Constitution of India – Art 226 – Exercise of discretionary powers under – Delay or laches, effect – On facts, four years after the allotment of LPG distributorship in favour of the appellant, and on acceptance of the alternate land offered by the appellant and permitting him to construct the godown and the showroom, the unsuccessful bidder challenged the decision of the Corporation – High Court dismissed the writ petition, however, in appeal the allotment made in favour of the appellant was set aside – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 506 : 2024 INSC 314

Mrinmoy Maity

v.

Chhanda Koley and Others

(Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 2024)

18 April 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Aravind Kumar,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Writ court, if justified in entertaining the writ petition filed by the

respondent No.1 challenging the approval granted in favour of the

appellant for starting LPG distributorship.

Headnotes

Constitution of India – Art 226 – Exercise of discretionary

powers under – Delay or laches, effect – On facts, four years

after the allotment of LPG distributorship in favour of the

appellant, and on acceptance of the alternate land offered

by the appellant and permitting him to construct the godown

and the showroom, the unsuccessful bidder challenged the

decision of the Corporation – High Court dismissed the writ

petition, however, in appeal the allotment made in favour of

the appellant was set aside – Correctness:

Held: Delay defeats equity – Delay or laches is one of the factors

which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising

discretionary powers u/Art. 226 – Applicant who approaches the

court belatedly ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief

by the writ courts – In a given case, the High Court may refuse

to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the

applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to

drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the

lapsed cause of action – Discretion to be exercised would be

with care and caution, depending upon the facts of the case –

Though, for filing of a writ petition, no fixed period of limitation

is prescribed, however, it has to be filed within a reasonable

time – If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and

laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole

ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge

in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 507

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

wrong – On facts, writ petition ought to have been dismissed

on the ground of delay and laches itself – Writ petitioner was

aware of all the developments including that of the allotment of

distributorship having been made in favour of the appellant way

back in 2014, yet did not challenge and only on acceptance of

the alternate land offered by the appellant in 2017 and permitting

him to construct the godown and the showroom, the same was

challenged and thereby the writ petitioner had allowed his right

if at all if any to be drifted away or acquiesced in the acts of the

Corporation – Also, the appropriate government felt the need of

permitting the Oil Marketing Companies to be more flexible and

as such modification to the guidelines had been brought about

whereby the applicants were permitted to offer alternate land

where the land initially offered by them was found deficient or

not suitable or change of the land, subject to specifications laid

down in the advertisement being met – Thus, the order of the

Division Bench of the High Court is set aside, and that of the

Single Judge is restored. [Para 15]

Case Law Cited

Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and

others. [2008] 15 SCR 194 : (2009) 1 SCC 768;

Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. and another v. K.

Thangappan and another [2006] 3 SCR 783 : (2006)

4 SCC 322; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply &

Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu [2014]

1 SCR 987 : (2014) 4 SCC 108 – referred to.

List of Acts

Constitution of India.

List of Keywords

LPG distributorship; Exercise of discretionary powers; Delay or

laches; Extraordinary relief; Cause of action; Period of limitation;

Acquiescence.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2018 of the High Court

at Calcutta in CAN No. 809 of 2018

508 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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Appearances for Parties

Pijush K. Roy, Sr. Adv., Pritthish Roy, Ms. Kakali Roy, Asit Roy, Rajan

K. Chourasia, Advs. for the Appellant.

Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., Zoheb Hossain, Ms. Asha Gopalan

Nair, Sandeep Narain, Ms. Nivedita Nair, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Aravind Kumar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The short point that arises for consideration in this appeal is:

“Whether the writ court was justified in entertaining the writ

petition filed by the respondent No.1 herein challenging

the approval dated 03.06.2014 granted in favour of

the appellant herein for starting LPG distributorship at

Jamalpur, District Burdwan?”

3. The facts in brief which has led to filing of the present appeal are

as under:

4. An advertisement came to be issued on 09.09.2012 calling for

application for distributors to grant LPG distributorship under

GP Category at Jamalpur, District Burdwan. From amongst the

applications so received, the application submitted by the appellant

as well as respondent No.1 were found to be in order. Since both

the appellant and the respondent No.1 were held to be eligible from

amongst the six (6) candidates, draw of lots was held on 11.05.2013

and appellant was found successful candidate and was selected

for verification of the documents. A letter of intent was issued to

the appellant on 24.02.2014 and on 03.06.2014 the approval was

granted by the BPCL in favour of the appellant for starting LPG

distributorship at the notified place.

5. After a lapse of 4 years, the respondent No.1 filed a complaint with

the BPCL alleging that land offered by the appellant was a Barga land

and same cannot be considered. Subsequently application having

been filed by the appellant offering an alternate land, the Corporation

allowed the prayer of the appellant to construct the godown and

showroom on the alternate land offered by the appellant.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 509

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

6. The respondent No.1 being a rival applicant for grant of distributorship,

having participated in submitting the application and being

unsuccessful in the draw of lots held way back in the year 2013

and being aggrieved by the decision of the Corporation to permit the

appellant to commence the construction of godown and showroom

on the alternate land offered, filed a writ petition in the year 2017

i.e., on 10.04.2017. Initially, there was an order of status quo passed

by the Learned Single Judge and on receiving the report from

the Corporation the writ petition came to be dismissed vide order

dated 18.01.2018 on the ground that the writ petitioner (respondent

No.1 herein) had no locus standi since she had participated in the

selection process. Being aggrieved by the same the intra-court appeal

came to be filed and the appellate court by the impugned judgment

allowed the appeal on the ground (a) that the successful applicant

had not offered unencumbered land for construction of godown and

showroom; (b) the land offered by the appellant was in contravention

of clause 7.1(vi) and (vii) of the guidelines for selection of regular

LPG Distributors; (c) the amendment of the said guidelines brought

about subsequently, cannot be made applicable retrospectively. The

allotment made in favour of the (appellant herein) was set aside by

the impugned order and as a consequence of it, the letter of intent,

the letter of approval accepting the alternate land offered by the

(appellant herein) and all subsequent permissions, licences and no

objections issued in his favour were held to be of no effect. Hence,

this appeal.

7. We have heard Shri Pijush K. Roy, learned Senior Counsel appearing

for the appellant and Shri Zoheb Hossain, learned counsel appearing

for respondent No.1 and Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior

Counsel for the Corporation. Learned counsel for the appellant

would vehemently contend that Learned Single Judge had rightly

dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of locus standi of

the writ petitioner and had dissolved the interim order granted earlier.

It is also contended that by the time the interim order of status quo

came to be passed by the Learned Single Judge on 20.07.2017, the

appellant herein had already submitted an application for accepting

the alternate land offered and which request came to be processed

and the applicant (appellant herein) had been allowed to construct

the godown and showroom on the alternate land so offered. These

facts though being available, the Division Bench ignoring the same 

510 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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had proceeded on tangent in accepting the plea of the writ petitioner

without examining the aspect of delay and giving a complete go by

for laches exhibited on the part of the writ petitioner and extended

the olive branch on surmises and conjectures and as such the

impugned order is liable to be set-aside and consequently, writ

petition which came to be dismissed by the Learned Single Judge

has to be upheld. Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel

appearing on behalf of the Corporation has fairly submitted that in

the light of the appellant herein being successful in the allotment

by draw of lots, had been issued with the letter of intent and the

prayer for offering the alternate land was also accepted and having

regard to the subsequent development namely the subsequent

notification dated 30.04.2015 issued by the appropriate government

directing the Oil Marketing Companies to provide flexibility in the

selection guidelines by providing an “opportunity to offer alternate

land in response to the advertisement” which clarified the position

with regard to alternative land offered had been acted upon by the

Corporation in the instant case and being satisfied with the bona

fides of the applicant/appellant, the Corporation had permitted the

construction, and accordingly the construction has been put up along

with building, the godown and the showroom and as such he has

prayed for suitable orders being passed.

8. On the contrary, Shri Zoheb Hossain, learned counsel appearing for

the respondent No.1 vehemently opposed the prayer of the appellant

herein and supported the order passed by the Division Bench. He

would contend that issue of delay in filing the Writ Petition has been

rightly ignored by the Division Bench and same has to recede to

background in the facts obtained in the present case, in as much

as the blatant violation of the guidelines would go to the root of the

matter and the inherent defect cannot be allowed to be rectified,

that too by relying upon an amendment to the guidelines which has

come into force subsequent to the advertisement in question or in

other words rules of the game could not have been changed after

the commencement of the game which was exactly the exercise

undertaken by the Learned Single Judge and rightly found to be

improper by the Division Bench. Hence, he prays for dismissal of

the appeal.

9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts

obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 511

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ

petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and

laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or

in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of

time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the

extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has

held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors

which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising

discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In

a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary

powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has

allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made

subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If

the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is

explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in

such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party

that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There

may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the

extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances

of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula

with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised

by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the

terrain in which the facts have travelled.

11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of

limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction

of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within

a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of

memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the

cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances

on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be

dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that

the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought

to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the

writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take

advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver

of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction

under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into

consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in 

512 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar

Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others., (2009) 1 SCC 768

has held to the following effect:

“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt

true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But

while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32,

226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into

account certain factors and one of such considerations is

delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching

a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is

discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under

Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner

is guilty of delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a

writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest

reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making

the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for

refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The

underlying object of this principle is not to encourage

agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have

already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of

third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of

M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR

261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450]

and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 :

(1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle

applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental

right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1

SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports

& Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v.

Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] ).

58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to

when a person can approach a court. The question is one

of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts

before the court depending on and varying from case to

case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental

right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the

delay arose.”

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 513

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in

Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. and another v. K. Thangappan

and another, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that

the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if

there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert

his right. It has been further held thereunder:

“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be

borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their

discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke

its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or

omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right

as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other

circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.

Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is

still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in

Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports

[(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the

discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in

Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874)

5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by

this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC

1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular

Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] .

Sir Barnes had stated:

“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not

an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be

practically unjust to give a remedy either because the

party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be

regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his

conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving

that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which

it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were

afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse

of time and delay are most material. But in every case,

if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be

just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not 

514 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity

of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially

equitable. Two circumstances always important in such

cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the

acts done during the interval which might affect either party

and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the

one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”

8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this

Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to

Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has

been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori,

to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v.

Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that

no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any

reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article

32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article

32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this

that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that

this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief

in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986)

4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in

exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy

and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If

there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and

such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court

may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its

writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on

a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily

permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because

it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and

bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is

exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect

of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also

injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ

jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the

creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important

factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding

whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 515

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle the

discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai

Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and others v. T.T.

Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:

“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not

be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh

the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same.

The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an

extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional

court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens

but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary

principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate

reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure,

the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise

whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained

or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In

certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal

but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only

invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors

of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the

part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic

norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of

time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and

rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes

injury to the lis.”

14. Having regard to the afore-stated principles of law enunciated

herein above, when we turn our attention to facts on hand, it would

not detain us for too long for accepting the plea of the appellant

in affirming the order of the Learned Single Judge and dismissing

the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. We say so for

reasons more than one, firstly, it requires to be noticed that the writ

petitioner was a rival applicant along with the appellant herein for

grant of LPG distributorship and she along with the appellant herein,

were found to be eligible and the appellant herein was held to be

successful by virtue of draw of lots. This factual aspect would reflect

that the writ petitioner was aware of all the developments including

that of the allotment of distributorship having been made in favour

of the appellant herein way back in 2014, yet did not challenge and

only on acceptance of the alternate land offered by the appellant in 

516 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

March, 2017 and permitting him to construct the godown and the

showroom. Same was challenged in the year 2017 and thereby the

writ petitioner had allowed his right if at all if any to be drifted away or

in other words acquiesced in the acts of the Corporation and as such

on this short ground itself the appellant has to succeed. Secondly,

another fact which has swayed in our mind to accept the plea of the

appellant herein is that, undisputedly the appropriate government

had felt the need of permitting the Oil Marketing Companies to be

more flexible and as such modification to the guidelines had been

brought about on 15.04.2015 whereby the applicants were permitted

to offer alternate land where the land initially offered by them was

found deficient or not suitable or change of the land, subject to

specifications as laid down in the advertisement being met. There

being no stiff opposition or strong resistance to the alternate land

offered by the appellant herein not being as per the specifications

indicated in the advertisement, we see no reason to substitute the

court’s view to that of the experts namely, the Corporation which

has in its wisdom has exercised its discretion as is evident from the

report filed in the form of affidavit by the territory manager (LPG)/

BPCL whereunder it has been stated:

“13. On the basis of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx to nonagricultural. In his application form the said Respondent

no. 9 had provided the Land for godown at Plot No 3732,

Khatian No LR 2585, 2586, 2587 JL No 34, Mouza Kolera,

Jamalpur, Distt Burdwan admeasuring 33 decimal. The

same was cleared based on Registered Lease Deed,

which was found to have been genuine in all respects as

confirmed by the ADSR Jamalpur.

16. The land offered by the successful candidate, namely

the Respondent no.9 was found to be eligible by relying

on the abovementioned clauses, which determine eligibility

of the land based on the status of ownership. The fact

that the said land was a “Barga” land is not a material

condition on the basis of which the Respondent no. 9’s

candidature could be cancelled.

24. Subsequently, FVC of the said newly offered land by

the LOI holder, Respondent no. 9 was conducted and the

same was found suitable for construction of LPG Godown. 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 517

Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others

A letter being DGP:LPG OMP: Jamalpur dated 21.03.2017

was provided to the said LOI holder informing him that

the alternate land provided is found suitable and therefore

his request to construct LPG Godown in the said alternate

land has been approved. A copy of the said letter dated

21.03.2017 is annexed hereto and is marked as “R-5”.

25. It is therefore submitted that the steps taken by the

Respondent no. 3 in allowing the LOI holder, Respondent

no. 9, to provide alternate land for construction of godown,

have been in consonance. with the change in policies and

no favoritism or nepotism, as suggested by the petitioner

has been in play.

32. It is further clarified that the FVC conducted on the

original land offered by the Respondent no. 9 was found to

be satisfactory on all counts, and only on the basis of this,

his request for provision of alternate land wall accepted.”

15. Hence, we are of the considered view that the order of the Learned

Division Bench is liable to be set aside and accordingly, it is set

aside. The order of the Learned Single Judge stands restored for the

reasons indicated herein above and the appeal is allowed accordingly

with no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.

A blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay his life out threadbare for examination by the electorate is not accepted – His ‘right to privacy’ would still survive as regards matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office – In that respect, non-disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial character – It is not necessary that a candidate declare every item of movable property that he or his dependent family members owns, unless the same is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to be disclosed – Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate would amount to a defect of a substantial character. [Para 44]

* Author

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 394 : 2024 INSC 289

Karikho Kri

v.

Nuney Tayang and Another

(Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023)

09 April 2024

[Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

In the year 2019, appellant-KK an independent candidate emerged

victorious in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 44 Tezu

(ST) Assembly Constituency. The issue arising for consideration

is as to the validity of the High Court’s findings that grounds u/ss.

100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of

the People Act, 1951 were established, warranting invalidation of

the election of KK.

Headnotes

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – ss. 100(1)(b), 100(1)

(d)(i), 123 – Election – Filing of nomination – Submission of

material particulars – Non-disclosure of three vehicles – High

Court held non-disclosure of vehicles as corrupt practice –

Correctness:

Held: The High Court was of opinion that appellant’s failure

to disclose the three vehicles (two scooty and van), that stood

registered in the names of his dependent family members, amounted

to a corrupt practice – The High Court assumed that the nondisclosure of a vehicle registered in the name of a candidate or

his dependent family members was sufficient in itself to constitute

undue influence – One scooty was in name of wife of the appellant,

DW5 deposed that he had taken this vehicle as scrap and sold

it to DW6 – DW6 confirmed the same – In relation to other two

vehicles in question, there were actual documents of conveyance

and also proof of the requisite forms prescribed under the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988 being duly filled in by wife and son of appellant

– Form No. 29, relating to notice of ownership transfer of a vehicle

by the registered owner, viz., the transferor, was issued in respect

of each of these vehicles but despite the same, the transferees

did not do the needful to get their own names registered as the

owners – Once it is accepted that the three vehicles in question 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 395

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

were either gifted or sold before the filing of the nomination by

KK, the said vehicles cannot be considered to be still owned by

KK’s wife and son for purposes other than those covered by the

Act of 1988 – However, the High Court did not take note of this

distinguishing factor in the case on hand – The vehicles were

not owned and possessed in praesenti by the dependent family

members of KK at the time of the filing of his nomination – Nondisclosure of three vehicles cannot be held against KK – Such

non-disclosure cannot be treated as an attempt on his part to

unduly influence the voters, thereby inviting the wrath of Section

123(2) of the Act of 1951. [Paras 20,21,22,25,27,28]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Election – Filing of

nomination – Non-disclosure of three vehicles – Vehicles sold/

gifted – The High Court was of the opinion that, notwithstanding

vehicles were sold/gifted, these vehicles continued to stand

in the names of the dependent wife and son of KK – In

consequence, upon considering the provisions of the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988 and the decision of the Supreme Court in

Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others [2018] 2 SCR 572,

it was held that vehicles were owned by the dependent wife

and son of KK but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit in

Form No. 26 filed by him – Correctness:

Held: The High Court overlooked the fact that the above judgment

(Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others) was rendered in the

context of and for the purposes of the Act of 1988 and not for

general application – The judgment itself made it clear that despite

the sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a claimant or claimants

should not be made to run from pillar to post to find out who was

the owner of the vehicle as on the date of the accident, if the

sale/transfer was not carried out in their books by the authorities

concerned by registering the name of the subsequent owner, be

it for whatever reason – Further, vehicles being goods, their sale

would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930,

and the same make it clear that conveyance of ownership of the

vehicle would stand concluded upon execution of the document of

sale/transfer and registration of the new owner by the authorities

concerned would be a post-sale event – Mere failure to get

registered the name of the new owner of an already registered

vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would stand

invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically handed

over to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be 

396 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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treated as still being in the possession and control of the former

owner.[Paras 23, 27]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – ss. 100(1)(b), 100(d)

(i) – Election – Filing of nomination – Submission of material

particulars – Non-submission of the ‘No Dues Certificate’

in respect of the Government accommodation occupied by

appellant during his earlier tenure as an MLA was held against

him – High Court held that his nomination was defective and

in consequence, the acceptance by the Returning Officer was

improper – Correctness:

Held: In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that there were

no actual outstanding dues payable by KK in relation to the

government accommodation occupied by him earlier – His failure

in disclosing the fact that he had occupied such accommodation

and in filing the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in that regard, with his

nomination form, cannot be said to be a defect of any real import

– More so, as he did submit the relevant documents of 2014

after an objection was raised before the Returning Officer – His

explanation that he submitted such Certificates in the year 2014

when he stood for re-election as an MLA is logical and worthy

of acceptance – The most important aspect to be noted is that

there were no actual dues and the failure of KK to disclose that

he had been in occupation of government accommodation during

the years 2009 to 2014 cannot be treated as a defect that is of

substantial character so as to taint his nomination and render its

acceptance improper. [Para 42]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Election – Filing of

nomination – Non-disclosure of taxes due – The High Court

held that non-disclosure of the taxes due and payable by KK

and his wife was a defect of substantial character and the

same tainted his nomination:

Held: The failure on the part of KK to disclose the dues of municipal/

property taxes payable by him and his wife, the same cannot be

held to be a non-disclosure, inasmuch as he did disclose the

particulars of such dues in one part of his Affidavit but did not do

so in another part. [Para 49]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Election – Filing

of nomination – Whether every defect in the nomination can

straightaway termed to be of such character as to render its

acceptance improper:

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 397

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

Held: Every defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed

to be of such character as to render its acceptance improper and

each case would have to turn on its own individual facts, insofar

as that aspect is concerned – This Court has always drawn a

distinction between non-disclosure of substantial issues as opposed

to insubstantial issues, which may not impact one’s candidature or

the result of an election – The very fact that Section 36(4) of the Act

of 1951 speaks of the Returning Officer not rejecting a nomination

unless he is of the opinion that the defect is of a substantial nature

demonstrates that this distinction must always be kept in mind and

there is no absolute mandate that every non-disclosure, irrespective

of its gravity and impact, would automatically amount to a defect

of substantial nature, thereby materially affecting the result of the

election or amounting to ‘undue influence’ so as to qualify as a

corrupt practice. [Para 40]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Voter’s right to know

– Absolute or not:

Held: A blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay

his life out threadbare for examination by the electorate is not

accepted – His ‘right to privacy’ would still survive as regards

matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to

his candidature for public office – In that respect, non-disclosure of

each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to

a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial character – It is not

necessary that a candidate declare every item of movable property

that he or his dependent family members owns, unless the same

is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect

upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to be

disclosed – Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities

and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when

the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate

would amount to a defect of a substantial character. [Para 44]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – s.100(1)(d)(iv) –

Election invalidation under:

Held: In the instant case, the High Court linked all the nondisclosures attributed to KK to s.100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951 but

ultimately concluded that his election stood invalidated u/s. 100(1)

(d)(iv) thereof – There is no discussion whatsoever on what were

the violations which qualified as non-compliance with the provisions

of either the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or the rules and orders 

398 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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framed thereunder, for the purposes of s.100(1)(d)(iv), and as to

how the same materially affected the result of the election – For

the election petitioner to succeed on such ground, viz., s.100 (1)(d)

(iv), he has not only to plead and prove the breach but also show

that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned the returned

candidate, has been materially affected thereby – Though there

are some general references to non-compliance with particular

provisions of the Act of 1951 and the rules made thereunder, there

are neither adequate pleadings nor proof to substantiate and satisfy

the requirements of s.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 – Therefore,

it is clear that NT (unsuccessful candidate) tied up the improper

acceptance of KK nomination, relatable to s.100(1)(d)(i) of the

Act of 1951, with the non-compliance relatable to s.100(1)(d)(iv)

thereof and he did not sufficiently plead or prove a specific breach

or how it materially affected the result of the election, in so far as

it concerned the returned candidate, KK – It was not open to NT

to link up separate issues and fail to plead in detail and adduce

sufficient evidence in relation to the non-compliance that would

attract s.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 – The finding of the High

Court in that regard is equally bereft of rhyme and reason and

cannot be sustained. [Paras 45, 46, 48]

Case Law Cited

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others

[1955] 1 SCR 1104 : (1954) 2 SCC 881; Association for

Democratic Reforms and another v. Union of India and

others [2024] 3 SCR 417 : WP (C) No. 880 of 2017,

decided on 15.02.2024 – followed.

Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others [2018] 2

SCR 572 : (2018) 3 SCC 1; Santosh Yadav v. Narender

Singh [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 545 : (2002) 1 SCC 160;

Harsh Kumar v. Bhagwan Sahai Rawat and others

(2003) 7 SCC 709; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,

Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala v. K.T.C. Automobiles

[2016] 1 SCR 994 : (2016) 4 SCC 82; Surendra Kumar

Bhilawe v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2020] 7 SCR

39 : (2020) 18 SCC 224; Kisan Shankar Kathore v. Arun

Dattatray Sawant and others [2014] 7 SCR 258 : (2014)

14 SCC 162; Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra

and others [1955] 1 SCR 509 : (1954) 2 SCC 32; Kamta

Prasad Upadhyaya v. Sarjoo Prasad Tiwari and others 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 399

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

(1969) 3 SCC 622; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash

Kushanrao Gorantyal and others [2020] 7 SCR 180 :

(2020) 7 SCC 1; Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju v.

Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy and others [2018]

9 SCR 164 : (2018) 14 SCC 1; Resurgence India v.

Election Commission of India and another [2013] 9 SCR

360 : (2014) 14 SCC 189; Union of India v. Association

for Democratic Reforms and another [2002] 3 SCR 696 :

(2002) 5 SCC 294; Lok Prahari through its General

Secretary S.N. Shukla v. Union of India and others [2018]

2 SCR 892 : (2018) 4 SCC 699; S. Rukmini Madegowda

v State Election Commission and others [2022] 12 SCR

1 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1218; Mairembam Prithviraj

alias Prithviraj Singh v. Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh

[2016] 9 SCR 687 : (2017) 2 SCC 487; People’s Union

for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and another v. Union of India

and another [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399;

Sambhu Prasad Sharma v. Charandas Mahant [2012]

6 SCR 356 : (2012) 11 SCC 390; Mangani Lal Mandal

v. Bishnu Deo Bhandari [2012] 1 SCR 527 : (2012) 3

SCC 314; L.R. Shivaramagowda and others v. T.M.

Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs and others [1998] Supp.

3 SCR 241 : (1999) 1 SCC 666 – referred to.

List of Acts

Representation of the People Act, 1951; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords

Election; Nomination; Disclosure of material particulars; Disclosure

of vehicles; Ownership transfer of vehicle; Corrupt practice; Undue

influence; Government accommodation; Non-due certificate;

Defective nomination; Dues of municipal/property taxes; Improper

acceptance; Election invalidation; Voter’s right to know.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2023 of the Gauhati High

Court at Itanagar Bench in Election Petition No. 01 (AP) of 2019

With

Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023

400 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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Appearances for Parties

C.A. Sundaram, Arunabh Chowdhury, Sr. Advs., Simranjeet Singh,

Pulkit Gupta, Gautam Talukdar, Raushal Kumar, Ms. Apurbaa Dutta,

Lovenish Jagdhane, Zafar Inayat, Amol Chitale, Mrs. Pragya Baghel,

Mrs. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Vishal Banshal, Karma Dorjee, Abhishek

Roy, Dechen W Lachungpa, Advs. for the Appellant.

Dr. Sushil Balwada, Mrs. Pragya Baghel, Ms. Tatini Basu, Boboy

Potsangbam, Gamso Billai, Kumar Shashank, Byrapaneni Suyodhan,

Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjay Kumar, J

1. In the year 2019, Karikho Kri, an independent candidate, Dr.

Mohesh Chai, candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party, and Nuney

Tayang, candidate of the Indian National Congress, contested

the election to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from

44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency. The election was held on

11.04.2019 and Karikho Kri emerged victorious with 7538 votes,

while Dr. Mohesh Chai secured 7383 votes and Nuney Tayang

secured 1088 votes.

2. Nuney Tayang filed Election Petition No. 01(AP) of 2019 before the

Itanagar Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram

and Arunachal Pradesh, seeking a declaration that the election of

Karikho Kri was void on the grounds mentioned in Sections 100(1)

(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the

People Act, 1951 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1951’). He also sought a

consequential declaration that he stood duly elected from the said

constituency.

3. By judgment and order dated 17.07.2023, a learned Judge of the

Itanagar Bench of the High Court allowed the election petition in

part, declaring the election of Karikho Kri void under Sections 100(1)

(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951, but rejecting

the prayer of Nuney Tayang to declare him duly elected, as he

had not led any evidence to prove the allegations levelled by him

against Dr. Mohesh Chai, the candidate with the second highest

number of votes.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 401

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

4. Aggrieved thereby, Karikho Kri filed Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023

before this Court and Nuney Tayang filed Civil Appeal No. 4716 of

2023. These appeals were filed under Section 116A of the Act of 1951

5. While ordering notice in both the appeals on 31.07.2023, in exercise

of power under Section 116B(2) of the Act of 1951, this Court directed

that an election should not be held for the subject Constituency

which was represented by Karikho Kri and permitted him to enjoy

all the privileges as a Member of the House and of the constituted

committees but restrained him from casting his vote on the floor of

the House or in any of the committees wherein he participated as

an MLA.

6. Thereafter, during the course of the hearing of these appeals, Karikho

Kri filed I.A. No. 73161 of 2024, as a fresh schedule for election to

the Legislative Assembly of the State of Arunachal Pradesh was

notified on 16.03.2024 and he wished to contest in the election that

is proposed to be held on 19.04.2024. He sought leave to contest

as a candidate in the upcoming assembly election in the State of

Arunachal Pradesh during the pendency of this appeal. By order

dated 20.03.2024, this Court opined that a strong prima facie case

had been made out by him and, in the light of the said fact, stayed

the operation of the impugned judgment. This Court also made it

clear that any steps taken by Karikho Kri in view of the stay order

would be subject to the final decision that would be taken upon

conclusion of the hearing of these appeals.

7. In his election petition, Nuney Tayang claimed that the nomination

submitted by Karikho Kri was improperly accepted by the Returning

Officer, Tezu, as he did not disclose material particulars in his Affidavit

filed in Form No.26 appended to the Conduct of Elections Rules,

1961. The High Court framed nine issues for determination in the

election petition and ultimately held against Karikho Kri on Issue

Nos. 1 (in part), 4, 5, 6 (in part), 7 and 8. Issue No.9 pertained to the

relief claimed by Nuney Tayang. The relevant ‘Issues’ read as under:

‘1. Whether there has been a non-disclosure of

ownership of Hero Honda CD Dawn Motorcycle

owned by the returned candidate, Shri Karikho

Kri bearing registration No. AR-11-2446; Kinetic

Zing Scooty owned by the wife of the returned

candidate, Smti. Bagilu Kri bearing registration No. 

402 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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AR-11-4474; Van, Maruti Omni Ambulance owned

by the wife of the returned candidate, Smti. Bagilu

Kri bearing registration No. AR-11A-3100 and TVS

Star City Motorcycle owned by Shri Goshinso Kri,

the son of the returned candidate Shri Karikho Kri

bearing registration No. AR- 11-6581, as is required

to be disclosed under Clause 7(vi) of the Conduct

of Election Rules, 1961, rendering the nomination of

the returned candidate invalid?

4. Whether there has been a non-submission of no

dues certificate with regard to Electricity Charges

required to be submitted under Clause 8(ii)(b) of

Form No. 26 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961,

as the respondent No. 1 was in occupation of MLA

Cottage No. 1 at ‘E’ Sector, Itanagar, from the year,

2009- 2014, while the respondent No. 1 was an MLA

of Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency during the year,

2009-2014?

5. Whether the statements made by the respondent No.

1 about the liability of himself and his wife in respect

of Municipal Tax, Property Tax, due and grand total of

all govt. dues against Serial No. 6 & 8 of the table in

Para-8(A) of the affidavit in Form No. 26 appended

to the nomination paper of the respondent No. 1

has rendered the nomination of respondent No. 1,

defective?

6. Whether the non-disclosure of assets both movable

and immovable belonging to the respondent No. 1,

his wife, his mother and his two sons in the affidavit

in Form No. 26 appended to the nomination paper

amounted to commission of corrupt practice of undue

influence within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the

Representation of the People Act, 1951?

7. Whether the election of respondent No. 1 to the

44- Tezu(ST) Assembly Constituency is liable to

be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the

Representation of the People Act, 1951?

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 403

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

8. Whether the nature of non-disclosure alleged by the

Election petitioner is of a substantial nature effecting

the election of the returned candidate/respondent

No. 1?

9. What consequential relief the petitioner is entitled

to, if any?’

8. Nuney Tayang examined 7 witnesses, including himself as PW7.

Karikho Kri examined 39 witnesses, including himself as DW1A. Dr.

Mohesh Chai did not choose to contest the case before the High Court,

despite service of notice. Before us, however, he is duly represented

by learned counsel and also filed his replies in both the appeals.

9. The High Court held against Karikho Kri on Issue No 1, in relation to

three out of the four vehicles, viz., the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing

No. AR-11/4474 and the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100,

both registered in the name of Bagilu Kri, his wife, and the TVS Star

City Motorcycle bearing No. AR-11/6851, registered in the name of

Goshinso Kri, his second son. The High Court was of the opinion that,

notwithstanding the sale of the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing No. AR11/4474 in 2009 and the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100

in the year 2017 and the gifting of the TVS Star City Motorcycle

bearing No. AR-11/6851 in 2014, these vehicles continued to stand

in the names of Bagilu Kri and Goshinso Kri, the dependent wife

and son of Karikho Kri, on the relevant date. Upon considering the

provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, ‘the Act of

1988’) and the decision of this Court in Naveen Kumar vs. Vijay

Kumar and others1

, the High Court concluded that the person in

whose name the motor vehicle stood registered should be treated as

the owner thereof. In consequence, it was held that, as on the date

of presentation of his nomination on 22.03.2019 and its scrutiny on

26.03.2019, the above three vehicles were owned by the dependent

wife and son of Karikho Kri but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit

in Form No. 26 filed by him.

10. On Issue No. 4 with regard to non-submission of a ‘No Dues

Certificate’ in the context of electricity and water charges, etc., that

was required to be submitted under Clause 8(ii)(B) of Form No. 26,

1 [2018] 2 SCR 572 : (2018) 3 SCC 1

404 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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the High Court noted that Karikho Kri had occupied government

accommodation in MLA Cottage No.1 at ‘E’ Sector, Itanagar, from

2009 to 2014, as the MLA of Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency during

those years. According to Karikho Kri, he lost the election in 2014

and vacated the said accommodation. He claimed that when he

filed his nomination for the Assembly Election in 2014, he obtained

a ‘No Dues Certificate’ after clearing the dues and submitted it. As

there were no outstanding dues thereafter and he did not occupy

government accommodation, he stated that he did not disclose the

same. As Karikho Kri admitted such non-disclosure in his Affidavit in

Form No. 26, the High Court held against him on this count.

11. As regards Issue No. 5, pertaining to the liability of Karikho Kri and

his wife in respect of their dues of municipal and property taxes,

the High Court found that Karikho Kri had disclosed the taxes due

and payable by him and his wife in one part of the Affidavit in Form

No.26 submitted by him, but failed to do so in another part thereof.

He disclosed the dues in Part A, Clause 8 (vi) and (viii), but failed to

disclose it in Clause 9 in Part B. Though the High Court held against

Karikho Kri even on this count, Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, learned

senior counsel, appearing for Nuney Tayang, fairly stated that he

would not be pressing this ground as there was disclosure of the

dues at least in one part of the Affidavit in Form No. 26.

12. As regards Issue No. 6, i.e., whether non-disclosure of the three

vehicles, registered in the names of his dependent wife and second

son, by Karikho Kri in his Affidavit in Form No. 26 amounted to

commission of a corrupt practice as per Section 123(2) of the Act

of 1951, the High Court referred to case law and held that such

non-disclosure amounted to a corrupt practice within the meaning

of Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951.

13. The High Court then considered Issue No. 7, i.e., whether the election

of Karikho Kri was liable to be declared void under Section 100(1)

(d)(i) of the Act of 1951 and opined that when the nomination of the

returned candidate was shown to have been improperly accepted

by the Returning Officer, there is no necessity to further prove that

the election was ‘materially affected’. As the High Court was of the

opinion that the nomination of Karikho Kri had, in fact, been improperly

accepted by the Returning Officer, Tezu, his election was held liable

to be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 405

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

14. On Issue No. 8 - as to whether the non-disclosures by Karikho Kri were

of a substantial nature affecting his election, the High Court observed

that disclosure of information as per Form No. 26 of the Conduct of

Election Rules, 1961, was fundamental to the concept of free and fair

elections and, therefore, the solemnity thereof could not be ridiculed

by offering incomplete information or suppressing material information,

resulting in disinformation and misinformation to the voters.

15. Coming to Issue No. 9, i.e., as to what consequential relief Nuney

Tayang would be entitled to, if any, the High Court noted that Nuney

Tayang had secured the least number of votes out of the three

candidates and though he made allegations to the effect that Dr.

Mohesh Chai had failed to disclose the properties belonging to his

mother in his Affidavit in Form No. 26, the High Court found that Nuney

Tayang had failed to lead any evidence in proof of this statement

and, as such, there was no material to hold that Dr. Mohesh Chai’s

mother was even his dependent. On that basis, the High Court held

that no judgment could be pronounced against Dr. Mohesh Chai,

solely on the basis of the pleadings and allegations made by Nuney

Tayang in his election petition. In consequence, Nuney Tayang was

held disentitled to relief by way of a declaration that he had been

duly elected from 44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency.

16. It is well-settled that the success of a winning candidate at an

election should not be lightly interfered with (See Santosh Yadav

vs. Narender Singh2 and Harsh Kumar vs. Bhagwan Sahai Rawat

and others3

). The issue before us presently is as to the validity of

the High Court’s findings that the grounds under Sections 100(1)(b),

100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 were established,

warranting invalidation of the election of Karikho Kri. Further, the

finding of the High Court on Issue No. 6, that Karikho Kri committed

a ‘corrupt practice’ within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the Act

of 1951 also requires to be examined.

17. Section 33 of the Act of 1951 deals with ‘presentation of nomination

papers and the requirements for a valid nomination’. Scrutiny of such

nominations is undertaken by the Returning Officers under Section 36

of the Act of 1951. To the extent relevant, Section 36 reads as under:

2 [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 545 : (2002) 1 SCC 160

3 (2003) 7 SCC 709

406 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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‘36. Scrutiny of nomination:-

‘1.  On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under

section 30, the candidates, their election agents, one

proposer of each candidate, and one other person duly

authorised in writing by each candidate but no other person,

may attend at such time and place as the returning officer

may appoint; and the returning officer shall give them all

reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers

of all candidates which have been delivered within the time

and in the manner laid down in section 33.

2.  The returning officer shall then examine the nomination

papers and shall decide all objections which may be made

to any nomination and may, either on such objection or

on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as

he thinks necessary, reject any nomination on any of the

following grounds:—

(a) ….. or

(b) ….. or

(c) …..

3  .…..

4.  The returning officer shall not reject any nomination

paper on the ground of any defect which is not of a

substantial character.

5. …..

6  The returning officer shall endorse on each nomination

paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same and, if

the nomination paper is rejected, shall record in writing a

brief statement of his reasons for such rejection.

7.  …..

8.  Immediately after all the nomination papers have been

scrutinized and decisions accepting or rejecting the same

have been recorded, the returning officer shall prepare a list

of validly nominated candidates, that is to say, candidates

whose nominations have been found valid, and affix it to

his notice board.

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 407

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

18. In terms of Section 36(4) above, a Returning Officer is under a

mandate not to reject a nomination paper for a defect unless it is of

substantial character. Significantly, Nuney Tayang raised objections

to the candidature of Karikho Kri by way of his written representation

dated 26.03.2019. Therein, he raised the issue of non-submission of

a ‘No Dues Certificate’ in respect of the government accommodation

occupied by Karikho Kri during his tenure as an MLA from 2009 to

2014. He also raised the issue of non-disclosure of the vehicles,

mentioned in Issue No. 1. By his reply dated 26.03.2019, Karikho

Kri informed the Returning Officer, Tezu, that the vehicles, viz., the

Kinetic Zing Scooty and the Maruti Omni Van standing in the name

of his wife had already been disposed of as was the TVS Star City

Motorcycle standing in the name of his dependent second son, which

had been gifted away. As regards the non-submission of a ‘No Dues

Certificate’, Karikho Kri asserted that there were no outstanding

dues against any government accommodation in his name. Karikho

Kri submitted documents with his explanation, including those

pertaining to the transfer of the vehicles in question as well as the

‘No Dues Certificates’ of 2014. Thereafter, Karikho Kri filed before

the High Court, Certificates issued in 2019 by the Bharat Sanchar

Nigam Limited; the Department of Power, Government of Arunachal

Pradesh; and the Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Arunachal

Pradesh, confirming that there were no outstanding dues. In effect

and in fact, there were no dues payable by Karikho Kri in relation to

the Government accommodation occupied by him earlier.

19. In any event, it appears that the Returning Officer concerned, being

satisfied with the explanation and documents submitted by Karikho

Kri, accepted his nomination. No doubt, this preliminary exercise on

the part of the Returning Officer did not preclude the Election Tribunal,

viz., the High Court, from examining as to whether the acceptance

of Karikho Kri’s nomination was improper and, in consequence,

whether it would have an impact on his election under the relevant

provisions of the Act of 1951. Section 100(1) thereof enumerates

the grounds on which an election can be invalidated. To the extent

relevant, it reads as under:

‘100. Grounds for declaring election to be void:-

(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High

Court is of opinion—

408 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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(a) …..; or

(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a

returned candidate or his election agent or by any other

person with the consent of a returned candidate or his

election agent; or

(c)…..; or

(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns

a returned candidate, has been materially affected—

(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination,

or

(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests

of the returned candidate by an agent other than

his election agent, or

(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection

of any vote or the reception of any vote which

is void, or

(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of

the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or

orders made under this Act, the High Court shall

declare the election of the returned candidate

to be void.’

20. The High Court held against Karikho Kri not only under Sections

100(1)(d)(i) and (iv) but also under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act of

1951, as it was of the opinion that his failure to disclose the three

vehicles, that still stood registered in the names of his dependent

family members, amounted to a corrupt practice. Insofar as Section

100(1)(b) of the Act of 1951 is concerned, the requirement thereof

for the purpose of invalidating the election of the returned candidate

is that the High Court must form an opinion that a ‘corrupt practice’

was committed by the returned candidate or his election agent or any

other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election

agent. Section 123 of the Act of 1951 inclusively defines ‘corrupt

practices’, by stating that what have been enumerated thereunder

shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of the Act

of 1951. Insofar as the present case is concerned, Section 123(2)

of the Act of 1951 is of relevance. This provision reads as under:

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 409

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

‘123. Corrupt practices.—

The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for

the purposes of this Act:—

……

(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect

interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the

candidate or his agent, or of any other person with the

consent of the candidate or his election agent, with the

free exercise of any electoral right:

……’

21. The High Court opined that non-disclosure of the Kinetic Zing

Scooty and the Maruti Omni Van that had belonged to Bagilu Kri

and the TVS Star City Motorcycle that had belonged to Goshinso

Kri, the dependent wife and son of Krikho Kri, was sufficient in itself

to constitute ‘undue influence’, thereby attracting Section 123(2) of

the Act of 1951. However, what is of significance is that the High

Court did not doubt that these vehicles had been sold or gifted long

before the submission of the nomination by Karikho Kri in 2019.

This is clear from the observations in Para 13 (xiii) of the judgment,

wherein the High Court observed: ‘….at the time of presentation of

nomination paper of respondent No. 1, and on the date of scrutiny of

the nomination paper on 26.03.2019, notwithstanding the aforesaid

vehicles were gifted/sold to other persons by Smti. Bagilu Kri, wife of

respondent No. 1 as well as Shri. Goshinso Kri, son of respondent No.

1; it has now become imperative to decide as to who was the owner

of the aforesaid vehicles at the time presentation of the nomination

paper by the respondent No. 1, and on the date of scrutiny of the

nomination paper on 26.03.2019’. This finding of the High Court has

attained finality as Nuney Tayang did not choose to challenge the

same before this Court.

22. Though it appears that the three vehicles in question still remained

registered in the names of the wife and son of Karikho Kri, the question

that arises is as to whether non-disclosure of such vehicles justified

the attributing of a corrupt practice to Karikho Kri and the negating

of his election on that ground. The High Court assumed that the

non-disclosure of a vehicle registered in the name of a candidate or

his dependent family members was sufficient in itself to constitute 

410 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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undue influence. In this context, the High Court placed reliance on

the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the decision of this Court in

Naveen Kumar (supra). Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988 defines

the owner of a vehicle as under:

‘ “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle

stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the

guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle

which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an

agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the

person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;’

In Naveen Kumar (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court was

dealing with the issue as to who would be the owner of an offending

vehicle in the context of the Act of 1988 when a claim arises from

an accident involving the said vehicle. ‘Owner’, as defined under

Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, was considered and it was opined

that the person in whose name a vehicle stands registered would

be the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act. Reference

was made to Section 50 of the Act of 1988, which deals with transfer

of ownership, and to various earlier decisions in that regard and it

was observed thus:

‘13. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges

from the above decisions is that in view of the definition

of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30), it is the person

in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who,

for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the

“owner”..……In a situation such as the present where the

registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but

continues to be reflected in the records of the Registering

Authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand

absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced

the definition of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30),

making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in

the earlier 1939 Act. The principle underlying the provisions

of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in

the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim

should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for

compensation ought not to be burdened with following

a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 411

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

with the Registering Authority. To hold otherwise would

be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act.

Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the

fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the

first respondent was the “owner” of the vehicle involved

in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The

liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him.

Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured.’

(emphasis is ours)

23. Notably, the High Court overlooked the fact that the above judgment

was rendered in the context of and for the purposes of the Act of

1988 and not for general application. The judgment itself made

it clear that despite the sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a

claimant or claimants should not be made to run from pillar to post

to find out who was the owner of the vehicle as on the date of the

accident, if the sale/transfer was not carried out in their books by

the authorities concerned by registering the name of the subsequent

owner, be it for whatever reason. Further, vehicles being goods,

their sale would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of Goods

Act, 1930 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1930’), and the same make it clear

that conveyance of ownership of the vehicle would stand concluded

upon execution of the document of sale/transfer and registration of

the new owner by the authorities concerned would be a post-sale

event. Section 2(7) of the Act of 1930 defines goods, inter alia, to

mean every kind of movable property, other than actionable claims

and money. Chapter III of the Act of 1930 is titled ‘Effects of the

Contract’ and ‘Transfer of property as between seller and buyer’.

Section 18 therein states that where there is a contract for the sale

of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is transferred to

the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. Section 19,

however, states that the property passes when intended to pass and

elaborates that, where there is a contract for the sale of specific or

ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer

at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.

24. In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Thiruvananthapuram,

Kerala vs. K.T.C. Automobiles4

, this Court observed that registration

4 [2016] 1 SCR 994 : (2016) 4 SCC 82

412 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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of a motor vehicle is a post-sale event but the question would arise

as to when the property in the motor vehicle actually passed to the

buyer. That was a case involving the first sale of a motor vehicle by

the dealer to the first owner and is, therefore, distinguishable from

the subsequent sale of a vehicle, as in the case on hand. It was

observed therein that registration of a motor vehicle is a post-sale

event but only after obtaining valid registration under the Act of 1988,

a purchaser would get entitlement to use the vehicle in a public

place. It was observed that the purchaser, as an owner under the Act

of 1988, was obliged to obtain the certificate of registration, which

alone would entitle him to enjoy the possession of the vehicle by

using it in public places after meeting the other statutory obligations

of insurance, etc. This Court rejected the contention that motor

vehicles would be ‘unascertained goods’ till their engine number or

chassis number is entered in the Certificate of Registration, as the

sale invoice itself would disclose such particulars, so that the owner

of the vehicle may apply for registration of that specific vehicle in

his name. However, owing to the statutory provisions governing

motor vehicles, this Court held that an intending owner or buyer of

a motor vehicle cannot ascertain the particulars of the vehicle for

appropriating it to the contract of sale till its possession is handed

over to him after observing the requirements of the Act of 1988 and

the rules framed thereunder and such possession can be given

only at the registration office immediately preceding the registration.

Owing to the aforestated legal position, this Court held that, prior

to getting possession of the motor vehicle, the intending purchaser/

owner would not have a claim over any ‘ascertained motor vehicle’.

The observations in this judgment would, however, have to be

understood in the context of the first sale of a vehicle by the dealer,

i.e., where such vehicle has no registration whatsoever as opposed

to the subsequent sale of a registered vehicle.

25. Presently, insofar as the Scooty bearing No. AR-11/4474 is concerned,

it stood in the name of Bagilu Kri but Md. Nizammudin (DW5)

deposed that he had taken this vehicle as scrap and sold it as such

to Promod Prasad (DW6). In turn, Promod Prasad (DW6) confirmed

that he bought the Scooty as scrap from Md. Nizammudin (DW5).

During their cross-examination, nothing was elicited from these

witnesses to doubt their claims. However, letter dated 20.09.2019

addressed by the District Transport Officer, Lohit District, Tezu, 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 413

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

to Bagilu Kri, manifests that the registration of the Scooty in her

name stood cancelled only at that time. The taxes in respect of this

Scooty were paid till 26.03.2022, as borne out by Treasury Challan

No. 4806 dated 30.08.2019. Though much was argued about this

payment of taxes and the fact that the receipt was issued in the

name of Bagilu Kri, we are not inclined to give any weightage to

it. The payment was made after the filing of the election petition

and any person could have done so. The receipt therefor would

automatically be generated in the name of the registered owner. We

may also note that in relation to the other two vehicles in question,

there were actual documents of conveyance and also proof of the

requisite forms prescribed under the Act of 1988 being duly filled in

and issued by Bagilu Kri and Goshinso Kri. Form No. 29, relating

to notice of ownership transfer of a vehicle by the registered owner,

viz., the transferor, was issued in respect of each of these vehicles

but despite the same, the transferees did not do the needful to get

their own names registered as the owners.

26. In Surendra Kumar Bhilawe vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.5

,

the issue before this Court was as to whether an insurance company

would be liable to cover the claim arising out of an accident on the

ground that the vehicle was sold to another long before the date of

the accident but the insured continued to be the registered owner

of the vehicle. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Naveen

Kumar (supra), it was observed that the policy of insurance was a

comprehensive policy which covered third-party risks as well and,

therefore, the insurer could not repudiate one part of the policy with

regard to reimbursing the owner for losses when it could not evade

liability to third parties under the same contract of insurance. In view

of the definition of ‘owner’ in Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, this

Court observed that the registered owner of the truck, on the date

of the accident, was the insured and, therefore, the insurer could not

avoid its liability for the losses suffered by the owner, on the ground

of transfer of ownership. This Court held that it is difficult to accept

that a person who transferred the ownership of a goods vehicle, on

receipt of consideration, would not report the transfer or apply for

transfer of registration and thereby continue to incur the risks and

liabilities of ownership of the said vehicle under the provisions of law,

5 [2020] 7 SCR 39 : (2020) 18 SCC 224

414 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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including the Act of 1988. This Court further observed that it is equally

incredible that an owner of a vehicle who has paid consideration

to acquire it would not insist on transfer of the permit and thereby

expose himself to the penal consequences of operating a goods

vehicle without a valid permit. This Court, accordingly, held that

the registered owner continues to remain the owner and when the

vehicle is insured in the name of such registered owner, the insurer

would remain liable notwithstanding the transfer. This judgment is

clearly inapplicable to the case on hand as it dealt with the liability of

an insurer in the event of an accident involving the vehicle. Further,

as already noted, the vehicles in question were transferred and

the requisite forms, insofar as the transferor was concerned, were

filled up and issued but it was the transferees who failed to get the

vehicles transferred in their own names.

27. Mere failure to get registered the name of the new owner of an already

registered vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would

stand invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically handed

over to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated

as still being in the possession and control of the former owner. Once

it is accepted that the three vehicles in question were either gifted or

sold before the filing of the nomination by Karikho Kri, the said vehicles

cannot be considered to be still owned by Karikho Kri’s wife and son

for purposes other than those covered by the Act of 1988. However,

the High Court did not take note of this distinguishing factor in the case

on hand. In Kisan Shankar Kathore vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant and

others6

, the vehicle, details of which had been suppressed by the

returned candidate, was actually owned and possessed by his wife

and such suppression was, accordingly, held against him. Presently,

the High Court itself concluded that the three vehicles in question were

transferred, be it by way of sale or gift. The vehicles were, therefore, not

owned and possessed in praesenti by the dependent family members

of Karikho Kri at the time of the filing of his nomination. This point of

distinction was completely lost sight of by the High Court but, in our

considered opinion, it made all the difference.

28. Therefore, non-disclosure of the three vehicles in question could not

be held against Karikho Kri in the light of the aforestated analysis.

6 [2014] 7 SCR 258 : (2014) 14 SCC 162

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 415

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

Such non-disclosure cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated

as an attempt on his part to unduly influence the voters, thereby

inviting the wrath of Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951. We may note

that Karikho Kri had declared the value of the movable assets of

his dependent family members and himself as ₹8,41,87,815/-. The

value of the three vehicles in question, by comparison, would be a

mere miniscule of this figure. In any event, suppression of the value

of these three vehicles would have no impact on the declaration of

wealth by Karikho Kri and such non-disclosure could not be said to

amount to ‘undue influence’.

29. Coming to the next ground, if the acceptance of a nomination is found

to be improper and it materially affects the result of the election in

so far as the returned candidate is concerned, Section 100(1)(d)(i)

of the Act of 1951 would come into play. It would be appropriate and

apposite at this stage for us to take note of precedential law on this

point. In Vashist Narain Sharma vs. Dev Chandra and others7

, a

3-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the burden of proving that

the improper acceptance of a nomination has materially affected the

result of an election would arise in one of three ways: (i) where the

candidate whose nomination was improperly accepted had secured

less votes than the difference between the returned candidate and

the candidate securing the next highest number of votes, (ii) where

the person referred to above secured more votes, or (iii) where

the person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is the

returned candidate himself. It was held that in the first case the

result of the election would not be materially affected because if all

the wasted votes were added to the votes of the candidate securing

the next highest votes, it would make no difference to the result and

the returned candidate would retain the seat. However, in the other

two cases, the result may be materially affected and insofar as the

third case is concerned, it may be readily conceded that such would

be the conclusion.

30. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others8

,

a Constitution Bench of 7 Judges considered the scope of enquiry

under Section 100(1)(d) of the Act of 1951. It was observed that the

7 [1955] 1 SCR 509 : (1954) 2 SCC 32

8 [1955] 1 SCR 1104 (1954) 2 SCC 881

416 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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said provision required, before an order setting aside an election

could be made, that two conditions be satisfied. It must, firstly, be

shown that there has been improper reception or refusal of a vote

or reception of any vote which is void, or non-compliance with the

provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951, or any rules or

orders made thereunder, relating to the election or any mistake in

the use of the prescribed form and it must further be shown that, as

a consequence thereof, the result of the election has been materially

affected. The Bench observed that the two conditions are cumulative

and must both be established. It was further observed that the burden

of establishing them is on the person who seeks to have the election

set aside. Reference was also made to Vashist Narain (supra).

31. In Kamta Prasad Upadhyaya vs. Sarjoo Prasad Tiwari and others9

,

another 3-Judge Bench of this Court affirmed the legal position settled

by Vashist Narain (supra). Again, in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs.

Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and others10, a 3-Judge Bench of

this Court affirmed the view taken in Vashist Narain (supra) that,

where a person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is

the returned candidate himself, it may be readily conceded that the

conclusion has to be that the result of the election was ‘materially

affected’ without their being any necessity to plead and prove the

same.

32. In Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju vs. Peddireddigari Ramachandra

Reddy and others11, another 3-Judge Bench of this Court affirmed

that if there are more than two candidates and if the nomination of

one of the defeated candidates has been improperly accepted, a

question might arise as to whether the result of the election of the

returned candidate has been materially affected by such improper

reception but that would not be so in the case of challenge to the

election of the returned candidate himself on the ground of improper

acceptance of his nomination.

33. Ergo, if acceptance of the nomination of the returned candidate is

shown to be improper, it would automatically mean that the same

materially affected the result of the election and nothing more needs

9 (1969) 3 SCC 622

10 [2020] 7 SCR 180 : (2020) 7 SCC 1

11 [2018] 9 SCR 164 : (2018) 14 SCC 1

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 417

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

to be pleaded or proved. However, whether acceptance of the

nomination of Karikho Kri was actually improper is the main issue

that requires to be addressed by us.

34. We may also take note of curial wisdom on the issue as to what

would be the defects that would taint a nomination to the extent of

rendering its acceptance improper. In Resurgence India vs. Election

Commission of India and another12, a 3-Judge Bench of this

Court observed that if the Election Commission accepts nomination

papers in spite of blank particulars therein, it would directly violate

the fundamental right of the citizen to know the criminal antecedents,

assets, liabilities and educational qualifications of the candidate. It was

observed that accepting an affidavit with such blanks would rescind the

verdict in Union of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms

and another13. In effect, the Bench held that filing of an affidavit

with blank particulars would render the affidavit nugatory. In Kisan

Shankar Kathore (supra), the issue before this Court was whether

non-disclosure of certain government dues in the nomination would

amount to a material lapse impacting the election of the returned

candidate. On facts, this Court found that the non-disclosure of

electricity and municipal dues was not a serious lapse as there was

a dispute raised in the context thereof. Having said so, this Court

clarified that it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of

each case as to whether such non-disclosure would amount to a

material lapse or not. This Court, however, found that there were,

in fact, material lapses by the returned candidate, inasmuch as he

had failed to disclose the bungalow standing in the name of his

wife and also a vehicle owned by her. Further, he had also failed to

disclose his interest/share in a partnership firm which amounted to a

very serious and major lapse. The observations of this Court, in the

context of improper acceptance of his nomination, are of relevance:

‘43.When the information is given by a candidate in

the affidavit filed along with the nomination paper and

objections are raised thereto questioning the correctness

of the information or alleging that there is non-disclosure

of certain important information, it may not be possible

12 [2013] 9 SCR 360 : (2014) 14 SCC 189

13 [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294

418 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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for the Returning Officer at that time to conduct a detailed

examination. Summary enquiry may not suffice. The present

case is itself an example which loudly demonstrates this. At

the same time, it would not be possible for the Returning

Officer to reject the nomination for want of verification about

the allegations made by the objector. In such a case, when

ultimately it is proved that it was a case of non-disclosure

and either the affidavit was false or it did not contain

complete information leading to suppression, it can be held

at that stage that the nomination was improperly accepted.

Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel appearing

for the Election Commission, rightly argued that such an

enquiry can be only at a later stage and the appropriate

stage would be in an election petition as in the instant

case, when the election is challenged. The grounds stated

in Section 36(2) are those which can be examined there

and then and on that basis the Returning Officer would be

in a position to reject the nomination. Likewise, where the

blanks are left in an affidavit, nomination can be rejected

there and then. In other cases where detailed enquiry is

needed, it would depend upon the outcome thereof, in an

election petition, as to whether the nomination was properly

accepted or it was a case of improper acceptance. Once it

is found that it was a case of improper acceptance, as there

was misinformation or suppression of material i`nformation,

one can state that question of rejection in such a case was

only deferred to a later date. When the Court gives such a

finding, which would have resulted in rejection, the effect

would be same, namely, such a candidate was not entitled

to contest and the election is void. Otherwise, it would be an

anomalous situation that even when criminal proceedings

under Section 125-A of the Act can be initiated and the

selected candidate is criminally prosecuted and convicted,

but the result of his election cannot be questioned. This

cannot be countenanced.’

35. In Lok Prahari through its General Secretary S.N. Shukla vs.

Union of India and others14, this Court observed that non-disclosure

14 [2018] 2 SCR 892 : (2018) 4 SCC 699

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 419

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

of assets and sources of income of candidates and their associates

would constitute a corrupt practice falling under the heading ‘undue

influence’, as defined under Section 123 (2) of the Act of 1951. In

S. Rukmini Madegowda vs. State Election Commission and

others15, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that a false

declaration with regard to the assets of a candidate, his/her spouse

or dependents, would constitute a corrupt practice irrespective of its

impact on the election of the candidate as it may be presumed that

a false declaration would impact the election.

36. In Mairembam Prithviraj alias Prithviraj Singh vs. Pukhrem

Sharatchandra Singh16, this Court noted that there is a difference

between improper acceptance of the nomination of a returned

candidate as opposed to improper acceptance of the nomination of

any other candidate. It was observed that a mere finding that there

has been an improper acceptance of a nomination would not be

sufficient for a declaration that the election is void under Section

100(1)(d)(i) and there has to be further pleading and proof that

the result of the election of the returned candidate was materially

affected, but there would be no necessity of any such proof in the

event of the nomination of the returned candidate being declared as

having been improperly accepted, especially in a case where there

are only two candidates in the fray.

37. In Association for Democratic Reforms and another vs. Union

of India and others17, a Constitution Bench affirmed that, in terms

of the earlier judgments in Association for Democratic Reforms

and another (supra) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties

(PUCL) and another vs. Union of India and another18, the right

of voters to information, which is traceable to Article 19(1)(a) of the

Constitution, is built upon the jurisprudence that information which

furthers democratic participation must be provided to citizens and

voters have a right to information which would enable them to cast

their votes rationally and intelligently because voting is one of the

foremost forms of democratic participation. It was further observed

15 [2022] 12 SCR 1 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1218

16 [2016] 9 SCR 687 : (2017) 2 SCC 487

17 [2024] 3 SCR 417 : W.P. (C) No. 880 of 2017, decided on 15.02.2024

18 [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399

420 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

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that voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is

‘essential’ for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast.

38. In his Affidavit in Form No. 26, Karikho Kri was required to state as

to whether he had been in occupation of accommodation provided by

the Government at any time during the last 10 years before the date

of notification of the current election and, if so, he was to furnish a

declaration to the effect that there were no dues payable in respect

of the said accommodation in relation to rent, electricity charges,

water charges and telephone charges. Karikho Kri, however, failed

to disclose the fact that he had been in occupation of government

accommodation during his tenure as an MLA between 2009 and 2014.

He stated ‘Not applicable’. However, with regard to the declaration

as to there being no dues, he mentioned the date ‘22.03.2019’ and

stated that the dues in respect of rent, electricity charges, water

charges and telephone charges were ‘Nil’. After Nuney Tayang raised

an objection to his candidature on this ground, Karikho Kri filed the

requisite ‘No Due Certificates’ of 2014.

39. However, the High Court was of the opinion that the failure of

Karikho Kri to disclose the factum of his occupying government

accommodation from 2009 to 2014 and his failure to submit the ‘No

Dues Certificate’ in relation to such government accommodation was

sufficient, in itself, to infer that his nomination was defective and,

in consequence, the acceptance thereof by the Returning Officer,

Tezu, was improper.

40. Having considered the issue, we are of the firm view that every

defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed to be of

such character as to render its acceptance improper and each case

would have to turn on its own individual facts, insofar as that aspect

is concerned. The case law on the subject also manifests that this

Court has always drawn a distinction between non-disclosure of

substantial issues as opposed to insubstantial issues, which may

not impact one’s candidature or the result of an election. The very

fact that Section 36(4) of the Act of 1951 speaks of the Returning

Officer not rejecting a nomination unless he is of the opinion that the

defect is of a substantial nature demonstrates that this distinction

must always be kept in mind and there is no absolute mandate that

every non-disclosure, irrespective of its gravity and impact, would

automatically amount to a defect of substantial nature, thereby 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 421

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

materially affecting the result of the election or amounting to ‘undue

influence’ so as to qualify as a corrupt practice.

41. The decision of this Court in Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra), also

demonstrates this principle, as this Court undertook examination of

several individual defects in the nomination of the returned candidate

and found that some of them were actually insubstantial in character.

This Court noted that two facets required consideration – Whether

there is substantial compliance in disclosing requisite information

in the affidavits filed along with the nomination and whether nondisclosure of information on identified aspects materially affected

the result of the election. This Court observed, on facts, that nondisclosure of the electricity dues in that case was not a serious

lapse, despite the fact that there were dues outstanding, as there

was a bonafide dispute about the same. Similar was the observation

in relation to non-disclosure of municipal dues, where there was

a genuine dispute as to re-valuation and re-assessment for the

purpose of tax assessment. Earlier, in Sambhu Prasad Sharma

vs. Charandas Mahant19, this Court observed that the form of

the nomination paper is not considered sacrosanct and what is

to be seen is whether there is substantial compliance with the

requirement as to form and every departure from the prescribed

format cannot, therefore, be made a ground for the rejection of the

nomination paper.

42. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that there were no actual

outstanding dues payable by Karikho Kri in relation to the government

accommodation occupied by him earlier. His failure in disclosing

the fact that he had occupied such accommodation and in filing

the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in that regard, with his nomination form,

cannot be said to be a defect of any real import. More so, as he did

submit the relevant documents of 2014 after Nuney Tayang raised

an objection before the Returning Officer. His explanation that he

submitted such Certificates in the year 2014 when he stood for reelection as an MLA is logical and worthy of acceptance. The most

important aspect to be noted is that there were no actual dues and

the failure of Karikho Kri to disclose that he had been in occupation

of government accommodation during the years 2009 to 2014 cannot

19 [2012] 6 SCR 356 : (2012) 11 SCC 390

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be treated as a defect that is of substantial character so as to taint

his nomination and render its acceptance improper.

43. The High Court opined that the nomination of Karikho Kri was

improperly accepted by the Returning Officer as he had failed

to disclose the three vehicles in question, which continued to be

registered in the name of his dependent family members. Nonsubmission of the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in respect of the government

accommodation occupied by him during his earlier tenure as an MLA

was also held to weigh against him. Lastly, the High Court held that

non-disclosure of the taxes due and payable by Karikho Kri and

his wife was a defect of substantial character and the same tainted

his nomination. In consequence, the High Court concluded that the

acceptance of Karikho Kri’s nomination by the Returning Officer was

improper and as he was the returned candidate, the question of

pleading and proving that such improper acceptance of his nomination

materially affected the result of the election did not arise.

44. Though it has been strenuously contended before us that the voter’s

‘right to know’ is absolute and a candidate contesting the election must

be forthright about all his particulars, we are not inclined to accept

the blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay his life out

threadbare for examination by the electorate. His ‘right to privacy’

would still survive as regards matters which are of no concern to

the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. In that

respect, non-disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate

would not amount to a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial

character. It is not necessary that a candidate declare every item of

movable property that he or his dependent family members owns,

such as, clothing, shoes, crockery, stationery and furniture, etc., unless

the same is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or

reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to

be disclosed. Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities

and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when

the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate

would amount to a defect of a substantial character. For example, a

candidate and his family who own several high-priced watches, which

would aggregate to a huge figure in terms of monetary value, would

obviously have to disclose the same as they constitute an asset of

high value and also reflect upon his lavish lifestyle. Suppression of

the same would constitute ‘undue influence’ upon the voter as that 

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 423

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

relevant information about the candidate is being kept away from the

voter. However, if a candidate and his family members each own a

simple watch, which is not highly priced, suppression of the value of

such watches may not amount to a defect at all. Each case would,

therefore, have to be judged on its own facts.

45. So far as the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 is

concerned, the provision requires that the established non-compliance

with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or any rules

or orders made thereunder necessarily has to be shown to have

materially affected the result of the election insofar as it concerns

the returned candidate. Significantly, the High Court linked all the

non-disclosures attributed to Karikho Kri to Section 100(1)(d)(i) of

the Act of 1951 but ultimately concluded that his election stood

invalidated under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) thereof. Surprisingly, there is

no discussion whatsoever on what were the violations which qualified

as non-compliance with the provisions of either the Constitution or

the Act of 1951 or the rules and orders framed thereunder, for the

purposes of Section 100(1)(d)(iv), and as to how the same materially

affected the result of the election.

46. In Mangani Lal Mandal vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari20, this Court held

that where a returned candidate is alleged to be guilty of non-compliance

with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or any rules

or orders made thereunder and his election is sought to be declared

void on that ground, it is essential for the election petitioner to aver,

by pleading material facts, that the result of the election insofar as

it concerned the returned candidate has been materially affected by

such breach or non-observance. It was further held that it is only on

the basis of such pleading and proof that the Court would be in a

position to form an opinion and record a finding that such breach or

non-compliance has materially affected the result of the election before

election of the returned candidate could be declared void. It was further

observed that mere non-compliance or breach of the Constitution or the

statutory provisions, as stated above, would not result in invalidating

the election of the returned candidate under Section 100 (1)(d)(iv) as

the sine qua non for declaring the election of a returned candidate to

be void on that ground under clause (iv) of Section 100 (1)(d) is further

20 [2012] 1 SCR 527 :(2012) 3 SCC 314

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proof of the fact that such breach or non-observance has resulted

in materially affecting the election of the returned candidate. For the

election petitioner to succeed on such ground, viz., Section 100 (1)

(d)(iv), he has not only to plead and prove the breach but also show

that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned the returned

candidate, has been materially affected thereby.

47. In L.R. Shivaramagowda and others vs. T.M. Chandrashekar

(Dead) by LRs and others21, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court pointed

out that in order to declare an election void under Section 100(1)

(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951, it is absolutely necessary for the election

petitioner to plead that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned

the returned candidate, has been materially affected by the alleged

non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of

1951 or the rules or orders made thereunder and the failure to plead

such material facts would be fatal to the election petition.

48. However, perusal of the election petition filed by Nuney Tayang

reflects that the only statement made by him in this regard is in

Paragraph 21 and it reads as follows:

‘……Hence, his nomination papers suffer from substantial

and material defects. As such, the result of the election,

insofar as the respondent No.1 is concerned, is materially

affected by the improper acceptance of his nomination

as well as by the non-compliance with the provisions of

the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the rules

and orders made thereunder, including Section 33(1) of

the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Rule 4A of

the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and the orders made

thereunder…...’

Again, in his ‘Ground No. (ii)’, Nuney Tayang stated as under:

‘…….As such, the nomination papers of the respondent

Nos. 1 and 2 were improperly accepted by the Returning

Officer and the result of the election in question, insofar as

it concerns the respondent No.1 the return candidate, as

well as the respondent No.2, has been materially affected

by such improper acceptance of their nominations……’

21 [1998] Supp. 3 SCR 241 : (1999) 1 SCC 666

[2024] 4 S.C.R. 425

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

Though there are some general references to non-compliance with

particular provisions of the Act of 1951 and the rules made thereunder,

we do not find adequate pleadings or proof to substantiate and satisfy

the requirements of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951. Therefore,

it is clear that Nuney Tayang tied up the improper acceptance of

Karikho Kri’s nomination, relatable to Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act

of 1951, with the non-compliance relatable to Section 100(1)(d)(iv)

thereof and he did not sufficiently plead or prove a specific breach

or how it materially affected the result of the election, in so far as it

concerned the returned candidate, Karikho Kri. It was not open to

Nuney Tayang to link up separate issues and fail to plead in detail

and adduce sufficient evidence in relation to the non-compliance that

would attract Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951. The finding of

the High Court in that regard is equally bereft of rhyme and reason

and cannot be sustained.

49. As regards the failure on the part of Karikho Kri to disclose the dues

of municipal/property taxes payable by him and his wife, the same

cannot be held to be a non-disclosure at all, inasmuch as he did

disclose the particulars of such dues in one part of his Affidavit but did

not do so in another part. In any event, as Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury,

learned senior counsel, fairly stated that he would not be pressing

this ground, we need not labour further upon this point.

50. On the above analysis, we hold that the High Court was in error in

concluding that sufficient grounds were made out under Sections

100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 to invalidate

the election of Karikho Kri and, further, in holding that non-disclosure

of the three vehicles, that still remained registered in the names of

his wife and son as on the date of filing of his nomination, amounted

to a ‘corrupt practice’ under Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951. In

consequence, we find no necessity to independently deal with Civil

Appeal No. 4716 of 2023 filed by Nuney Tayang, in the context of

denial of relief to him by the High Court, or the issues raised by Dr.

Mohesh Chai in the replies filed by him.

51. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023 filed by Karikho Kri is

allowed, setting aside the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2023

passed by the Itanagar Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland,

Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh in Election Petition No.01(AP) of

2019. In consequence, the election of Karikho Kri as the returned 

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candidate from 44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency of the State of

Arunachal Pradesh is upheld.

As a corollary, Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023, filed by Nuney Tayang,

shall stand dismissed.

Pending applications in both the appeals, if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

This decision shall be intimated to the Election Commission of India

and to the Chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the State of

Arunachal Pradesh forthwith, as required by Section 116C(2) of the

Act of 1951.

An authenticated copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Election

Commission of India forthwith.

Parties shall bear their own costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeals disposed of.