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Wednesday, February 14, 2024

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – s. 10-A – Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 – Concession Rules, 2016 – r.61 and Proviso – Directions issued to the government of West Bengal to execute a mining lease in favour of respondent no.1-M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih:

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 277 : 2023 INSC 824

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER

v.

M/S. CHIRANJILAL (MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF

BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

(Civil Appeal No. 8238 of 2022)

SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

[SANJIV KHANNA* AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]

Issue for consideration: Intra-court appeal preferred by the

State of West Bengal before the High Court was dismissed with

the direction to the Appellant No. 2 – Joint Secretary, Department

of Industries, Commerce and Enterprises, West Bengal or any

authorised officer to execute a mining lease in favour of the

Respondent No. 2, sole proprietor of Respondent No. 1 - M/s.

Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih.

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

– s. 10-A – Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)

Amendment Act, 2015 – Concession Rules, 2016 – r.61 and

Proviso – Directions issued to the government of West Bengal

to execute a mining lease in favour of respondent no.1-M/s.

Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih:

Held: It is the stand of the appellants – State of West Bengal,

that they are owners of 20.87 acres of the land in question and to

this extent, they have no difficulty in executing the mining lease –

This being the stated stand, which has also been affirmed, there

should be no difficulty in granting of mining lease for the said area

to the Respondent No. 1-M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of

Bagandih – So, it is directed that the government of West Bengal

will execute a mining lease for 20.87 acres of land in favour of the

Respondent No. 1 – The claim of the Respondent No. 1 towards

the balance area for the grant of mining lease will be treated as

rejected and dismissed. [Paras 20 and 22]

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,

1957 – sub-section (1) to Section 10-A Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 – Object

and purpose of amendment – Application of exceptions or the

saving clauses in three kinds of situations:

* Author

278 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

Held: The object and purpose of the Amendment Act, 2015 is

to ensure that allocation of mineral resources is done through

auctioning – This is the reason why sub-section (1) to Section 10-A

of the MMDR Act, 1957 mandates that all applications received

prior to 12.01.2015 shall become ineligible – The exceptions or

the saving clause applies to three kinds of situations specified in

sub-section (2) to Section 10-A of the MMDR Act, 1957 – The first

category is where an application has been received u/s. 11-A of the

MMDR Act,1957 – The second category is where a reconnaissance

permit or a prospecting licence has been granted the permit holder

or the licensee has the right to obtain a prospecting licence followed

by a mining lease and the State Government is satisfied that the

permit holder or the licensee has complied with the requirements

specified in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (b) of sub-section

(2) to Section 10-A of the MMDR Act, 1957 – The reason for

protecting this class of cases is on account of the fact that they

had altered their position by spending money on reconnaissance

operations or prospecting operations – Accordingly, the principle

of legitimate expectation is applied – The third category is where

the Central Government had already communicated their previous

approval or the State Government had issue Letter of Intent for

grant of mining lease before coming into force of the Amendment

Act 2015 – The raison dêtre, it is observed therein, is that certain

rights had accrued to these applicants inasmuch as all necessary

procedures and formalities had been complied with and only formal

lease remains to be executed. [Para 14]

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 –

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment

Act, 2015 – A Grant Order dated 16.07.2015 was issued by

the Deputy Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department,

West Bengal for Dolomite mining in favour of Respondent No.

1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih in respect

of 76 acres of land, subject to certain conditions – Whether

approval of the Central Government required or not:

Held: Though in the present case, post notification No. S.O. 423(E)

dated 10.02.2015, Dolomite was notified as a minor mineral and

hence, the approval of the Central Government was not required

for the reason that the Grant Order dated 16.07.2015 was hedged

with pre-conditions, including the requirement to submit consent

letters of the owners of the land in question (Raiyats) before the 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 279

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

execution of the lease deed, or there was to be a stipulation that

a condition to this effect would be incorporated in the draft lease

– Therefore, the Grant Order dated 16.07.2015 is provisional, and

is subject to fulfilment of the conditions therein. [Para 16]

West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 – sub-section (10) to

section 2 and sub-section (2A) to section 4 – Raiyat Land –

Meaning – Rights of Raiyat in respect of land:

Held: Raiyat land is to be used for cultivation, etc., and not for

mining – Once the mining activity is undertaken, the Raiyats will not

be able to use the land – In terms of sub-section (10) to Section 2

of the WBLR Act, 1955, a Raiyat means a person or an institution

holding land for any purpose whatsoever – However, the rights

of Raiyat in respect of the land in terms of sub-section (2A) to

Section 4 of the WBLR Act, 1955 does not permit any other person

to quarry sand from his holding, dig or use, or permit any person

to dig or use, earth or clay of his holding for the manufacture of

bricks or tiles except with previous permission in writing of the State

Government – In case of breach of the condition, the prescribed

authority may, after giving notice and opportunity to a Raiyat to

show cause, can levy a monetary penalty. [Para 17]

West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 – s. 4B – Preservation

of character of land:

Held: Section 4-B of the WBLR Act, 1955 stipulates that every

Raiyat holding any land shall maintain and preserve such land in

a manner that the area is not diminished or its character is not

changed or the land is not converted for any purpose other than

the purpose for which it was settled or previously held except

with the previous permission of the Collector in writing. [Para 17]

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

– West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 – s. 14 Y – A Grant

Order dated 16.07.2015 was issued by the Deputy Secretary,

Commerce and Industries Department, West Bengal for

Dolomite mining in favour of Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal

(Mineral) Industries of Bagandih in respect of 76 acres of

land, subject to certain conditions, including the requirement

to submit consent letters of owners of the land in question

(Raiyats) – Another stipulation mentioned therein was the need

for permission u/s. 14-Y of the WBLR Act, 1955 for holding

the required land and furnishing of Conversion Certificate for 

280 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

plots of land from the appropriate authority in terms of s.4-C

of the WBLR Act, 1955:

Held: The controversy relating to Section 4-C of the WBLR Act,

1955, cannot simply be decided on the basis of Memo No. V/

RTI/775/15 dated 06.03.2017 issued by the Deputy District Land

and Land Reforms Officer, Purulia, that as per the revenue records

the land was recorded as ‘Dungri’ – The reason is that Raiyat land

is not for mining – Thus, a contradiction arises, as the grant of

Raiyat land and the classification of the same land as ‘Dungri’ is

contradictory – Further, whether the consent letter of the owners

of the land in question (Raiyats) obtained by the Respondent No.

1still hold good, would be relevant as there could be a change of

hands on account of transfer, inheritance, etc – Connected with

this are the legal issues – First, whether the Respondent No. 1

had altered its position post the issue of the Grant Order dated

16.07.2015, but before enforcement of the Concession Rules, 2016,

to get the benefit of Rule 61 of the Concessions Rules, 2016? – It is

necessary to ascertain the facts and then alone one can adjudicate

and decide the question whether the Respondent No. 1 is entitled

to the benefit of the proviso to Rule 61 of the Concession Rules,

2016 – This has not been verified and ascertained – An issue

would arise on whether the application filed by the Respondent

No. 1 way back in 1998 would still hold good as at the time, when

the application was filed, approval of the Central Government

was required – Another difficulty is that WBMDTCL has not been

impleaded as a party, though it was always contesting the claim

made by the Respondent No. 1 – However, these issues are not

being examined in the light of the directions issued – Further, that

the remand order cannot be passed at this distinct point of time.

[Paras 18 and 19]

Bhushan Power and Steel Limited v. S.L. Seal, Additional

Secretary (Steel and Mines), State of Odisha and Others,

(2017) 2 SCC 125:[2016] 11 SCR 149; Bhushan Power

and Steel Limited and Others v. State of Orissa and

Another, (2012) 4 SCC 246:[2012] 5 SCR 16; Sandur

Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. v. State of Karnataka,

(2010) 13 SCC 1:[2010] 11 SCR 240; Bhushan Power

and Steel Limited v. Rajesh Verma, (2014) 5 SCC

551:[2014] 5 SCR 493; Rishi Kiran Logistics Private

Limited v. Board of Trustees of Kandla Port Trust

and Others, (2015) 13 SCC 233:[2014] 5 SCR 411; 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 281

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Federation Limited v.

Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service Private Limited

and Others, (1996) 10 SCC 405:[1996] 6 Suppl. SCR

368; Thressiamma Jacob and Others v. Geologist,

Department of Mining and Geology and Others, (2013)

9 SCC 725:[2013] 7 SCR 863 – referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL APPEAL NO.8238 OF

2022

[From the Judgment and Order dated 04.10.2018 of the High Court

at Calcutta in FMA No.1458 of 2017]

Anand Grover, Sr. Adv., Ms. Mantika Haryani, Shreyas Awasthi, Ms.

Astha Sharma, Advs. for the Appellants.

Respondent in Person.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SANJIV KHANNA, J.

This appeal, by way of special leave, takes exception to the judgment of

the division bench of the High Court of Calcutta, whereby the intra-court

appeal preferred by the State of West Bengal and Others in F.M.A. No.

1458 of 2017 with CAN No. 6596 of 2017 has been dismissed with the

direction to the Appellant No. 2 – Joint Secretary, Department of Industries,

Commerce and Enterprises, West Bengal or any authorised officer to

execute a mining lease in favour of the Respondent No. 2 – Dinesh

Agarwal, sole proprietor of Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral)

Industries of Bagandih.

2. The facts are rather chequered, albeit are required to be noticed

in detail. On 07.08.1985, West Bengal Mineral Development and

Trading Corporation Limited1

 had filed an application for grant of long

term mining lease for Dolomite, Limestone and Quartzite at the plots

in Mouza - Khariduara, Kumari and Boch. An application was also

filed by WBMDTCL for grant of long term mining lease for Iron Ore,

Manganese and Fireclay at the plots in Mouza - Khariduara, Kumari,

Boch and Kangametya. Grant Order dated 07.04.1986 was issued

in favour of WBMDTCL by the Assistant Secretary, Commerce and

Industries Department, Mines Branch, West Bengal.

1 For Short,’ WBMDTCL’.

282 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

2.1 On 06.03.1998, Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral)

Industries of Bagandih. had filed an application before the

Mining Officer-in-charge, Purulia Zone, Directorate of Mines and

Minerals, West Bengal, for the grant of a mining lease for the

purpose of extracting Dolomite at Mouza - Khariduara, Kumari

and Boch, in 76 acres of land.

2.2 The Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of

Bagandih filed Writ Petition No. 7808 (W) of 2001 before the High

Court of Calcutta, seeking disposal of their application for grant

of mining lease. The High Court vide order dated 13.06.2001,

directed the State authorities to dispose of the application of

Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of

Bagandih at an early date and in accordance with law.

2.3 The Joint Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department,

West Bengal, vide order dated 13.03.2003, rejected the

application of Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral)

Industries of Bagandih, on the ground of non-availability of land

in view of the previous application of WBMDTCL. By another

order dated 26.03.2003, the Joint Secretary, Commerce and

Industries Department, West Bengal reiterated that the mining

application of Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral)

Industries of Bagandih overlaps with the area applied for in

the previous application by WBMDTCL. The application of

the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of

Bagandih was accordingly rejected.

2.4 Aggrieved, the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral)

Industries of Bagandih had filed Writ Petition No. 7505 (W)

of 2003 in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the orders

passed by the Joint Secretary, Commerce and Industries

Department, West Bengal, dated 13.03.2003 and 26.03.2003.

During the pendency of the said Writ Petition, the Joint

Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department, West Bengal,

reviewed the aforesaid orders and passed a fresh order dated

13.10.2006 for apportionment of land between WBMDTCL and

the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries

of Bagandih. This order states that two hearings were held

on 24.05.2006 and 19.06.2006 to review the matter, and 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 283

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

thereupon at the hearing dated 19.06.2006, in the presence of

the representatives of WBMDTCL and the Respondent No. 1 -

M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih, it was agreed

that Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of

Bagandih will be granted the whole of the mining area of 76

acres, and the lease for the rest of the area will be granted in

favour of WBMDTCL. No other reason has been stated and

indicated in the said order. Thus, the orders dated 13.03.2003

and 26.03.2003 rejecting the application of the Respondent

No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih were

recalled. Consequently, the Letter of Intent dated 26.10.2006

was issued in favour of the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal

(Mineral) Industries of Bagandih for an area of 76 acres of land

subject to fulfilling/submission of various documents, including

approval of the Mining Plan duly approved by the Chief Mining

Officer, Asansol and Clearance Certificate from the Ministry of

Environment and Forests, Government of India.

2.5 However, the order dated 13.10.2006 was cancelled or revoked

vide order dated 03.12.2010 by the Joint Secretary, Commerce

and Industries Department, Mines Branch, West Bengal, inter

alia, recording that this order was passed without ascertaining

the exact position of the land and in ignorance of the fact that

the rejection orders dated 13.03.2003 and 26.03.2003 had

already been challenged before the High Court in Writ Petition

No. 7505 (W) of 2003. The authorities had not ascertained the

status of the case. The order of cancellation or revocation dated

03.12.2010 was not challenged by the respondents.

2.6 This order dated 03.12.2010 was also not brought to the notice

of the High Court, when the Writ Petition No. 7505 (W) of 2003

was disposed of ex-parte vide order dated 25.03.2014 by relying

upon the supplementary affidavit filed by the Respondent No.

1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih, which had

referred to the recalled order dated 13.10.2006. This order of

the High Court states that a decision as to whether a lease

or licence to be granted in favour of the Respondent No. 1 -

M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih shall be taken

within a period of eight weeks and Respondent No. 1 - M/s. 

284 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih would be accordingly

informed. It was made clear that the decision as to the grant

will be on the basis of the law and the rules applicable at the

time of consideration.

2.7 By the order dated 09.07.2014 passed by the Joint Secretary,

Commerce and Industries Department, West Bengal, the

application filed by the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal

(Mineral) Industries of Bagandih was rejected inter alia relying

upon the earlier application filed by WBMDTCL. Significantly, this

order mentions that the two rejection orders dated 13.03.2003

and 26.03.2003 were recalled by the Joint Secretary vide his

order dated 13.10.2006. This order also refers to the factum

that the Grant Order dated 07.04.1986 to WBMDTCL for Iron

Ore, Manganese and Fireclay in the plots in question had been

revoked and the application for Long-Term Mining Lease filed

by WBMDTCL for Dolomite and Limestone was rejected by a

common order dated 24.09.2009. The order dated 24.09.2009

has not been placed on record, though it is necessary to

ascertain and know the reasons for cancellation and rejection

in favour of WBMDTCL. WBMDTCL had applied earlier in point

of time, and is a government of West Bengal undertaking. The

order dated 09.07.2014 does indicate that the cancellation

and rejection against WBMDTCL had something to do with

the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of

Bagandih, and possibly the order dated 13.10.2006 in favour

of the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries

of Bagandih. This is reflected from the reason given in the

order dated 09.07.2014, which states that since the recall

order dated 13.10.2006 was cancelled or revoked vide order

dated 03.12.2010, the rejection orders dated 13.03.2003 and

26.03.2003 were still valid and the application for mining lease

dated 07.08.1985 for Dolomite and Limestone by WBMDTCL still

subsists. Thereupon, reference in the order dated 09.07.2014

is made to sub-section (2) to Section 112

 of the Mines and

2 11. Preferential right of certain persons . - (1) Where a reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence

has been granted in respect of any land, the permit holder or the licensee shall have a preferential right for

obtaining a prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, in respect of that land over any other

person:

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 285

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 19573

, which states

that in cases where the State Government has not notified in

the Official Gazette an area for grant of reconnaissance permit,

prospecting licence for mining lease, and two or more persons

had applied for the permit, licence or mining lease, the person

whose application received earlier in point of time shall have

preferential right for grant of permit, licence or lease over the

Provided that the State Government is satisfied that the permit holder or the licensee, as the case may be, -

(a) has undertaken reconnaissance operations or prospecting operations, as the case may be, to establish

mineral resources in such land;

(b) has not committed any breach of the terms and conditions of the reconnaissance permit or the prospecting licence;

(c) has not become ineligible under the provision of this Act; and

(d) has not failed to apply for grant of prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, within three

months after the expiry of reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence, as the case may be, or within such

further period as may be extended by the said Government.

(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1),where the State Government has not notified in the Official

Gazette the area for grant of reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may

be, and two or more persons have applied for a reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or a mining

lease in respect of any land in such area, the applicant whose application was received earlier, shall have a

preferential right to be considered for grant of reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease, as

the case may be, over the applicant whose application was received later:

Provided that where an area is available for grant of reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining

lease, as the case may be, and the State Government has invited applications by notification in the Official

Gazette for grant of such permit, licence or lease, all the applications received during the period specified in

such notification and the applications which had been received prior to the publication of such notification in

respect of the lands within such area and had not been disposed of , shall be deemed to have been received

on the same day for the purposes of assigning priority under this subsection.

Provided further that where any such applications are received on the same day, the State Government,

after taking into consideration the matters specified in sub-section (3), may grant the reconnaissance permit,

prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, to such one of the applicants as it may deem fit.

(3) The matters referred to in sub-section (2) are the following:-

(a) any special knowledge of, or experience in, reconnaissance operations, prospecting operations or mining

operations, as the case may be, possessed by the applicant;

(b) the financial resources of the applicant;

(c) the nature and quality of the technical staff employed or to be employed by the applicant;

 (d) the investment which the applicant proposes to make in the mines and in the industry based on the

minerals;

(e) such other matters as may be prescribed.

(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section(1), where the State Government notifies in the Official Gazette

an area for grant of reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, all the

applications received during the period as specified in such notification, which shall not be less than thirty

days, shall be considered simultaneously as if all such applications have been received on the same day

and the State Government, after taking into consideration the matters specified in sub-section(3), may grant

the reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, to such one of the applicants as it may deem fit.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), but subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), the

State Government may, for any special reasons to be recorded, grant a reconnaissance permit, prospecting

licence or a mining lease, as the case may be, to an applicant whose application was received later in preference to an applicant whose application was received earlier:

Provided that in respect of minerals specified in the First Schedule, prior approval of the Central Government

shall be obtained before passing any order under this sub-section.

3 For short, ‘MMDR Act, 1957’

286 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

person whose application was received later. The order states

that WBMDTCL is very much interested in mining Dolomite

and Limestone in the area and has confirmed the said fact in

writing vide letter dated 05.06.2014.

2.8 The Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries

of Bagandih challenged the order dated 09.07.2014 passed

by the Joint Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department,

West Bengal in Writ Petition No. 21358 (W) of 2014 before

the High Court of Calcutta. This petition was disposed of vide

order dated 10.09.2014 observing that the Joint Secretary, who

had passed the order dated 09.07.2014 had failed to exercise

jurisdiction vested in him as the applications filed by WBMDTCL

had been rejected vide common order dated 24.09.2009 and

were therefore not pending. Direction was issued by the High

Court to grant a long term lease in respect of 76 acres of land

to the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries

of Bagandih by observing that the respondent had a Rayati

status and that the remaining land can be given to WBMDTCL.

It may be relevant to note here that this order records that the

files relating to the application of WBMDTCL were untraceable.

WBMDTCL was not made a party to the said writ petition.

Notably, the application filed by WBMDTCL, being earlier in

point of time in terms of the applicable rules was to be given

preference, whereas the application filed by the Respondent

No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih was

rejected vide orders dated 13.03.2003 and 26.03.2003. However,

the rejection orders were recalled vide order dated 13.10.2006

and the Letter of Intent dated 26.10.2006 was issued in favour

of the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries

of Bagandih. Subsequently, the Grant Order dated 13.10.2006

in favour of the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral)

Industries of Bagandih was cancelled and recalled vide order

dated 13.12.2010. This order dated 13.12.2010 was never

challenged and has attained finality. It is during the period

between the order dated 13.10.2006 and the order dated

13.12.2010 that the request/application of WBMDTCL was

rejected and the mining lease cancelled vide order dated

24.09.2009. 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 287

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

2.9 On 10.02.2015, vide notification No. S.O. 423 (E), Dolomite

was notified as a minor mineral, and accordingly henceforth,

fell under the legislative and administrative jurisdiction of the

State Government.

2.10 A Grant Order dated 16.07.2015 was issued by the Deputy

Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department, West

Bengal for Dolomite mining in favour of Respondent No. 1 -

M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih in respect of

76 acres of land, subject to certain conditions, including the

requirement to submit consent letters of owners of the land

in question (Raiyats) before the execution of the lease deed,

or a condition to this effect would be incorporated in the draft

lease. Another stipulation mentioned therein is the need for

permission under Section 14-Y4 of the West Bengal Land

Reforms Act, 19555

 for holding the required land and furnishing

of Conversion Certificate for plots of land from the appropriate

authority in terms of Section 4-C6

 of the WBLR Act, 1955. It

4 14-Y. Limitation on future acquisition of land by a raiyat.—If at any time, after the commencement

of the provisions of this Chapter, the total area of land owned by a raiyat exceeds the ceiling area applicable

to him under Section 14-M, on account of transfer, inheritance or otherwise, the area of land which is in

excess of the ceiling area shall vest in the State and all the provisions of this Chapter relating to ceiling area

shall apply to such land:

Provided that a person intending to establish a tea garden, mill, factory or workshop, livestock breeding

farm, poultry farm, or dairy, or township in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal Town and

Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979, may, with the previous permission, in writing, of the State

Government and on such terms and conditions and in such manner as the State Government may by rules

prescribe, acquire and hold land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him under Section 14-M:

Provided further that if such person, having been permitted by the State Government, does not utilise within

two years of the date of such permission such land for the purpose for which he has been so permitted by

the State Government to acquire and hold it, then, all the provisions of this Chapter relating to ceiling area

shall apply to the area of land which is held in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him under Section

14-M.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “person” includes an individual, a firm, a company, an institution, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.

5 For short, ‘WBLR Act, 1955’.’

6 4-C. Permission for change of area, character or use of land.—(1) A raiyat holding any land may

apply to the Collector for change of area or character of such land or for conversion of the same for any

purpose other than the purpose for which it was settled or was being previously used or for alteration in the

mode of use of such land.

(2) On receipt of such application, the Collector may, after making such inquiry as may be prescribed and

after giving the applicant or the persons interested in such land or affected in any way an opportunity of being heard, by order in writing either reject the application or direct such change, conversion or alteration, as

the case may be, on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.

(3) Every order under sub-section (2) directing change, conversion or alteration shall specify the date from

which such change, conversion or alteration shall take effect.

(4) A copy of the order passed by the Collector directing change, conversion or alteration, if any, under subsection (2), or in an appeal therefrom shall he forwarded to the Revenue Officer referred to in Section 50 or 

288 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

is also stipulated that the Grant Order and the subsequent

execution of the lease deed are subject to the No Objection

Certificate to be obtained from the Central Government since

Dolomite was a major mineral at the time of the order dated

10.09.2014 passed by the High Court.

2.11 Aggrieved by the conditions and the requirements stipulated in

the Grant Order dated 16.07.2015, the Respondent No. 1 - M/s.

Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih filed two Contempt

Petitions in W.P. 21358 (W) of 2014. These contempt petitions

were disposed of, inter alia, observing that the Respondent

No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih was

required to fulfil the conditions, including furnishing of the

Conversion Certificate under Section 4-C of the WBLR Act,

1955 and No Objection Certificate from the Government of

India. The court, therefore, found that there was no wilful, or

contumacious violation of the order dated 10.09.2014. However,

liberty was granted to the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal

(Mineral) Industries of Bagandih to question the Grant Order

dated 16.07.2015.

2.12 The Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of

Bagandih thereupon preferred Writ Petition No. 20309 (W) of

2016 before the High Court of Calcutta. However, WBMDTCL

was not a party to this writ petition. In the meanwhile, a

clarification was sought by the Deputy Secretary, Commerce

and Industries Department, West Bengal and vide clarification

dated 26.08.2016 issued by the Government of India, Ministry

of Mines, it was clarified that even prior to 10.02.2015, Dolomite

was a Non-Scheduled major mineral, for which prior approval

of the Central Government was not required under sub-section

(1) to Section 5 of the MMDR Act, 1957.

Section 51, as the case may be, and such Revenue Officer shall incorporate in the record-of-rights changes

effected by such order and revise the record-of-rights in accordance with such order.

(5) If the Collector is satisfied that any land is being convened for any purpose other than the purpose for

which it was settled or was being previously held, or attempts are being made to effect alteration in the mode

of use of such land or change of the area or character of such land, he may, by order, restrain the raiyat from

such Act.

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 289

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

2.13 This Writ Petition No. 20309 (W) of 2016 vide judgment and

order dated 12.04.2017 has been allowed inter alia observing

that Dolomite had become a minor mineral with effect from

10.02.2015 and hence prior approval of the Central Government

is not required under Section 5(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957. On

the question of requirements under Section 14-Y and 4-C of

the WBLR Act, 1955, it is observed that the land in question is

recorded as ‘Dungri’ as per information provided by the Deputy

District Land and Land Reforms Officer, Purulia vide Memo No.

V/RTI/775/15 dated 06.03.2017 and that the land classified as

‘Dungri’ is only used for the purpose of mining lease and thus,

there is no need for a conversion certificate under Section 4-C

of the WBLR, Act, 1955. The clarification dated 07.04.2016 was

issued by the Additional District Magistrate and District Land

and Land Reforms Officer, Purulia, stating that the Respondent

No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih had

procured a No Objection Certificate in respect of the major

portion of Raiyati land from different owners and that the State

Government itself was the owner of 20.87 acres of land, thus

Section 14-Y of the WBLR Act, 1955 would not be applicable as

the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of

Bagandih has not acquired land in excess ceiling limit prescribed

under Section 14-M of the WBLR Act, 1955.

2.14 This judgment was challenged by the State of West Bengal

in an intra-court appeal being F.M.A. No. 1458 of 2017 with

CAN No. 6596 of 2017 which has been dismissed vide the

impugned judgment dated 04.10.2018. Agreeing with the findings

recorded by the Single Judge, the division bench has held that

the provisions of the West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession

Rules, 20167

 will not be applicable as the Respondent No. 1 -

M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih had made the

application in March 1998, and more so as the Joint Secretary,

Government of West Bengal had passed the order dated

13.10.2006 to grant mining lease. The High Court’s direction

given in Writ Petition No. 21358 (W) of 2014 vide judgment

7 For short, ‘Concession Rules, 2016’.

290 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

dated 10.09.2014 are prior to the enforcement of the Concession

Rules, 2016.

3. We have heard the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the State

of West Bengal and the Respondent No. 2 – Dinesh Agarwal, who

has appeared in-person. They have also submitted their written

submissions.

4. We begin our discussion by first referring to Rule 61 of the Concession

Rules, 2016, which reads as under:

“61.Decleration of ineligibility of the pending minor mineral

applications for mining lease including the applications of

reclassified major minerals.- All applications for mining lease of

minor minerals including the reclassified minor minerals vide SO No423 (E) dated 12th February,2015 received prior to the giving-effect

to this rules irrespective of its duration of pendency shall become

ineligible.

Provided that if the applicant has been issued a Grant Order or

Letter of Intent (LoI) or any other Government Order requiring the

alteration of applicant’s position then his mining lease application

may be considered after due compliance of the all the necessary

conditions”

5. An almost corresponding amendment was made to the MMDR

Act, 1957 by incorporating Section 10-A vide Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 20158

, which reads

as under:

10-A. Rights of existing concession holders and applicants.—

(1) All applications received prior to the date of commencement of

the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment

Act, 2015, shall become ineligible.

(2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1), the following shall remain

eligible on and from the date of commencement of the Mines and

Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015—

(a) applications received under Section 11-A of this Act;

8 For short, ‘Amendment Act, 2015’.

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 291

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

(b) where before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 a

reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence has been granted

in respect of any land for any mineral, the permit holder or the

licensee shall have a right for obtaining a prospecting licence

followed by a mining lease, or a mining lease, as the case

may be, in respect of that mineral in that land, if the State

Government is satisfied that the permit holder or the licensee,

as the case may be,—

(i) has undertaken reconnaissance operations or prospecting

operations, as the case may be, to establish the existence

of mineral contents in such land in accordance with

such parameters as may be prescribed by the Central

Government;

(ii) has not committed any breach of the terms and conditions

of the reconnaissance permit or the prospecting licence;

(iii) has not become ineligible under the provisions of this

Act; and

(iv) has not failed to apply for grant of prospecting licence

or mining lease, as the case may be, within a period of

three months after the expiry of reconnaissance permit

or prospecting licence, as the case may be, or within

such further period not exceeding six months as may be

extended by the State Government;

(c) where the Central Government has communicated previous

approval as required under sub-section (1) of Section 5 for

grant of a mining lease, or if a letter of intent (by whatever

name called) has been issued by the State Government to

grant a mining lease, before the commencement of the Mines

and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act,

2015, the mining lease shall be granted subject to fulfilment of

the conditions of the previous approval or of the letter of intent

within a period of two years from the date of commencement

of the said Act:

292 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

Provided that in respect of any mineral specified in the First Schedule,

no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted under

clause (b) of this sub-section except with the previous approval of

the Central Government.

6. Rule 61 of the Concession Rules, 2016 states that all applications for

mining lease of minor minerals including reclassified minor minerals

vide S.O. No. 423 (E) dated 12.02.2015 received prior to giving

effect to the Concession Rules, 20169

, irrespective of its duration of

pendency shall become ineligible. In other words, these applications

are not to be considered. The proviso makes an exception and

states that if an applicant, who had made an application prior to

29.07.2016, had been issued a Grant Order or a Letter of Intent, or

any other order requiring alteration of the applicant’s position, his

application for mining lease may be considered after due compliance

of all necessary conditions. The question is whether the respondents’

case is covered by the exception in terms of the proviso to Rule

61 of the Concession Rules,2016. We have already referred to the

reasoning given by the division bench of the High Court dealing with

the Concession Rules, 2016, and would like to quote the findings

which hold that the proviso would not be applicable to the facts of

the present case. These observations read:

“25. ….Neither such recent policy nor can the provisions of the

West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016 can apply

to the application of the writ petitioners made in March, 1998 and

more so as the order of the Joint Secretary to grant lease is dated

13th October, 2006 and that of this Court directing grant of long term

lease is dated 10th September, 2014 are prior to such policy and

prior to the said Rules came into operation. It further appears that

necessary mining plan taking into account the environmental aspect

has been submitted by the writ petitioners and the appellant/State

has raised no grievance in respect thereof.”

7. The policy referred to in the aforesaid paragraph is in terms of the

letter dated 02.02.2018 issued by the Principal Secretary, State of

West Bengal, wherein it is specified that obtaining a Conversion

9 The Concession Rules, 2016 came into effect on 29.07.2016

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 293

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

Certificate is a mandatory condition for the purpose of a mining

lease. Reference in the impugned judgment to the order dated

13.10.2006, or for that matter, the Letter of Intent dated 26.10.2006

is inconsequential as the said orders were recalled and revoked

on 03.12.2010. The orders did not survive and continue to operate

thereafter. Writ Petition No. 7505 (W) of 2003 was disposed of exparte, without noticing that the order dated 13.10.2006 had been

recalled or cancelled, albeit the judgment had directed that the

application for grant of lease would be considered in accordance

with law and the rules applicable at the time of consideration. The

order dated 03.12.2010 was never challenged by the Respondent

No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih and has

attained finality. At best, the case of the Respondent No. 1 - M/s.

Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih is that the application

dated 06.03.1998 should be considered in accordance with law.

8. The Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of

Bagandih has relied upon judgment of this Court in Bhushan

Power and Steel Limited v. S.L. Seal, Additional Secretary

(Steel and Mines), State of Odisha and Others10. In the said case,

the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner therein had made an

application for grant of lease before the State of Odisha for mining

of Iron Ore in an area measuring 1250 acres. The application

was in view of the proposal to set up a steel plant in the district

of Sambalpur, Odisha. The rejection for the grant of the mining

lease to M/s. Bhushan Power and Steel Limited was challenged

in a Writ Petition in the High Court, which was dismissed, but the

appeal preferred before this Court was allowed vide judgment dated

14.03.2012 in Bhushan Power and Steel Limited and Others v.

State of Orissa and Another11, setting aside the order of the State

Government dated 09.02.2016, with the following directions:

“41. In the light of the above, the High Court erred in holding that it

could not interfere with the decision of the State Government calling

upon the appellants to sign a fresh MoU with the Government, during

subsistence of the earlier MoU. Since the State Government has

10 (2017) 2 SCC 125.

11 (2012) 4 SCC 246.

294 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

already made allotments in favour of others in relaxation of the Mineral

Concession Rules, 1960, under Rule 59(2) thereof, no cogent ground

had been made out on behalf of the State to deny the said privilege

to the appellants as well. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set

aside the judgment and order of the High Court of Orissa and also

the decision of the State Government dated 9-2-2006, rejecting the

appellants’ claim for grant of mining lease.

42. During the course of hearing, we have been informed that

Thakurani Block A has large reserves of iron ore, in which the

appellants can also be accommodated. We, accordingly, direct the

State of Orissa to take appropriate steps to act in terms of the MoU

dated 15-5-2002, as also its earlier commitments to recommend

the case of the appellants to the Central Government for grant of

adequate iron ore reserves to meet the requirements of the appellants

in their steel plant at Lapanga.”

9. The State of Odisha thereafter filed an application for review of

the judgment in Bhushan Power and Steel Limited and Others

v. State of Orissa and Another12 (supra) which was rejected vide

order dated 11.09.2012.

10. Alleging non-compliance and in-action of the judgment dated

14.03.2012, a contempt petition was filed by M/s Bhushan Power

and Steel Limited. The contempt petition was contested by the

State of Odisha on several grounds, including that the judgment

dated 14.03.2012 is incapable of enforcement, for which reliance

was placed on a subsequent judgment of this Court in Sandur

Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. v. State of Karnataka13. This

stand did not find favour with this Court and the officers of the State

Government were found to be in contempt of the judgment dated

14.03.2012 vide judgment dated 22.04.2014 in Bhushan Power

and Steel Limited v. Rajesh Verma14. Under these circumstances,

the judgment dated 22.04.2014 had given one more opportunity

to the State Government to send requisite recommendation to the

Central Government inter alia observing that this Court cannot lose

12 (2012) 4 SCC 246.

13 (2010) 13 SCC 1.

14 (2014) 5 SCC 551.

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 295

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

sight of the fact that there is a judgment inter se the parties, which

has become final. Accordingly, the contention that the judgment of

this Court in Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Limited (supra)

will not undo the directions given in the judgment dated 14.03.2012

was rejected. The relevant observations in the judgment dated

22.04.2014 read as under:

“21. We cannot lose sight of the fact that there is a judgment, inter

partes, which has become final. Even when the civil appeal was

being heard, certain other parties claiming their interest in these very

lands had moved intervention applications which were dismissed.

At that time also it was mentioned that there are 195 applicants.

However, notwithstanding the same, this Court issued firm directions

to the State Government to recommend the case of the petitioners

for mining lease in both the areas. In view of such categorical and

unambiguous directions given in the judgment which has attained

finality, merely because another judgment has been delivered by

this Court in Sandur Manganese case , cannot be a ground to undo

the directions contained in the judgment dated 14-3-2012. Insofar

as law laid down in Sandur Manganese is concerned, that may be

applied and followed by the State Government in respect of other

applications which are still pending. However, that cannot be pressed

into service qua the petitioner whose rights have been crystallised

by the judgment rendered in its favour. It cannot be reopened, that

too at the stage of implementation of the said judgment.

22. …. Once we hold that the respondents are bound to implement

the direction contained in the judgment dated 14-3-2012, insofar as

the State Government is concerned, it is obliged to comply therewith

and such matters, along with other relevant considerations, can be

left to the wisdom of the Central Government while taking a decision

on the recommendation of the State Government.

xx xx xx

24. …. However, we are giving one final opportunity to them to

purge the contempt by transmitting requisite recommendations to

the Central Government.  It would be for the Central Government

to consider the said recommendations on its own merits and in

accordance with law. In case the recommendation is sent within 

296 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

one month from the date of copy of receipt of this order, we propose

not to take any further action and the respondents/contemnors shall

stand discharged from this contempt petition. However, in case the

respondents do not purge in the manner mentioned above, it would

be open to the petitioners to point out the same to this Court by

moving appropriate application and in that event the contemnors

shall be proceeded against.”

(emphasis supplied)

11. Consequent to the directions dated 22.04.2014, the State Government

had sent the requisite recommendation to the Central Government for

grant of mining lease of the area in question. The Central Government,

however, took the stand that having regard to the amendments in

the MMDR Act, 1957, vide the Amendment Act, 2015 introducing

Section 10-A, the request made by M/s Bhushan Power and Steel

Limited stands invalidated. In view of the aforesaid stand, the Central

Government had written letters to the State Government, with a copy

sent to M/s Bhushan Power and Steel Limited. In the letter dated

13.05.2015, the Central Government had stated that the proposal

for according the prior approval for grant of mineral concession was

ineligible in terms of sub-section (1) to Section 10-A of the MMDR

Act, 1957 and, therefore, should be treated as closed. However, the

State Government might ascertain whether the proposal was safe from

ineligibility under Section 10-A of the MMDR Act, 1957 and thereupon

the State Government could take action accordingly. Similar view

was also expressed by the Central Government in the letter dated

29.05.2015 therein. Consequent to these communications, the State

government vide letter dated 09.07.2015 had informed M/s Bhushan

Power and Steel Limited that their applications for grant of mining

lease had become ineligible as per sub-section (1) to Section 10-A

of the MMDR Act, 1957.

12. This Court in M/s Bhushan Steel and Power Limited15 (supra),

specifically examined the contention whether in the facts of the said

case, clause (c) to sub-section (2) to Section 10-A of the MMDR

Act, 1957 could be invoked in view of the contention raised by M/s

15 (2012) 4 SCC 246.

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 297

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

Bhushan Steel and Power Limited that the Letter of Intent was issued

by the State Government for grant of mining lease and, therefore,

their application stands protected. The submission was that the

recommendation dated 24.05.2014, given by the State Government

should be treated as a Letter of Intent by “whatever name called”,

as it signifies the intention to grant mining lease insofar as the

State Government is concerned. It was also argued that under the

new regime contained under Section 10-A of the MMDR Act, 1957,

approval of the Central Government was not even required and the

State Government could have proceeded further and granted the

lease.

13. The aforesaid arguments did not find favour of this Court in the case

of M/s Bhushan Steel and Power Limited (supra) in spite of the

earlier judgment of this Court dated 14.03.2012 and the order passed

in the contempt petition dated 22.04.2014 with the observations

therein that there was failure of the State Government to comply with

the directions. This Court rejected the submissions in M/s Bhushan

Steel and Power Limited (supra) and held as under:

“17.  Undoubtedly, as per sub-section (1) of Section 10-A, all

applications received prior to coming into force of the Amendment

Act, 2015, become ineligible. Reason for interpreting such a provision

is not far to seek. Before the passing of the Amendment Act, 2015, it

was the Central Government which had the ultimate control over the

grant of licences insofar as mining of major minerals is concerned.

As per the procedure then existing, the State Government could

recommend the application submitted by any applicant for grant of

mining lease to the Central Government and the Central Government

was given the power to grant or refuse to grant the approval. Thus,

“previous approval” from the Central Government was essential for

grant of lease, without which the State Government could not enter

into any such lease agreement with the applicant. Shortcomings of

this procedure were noticed by this Court in its judgment rendered

in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India [(2012) 3 SCC

1] (for short “CPIL case”) and also in Natural Resources Allocation, In

re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 [Natural Resources Allocation,

In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1] . In these

judgments, this Court expressed that allocation of natural resources 

298 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

should normally be by auction. Judgment in CPIL case had a direct

relevance to the grant of mineral concessions as the Government

found that it was resulting in multipurpose litigation which was

becoming counterproductive. Mining Ordinance, 2015 was passed on

12-1-2015 which was ultimately replaced when Parliament enacted

the Amendment Act, 2015.

18. The exhaustive Statement of Objects and Reasons reveals that

the extensive amendment in the Act were effected after extensive

consultations and intensive scrutiny by the Standing Committee on

Coal and Steel, who gave their Report in May 2013. As is evident

from the Statement that difficulties were experienced because the

existing Act does not permit the auctioning of mineral concessions.

It was observed that with auctioning of mineral concessions,

transparency in allocation will improve; the Government will get an

increased share of the value of mineral resources; and that it will

alleviate the procedural delay, which in turn would check slowdown

which adversely affected the growth of mining sector.

19.  The Amendment Act, 2015, as is evident from the objects,

aims at: (i) eliminating discretion; (ii) improving transparency in

the allocation of mineral resources; (iii) simplifying procedures; (iv)

eliminating delay on administration, so as to enable expeditious

and optimum development of the mineral resources of the country;

(v) obtaining for the Government an enhanced share of the value

of the mineral resources; and (vi) attracting private investment and

the latest technology.

20. The Amendment Act, 2015 ushered in the amendment of Sections

3, 4, 4-A, 5, 6, 13, 15, 21 and First Schedule; substitution of new

sections for Sections 8, 11 and 13; and, insertion of new Sections

8-A, 9-B, 9-C, 10-A, 10-C, 11-B, 11-C, 12-A, 15-A, 17-A, 20-A, 30-B,

30-C and Fourth Schedule.

21. These amendments brought in vogue: (i) auction to be the sole

method of allotment; (ii) extension of tenure of existing lease from the

date of their last renewal to 31-3-2030 (in the case of captive mines)

and till 31-3-2020 (for the merchant miners) or till the completion

of renewal already granted, if any, or a period of 50 years from the

date of grant of such lease; (iii) establishment of District Mineral 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 299

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

Foundation for safeguarding interest of persons affected by mining

related activities; (iv) setting up of a National Mineral Exploration

Trust created out of contributions from the mining lease-holders,

in order to have a dedicated fund for encouraging exploration and

investment; (v) removal of the provisions requiring “previous approval”

from the Central Government for grant of mineral concessions in

case of important minerals like iron ore, bauxite, manganese, etc.

thereby making the process simpler and quicker; (vi) introduction of

stringent penal provisions to check illegal mining prescribing higher

penalties up to Rs 5 lakhs per hectare and imprisonment up to 5

years; and (vii) further empowering the State Government to set up

Special Courts for trial of offences under the Act.”

14. Thus, the object and purpose of the Amendment Act, 2015 is to ensure

that allocation of mineral resources is done through auctioning. This

is the reason why sub-section (1) to Section 10-A of the MMDR Act,

1957 mandates that all applications received prior to 12.01.2015 shall

become ineligible. The exceptions or the saving clause applies to

three kinds of situations specified in sub-section (2) to Section 10-A

of the MMDR Act. 1957. The first category is where an application

has been received under Section 11-A of the MMDR Act,1957. The

second category is where a reconnaissance permit or a prospecting

licence has been granted the permit holder or the licensee has the

right to obtain a prospecting licence followed by a mining lease and

the State Government is satisfied that the permit holder or the licensee

has complied with the requirements specified in sub-clauses (i) to

(iv) of clause (b) of sub-section (2) to Section 10-A of the MMDR Act,

1957. The reason for protecting this class of cases is on account of

the fact that they had altered their position by spending money on

reconnaissance operations or prospecting operations. Accordingly,

the principle of legitimate expectation is applied. The third category

is where the Central Government had already communicated their

previous approval or the State Government had issue Letter of Intent

for grant of mining lease before coming into force of the Amendment

Act 2015. The raison dêtre, it is observed therein, is that certain

rights had accrued to these applicants inasmuch as all necessary

procedures and formalities had been complied with and only formal

lease remains to be executed.

300 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

15. Delving on the question of whether the letter for approval dated

22.05.2014 granted by the State Government can be treated as a

Letter of Intent predicated on the words by whatever name, which

expression, it was submitted, should be given a broad interpretation in

view of the words ‘by whatever name called’ was examined in-depth

and in detail. Reference was made to the legal dictionary for the

meaning of the term ‘Letter of Intent’ as a preliminary understanding

between the parties who intend to make a contract or join together

for further action. Reference was also made to decisions of this Court

in Rishi Kiran Logistics Private Limited v. Board of Trustees of

Kandla Port Trust and Others16 and Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy

Federation Limited v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service

Private Limited and Others17 However, the said contention was

rejected inter alia holding as under:

“26. Applying the aforesaid meaning, can it be said that Letter dated

24-5-2014 of the State Government would constitute a letter of intent?

We are afraid, answer has to be in the negative. Reason is simple.

As mentioned above, in order to enable the State Government to

enter into any lease agreement/contract with the prospecting licensee,

“previous approval” of the Central Government was essential. Unless

such approval came, the State Government could not communicate to

the prospecting licensee/lessee its intention to enter into any contract

as the prerequisite prior approval would be lacking. Therefore, no

promise could be held by the State Government to any applicant

showing its intention to enter into a contract in the future. Position

would have been different had Letter dated 24-5-2014 been issued

after receiving previous approval of the Central Government.

However, that is not so. This letter to the Central Government

was only recommendatory in nature and ultimate decision rested

with the Central Government. It is a different thing if the Central

Government refuses to give its approval on any extraneous reasons

or mala fides or does not take into consideration relevant factors/

material while rejecting the application, which may form a different

cause of action and may become a reason to challenge the action

of the Central Government rejecting the application on the grounds

16 (2015) 13 SCC 233.

17 (1996) 10 SCC 405.

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 301

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

that are available in law to seek judicial review of such an action.

However, we are not dealing with that situation in the instant case.

Our discussion is confined to the plea raised before us viz. whether

Letter dated 24-5-2014 can be termed as “letter of intent”. For the

reasons stated above, we are of the view that it was not a letter

of intent. The application of the petitioner, therefore, would not be

covered by clause (c) of Section 10-A of the Act.

27.  We are conscious of the fact that the petitioner herein had

originally succeeded in the appeal inasmuch as judgment dated 14-

3-2012 was rendered giving direction to the State Government to

recommend the case of the petitioner, in terms of the MoU entered

into between the parties, to the Central Government. This was not

done and the decision was reiterated in orders dated 22-4-2014

passed in Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd. v. Rajesh Verma [. It is

possible that had the State Government acted promptly and sent

the recommendations earlier, the Central Government might have

accorded its approval. However, whether it could have done so or

not would be in the realm of conjectures. Insofar as the Central

Government is concerned, no direction was ever given by this Court.

On the contrary, it was categorically observed in the order dated 22-4-

2014 in Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd. v. Rajesh Verma that it would

be for the Central Government to consider the recommendations of

the State Government on its own merits and in accordance with law.

If that has not been done by the Central Government, it cannot be

the subject-matter of present contempt petition.”

16. The aforesaid judgment is relevant for our purpose, though in the

present case, post notification No. S.O. 423(E) dated 10.02.2015,

Dolomite was notified as a minor mineral and hence, the approval

of the Central Government was not required for the reason that

the Grant Order dated 16.07.2015 was hedged with pre-conditions,

including the requirement to submit consent letters of the owners

of the land in question (Raiyats) before the execution of the lease

deed, or there was to be a stipulation that a condition to this effect

would be incorporated in the draft lease. Therefore, in our opinion,

the Grant Order dated 16.07.2015 is provisional, and is subject to

fulfilment of the conditions therein. This is clear from the terms of

the Grant Order dated 16.07.2015, which are reproduced below:

302 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

xx xx xx

(a) You have to furnish a Draft Mining Lease Deed in the model

form K us prescribed in the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960,

as amended upto date (1 rule 31 of MC Rules, 1960),

(b) The Draft Mining Lease Deed should be prepared in durable

papers neatly and sufficient space should be kept in between

two lines in order to permit, if necessary, correction therein,

(c) The Deed of Lease, after execution, shall be registered by you

at your own cost and no mining operation should be started

before registration of the Deed,

(d) You shall have to furnish the approved Mining Plan, if not

submitted rules 22(4) and 22A of MC Rules, 1960,

(e) You shall have to furnish the Environment Clearance (EC), if not

submitted from the M1EF Environment of Protection Act, 1986,

(f) You shall have to furnish Consent to Establish and Consent to

Operate from the WBPCB before execution of Deed of Lease

[Section 25 and 26 of Water Act ,1974 and Section 21 of Air

Act, 1981],

(g) You shall have to raise annually a minimum quantity of minerals

as stipulated in the approved Mine Plan [rules 22A and 45(ia)

of MC Rules, 1960],

(h) You shall have to deposit Rs. 10,000/ (Rupees ten thousand)

only as Security for due observance of the terms and conditions

of the lease, under appropriate Head of Account which shall be

refundable to you after expiry of the period of Lease, unless the

whole or a part of it is withheld or forfeited by the Government

for any default on you part including default in payment of

amount due to the Government [rule 32 of MC Rules, 1960],

(i) You shall have to submit consent letter(s) of the owner(s) of the

land under consideration before execution of the Lease Deed

(Consent of the Raiyats) or a condition to that effect should be

incorporated in the Draft Deed (rule 22(3)(i)(1t)),

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 303

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

(j) You shall have to furnish the N.O.C., of the Forest Authority in

proper format in case the applied area falls in the forest area

as notified by the Appropriate Authority, alongwith the Draft

Lease Deed or a condition to that effect should be incorporated

in the Draft Deed [Section 2 of Forest Conservation Act, 1980],

(k) For actual operation of quarrying or digging, ten (10) yards clear

margin shall be kept from the outer boundary of the adjacent 1

plot or plots and maintain throughout the operation and you shall

have to give a written undertaking to that effect or corporate a

condition in the Draft Lease Deed,

(l) You shall have to incorporate all the conditions as mentioned

in the M.C. Rules, 1960 in the Draft Lease Deed,

(m) You shall have to furnish up to date Royalty Clearance, Income

Tac Clearance and VAT Clearance certificates before execution

of the Deed,

(n) You shall have to submit, along with the Draft Deed, a GeoReference Map duly vetted by the DL&LRO and DMM, West

Bengal, if not submitted,

(o) You shall have obtained the permission under Section 14Y of

WBLR Act, 1955 for holding the required land,

(p) You have to furnish the Conversion Certificate for plots of land

from the Appropriate Authority (Section 4C of WBLR Act, 1955),

(q) You have to furnish the current Land Availability Report (LAR)

from the Appropriate Authority.

(r) In the event of non-execution of the deed within the stipulated

period on compliance with the above mentioned conditions

the order sanctioning the lease shall be liable to be revoked,

(s) You shall have to comply with all the statutory requirements

before presenting the Deed of Lease of execution to this

Department,

(t) This Grant Order and subsequent execution of Lease Deed are

subject to the No Objection Certificate (NOC) to be obtained

by this Department form the Govt. of India since the applicant

prayed for mining lease on the ground that the Letter of Intent 

304 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

(Lol) was issued for the mineral Dolomite which was a major

mineral at the time of order dated 10.09.2014 of the Hon’ble

High Court.

xx xx xx”

17. Raiyat land is to be used for cultivation, etc., and not for mining.

Once the mining activity is undertaken, the Raiyats will not be able

to use the land. In terms of sub-section (10) to Section 2 of the

WBLR Act, 1955, a Raiyat means a person or an institution holding

land for any purpose whatsoever. However, the rights of Raiyat in

respect of the land in terms of sub-section (2A) to Section 4 of the

WBLR Act, 1955 does not permit any other person to quarry sand

from his holding, dig or use, or permit any person to dig or use, earth

or clay of his holding for the manufacture of bricks or tiles except

with previous permission in writing of the State Government. In

case of breach of the condition, the prescribed authority may, after

giving notice and opportunity to a Raiyat to show cause, can levy

a monetary penalty. Further, on an order being passed, the land

shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances. Section 4-B of

the WBLR Act, 1955 stipulates that every Raiyat holding any land

shall maintain and preserve such land in a manner that the area

is not diminished or its character is not changed or the land is not

converted for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was

settled or previously held except with the previous permission of the

Collector in writing. Equally significant for our purpose is Section 3A

of the WBLR Act, 1955, which states that the rights and interests

of all non-agricultural tenants and under-tenants shall vest in the

State free from all encumbrances and provisions of Section 5 and

5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 shall apply. An

exception is carved out by sub-section (2) to Section 3A of the WBLR

Act, 1955, where a non-agricultural tenant or under-tenant is holding

khas possession of any land, in which case he is entitled to retain the

land as Raiyat. There are also provisions relating to the transferability

of land by the Raiyat. If cultivation was not being undertaken at the

land in question, the classification requires a change.

18. The controversy relating to Section 4-C of the WBLR Act, 1955,

cannot simply be decided on the basis of Memo No. V/RTI/775/15 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 305

STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER v. M/S. CHIRANJILAL

(MINERAL) INDUSTRIES OF BAGANDIH AND ANOTHER

dated 06.03.2017 issued by the Deputy District Land and Land

Reforms Officer, Purulia, that as per the revenue records the land

was recorded as ‘Dungri’. The reason is that Raiyat land is not for

mining. Thus, a contradiction arises, as the grant of Raiyat land

and the classification of the same land as ‘Dungri’ is contradictory.

19. Further, whether the consent letter of the owners of the land in

question (Raiyats) obtained by the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal

(Mineral) Industries of Bagandih still hold good, would be relevant as

there could be a change of hands on account of transfer, inheritance,

etc. Connected with this are the legal issues. First, whether the

Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih

had altered its position post the issue of the Grant Order dated

16.07.2015, but before enforcement of the Concession Rules, 2016,

to get the benefit of Rule 61 of the Concessions Rules, 2016? It is

necessary to ascertain the facts and then alone one can adjudicate

and decide the question whether the Respondent No. 1 - M/s.

Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih is entitled to the benefit of

the proviso to Rule 61 of the Concession Rules, 2016. This has not

been verified and ascertained. An issue would arise on whether the

application filed by the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral)

Industries of Bagandih way back in 1998 would still hold good as

at the time, when the application was filed, approval of the Central

Government was required. Another difficulty is that WBMDTCL has

not been impleaded as a party, though it was always contesting the

claim made by the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral)

Industries of Bagandih. On the question of cancellation or rejection

of the application made by WBMDTCL, we have made observations

supra. However, we need not examine these issues in light of the

order and directions we are issuing. Further, we feel that the remand

order should not be passed at this distinct point of time.

20. Having said so, it is the stand of the appellants – State of West

Bengal, that they are owners of 20.87 acres of the land in question

and to this extent, they have no difficulty in executing the mining

lease. This being the stated stand, which has also been affirmed

before us, there should be no difficulty in granting of mining lease

for the said area to the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral)

Industries of Bagandih.

306 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

21. During the course of arguments before us, reference was made

by the appellants to the provisions of the WBLR Act, 1955 and

the judgment of this Court in Thressiamma Jacob and Others v.

Geologist, Department of Mining and Geology and Others18.

We have not examined the said aspects which are left open and

not adjudicated upon. However, we deem it appropriate to observe

that the judgment of this Court in Thressiamma Jacob and Others

(supra) is prior to the enforcement of the Amendment Act, 2015

and the Concession Rules, 2016. The amendments made by the

Amendment Act, 2015 were not subject matter of decision in the

said case and would have to be considered by the courts and the

authorities as a judgment’s binding ratio depends upon the legal

provisions considered, interpreted and applied in a given judgment.

When the law changes by an amendment in the legislation, the

amended legal provisions have to be considered, interpreted and

applied.

Accordingly, and for the reasons stated, we partly allow the present appeal

and set aside the impugned judgment with a direction that the government

of West Bengal will execute a mining lease for 20.87 acres of land in favour

of the Respondent No. 1 - M/s. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih.

The Writ Petition No. 20309 (W) of 2016 will be treated as allowed to

the extent as indicated above. The claim of the Respondent No. 1 - M/s.

Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih towards the balance area for

the grant of mining lease will be treated as rejected and dismissed. In the

facts of the present case, there will be no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case : Appeal partly

allowed.

18 (2013) 9 SCC 725.

Whether the closure of the slaughter house was effected after following due process of law. Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 – Permanent Lok Adalat directed the Municipal Board to close down the slaughter house for violation of rules and regulations, causing pollution in the area – SPCB issued directions u/s. 33A of the 1974 Act for closure of the slaughter house – Order of Permanent Lok Adalat challenged in writ petition – Writ petition dismissed by the High Court:

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 271 : 2023 INSC 841

PANCHAYAT QURESHIAN AND ANOTHER

v.

STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

(Civil Appeal Nos. 1538-1539 of 2008)

SEPTEMBER 13, 2023

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI*.,

PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA AND

MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]

Issue for consideration: Whether the closure of the slaughter

house was effected after following due process of law.

Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 –

Permanent Lok Adalat directed the Municipal Board to close

down the slaughter house for violation of rules and regulations,

causing pollution in the area – SPCB issued directions u/s.

33A of the 1974 Act for closure of the slaughter house – Order

of Permanent Lok Adalat challenged in writ petition – Writ

petition dismissed by the High Court:

Held: On 21.11.2003, the Supreme Court stayed the order of the

High Court – On 24.01.2004, during the course of an inspection

by the State Board, it was found that the slaughter house did

not have arrangements for treatment and disposal of effluents

and the waste water was being discharged without treatment

– In 2005, State Board approved the scheme for treatment of

the trade effluent – Commissioner was asked to intimate the

action taken for the construction of an effluent treatment plant –

However, on 03.01.2008, it was found that the effluent treatment

plant was incomplete, as a result of which the trade effluent

was not being properly treated – On 20.02.2008, the Supreme

Court modified its interim order of stay by permitting the SPCB

to take action against the polluting slaughter house in terms of

the statute – Thereafter, directions were issued u/s. 33A by the

State Board to the Commissioner to close down the operation of

the slaughter house – The issue as to whether the Permanent

Lok Adalat had the jurisdiction to direct closure of the slaughter

* Author

272 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

house has since been overtaken by subsequent events – The

SPCB has exercised its statutory powers u/s. 33A after finding,

upon inspection, that the waste generated from the slaughter

house was being discharged without adequate treatment resulting

in a violation of the applicable pollution parameters – In writ

petition, a direction was sought to provide water to the water

treatment plant and to stop the illegal slaughter on the streets

in the city of Tonk – The petitioners in the writ petition cannot be

oblivious of the fact that the slaughter house was closed as a

result of the failure to meet the prescribed pollution parameters

and since the waste which was generated from its operation was

being discharged without proper treatment – The closure is not

in pursuance of the direction of the Lok Adalat, but in exercise

of the statutory jurisdiction of the Rajasthan Pollution Control

Board – The petitioners are not entitled to any relief since the

closure of the slaughter house has been effected after following

due process of law in terms of the statutory powers conferred

on the Pollution Control Board u/s. 33 A of the Water Pollution

Act 1974. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1538-1539 of

2008.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.10.2003 of the High Court of

Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCWP Nos.2823 and 2776 of 2003.

With

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 358 of 2011.

Saahil Gupta, Saeed Qadri, Lakshmi Raman Singh, Advs. for the

Appellants.

Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv., V. K.

Verma, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Kaushal Yadav, Nandlal Kumar Mishra,

Srilok Nath Rath, Ms. Reena Rao, Dr. Ajay Kumar, Ms. Shubhangi

Agarwal, Apurv S., Milind Kumar, Ashok Kumar Singh, Ansar Ahmad

Chaudhary, Irshad Ahmad, S.K. Verma, Mahesh Kasana, Ms. Aparna

Rohatgi Jain, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Chinmayee

Chandra, Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, P.V. Yogeswaran, Mukul Singh,

Advs. for the Respondents.

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 273

PANCHAYAT QURESHIAN AND ANOTHER v.

STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI

1. The appeals1 arise from a judgment and order dated 15 October

2003 of a Division Bench at the Jaipur Bench of the High Court of

Judicature for Rajasthan. In addition, there is a writ petition2 under

Article 32 of the Constitution which has been heard with the civil

appeals.

2. The underlying facts are thus:

An application was submitted before the Permanent Lok Adalat at Tonk,

Rajasthan by the Sarva Seva Sansthan stating that a slaughter house

situated in proximity to National Highway No 12 was conducting its activities

in violation of rules and regulations, causing pollution in the area. On 2

April 2003, the Permanent Lok Adalat directed the Municipal Board Tonk to

close down the slaughter house within a month. The District Collector and

the Rajasthan Pollution Control Board were directed to ensure compliance.

3. The State Pollution Control Board3 issued directions under Section

33A of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 19744

for the closure of the slaughter house on the ground that it did not

have consent to operate and for absence of an authorization under

the Bio-Medical Waste (Management and Handling) Rules 1988.

4. The order of the Permanent Lok Adalat was challenged by Panchayat

Qureshian in a writ petition5 before the Rajasthan High Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petition

by an order dated 15 October 2003.

5. A Special Leave Petition was instituted before this Court under

Article 136 of the Constitution for challenging the order of the High

Court. On 21 November 2003, this Court stayed the order of the

High Court. On 24 January 2004, during the course of an inspection

by the State Board, it was found that the slaughter house did not

have arrangements for treatment and disposal of effluents and the

1 Civil Appeal Nos 1538-1539 of 2008

2 Writ Petition (Civil) No 358 of 2011

3 “SPCB”

4 “Act of 1974”

5 SB Civil Writ Petition No 2823 of 2003

274 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

waste water was being discharged without treatment. Samples were

collected during the course of the inspection of the trade effluent.

The observed values were found to be in breach of permissible

limits prescribed under Schedule VI of the Environment (Protection)

Rules 1986.

6. On 27 April 2004, the State Board informed the Commissioner

of the Municipal Council that the slaughter house had not made

arrangements for treatment and disposal of effluents generated and

the waste was being discharged without treatment. The Commissioner

was directed to submit a feasibility report. On 13 September 2004, the

Commissioner of the Municipal Council submitted an application for

consent to operate under Sections 25/26 of the Act of 1974. On 21

September 2004, the Commissioner was called upon to show cause

why the application for obtaining consent should not be refused. The

State Board refused the application for consent by an order dated 2

November 2004 on the ground that the Commissioner had failed to

respond to the notice to show cause. The Commissioner thereafter

submitted an application on 9 March 2005 for obtaining consent to

operate under Sections 25/26 of the Act of 1974. On 2 May 2005, the

State Board directed the Commissioner to submit certain information.

Pursuant to it, the Commissioner responded on 6 June 2005. On 25

June 2005, the State Board approved the scheme for treatment of

the trade effluent subject to the condition that the prescribed norms

would be achieved and proper arrangements would be made to

utilize the treated water.

7. On 8 July 2005, the Commissioner requested the State Board to

approve the design of the effluent treatment plant for the treatment of

the trade effluent. On 11 August 2005, the State Board informed the

Commissioner that it had already approved the scheme presented

by the Commissioner. The Commissioner was however asked to

intimate the action taken for the construction of an effluent treatment

plant. Another inspection was conducted on 30 November 2005

following which the State Board by its letter dated 30 January 2006

refused consent to the slaughter house on the ground that the entire

effluent/waste water was being discharged on the nearby land without

treatment. On 13 September 2007, an inspection was carried out

which revealed that the effluent treatment plant was incomplete

and that untreated waste water was being discharged. Samples

were collected during the course of the inspection indicating that 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 275

PANCHAYAT QURESHIAN AND ANOTHER v.

STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

the trade effluent was beyond the prescribed polluting parameters.

This was brought to the notice of the Commissioner of the Municipal

Council on 27 October 2007. On 3 January 2008, it was found that

the effluent treatment plant was incomplete, as a result of which the

trade effluent was not being properly treated.

8. On 20 February 2008, this Court modified its interim order of stay

by permitting the SPCB to take action against the polluting slaughter

house in terms of the statute. On 29 March 2008, directions were

issued under Section 33A by the State Board to the Commissioner to

close down the operation of the slaughter house. On 17 September

2010, while hearing an interlocutory application filed by the Panchayat

Qureshian, this Court clarified that the interim order would not come

in the way of either the Municipal Council or the Pollution Control

Board taking action in accordance with law if there is a violation.

9. On 16 November 2011, an inspection was carried out by the State

Board during the course of which the representative of the Municipal

Council stated that the slaughter house had been closed on 13 March

2008 in compliance of the order of the State Board under Section

33A dated 29 March 2008.

10. The narration of facts would indicate that the civil appeals arose from

the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court dismissing a writ petition

which challenged the order of the Permanent Lok Adalat directing

closure of the slaughter house. The principal ground of challenge

was that the Permanent Lok Adalat would have no jurisdiction to

order a closure. During the pendency of the appeals, the order of

the Rajasthan High Court was initially stayed. However, subsequently

the order of stay was modified by permitting the statutory authority

to take action in accordance with law. The issue as to whether the

Permanent Lok Adalat had the jurisdiction to direct closure of the

slaughter house has since been overtaken by subsequent events.

The SPCB has exercised its statutory powers under Section 33A

after finding, upon inspection, that the waste generated from the

slaughter house was being discharged without adequate treatment

resulting in a violation of the applicable pollution parameters. As a

consequence of the directions, the slaughter house was directed to

be closed and upon inspection it was found to have been closed.

11. A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been filed in

the above backdrop seeking a direction to the State of Rajasthan and 

276 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

the Municipal Board of Tonk, the State Pollution Control Board and

other authorities to discharge their statutory duties under Schedule

XII of the Constitution and Section 98 of the Rajasthan Municipality

Act 1959. A direction has been sought to the respondents to provide

water to the water treatment plant and to stop the illegal slaughter

on the streets in the city of Tonk.

12. The writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot obviate

the findings which have been arrived at by the statutory board in

the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 33A of the Act of 1974.

The petitioners in the writ petition cannot be oblivious of the fact that

the slaughter house was closed as a result of the failure to meet

the prescribed pollution parameters and since the waste which was

generated from its operation was being discharged without proper

treatment. The basis of the appeals which question the jurisdiction

of the Lok Adalat, directing a closure has since been overtaken by

the subsequent developments in terms of which the slaughter house

has been closed. The closure is not in pursuance of the direction

of the Lok Adalat, but in exercise of the statutory jurisdiction of the

Rajasthan Pollution Control Board.

13. For the reasons which have been indicated above, the petitioners

are not entitled to any relief since the closure of the slaughter house

has been effected after following due process of law in terms of the

statutory powers conferred on the Pollution Control Board under

Section 33 A of the Water Pollution Act 1974.

14. The civil appeals and the writ petition shall accordingly stand

dismissed for the reasons recorded above.

15. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case : Appeals and writ petition

dismissed.

Whether the High Court was justified in denying the absorption of appellant as an Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary section and also rejecting his claim for continuity of service. Service Law – Claim for absorption as an Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary section – Tenable or not:

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 254 : 2023 INSC 836

SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER

v.

THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 6027 of 2014)

SEPTEMBER 20, 2023

[J. K. MAHESHWARI AND K. V. VISWANATHAN*, JJ.]

Issue for consideration: Whether the High Court was justified

in denying the absorption of appellant as an Assistant Teacher

in the Higher Secondary section and also rejecting his claim for

continuity of service.

Service Law – Claim for absorption as an Assistant Teacher

in the Higher Secondary section – Tenable or not:

Held: The appellant was appointed as a substitute teacher in the

payscale of a primary teacher – When he filed the first round of

proceedings in O.A. No. 209 of 1991, no plea was raised that he

worked as an Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section

– Before the Tribunal, the argument was only about regularization

– The Screening Committee having considered him, pursuant to

the orders of the Supreme Court, has thought it fit to absorb him

only as a primary teacher; the Screening Committee itself was

pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court and based on the

Master Circular of 29.01.1991 wherein the claims of the candidates

like the appellant were examined; the records of his appointment as

a substitute teacher admittedly showed that he was only appointed

as a substitute primary teacher – Also, in the earlier round of

proceedings culminating in the order of the Supreme Court dated

15.02.1996, this issue was never raised – His claim for absorption

as an assistant teacher in the Higher Secondary Section is clearly

barred by constructive res judicata – Thus, the appellant’s claim for

absorption as Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section

is not tenable. [Paras 29, 31 and 32]

Service Law – Claim for continuity of service – Relief denied

by the High Court – Propriety:

* Author

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 255

SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Held: The only reason given in the order denying continuity for the

appellant while granting continuity of the same for the others was

that, in the case of the appellant, the Supreme Court had not directed

any specific order regarding continuity of service – The authorities

are wrong in stating that in the case of the appellant, the Supreme

Court had not directed any specific order regarding continuity of

service – Nowhere in the said order in the appellant’s appeal had

the benefits available to the appellant under the Master Circular

dated 29.01.1991 been taken away – In the case of Smt. Jayasree

Deb Roy (Dutta), by abundant caution, the Master Circular was

referred to and the rights granted therein were reiterated expressly

– The appellant being identically situated with the other absorbees

in the order of 02.01.1998 could not have been discriminated and

denied the benefit of his service from 04.03.1990 to the date of his

absorption – The Tribunal and the High Court have grossly erred

in denying the relief by wrongly understanding the orders of the

Supreme Court and the legal position – Thus, the appellant should

be extended the same benefits as were extended to others, who

were granted continuity by the letter of 28.12.1998. [Paras 38,

41, 42, 43 and 44]

Doctrines – Doctrine of constructive res judicata – discussed.

Maxims – Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium – discussed.

Maharashtra Vikrikar Karamchari Sangathan v. State of

Maharashtra and Another, (2000) 2 SCC 552 : [2000]

1 SCR 166 – relied on.

Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) v. The Union of India

& Ors. C.A. No. 9424 of 1995 arising out of O.A.

No. 149(G) of 1989; M. Nagabhushana vs. State of

Karnataka and Others (2011) 3 SCC 408:[2011] 2 SCR

435 – referred to.

Henderson v. Henderson, (1843) 3 Hare, 100 – referred

to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6027 of 2014.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.07.2011 of the High Court at

Calcutta in W.P.C.T. No.130 of 2009.

Ms. Uttara Babbar, Ms. Daisy Hannah, Madhav Maira, Ms. Sampriti

Baksi, Advs. for the Appellant.

256 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

Ms. Nachiketa Joshi, Rajesh Kumar Singh, Ms. Priya Mishra, Rupesh

Kumar, Amrish Kumar, Srisatya Mohanty, Ms. Astha Sharma, Advs.

for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K.V. VISWANATHAN, J.

1. Samir Kumar Majumder (the appellant) was a school teacher at the

Railway Higher Secondary School, Alipurduar Junction. He taught

mathematics to the school children. Aggrieved by the judgment

of the High Court at Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as ‘the High

Court’) dated 19.07.2011 in W.P.C.T. No. 130 of 2009, the appellant

is before us in appeal. By the said judgment, the High Court denied

him absorption as an Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary

Section and also rejected his claim for continuity of service.

Relevant Facts:

2. The appellant was initially appointed as a Substitute Teacher on

05.12.1989. According to him, artificial breaks were created in

his service by terminating him on the eve of the school vacations

and thereafter reappointing him. The appellant states that he was

terminated first before the summer vacations on 09.06.1990 and was

re-engaged on 24.07.1990. His further case is that he was again

terminated on 22.09.1990, on the eve of Puja Holidays. According

to him, he was re-engaged on 01.11.1990.

3. When the matter stood thus, the appellant, fearing further creation of

artificial breaks filed an application being O.A. No. 209 of 1990 before

the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’) Guwahati

Bench. He prayed for setting aside of the letters of termination dated

09.06.1990 and 19.09.1990 and also prayed for regularization of his

service and for salary during the period of breaks.

4. The Tribunal passed an interim order on 03.12.1990 and it is an

admitted fact that he continued till 12.11.1994 when his services were

again terminated, after the Tribunal had dismissed his application

on 31.10.1994.

5. The Tribunal, while dismissing his application on 31.10.1994, solely

relied on another order of the same Tribunal, passed on the same 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 257

SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

day, in O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989 in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb

Roy (Dutta) vs. The Union of India & Ors. Para 4 of the order in

the appellant’s case is important, which we extract herein below:

“4. We have examined the question of regularization of substitute

teachers in detail in our order on O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989 passed

today. We have come to the conclusion that the substitute teachers

cannot claim regularization as a matter of right. We have also held

that selection by the Railway Recruitment Board is essential for

regular appointment. For the same reasons we hold that the applicant

is not entitled to be granted any relief of regularization. More-over,

in the instant case although the applicant had appeared before the

Recruitment Board he was not selected. That does not entitled him to

ask for any relief of regularization on the basis of his earlier service

as substitute teacher.”

6. O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989 was carried in Appeal to this Court by way

of Civil Appeal No. 9424 of 1995 along with the batch of matters of

similarly situated candidates, which was disposed of on 13.10.1995.

The operative portion of the said order reads as under:-

“… The appellants were, therefore, entitled to the benefit conferred

under para 5.1 of the circular (Circular R.B. No. 12/91 M.C. No. 20/91

E(NG)/90/SC/Master) dated January 29, 1991, and on that basis the

appellants are entitled to absorption on regular basis through the

process of screening by the screening committee in accordance with

the said provision and they are not re-quired to face selection by the

Railway Recruitment Board for the purpose of regular absorption.

The judgment of the Tribunal holding otherwise cannot, therefore,

be upheld and has to be set aside.

After the impugned Judgment of the Tribunal, the services of the

appellants have been terminated.

In case the appellants are found suitable for absorption by the

Screening Committee, they should be appointed on regular basis

on the post that was held by them and they would also be en-titled

to continuity of service. The appeals are, therefore, allowed, the

judgments of the Tribunal dated October 31,1994 in the applications

filed by the appellants are set aside and the said applications are 

258 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

allowed with the direction that the appellants shall be considered

for absorption on regular basis on the post of Assistant Teacher by

the Screening Committee in accordance with para 5.1 of the master

circular dated January 29, 1991, and in case the appellants are found

suitable for such absorption by the Screening Committee, they shall

be restored to the post held by them with continuity of service.

The process of selection by the Screening Committee as per directions

in this order shall be completed within a period of three months from

the receipt of the copy of this order. A copy of this order be sent to

the Chief Personnel Officer, North East Frontier Railway, Maligaon,

Guwahati.

By our order dated March 27, 1995, we had directed that appointment

may not be made on six posts of school teachers. The said order

shall continue till the Screening Committee completes the process

of screening.”

7. The appellant too carried the matter from the Tribunal to this Court.

His matter was disposed of on 15.02.1996 in the following terms:-

“These appeals relate to regular absorption of the appellants who

are working as substitute teachers in the Railways. In the impugned

judgment the Central Administrative Tribunal has observed that the

appellants should be given an opportunity to appear before the

Selection Board if they are otherwise eligible as and when such

selection is made and has expressed the hope that the respondents

would try to accommodate them even on temporary basis if there

happens to be any casual vacancy available from time to time and for

that purpose they may be placed on waiting list of substitute teachers.

The submission of Shri Puri, the learned counsel appearing for the

appellants, is that the appellants who have crossed the age bar may

not be eligible for such consideration. Having regard to the facts and

circumstances of these cases, it is directed that if the appellants

have crossed the prescribed maximum age, they may be considered

for regular selection by giving relaxation in that regard. But such

relaxation shall be confined to one opportunity for consideration for

such selection. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No order

as to costs.”

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 259

SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

8. Even though textually, the orders may appear different, the

respondent-authorities rightly acted in terms of the true purport

of the order. They subjected the appellant also to the process of

screening by the Screening Committee in accordance with para 5.1

of the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991 (hereinafter referred to as

‘the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991’)

9. After subjecting the appellant for screening, by an order of 02.01.1998,

the appellant was appointed as Primary Teacher (Bengali Medium)

in the Railway Higher Secondary School, Alipurduar Junction against

an existing vacancy.

10. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed Original Application No. 978 of

1998 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench.

11. The grievance was that firstly, the appellant should have been

absorbed in the post of Assistant Teacher instead of being absorbed

as a Primary Teacher with admissible continuity of service in the

pay-scale of Rs.5500-9000 and not Rs.4500-7000 that was now

offered under the 02.01.1998 order; secondly, the appellant is entitled

to the pay-scale and allowance admissible to the post of Assistant

Teacher Grade-I, namely, Rs.1640-2900 from 05.12.1989 instead of

the pay-scale of Rs.1200-2040 that was offered. Thirdly, that under

the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991, a Substitute School Teacher

who acquires temporary status, after putting in continuous service for

three months, is entitled to continuity in service as prescribed therein.

12. At this stage, we can profitably refer the order dated 28.12.1998

passed on the aspect of continuity of service with regard to these

teachers who were currently absorbed. The order reads as under:

“Sub:- Continuity of Service on regular absorption

In compliance with Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

and CAT/Guwahati dated 13-10-95, 15-2-96. 2-1-96 and 7-10-96,

the following substitute teachers are absorbed as Primary teacher

(Bengali Medium) and posted in Railway Schools.

1. Smt. Jayashree Deb Roy (Dutta)

2. Smt. Ratna Roy.

260 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

3. Shri Subal Chandra Chakraborty

4. Smt. Anupama Bhowmick

5. Shri Pijush Kanti Das

6. Smt.Radha Chakraborty

7. Shri S. K. Majumder.

The past service rendered by (1) Smt. Jayashree Deb Roy (Dutta)

(2) Smt. Ratna Roy (3) Shri Subal Chandra Chakraborty (4) Smt.

Anupama Bhowmick and Shri Pijush Kanti Das as Substitute teacher

in different spells may be taken into account for all purpose except

Seniority from the date of acquiring of temporary status with treating

breaks as Dies-non.

However, the Hon’ble Court has not directed any specific order

regarding Continuity of service in favour of Smt. Radha Chakraborty

and Shri S.K. Majumder and as such the date of appointment will

be the date of regular appointment after regularization by Screening

Committee.

This has the approval of Competent authority.”

13. As will be seen from the penultimate paragraph of the letter dated

28.12.1998, extracted hereinabove, the only reason that the appellant

was denied continuity of service while others were granted was that

this Court had not made any order regarding continuity of service.

All other teachers, including Jayashree Deb Roy (Dutta) [applicant

in O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989] were granted continuity of service and

the past service rendered by them as substitute Teacher in different

spells was taken into account for all purposes except seniority from

the date of acquiring of temporary status by treating breaks as dies

non. (A day on which no legal business is carried on).

14. The respondent-authorities defended their orders before the Central

Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench.

Findings of the courts below:

15. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, by its judgment

of 28.11.2008, held that the appellant had only been appointed as 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 261

SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

a primary teacher on 05.12.1989 in the pay-scale of Rs.1200-2040;

that functioning as a mathematics teacher for Classes XI and XII,

as a stop-gap measure, would not entitle him the rights of a regular

appointee to the post of Post Graduate Teacher; that the orders

of this Court did not, in the appellant’s case, direct specifically

regarding continuity of service, as was done in the other cases and

the appellant’s case being one of regular absorption, no continuity of

service can be given to him. Holding so, the Central Administrative

Tribunal, Calcutta Bench dismissed the application of the appellant.

16. The appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court at Calcutta.

The High Court once again, relying on the order of this Court, held

that the benefit of continuous service was specifically rejected in the

case of the appellant. So holding, the High Court upheld the order

of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench.

17. The appellant is before us in Appeal.

Contentions:

18. We have heard Ms. Uttara Babbar, learned counsel for the appellant

and Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel for the Union of India. Both

the learned counsel have painstakingly taken us through the records

of the case and presented their respective points of view very ably.

19. Ms. Uttara Babbar, learned counsel for the appellant, contends

that under the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991, Clause 4.3, 5.1

and 6 would apply to the case of the appellant. According to her,

on completion of three months continuous service, the appellant

acquired the temporary status under Clause 4.3; that under Clause 5,

Substitutes, who have acquired temporary status were to be screened

by a Screening Committee and not by Selection Boards for the

purpose of absorption, and under Clause 6, the date of appointment

of a substitute to be recorded in the service book against the column

“date of appointment” should be the date on which the substitute

attains a temporary status after continuous service of three months,

if the same is followed by his/her regular absorption. According to

the learned counsel, only for those who do not acquire temporary

status and who are regularly appointed, the date of appointment

would be the date when they are absorbed.

262 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

20. According to the learned counsel, the appellant having completed

three months of continuous service as a substitute teacher is entitled

to reckon his date of appointment as 04.03.1990 (on completion of

three months) since he now stands duly absorbed by the order of

02.01.1998.

21. According to the learned counsel, the appellant ought to have been

absorbed as Assistant Teacher since he worked as a substitute

Assistant Teacher and taught Classes XI and XII. Her further

alternative case is if he has to be only considered as absorbed under

the category of Primary Teacher, then he should be entitled to the

benefit under the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991 and should be

entitled to reckon his service under Clause 6 of the said Circular

from 04.03.1990. Learned counsel further contends that the order

of this Court in the case of the appellant dated 15.02.1996 should

be read in conjunction with the order of this Court dated 13.10.1995

in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) - applicant in O.A.

No. 149(G) of 1989. Learned counsel lays particular emphasis on

the fact that the Tribunal in the appellant’s case in O.A. No. 209 of

1990 had wholly relied on the order in the case of O.A. No. 149(G)

of 1989 (the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta). Reiterating

para 4 of the said order, learned counsel contends that O.A. No. 209

of 1990 of the appellant was dismissed for the same reasons that

O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989 was dismissed. Learned counsel further

emphasizes the fact that in C.A. No. 9424 of 1995, by order dated

13.10.1995, this Court in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta)

had specifically recorded that the judgment of the Tribunal in O.A.

No. 149(G) of 1989 was set aside.

22. Learned counsel further contends that even the authorities so

understood the orders of this Court and it is for that reason that they

subjected the appellant also to a screening before the Screening

Committee before the absorption on 02.01.1998. Learned counsel

contends that, having done so, there was no plausible reason to

discriminate the case of the appellant when it came to the grant of

relief regarding continuity of service on the ground that this Court

had not made any specific order regarding continuity of service. 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 263

SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

23. Learned counsel contends that the grant of age bar relaxation can

only be understood as a grant of additional relief and this cannot

be read to mean that there was denial of the relief of continuity of

service, if the appellants’ were found entitled for absorption which

they ultimately were found be entitled to.

24. Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel for the Union of India, vehemently

opposed the above submissions. Learned counsel, defending the

orders of the courts below would submit that the claim for absorption

as Assistant Teacher was totally unjustified. According to the learned

counsel, the appellant was appointed in 1989 only as a substitute

primary teacher in the pay-scale of the primary teacher and hence

merely on the basis of the claim that some stop-gap classes XI and

XII were taken, no plea for absorption as Assistant Teacher could be

justified/made. He defended the order of absorption dated 02.01.1998

and also contended that the authorities were justified in passing

the order of 28.12.1998 denying continuity of service for the period

before 02.01.1998, since there was a clear distinction between the

judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta)

and others in the case of the appellant.

25. Drawing attention to the orders of this Court in the case of Smt.

Jayashree Deb Roy (Dutta) vs. Union of India and Ors. (C.A.

No. 9424 of 1995) arising out of O.A. No. 149(G) of 1989, learned

counsel contends that in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta)

(supra), there was a specific finding that the appellants in that case

were entitled to continuity of service in accordance with para 5.1 of

the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991 in the event the Screening

Committee found them fit for absorption.

26. Contrasting this with the judgment of this Court in the appellant’s

case, learned counsel would contend that no such direction for

granting continuity of service in the event of absorption was given

in the appellant’s case.

27. Learned counsel would contend that even factually the case of the

appellant was different from the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy

(Dutta) inasmuch as Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) was in service on

the date of absorption, while the appellant was not. This submission 

264 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

is seriously disputed by Ms. Uttara Babbar. Nothing much however

turns on this last submission of the counsel for the respondents.

Reasons and Conclusion:

28. We have considered the rival contentions and perused the records.

Claim for absorption as Assistant Teacher – Higher Secondary

Section:

29. We are of the view that the appellant’s claim for absorption as

Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section in the pay-scale

of Rs.5500-9000 is not tenable. The appellant was appointed as

a substitute teacher in the pay-scale of a primary teacher. In fact,

when he filed the first round of proceedings in O.A. No. 209 of 1991,

no plea was raised that he worked as an Assistant Teacher in the

Higher Secondary Section. Even when he obtained interim orders

from the Tribunal on 03.12.1990, it was only to the effect that the

services of the appellant should not be dispensed with without the

leave of the Court. Even before the Tribunal, the argument was only

about regularization. Before this Court too, no claim for regularization

as Assistant Teacher in the Higher Secondary Section was made.

30. The contention now raised in the present round of proceedings (O.A.

No. 978 of 1998) for absorption as Assistant Teacher in the Higher

Secondary Section is strongly refuted by the respondents by pointing

out that his engagement as a substitute teacher was only in the payscale of Rs.1200-2040 which was the scale for the primary teacher.

They contend that his claim that he was allowed to take classes for XI

and XII is unfounded. No doubt, the Central Administrative Tribunal,

Calcutta Bench has recorded that the applicant had functioned as a

mathematics teacher for Class XI and XII as a stop-gap measure.

31. This issue, however, need not detain the Court any longer as at no

point in the first round of proceedings, the appellant made such a

claim; the Screening Committee having considered him, pursuant

to the orders of this Court, has thought it fit to absorb him only as

a primary teacher; the Screening Committee itself was pursuant

to the orders of this Court and based on the Master Circular of

29.01.1991 wherein the claims of the candidates like the appellant 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 265

SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

were examined; the records of his appointment as a substitute teacher

admittedly show that he was only appointed as a substitute primary

teacher; it is on the completion of three months as substitute primary

teacher that he acquired temporary status and on absorption now

he became entitled to certain benefits under the Circular which we

have elaborated herein above.

32. In the earlier round of proceedings culminating in the order of this

Court dated 15.02.1996, this issue was never raised. His claim for

absorption as an assistant teacher in the Higher Secondary Section

is clearly barred by constructive res judicata.

Law on Constructive Res Judicata:

33. Almost two centuries ago, in Henderson vs. Henderson, (1843) 3

Hare, 100, the Vice-Chancellor Sir James Wigram felicitously puts

the principle thus:-

“In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the Court correctly

when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of

litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction,

the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their

whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit

the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect

of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the

subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because

they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted

part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special

cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required

by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but

to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation,

and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have

brought forward at the time. ….”

34. This principle popularly known as the doctrine of constructive res

judicata, based on the might and ought theory, has been recognized by

this Court in several judgments. In Maharashtra Vikrikar Karamchari

Sangathan vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2000) 2 SCC

552, this Court held as under:-

266 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

“22. It was then contended on behalf of the appellants that neither the

Recruitment Rules of 1971 nor the Seniority Rules of 1982 provided

for carrying forward the vacancies falling in either category. In the

absence of such rules which specifically provide for carrying forward

the vacancies falling in either category, no such carry-forward rule

could be implied either in the Recruitment Rules or in the Seniority

Rules. This contention need not detain us any longer because such a

contention was available to the appellants in the earlier proceedings,

namely, Transfer Application No. 822 of 1991 and the same was not

put in issue. That not having been done, it must follow that such a

contention is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata.

Neither the contesting respondents nor the appellants ever raised this

contention at any stage of the proceedings in Transfer Petition No.

822 of 1991. It would, therefore, be too late to raise such a contention

when the seniority list has been finalized pursuant to the judgment

of MAT, Bombay Bench in Transfer Petition No. 822 of 1991.”

Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium:

35. The doctrine itself is based on public policy flowing from the age-old

legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that in

the interest of the State there should be an end to litigation and no party

ought to be vexed twice in a litigation for one and the same cause (See

M. Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2011) 3

SCC 408.

36. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant that he should at

least be paid the salary and allowances as paid to the Assistant

Teachers in the Higher Secondary Section for the time he functioned

should also fail for the reason as set out herein above.

Claim for continuity of service:

37. The appellant however cannot be denied continuity of service under

the Master Circular dated 29.01.1991 read with the orders of this

Court in Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) (supra) [C.A. No. 9424 of

1995] and the order in the appellant’s own case i.e. C.A. No. 3557

of 1996 dated 15.02.1996. This is a fresh cause of action, which

has arisen in view of his absorption on 02.01.1998, subsequent to

the culmination of the earlier round of proceedings.

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 267

SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

38. The conduct of the authorities themselves in subjecting the appellant

to screening before the Screening Committee, like they did for Smt.

Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) and Others, also clearly indicates that

even they wanted to treat the appellant’s case on par with the case

of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) and Others. It is on that basis that

the appellant was found fit for absorption as a primary teacher and

he was so absorbed. The only reason given in the order denying

continuity for the appellant while granting continuity of the same for

the others is that, in the case of the appellant, this Court had not

directed any specific order regarding continuity of service.

Rights under the Master Circular:

39. The appellant’s right first of all flows from the Master Circular dated

29.01.1991, as has been rightly contended by learned counsel for

the appellant. For the sake of convenience, we extract herein below

the relevant clauses:-

“4. BENEFITS.

4.1. Substitutes engaged should be paid regular scales of pay and

allowances admissible to the post against which they have been

appointed irrespective of the nature of duration of the vacancy.

4.2. They be allowed all the rights and privileges as are admissible

to temporary railway employees on completion of four months

continuous Service.

4.3. Substitute school teacher may, however, be afforded temporary

status after they have put in continuous service of three months. Their

service to be treated as continuous for all purposes except seniority

on their eventual absorption against regular posts after selection.

4.4 The conferment of temporary status after completion of four

months continuous service in the case of others and three months

continuous service in the case of substitute teachers mentioned

in paras - 4.2 and 3 above does not entitle them to automatics

absorption/ appointment to Railway service unless they are selected in

the approved manner for appointment or absorption to regular posts.

268 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

4.5 Service of substitutes will count for Pensionary benefits from the

date of completion of four months (3 months in the case of teachers)

continuous service provided it is followed by absorption in regular

Group-C’ (Class lll)/Group-’D’ (Class -IV) Service without break.”

... ...

“5. Screening of the substitutes for their absorption in regular service:-

5.1 Substitutes, who have acquired temporary status should be

screened by screening Committees and not by Selection Boards,

Constituted for this purpose be-fore being absorbed in regular Group

-’C’ (Class-Ill) and Group-’D’ (Class-IV) posts.

Such a screening Committee should consist of at least three members,

one of whom should belong to the SC/ST Communities and another

to minority communities.”

… ...

5. 11 Gaps which may occur in service of substitutes between two

engagements should be ignored for the purpose of temporary status

on completion of four months services and in case of teachers, on

completion of 3 months service.”

… …

“6. Date of appointment.

The date of appointment of a substitute to be recorded in the service

book against the column “date of appointment” should be the date

on which he /she attains temporary status after continuous service

of four months if the same is followed by his/her regular absorption.

Otherwise, it should be the date on which he/she is regularly

appointed/absorbed.

This applies to substitute teachers also who attain the temporary

status after a continuous service of three months only.”

40. A reading of the above clearly shows that on completion of three

months of continuous service as substitute teacher, the incumbent

acquires temporary status. It is also clear that substitutes who have

acquired temporary status should be screened by the Screening

Committee and not by Selection Board. It is also clear that under 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 269

SAMIR KUMAR MAJUMDER v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Clause 5.11, gaps which may occur in service of substitutes between

two engagements should be ignored for the purpose of temporary

status on completion of four months service and in case of teachers,

on completion of three months service. Further, it is clear that the date

of appointment should be the date on which they attained temporary

status in the event they are regularly absorbed. As is clear from the

dates mentioned hereinbelow that the appellant having acquired

temporary status on 04.03.1990 is entitled to count his service from

04.03.1990 in view of his absorption in the service as a primary

teacher on 02.01.1998.

41. The authorities are wrong in stating that in the case of the appellant

this Court had not directed any specific order regarding continuity

of service. This Court’s order of 15.02.1996 has to be read with

the order in the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy (Dutta) dated

13.10.1995. Nowhere in the order of this Court in the appellant’s

appeal had the benefits available to the appellant under the Master

Circular been taken away. In the case of Smt. Jayasree Deb Roy

(Dutta), by abundant caution, the Master Circular was referred to and

the rights granted therein were reiterated expressly in this Court’s

order. On the facts of the present case, we are not persuaded to

accept the contention of the respondent that the order of this Court

in the appellant’s case should be so read as having denied him the

benefits of Master Circular dated 29.01.1991.

42. The appellant being identically situated with the other absorbees

in the order of 02.01.1998 could not have been discriminated and

denied the benefit of his service from 04.03.1990 to the date of his

absorption.

43. The Tribunal and the High Court have grossly erred in denying the

relief by wrongly understanding the orders of this Court and the

legal position.

44. We direct that the appellant will be entitled to take into account

the past service rendered by him as substitute teacher in different

spells, from the date of obtaining temporary status (04.03.1990). The

appellant should be extended the same benefits as were extended

to others, who were granted continuity by the letter of 28.12.1998.

270 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

45. The appellant has superannuated now. The pay of the appellant shall

be re-fixed after granting continuity of service with all consequential

benefits in accordance with Clause 6 of the Master Circular dated

29.01.1991. All the necessary increments and allowances due on

that basis also should be granted. The retrial benefits also should

be consequently reworked. The unpaid arrears amount be paid to

the appellant with six percent interest from the respective dates the

various amounts fell due. Let the payment be made within eight

weeks from today.

46. Accordingly, the impugned order of the High Court dated 19.07.2011

passed in W.P.C.T. No. 130 of 2009 is set aside. The Appeal is partly

allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case : Appeal partly allowed.

Claim of petitioner for juvenility after conviction u/s. 302 r/w. s.34 IPC. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Petitioner and other co-accused convicted u/s. 302 r/w. s.34 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life – High Court upheld the conviction and sentence – SLP also dismissed – Petitioner claimed juvenility – The Sessions Judge was directed to conduct an enquiry and to submit the report:

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 250 : 2023 INSC 800

MAKKELLA NAGAIAH

v.

THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

(Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 429 of 2022)

SEPTEMBER 05, 2023

[B. R. GAVAI, PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASHIMHA AND

SANJAY KUMAR, JJ.]

Issue for consideration: Claim of petitioner for juvenility after

conviction u/s. 302 r/w. s.34 IPC.

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000

– Petitioner and other co-accused convicted u/s. 302 r/w.

s.34 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life –

High Court upheld the conviction and sentence – SLP also

dismissed – Petitioner claimed juvenility – The Sessions Judge

was directed to conduct an enquiry and to submit the report:

Held: The Additional Sessions Judge submitted the report after

recording necessary evidence by summoning the concerned officials

for the production of school records – The report of the Additional

Sessions Judge confirmed the petitioner’s juvenility at the time of

commission of the offence – The report has categorically come

to the conclusion that the date of birth of petitioner is 02.05.1989

– If the date of birth of the petitioner is 02.05.1989, he was 16

years 7 months old as on the date of the crime, i.e., 21.12.2005

– In view of s.16 r/w. s.15(1)(g) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000,

the maximum period for which the petitioner could have been in

custody is three years – The petitioner has already undergone

more than 12 years of imprisonment – Accepting the report, the

petitioner can no longer be incarcerated – Petitioner directed to

be released forthwith. [Paras 5, 6, 7 and 8]

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 429

of 2022

Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India.

Rishi Malhotra, Adv. for the Petitioner.

* Author

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 251

MAKKELLA NAGAIAH v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Rajiv Kumar Choudhry, Sriharsha Peechara, Duvvuri Subrahmanya

Bhanu, Ms. Pallavi, Ms. Kriti Sinha, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Advs.

for the Respondent.

ORDER

1. This is a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Petitioner seeks verification of his claim of juvenility and consequential

orders as per the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and

Protection of Children) Act, 20001. As such a plea can be raised at

any stage, we called for a report after due enquiry. Having perused

the report of the Additional Sessions Judge confirming the petitioner’s

juvenility at the time of commission of the offence, we have allowed

the Writ Petition and directed the release of the petitioner, who has

undergone much more than the maximum statutory punishment under

the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, i.e., three years of incarceration.

2. For an incident dated 21.12.2005, the petitioner was arrayed as an

accused along with others in Crime No. 228/05, P.S. Sathupally,

(A.P.). By its judgment dated 15.12.2009, the III Additional Sessions

Judge (FTC), Khammam, convicted the petitioner and other coaccused persons, inter alia, under Section 302 read with Section

34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced them to undergo

imprisonment for life. The petitioner appealed against the conviction

and the sentence to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which by its

judgment dated 10.04.2014, dismissed the appeal and upheld the

aforesaid conviction. The petitioner also filed a Special Leave Petition

against the concurrent findings of the Sessions Court and the High

Court, and this Court by its order dated 12.07.2022 dismissed the

SLP, according finality to the conviction and the sentence.

3. Two months after the dismissal of the SLP, the petitioner filed the

present Writ Petition praying that a Writ of Mandamus be issued

to the State to verify his claim of juvenility and to pass necessary

consequential orders.

4. As it is well settled that the question of juvenility can be raised before

any Court and at any stage, as prescribed under Section 7A(1) of the

Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and confirmed by judicial precedents2, this

1 Hereinafter ‘Juvenile Justice Act, 2000’.

2 Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 211.

252 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

Court issued notice in the Writ Petition. The State filed an affidavit

through the Inspector of Police, PS Sathupally, Khammam District,

Telangana, stating that the petitioner studied at the M.P.P. School,

Putrela Main, Village of Vissannapet Mandal, Krishna District, Andhra

Pradesh, from First to Third Standard from 1994 to 1997 and his

date of birth is 02.05.1989. Since the juvenility was based on the

petitioner’s school documents, this Court considered it appropriate to

direct the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Khammam,

Andhra Pradesh, to conduct an enquiry with regard to the plea of

juvenility raised by the petitioner. The Sessions Judge was directed

to conduct an enquiry and to submit the report after recording

necessary evidence by summoning the concerned officials for the

production of school records.

5. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has forwarded the report of the

II Additional Sessions Judge, Khammam, on the issue of juvenility of

the petitioner. In the report dated 13.05.2023, the FAC II Additional

Sessions Judge, Khammam, has categorically come to the conclusion

that the date of birth of Makkella Nagaiah is 02.05.1989. The report

is based on a detailed examination of the documents, Exhibits C1

to C7, coupled with the oral evidence of witnesses CW-1 and CW-2.

We have no hesitation in accepting the same.

6. If the date of birth of the petitioner is 02.05.1989, he was 16 years 7

months old as on the date of the crime, i.e., 21.12.2005. Accordingly,

the petitioner was a juvenile in conflict with the law on the date of

commission of the offence.

7. In view of Section 16 read with Section 15(1)(g) of the Juvenile

Justice Act, 2000, the maximum period for which the petitioner

could have been in custody is three years. However, as the plea

of juvenility was raised for the first time in the present writ petition

before us, the process of criminal law, which commenced in 2005, led

to the petitioner being convicted and sentence for life imprisonment

concurrently by the Trial Court, the High Court as well as the Supreme

Court. In the meanwhile, the petitioner has undergone more than

12 years of imprisonment3. Having accepted the report of the II

3 Although the Order of the Supreme Court dated 12.07.2022 notes that the petitioner has served 16

years of imprisonment, as per Letter No RC3/1009/2022 dated 13.12.2022, and Letter No. RC3/1009/2022,

dated 21.01.2023, addressed by the Director General of Prisons to the Government, the Petitioner has only

served 12 years 03 months and 10 days of sentence in present case Crime No. 228/05.

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 253

MAKKELLA NAGAIAH v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Additional Sessions Judge, Khammam, the petitioner can no longer

be incarcerated.

8. In view of the above we allow the Writ Petition and direct that the

petitioner be released forthwith, if he is not required to be detained

in any other case. There shall be no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case : Writ petition allowed.

Whether a person holding a driving licence in respect of a “light motor vehicle” could on the strength of the licence be entitled to drive a “transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class” having unladen weight not exceeding 7500 kgs.

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 241 : 2023 INSC 832

M/s. BAJAJ ALLIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD.

v.

RAMBHA DEVI AND ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 841 of 2018)

SEPTEMBER 13, 2023

[Dr. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI,

HRISHIKESH ROY, PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA,

PANKAJ MITHAL AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.]

Issue for consideration: Whether a person holding a driving

licence in respect of a “light motor vehicle” could on the strength

of the licence be entitled to drive a “transport vehicle of light motor

vehicle class” having unladen weight not exceeding 7500 kgs.

Motor Vehicles Act 1988 - Person holding a driving licence

in respect of a “light motor vehicle” – Entitlement to drive a

“transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class” having unladen

weight not exceeding 7500 kgs, on the strength of that licence:

Held: Decision in Mukund Dewangan’s case which enables a person

holding a licence for a light motor vehicle to drive a transport vehicle

on the strength of that licence without a separate transport vehicle

licence, does not appear to be in accord with the legislative intent

– Any change in the position of law as expressed would have an

impact on large number of persons who have obtained insurance

and may be driving commercial vehicles with LMV licences relying

on Mukund Dewangan’s case – Impact of the reversal of the

decision on the social sector is a facet which would have to be

placed in balance by the policy decisions of the Government –

Thus, it would be necessary for the Union Government to have a

fresh look at the matter and determine whether a change in the

law is warranted bearing in mind the diverse considerations which

fall within its remit in making policy choices and decisions – Union

Government requested to carry out the exercise within the stipulated

period and thereafter, the proceedings would be taken up.

Mukund Dewangan v Oriental Insurance Company

Limited (2017) 14 SCC 663 – referred to.

242 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

CIVIL APPELLATE/EXTRA ORDINARY JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal

No. 841 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 04.08.2017 of the High Court

of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal

No.5127 of 2011.

With

SLP(C) Nos. 10918, 9604, 9613 of 2018, Diary No(s). 24834, 25256

of 2018, SLP(C) No. 24671 of 2018, Diary No(s). 32753, 32756,

37055, 39059 of 2018, SLP(C) Nos. 426, 505-506 of 2019, SLP(C)

No. 17506 of 2018, Diary No(s). 23638, 24137, 24530, 24534 of

2018, SLP(C) Nos. 5958, 8918-8919, 11503-11504 of 2019, SLP(C)

No. 8277 of 2020, SLP(C) Nos. 8123-8124 of 2022, SLP(C) Nos.

14645-14646, 35472-35473 of 2017, SLP(C) No. 6055 of 2018,

SLP(C) Nos. 18849, 20449, 21547, 23017-23018 of 2019, C.A. Nos.

8001-8002 of 2019, SLP(C) No. 766 of 2020, SLP(C) Nos. 24545,

30601 of 2019, SLP(C) No. 696 of 2021, C.A. Nos. 1477, 842, 1479,

483, 1506, 1478 of 2018, Diary No. 40406 of 2017, C.A. No. 1476

of 2018, Diary No. 41949 of 2017, SLP(C) Nos. 2684-2685, 597,

524 of 2018, Diary No. 2524 of 2018, SLP(C) Nos. 19242-19244 of

2018, Diary No. 23636 of 2018, SLP(C) No. 28906 of 2018, SLP(C)

Nos. 13315, 14523-14524 of 2019, Diary No. 37270 of 2017, C.A.

No. 1475 of 2018, SLP(C) Nos. 5065, 10459, 9908, 6668 of 2018,

Diary No(s). 4869, 6119, 6264 of 2018, SLP(C) Nos. 8816, 9607,

9610, 9612, 9606, 9609 of 2018, Diary No(s). 9963, 9970, 990 of

2018, SLP(C) No. 5193, 5188, 9611, 9608, 9605 of 2018, SLP(C)

No. 20221 of 2023

Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, R Venkataramani, Attorney General,

Jayant K Sud, Siddhartha Dave, Jayant Bhushan, Neeraj Kishan

Kaul, Mrs. Anitha Shenoy, Sr. Advs., Jagdish Chandra Solanki, Ms.

Archana Pathak Dave, Kartik Jasra, Vaibhav Dwivedi, A N Krishna

Swami, Udai Khanna, Avnish Dave, Jagdish C Solanki, Ms. Riya

Sethi, Pratyush Srivastav, Ms. Vidhi Thaker, Parmod Kumar Vishnoi,

Prastut Dalvi, Kumar Prashant, Tushar Bhushan, Amartya Bhushan,

Yojit Mehra, Ketan Paul, Sukant Vikram, Ms. Sakshi Mittal, Vishnu

Mehra, Kunal Malhotra, Amit Kumar Singh, Ms. K Enatoli Sema,

Ms. Chubalemla Chang, Prang Newmai, Abhsihek Gola, Viresh B. 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 243

M/s. BAJAJ ALLIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD. v.

RAMBHA DEVI AND ORS.

Saharya, Akshat Agarwal, Rajeev Kumar, P. K. Seth, Ms. Manjeet

Chawla, Mrs. Usha Pant Kukreti, Ms. Meenakshi Midha, Kapil

Midha, Ms. Garv Singh, Ms. Samiksha Gupta, Garv Singh, Chander

Shekhar Ashri, Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, Rajeev Maheshwaranand Roy,

Dr. Meera Agarwal, Ramesh Chandra Mishra, Sandeep Jha, Ram

Ekbal Roy, Binay Kumar Das, Ms. Neha Das, Ms. Priyanka Das,

Ms. Aman Nihal, Sanjay Kumar Singh, Ravi Shankar Ravi, Sanjay

Kumar Lal Das, Abhishek Kumar Gola, Abhishek K Gola, Sudhir

Naagar, Anil Kumar, Ms. Amrreeta Swaarup, Rajesh Kumar Gupta,

Ganesh Kumar R., Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Vivek Kumar Pandey,

Shuchi Singh, Rakesh Kumar Tewari, Krishna Kant Dubey, Ujjwal

Kumar Dubey, Ram Lal Roy, Punit Damodar, C. George Thomas,

Sanyat Lodha, Dhruv Sharma, Raghav Agrawal, Toshiv Goyal, Ms.

Raveena Kinkhabwala, Ms. Prachi Pandey, Vivek Mathur, Siddharth

Agarwal, Ivan, Ayushma Awasthi, Ms. Namrata Sarah Caleb, Parita,

Ms. Mohini Priya, Devvrat, Ms. Charu Sangwan, Anup Kumar, Abhijit

Banerjee, Ms. Swati Setia, Devesh Kumar Agnihotri, Sachin Sharma,

Anuj Bhandari, Rajat Gupta, Gaurav Jain, Mrs. Disha Bhandari, Mrs.

Anjali Doshi, Kaustubh Shukla, Abhishek Gola, Anilendra Pandey, Ms.

Priya Kashyap, Rajeev Kumar Ranjan, Ms. Shalini Kaul, Mallikarjun

S. Mylar, Ashok Bannidinni, Sujeet Kumar, Nishanth Patil, Ayush P

Shah, Vignesh Adithiya S, Tripurari Ray, Nithyananda Murthy P, Mrs.

Bhanu Prabha, Balwant Singh Billowria, Vivekanad Singh, Anirudh

Ray, Atrul Wadera, N Suresha, Rajinder Singh, Ms. Shilpa Singh,

Sushil Kumar Sharma, Pahlad Singh Sharma, Virendra Kumar,

Manish Kumar Mishra, Kshitij Vedwal, Salil Paul, Sahil Paul, Ms.

Manjeet Chawla, M/s. Nuli & Nuli, Sibo Sankar Mishra, Manjunath

Meled, Sandeep Sharma, Mrs. Vijayalaxmi Udapudi, Anil Kumar,

Subhro Sanyal, Prakash Ranjan Nayak, C.B. Gururaj, Balaram

Nayak, Animesh Dubey, Ms. Laxmi Haribhai Nakum, Sharanagouda

Patil, Mrs. Supreeta Patil, M/s. S-legal Associates, Pradeep Gaur,

Amit Gaur, Sunil Kumar Sethi, Ms. Sweta Sinha, Rameshwar

Prasad Goyal, P. B. Suresh, Vipin Nair, Arindam Ghosh, Karthik

Jayashankar, Anshumaan Bahadur, P.b.sashaankh, Mrs. Madhavi

Yadav, A. N. Krishnaswamy, Navneet Kumar, Saurabh Tiwari, Parijat

Kishore, Faisal Sherwani, Shikher Deep Aggarwal, Shivi Sethi, Onkar

Thakur, M. Shoeb Alam, Ms. Fauzia Shakil, Ujjwal Singh, Ms. Garima

Chaudhary, Ms. Agastya Sen, Advs. for the appearing parties.

244 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

ORDER

1. This reference before the Constitution Bench arises in pursuance

of an order dated 8 March 2022 of a Bench of three-Judges. The

three-Judge Bench was in turn hearing a reference by two-Judges

which was made on 3 May 2018.

2. The primary issue which has been referred to the Constitution Bench

is whether a person holding a driving licence in respect of a “light

motor vehicle” could on the strength of the licence be entitled to

drive a “transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class” having unladen

weight not exceeding 7500 kgs.

3. The issue was dealt with by a Bench of three-Judges in Mukund

Dewangan v Oriental Insurance Company Limited1. The

conclusions which were arrived at in the judgment were in the

following terms:

“60. Thus, we answer the questions which are referred to us thus:

60.1 “Light motor vehicle” as defined in Section 2(21) of the Act

would include a transport vehicle as per the weight prescribed

in Section 2(21) read with Sections 2(15) and 2(48). Such

transport vehicles are not excluded from the definition of the

light motor vehicle by virtue of Amendment Act 54 of 1994.

60.2 A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle weight

of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg would be a light

motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a roadroller,

“unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg and holder

of a driving licence to drive class of “light motor vehicle” as

provided in Section 10(2)(d) is competent to drive a transport

vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of which does

not exceed 7500 kg or a motor car or tractor or roadroller, the

“unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is

to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required

to drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as

1 (2017) 14 SCC 663

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 245

M/s. BAJAJ ALLIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD. v.

RAMBHA DEVI AND ORS.

enumerated above. A licence issued under Section 10(2)(d)

continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54 of 1994 and

28-3-2001 in the form.

60.3 The effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act 54 of

1994 w.e.f. 14-11-1994 while substituting clauses (e) to (h)

of Section 10(2) which contained “medium goods vehicle” in

Section 10(2)(e), “medium passenger motor vehicle” in Section

10(2)(f), “heavy goods vehicle” in Section 10(2)(g) and “heavy

passenger motor vehicle” in Section 10(2)(h) with expression

“transport vehicle” as substituted in Section 10(2)(e) related

only to the aforesaid substituted classes only. It does not

exclude transport vehicle, from the purview of Section 10(2)

(d) and Section 2(41) of the Act i.e. light motor vehicle.

60.4 The effect of amendment of Form 4 by insertion of “transport

vehicle” is related only to the categories which were substituted

in the year 1994 and the procedure to obtain driving licence

for transport vehicle of class of “light motor vehicle” continues

to be the same as it was and has not been changed and there

is no requirement to obtain separate endorsement to drive

transport vehicle, and if a driver is holding licence to drive

light motor vehicle, he can drive transport vehicle of such

class without any endorsement to that effect.”

4. When the reference before the three-Judge Bench was taken up,

counsel appearing on behalf of the insurance companies submitted

that the judgment in Mukund Dewangan (supra) has not noticed

certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act 19882. In particular,

it was submitted that Section 3 stipulates that “no person shall so

drive a transport vehicle other than the motor cab or motor cycle

hired for his own use or rented under any scheme made under

sub-section (2) of Section 75 unless his driving licence specifically

entitles him so to do”. Apart from this, the referral order notes that

the two-Judge Bench was also of the view that other provisions,

including Sections 4(1), 7 and 14 of the Act and Rules 5 and 31 of

2 “Act”

246 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

the Central Motor Vehicles Rules 1989, were not noticed in Mukund

Dewangan(supra).

5. The Union of India was not a party to the proceedings before this

Court when the referral order was passed on 8 March 2022.

6. On 20 July 2023, the Constitution Bench heard arguments on behalf

of the insurance companies and on behalf of the claimants. This

Court observed as follows:

“3. During the course of the hearing, one of the principal

submissions of the respondents has been that the judgment

of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Mukund Dewangan

v Oriental Insurance Company Limited was accepted by

the Union government by issuing notifications dated 16 April

2018 and 31 March 2021 in the Ministry of Road Transport

and Highways, as a result of which the Rules were amended

to bring them in conformity with the judgment of this Court.

4. We are of the considered view that having regard to the above

background, the position of the Union government in the

Ministry of Road Transport and Highways would be necessary.

We request the Attorney General for India to assist the Court

in the matter.”

7. As noted in the above extract, the letter dated 16 April 2018 and

notification dated 31 March 2021 in the Ministry of Road Transport

and Highways were pressed in aid on behalf of counsel for the

claimants to urge that the Union Government has, in fact, amended

the Rules to bring them in conformity with the judgment in Mukund

Dewangan (supra).

8. Mr R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, has appeared in

response to the request of the Court and submitted a written note.

The note submitted by the Attorney General indicates that:

(i) Application of the ratio in Mukund Dewangan (supra) enables

a person holding a licence for a light motor vehicle to drive

a transport vehicle on the strength of that licence without a

separate transport vehicle licence; and

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 247

M/s. BAJAJ ALLIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD. v.

RAMBHA DEVI AND ORS.

(ii) This interpretation of the provisions of the statute and the

Rules in Mukund Dewangan (supra) does not appear to be

in accord with the legislative intent.

9. The note also indicates that the letter dated 16 April 2018 was issued

by the Union government taking note of the judgment in Mukund

Dewangan (supra) as the law declared by this Court. Resultantly,

the notification dated 31 March 2021 was issued to further amend

the Rules to bring them in conformity with the judgment. However,

the Attorney General has submitted that this may not be treated as a

policy declaration by the Union Government and, as such, the letter

and the notification may not have any bearing or conclusiveness

on the state of law to be clarified.

10. At the same time, it has been submitted that the Union of India is

open to the need, if any, to issue guidelines/regulations to address

the perceived gaps in law as understood in the judgment of this

Court in Mukund Dewangan (supra).

11. Apart from the specific submission of the Union Government during

the course of hearing, that it is open to re-evaluate the position in

law, we are of the considered view that it would be necessary for

the Union Government to have a fresh look at the matter. We are

inclined to take this view for the following reasons:

(i) Since the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, there has

been a rapid evolution of the transport sector, particularly in

the last few years with the emergence of new infrastructure

and new arrangements for putting into place private transport

arrangements;

(ii) Any interpretation or formulation of the law must duly take into

account valid concerns of road safety bearing on the safety of

users of public transport facilities;

(iii) Any change in the position of law as expressed in Mukund

Dewangan (supra) would undoubtedly have an impact on

persons who have obtained insurance relying on the law

declared by this Court and who may be driving commercial 

248 [2023] 12 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL

vehicles with LMV licences. A large number of persons would

be dependent on the sector for earning their livelihood; and

(iv) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (supra) has held the

field for nearly six years and the impact of the reversal of the

decision, at this stage, particularly on the social sector, is a

facet which would have to be placed in balance by the policy

arm of the Government.

12. The considerations which have been flagged above do not necessarily

weigh in the same direction. However, all of them do raise important

issues of policy which must be assessed and evaluated by the Union

Government. Whether a change in the law is warranted is a matter

which has to be determined by the Union Government after taking

a considered decision bearing in mind the diverse considerations

which fall within its remit in making policy choices and decisions.

13. Having regard to these features, we are of the view that the issue

of interpretation which has been referred to the Constitution Bench

by the referral order dated 8 March 2022 should await a careful

evaluation of the policy considerations which may weigh with the

Government in deciding as to whether the reversal of the decision

as it obtains in Mukund Dewangan (supra) is warranted and, if

so, the way forward that must be adopted bearing in mind the

diverging interests, some of which have been noted in the earlier

part of the order.

14. Hence, in view of the consequences which may arise by the

reversal of the judgment in Mukund Dewangan (supra), it would

be appropriate if the entire matter is evaluated by the Government

before this Court embarks upon the interpretative exercise. Once the

Court is apprised of the considered view of the Union Government,

the proceedings before the Constitution Bench can be taken up.

15. We request the Union Government to carry out this exercise within

a period of two months.

16. We clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of

the referral order dated 8 March 2022 or on the correctness of the 

[2023] 12 S.C.R. 249

M/s. BAJAJ ALLIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD. v.

RAMBHA DEVI AND ORS.

decision in Mukund Dewangan (supra) which would await further

arguments once the considered view of the Union Government is

placed before this Court.

17. List the proceedings for directions on 22 November 2023, as a

part-heard case on the top of the Board.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case : Proceedings listed

for directions.