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SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 - Order XII, Rule 3 – Scope thereof, explained – Filing of applications after disposal of the statutory appeal: Held: Impermissible – A post disposal application for modification and clarification of an order shall lie only in rare cases, where the order passed by the Supreme Court is executory in nature and the directions of the Supreme Court have become impossible to be implemented because of certain subsequent events or developments – After disposal of an appeal / petition, the Supreme Court becomes functus officio and does not retain jurisdiction to entertain any application. [Para 20] SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 – Practice and Procedure – Application projected as an application for clarification, though it was registered as a miscellaneous application – Practice deprecated. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXIII, Rule 1 – Scope thereof, explained.

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1023 : 2024 INSC 213

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors.

v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

Miscellaneous Application Diary No. 21994 of 2022

In

Civil Appeal Nos. 8625 – 8626 of 2019

18 March 2024

[Aniruddha Bose* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

When can a litigant apply for modification of a judgment or an

order in a matter which stands finally concluded; and can a party

file an application after disposal of the statutory appeal by invoking

inherent powers of the Supreme Court.

Headnotes

SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 - Order XII, Rule 3 – Scope

thereof, explained – Filing of applications after disposal of

the statutory appeal:

Held: Impermissible – A post disposal application for modification

and clarification of an order shall lie only in rare cases, where the

order passed by the Supreme Court is executory in nature and

the directions of the Supreme Court have become impossible

to be implemented because of certain subsequent events or

developments – After disposal of an appeal / petition, the Supreme

Court becomes functus officio and does not retain jurisdiction to

entertain any application. [Para 20]

SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 – Practice and Procedure –

Application projected as an application for clarification, though

it was registered as a miscellaneous application – Practice

deprecated.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXIII, Rule 1 – Scope

thereof, explained.

Held: There are two Orders in the Supreme Court Rules, 2013

which permit review of a judgment or an order of the Supreme

Court, Orders XLVII and XLVIII – The former Order, contained in 

1024 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Part IV of the 2013 Rules, relates to “Review of a Judgment” and

the latter relates to “Curative Petition” – There is no other provision

in the 2013 Rules, whereby a litigant can apply for modification of

a judgment or an order of the Supreme Court in a matter which

stands finally concluded – By taking out a Miscellaneous Application,

the applicant cannot ask for reliefs which were not granted in the

main judgment itself. [Para 10]

Through this miscellaneous application, the applicant seeks a

direction upon the Rajasthan Discoms for making payment of

Rs.1376.35 crores – The present application has been captioned

as “APPLICATION FOR DIRECTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE

RESPONDENT NO.1/APPLICANT (ADANI POWER RAJASTHAN

LIMITED)” in the said appeals which stood disposed of by a

common judgment of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme

Court delivered on 31.08.2020 – Review petitions filed against

this judgment by the Rajasthan Discoms stood dismissed on

02.03.2021. [Para 2]

In the course of hearing, it was projected as an application for

clarification, though the same was registered as a miscellaneous

application – The reliefs asked for in this application do not refer

to any clarification. [Para 9]

The applicant had expressed its desire to withdraw the present

application on the last date of hearing, i.e., 24.01.2024 – The

Supreme Court, however, decided not to permit such simpliciter

withdrawal – Even if an applicant applies for withdrawal of an

application, in exceptional cases, it would be within the jurisdiction of

the Supreme Court to examine the application and pass appropriate

orders – So far as the present proceeding is concerned, an important

question of law has arisen as regards jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court to entertain an application taken out in connection with a set

of statutory appeals which stood disposed of – Judgment of the

Supreme Court in Supertech Limited v. Emerald Court Owner

Resident Welfare Association & Others, (2023) 10 SCC 817

deals with this question and the ratio of the said judgment would

apply to the present proceeding as well. [Para 19]

The Supreme Court becomes functus officio and does not retain

jurisdiction to entertain an application after the appeal was disposed

of by the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme

Court – This is not an application for correcting any clerical or

arithmetical error – Neither it is an application for extension of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1025

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

time – A post disposal application for modification and clarification

of the order of disposal shall lie only in rare cases, where the

order passed by the Supreme Court is executory in nature and the

directions contained in the judgment may become impossible to

be implemented because of subsequent events or developments–

The factual background of this Application does not fit into that

description. [Para 20]

SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 - Order XII, Rule 3 read with

Rule 6 of Order LV – Filing of applications after disposal of the

statutory appeal by invoking inherent powers of the Supreme

Court – Held, impermissible.

Held: The maintainability of the present application cannot be

explained by invoking the inherent power of the Supreme Court

either – The applicant has not applied for review of the main

judgment – In the contempt action, it failed to establish any wilful

disobedience of the main judgment and order – Now the applicant

cannot continue to hitchhike on the same judgment by relying on

the inherent power or jurisdiction of this Court. [Para 13]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 152 read with Order XII,

Rule 3 of the SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 – Rectification

of an arithmetic order – permissibility thereof.

Held: A miscellaneous application had been filed for modification

of the content of judgment dated 1st September 2020 passed

in M.A. (D) No. 9887 of 2020 in Civil Appeal Nos. 6328-6399

of 2015 – In the said proceeding, clarification was also sought

on the aspect that the judgment did not bar the Union of India

from considering and rectifying the clerical/arithmetical errors

in computation of certain dues – This was an order permitting

rectification of an arithmetic error, which is implicit in Section 152

of the CPC read with Order XII Rule 3 of the 2013 Rules. [Para 18]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 148 read with Section

112 - Power of the Supreme Court to extend time.

Held: The power to extend time beyond that fixed by a Court on a

legitimate ground is incorporated in Section 148 of the CPC – If the

time to do something requires to be extended, it would be within

the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to go beyond the

maximum period of 30 days prescribed in the aforesaid Section,

after sufficient reason is shown – Section 112 of the Code itself

provides that nothing contained in the CPC shall affect the inherent 

1026 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 or any other

provision of the Constitution. [Para 17]

SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013 - Order XII, Rule 3 – Imposition

of costs on filing of applications after disposal of the statutory

appeal.

Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the present application and

imposed costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the applicant to be

remitted to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee as it was

listed several times. [Para 23]

Case Law Cited

Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Private Limited v.

Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited,

[2021] 13 SCR 738 : M. A. No. 1166 of 2021 in CA

No. 8129 of 2019 – relied on.

Supertech Limited v. Emerald Court Owner Resident

Welfare Association & Others [2021] 10 SCR 569 :

(2023) 10 SCC 817 – Relied on.

State (UT of Delhi) v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others

[2000] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 : (2000) 7 SCC 296; Sone

Lal and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1982) 2 SCC

398; Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and Others

[2003] Suppl. 4 SCR 543; (2004) 12 SCC 713; Common

Cause v. Union of India and Others (2004) 5 SCC 222;

Zahira Habibullah Sheikh and Another v. State of Gujarat

and Others [2004] Suppl. 2 SCR 571 : (2004) 5 SCC

353; P.N. Eswara Iyer and Others v. Registrar, Supreme

Court of India [1980] 2 SCR 889 : (1980) 4 SCC 680;

Suthendraraja alias Suthenthira Raja alias Santhan

and Others v. State through DSP/CBI, SIT, Chennai

[1999] Suppl. 3 SCR 540 : (1999) 9 SCC 323; Ramdeo

Chauhan alias Raj Nath v. State of Assam [2001] 3 SCR

669 : (2001) 5 SCC 714; Devendra Pal Singh v. State

(NCT of Delhi) and Another [2002] Suppl. 5 SCR 332

: (2003) 2 SCC 501; Rashid Khan Pathan in re (2021)

12 SCC 64 – referred to.

Energy Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory

Commission and Others, MA Nos. 2705 – 2706 of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1027

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

2018 in Civil Appeal Nos. 5399 – 5400 of 2016;

Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Anr. V. Adani

Power (Mundra) Limited, MA (D) No. 18461 of 2023 in

Civil Appeal No. 2908 of 2022; Kalpataru Properties

Pvt. Ltd. v. Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd., MA No.

2064 of 2022 in Civil Appeal No. 7050 of 2022;

Supertech Limited v. Emerald Court Owner Resident

Welfare Association & Ors., MA No. 1918 of 2021

in Civil Appeal No. 5041 of 2021; Union of India v.

Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of

India and Ors., MA No. 83 of 2021 in MA (D) No.

9887 of 2020 in Civil Appeal No. 6328-6399 of

2015] – distinguished.

List of Acts

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

List of Keywords

Miscellaneous Application, Clarification Application, Modification

Application, Costs, Inherent Powers, Maintainability, Post Dismissal

Application.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Miscellaneous Application Diary

No.21994 of 2022

In

Civil Appeal Nos.8625-8626 of 2019

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.08.2020 in C. A. Nos.8625-

8626 of 2019 of the Supreme Court of India

Appearances for Parties

Dushyant Dave, Sr. Adv., Kartik Seth, Anshul Chowdhary, Prashanth

R. Dixit, Ms. Arushi Rathore, Abhishek Kandwal, Amit Goyal, Mahesh

Bhati, Saurabh Chaturvedi, M/s. Chambers of Kartik Seth, Advs. for

the Appellants.

Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Mahesh Agarwal, Ms. Poonam Sengupta,

Arshit Anand, Shashwat Singh, Ms. Sakshi Kapoor, Saunak Rajguru,

Sidharth Seem, E. C. Agrawala, Advs. for the Respondents/Applicants.

1028 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Aniruddha Bose, J.

The applicant, Adani Power Rajasthan Limited (APRL), is a generating

company as per Section 2(28) of the Electricity Act, 2003 (“2003

Act”). It operates a thermal power plant in the State of Rajasthan.

There were three appellants (1 to 3) in the main set of appeals, in

connection with which the present application has been taken out,

being the distribution licensees of the State of Rajasthan as per the

provisions of the 2003 Act. They shall, henceforth in this judgment,

be collectively referred to as “Rajasthan Discoms”. Rajasthan Urja

Vikas Nigam Limited was the 4th appellant in the main set of appeals.

It appears to have been formed by the Government of Rajasthan for

the purpose of coordination among the aforesaid three Discoms, as

also other distribution licensees of the State.

2. Through this miscellaneous application, the applicant seeks a direction

upon the Rajasthan Discoms for making payment of Rs.1376.35

crore towards Late Payment Surcharge (“LPS”). This claim has been

raised by the applicant citing Article 8.3.5 of the Power Purchase

Agreement dated 28.01.2010 (“PPA-2010”) entered into between

the Rajasthan Discoms and the applicant. The present application

has been captioned as “APPLICATION FOR DIRECTIONS ON

BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.1/APPLICANT (ADANI

POWER RAJASTHAN LIMITED)” in the said appeals which stood

disposed of by a common judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this

Court delivered on 31.08.2020. Review petitions filed against this

judgment by the Rajasthan Discoms stood dismissed on 02.03.2021.

3. The appeals arose out of a dispute involving certain additional

payments claimed by the applicant as per the PPA-2010. Under the

agreement, the applicant was to supply electricity to the Rajasthan

Discoms, which had to be generated by the applicant. For this

purpose, the PPA-2010 postulated domestic coal as the primary

source of energy, while imported coal was to be used as a backup

option. The applicant’s complaint was that, due to non-availability

of sufficient domestic coal, it could not be allocated a domestic coal

linkage by the Government of India and it was compelled to rely on

imported coal from Indonesia, which had a higher cost. Claim for

compensation of loss, caused on account of non-supply of domestic 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1029

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

coal, was raised by the applicant before the Rajasthan Electricity

Regulatory Commission (“RERC”), invoking the change in law clause

of the PPA-2010. Change in law was one of the conditions under

the PPA-2010, for which tariff adjustment payment could be made

by the seller of electricity following the procedure stipulated in the

aforesaid agreement. By an order dated 17.05.2018, RERC held

that the applicant would be entitled to relief on account of change

in law, which was held to be the difference between actual landed

cost of alternative/imported coal (as certified by the auditor) and

actual landed cost of domestic linkage coal. This was recorded in

an order passed on 25.02.2022 by a Coordinate Bench of this Court

in a contempt action brought by the applicant [Contempt Petition

(Civil) No(s) 877-878 of 2021]. We shall refer to the said proceeding

later in this judgment. We also need not delve into the question of

eligibility of the applicant to get additional sum on account of change

in law, as that question stands finally decided in the main judgment.

4. The applicant had also raised another claim for additional payment

before the RERC, under the head of carrying cost which was

disallowed by the RERC. Rajasthan Discoms, being aggrieved by

the grant of change-in-law compensation, as also the applicant, being

aggrieved by rejection of the claim for carrying costs appealed against

the order of the RERC before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity

(“APTEL”). By a common decision dated 14.09.2019, the APTEL

found that the applicant’s claim based on “change in law” was valid

and opined that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the

loss caused to it because of change in law under a subsequent coal

supply scheme, termed as the SHAKTI scheme, which failed to provide

domestic coal linkage. The APTEL further found that the applicant

would also be entitled for payment towards applicable carrying cost.

The Rajasthan Discoms had appealed against the common decision

of APTEL before this Court. The three-Judge Bench of this Court,

by the judgement dated 31.08.2020, dismissed the appeals with the

following observations and directions: -

“66. Considering the facts of this case and keeping in

view that the RERC and APTEL have given concurrent

findings in favour of the respondent with regard to change

in law, with which we also concur, we may now deal with

the question of liability of appellants-Rajasthan Discoms

with regard to late payment surcharge. In this regard, the 

1030 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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following Articles 8.3.5 and 8.8 of PPA, which are relevant

for the present purpose, are extracted hereunder:

“8.3.5. In the event of delay in payment of a Monthly Bill

by the Procurers beyond its Due Date, a Late Payment

Surcharge shall be payable by such Procurers to the Seller

at the rate of two percent (2%) in excess of the applicable

SBAR per annum, on the amount of outstanding payment,

calculated on a day to day basis (and compounded with

monthly rest), for each day of the delay. The Late Payment

Surcharge shall be claimed by the Seller through the

Supplementary Bill.

8.8 Payment of Supplementary Bill

8.8.1 Either Party may raise a bill on the other Party

(supplementary bill) for payment on account of:

i) Adjustments required by the Regional Energy

Account (if applicable):

ii) Tariff Payment for change in parameters,

pursuant to provisions in Schedule 4; or

iii) Change in Law as provided in Article 10, and

such Supplementary Bill shall be paid by the

others party.

8.8.2 The Procurers shall remit all amounts due

under a Supplementary Bill raised by the Seller to

the Seller’s Designated Account by the Due Date and

notify the Seller of such remittance on the same day

or the Seller shall be eligible to draw such amounts

through the Letter of Credit. Similarly, the Seller shall

pay all amounts due under a Supplementary Bill

raised by Procurer(s) by the Due Date to concerned

Procurer’s designated bank account and notify such

Procurer(s) of such payment on the same day.

For such payments by the Procurer(s), Rebate as

applicable to Monthly Bills pursuant to Article 8.3.6

shall equally apply.

8.8.3 In the event of delay in payment of a

Supplementary Bill by either Party beyond its Due 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1031

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

Date, a Late Payment Surcharge shall be payable

at the same terms applicable to the Monthly Bill in

Article 8.3.5.

8.9 The copies of all; notices/offers which are required

to be sent as per the provisions of this Article 8, shall

be sent by a party, simultaneously to all parties.”

Liability of the Late Payment Surcharge which has been

saddled upon the appellants is at the rate of 2% in

excess of applicable SBAR per annum, on the amount of

outstanding payment, calculated on a day to day basis

(and compounded with monthly rest) for each day of the

delay. Therefore, there shall be huge liability of payment

of Late Payment Surcharge upon the appellants-Rajasthan

Discoms.

67. With regard to the question of interest/late payment

surcharge, we notice that the plea of change in law was

initially raised by APRL in the year 2013. A case was also

filed by APRL in the year 2013 itself raising its claim on

such basis. However, the appellants-Rajasthan Discoms

did not allow the claim regarding change in law, because

of which APRL was deprived of raising the bills with effect

from the date of change in law in the year 2013. We

are, thus, of the opinion that considering the totality of

the facts of this case and in order to do complete justice

and to reduce the liability of the appellants-Rajasthan

Discoms, payment of 2 per cent in excess of the applicable

SBAR per annum with monthly rest would be on higher

side. In our opinion, it would be appropriate to direct the

appellants-Rajasthan Discoms to pay interest/late payment

surcharge as per applicable SBAR for the relevant years,

which should not exceed 9 per cent per annum. It is also

provided that instead of monthly rest, the interest would

be compounded per annum.

68. We accordingly direct that the rate of interest/late

payment surcharge would be at SBAR, not exceeding 9

per cent per annum, to be compounded annually, and the

2 per cent above the SBAR (as provided in Article 8.3.5

of PPA) would not be charged in the present case. 

1032 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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69. Before we part with the case, we may notice that

Shri Prashant Bhushan, raised the submission with

respect to over-invoicing. He attracted our attention to the

investigation pending before the DRI. He has submitted

that 40 importers of coal are under investigation by the DRI

concerning alleged over-invoicing. The letter of rogatory

was issued. However, leamed counsel conceded that there

is no ultimate conclusion in the investigation reached so far.

Thus, we are of the opinion that until and unless there is

a finding recorded by the competent court as to invoicing,

the submission cannot be accepted. At this stage, it cannot

be said that there is over-invoicing. We have examined

the case on merits with abundant caution, and we find

that there are concurrent findings of facts recorded by the

RERC and the APTEL. With respect to the aspect that

bid was premised on domestic coal, we find that findings

recorded do not call for any interference.”

5. The applicant had filed contempt proceedings alleging disobedience

of the said judgment and order, which were registered as Contempt

Petition (C) Nos. 877-878 of 2021. We have already referred to this

proceeding. In the contempt proceeding, the applicant’s position

gets reflected in the submissions of its learned senior counsel,

recorded in paragraph 6 of the order passed on 25.02.2022 (One

of us, Aniruddha Bose, J., was a party to this order). The relevant

portion of that order is reproduced below:-

“6. Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the only

dispute which was to be resolved by RERC, APTEL and

this Court was with regard to the payment due because of

“change in law”, which was held to be the actual landed

cost of alternate coal/imported coal as certified by the

auditor minus landed cost of domestic linkage coal. There

was no other dispute which was to be resolved by this

Court. Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that it is

now contended by the respondents that certain payments

have been made by the respondents which, according to

the learned Senior Counsel, was towards regular payment

on the basis of domestic linkage coal and nothing else.

Since, the “change in law” ground of the petitioner has been 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1033

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

accepted by all the authorities i.e. RERC, APTEL and this

Court and also confirmed by the dismissal of the Review

Petition filed before this Court, the question cannot now be

reopened at this stage. It is, thus, submitted that since the

actual landed cost of alternate coal/imported coal as was

submitted by the petitioner has been duly certified by the

auditors, which has not been disputed by the respondents,

the payment, as claimed, ought to have been made and

since the same has not been paid, the respondents are

liable for contempt. The further contention of the learned

Senior Counsel of the petitioner is that the claim of the

respondents that they had paid certain amount towards

energy charges regularly month by month, which included

certain amount of price of alternate coal/imported coal

charges cannot be accepted, as at that stage i.e. in the

year 2013, the respondents had not accepted the claim

of the petitioner with regard to “change in law”, and the

assertion now being made by the respondents that they had

paid certain amount after partially accepting the “change

in law” theory cannot be accepted, as this issue had never

been raised by respondents in any proceedings earlier, as

the respondents had, in fact, throughout contested that

the petitioner is not entitled to the “change in law” benefit.”

6. The allegations of non-compliance with the judgment of the threeJudge Bench were dealt with by the Coordinate Bench in the aforesaid

order passed on 25.02.2022. It was, inter-alia, observed and directed

in the said order:-

“9. Firstly, what we have to consider is only the effect of

“change in law”, which as per RERC, API’EL and this Court

would be the actual landed cost of alternate coal/ imported

coal minus the landed cost of domestic linkage coal. The

question of any claim which the respondents may have

against the petitioner, is not an issue before us. As per the

principle laid down by RERC and affirmed up till this Court,

the petitioner has claimed an amount of Rs.5344. 75 crores

up to March, 2021. The said principle having been affirmed

by the APTEL as well as by this Court and even in Review

Petition, cannot be reopened now. It cannot be disputed

that after March, 2021 also, the petitioner would be entitled 

1034 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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to payment on the basis of the same calculation, which up

to November, 2021 comes to Rs.130.69 crores. As such,

the due amount up to November 2021 would be Rs.5344.

75 + Rs.130.69 = 54 75.44 crores. Out of this amount of

Rs.54 75.44 crores, the petitioner has been paid a sum

of Rs.2426.81 crores in terms of the interim order passed

by this Court. Hence, as per the petitioner, the balance

amount of Rs.3048.63 crores would remain due to be

paid up to November, 2021. The interest at the maximum

rate of 9% per annum, as capped by this Court vide its

judgment and order dated 31.08.2020, is to be applied on

the said amount, from the date the amount became due,

till the date of actual payment. The further claim of late

payment surcharge, amounting to Rs.2477.70 crores, as

per the petitioner, would be a subject matter which the

petitioner, if so advised, can claim before the appropriate

forum, as the same is not the subject in question in the

present proceedings, regarding which no directions have

also been issued by this Court.

10. As such, considering the totality of facts and

circumstances of this case, prima face we are of the

opinion that the respondents are liable for contempt for

not complying this Court’s order dated 31.08.2020. We,

thus, direct the respondents to pay to the petitioner, the

principal amount (as per the terms/norms laid down in the

judgment of this Court dated 31.08.2020) minus Rs.2426.81

crores deposited by the respondents in terms of the interim

order dated 29.10.2018 (which, as per the petitioner, the

balance payable amount would be Rs.3048.63 crores)

along with interest as per the applicable SBAR for the

relevant years, which should not exceed 9% per annum

(to be compounded annually), from the date the amount

became due till the date of actual payment, within four

weeks from today, failing which the respondents shall

appear before this Court in person, on the next date, so

as to enable this Court to frame charges.”

7. The contempt petitions were subsequently directed to be closed by

another Coordinate Bench of this Court and order to that effect was

passed on 19.04.2022. In this order, it was, inter-alia, observed:-

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1035

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

“With regard to the first question it may only be observed

that by order dated 25.02.2022 passed in these contempt

petitions, this court, in paragraph no. 9, has observed as

under:

“The further claim of late payment surcharge,

amounting to Rs.2477.70 crores, as per the

petitioner, would be a subject matter which

the petitioner, if so advised, can claim before

the appropriate forum, as the same is not the

subject in question in the present proceedings,

regarding which no directions have also been

issued by this Court.”

As such, since according to the respondent(s) the payment

made is only towards the principal amount plus 9% interest

per annum, we are not inclined to pass any further orders

as we have already left the question of late payment

surcharge open, which the petitioner, if so advised, can

claim before the appropriate forum.

As regards the second question of the alleged noncompliance, by the respondents after November, 2021

of the judgment and order dated 31.08.2020, we would

not like to make any observation as there is neither. any

material before us with regard to that nor the same was

in question when the contempt petitions were filed. As

such, we leave this question open to be agitated by the

petitioner, of it is so advised.

With regard to the last issue raised by the respondents,

which is to the effect that the claim of the Rajasthan

Utilities against the petitioner outside the judgment dated

31.08.2020 be permitted to be made, we would only like to

observe that the same cannot be a matter to be considered

in a contempt petition and as such neither we are inclined

to grant any such relief nor stop them from raising any

such issue, if the respondents are so advised and found

entitled under the law. With the aforesaid observations,

we close these contempt petitions.”

8. After institution of the present application on 19.07.2022, it was heard

from time to time and finally on 24.01.2024, when this matter was 

1036 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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called on for hearing, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior

counsel, appearing for the applicant, sought leave to withdraw the

application. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for

the Rajasthan Discoms, however, opposed such prayer and his case

was that the present application, having been taken out in an appeal

which stood disposed of, did not lie and it should be dismissed on

the ground that it is not maintainable. Mr. Dave drew our attention

to paragraph 67 of the judgment of the three-Judge Bench, which

we have quoted above. The issue of LPS has been dealt with by

the three-Judge Bench in the said passage.

9. In the course of hearing, it was projected as an application for

clarification, though the same was registered as a miscellaneous

application. The reliefs asked for in this application do not refer to

any clarification. We have referred to the substance of the reliefs

prayed for in this application earlier in this judgment.

10. Order XII Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (“2013 Rules”)

framed in pursuance of Article 145 of the Constitution of India,

stipulates:-

“3. Subject to the provisions contained in Order XLVII of

these rules, a judgment pronounced by the Court or by

a majority of the Court or by a dissenting Judge in open

Court shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save for

the purpose of correcting a clerical or arithmetical mistake

or an error arising from any accidental slip or omission.”

There are, however, two chapters in the 2013 Rules which permit

review of a judgment or order of this Court, being Order XLVII and

XLVIII. The former Order, contained in Part IV of the 2013 Rules

relates to “Review of a Judgment” and the latter relates to “Curative

Petition”. There is no other provision in the 2013 Rules, whereby a

litigant can apply for modification of a judgment or an order of this

Court in a matter which stands finally concluded. On rare occasions,

a litigant may apply for clarification of an order if the same is ex-facie

incomprehensible, but we do not expect any judgment or order to

bear such a character. So far as the applicant is concerned, it did

not apply for review of the judgment delivered by the three-Judge

Bench. Neither in the contempt action initiated by the applicant, did

this Court find that any case of willful disobedience of the judgment

of the three-Judge Bench was made out on the question of LPS. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1037

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

This would be apparent from the orders passed by this Court in

the contempt petitions which have been reproduced earlier in this

judgement. The judgment of the three-Judge Bench has already

examined the question of LPS and by taking out a Miscellaneous

Application, the applicant cannot ask for reliefs which were not

granted in the main judgment itself.

11. In the case of Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Private Limited -vsEdelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited [M.A. No. 1166

of 2021 in CA No. 8129 of 2019], a two-Judge Bench of this Court

in its judgment delivered on 17th August 2022 observed and held:-

“4. Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties

and having perused the relevant materials placed on

record, we are of the considered view that the present

applications are nothing else but an attempt to seek review

of the judgment and order passed by this Court on 13th

April 2021 under the garb of miscellaneous application.

5. We find that there is a growing tendency of

indirectly seeking review of the orders of this Court

by filing applications either seeking modifications or

clarifications of the orders passed by this Court.

6. In our view, such applications are a total abuse of

process of law. The valuable time of Court is spent in

deciding such application which time would otherwise

be utilized for attending litigations of the litigants who

are waiting in the corridors of justice for decades

together.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. Subsequently in the judgment of this Court in the case of Supertech

Limited-vs- Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association

& Others [(2023) 10 SCC 817], a two-Judge Bench of this Court

examined the maintainability of miscellaneous applications “for

clarification, modification or recall” and was pleased to observe the

following in the context of that case:-

“12. The attempt in the present miscellaneous application is

clearly to seek a substantive modification of the judgment

of this Court. Such an attempt is not permissible in a

miscellaneous application. While Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned 

1038 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Senior Counsel has relied upon the provisions of Order

LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, what is

contemplated therein is a saving of the inherent powers of

the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for

the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process

of the Court. Order LV Rule 6 cannot be inverted to bypass

the provisions for review in Order XLVII of the Supreme

Court Rules, 2013. The miscellaneous application is an

abuse of the process.”

The authorities which were cited in the said Judgment by the

Coordinate Bench are the cases of State (UT of Delhi) -vs- Gurdip

Singh Uban and Others [(2000) 7 SCC 296], Sone Lal and Others

-vs- State of Uttar Pradesh [(1982) 2 SCC 398], Ram Chandra

Singh -vs- Savitri Devi and Others [(2004 12 SCC 713], Common

Cause -vs- Union of India and Others [(2004) 5 SCC 222], Zahira

Habibullah Sheikh and Another -vs- State of Gujarat and Others

[(2004) 5 SCC 353], P.N. Eswara Iyer and Others -vs- Registrar,

Supreme Court of India [(1980) 4 SCC 680], Suthendraraja alias

Suthenthira Raja alias Santhan and Others -vs- State through

DSP/CBI, SIT, Chennai [(1999) 9 SCC 323], Ramdeo Chauhan

alias Raj Nath -vs- State of Assam [(2001) 5 SCC 714], Devendra

Pal Singh -vs- State (NCT of Delhi) and Another [(2003) 2 SCC

501] and Rashid Khan Pathan in re, [(2021) 12 SCC 64]. These

authorities broadly stipulate that multiple attempts to reopen a

judgment of this Court should not be permitted. Hence, we do not

consider it necessary to deal with these authorities individually.

13. Rule 6 of Order LV of the 2013 Rules stipulates: -

“6. Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or

otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make

such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice

or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”

The maintainability of the present application cannot be explained by

invoking the inherent power of this Court either. The applicant has

not applied for review of the main judgment. In the contempt action,

it failed to establish any willful disobedience of the main judgment

and order on account of non-payment of LPS. Now the applicant

cannot continue to hitchhike on the same judgment by relying on

the inherent power or jurisdiction of this Court. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1039

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

14. Appearing on behalf of the applicant, Dr. Singhvi, learned Senior

Counsel, relied on five orders of this Court in which post-disposal

applications were entertained. The first one was an order dated

29.10.2018 in the case of Energy Watchdog -vs- Central Electricity

Regulatory Commission and Others, [MA Nos.2705-2706 of 2018

in Civil Appeal Nos.5399-5400 of 2016]. In that case, an application

for impleadment on behalf of the State of Gujarat was allowed, upon

going through a High Power Committee’s report, which was given

after the judgment was delivered. The judgment disposing of the

Civil Appeal was delivered on 11.04.2017, but in the miscellaneous

application, the applicant was given liberty to approach the Central

Electricity Regulatory Commission for approval of the proposed

amendments to be made to a power purchase agreement. That

was a case where this Court, after the judgment was delivered,

considered certain events which accrued subsequently and had a

bearing on the main decision. The subsequent event was taken into

account for modifying the order but there was no substantive change

in the judgment itself.

15. The next order, on which Dr. Singhvi placed reliance, was passed

on 04.05.2023 in the case of Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.

& Anr. -vs- Adani Power (Mundra) Limited [MA (D) No. 18461 of

2023 in Civil Appeal No.2908 of 2022]. The substantive part of the

order is contained in Paragraph 2 thereof and this paragraph reads:-

“2. As agreed by the learned counsel for the parties, the

words “As per the details given in the PPA, the mode of

transportation is through railway” shown in paragraph 32

of the judgment dated 20.04.2023 passed in C.A. No. 2908

of 2022 be read as “As per the details given in the FSA,

the mode of transportation is through railway”.

But this order appears to be in the nature of correcting an error

which was clerical in nature and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(“the Code”) itself provides for such correction under Section 152

thereof, as also Order XII Rule 3 of the 2013 Rules.

16. The third order relied on by Dr. Singhvi was passed on 09.12.2022 in

the case of Kalpataru Properties Pvt. Ltd. -vs- Indiabulls Housing

Finance Ltd. [MA No.2064 of 2022 in Civil Appeal No.7050 of 2022].

The applicant therein had approached this Court contending that he

was not heard when the civil appeal was decided. In that case, the 

1040 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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appellant had approached this Court against an Order passed by

NCLAT in Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 880/2021 and the

said appellant sought to withdraw the appeal on deposit of certain

amount by the first respondent in the said appeal. The request was

accepted by this Court and by the Order passed on 26.09.2022, the

appeal pending before the NCLAT was also disposed of by this Court.

The applicant was an intervenor before the NCLAT and his submission

was that in the appeal before the NCLAT which was disposed of,

he also sought to raise some grievances before the NCLAT, in his

capacity as an intervenor. His case was that he should have been

given the liberty to be heard as an intervenor before the NCLAT. A

Coordinate Bench of this Court entertained that application and held: -

“We do believe that this controversy should be resolved

by the NCLAT itself i.e. whether on the appellants seeking

to withdraw the appeal, there can be any impediment in

withdrawal of the appeal and is the NCLAT really required

to comment on the merits of the order of the NCLT at the

behest of an intervener. We further make it clear that we

are not expanding the array of parties before the NCLAT

as a number of entities seems to have jumped into the

picture as the matter has gone on before the Court. We

make it clear that only the parties/existing interventionist

before the NCLAT will have the right of hearing.

In view of the orders passed in Civil Appeal No. 9062/2022,

this appeal will also to be listed before the Bench presided

over by the Chairman.

In view thereof, the final picture which would emerge would

be before the NCLAT and to that extent the order passed

by us on 14.11.2022 would be kept in abeyance till the

NCLAT resolves the issue.”

Again, this Order was in the nature of a review order by the applicant

who was a party to the proceeding before the NCLAT. All the appeals

before the NCLAT were disposed of without hearing him. The context

is entirely different from the one in which the applicant has presently

approached this Court.

17. The fourth order on which the present applicant relied was passed

on 12.08.2022 in the case of Supertech Limited -vs- Emerald 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1041

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

Court Owner Resident Welfare Association & Ors. [MA No.1918

of 2021 in Civil Appeal No.5041 of 2021]. The Coordinate Bench

of this Court granted extension of time, as sought by the applicant

therein, in effecting demolition of two building towers which were

approved by the Court while disposing of the civil appeal. The power

to extend time beyond that fixed by a Court on a legitimate ground is

incorporated in Section 148 of the Code. If the time to do something

requires to be extended, it would be within the inherent jurisdiction of

this Court to go beyond the maximum period of 30 days prescribed

in the aforesaid Section, after sufficient reason is shown. Section

112 of the Code itself provides that nothing contained in the Code

shall affect the inherent powers of the Supreme Court under Article

136 or any other provision of the Constitution.

18. The fifth order referred to by the applicant was passed on 23.07.2021

in the case of Union of India -vs- Association of Unified Telecom

Service Providers of India and Ors. [MA No.83 of 2021 in MA

(D) No. 9887 of 2020 in Civil Appeal No.6328-6399 of 2015]. A

miscellaneous application had been filed for modification of the

content of judgment dated 1st September 2020 passed in M.A. (D)

No. 9887 of 2020 in Civil Appeal Nos. 6328-6399 of 2015. In the

said proceeding, clarification was also sought on the aspect that

the judgment did not bar the Union of India from considering and

rectifying the clerical/arithmetical errors in computation of certain

dues. This was again an Order, in substance, permitting rectification

of an arithmetic error, which is implicit in Section 152 of the Code

read with Order XII Rule 3 of the 2013 Rules.

19. We have indicated in the earlier part of this judgment that Dr. Singhvi

had expressed his desire to withdraw the present application on

the last date of hearing, i.e., 24.01.2024. Ordinarily, we would not

have had set out the background leading to the filing of the present

application and the course of the application that was taken before

this Court in view of such submission. Any plaintiff would be entitled

to abandon a suit or abandon part of the claim made in the suit at

any time after institution of the suit, as provided in Rule 1 of Order

XXIII of the Code. We, however, decided not to permit such simpliciter

withdrawal, as the Rajasthan Discoms sought imposition of costs.

Secondly, in our opinion, the provision which pertains to a suit would

not ipso facto apply to a miscellaneous application invoking inherent

powers of this Court, instituted in a set of statutory appeals which 

1042 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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stood disposed of. Even if an applicant applies for withdrawal of an

application, in exceptional cases, it would be within the jurisdiction

of the Court to examine the application and pass appropriate orders.

So far as the present proceeding is concerned, an important question

of law has arisen as regards jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an

application taken out in connection with a set of statutory appeals

which stood disposed of. Judgment of this Court in Supertech

Limited (supra) deals with this question and in our opinion, the ratio

of the said judgment would apply to the present proceeding as well.

20. We felt it necessary to examine the question about maintainability of

the present application as we are of the view that it was necessary

to spell out the position of law as to when such post-disposal

miscellaneous applications can be entertained after a matter is

disposed of. This Court has become functus officio and does not

retain jurisdiction to entertain an application after the appeal was

disposed of by the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court

on 31.08.2020 through a course beyond that specified in the statute.

This is not an application for correcting any clerical or arithmetical

error. Neither it is an application for extension of time. A post disposal

application for modification and clarification of the order of disposal

shall lie only in rare cases, where the order passed by this Court

is executory in nature and the directions of the Court may become

impossible to be implemented because of subsequent events or

developments. The factual background of this Application does not

fit into that description.

21. Our attention was drawn to an order passed on 14.12.2022 in which

a Coordinate Bench was of the prima facie opinion that the applicant

may be entitled to LPS as per Article 8.3.5 of PPA-2010, at least

from 31.08.2020, till the actual payment was made pursuant to the

order passed by this Court in the contempt proceedings. This prima

facie view was expressed in the course of hearing of the present

application only. We have examined the issue in greater detail. As

we have already indicated, the applicant, after the three-Judge Bench

decision was delivered, did not file any petition for review. On the

other hand, it was the Rajasthan Discoms that had filed the review

petitions which stood dismissed. In the contempt action instituted by

the applicant, the question concerning payment of LPS was raised,

but the Bench of this Court found that the same was not the subject

in question in the contempt proceedings regarding which no direction 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1043

Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v.

Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. & Anr.

had been issued by this Court. Hence the Coordinate Bench decided

not to address that question in the contempt proceedings. In this

judgement, we have already quoted the observations regarding the

question of LPS made by the Contempt Court on 25.02.2022 and

19.04.2022. Despite that question being left open by the Contempt

Court, we are of the view that a miscellaneous application is not the

proper legal course to make demand on that count. A relief of this

nature cannot be asked for in a miscellaneous application which was

described in the course of hearing as an application for clarification.

22. So far as the observations made in the order passed in the present

proceedings on 14.12.2022 are concerned, they were made only at

a prima facie stage and do not have binding effect at the hearing

stage. Moreover, the question whether such a prayer could be made

in an application labeled as a “Miscellaneous Application” taken

out in connection with a set of appeals which have been finally

decided, does not appear to have been considered by this Court at

the time of making of the order dated 14.12.2022. The order of this

Court does not reflect any discussion on the issue of maintainability

of the present application. It also does not appear to us that the

maintainability issue was raised at that stage. Thus, mere making

of such observations cannot be construed to mean that this Court

found such application to be maintainable.

23. We, accordingly, dismiss the present application. This application was

listed before us on several occasions and for that reason we impose

costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the applicant to be remitted to

the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Raghav Bhatia, Hony. Associate Editor Application dismissed

(Verified by: Abhinav Mukerji, Sr. Adv.)

Friday, May 3, 2024

Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 153A, 505 (1b), 117 r/w. s.34 – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – ss.13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 4 38, 39, 40 & 43-D– National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 – The prosecution’s case is that in a programme, provocative speeches were delivered and there were cultural performances which resulted in disruption of communal harmony, violence, and loss of life – Police conducted raids – The State Police, allegedly, found incriminatory materials – According to prosecution, the State Police had discovered a larger conspiracy of which the appellant was a part – They found that CPI (Maoist) to be behind such conspiracy – The latter being a banned terrorist organisation, led to invoking offences under the 1967 Act – Appellant was arrested – After that the initial chargesheet and supplementary charge-sheet was submitted by the State Police invoking allegations of commission of offences under sections of the 1860 Code r/w. Sections of the 1967 Act – Bail application of appellant was rejected by trial Court – Appellant filed regular bail application before the High Court – Meanwhile, investigation was transferred to NIA – Single judge directed to file bail application before the Division Bench of the High Court considering the provisions of s.21(2) of the 2008 Act – The Division Bench disposed of [2024] 4 S.C.R. 271 Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. the appellant’s prayer for bail, giving liberty to the appellant to approach the Trial Court for filing a fresh application for bail – Permissibility:

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 270 : 2024 INSC 269

Shoma Kanti Sen

v.

The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

(Criminal Appeal No. 2595 of 2023)

05 April 2024

[Aniruddha Bose* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The appellant was detained on 06.06.2018. The appellant

assails the order of a Division Bench of the High Court passed

on 17.01.2023, disposing her application for bail with liberty to

approach the Trial Court for filing a fresh application for bail. The

issue arises for consideration that whether the offences under Part

IV & VI of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, alleged to

have been committed by the appellant, are prima facie true or not.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 153A, 505 (1b), 117 r/w. s.34 – Unlawful

Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – ss.13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 4

38, 39, 40 & 43-D– National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 –

The prosecution’s case is that in a programme, provocative

speeches were delivered and there were cultural performances

which resulted in disruption of communal harmony, violence,

and loss of life – Police conducted raids – The State Police,

allegedly, found incriminatory materials – According to

prosecution, the State Police had discovered a larger

conspiracy of which the appellant was a part – They found that

CPI (Maoist) to be behind such conspiracy – The latter being a

banned terrorist organisation, led to invoking offences under

the 1967 Act – Appellant was arrested – After that the initial

chargesheet and supplementary charge-sheet was submitted

by the State Police invoking allegations of commission of

offences under sections of the 1860 Code r/w. Sections of

the 1967 Act – Bail application of appellant was rejected by

trial Court – Appellant filed regular bail application before

the High Court – Meanwhile, investigation was transferred to

NIA – Single judge directed to file bail application before the

Division Bench of the High Court considering the provisions

of s.21(2) of the 2008 Act – The Division Bench disposed of 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 271

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

the appellant’s prayer for bail, giving liberty to the appellant

to approach the Trial Court for filing a fresh application for

bail – Permissibility:

Held: The course adopted by the High Court was a permissible

course – However, the appellant has been in detention for almost

six years, her age is over 66 years suffering from various ailments

and charges have not yet been framed – Having taken these

factors into account, it would not be in the interest of justice to

remand the matter to the Special Court constituted under the 2008

Act at this stage – Bail of the appellant required to be considered

on merits – NIA responded to the necessity of detention of the

appellant at this stage in negative – There is no allegation at this

stage that apart from being present, she had any further active

participation on that date in the programme – She was also not

named in the initial FIR – On examining the acts attributed to

the appellant by the various witnesses or as inferred from the

evidence relied on by the prosecution, there is no prima facie

commission or attempt to commit any terrorist act by the appellant

applying the test for invoking s.15 r/w. s.162 of the 1967 Act – On

the allegations of raising funds for a terrorist act, there are mere

third-party allegations that money has been directed to be sent

to her – None of the materials reveal receipt of any funds by her

or her direct role in raising or collecting funds – As regards the

allegation against the appellant for committing an offence u/s.

184 of the 1967 Act are concerned, the materials collected so far,

only reveal her participation in some meetings and her attempt to

encourage women to join the struggle for new democratic revolution

– These allegations, prima facie, do not reveal the commission of

an offence u/s. 18 of the 1967 Act – There are no specific materials

or statements produced by the prosecution which attribute acts of

recruitment in banned organization by the appellant – Evidence of

her involvement in any fund-raising activities for the CPI (Maoist)

or her support to the said organisation has not transpired through

any reliable evidence at this stage – Mere meeting of accused

individuals or being connected with them through any medium

cannot implicate one in Chapter VI offences under of the 1967 Act,

in the absence of any further evidence of being associated with

a terrorist organisation – On perusal of the evidences collected

against her as also the allegations made by prosecution witnesses,

there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accusations

against the appellants for commission of the offences incorporated 

272 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

in Chapter IV and VI of the 1967 Act are prima facie true – Thus,

the impugned judgment set aside and the appellant directed to

be released on bail with conditions. [Paras 14, 15, 23, 24, 30,

31, 32, 35, 36, 42]

Case Law Cited

Vernon v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2023] 10

SCR 867 : (2023) INSC 655 – relied on.

State of Haryana v. Basti Ram [2013] 4 SCR 850 : (2013)

4 SCC 200; State of Andhra Pradesh, through Inspector

General, National Investigation Agency v. Mohd. Hussain

alias Salim [2013] 11 SCR 140 : (2014) 1 SCC 258;

National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah

Watali [2019] 5 SCR 1060 : (2019) 5 SCC 1; Gurwinder

Singh v. State of Punjab [2024] 2 SCR 134 : (2024)

INSC 92; K.A. Najeeb v. Union of India [2021] 1 SCR

443 : (2021) 3 SCC 713; Mazhar Khan v. N.I.A. New

Delhi; Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India

and Others [1996] 2 SCR 1123 : (1996) 2 SCC 616;

Angela Harish Sontakke v. State of Maharashtra (2021)

3 SCC 723 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967;

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords

Provocative speeches; Disruption of communal harmony, violence,

and loss of life; Detention; Incarceration for a long period; Nonframing of charges; Bail; Commission or attempt to commit

any terrorist act; Third-party allegations; Direct role in raising

or collecting funds; Punishment for terrorist activities; Terrorist

Organizations.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2595

of 2023

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.01.2023 of the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay in CRMBA No. 118 of 2020

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 273

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

Appearances for Parties

K M Nataraj, A.S.G., Anand Grover, Mihir Desai, Sr. Advs., Paras

Nath Singh, Rohin Bhatt, Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Aparna Bhat,

Ms. Karishma Maria, Ms. Rishika Agarwal, Kanu Agarwal, Mrs.

Swati Ghirdiyal, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Shailesh Madiyal, Anam

Venkatesh, Annirudh Sharma Ii, Siddhant Kohli, Ishaan Sharma,

Annirudh Bhatt, Amit Sharma B, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Omkar

Deshpande, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh,

Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, Raj Kamal,

Aseem Atwal, Shaheen Pradhan, Siddhant Sharma, Maheen Pradhan,

Advs. for the appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Aniruddha Bose, J.

The appellant before us assails the order of a Division Bench of the

High Court of Judicature at Bombay passed on 17.01.2023, disposing

her application for bail with liberty to approach the Trial Court for

filing a fresh application for bail.

2. The appellant was detained on 06.06.2018 in connection with First

Investigation Report (“FIR”) no. 04/2018 dated 08.01.2018 registered

with Vishrambaug Police Station, Pune alleging commission of

offences under Sections 153A, 505 (1b), 117 read with Section 34 of

the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“1860 Code”). The complaints therein

related to violence that broke out at a function organised by Elgar

Parishad. Certain acts of violence had taken place at Shanivarwada,

Pune on 31.12.2017 thereafter. The prosecution’s case is that in the

said programme, provocative speeches were delivered and there

were cultural performances which had the effect of creating enmity

between caste groups, resulting in disruption of communal harmony,

violence, and loss of life. The said FIR was initially lodged against

the organisers of the Elgar Parishad event, which included activists

of a cultural body, known as Kabir Kala Manch. The appellant before

us was not named in that FIR as an accused at that point of time.

3. Subsequently, the scope of investigation was expanded and Section

120-B of the 1860 Code was added to the list of offences on 06.03.2018.

The State Police, who were investigating the case at that point of 

274 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

time raided houses of eight accused persons on 17.04.2018, namely

(1) Rona Wilson of Delhi, (2) Surendra Gading of Nagpur, (3) Sudhir

Dhawale of Mumbai, (4) Harshali Potdar of Mumbai, (5) Sagar Gorkhe

of Pune, (6) Deepak Dhaeagale of Pune, (7) Jyoti Jagtap of Pune

and (8) Ramesh Gaychore of Pune. The State Police, allegedly, found

incriminatory materials from the residences of the raided persons. The

State Police seemed to have had discovered a larger conspiracy of

which the appellant was a part, according to the prosecution. They

found that Communist Party of India (Maoist) [“CPI (Maoist)”] to be

behind such conspiracy. The latter is a banned terrorist organisation,

and has been included in the First Schedule of the Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1967 (“1967 Act”) by an order of the Union Home

Ministry dated 22.06.2009. This led to invoking offences under Sections

13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38, 39 and 40 of the 1967 Act. On 06.06.2018,

appellant’s residence was raided and certain literatures, electronic

devices and mobile phones were seized from her. On that date itself,

the appellant came to be arrested by the State Police.

4. On 02.11.2018, statement of one Kumarasai was recorded. He

had also recorded two other subsequent statements on 23.12.2018

(Annexure P-6 to the appeal-petition) and 24.08.2020. All these

statements form a part of the three chargesheets which have been

submitted in connection with the subject case and we shall refer to

the contents thereof later in this judgment. We would also point out

here that on behalf of prosecution, four sets of statements have been

produced before us as statements of protected witnesses. But status

of two of those witnesses as ‘protected’ was removed by the Special

Court constituted under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008

(“2008 Act”) by an order passed on 27.04.2022. The investigation

was transferred to the National Investigation Agency (“NIA”) on

24.01.2020 and the same case was renumbered as RC-01/2020/

NIA/MUM, with NIA police station, Mumbai. The Special Court held

that prior directions to maintain secrecy in respect of identity of KW2

and KW4 ought to be set aside. The names of KW2 and KW4 thus

stood removed from the list of protected witnesses. This was done

mainly on the ground that copies of statements of those two witnesses

had been supplied to the defence under Section 207 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“1973 Code”), which transmitted their

names and identities. KW4 is Kumarasai, whose statement we have

referred to earlier in this paragraph.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 275

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

5. On 15.11.2018, the initial chargesheet was submitted by the State

Police invoking allegations of commission of offences under Sections

153A, 501(1)(b), 117, 120B, 121, 121A, 124A & 34 of the 1860 Code

read with Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38, 39 & 40 of the 1967

Act. The appellant was implicated in the said chargesheet as accused

no. 4 for having committed offences under the aforesaid provisions. In

column 10 of this chargesheet, under the heading “Details of accused

charge-sheeted (with absconding accused)” names of Sudhir Prahlad

Dhavle, Rona Jacob Wilson, Surendra Pundlikrao Gadling, Shoma

Sen (the appellant) and Mahesh Sitaram Raut appear as arrested

accused whereas names of five other accused persons have been

shown as “at present underground”. A supplementary chargesheet

was also filed by the State Police on 21.02.2019, broadly under the

same provisions, implicating certain other individuals, Varavara Rao,

Vernon Gonzalves, Arun Ferreira and Sudha Bhardwaj as accused

persons in the same case.

6. After filing of the initial chargesheet, the appellant had preferred a bail

application before the Sessions Court at Pune on 13.12.2018. The

Additional Sessions Judge, upon going through the two chargesheets

dated 15.11.2018 and 21.11.2019, rejected her bail plea by an order

dated 06.11.2019. The Sessions Court applied the bail restricting

provision contained in Section 43-D (5) of the 1967 Act to deny bail

to the appellant. Thereafter, on 09.01.2020, the appellant had filed

a regular bail application before the High Court of Judicature at

Bombay, invoking the provisions of Section 439 of the 1973 Code.

7. As the investigation had been transferred to the NIA during

subsistence of the bail application before the High Court, the learned

Single Judge, before whom the appellant’s petition was pending,

directed that the bail application ought to be placed before a Division

Bench and the NIA was also impleaded as respondent to the said

petition. Under normal circumstances, the bail petition would have

been heard by a learned Single Judge only. This direction, however,

was made considering the provisions of Section 21(2) of the 2008

Act. The order dated 17.07.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge

of the High Court, placing the bail application before the Division

Bench, reads: -

"1. Learned counsel for the applicant states that, the

case is now being investigated by N.I.A. under the 

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N.I.A. Act. He seeks leave to add N.I.A. as a party

respondent. Learned counsel for the applicant seeks

two weeks time to carry out amendment. Time is

granted.

2. Since the N.I.A. has taken over the investigation,

the matter will have to be placed before the

Division bench. I have taken this view in Criminal

Bail Application No.2024 of 2021 vide order dated

11/06/2021 based on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s

Judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh,

through Inspector General, National Investigation

Agency, Vs. Mohd. Hussain @ Salim, as reported

in (2014) 1 Supreme Court Cases 258.

3. Hence, the following order is passed:

ORDER

(i) Leave to amend is granted to add N.I.A. as a

party respondent.

(ii) Amendment shall be carried out within a period

of two weeks from today.

(iii) Office to take steps to place this matter before

the appropriate Division Bench.

(iv) The applicant shall supply second set of this

application.”

8. The Division Bench heard the bail application and by an order passed

on 17.01.2023, which is assailed before us, disposed of the appellant’s

prayer for bail, giving liberty to the appellant to approach the Trial

Court for filing a fresh application for bail. Prior to the passing of the

order which is impugned before us, the NIA had submitted a second

supplementary chargesheet dated 09.10.2020, implicating seven

more persons as accused in the case. They are Anand Teltumbde,

Gautam Navlakha, Hany Babu, Sagar Gorkhe, Ramesh Gaychore,

Jyoti Jagtap and Stan Swamy. It is the case of the prosecution that

the second supplementary chargesheet filed by the NIA contains

certain incriminating materials against the appellant as well. It is

primarily on account of the second supplementary chargesheet

being filed, the Division Bench of the High Court refused to consider 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 277

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

the appellant’s petition for bail on merit. The reasoning for such a

course being directed by the Division Bench would appear from the

following passage of the impugned order: -

"2. As noted in Order dated 2nd December, 2022, the

investigation of present Crime was subsequently

transferred to the National Investigation Agency (for

short “the NIA”) in the month of January, 2020 i.e. after

passing of the impugned Order. After completion of

further investigation, the NIA has filed supplementary

charge-sheet in the Special Court (under NIA Act) at

Mumbai. The said case arising out of present crime

is now pending for final adjudication in the Special

Court (under NIA Act) at Mumbai.

3. It is to be noted here that, after the NIA filed

supplementary charge-sheet, in view of the

substantive change in circumstance, the Applicant

did not approach the trial Court, at the first instance

for appreciation of evidence by it. This Court therefore

does not have the benefit of assessment of entire

evidence on record by the trial Court. It is therefore

necessary for the Petitioner to approach the trial Court

afresh for seeking bail under Section 439 of Criminal

Procedure Code, so that the trial Court will get an

opportunity to assess entire material available on

record against the Applicant. Even otherwise, in view

of substantive change in circumstance it is necessary

for the Applicant to approach the trial Court by filing

a fresh Application for bail.”

9. Appearing on behalf of NIA, learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr.

Nataraj, took preliminary objection on maintainability of the present

appeal. His counter-affidavit is also founded on that factor. He stressed

on the fact that since the first Court of bail had no opportunity to

examine the fresh set of accusations emanating from the second

supplementary chargesheet, no error was committed by the Division

Bench in remanding the matter to the Court of first instance.

10. His argument is that the High Court is an appellate forum on the

question of bail, where the 2008 Act is applicable and thus ought

not to examine, for the first time, a fresh set of accusations made 

278 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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by the investigating agency. He relied on a judgment of this Court in

the case of State of Haryana -vs- Basti Ram [(2013) 4 SCC 200].

A Coordinate Bench of this Court observed in this case:-

“27. Normally, we would have gone through the entire

evidence on record and decided whether the acquittal of

Basti Ram should be sustained or not. However, in the

absence of any discussion or analysis of the evidence by

the High Court in the first appeal, we are of the opinion that

a right of appeal available to Basti Ram would be taken

away if we were to consider the case on its merits without

the opinion of the High Court. Additionally, for a proper

appreciation of the case, it is necessary for us to have

the views of the High Court on record. This is important

since the High Court has reversed a finding of conviction

given by the trial Judge.”

11. This was a case where the respondent-accused was implicated in

offences of sexual assault and kidnapping of a minor girl along with

other related offences and the accused was convicted by the Trial

Court. Conviction of the respondent along with the co-accused was

set aside by a Single Judge of the High Court. It was contended

by the State before this Court that the judgment of acquittal was

passed by the High Court ignoring the statement of prosecutrix,

made under Section 164 of the 1973 Code, as also her testimony

before the trial court. It was in the context of this argument that the

aforesaid judgment was delivered and observations were made in

the passage quoted above. The same course, in our opinion, would

not be mandatory on the question of considering pre-trial bail plea.

12. So far as the initial and the first supplementary chargesheets filed by

the State Police are concerned, the Court of first instance had the

occasion to go through the same. But the High Court opined that after

transfer of investigation to NIA and filing of the second supplementary

chargesheet, which was also placed before the High Court, it should

be the Special Court itself which should examine, at the first instance,

the content of all the chargesheets, before considering the prayer of

an accused for bail. In the present case, when the bail application

was filed before the Single Judge of the High Court under Section

439 of the 1973 Code, the second supplementary chargesheet

had not been submitted. Under the provisions of the 1973 Code, 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 279

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

the jurisdiction of the High Court to consider the question of bail is

coordinate with that of the Sessions Court and it has evolved as a

matter of practice that an accused seeking bail ought to approach

the Sessions Court before approaching the High Court. Thus, at the

point of time when the bail petition was filed by the appellant before

the High Court, there was no apparent jurisdictional shortcoming in

the High Court examining the appellant’s plea for bail. It was also, in

our opinion, the proper course which was adopted by the High Court

exercising jurisdiction under Section 439 of the 1973 Code to refer

the matter to a Division Bench to decide the bail plea in accordance

with Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act. This course has been prescribed in

the judgement of this court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh,

through Inspector General, National Investigation Agency -vsMohd. Hussain alias Salim [(2014) 1 SCC 258], which was relied

upon by the learned Single Judge while placing the bail application

before a Division Bench. The relevant portion of this judgement

passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court stipulates: -

“27. The order passed by this Court on 2-8-2013 in State

of A.P. v. Mohd. Hussain [State of A.P. v. Mohd. Hussain,

(2014) 1 SCC 706] is therefore clarified as follows:

27.1. Firstly, an appeal from an order of the Special Court

under the NIA Act, refusing or granting bail shall lie only

to a Bench of two Judges of the High Court.

27.2. And, secondly as far as Prayer (b) of the petition for

clarification is concerned, it is made clear that inasmuch

as the applicant is being prosecuted for the offences under

the MCOC Act, 1999, as well as the Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1967, such offences are triable only by

the Special Court, and therefore application for bail in such

matters will have to be made before the Special Court

under the NIA Act, 2008, and shall not lie before the High

Court either under Section 439 or under Section 482 of the

Code. The application for bail filed by the applicant in the

present case is not maintainable before the High Court.

27.3. Thus, where the NIA Act applies, the original

application for bail shall lie only before the Special Court,

and appeal against the orders therein shall lie only to a

Bench of two Judges of the High Court.”

280 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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13. The factual position which forms the background of the present

appellant’s plea for bail is, however, different from that in which

the aforesaid judgments were delivered. The appellant before us,

at each stage, had applied for bail before the Court which, at that

point of time, had regular jurisdiction to consider her application. It

was because of supervening circumstances the NIA entered into

the picture and then issued the second supplementary chargesheet.

The Division Bench, being an appellate forum, has the jurisdiction to

look into the facts which may arise subsequent to the order of bail

passed by the Court of regular jurisdiction. The order by which the

Single Judge, hearing the bail application under Section 439 of the

1973 Code, placed the matter before the Division Bench (in essence,

giving the said application the form or character of an appeal under

Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act), had not been assailed by any of the

parties. We also do not find any error in such a direction having

been issued by the Single Judge of the High Court exercising

jurisdiction under Section 439 of the 1973 Code. It was the same

investigation which was continued by the NIA, based on the same

FIR. Only the investigating agency had changed. Just because the

second supplementary chargesheet had been issued by the NIA

after disposal of the bail application by the Sessions Court, it was

not the only legal course available to the High Court to remand the

matter to the Special Court for examining the second supplementary

chargesheet at the first instance. As an Appellate Forum, in the

facts of the given case, it was well within the jurisdiction of the High

Court exercising its power under Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act, to

examine the second supplementary chargesheet as well, while sitting

in appeal over the order of rejection of bail by the regular Sessions

Court upon considering the first two chargesheets.

14. Now, the question arises as to whether the course adopted by the

High Court ought to be invalidated by us simply because another

course, which is suggested by the appellant, could also be adopted

by the High Court. In our view, under ordinary circumstances, we

might not have had interfered with the High Court’s judgment and

order which is under appeal before us. The course adopted by the

High Court was a permissible course. We, however, must take into

account that the High Court had passed the aforesaid order when

the appellant, a lady, was in detention for over four and a half years.

At present, the appellant has been in detention for almost six years, 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 281

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

her age is over 66 years and charges have not yet been framed.

The appellant has also moved an application before us, registered

as CRL MP No. 166531 of 2023, in which various ailments from

which she suffers have been cited and prayer is made for bail on

medical grounds as well.

15. Having taken these factors into account, we do not think it would be

in the interest of justice to remand the matter to the Special Court

constituted under the 2008 Act at this stage. We are taking this

view as in our opinion, it would not have been beyond jurisdiction

of the High Court Division Bench, even in exercise of appellate

power under Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act, to examine the second

supplementary chargesheet as well. For these reasons, we decline

to accept the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Nataraj and shall

proceed to consider here, the appellant’s plea for bail on merit. Now

that we have given leave to the appellant in her petition for special

leave to appeal, the same appellate jurisdiction which vested in the

High Court will vest in us as well and in exercise of such appellate

jurisdiction, we shall consider the appellant’s prayer for bail, which

was not considered by the High Court on merit.

16. It was also urged by Mr. Nataraj that in the appeal-petition, the

appellant has only asked for setting aside the impugned judgment and

order. No specific prayer for bail has been made. But in our opinion,

the plea for bail in the context of the present appeal is implicit. The

petition which was transferred to the Division Bench carried prayer

of the appellant for being released on bail and argument advanced

by Mr. Grover, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant is

that the High Court itself ought to have granted bail to the appellant

on the basis of available materials. Moreover, the appellant in the

appeal-petition has also asked for bail as interim relief. Since the

appeal, in substance, is against the judgment by which prayer for

bail was refused, merely based on the manner of framing of reliefs

or prayers in the subject-petition, the actual relief sought by the

appellant would not stand eclipsed.

17. Mr. Nataraj had also contended that the NIA must be permitted to

contest the bail plea of the appellant before the first Court of bail

on the basis of materials disclosed in the second supplementary

charge-sheet, because the prosecution would also be entitled

to a right of appeal. His submission is that such right of appeal 

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would stand lost if the High Court itself had examined the second

supplementary charge-sheet and decided the question of bail in

favour of the appellant-accused. These are cogent arguments, but

we must not lose sight of the fact that we are concerned here with

the question of liberty of a pre-trial detenue, who is a senior citizen,

in custody for almost six years, against whom charges are yet to be

framed. The question of losing right of an appellate forum would have

greater significance in substantive proceedings but on the question

of bail, in a proceeding where the detenue herself has volunteered

to forego an appellate forum by arguing before us her case for bail,

the approach of this Court would be to address the question on

merit, rather than to send it back to the Court of first instance for

examining the materials available against the appellant.

18. This argument of the prosecution would have had stronger impact if

the last charge-sheet, which the first bail Court could not examine,

had disclosed any new or egregious set of accusations against the

appellant, far removed from those contained in the earlier chargesheets. We have gone through the second supplementary chargesheet

but do not find disclosure of any such material. This question shall

be examined by us in the subsequent paragraphs of this judgment.

19. Another point urged by Mr. Nataraj was that the entirety of incriminating

material in the chargesheets, which forms the basis for implicating the

appellant did not form part of petition for special leave to appeal and to

that extent the investigating agency did not have full opportunity to meet

the appellant’s case. But as would be evident from various paragraphs

of this judgment, these materials were brought on record and both

parties had the opportunity to consider these materials and advance

submissions on that basis. This is not a case where equitable relief is

snatched ex-parte, for instance in case of an ad-interim injunction, by

not bringing to the notice of the Court the entire factual basis of a given

case. In this appeal, both the parties have had sufficient opportunity to

deal with the relevant materials and the appellant cannot be non-suited

on the sole ground of non-disclosure of such materials.

20. We shall now test the appellant’s claim for bail on merit. Having regard

to the proviso to Section 43D (5)1

 of 1967 Act, the Court hearing the

1 43-D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.

1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, every offence punishable under 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 283

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

question of bail is under duty to scan through the case diary or report

made under Section 173 of the Code for the purpose of forming an

opinion to the effect that there are reasonable grounds for believing

that the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true. This test

would apply in only relation to offences stipulated under Chapters IV

and VI of the 1967 Act. So far as the prosecution’s accusation against

the appellant is concerned, allegations of commission of offences

under Sections 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38, 39 and 40 of the 1967 Act

come within the purview of the bail restricting clause as specified in

the aforesaid provision. The manner in which the Court shall come

to such a finding at the stage of considering petition for bail has

this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of

the Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly.

2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this

Act subject to the modification that in sub-section (2),--

(a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and “sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be

construed as references to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety days” respectively; and

(b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:--

“Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of

ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating

the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused

beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty

days:

Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under this Act, requests, for

the purposes of investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any person in judicial

custody, he shall file an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the

delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.

(3) Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this

Act subject to the modification that--

(a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof

(i) to “the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Government

or the State Government.”;

(ii) to “order of the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “order of the

Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”; and

(b) the reference in sub-section (2) thereof, to ‘the State Government” shall be construed as a

reference to “the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”.

(4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any

person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable

under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond

unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for

such release:

Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court,

on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion

that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima

facie true.

(6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under

the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.

(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person

accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the

country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be

recorded in writing.”

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been dealt with and explained in two judgments of two Coordinate

Benches of this Court in the cases of National Investigation Agency

-vs-Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] and Vernon

-vs- The State of Maharashtra & Anr. [2023 INSC 655]. (One of

us, Aniruddha Bose J., was a party to the latter judgement).

21. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), it has been,

inter-alia, held:-

“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the

duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the accusation against the

accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention

was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had

an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA

and Mcoca. The principle underlying those decisions may

have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in

relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably,

under the special enactments such as TADA, Mcoca and

the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,

1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there

are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused

is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is a degree

of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by

the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing

that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the

satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967

Act that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the

accusation against such person is “prima facie” true. By its

very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean

that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating

agency in reference to the accusation against the accused

concerned in the first information report, must prevail

until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other

evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of

such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It

must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given

fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence,

unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree

of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that

the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 285

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as

required under the other special enactments. In any case,

the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for

opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that

the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is

lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for

considering a discharge application or framing of charges

in relation to offences under the 1967 Act. Nevertheless,

we may take guidance from the exposition in Ranjitsing

Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, [(2005) 5

SCC 294 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1057], wherein a three-Judge

Bench of this Court was called upon to consider the scope

of power of the Court to grant bail. In paras 36 to 38, the

Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 316-17)

“36. Does this statute require that before a

person is released on bail, the court, albeit prima

facie, must come to the conclusion that he is not

guilty of such offence? Is it necessary for the

court to record such a finding? Would there be

any machinery available to the court to ascertain

that once the accused is enlarged on bail, he

would not commit any offence whatsoever?

37. Such findings are required to be recorded

only for the purpose of arriving at an objective

finding on the basis of materials on record only

for grant of bail and for no other purpose.

38. We are furthermore of the opinion that the

restrictions on the power of the court to grant

bail should not be pushed too far. If the court,

having regard to the materials brought on record,

is satisfied that in all probability he may not

be ultimately convicted, an order granting bail

may be passed. The satisfaction of the court

as regards his likelihood of not committing an

offence while on bail must be construed to mean

an offence under the Act and not any offence

whatsoever be it a minor or major offence. …

What would further be necessary on the part of 

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the court is to see the culpability of the accused

and his involvement in the commission of an

organised crime either directly or indirectly. The

court at the time of considering the application

for grant of bail shall consider the question from

the angle as to whether he was possessed of

the requisite mens rea.”

And again in paras 44 to 48, the Court observed : (SCC

pp. 318-20)

“44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion,

does not lead to the conclusion that the court

must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant

for bail has not committed an offence under the

Act. If such a construction is placed, the court

intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding

that the applicant has not committed such an

offence. In such an event, it will be impossible

for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of

conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be

the intention of the legislature. Section 21(4) of

Mcoca, therefore, must be construed reasonably.

It must be so construed that the court is able to

maintain a delicate balance between a judgment

of acquittal and conviction and an order granting

bail much before commencement of trial.

Similarly, the court will be required to record

a finding as to the possibility of his committing

a crime after grant of bail. However, such an

offence in futuro must be an offence under the

Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult

to predict the future conduct of an accused, the

court must necessarily consider this aspect of

the matter having regard to the antecedents of

the accused, his propensities and the nature

and manner in which he is alleged to have

committed the offence.

45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose

of considering an application for grant of bail, 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 287

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

although detailed reasons are not necessary

to be assigned, the order granting bail must

demonstrate application of mind at least in

serious cases as to why the applicant has been

granted or denied the privilege of bail.

46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to

weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive

at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities.

However, while dealing with a special statute like

Mcoca having regard to the provisions contained

in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the

court may have to probe into the matter deeper

so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the

materials collected against the accused during

the investigation may not justify a judgment of

conviction. The findings recorded by the court

while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would

be tentative in nature, which may not have any

bearing on the merit of the case and the trial

court would, thus, be free to decide the case

on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial,

without in any manner being prejudiced thereby.

47. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan

[(2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] this

Court observed : (SCC pp. 537-38, para 18)

‘18. We agree that a conclusive finding in

regard to the points urged by both the sides

is not expected of the court considering a

bail application. Still one should not forget, as

observed by this Court in Puran v. Rambilas

[(2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124] :

(SCC p. 344, para 8)

“8. …Giving reasons is different

from discussing merits or demerits.

At the stage of granting bail a

detailed examination of evidence

and elaborate documentation of the

merits of the case has not to be 

288 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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undertaken. … That did not mean

that whilst granting bail some reasons

for prima facie concluding why bail

was being granted did not have to

be indicated.”

We respectfully agree with the above dictum of

this Court. We also feel that such expression

of prima facie reasons for granting bail is a

requirement of law in cases where such orders

on bail application are appealable, more so

because of the fact that the appellate court has

every right to know the basis for granting the

bail. Therefore, we are not in agreement with

the argument addressed by the learned counsel

for the accused that the High Court was not

expected even to indicate a prima facie finding

on all points urged before it while granting bail,

more so in the background of the facts of this

case where on facts it is established that a

large number of witnesses who were examined

after the respondent was enlarged on bail had

turned hostile and there are complaints made

to the court as to the threats administered by

the respondent or his supporters to witnesses in

the case. In such circumstances, the court was

duty-bound to apply its mind to the allegations

put forth by the investigating agency and ought

to have given at least a prima facie finding in

regard to these allegations because they go to

the very root of the right of the accused to seek

bail. The non-consideration of these vital facts

as to the allegations of threat or inducement

made to the witnesses by the respondent

during the period he was on bail has vitiated

the conclusions arrived at by the High Court

while granting bail to the respondent. The other

ground apart from the ground of incarceration

which appealed to the High Court to grant bail

was the fact that a large number of witnesses are 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 289

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

yet to be examined and there is no likelihood of

the trial coming to an end in the near future. As

stated hereinabove, this ground on the facts of

this case is also not sufficient either individually

or coupled with the period of incarceration to

release the respondent on bail because of

the serious allegations of tampering with the

witnesses made against the respondent.’

48. In Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State

of T.N. (2005) 2 SCC 13 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 481]

this Court observed [(SCC pp. 21-22, para 16)]

‘16. … The considerations which

normally weigh with the court in

granting bail in non-bailable offences

have been explained by this Court in

State v. Jagjit Singh [(1962) 3 SCR

622 : AIR 1962 SC 253 : (1962) 1 Cri

LJ 215] and Gurcharan Singh v. State

(UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC 118 :

1978 SCC (Cri) 41] and basically they

are — the nature and seriousness

of the offence; the character of the

evidence; circumstances which are

peculiar to the accused; a reasonable

possibility of the presence of the

accused not being secured at the

trial; reasonable apprehension of

witnesses being tampered with; the

larger interest of the public or the

State and other similar factors which

may be relevant in the facts and

circumstances of the case.’”

22. In the case of Vernon (supra), it was observed:-

“36. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra),

it has been held that the expression “prima facie true”

would mean that the materials/evidence collated by

the investigating agency in reference to the accusation

against the accused concerned in the chargesheet must 

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prevail, unless overcome or disproved by other evidence,

and on the face of it, materials must show complicity of

such accused in the commission of the stated offences.

What this ratio contemplates is that on the face of it, the

accusation against the accused ought to prevail. In our

opinion, however, it would not satisfy the prima facie “test”

unless there is at least surface-analysis of probative value

of the evidence, at the stage of examining the question of

granting bail and the quality or probative value satisfies

the Court of its worth………”

23. We must point out here that Mr. Nataraj has taken a fair stand in

this case and in response to our query on necessity of detention of

the appellant at this stage, for further investigation, he has submitted

that the prosecution at present would not require custody of the

appellant for such purpose. He has simultaneously emphasised on

gravity and seriousness of the offences alleged against the appellant

and submitted that the question of entitlement of the appellant to

be enlarged on bail would have to be examined in the light of the

bail restricting clause of Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act and on

that basis, he has contested the appeal. We shall first examine

the applicability of the offences contained in Chapters IV and VI in

relation to the materials which have been disclosed before us and

then go on to apply the normal principle of granting bail, only on our

satisfaction that the materials disclosed before us do not establish

reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the

appellant under the bail restricting provisions of the 1967 Act are prima

facie true. The substance of allegations against the appellant are,

inter-alia, contained in paragraphs 17.4, 17.5, 17.8, 17.10.1, 17.11,

17.12, 17.15, 17.16 and 17.18 of the chargesheet dated 15.11.2018

and paragraphs 17.4, 17.5 and 17.16 of the first supplementary

chargesheet dated 21.02.2019. The allegations against the appellant

are, inter-alia, contained in paragraphs 17.24, 17.25, 17.29, 17.32,

17.39, 17.45, 17.55, 17.56, 17.73, 17.74, 17.75 and 17.78 of the

second supplementary chargesheet dated 09.10.2020.

24. It is admitted position that appellant was present at Shanivarwada

within the district of Pune on 31.12.2017 when the Elgar Parishad

event took place. But there is no allegation at this stage that apart

from being present, she had any further active participation on that

date in the programme. For instance, there is no allegation that she 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 291

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

had delivered any provocative speech. She was also not named in

the initial FIR which was registered at Vishrambaug Police Station,

Pune on 08.01.2018. The prosecution’s case is that the appellant is

an active member of CPI (Maoist) and conspired with other accused

persons to violently overthrow democracy and the State. There are

also allegations that she provided party funds and also received party

funds from another accused Mahesh Raut, she was paid a sum of

Rs. five lakhs by two other co-accused persons and made constant

attempts to further terrorist activities of the banned CPI (Maoist).

It is also the prosecution’s case that she has been encouraging

youngsters and recruited them as members in the banned organization

and participated in a broad conspiracy to organize Elgar Parishad

programme. It is further alleged that the appellant is associated with

the Indian Association of Peoples Lawyer (“IAPL”), Committee for

the Protection of Democratic Rights (“CPDR”) Anuradha Ghandy

Memorial Committee (“AGMC”) and Kabir Kala Manch (“KKM”) which

have been described as frontal organization of the CPI (Maoist) on

the ground that they are instrumental in organizing meetings and

exchange of messages for implementation of aims and policies of

the said banned organization. Her involvement in the controversy

hatched by two other accused and underground members has also

been highlighted. As we have already indicated, there was a search

in her residential premises on 06.06.2018. It is the prosecution’s

case that materials recovered from her, as also other accused

persons, revealed her participation in the meetings and conferences

of Revolutionary Democratic Front (“RDF”), which again has been

alleged to be a frontal organization to spread the propaganda of

the banned CPI (Maoist). The presence of the appellant in the

National Conference of RDF conducted in Hyderabad is sought to

be demonstrated through the first supplementary chargesheet.

25. In the second supplementary chargesheet, allegations against her

are contained in the paragraphs which we have already referred to.

Here also, the video of the RDF Conference held on 22-23.04.2012

has been highlighted. It is also indicated that she took active part in

the Elgar Parishad function. In this chargesheet, her conduct and

coordination with other accused persons has been sought to be

demonstrated, which include Anand Teltumbadde, Gautam Navlakha,

Hany Babu, Jyoti Jagtap and Stan Swamy (since deceased). It is also

pointed out that she was in close connection with the other members 

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of CPI (Maoist) through e-mail and mobile phones. But we do not

find these allegations to reveal involvement of the appellant in any

outrageously offensive act or activities having characters altogether

different from those contained in the two earlier chargesheets. In

this chargesheet, only her interaction and connection with other

accused persons has been revealed and forms part of the same

chain of accusations.

26. In its counter-affidavit, the NIA, being the contesting respondent before

us, has primarily taken the stand confined to its preliminary objections

on maintainability of this appeal, which we have already noted. But

in course of hearing before us, we were addressed on merit of the

appeal on the question of entitlement of the appellant to be released

on bail, having regard to the proviso of Section 43D(5) of 1967

Act. The materials which form part of the three chargesheets, were

brought on record before us by the appellant through two additional

affidavits. Apart from these of these of the appellant, detailed written

submission has been filed by Mr. Nataraj, which contains a series of

documents found to be incriminating by the prosecution along with

witness statements implicating the appellant.

27. So far as the appellant is concerned, the prosecution has emphasised

on the following list of materials forming part of this appeal:-

(i) A Letter dated 08.06.2017 from one “Comrade M” addressed

to “Comrade Surendra”, which carries reference to the

appellant to the limited extent that the party leadership has

sent instructions to “Comrade Shomasen” for strengthening

CPDR and Radical Student’s Union in Nagpur, Chandrapur

and Gondia region. This letter also records that necessary

funds have been sent, but no specific person is named as

the recipient of such funds.

(ii) Letter dated 23.12.2017 from one “R” addressed to “Comrade

Prakash” which relates to constituting a fact-finding team to

gauge the truth about fake encounters in Gadchiroli and it has

been indicated that letter that “Shoma” will speak to the friends,

presumably of the author and addressee of the letter, in Nagpur

who might join the team.

(iii) Next is a letter dated 02.01.2018 from one “Com. M” to

“Comrade Rona” and the offending part of this letter, so far as

the appellant is concerned, is to the effect that “Com. Shoma” 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 293

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

and “Com. Surendra” were authorised to provide funds for the

future.

(iv) Next document bears the character of a minutes of a meeting

dated 02.01.2008, which marks the presence of “Shomasen”

as a “leading CPDR member”, along with certain other accused

individuals.

(v) Thereafter, an undated account statement is relied on by the

prosecution, which mentions “Shoma” as recipient of “1L”

(presumably Rs. one lakh) from “Surendra” who is the accused

no. 3 in the present case.

(vi) The prosecution has relied on another letter dated 25.09.2017,

written by “Com. Prakash” addressed to “Comrade Surendra”

where the author asks the addressee to coordinate with

“shomasen” and ensure that all pgp files are securely wiped

out from all the computers.

(vii) Then there is another letter dated 05.11.2017 purported to

have been written by “Comrade Surendra” and addressed to

“Comrade Prakash” wherein the author informs the addressee

that the information from the party has been communicated to

“Soma” and she has destroyed all the data on her computer

in addition to all the APT files sent by the party, old and new

letters and the party’s resolutions etc.

(viii) The last set of documents includes the panchnama of the

search conducted at the house of the appellant, along with

the Forensic Science Laboratory (‘FSL”) Report containing

the analysis of the materials seized from the appellant. These

documents have been cited by Mr. Nataraj to corroborate

the allegations of destruction of evidence at the instance of

the co-accused persons. The FSL report reveals that deleted

audio and video files were retrieved from hard disk and also

mentions that uninstalled softwares have been recovered, but no

substantive content of the deleted materials has been placed in

the chargesheets. The material placed before us only indicates

that the process of deletion had taken place.

It appears that all the letters and other materials mentioned in the

above list have been purported to have been recovered from the

electronic devices of co-accused Rona Wilson.

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28. The next set of evidences to which our attention has been drawn by

Mr. Nataraj are four witness statements, two of whom were originally

given the status of protected witnesses. We have referred to their

present status earlier in this judgment. The accusations made by

the four witnesses in their respective statements placed before us

are as follows:-

(i) The first protected witness (KW1) statement carries reference

to Shoma Sen as having addressed the delegates of the

conference of RDF held in April 2012. The relevant part of the

said recorded statement reads:-

“………Shoma Sen said that we have to

understand the essence of the Maoist slogan

‘women hold up half the sky’. To solve the

problems women in our country, as well as in

other countries, the struggle for New Democratic

Revolution is the only way forward. Simply she

was advocating women to join CPI Maoist to

solve their issues……....”

(ii) The statement of KW-2 recorded by the NIA under Section 161

of the 1973 Code on 10.08.2020 reveals alleged presence of

the appellant in the office of a co-accused person i.e. Surendra

Gadling, when KW-2 purported to have joined the CPI (Maoist)

at the instance of Surendra.

(iii) A redacted statement of KW-3, who is a protected witness,

has been produced by the NIA in its written submissions. This

witness, on being asked about senior Naxal members of CPI

(Maoist), stated that he first met the appellant in 2007-08, during

the classes of communist ideology, revolutionary movement,

party working etc. in Nagpur, which were attended by some

other individuals. The same witness goes on implicate the

appellant in certain message channels working to exchange

messages regarding urban work of CPI (Maoist). In this regard,

he has stated that:-

“……..During year 2017, there were 3-4

message channels were working to exchange

message between Deepak and Angela regarding

urban work of CPI (Maoist) viz (i) Deepak -Nandu 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 295

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

(Myself)- Kalyan Hirekhan-Gadling-Angela; for

legal work (ii) Deepak-Nandu (Myself)-Kalyan

Hirekhan- Angela Sontakke at Shoma Sen’s

house for meeting with Deepak in Nagpur (iii)

Deepak-Nandu (Myself)- Arif Shaikh (WCL

worker and Journalist)-Vipalav Teltumbde

(Nephew of Deepak Teltumbde)-Angela; this

was the second option for meeting of Deepak &

Angela (iv) Deepak-Nandu (Myself)-Arif ShaikhNT Maske- Angela Sontakke; alternative meeting

channel……...”

This statement, however, does not prima facie show any direct

involvement of the appellant in the offending acts with which

she has been charged vis-à-vis the bail restricting provisions

of the 1967 Act.

(iv) From the three statements of Kumarasai who was originally

identified as “KW-4”, there are only two purported incriminating

references to the appellant, in the second and the third ones,

recorded on 23.12.2018 and 24.08.2020 respectively. In the

former statement, which was recorded by the State Police, he

stated that appellant was working along with an intellectual

group for solving problems of women and students. In the latter

statement, recorded by the NIA, he stated that the appellant

was an urban Naxalite working with CPI (Maoist). The name

of the appellant, however, does not figure in his first statement

recorded by the State Police on 02.11.2018.

29. In the light of these materials we shall have to examine the strength of

prosecution’s case to implicate the appellant in the offences specified

under Sections 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38, 39 and 40 of the 1967 Act.

There is also allegation against her for commission of offence under

Section 13 of the same statute, but that offence does not come under

the purview of the bail restricting provision of Section 43D (5) of the

1967 Act and we shall deal with that accusation in the succeeding

paragraphs of this judgment. The offences under Chapter IV of the

1967 Act with which the appellant has been charged with by the

prosecuting agency, mainly stem from commission of a terrorist

act or any act in connection therewith. Section 15 of the 1967 Act

stipulates: - 

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“15. Terrorist act.— (1) Whoever does any act with intent

to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security,

economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to

strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any

section of the people in India or in any foreign country,—

(a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive

substances or inflammable substances or

firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or

noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other

substances (whether biological radioactive,

nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature

or by any other means of whatever nature to

cause or likely to cause—

(i) death of, or injuries to, any person or

persons; or

(ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of,

property; or

(iii) disruption of any supplies or services

essential to the life of the community in

India or in any foreign country; or

(iii-a)damage to, the monetary stability of

India by way of production or smuggling

or circulation of high quality counterfeit

Indian paper currency, coin or of any

other material; or

(iv) damage or destruction of any property

in India or in a foreign country used or

intended to be used for the defence of

India or in connection with any other

purposes of the Government of India,

any State Government or any of their

agencies; or

(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show

of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes

death of any public functionary or attempts to

cause death of any public functionary; or

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 297

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and

threatens to kill or injure such person or does any

other act in order to compel the Government of

India, any State Government or the Government

of a foreign country or an international or intergovernmental organisation or any other person

to do or abstain from doing any act; or commits

a terrorist act.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section,—

(a) “public functionary” means the constitutional

authorities or any other functionary notified in

the Official Gazette by the Central Government

as public functionary;

(b) “high quality counterfeit Indian currency” means

the counterfeit currency as may be declared

after examination by an authorised or notified

forensic authority that such currency imitates or

compromises with the key security features as

specified in the Third Schedule.

(2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an

offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the

treaties specified in the Second Schedule.”

30. We are not concerned with sub-section (2) of the said provision. In this

appeal, there is no allegation of any act of the appellant constituting

an offence within the scope of the Second Schedule to the same

statute. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 refers to certain acts which

would constitute a terrorist act but the first part of sub-section (1)

of Section 15 cannot be read in isolation. In our reading of the said

provision of the statute, to qualify for being a terrorist act, such act

must be done with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity,

integrity, security, economic security or sovereignty of India or such

act must be accompanied with an intent to strike terror or likely to

strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in

any foreign country. These are initial requirements to invoke Section

15(1) of the 1967 Act. The legislature, however, has not left the nature

of such acts unspecified and in sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) of the

said sub-section, the law stipulates the manner of commission of 

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the acts specified in first part of sub-section (1) of said Section 15. If

any offender attempts to commit any of the acts specified in Section

15(1), to come within the ambit of the expression “terrorist act” under

the 1967 legislation, action or intention to cause such act must be

by those means, which have been specified in sub-clauses (a), (b),

and (c) of the said provision. This is the line of reasoning broadly

followed by this Court in the case of Vernon (supra) in construing the

applicability of the said provision. If we examine the acts attributed

to the appellant by the various witnesses or as inferred from the

evidence relied on by the prosecution, we do not find prima facie

commission or attempt to commit any terrorist act by the appellant

applying the aforesaid test for invoking Section 15 read with Section

162

 of the 1967 Act.

31. On the allegations of raising funds for a terrorist act forming part of

charges under Section 17 of the 19673

 Act, most of the materials

have emanated from recovery of documents from devices of third

parties and at this stage, on the strength of the materials produced

before us, the prosecution has not been able to corroborate or even

raise a hint of corroboration of the allegation that the appellant has

funded any terrorist act or has received any money for that purpose.

What we can infer on the basis of the materials produced before us,

are mere third-party allegations that money has been directed to be

2 16. Punishment for terrorist act.—

(1) Whoever commits a terrorist act shall,—

(a) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death or imprisonment

for life, and shall also be liable to fine;

(b) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than

five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

3 17. Punishment for raising funds for terrorist act.—Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly

or indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source,

from any person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds for any person or

persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such person or persons or

by a terrorist organisation or by a terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a terrorist act,

notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act, shall be

punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to

imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section,—

(a) participating, organising or directing in any of the acts stated therein shall constitute an

offence;

(b) raising funds shall include raising or collecting or providing funds through production or

smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian currency; and

(c) raising or collecting or providing funds, in any manner for the benefit of, or, to an individual

terrorist, terrorist gang or terrorist organisation for the purpose not specifically covered under

Section 15 shall also be construed as an offence.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 299

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

sent to her. None of the materials reveal receipt of any funds by her

or her direct role in raising or collecting funds. We are conscious

of the fact that in course of trial, the prosecution will have the

opportunity to bring more detailed evidence in that regard, but here

we are only examining whether the offences under Part IV & VI of

the 1967 Act, alleged to have been committed by the appellant, are

prima facie true or not.

32. As regards the allegation against the appellant for committing an

offence under Section 184

 of the 1967 Act are concerned, which

includes conspiracy or attempt on her part to commit, advocate, abet,

advice, incite or facilitate commission or any terrorist act, the materials

collected so far, even if we believe them to be true at this stage,

applying the principles enunciated by this Court in the case of Zahoor

Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), only reveal her participation in some

meetings and her attempt to encourage women to join the struggle

for new democratic revolution. These allegations, prima facie, do not

reveal the commission of an offence under Section 18 of the 1967 Act.

33. KW-2 has found her to be present in the office of another co-accused

Surendra, when he was being convinced by Surendra to join CPI

(Maoist), but her mere presence on the spot, by itself, would not

constitute an offence of recruiting any person or persons for a terrorist

act, as specified in Section 18 thereof. As regards the statement of

KW-3, he claims to have met the appellant in 2007-08 during her

lectures on communist ideology and party-functioning of CPI (Maoist)

at Nagpur. At that point of time, CPI (Maoist) had not been included in

the First Schedule of the 1967 Act enumerating terrorist organisations.

It came to be banned on 22.06.2009, as we have already specified.

Kumarasai, i.e. KW-4 in his third statement recorded on 24.08.2020

has only stated she is an urban Naxal working for CPI (Maoist). On

this thin thread, we cannot apply the rigors of Section 43D (5) of

the 1967 Act against her. Apart from that, there is no evidence that

she was a member of CPI (Maoist). There are no specific materials

or statements produced by the prosecution which attribute acts of

recruitment in banned organization by the appellant. Thus, at this

4 18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc.—Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets,

advises or incites, directs or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory

to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be

less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

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stage, we cannot form an opinion that the accusation against her

under Section 18-B5

 of the 1967 Act is prima facie true.

34. So far as the allegation of prosecution of the appellant being member of

frontal organisation of CPI (Maoist), reference has been made to RDF,

IAPL, CPDR, AGMC and KKM. But apart from mere allegations that

these are frontal organizations of CPI (Maoist), no credible evidence

has been produced before us through which these organisations can

be connected to the aforesaid banned terrorist organization. Thus, the

offence under Section 20 of the 1967 Act relating to membership of

a terrorist organisation which is involved in a terrorist act, cannot be

made out against the appellant at this stage, on the basis of materials

produced before us. Relying on the judgement of this Court in the

case of Vernon (supra), we have already dealt with the position of

the appellant vis-à-vis terrorist acts in the earlier paragraphs of this

judgement and we prima facie do not think that Section 206

 of the

1967 Act can be made applicable against the appellant at this stage

of the proceeding based on the available materials.

35. The next set of allegations against her to bring her case within the

bail restricting provisions relates to offences specified under Chapter

VI of 1967 Act. This set of allegations relates to being associated

with a terrorist organization. We have already given our finding on

such allegations and in our prima facie opinion, the allegations of the

prosecution that the appellant is a member of a terrorist organisation

or that she associates herself or professes to associate herself with

a terrorist organization are not true, and at this stage, she cannot

be implicated in the offence under Sections 387

 of 1967 Act. Mere

5 18-B. Punishment for recruiting of any person or persons for terrorist act.—Whoever recruits or

causes to be recruited any person or persons for commission of a terrorist act shall be punishable with

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment

for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

6 20. Punishment for being member of terrorist gang or organisation.—Any person who is a member

of a terrorist gang or a terrorist organisation, which is involved in terrorist act, shall be punishable with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

7 38. Offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation.—

(1) A person, who associates himself, or professes to be associated, with a terrorist organisation

with intention to further its activities, commits an offence relating to membership of a terrorist

organisation:

Provided that this sub-section shall not apply where the person charged is able to prove—

(a) that the organisation was not declared as a terrorist organisation at the time when he became

a member or began to profess to be a member; and

(b) that he has not taken part in the activities of the organisation at any time during its inclusion

in the First Schedule as a terrorist organisation.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 301

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

meeting of accused individuals or being connected with them through

any medium cannot implicate one in Chapter VI offences under of the

1967 Act, in the absence of any further evidence of being associated

with a terrorist organisation. Such association or connection must

be in relation to furtherance of terrorist act. It has been held by this

Court in the case of Vernon (supra):-

“32. “Terrorist act” as defined under Section 2(k) of the

1967 Act carries the meaning assigned to it in Section 15.

This Section also stipulates that the expressions “terrorism”

and “terrorist” shall be construed accordingly. This implies

construction of these two expressions in the same way as

has been done in Section 15.

“terrorist organisation” has been independently defined

in Section 2(m) to mean an organisation listed in the

First Schedule or an organisation operating under the

same name as an organisation so listed. But so far as

the word “terrorist” is concerned, in this Section also,

the interpretation thereof would be relatable to the same

expression as used in Section 15. It is one of the basic

rules of statutory construction that an expression used

in different parts of a statute shall ordinarily convey the

same meaning – unless contrary intention appears from

different parts of the same enactment itself. We do not

find any such contrary intention in the 1967 Act.

33. Section 38 of the 1967 Act carries the heading or title

“offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation”.

As we have already observed, a terrorist act would have to

be construed having regard to the meaning assigned to it

in Section 15 thereof. We have given our interpretation to

this provision earlier. “terrorist organisation” [as employed

in Section 2(m)], in our opinion is not a mere nomenclature

and this expression would mean an organisation that carries

on or indulges in terrorist acts, as defined in said Section

15. The term terrorism, in view of the provisions of Section

(2) A person, who commits the offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation under subsection (1), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or with fine,

or with both.

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2(k) of the said Act, ought to be interpreted in tandem with

what is meant by ‘terrorist Act’ in Section 15 thereof.

34. In this context, to bring the appellants within the fold of

Section 38 of the 1967 Act, the prosecution ought to have

prima facie establish their association with intention to further

the said organisation’s terrorist activities. It is only when such

intention to further the terrorist activities is established prima

facie, appellants could be brought within the fold of the offence

relating to membership of a terrorist organisation. To bring

within the scope of Section 38 of the 1967 Act, it would not be

sufficient to demonstrate that one is an associate or someone

who professes to be associated with a terrorist organisation.

But there must be intention to further the activities of such

organisation on the part of the person implicated under

such provision. But the same line of reasoning in respect

of membership of a terrorist organisation under Section 20,

ought to apply in respect of an alleged offender implicated

in Section 38 of the 1967 Act. There must be evidence of

there being intention to be involved in a terrorist act. So far

as the appellants are concerned, at this stage there is no

such evidence before us on which we can rely.”

We, further, do not think the undated account statement has sufficient

probative value at this stage to prima facie sustain a case against

her and implicate her for offences relating to the provision of support

or raising of funds for a terrorist organisation, specified under

Section 398

 and 409

 of 1967 Act. Evidence of her involvement in

8 39. Offence relating to support given to a terrorist organisation. —

(1) A person commits the offence relating to support given for a terrorist organisation,—

(a) who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation,—

(i) invites support for the terrorist organisation, and

(ii) the support is not or is not restricted to provide money or other property within the

meaning of Section 40; or

(b) who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation, arranges, manages or

assists in arranging or managing a meeting which, he knows, is—

(i) to support the terrorist organisation, or

(ii) to further the activity of the terrorist organisation, or

(iii) to be addressed by a person who associates or professes to be associated with the

terrorist organisation; or

(c) who, with intention to further the activity of a terrorist organisation, addresses a meeting

for the purpose of encouraging support for the terrorist organisation or to further its activity.

(2) A person, who commits the offence relating to support given to a terrorist organisation under subsection (1) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or with fine,

or with both.

9 40. Offence of raising fund for a terrorist organisation.—

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 303

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

any fund-raising activities for the CPI (Maoist) or her support to the

said organisation has not transpired through any reliable evidence

before us at this stage.

36. In the light of our observations made in this judgment and on our

perusal of the evidences collected against her as also the allegations

made by prosecution witnesses, we are of the opinion that there is

no reasonable ground for believing that the accusations against the

appellants for commission of the offences incorporated in Chapter

IV and VI of the 1967 Act are prima facie true.

37. In the case of K.A. Najeeb -vs- Union of India [(2021) 3 SCC 713],

a three Judge Bench of this Court (of which one of us Aniruddha

Bose, J was a party), has held that a Constitutional Court is not strictly

bound by the prohibitory provisions of grant of bail in the 1967 Act

and can exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to release an accused

on bail who has been incarcerated for a long period of time, relying

on Article 21 of Constitution of India. This decision was sought to

be distinguished by Mr. Nataraj on facts relying on judgment of this

Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh -vs- State of Punjab [2024

INSC 92]. In this judgment, it has been held:-

“32. The Appellant’s counsel has relied upon the case of

KA Najeeb (supra) to back its contention that the appellant

has been in jail for last five years which is contrary to

law laid down in the said case. While this argument may

appear compelling at first glance, it lacks depth and 22

substance. In KA Najeeb’s case this court was confronted

with a circumstance wherein except the respondent-

(1) A person commits the offence of raising fund for a terrorist organisation, who, with intention to

further the activity of a terrorist organisation,—

(a) invites another person to provide money or other property, and intends that it should be used,

or has reasonable cause to suspect that it might be used, for the purposes of terrorism; or

(b) receives money or other property, and intends that it should be used, or has reasonable

cause to suspect that it might be used, for the purposes of terrorism; or

(c) provides money or other property, and knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that it

would or might be used for the purposes of terrorism.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, a reference to provide money or other property

includes—

(a) of its being given, lent or otherwise made available, whether or not for consideration; or

(b) raising, collecting or providing funds through production or smuggling or circulation of high

quality counterfeit Indian currency.

(2) A person, who commits the offence of raising fund for a terrorist organisation under sub-section

(1), shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years, or with fine,

or with both.

304 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

accused, other co-accused had already undergone trial

and were sentenced to imprisonment of not exceeding

eight years therefore this court’s decision to consider

bail was grounded in the anticipation of the impending

sentence that the respondent accused might face upon

conviction and since the respondent-accused had already

served portion of the maximum imprisonment i.e., more

than five years, this court took it as a factor influencing its

assessment to grant bail. Further, in KA Najeeb’s case the

trial of the respondent-accused was severed from the other

co-accused owing to his absconding and he was traced

back in 2015 and was being separately tried thereafter and

the NIA had filed a long list of witnesses that were left to

be examined with reference to the said accused therefore

this court was of the view of unlikelihood of completion of

trial in near future. However, in the present case the trial is

already under way and 22 witnesses including the protected

witnesses have been examined. As already discussed, the

material available on record indicates the involvement of

the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed

by members of banned terrorist organization involving

exchange of large quantum of money through different

channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in

such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there

is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses

of the case which might hamper the process of justice. 23

Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences

as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a

ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on

the behalf the appellant cannot be accepted.”

38. Relying on this judgement, Mr. Nataraj, submits that bail is not a

fundamental right. Secondly, to be entitled to be enlarged on bail,

an accused charged with offences enumerated in Chapters IV and

VI of the 1967 Act, must fulfil the conditions specified in Section

43D (5) thereof. We do not accept the first part of this submission.

This Court has already accepted right of an accused under the said

offences of the 1967 Act to be enlarged on bail founding such right

on Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This was in the case of

Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long period of incarceration 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 305

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

was held to be a valid ground to enlarge an accused on bail in

spite of the bail-restricting provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967

Act. Pre-conviction detention is necessary to collect evidence (at

the investigation stage), to maintain purity in the course of trial and

also to prevent an accused from being fugitive from justice. Such

detention is also necessary to prevent further commission of offence

by the same accused. Depending on gravity and seriousness of the

offence alleged to have been committed by an accused, detention

before conclusion of trial at the investigation and post-chargesheet

stage has the sanction of law broadly on these reasonings. But

any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the

Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being

reasonable, following a just and fair procedure and such deprival

must be proportionate in the facts of a given case. These would

be the overarching principles which the law Courts would have to

apply while testing prosecution’s plea of pre-trial detention, both at

investigation and post-chargesheet stage.

39. As regards second part of Mr. Nataraj’s argument which we have

noted in the preceding paragraph, we accept it with a qualification. The

reasoning in Najeeb’s (supra) case would also have to be examined,

if it is the Constitutional Court which is examining prosecution’s plea

for retaining in custody an accused charged with bail-restricting

offences. He cited the case of Gurwinder Singh (supra) in which

the judgement of K. A. Najeeb (supra) was distinguished on facts

and a judgment of the High Court rejecting the prayer for bail of the

appellant was upheld. But this was a judgment in the given facts of

that case and did not dislocate the axis of reasoning on constitutional

ground enunciated in the case of Najeeb (supra). On behalf of

the prosecution, another order of a Coordinate Bench passed on

18.01.2024, in the case of Mazhar Khan -vs- N.I.A. New Delhi

[Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 14091 of 2023] was cited. In this

order, the petitioner’s prayer for overturning a bail-rejection order of the

High Court under similar provisions of the 1967 Act was rejected by

the Coordinate Bench applying the ratio of the case of Watali (supra)

judgment and also considering the case of Vernon (supra). We have

proceeded in this judgment accepting the restrictive provisions to be

valid and applicable and then dealt with the individual allegations in

terms of the proviso to Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act. Thus, the

prosecution’s case, so far as the appellant is concerned, does not 

306 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

gain any premium from the reasoning forming the basis of the case

of Mazhar Khan (supra).

40. Two authorities have been cited by the appellant in which gross

delay in trial was held to be a ground for granting bail in statutes in

which there was restriction on such grant. These are the judgements

of this court in the cases of Shaheen Welfare Association -vsUnion of India and Others [(1996) 2 SCC 616] and Angela Harish

Sontakke -vs- State of Maharashtra [(2021) 3 SCC 723]. But each

of these cases has been decided on their own facts and so far as

the appellant’s case is concerned, we have examined the materials

disclosed before us and given our finding as regards applicability of

Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act in her case.

41. Once we find that Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act would not be

applicable in the case of the appellant, we shall have to examine

the case of the appellant in relation to accusation against her

under Section 13 of the 1967 Act and also other offences under

the provisions of the 1860 Code, which we have narrated earlier.

We have already indicated that she is a lady of advanced age,

suffering from various ailments. The ailments by themselves may not

be serious enough for granting bail on medical ground. But taking

cognizance of the composite effect of delay in framing charge, period

of detention undergone by her, the nature of allegations against

her vis-à-vis the materials available before this Court at this stage

in addition to her age and medical condition, we do not think she

ought to be denied the privilege of being enlarged on bail pending

further process subsequent to issue of chargesheets against her

in the subject-case.

42. We repeat here that our observations as regards the nature of

allegations against her are only prima facie views and the future

course of her prosecution would be dependent upon framing of charge

and if charges are framed, the nature of evidence the prosecution

can adduce against her in trial as also her own defence. With these

observations, we set aside the impugned judgment and direct that

the appellant be released on bail on such conditions the Special

Court may consider fit and proper but the conditions shall include

the following:-

(a) The appellant shall not leave the State of Maharashtra without

leave of the Special Court.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 307

Shoma Kanti Sen v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.

(b) The appellant shall surrender her passport, if she possesses

one, with the Special Court, during the period she remains

enlarged on bail.

(c) The appellant shall inform the Investigating Officer of the NIA the

address where she shall reside during the period she remains

enlarged on bail.

(d) The appellant shall use only one mobile number, during the

time she remains on bail, and shall inform her mobile number

to the Investigating Officer of the NIA.

(e) The appellant shall also ensure that her mobile phone remains

active and charged round the clock so that she remains

constantly accessible throughout the period she remains

enlarged on bail.

(f) During this period, i.e. the period during which she remains on

bail, the appellant shall keep the location status (GPS) of her

mobile phone active, twenty-four hours a day, and her phone

shall be paired with that of the Investigating Officer of the NIA

to enable him, at any given time, to identify the appellants’

exact location.

(g) The appellant, while on bail, shall report to the Station House

Officer of the Police Station within whose jurisdiction she shall

reside, once every fortnight.

43. In the event there is breach of any of these conditions or any other

condition that may be imposed by the Special Court independently, it

would be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of bail granted

to the appellant before the Special Court only, without any further

reference to this Court.

44. The appeal stands allowed in the above terms and Criminal

Miscellaneous Petition No.166531 of 2023 shall also stand disposed

of.

45. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.