

good faith clauses and therefore couched its displeasure and distress

by stating that such officials “may not” be protected or that it “may be

difficult” to accept the contention of good faith. We are of the opinion

that these observations are in the nature of advance rulings. This

is because even before the initiation of a suit, prosecution or legal

proceeding, the High Court expressed a tentative opinion. If such

observations remain, they will affect the integrity and independence

of that adjudication, compromising the prosecution and the defence

equally.

11. We say no more than reiterate that a citizen of this country has a

right of accountability, for which he is entitled to initiate and adopt

such legal remedies as are available to him, and in such proceedings

the statutory functionary is equally entitled to take a defense of good

faith. It is for the court to adjudicate and decide.

12. In view of the above, we expunge paragraph 28 and dispose of the

appeal.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeal disposed of.

5 See, for example, Army Headquarters (supra), paras 76-78. 

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s. 62 – On facts and to justify withdrawal, it was submitted that in the instant case, the successful resolution applicants were prevented, and were handicapped because of lack of information or rather fraud on the part of the resolution professional – Propriety:

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1044 : 2024 INSC 321

Deccan Value Investors L.P. & Anr.

v.

Dinkar Venkatasubramanian & Anr.

(Civil Appeal No. 2801 of 2020)

06 March 2024

[Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the judgment dated 07.02.2020 passed by the National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal which upholds the order dated

27.09.2019 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal is

legally flawed and unsustainable; Whether the reasons or grounds

taken by the successful resolution applicants in the instant case

qualify and can be treated as a fraud on the part of the resolution

professional.

Headnotes

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s. 62 – On facts

and to justify withdrawal, it was submitted that in the instant

case, the successful resolution applicants were prevented,

and were handicapped because of lack of information or

rather fraud on the part of the resolution professional –

Propriety:

Held: The Supreme Court in Ebix Singapore Private Limited,

has inter alia held that the resolution applicant cannot withdraw

or modify the resolution plan, after the same is approved by the

Committee of Creditors – It is immaterial that post approval by

the Committee of Creditors, there is consideration under Section

31(1) of the Code by the adjudicating authority for final approval

– The judgment in Ebix Singapore Private Limited elaborates

and sets out several reasons why the resolution applicant

cannot be permitted to withdraw or modify the resolution plan

after approval by the Committee of Creditors, and before an

order under Section 31(1) of the Code is passed – These

reasons include delay, consequences of the delay and the

uncertainty and complexities that would arise in the Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Process, which are unacceptable and not

contemplated in law – Even the terms of the resolution plan,

will not permit withdrawal or modification in the absence of a 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1045

Deccan Value Investors L.P. & Anr. v.

Dinkar Venkatasubramanian & Anr.

statutory provision, that allow withdrawal or amendment in the

resolution plan after approval by the Committee of Creditors

– The reasons or grounds taken by the successful resolution

applicants in the instant case do not qualify and cannot be

treated as a fraud on the part of the resolution professional –

This is not a case where misinformation or wrong information

was given to the resolution applicants – The impugned judgment

dated 07.02.2020 passed by the NCLAT, upholding the order

passed by the NCLT, dated 27.09.2019 is set aside – The

resolution plan, as submitted by the successful resolution

applicants is approved. [Paras 4, 5, 8, 17]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Resolution Plan –

Preparation of:

Held: Resolution plans are not prepared and submitted by lay

persons – They are submitted after the financial statements and

data are examined by domain and financial experts, who scan,

appraise evaluate the material as available for its usefulness,

with caution and scepticism – Inadequacies and paltriness of

data are accounted and chronicled for valuations and the risk

involved – It is rather strange to argue that the superspecialists

and financial experts were gullible and misunderstood the details,

figures or data – The assumption is that the resolution applicant

would submit the revival/resolution plan specifying the monetary

amount and other obligations, after in-depth analysis of the fiscal

and commercial viability of the corporate debtor – Pointing out the

ambiguities or lack of specific details or data, post acceptance

of the resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors, should

be rejected, except in an egregious case were data and facts

are fudged or concealed – Absence or ambiguity of details and

particulars should put the parties to caution, and it is for them to

ascertain details, and exercise discretion to submit or not submit

resolution plan. [Para 15]

Case Law Cited

Ebix Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors

of Educomp Solutions Limited and Another [2021] 14

SCR 321 : (2022) 2 SCC 401 – relied on.

List of Acts

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

1046 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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List of Keywords

Resolution Plan; Withdrawal or modification of resolution

plan; Misinformation or wrong information; Financial experts;

Inadequacies and paltriness of data; Revival/resolution plan;

Principle of “clean slate”; Fiscal and commercial viability.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2801 of 2020

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.02.2020 of the National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Company Appeal

(AT) (Insolvency) No. 1281 of 2019

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 2642 and 2432 of 2020

Appearances for Parties

Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Guru Krishna Kumar, Shyam Divan, Sr. Advs.,

Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, Rohan Dakshni, Ms. Nikita Mishra,

Himanshu Satija, Ms. Geetika Sharma, Nidhi Ram Sharma, Ms.

Aakansha Kaul, E. C. Agrawala, S. S. Shroff, Ms. Misha, Anoop

Rawat, Siddhant Kant, Saurav Panda, Nikhil Mathur, Prithviraj

Oberoi, Ms. Anannya Ghosh, Brian Henry Moses, Rohan Talwar,

Ms. Nidhi Ram Shrama, Ms. Nidhi Ram Sharma, Advs. for the

appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1. This order would decide the cross-appeals under Section 62 of

the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20161

 filed by the successful

resolution applicants – Deccan Value Investors L.P. and DVI PE

(Mauritius) Ltd.; the Committee of Creditors of Metalyst Forgings

Limited; and Dinkar Venkatasubramanian - the Resolution Professional

of Metalyst Forgings Limited.

2. The company in question, the corporate debtor, is Metalyst Forgings

Ltd.

1 “the Code” for short 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1047

Deccan Value Investors L.P. & Anr. v.

Dinkar Venkatasubramanian & Anr.

3. In our opinion, the impugned judgment dated 07.02.2020 passed

by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal2, New Delhi,

which upholds the order dated 27.09.2019 passed by the National

Company Law Tribunal3

, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai, is legally flawed

and unsustainable in view of the judgment of this Court in “Ebix

Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors of Educomp

Solutions Limited and Another”4

.

4. This Court in Ebix Singapore Private Limited (supra), has inter alia

held that the resolution applicant cannot withdraw or modify the

resolution plan, after the same is approved by the Committee of

Creditors. It is immaterial that post approval by the Committee of

Creditors, there is consideration under Section 31(1) of the Code

by the adjudicating authority for final approval.

5. The judgment in Ebix Singapore Private Limited (supra) elaborates

and sets out several reasons why the resolution applicant cannot be

permitted to withdraw or modify the resolution plan after approval by

the Committee of Creditors, and before an order under Section 31(1)

of the Code is passed. These reasons include delay, consequences

of the delay and the uncertainty and complexities that would arise in

the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, which are unacceptable

and not contemplated in law. Even the terms of the resolution plan,

will not permit withdrawal or modification in the absence of a statutory

provision, that allow withdrawal or amendment in the resolution plan

after approval by the Committee of Creditors. The resolution plan

approved by the Committee of Creditors is a creature of the Code

and not a pure contract between two consenting parties.

6. During the course of arguments, our attention was drawn to the proviso

to Section 31(1) of the Code, which postulates that the adjudicating

authority, before passing an order for approval of the resolution

plan, must satisfy itself that the resolution plan has provisions for

its effective implementation. Ebix Singapore Private Limited (supra)

did examine this provision but rejected the argument on several

grounds, including absence of legislative mandate to direct unwilling

Committee of Creditors to re-negotiate or agree to withdrawal of the

2 “NCLAT” for short

3 “NCLT” or “adjudicating authority”, for short

4 [2021] 14 SCR 321 : (2022) 2 SCC 401

1048 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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resolution plan at the behest of the resolution applicant. The effect

of approval by the adjudicating authority under Section 31(1) of the

Code makes the resolution plan binding on all stakeholders, even

those who are not members of the Committee of Creditors. The

scrutiny by the adjudicating authority for grant of approval in terms

of Section 31(1), read with other provisions of the Code, is limited

and restricted. It does not allow or permit the resolution applicant

to unilaterally amend/modify, or withdraw the resolution plan post

approval by the Committee of Creditors.

7. On facts and to justify the withdrawal, it was submitted that in the

present case, the successful resolution applicants were prevented,

and were handicapped because of lack of information or rather

fraud on the part of the resolution professional. Four aspects were

highlighted: -

(a) It was concealed that 70 per cent of the revenue

of the corporate debtor came from trading, and not

from manufacturing.

(b) The Mott Macdonald Report dated 30.09.2016 is

factually incorrect and flawed.

(c) Misleading and false statement was made with regard

to the uninstalled imported components of 12,500

M.T. Press, which were stored in the land of a sister

concern – Clover Forging and Machining Pvt. Ltd.

(d) The successful resolution applicants were misled in

view of the non-reliability of financial data. There was

ongoing financial/forensic audit.

8. The aforesaid reasons or grounds taken by the successful resolution

applicants do not qualify and cannot be treated as a fraud on the part

of the resolution professional. This is not a case where misinformation

or wrong information was given to the resolution applicants.

9. We have been taken through the information memorandum, as well

as, the data in the virtual data room, access to which was granted

to the prospective resolution applicant(s), before they had submitted

their resolution plan(s).

10. We have also been taken through the documents, which would show

the manufacturing output, as well as the capacity of realisation of the 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1049

Deccan Value Investors L.P. & Anr. v.

Dinkar Venkatasubramanian & Anr.

four units of the corporate debtor. The excise returns, as well as the

VAT returns etc., were available in the virtual data room.

11. The Mott Macdonald Report was submitted by the said consultants in

September, 2016 at the behest of the erstwhile promoters/directors of

the corporate debtor. The report itself is hedged with conditions and

disclaimers. Value and worth of the report, the data and projections

were for the prospective resolution applicants to evaluate.

12. On the aspect of 12,500 M.T. Press, it was clearly stated and noted

that the said Press after import, was stored in the shed belonging

to Clover Forging and Machining Pvt. Ltd.

13. Submission regarding the non-availability of Floor Space Index (FSI)

at the plant in Aurangabad, was made with reference to the statement

made by an employee of the corporate debtor. We are not inclined

to accept this version of the successful resolution applicant. The

corporate debtor has four units, three units in Maharashtra and one

unit in Himachal Pradesh. False projection was not made.

14. The resolution plan submitted by the successful resolution applicants

refers to the transaction audits being undertaken and acknowledges

appropriation of the proceeds, if any available, to the resolution

professional on the recoveries being made for prior period. The

principle of “clean slate” is well established and known.

15. Resolution plans are not prepared and submitted by lay persons.

They are submitted after the financial statements and data are

examined by domain and financial experts, who scan, appraise

evaluate the material as available for its usefulness, with caution and

scepticism. Inadequacies and paltriness of data are accounted and

chronicled for valuations and the risk involved. It is rather strange

to argue that the superspecialists and financial experts were gullible

and misunderstood the details, figures or data. The assumption is

that the resolution applicant would submit the revival/resolution plan

specifying the monetary amount and other obligations, after in-depth

analysis of the fiscal and commercial viability of the corporate debtor.

Pointing out the ambiguities or lack of specific details or data, post

acceptance of the resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors,

should be rejected, except in an egregious case were data and

facts are fudged or concealed. Absence or ambiguity of details and

particulars should put the parties to caution, and it is for them to 

1050 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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ascertain details, and exercise discretion to submit or not submit

resolution plan.

16. Records of corporate debtor, who are in financial distress, may

suffer from data asymmetry, debatable or even wrong data. Thus,

the provision for transactional audit etc, but this takes time and is

not necessary before information memorandum or virtual data room

is set up. Financial experts being aware, do tread with caution.

Information memorandum is not to be tested applying “the true picture

of risk” obligation, albeit as observed by the NCLAT the resolution

professional’s obligation to provide information has to be understood

on “best effort” basis.

17. In view of the aforesaid position, we set aside the impugned judgment

dated 07.02.2020 passed by the NCLAT, upholding the order passed

by the NCLT, dated 27.09.2019. In other words, we accept the present

appeals and it is held that the resolution plan, as submitted by the

successful resolution applicants – Deccan Value Investors L.P. and

DVI PE (Mauritius) Ltd., is approved.

18. To cut short the delay, parties are directed to appear before the NCLT

on 09.04.2024, when further proceedings will take place.

19. Recording the aforesaid, the appeals are allowed in the above terms.

20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeals allowed.

Constitution of India – Article 142, 226 – Appellant verbally and physically assaulted in police custody – Appellant illegally detained for 4 hours despite being granted bail – Subdivisional Police Officer’s inquiry report found Respondent No. 2 responsible – Special Inspector General of Police imposed punishment of “strict warning” in departmental proceedings – High Court partly allowed Appellant’s writ petition but declined to initiate criminal proceedings – Respondent No. 2 was directed to pay Rs. 75,000/- from his own pocket – Respondent No. 2 paid Rs. 1,75,000/- plus Rs. 25000/- – Respondent No.2 superannuated.

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1014 : 2024 INSC 232

Somnath

v.

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1717 of 2024)

18 March 2024

[Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether criminal proceedings should be initiated against a police

officer who has committed excesses on individual in police custody?

Headnotes

Constitution of India – Article 142, 226 – Appellant verbally

and physically assaulted in police custody – Appellant

illegally detained for 4 hours despite being granted bail – Subdivisional Police Officer’s inquiry report found Respondent

No. 2 responsible – Special Inspector General of Police

imposed punishment of “strict warning” in departmental

proceedings – High Court partly allowed Appellant’s writ

petition but declined to initiate criminal proceedings –

Respondent No. 2 was directed to pay Rs. 75,000/- from his

own pocket – Respondent No. 2 paid Rs. 1,75,000/- plus Rs.

25000/- – Respondent No.2 superannuated.

Held: Respondent No. 2 committed excesses against Appellant -

Supreme Court refrained from initiating criminal proceedings in

the peculiar facts – Under Article 226, High Court has power to

award compensation – Zero tolerance approach to be taken by

courts – Direction to police forces and similar agencies to adhere

to all guidelines regarding arrest and police custody. [Paras 21-24]

Case Law Cited

Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat

[1991] 3 SCR 936 : (1991) 4 SCC 406; Sunil Gupta v.

State of Madhya Pradesh [1990] 2 SCR 871 : (1990) 3

SCC 119; Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration

[1980] 3 SCR 855 : (1980) 3 SCC 526; Bhim Singh,

MLA v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1985) 4 SCC

677; D K Basu v. State of West Bengal [1996] Supp. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1015

Somnath v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

10 SCR 284 : (1997) 1 SCC 416; Sube Singh v. State

of Haryana [2006] 2 SCR 67 : (2006) 3 SCC 178 –

relied on.

Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [1993] 2 SCR 581 :

(1993) 2 SCC 746 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Maharashtra Police Act, 1951

List of Keywords

Individual dignity; Personal liberty; Excess use of force; Safeguards,

arrest; Remand; Police custody; Treatment of detenu; Strict warning;

Departmental inquiry; Criminal proceedings; Compensation,

superannuated; Belated prosecution; Police officer; Colour of

official duty; Commit excess; High-handed action.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1717

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2018 of the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in CRWP No.215 of 2017

Appearances for Parties

Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, Nishant Sharma, Tushar D.bhelkar,

Akshay Jagtap, Advs. for the Appellant.

Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla,

Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Atul Babasaheb Dakh, Bitu Kumar

Singh, Praveen Pandey, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Leave granted.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. The present appeal is directed against the Final Judgment and

Order dated 08.10.2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned 

1016 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Judgment”) passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,

Bench at Aurangabad (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”)

in Criminal Writ Petition No.215 of 2017 by which the writ petition

filed by the appellant was partly allowed and the respondent no.2

was directed to pay a sum of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five

Thousand only) from his own pocket to the appellant.

BRIEF FACTS:

4. A First Information Report1

 bearing Crime No.1-117 of 2015 for an

offence punishable under Section 3792

 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”) was filed by one Mr. Madhukar

Vikram Gayake on 14.06.2015 with Paithan Police Station, Taluka

Paithan, District Aurangabad, State of Maharashtra (hereinafter

referred to as the “PS”) alleging that on 12.06.2015 the complainant

had come to attend the last rites of his brother-in-law and was standing

in a queue in the holy Nath Temple when some unknown persons

took away Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand only), which he was

carrying in his pocket, which he realized only after coming out from

the temple. The appellant was arrested at 08:30PM in connection

with the said crime on 14.06.2015 on the basis of CCTV3

 footage

showing the involvement of the appellant in the said crime.

5. On 15.06.2015, the appellant was produced before the Magistrate

at 4PM and the investigating agency sought police remand on the

ground that recovery had been made from the appellant. The request

was granted by the Magistrate and he was remanded to police

custody till 18.06.2015.

6. On 17.06.2015, the investigating agency prepared a memorandum

under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 showing recovery

of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand) from the house of the

appellant.

7. On 18.06.2015, the investigating agency produced the appellant

before the Magistrate praying for further extension of police custody for

two days and the same was granted till 20.06.2015. On 19.06.2015,

1 FIR.

2 ‘379. Punishment for theft.—Whoever commits theft shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.’

3 Closed-Circuit Television.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1017

Somnath v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

the appellant was allegedly taken out of the lock-up by the respondent

no.2, the then officiating Inspector of PS, in handcuffs and paraded

half-naked with garland of footwear around his neck and is said

to have been verbally abused with reference to his caste as also

physically assaulted by the respondent no.2.

8. On 20.06.2015, the investigating agency did not ask for any further

extension of police remand and thus the appellant was remanded to

judicial custody till 04.07.2015. On the same day, the appellant filed

an application for bail in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,

Paithan, which was allowed on the condition that he would visit Police

Station on every alternate day between 1000hrs to 1300hrs till filing

of the Final Report. The appellant was not released pursuant to the

order due to the respondent no.2 not allowing him to be released

and instead had taken the appellant to the PS.

9. Mr. Rahul Raju Kamble, relative of the appellant filed application

before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Paithan, narrating the

chain of events and praying for directions to release the appellant

and, inter alia, praying for issuance of Show-Cause Notice to the

concerned police officer. Thereon, the Magistrate had directed

the prosecution to file its reply. However, the appellant was finally

released on 20.06.2015.

10. The Superintendent of Police, Aurangabad (Rural), on complaint made

by the appellant and others, directed the Sub Divisional Police Officer,

Paithan on 07.07.2015 to initiate inquiry on the entire issue and submit

report. The Sub Divisional Police Officer, Paithan conducted inquiry

relating to the complaint made against the respondent no.2, directing

both the appellant and respondent no.2 and other Police officers/

constables to appear and submit their statements. In his report dated

11.09.2015, it was recorded that on 19.06.2015 the appellant was

taken out from the lock-up by the respondent no.2 and paraded on

the streets of the city of Paithan and was also physically assaulted

during the said procession and held respondent no.2 responsible for

this. It further narrated that despite grant of bail to the appellant he

was illegally detained by respondent no.2 for four hours.

11. On 08.10.2015 and 09.10.2015, the sister of the appellant

complained to various authorities including the Superintendent of

Police, Aurangabad (Rural) and the President [read Chairperson],

National Human Rights Commission (hereinafter referred to as 

1018 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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the “Commission”) seeking initiation of departmental enquiry and

criminal prosecution under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to

as the “SC/ST Act”).

12. On 25.12.2015, the appellant was charge-sheeted in connection

with another FIR bearing Crime No.1-192/2015 punishable under

Section 3944

, IPC and he was sought to be declared a Proclaimed

Offender despite him being available in town and co-operating with

the investigating agency. However, the appellant was arrested on

24.05.2016 and subsequently released on bail.

13. The Special Inspector General of Police, Aurangabad Range,

Aurangabad, after perusing the Inquiry Report of the Sub Divisional

Police Officer dated 11.09.2015 and not finding the explanation of

respondent no.2 to be satisfactory, imposed punishment of “strict

warning”.

14. The appellant on 02.02.2017, approached the High Court by way

of filing Writ Petition, inter alia, praying for initiation of departmental

inquiry and criminal proceedings against respondent no.2 and also

sought compensation. The writ petition was partly allowed by the

Impugned Judgment by awarding Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five

Thousand only) to be payable to the appellant by respondent no.2

from his own pocket but declining to give any direction for initiating

criminal action under the SC/ST Act.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:

15. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it would be a

travesty of justice if for such blatant violation of the personal liberty

of the appellant and abuse of authority, the respondent no.2 is let

off with just “strict warning” without any real effective punishment.

It was submitted that the conduct of the respondent no.2 besides

being unprovoked was also in the teeth of the judgments of this

Court in D K Basu v State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416

and Sube Singh v State of Haryana, (2006) 3 SCC 178, which

have laid down the guidelines of how a detenu has to be treated

4 ‘394. Voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery.—If any person, in committing or in attempting

to commit robbery, voluntarily causes hurt, such person, and any other person jointly concerned in

committing or attempting to commit such robbery, shall be punished with 1

[imprisonment for life], or with

rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.’

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1019

Somnath v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

when in custody.

16. Learned counsel submitted that one of the grounds for not directing

criminal prosecution of respondent no.2 by the High Court was that

Section 1615

, Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred

to as the “Police Act”) gives protection to a police officer from any

belated prosecution, the period being six months. It was submitted

the same should not be so enforced particularly in the facts of the

present case where the appellant belongs to a weaker section and

is without the wherewithal to pursue prosecution of a police officer.

It was submitted that respondent no.2 has in fact been let off without

any punishment as “strict warning” does not translate into any effective

punishment which is also one of the minimum/minor punishments

contemplated, whereas the conduct of the respondent no.2 required

inflicting major punishment upon him.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE STATE:

17. Learned counsel for the State submitted that it has initiated

departmental proceeding against respondent no.2 and punishment

has also been awarded to him pursuant thereto.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2:

18. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 submitted that the incident is

totally without any truth and only to browbeat, and to demoralise the

police, the appellant, who is habitual offender, has lodged a false

5 ‘161. Suits or prosecutions in respect of acts done under colour of duty as aforesaid not to be entertained

or to be dismissed if not instituted within the prescribed period.—(1) In any case of alleged offence

by the Revenue Commissioner, the Commissioner, a Magistrate, Police officer or other person, or of a

wrong alleged to have been done by such Revenue Commissioner, Commissioner, Magistrate, Police

officer or other person, by any act done under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as

aforesaid, or wherein, it shall appear to the Court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was

of the character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be entertained, or shall be dismissed, if

instituted, more than six months after the date of the act complained of:

Provided that, any such prosecution against a Police Officer may be entertained by the Court, if instituted

with the previous sanction of the State Government within two years from the date of the offence.

(2) In suits as Aforesaid one month’s notice of suit to be given with sufficient description of wrong

complained of. In the case of an intended suit on account of such a wrong as aforesaid, the person

intending to sue shall be bound to give to the alleged wrong-doer one month’s notice at least of the

intended suit with sufficient description of the wrong complained of, failing which such suit shall be

dismissed.

(3) Plaint to set forth service of notice and tender of amends. The plaint shall set forth that a notice art

aforesaid has been served on the defendant and the date of such service, and shall state whether any,

and if any what tender of amends has been made by the defendant. A copy of the mid notice shall be

annexed to the plaint endorsed or accompanied with a declaration by the plaintiff of the time and manner

of service thereof.’

1020 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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complaint, that too, much after the time prescribed under the Police

Act. It was further submitted that respondent no.2 has already paid

Rs.1,75,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Seventy Five Thousand only) to the

appellant i.e., Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) beyond what

was directed by the High Court and in terms of the order passed by

this Court on 07.07.20236

. It was submitted that the appellant having

been found committing the offence for which his prosecution began,

from the CCTV footage, cannot claim innocence.

19. Learned counsel submitted that on 20.06.2015 at 3PM when he

was produced before the Magistrate, the appellant did not allege

any ill-treatment much less spoke about him having been subjected

to parade in handcuffs and in a half-naked state with a garland of

footwear around his neck. Even when relatives of the appellant

had filed a complaint before the Magistrate on 20.06.2015, due to

delay in release of the appellant despite grant of bail, there was no

reference of any alleged instance of the appellant being paraded

half-naked on 19.06.2015. Further, the report of the Sub Divisional

Police Officer does not refer to the appellant having been paraded

half-naked with a garland of shoes. It was submitted that due to

the strained relationship of the respondent no.2 with the then Sub

Divisional Police Officer, who had submitted the Report, adverse

findings were recorded against the respondent no.2. Thus, it was

submitted that the Special Inspector General of Police found the

clarification submitted by the respondent no.2 to be satisfactory and

that was the reason why a punishment of only “strict warning” was

awarded. He submitted that pursuant to FIR bearing Crime No.1-

192 of 2015, the appellant could not be traced and was declared

a proclaimed offender under Section 82(4) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 on 25.12.2015. It was further contended that only on

03.02.2017, the appellant had filed the underlying Writ Petition before

the High Court and for the first time agitating that the respondent

6 ‘Learned counsel for respondent No.2, on instructions, states that he will further compensate the

petitioner by an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) within a period of four weeks from

today.

Learned counsel for the petitioner may provide the bank details of the petitioner to the learned counsel

for respondent No.2 within a week from today.

List the matter again on 22.08.2023.

If by the said date, the said amount is paid to the petitioner and the counsel for the parties make a

statement, the matter may be considered for closure on the next date. ’

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1021

Somnath v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

no.2 paraded him half-naked with a garland of shoes.

20. Learned counsel submitted that in terms of Section 161 of the Police

Act, prosecution against a police officer acting under colour of official

duty after six months of the alleged act cannot be entertained and

rightly the High Court has declined to direct any action on such

prosecution.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

21. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court

finds that there is enough material to indicate that respondent no.2

did commit excesses against the appellant, as the same has also

been found in an enquiry by the Commission as also relied upon by

the High Court and such finding has not been varied or interfered

with. Thus, the Court has no hesitation in strongly denouncing such

high-handed action by the respondent no.2, who being in a position

of power, totally abused his official position. However, in view of the

fact that the respondent no.2 has superannuated and during the

course of the present proceedings Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh

only), apart from what was ordered by the High Court, has also been

paid by the respondent no.2 from his own pocket to the appellant,

which the appellant accepted, the Court finds that the matter now

requires to be finally given a quietus. Be it noted, the appellant has

additionally received Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand

only) as ordered by the Commission. We only add that the power of

the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to award

compensation is undoubtable, reference whereof can be made to

Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746.

22. Accordingly, the appeal stands disposed of by upholding the Impugned

Judgment, with the modification that the respondent no.2 is held liable

to pay a further sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) to

the appellant. However, as the same stands already complied with,

no further steps are required to be taken by the respondent no.2.

23. Before parting, the Court would indicate that in such matters the

Courts need to take a very strict view. A zero-tolerance approach

towards such high-handed acts needs to be adopted as such acts,

committed by persons in power against an ordinary citizen, who is in

a non-bargaining position, bring shame to the entire justice delivery

system. As such, we were considering resorting to Article 142 of the 

1022 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Constitution of India to direct initiation of criminal proceedings, but

only because of the fact that respondent no.2 has retired and has

already paid a sum of Rs.1,75,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Seventy Five

Thousand)[Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand) as per the

Impugned Judgment and Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) as per

this Court’s order dated 07.07.2023] in total to the appellant, who

has also been paid Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) as

per the Commission’s order, we refrain from so directing, in these

peculiar facts and circumstances. We hold back noting that justice

ought to be tempered with mercy.

POST-SCRIPT:

24. It is sad that even today, this Court is forced to restate the principles

and directions in D K Basu (supra). Before D K Basu (supra), this

Court had expressed its concern as to how best to safeguard the

dignity of the individual and balance the same with interests of the

State or investigative agency in Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi

Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 526. In Bhim Singh, MLA v State

of Jammu and Kashmir, (1985) 4 SCC 677, this Court noted that

police officers are to exhibit greatest regard for personal liberty of

citizens and restated the sentiment in Sunil Gupta v State of Madhya

Pradesh, (1990) 3 SCC 119. The scenario in Delhi Judicial Service

Association v State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406 prompted this

Court to come down heavily on excess use of force by the police. As

such, there will be a general direction to the police forces in all States

and Union Territories as also all agencies endowed with the power

of arrest and custody to scrupulously adhere to all Constitutional

and statutory safeguards and the additional guidelines laid down

by this Court when a person is arrested by them and/or remanded

to their custody.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Aishani Narain, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal disposed of.

(Verified by: Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv.)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1986 – Compensation – Determination of – Calculation of multiplier, on basis of the age of the deceased or the age of the dependents: Held: It is the age of the deceased which ought to be taken into consideration and not the age of the dependents for arriving at the multiplier – High Court erred in returning findings to the effect that the age of dependents of the deceased ought to be the relevant consideration for arriving at the choice of the multiplier. [Para 5]

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1009 : 2024 INSC 251

Haresh Shantilal Avlani & Anr.

v.

The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

(Civil Appeal No. 4029-4030 of 2024)

12 March 2024

[Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Matter pertains to fixing of the age of the deceased for applying a

multiplier for the purposes of computing the compensation payable

to the claimants.

Headnotes

Motor Vehicles Act, 1986 – Compensation – Determination of –

Calculation of multiplier, on basis of the age of the deceased

or the age of the dependents:

Held: It is the age of the deceased which ought to be taken into

consideration and not the age of the dependents for arriving at the

multiplier – High Court erred in returning findings to the effect that

the age of dependents of the deceased ought to be the relevant

consideration for arriving at the choice of the multiplier. [Para 5]

Case Law Cited

Sube Singh and Another v. Shyam Singh (Dead) and

Others [2018] 1 SCR 636 : (2018) 3 SCC 18; Munna

Lal Jain and Another v. Vipin Kumar Sharma and Others

[2015] 7 SCR 207 : (2015) 6 SCC 347; Reshma Kumari

and Others v. Madan Mohan and Another [2013] 2 SCR

706 : (2013) 9 SCC 65; Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Others

v. DTC and Another [2009] 5 SCR 1098 : (2009) 6

SCC 121; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi

and Other [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680;

Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Limited

v. Mandala Yadagari Goud and Others [2019] 6 SCR

941 : (2019) 5 SCC 554 – relied on.

List of Keywords

Compensation; Multiplier; Age of the deceased; Age of the

dependents.

1010 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4029-4030 of

2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2016 and 25.10.2016

of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in FAN No. 756 of 2016

With

Civil Appeal No. 4031 of 2024

Appearances for Parties

Shantanu M. Adkar, Pravin Satale, Rishabh Jain, Rajiv Shankar

Dvivedi, S K Sarkar, Shivaji M. Jadhav, Ms. Apurva, Adarsh Kumar

Pandey, Vignesh Singh, Dipesh Singhal, M/S. S.M. Jadhav and

Company, Advs. for the Appellants.

Anshum Jain, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ranjan Kumar Pandey,

K.K. Bhat, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1. Leave granted.

2. The issue raised in these appeals relates to fixing of the age of the

deceased for applying a multiplier for the purposes of computing the

compensation payable to the claimants.

3. The appellants (parents of the deceased, Kartik Avlani) in Civil

Appeals @ Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.13093

of 2017 are aggrieved by the judgement dated 19th October, 2016,

passed by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court,

whereby the appeal filed by the respondent-Insurance Company

challenging its liability to pay compensation was partly allowed and

the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,

Mumbai1

, vide order dated 10th July, 2015, estimated as ₹20,70,000/-

(Rupees Twenty Lakhs Seventy Thousand) with interest @ 7.5%

per annum from the date of filing of the petition, till realization, was

slashed to ₹12,82,500/- (Rupees Twelve Lakhs Eighty Two Thousand

1 For short the ‘MACT’

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1011

Haresh Shantilal Avlani & Anr. v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

and Five Hundred) on accepting the plea taken by the respondent

– Insurance Company that in the case of an unmarried person, it is

not the age of the deceased, but the age of the parents, who are

the claimants, that should be relevant. In the instant case, the age

of the deceased was 23 years at the time of the accident and it was

proved that he was working as a Manager in an investment firm.

4. In Civil Appeal @ Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.

13072 of 2017, the age of the deceased (Nilesh Arun Patil) was 28

years. The claimants are the parents and brothers of the deceased.

The MACT assessed the income of the deceased as ₹4,000/- (Rupees

Four Thousand) per month and applied a multiplier of 17. After

extending the benefit of future prospects and loss of dependency,

the compensation awarded by the MACT was fixed at ₹6,37,000/-

(Rupees Six Lakhs Thirty Seven Thousand) with interest @ 7.5 %

from the date of filing of the claim petition till realisation. In an appeal

preferred by the appellants before the High Court, vide impugned

judgement dated 10th January, 2017, the High Court reassessed the

income of the deceased and enhanced it to ₹12,194/- (Rupees Twelve

Thousand One Hundred and Ninety Four) per month. However, the

High Court interfered with the multiplier applied by the MACT and

instead of applying the multiplier of 17, reduced it to 13. The reason

for the High Court to have changed the multiplier from 17 to 13

was that the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants being his

parents, the choice of multiplier had to be assessed on the basis of

the age of the parents and not the age of the deceased. As a result,

the amount awarded by the High Court was ₹14,29,000/- (Rupees

Fourteen Lakhs Twenty Nine Thousand) with interest @ 7.5 % per

annum.

5. We may note that the issue as to whether the age of the deceased

that ought to be taken into consideration for calculation of the

estimated compensation and not the age of the dependents, is no

longer res integra. There are series of decisions of this Court in Sube

Singh and Another v. Shyam Singh (Dead) and Others2

, Munna

Lal Jain and Another v. Vipin Kumar Sharma and Others3

 and

2 [2018] 1 SCR 636 : (2018) 3 SCC 18

3 [2015] 7 SCR 207 : (2015) 6 SCC 347

1012 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Reshma Kumari and Others v. Madan Mohan and Another4

, where

it has been held that it is the age of the deceased and not the age

of the parents that would be the clinching factor for calculating the

multiplier to be applied for estimating the compensation payable to

the claimants. The aforesaid decisions were followed Sarla Verma

(Smt.) and Others v. DTC and Another5

. The Constitution Bench

in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi and

Other6 has also been referred to in Sube Singh (supra) on the

aspect of calculation of the multiplier applicable in such a case. A

recent decision in the case of Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance

Company Limited Vs. Mandala Yadagari Goud and Others7

 has

reiterated the same position as observed in the cases cited above.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that it is the age of the deceased

which ought to be taken into consideration and not the age of the

dependents for arriving at the multiplier and the High Court has erred

in returning findings to the effect that the age of dependents of the

deceased ought to be the relevant consideration for arriving at the

choice of the multiplier.

6. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 19th October, 2016, in Civil

Appeal @ Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.13093 of

2017, in respect of FAO No. 756 of 2016 is quashed and set aside

and the judgement dated 10th July, 2015, passed by the learned

MACT fixing the multiplier of 18 in the instant case is restored. The

respondent–Insurance Company is directed to pay the balance

amount along with up-to-date interest after adjusting the amounts

already paid to the appellants. The said amount shall be deposited

with the MACT within six weeks.

7. Similarly, the impugned judgment dated 10th January, 2017 in Civil

Appeal @ Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.13072 of

2017 in respect of First Appeal No. 50 of 2016 is modified to the

extent that the multiplier shall be applied as assessed by the MACT

as 17. The MACT shall recalculate the amount payable by the

respondent no.2-Insurance Company to the appellants by replacing

4 [2013] 2 SCR 706 : (2013) 9 SCC 65

5 [2009] 5 SCR 1098 : (2009) 6 SCC 121

6 [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680

7 [2019] 6 S.C.R. 941 : (2019) 5 SCC 554

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1013

Haresh Shantilal Avlani & Anr. v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

the multiplier from 13 to 17. After adjusting the amount already paid

by the respondents the balance amount shall be deposited by the

respondent no.2-Insurance Company within six weeks.

8. The appeals are allowed and disposed of on the above terms.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeals disposed of.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Quashing of FIR – FIR against the accused-employee by the complainant for defrauding the State-employer – Allegations with reference to withdrawal of salary for the period the accused-employee was on unauthorized foreign trips and also withdrawal of salary by producing false medical certificates – FIR quashed by the High Court on basis of a “compromise” between the complainant and the accused – Sustainability:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1004 : 2024 INSC 263

State of Haryana

v.

Dr. Ritu Singh and Another

(Criminal Appeal No. 1791 of 2024)

22 March 2024

[Sudhanshu Dhulia and Rajesh Bindal,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

FIR against the accused-employee by the complainant, for

defrauding the State-employer, if can be quashed on basis of a

“compromise” between the complainant and the accused.

Headnotes

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Quashing of FIR

– FIR against the accused-employee by the complainant for

defrauding the State-employer – Allegations with reference

to withdrawal of salary for the period the accused-employee

was on unauthorized foreign trips and also withdrawal of

salary by producing false medical certificates – FIR quashed

by the High Court on basis of a “compromise” between the

complainant and the accused – Sustainability:

Held: Order not legally sustainable – Allegations against the

accused are of defrauding the State – Such a matter cannot

be settled on the basis of a “compromise” between two private

individuals – Perusal of the contents of the FIR would show that

it was not the complainant who was the victim with reference to

the allegations made in the complaint to the police, to enable the

High Court to exercise the power to quash the FIR on the basis of

compromise – When the FIR was quashed the matter was still being

investigated by the police – After setting the criminal machinery into

motion, which had relevance with the fraud allegedly committed

by the employee with her employer, the complainant did not have

any locus to compromise the matter with the accused when the

FIR had been registered – Even the High Court failed to consider

that aspect of the matter – Also the reply filed by the State to the

quashing petition was not referred to – Submission that in the

departmental proceedings initiated on the same ground, employee

has already been exonerated is merely to be noticed – Thus,

impugned order passed by the High Court set aside. [Paras 7-9]

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1005

State of Haryana v. Dr. Ritu Singh and Another

List of Acts

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords

FIR; Quashing of FIR; Compromise between two private individuals;

Defrauding the State.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1791

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.02.2019 of the High Court

of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRMM No. 51493 of 2018

Appearances for Parties

Deepak Thukral, A.A.G., Gautam Sharma, Dr. Monika Gusain, Advs.

for the Appellant.

Aayush Agarwala, M/S. PBA Legal, Nitin Saluja, Ms. Pranya Madan,

Nischal Tripathi, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Rajesh Bindal, J.

1. The State has filed the present appeal impugning the order1

 passed

by the High Court2

 whereby the petition3

 filed by the respondent

no.1 seeking quashing of the FIR was allowed and the same was

quashed on the basis of the compromise entered into between the

complainant-respondent no.2 and the accused-respondent no.1.

2. Briefly stated, the facts available on record are that a complaint

was filed by the respondent no.2 with the police alleging certain

offences committed by the respondent no.1, on the basis of which

FIR4

 in question was registered. Respondent no.1 at the relevant

point of time was working as veterinary doctor in Policlinic, Sonipat

1 Dated 27.02.2019

2 High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

3 CRM-M-51493 of 2018

4 FIR No.0116 dated 12.05.2018, Police Station Barauda, Dist. Sonipat, Haryana

1006 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Animal Husbandry Department. Immediately, after registration of the

FIR while the matter was still under investigation, the respondent

no.1 filed a petition in the High Court seeking quashing thereof. A

perusal of the impugned order passed by the High Court shows that

respondent no.1-accused as well as respondent no.2-complainant

submitted before the High Court that the matter in dispute has been

amicably settled between the parties, hence, the FIR may be quashed

on the basis of the compromise. Even though in the reply filed by

the State to the quashing petition, the stand taken was that the

FIR does not deserve be quashed as there are serious allegations

against the respondent no.1-accused. However, still the High Court

merely because the complainant had compromised the matter with

the respondent no.1-accused, quashed the FIR. The aforesaid order

is impugned by the State before this Court.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that once on the

basis of a complainant, submitted to the Police, an FIR had been

registered with the allegations that the respondent no.1 was involved

in commission of serious offences during her service career and

the matter was still under investigation, the High Court exceeded its

jurisdiction in quashing the FIR, merely because the complainantrespondent no.2 had compromised the matter with the accusedrespondent no.1. After the FIR was registered or even before that,

it was not the complainant only who was the sufferer, rather it was

an offence against the State. Allegation against the respondent no.1

was of defrauding the State, her employer. The FIR was registered

as cognizable offence was found to have been committed by the

respondent no.1. The stand taken by the State before the High

Court was not even considered.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submitted

that the respondent no.2-complainant had no locus to involve in the

issue. He had filed a complaint to the police with certain allegations

with regard to her service career referring to certain documents,

which were not privy to him. Registration of FIR against respondent

no.1 was merely to harass her, who had otherwise exposed various

irregularities in the Animal Husbandry Department. Even in the

departmental proceedings, the respondent no.1 has been exonerated

after due enquiry. If FIR is allowed to be proceeded with, it will be

nothing else but an abuse of process of law. The High Court has not

committed any error in the exercise of jurisdiction to quash the FIR.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1007

State of Haryana v. Dr. Ritu Singh and Another

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

paper book.

6. In the case in hand, on the basis of information received under the

Right to Information Act, 2015 the respondent no.2 filed complaint

to the police, on the basis of which FIR in-question was registered.

The contents of the same are extracted below:

“Sir, in concern to abovementioned subject, I draw your

attention that Dr. Ritu Singh Veterinary Doctor Policlinic

Sonipat Animal Husbandry Department was appointed

in year 2013-2014 at Nizampur Gohana. Thereafter, Dr.

Ritu Singh visited foreign countries 6-7 times without

the permission of department. During these visits, she

had shown her presence at State Veterinary Hospital

Nizampur. During this period (Foreign Trips), showing false

presence, self verified and withdraw the salary from Govt.

Treasury. During this period, she also presented false

medical certificates and intentionally, under a scheme, she

withdrew the salary from Govt. Treasury and committed

loss to Govt. Treasury. It is requested to you that this

complaint be fairly investigated and legal action be taken

against her. Enclosed: Information received under RTI.

26 Applicant: Satish Saroha S/o Sh. Lekhi Ram Village

Veyapur, Sonipat.”

6.1 Immediately after registration of FIR, respondent no.1 filed a

petition before the High Court seeking quashing thereof, on

the basis of the compromise with the complainant, which was

allowed by the High Court.

7. A perusal of the contents of the FIR would show that it was not the

complainant who was the victim with reference to the allegations

made in the complaint to the police, to enable the High Court to

exercise the power to quash the FIR on the basis of compromise.

The allegations are with reference to withdrawal of salary for the

period the respondent no.1 was on unauthorized foreign trips and

also withdrawal of salary by producing false medical certificates5

.

When the FIR in-question was quashed the matter was still being

5 The victim was not the complainant but the State.

1008 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

investigated by the police. It was even so submitted by the State in

its reply to the quashing petition in the High Court.

8. In the facts of the present case after setting the criminal machinery

into motion, which had relevance with the fraud allegedly committed

by the respondent no.1 with her employer, the complainant did not

have any locus to compromise the matter with the accused when

the FIR had been registered. Even the High Court had failed to

consider that aspect of the matter. Even though the reply filed by

the State to the quashing petition was taken on record but without

even referring to the stand taken therein, merely on the basis of

compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused,

the FIR was quashed. The order cannot be legally sustained. The

allegations against the accused are of defrauding the State. How can

such a matter be settled on the basis of a “compromise” between

two private individuals? The simple answer is that it cannot be done.

8.1 The argument raised by the learned counsel for the respondent

no.1 that in the departmental proceedings initiated on the same

ground, she has already been exonerated is merely to be

noticed as this may be a defence of the accused, which was

not at all the ground on the basis of which the FIR in-question

was quashed, at the stage of investigation.

9. For the reasons mentioned above, the present appeal is allowed.

The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The

petition filed by the respondent no.1 seeking quashing of the FIR

in-question on the basis of compromise is dismissed. However, we

make it clear that nothing said above will prejudice the case of the

respondent no.1 for taking any defence in the proceedings against

her at any appropriate stage. The limited issue considered by this

Court was with reference to quashing of the FIR in-question on the

basis of the compromise.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.