Accused not formally arrested at the time of giving information if can be deemed to be in the ‘custody’ of the police, admissibility of evidence in terms of s.27, Evidence Act, 1872. Conviction and sentence of the appellant u/ss.302 and 201, Penal Code, 1860, if justified. Headnotes Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – “in the custody of a police officer” – Interpretation – Case based on circumstantial evidence – Appellant was taken into custody during the course of investigation for the murder of his Uncle – However, he made a disclosure statement – Appellant along with other co-accused had murdered his uncle’s son-deceased (appellant’s cousin) who was missing for months and his body was first dumped in the sump tank and later retrieved, cut into two parts, put in sack bags, and thrown in the river/canal – Appellant subsequently arrested in the present case – On the basis of the disclosure statement, parts of the dead body and sack bags were recovered – Other articles were also recovered – Appellant’s conviction and sentence u/ss.302 and 201, Penal Code, 1860, challenged: Held: The pre-requisite of police custody, within the meaning of s.27, ought to be read pragmatically and not formalistically or euphemistically – “custody” u/s.27 does not mean formal custody – It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance by the police– Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police – Words “person accused of an offence” and “in the custody of a police 88 [2024] 1 S.C.R. DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS officer” in s.27 are separated by a comma and thus, have to be read distinctively – The wide and pragmatic interpretation of the term “police custody” is supported by the fact that if a narrow or technical view is taken, it will be very easy for the police to delay the time of filing the FIR and arrest, and thereby evade the contours of ss.25 to 27 – A person giving word of mouth information to police, which may be used as evidence against him, may be deemed to have submitted himself to the “custody” of the police officer – In the present case, the disclosure statement was made by the appellant when he was detained in another case relating to the murder of his Uncle– He was subsequently arrested in the present case – Body parts of the deceased were recovered on the pointing out of appellant in his disclosure statement – Deceased had been missing for months and was untraceable – His whereabouts were unknown– The perpetrator(s) were also unknown – It is only consequent to the disclosure statement by the appellant that the police came to know that the Deceased had been murdered – The homicidal death of Deceased, the disclosure statement and the consequent recoveries of the motorcycle and other belongings at the behest of the appellant proved beyond doubt – These facts, in the absence of any other material to doubt them, establish that the appellant committed murder of Deceased – The presence of motive, inter se family property disputes, reinforces the said conclusion – Conviction of the appellant upheld. [Paras 25, 28, 29, 31, 41] Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25-27 – s.27, an exception to ss.25, 26 – Doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events: Held: s.27 is an exception to ss.25 and 26 – s.27 makes that part of the statement which distinctly leads to discovery of a fact in consequence of the information received from a person accused of an offence, to the extent it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered, admissible in evidence against the accused – The fact which is discovered as a consequence of the information given is admissible in evidence – Further, the fact discovered must lead to recovery of a physical object and only that information which distinctly relates to that discovery can be proved – s.27 is based on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events- a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information given, which results in recovery of a physical object – The facts discovered and the recovery is an assurance that the information given by a person [2024] 1 S.C.R. 89 PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v. STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE accused of the offence can be relied – However, s.27 does not lay down the principle that discovery of a fact is to be equated to the object produced or found. [Paras 19, 22] Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Conditions necessary for bringing s.27 into operation, discussed – Facts proved by the prosecution – Duty of the Court – Evidence produced in terms of s.27 – Evidentiary value: Held: The facts proved by the prosecution, particularly the admissible portion of the statement of the accused, would give rise to two alternative hypotheses, (i) that the accused had himself deposited the physical items which were recovered; or (ii) only the accused knew that the physical items were lying at that place – The second hypothesis is wholly compatible with the innocence of the accused, whereas the first would be a factor to show involvement of the accused in the offence – The court has to analyse which of the hypotheses should be accepted in a particular case – s.27 is frequently used by the police, and the courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse – However, this does not mean that in every case invocation of s.27 must be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded as perfunctory and unworthy of credence – Evidentiary value to be attached on evidence produced before the court in terms of s.27 cannot be codified or put in a straightjacket formula – It depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case – A holistic and inferential appreciation of evidence is required to be adopted in a case of circumstantial evidence. [Paras 23, 24] Evidence Act, 1872– ss.24-27 – “accused person”, “a person accused of any offence”: Held: The bar u/s.25 applies equally whether or not the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was in custody at the time of making the confession – For the ban to be effective the person need not have been accused of an offence when he made the confession – The reason is that the expression “accused person” in s.24 and the expression “a person accused of any offence” in ss.26 and 27 have the same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding – The adjectival clause “accused of any offence” is, therefore, descriptive of the person against whom a 90 [2024] 1 S.C.R. DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS confessional statement made by him is declared not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person at the time of making the statement. [Para 26] Criminal Law – Appellant was accused of the murder of his Uncle and his son – Acquitted in the case relating to the murder of Uncle – Judgment of acquittal – Evidentiary value, if any: Held: Except for the fact that the appellant was taken into custody during the course of investigation for the murder of his Uncle and thereupon his disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37) was recorded, there is no connection between the two offences – Murders were committed on two different dates – Murder trial of his Uncle was primarily based upon an entirely different set of evidence – Conviction of the appellant is sustainable in view of the evidence placed on record in the present case – The judgment of acquittal would not qualify as relevant and of evidentiary value so as to acquit the appellant in the present case. [Para 42] Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37) made by the appellant, convicted – Acquittal of the coaccused – Application of s.27: Held: Acquittal of the co-accused was for want of evidence against them – At best, they were found in possession of the articles connected with the crime on the basis of the disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37) made by the appellant – s.27 of the Evidence Act could not have been applied to the other co-accused as the provision pertains to information that distinctly relates to the discovery of a ‘fact’ that was previously unknown, as opposed to fact already disclosed or known – Once information is given by an accused, the same information cannot be used, even if voluntarily made by a co-accused who is in custody – s.27 does apply to joint disclosures, but this is not one such case – This was precisely the reason given by the trial court to acquit the co-accused – Further, even if Section 8 of the Evidence Act was to apply, it would not have been possible to convict the co-accused – The trial court rightly held other co-accused not guilty. [Para 43] Evidence – Case based on circumstantial evidence – Five golden principles to be satisfied as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 – Conditions to be fulfilled before the false explanation or a false defence can be used by the Court as an additional link to lend an assurance to the court, stated – A distinction has [2024] 1 S.C.R. 91 PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v. STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE to be drawn between incomplete chain of circumstances and a circumstance after a chain is complete and the defence or explanation given by the accused is found to be false, in which event the said falsehood is added to reinforce the conclusion of the court. [Paras 37, 38] Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.313: Held: Appellant in his statement u/s.313 denied all accusations without furnishing any explanation regarding his knowledge of the places from which the dead body was recovered – The failure of the appellant to present evidence on his behalf or to offer any cogent explanation regarding the recovery of the dead body by virtue of his special knowledge must lead to a reasonable adverse inference, by application of the principle u/s.106 of the Evidence Act thus forming an additional link in the chain of circumstances – The additional link further affirms the conclusion of guilt as indicated by the prosecution evidence. [Para 40] Words and Phrases – ‘distinctly’ in s.27, Evidence Act, 1872: Held: The word ‘distinctly’ is used to limit and define the scope of the information and means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’ or ‘unmistakably’ – Only that part of the information which is clear, immediate and a proximate cause of discovery is admissible. [Para 22] List of Citations and Other References State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1961) 1 SCR 14 – followed. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79:(2005) 11 SCC 600; Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra [1976] 1 SCR 715:(1976) 1 SCC 828; Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar [1966] SCR 134:AIR 1966 SC 119; Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2014] 8 SCR 650:(2014) 5 SCC 509; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88:(1984) 4 SCC 116 – relied on. State of A.P. v. Gangula Satya Murthy [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 808:(1997) 1 SCC 272; A.N.Vekatesh and Anr. v. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714; 92 [2024] 1 S.C.R. DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS State of Maharashtra v. Suresh [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR 215:(2000) 1 SCC 471; Harivadan Babubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [2013] 10 SCR 889:(2013) 7 SCC 45; Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra [2014] 14 SCR 961:(2015) 1 SCC 253; State of Maharashtra v. Damu S/o Gopinath Shinde and Ors. [2000] 3 SCR 880:(2000) 6 SCC 269; Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam [2013] 3 SCR 801:(2013) 7 SCC 417; Rajesh & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1202; Khatri Hemraj Amulakh v. State of Gujarat (1972) 3 SCC 671; Vikram Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab [2010] 2 SCR 22:(2010) 3 SCC 56; Sandeep v. State of U.P. [2012] 5 SCR 952:(2012) 6 SCC 107; Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC 71; Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 570; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 1054:(2005) 2 SCC 673; Union of India and Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs., [1989] 3 SCR 316:(1989) 2 SCC 754; Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1247 – referred to.

Accused not formally arrested at the time of giving information if

can be deemed to be in the ‘custody’ of the police, admissibility

of evidence in terms of s.27, Evidence Act, 1872. Conviction and

sentence of the appellant u/ss.302 and 201, Penal Code, 1860,

if justified.

Headnotes

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – “in the custody of a police officer”

– Interpretation – Case based on circumstantial evidence

– Appellant was taken into custody during the course of

investigation for the murder of his Uncle – However, he made a

disclosure statement – Appellant along with other co-accused

had murdered his uncle’s son-deceased (appellant’s cousin)

who was missing for months and his body was first dumped

in the sump tank and later retrieved, cut into two parts,

put in sack bags, and thrown in the river/canal – Appellant

subsequently arrested in the present case – On the basis of

the disclosure statement, parts of the dead body and sack

bags were recovered – Other articles were also recovered –

Appellant’s conviction and sentence u/ss.302 and 201, Penal

Code, 1860, challenged:

Held: The pre-requisite of police custody, within the meaning of

s.27, ought to be read pragmatically and not formalistically or

euphemistically – “custody” u/s.27 does not mean formal custody

– It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance

by the police– Even if the accused was not formally arrested at

the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed,

for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police – Words

“person accused of an offence” and “in the custody of a police 

88 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

officer” in s.27 are separated by a comma and thus, have to be

read distinctively – The wide and pragmatic interpretation of the

term “police custody” is supported by the fact that if a narrow

or technical view is taken, it will be very easy for the police to

delay the time of filing the FIR and arrest, and thereby evade the

contours of ss.25 to 27 – A person giving word of mouth information

to police, which may be used as evidence against him, may be

deemed to have submitted himself to the “custody” of the police

officer – In the present case, the disclosure statement was made

by the appellant when he was detained in another case relating

to the murder of his Uncle– He was subsequently arrested in the

present case – Body parts of the deceased were recovered on the

pointing out of appellant in his disclosure statement – Deceased had

been missing for months and was untraceable – His whereabouts

were unknown– The perpetrator(s) were also unknown – It is only

consequent to the disclosure statement by the appellant that the

police came to know that the Deceased had been murdered – The

homicidal death of Deceased, the disclosure statement and the

consequent recoveries of the motorcycle and other belongings at

the behest of the appellant proved beyond doubt – These facts,

in the absence of any other material to doubt them, establish that

the appellant committed murder of Deceased – The presence

of motive, inter se family property disputes, reinforces the said

conclusion – Conviction of the appellant upheld. [Paras 25, 28,

29, 31, 41]

Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25-27 – s.27, an exception to ss.25,

26 – Doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events:

Held: s.27 is an exception to ss.25 and 26 – s.27 makes that part

of the statement which distinctly leads to discovery of a fact in

consequence of the information received from a person accused

of an offence, to the extent it distinctly relates to the fact thereby

discovered, admissible in evidence against the accused – The fact

which is discovered as a consequence of the information given is

admissible in evidence – Further, the fact discovered must lead

to recovery of a physical object and only that information which

distinctly relates to that discovery can be proved – s.27 is based

on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events- a fact is

actually discovered in consequence of the information given, which

results in recovery of a physical object – The facts discovered and

the recovery is an assurance that the information given by a person 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 89

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

accused of the offence can be relied – However, s.27 does not

lay down the principle that discovery of a fact is to be equated to

the object produced or found. [Paras 19, 22]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Conditions necessary for

bringing s.27 into operation, discussed – Facts proved by

the prosecution – Duty of the Court – Evidence produced in

terms of s.27 – Evidentiary value:

Held: The facts proved by the prosecution, particularly the

admissible portion of the statement of the accused, would give

rise to two alternative hypotheses, (i) that the accused had

himself deposited the physical items which were recovered; or

(ii) only the accused knew that the physical items were lying at

that place – The second hypothesis is wholly compatible with the

innocence of the accused, whereas the first would be a factor

to show involvement of the accused in the offence – The court

has to analyse which of the hypotheses should be accepted in a

particular case – s.27 is frequently used by the police, and the

courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility

of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse – However,

this does not mean that in every case invocation of s.27 must

be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded as perfunctory

and unworthy of credence – Evidentiary value to be attached on

evidence produced before the court in terms of s.27 cannot be

codified or put in a straightjacket formula – It depends upon the

facts and circumstances of the case – A holistic and inferential

appreciation of evidence is required to be adopted in a case of

circumstantial evidence. [Paras 23, 24]

Evidence Act, 1872– ss.24-27 – “accused person”, “a person

accused of any offence”:

Held: The bar u/s.25 applies equally whether or not the person

against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was

in custody at the time of making the confession – For the ban to

be effective the person need not have been accused of an offence

when he made the confession – The reason is that the expression

“accused person” in s.24 and the expression “a person accused

of any offence” in ss.26 and 27 have the same connotation, and

describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led

in a criminal proceeding – The adjectival clause “accused of any

offence” is, therefore, descriptive of the person against whom a 

90 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

confessional statement made by him is declared not provable,

and does not predicate a condition of that person at the time of

making the statement. [Para 26]

Criminal Law – Appellant was accused of the murder of his

Uncle and his son – Acquitted in the case relating to the murder

of Uncle – Judgment of acquittal – Evidentiary value, if any:

Held: Except for the fact that the appellant was taken into custody

during the course of investigation for the murder of his Uncle and

thereupon his disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37) was recorded,

there is no connection between the two offences – Murders were

committed on two different dates – Murder trial of his Uncle

was primarily based upon an entirely different set of evidence –

Conviction of the appellant is sustainable in view of the evidence

placed on record in the present case – The judgment of acquittal

would not qualify as relevant and of evidentiary value so as to

acquit the appellant in the present case. [Para 42]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Disclosure statement (Exhibit

P-37) made by the appellant, convicted – Acquittal of the coaccused – Application of s.27:

Held: Acquittal of the co-accused was for want of evidence against

them – At best, they were found in possession of the articles

connected with the crime on the basis of the disclosure statement

(Exhibit P-37) made by the appellant – s.27 of the Evidence Act

could not have been applied to the other co-accused as the provision

pertains to information that distinctly relates to the discovery of

a ‘fact’ that was previously unknown, as opposed to fact already

disclosed or known – Once information is given by an accused,

the same information cannot be used, even if voluntarily made

by a co-accused who is in custody – s.27 does apply to joint

disclosures, but this is not one such case – This was precisely the

reason given by the trial court to acquit the co-accused – Further,

even if Section 8 of the Evidence Act was to apply, it would not

have been possible to convict the co-accused – The trial court

rightly held other co-accused not guilty. [Para 43]

Evidence – Case based on circumstantial evidence – Five

golden principles to be satisfied as laid down in Sharad

Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88

– Conditions to be fulfilled before the false explanation or a

false defence can be used by the Court as an additional link

to lend an assurance to the court, stated – A distinction has 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 91

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

to be drawn between incomplete chain of circumstances and

a circumstance after a chain is complete and the defence or

explanation given by the accused is found to be false, in which

event the said falsehood is added to reinforce the conclusion

of the court. [Paras 37, 38]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 – s.313:

Held: Appellant in his statement u/s.313 denied all accusations

without furnishing any explanation regarding his knowledge of the

places from which the dead body was recovered – The failure of

the appellant to present evidence on his behalf or to offer any

cogent explanation regarding the recovery of the dead body by

virtue of his special knowledge must lead to a reasonable adverse

inference, by application of the principle u/s.106 of the Evidence Act

thus forming an additional link in the chain of circumstances – The

additional link further affirms the conclusion of guilt as indicated

by the prosecution evidence. [Para 40]

Words and Phrases – ‘distinctly’ in s.27, Evidence Act, 1872:

Held: The word ‘distinctly’ is used to limit and define the scope

of the information and means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’ or

‘unmistakably’ – Only that part of the information which is clear,

immediate and a proximate cause of discovery is admissible.

[Para 22]

List of Citations and Other References

State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1961) 1 SCR

14 – followed.

State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan

Guru [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79:(2005) 11 SCC 600;

Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra [1976] 1

SCR 715:(1976) 1 SCC 828; Aghnoo Nagesia v. State

of Bihar [1966] SCR 134:AIR 1966 SC 119; Dharam

Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2014] 8 SCR

650:(2014) 5 SCC 509; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.

State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88:(1984) 4 SCC

116 – relied on.

State of A.P. v. Gangula Satya Murthy [1996] 8

Suppl. SCR 808:(1997) 1 SCC 272; A.N.Vekatesh

and Anr. v. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714; 

92 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

State of Maharashtra v. Suresh [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR

215:(2000) 1 SCC 471; Harivadan Babubhai Patel v.

State of Gujarat [2013] 10 SCR 889:(2013) 7 SCC 45;

Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra [2014]

14 SCR 961:(2015) 1 SCC 253; State of Maharashtra

v. Damu S/o Gopinath Shinde and Ors. [2000] 3 SCR

880:(2000) 6 SCC 269; Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of

Assam [2013] 3 SCR 801:(2013) 7 SCC 417; Rajesh

& Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine

SC 1202; Khatri Hemraj Amulakh v. State of Gujarat

(1972) 3 SCC 671; Vikram Singh and Ors. v. State of

Punjab [2010] 2 SCR 22:(2010) 3 SCC 56; Sandeep

v. State of U.P. [2012] 5 SCR 952:(2012) 6 SCC 107;

Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC

71; Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR

570; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and

Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., [2004] 6 Suppl.

SCR 1054:(2005) 2 SCC 673; Union of India and

Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs., [1989] 3 SCR

316:(1989) 2 SCC 754; Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd.

v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine

SC 1247 – referred to. 

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 87 : 2024 INSC 13

Case Details

Perumal Raja @ Perumal

v.

State, Rep. by Inspector of Police

(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 863 of 2019)

03 January 2024

[Sanjiv Khanna* and S. V. N. Bhatti, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Accused not formally arrested at the time of giving information if

can be deemed to be in the ‘custody’ of the police, admissibility

of evidence in terms of s.27, Evidence Act, 1872. Conviction and

sentence of the appellant u/ss.302 and 201, Penal Code, 1860,

if justified.

Headnotes

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – “in the custody of a police officer”

– Interpretation – Case based on circumstantial evidence

– Appellant was taken into custody during the course of

investigation for the murder of his Uncle – However, he made a

disclosure statement – Appellant along with other co-accused

had murdered his uncle’s son-deceased (appellant’s cousin)

who was missing for months and his body was first dumped

in the sump tank and later retrieved, cut into two parts,

put in sack bags, and thrown in the river/canal – Appellant

subsequently arrested in the present case – On the basis of

the disclosure statement, parts of the dead body and sack

bags were recovered – Other articles were also recovered –

Appellant’s conviction and sentence u/ss.302 and 201, Penal

Code, 1860, challenged:

Held: The pre-requisite of police custody, within the meaning of

s.27, ought to be read pragmatically and not formalistically or

euphemistically – “custody” u/s.27 does not mean formal custody

– It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance

by the police– Even if the accused was not formally arrested at

the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed,

for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police – Words

“person accused of an offence” and “in the custody of a police 

88 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

officer” in s.27 are separated by a comma and thus, have to be

read distinctively – The wide and pragmatic interpretation of the

term “police custody” is supported by the fact that if a narrow

or technical view is taken, it will be very easy for the police to

delay the time of filing the FIR and arrest, and thereby evade the

contours of ss.25 to 27 – A person giving word of mouth information

to police, which may be used as evidence against him, may be

deemed to have submitted himself to the “custody” of the police

officer – In the present case, the disclosure statement was made

by the appellant when he was detained in another case relating

to the murder of his Uncle– He was subsequently arrested in the

present case – Body parts of the deceased were recovered on the

pointing out of appellant in his disclosure statement – Deceased had

been missing for months and was untraceable – His whereabouts

were unknown– The perpetrator(s) were also unknown – It is only

consequent to the disclosure statement by the appellant that the

police came to know that the Deceased had been murdered – The

homicidal death of Deceased, the disclosure statement and the

consequent recoveries of the motorcycle and other belongings at

the behest of the appellant proved beyond doubt – These facts,

in the absence of any other material to doubt them, establish that

the appellant committed murder of Deceased – The presence

of motive, inter se family property disputes, reinforces the said

conclusion – Conviction of the appellant upheld. [Paras 25, 28,

29, 31, 41]

Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25-27 – s.27, an exception to ss.25,

26 – Doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events:

Held: s.27 is an exception to ss.25 and 26 – s.27 makes that part

of the statement which distinctly leads to discovery of a fact in

consequence of the information received from a person accused

of an offence, to the extent it distinctly relates to the fact thereby

discovered, admissible in evidence against the accused – The fact

which is discovered as a consequence of the information given is

admissible in evidence – Further, the fact discovered must lead

to recovery of a physical object and only that information which

distinctly relates to that discovery can be proved – s.27 is based

on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events- a fact is

actually discovered in consequence of the information given, which

results in recovery of a physical object – The facts discovered and

the recovery is an assurance that the information given by a person 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 89

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

accused of the offence can be relied – However, s.27 does not

lay down the principle that discovery of a fact is to be equated to

the object produced or found. [Paras 19, 22]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Conditions necessary for

bringing s.27 into operation, discussed – Facts proved by

the prosecution – Duty of the Court – Evidence produced in

terms of s.27 – Evidentiary value:

Held: The facts proved by the prosecution, particularly the

admissible portion of the statement of the accused, would give

rise to two alternative hypotheses, (i) that the accused had

himself deposited the physical items which were recovered; or

(ii) only the accused knew that the physical items were lying at

that place – The second hypothesis is wholly compatible with the

innocence of the accused, whereas the first would be a factor

to show involvement of the accused in the offence – The court

has to analyse which of the hypotheses should be accepted in a

particular case – s.27 is frequently used by the police, and the

courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility

of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse – However,

this does not mean that in every case invocation of s.27 must

be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded as perfunctory

and unworthy of credence – Evidentiary value to be attached on

evidence produced before the court in terms of s.27 cannot be

codified or put in a straightjacket formula – It depends upon the

facts and circumstances of the case – A holistic and inferential

appreciation of evidence is required to be adopted in a case of

circumstantial evidence. [Paras 23, 24]

Evidence Act, 1872– ss.24-27 – “accused person”, “a person

accused of any offence”:

Held: The bar u/s.25 applies equally whether or not the person

against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was

in custody at the time of making the confession – For the ban to

be effective the person need not have been accused of an offence

when he made the confession – The reason is that the expression

“accused person” in s.24 and the expression “a person accused

of any offence” in ss.26 and 27 have the same connotation, and

describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led

in a criminal proceeding – The adjectival clause “accused of any

offence” is, therefore, descriptive of the person against whom a 

90 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

confessional statement made by him is declared not provable,

and does not predicate a condition of that person at the time of

making the statement. [Para 26]

Criminal Law – Appellant was accused of the murder of his

Uncle and his son – Acquitted in the case relating to the murder

of Uncle – Judgment of acquittal – Evidentiary value, if any:

Held: Except for the fact that the appellant was taken into custody

during the course of investigation for the murder of his Uncle and

thereupon his disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37) was recorded,

there is no connection between the two offences – Murders were

committed on two different dates – Murder trial of his Uncle

was primarily based upon an entirely different set of evidence –

Conviction of the appellant is sustainable in view of the evidence

placed on record in the present case – The judgment of acquittal

would not qualify as relevant and of evidentiary value so as to

acquit the appellant in the present case. [Para 42]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Disclosure statement (Exhibit

P-37) made by the appellant, convicted – Acquittal of the coaccused – Application of s.27:

Held: Acquittal of the co-accused was for want of evidence against

them – At best, they were found in possession of the articles

connected with the crime on the basis of the disclosure statement

(Exhibit P-37) made by the appellant – s.27 of the Evidence Act

could not have been applied to the other co-accused as the provision

pertains to information that distinctly relates to the discovery of

a ‘fact’ that was previously unknown, as opposed to fact already

disclosed or known – Once information is given by an accused,

the same information cannot be used, even if voluntarily made

by a co-accused who is in custody – s.27 does apply to joint

disclosures, but this is not one such case – This was precisely the

reason given by the trial court to acquit the co-accused – Further,

even if Section 8 of the Evidence Act was to apply, it would not

have been possible to convict the co-accused – The trial court

rightly held other co-accused not guilty. [Para 43]

Evidence – Case based on circumstantial evidence – Five

golden principles to be satisfied as laid down in Sharad

Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88

– Conditions to be fulfilled before the false explanation or a

false defence can be used by the Court as an additional link

to lend an assurance to the court, stated – A distinction has 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 91

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

to be drawn between incomplete chain of circumstances and

a circumstance after a chain is complete and the defence or

explanation given by the accused is found to be false, in which

event the said falsehood is added to reinforce the conclusion

of the court. [Paras 37, 38]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.106 – Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 – s.313:

Held: Appellant in his statement u/s.313 denied all accusations

without furnishing any explanation regarding his knowledge of the

places from which the dead body was recovered – The failure of

the appellant to present evidence on his behalf or to offer any

cogent explanation regarding the recovery of the dead body by

virtue of his special knowledge must lead to a reasonable adverse

inference, by application of the principle u/s.106 of the Evidence Act

thus forming an additional link in the chain of circumstances – The

additional link further affirms the conclusion of guilt as indicated

by the prosecution evidence. [Para 40]

Words and Phrases – ‘distinctly’ in s.27, Evidence Act, 1872:

Held: The word ‘distinctly’ is used to limit and define the scope

of the information and means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’ or

‘unmistakably’ – Only that part of the information which is clear,

immediate and a proximate cause of discovery is admissible.

[Para 22]

List of Citations and Other References

State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1961) 1 SCR

14 – followed.

State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan

Guru [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79:(2005) 11 SCC 600;

Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra [1976] 1

SCR 715:(1976) 1 SCC 828; Aghnoo Nagesia v. State

of Bihar [1966] SCR 134:AIR 1966 SC 119; Dharam

Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2014] 8 SCR

650:(2014) 5 SCC 509; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.

State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88:(1984) 4 SCC

116 – relied on.

State of A.P. v. Gangula Satya Murthy [1996] 8

Suppl. SCR 808:(1997) 1 SCC 272; A.N.Vekatesh

and Anr. v. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714; 

92 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

State of Maharashtra v. Suresh [1999] 5 Suppl. SCR

215:(2000) 1 SCC 471; Harivadan Babubhai Patel v.

State of Gujarat [2013] 10 SCR 889:(2013) 7 SCC 45;

Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra [2014]

14 SCR 961:(2015) 1 SCC 253; State of Maharashtra

v. Damu S/o Gopinath Shinde and Ors. [2000] 3 SCR

880:(2000) 6 SCC 269; Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of

Assam [2013] 3 SCR 801:(2013) 7 SCC 417; Rajesh

& Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine

SC 1202; Khatri Hemraj Amulakh v. State of Gujarat

(1972) 3 SCC 671; Vikram Singh and Ors. v. State of

Punjab [2010] 2 SCR 22:(2010) 3 SCC 56; Sandeep

v. State of U.P. [2012] 5 SCR 952:(2012) 6 SCC 107;

Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC

71; Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR

570; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and

Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., [2004] 6 Suppl.

SCR 1054:(2005) 2 SCC 673; Union of India and

Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs., [1989] 3 SCR

316:(1989) 2 SCC 754; Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd.

v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine

SC 1247 – referred to.

List of Acts

Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973.

List of Keywords

Circumstantial evidence; Disclosure statement; Police custody;

Formal custody; Doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events;

Special knowledge; Adverse inference; Additional link in chain of

circumstances.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition

(Criminal) No.863 of 2019.

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.08.2016 of the High Court

of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No.280 of 2016.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 93

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

Appearances:

Col R. Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., D. Kumanan, Raghav Gupta, Y.

William Vinoth Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.

Aravindh S., Abbas, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjiv Khanna, J.

Leave granted.

2. The impugned judgment1

 by the High Court of Judicature at Madras

affirms the conviction of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal for

murder of Rajini @ Rajinikanth under Section 302 of the Indian Penal

Code, 18602

 and Section 201 of the IPC, by the Principal Sessions

Judge, Puducherry in SC No. 22 of 20143, in the charge sheet

arising from the First Information Report4

 No. 80 of 2008 registered

on 24.04.2008 in Police Station5

 Odiansalai, District – Puducherry.

3. The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal stands sentenced to

imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under

Section 302 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for three years

and fine of Rs.3,000/- for the offence under Section 201 of the IPC.

4. The other co-accused, namely, Saravanan @ Krishnan, Mohan

@ Mohankumar, and Ravi @ Ravichandran were acquitted by the

trial court, which acquittal has become final. One ‘N’ was tried as a

juvenile and acquitted. On 15.02.2013, the case of another co-accused

– Chella @ Mugundhan was split up since he was absconding.

Subsequently, vide judgment dated 04.06.2019, which has been

placed on record as additional evidence, Chella @ Mukundhan has

been acquitted.

5. The prosecution case in brief is as follows:

1 Dated 31.08.2016 passed in Criminal Appeal No.280/2016.

2 For short, “IPC”.

3 Dated 07.04.2016.

4 For short, “FIR”.

5 For short, “PS”.

94 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(i) On 20.04.2008, Rajaram, who was settled in France, returned

to Puducherry as his son Rajini @ Rajinikanth, who was living

in India, had gone missing.

(ii) On 20.04.2008, Rajaram had approached PS Odiansalai,

Puducherry, and made an oral complaint stating that when he

had opened his house No. 13, Chinna Vaikkal Street, Puducherry,

he had found articles to be scattered all over the place. His

motorcycle was missing. He had suspected that his son – Rajini

@ Rajinikanth and his sister’s husband Krishnamurthy could

have taken the bike. He requested the Police to make inquiries.

However, in spite of being asked, he did not make any written

complaint. He stated that he was exhausted and would come

back to lodge written complaint afterwards.

(iii) Next day on 21.04.2008, Rajaram was murdered. FIR No. 204 of

2008 was registered at PS Grand Bazaar, District – Puducherry

under Sections 147, 148, 341 and 302 of the IPC read with

Section 149 of the IPC.

(iv) On 24.04.2008, Arumugam, father of Rajaram, had made a

written complaint at Odiansalai PS, Puducherry that his grandson

Rajini @ Rajinikanth was missing. The complaint was registered

as Diary No. 80 of 2008 for a ‘missing man’ and was taken up

for investigation.

(v) The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, son of Krishnamurthy

(husband of the sister of Rajaram), was detained and taken

into custody during the course of investigation in FIR No. 204

of 2008 for murder of Rajaram.

(vi) On 25.04.2008, the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal made

a disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37).6

(vii) The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, along with other

co-accused, had committed murder of Rajini @ Rajinikanth

on 23.11.2007 at Rajaram’s house at Chinna Vaikkal Street,

Puducherry. His dead body was thrown in the sump tank located

in the same house.

6 We shall be subsequently referring to the admissible portions of the disclosure statement under

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and also to a limited extent in terms of Section 8 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 95

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

(viii) The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal had also removed

various belongings from the same house, including iron box,

home theatre, CD player, documents of the house, motorcycle,

RC book, key, Rajini @ Rajinikanth’s passport, Rajini @

Rajinikanth’s passport size photograph, birth registration of the

grandmother, ration card, etc.

(ix) Later on, the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, and other

co-accused, decided to remove the dead body of Rajini @

Rajinikanth from the sump tank as they had learnt that Rajaram

was returning to India as his son Rajini @ Rajinikanth was

missing.

(x) Accordingly, the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal had

bought a knife and sack bags. They opened the sump tank

and took out Rajini @ Rajinikanth’s body, which was in a

decomposed state. They had cut Rajini @ Rajinikanth’s body

into two pieces and put it in two sack bags. The knife and rope

were put in another sack bag. The three sack bags were taken

by them from Chinna Vaikkal Street, and after passing through

Gandhi Street they threw the sack bags in the canal/river from

the Uppanaru Bridge near the railway crossing.

(xi) On the basis of the disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37), the sack

bags with the decomposed dead body of Rajini @ Rajinikanth

were recovered on 26.04.2008 from the Uppanaru canal/river.

Knife was also recovered.

(xii) The body parts which were in a decomposed state were sent

for post mortem, which was conducted by Dr. S. Diwakar (PW24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,

Government General Hospital, Puducherry on 26.04.2008.

(xiii) On 30.04.2008, eight articles were recovered from the water

sump tank at the house of the deceased, namely, gloves, lower

jaw, rib, cervical vertebrae, tarsal and metatarsal, small and big

size bone pieces, and knee cap.

(xiv) The skull recovered from the canal/river and the lower part of the

jaw recovered from the sump tank were sent for superimposition

test to ascertain whether they belong to the deceased Rajini

@ Rajinikanth. C. Pushparani, Scientific Assistant Grade II, 

96 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Anthropology Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai,

who had deposed as PW-29, proves the superimposition test

report dated 20.01.2009 (Exhibit P-25), which confirms that the

skull and mandible were of the deceased – Rajini @ Rajinikanth.

(xv) On the basis of the disclosure statement, various articles,

including the motorcycle, ignition key, original RC book were

recovered from the co-accused Mohan Kumar @ Mohan and

a juvenile.

(xvi) The motive for the crime was inter se family property disputes

and the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal’s desire to acquire

and become owner of the property No. 13, Chinna Vaikkal

Street, Puducherry.

6. Several public witnesses turned hostile and did not support the

prosecution case. This includes Arumugam (PW-20), the grandfather

of the deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth, who had filed the ‘missing

man’ complaint for Rajini @ Rajinikanth, vide Diary No. 80 of 2008.

However, Arumugam (PW-20) did accept that his son, Rajaram,

who was living abroad had come home when he was murdered

on 21.04.2008. Arumugam (PW-20) also accepts that his grandson

Rajini @ Rajinikanth had not attended crematorial rites of his father

Rajaram and was missing.

7. Narayanasamy (PW-12), then head constable, PS Odiansalai, has

testified that he had received the oral complaint of Rajaram on

20.04.2008, in connection with the scattered articles in his house,

and the missing motorcycle. Rajaram had assumed that his son

Rajini @ Rajinikanth could have taken it away.

8. Kaniyakumaran (PW-10), involved in real estate business, did not

specifically implicate the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, but

has accepted that Punitha (PW-3), a relative of the deceased Rajini

@ Rajinikanth, had tried to sell the property in Kurumbapet. Reliance

can be also placed on the documentary evidence to establish that

the property in question in the name of Rajaram was dealt with by

Porkilai (PW-4), mother of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal.

In support, the following documents are relied:

(i) sale deed in favour of Rajaram executed on 26.06.1990 (Exhibit

P-66);

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 97

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

(ii) sale agreement between Porkilai (PW-4) and accused no.5 -

Ravi @ Ravichandran executed on May, 2007 (Exhibit P-66);

(iii) release deed in favour of Rajaram by Porkilai (PW-4), executed

on 27.06.1990 (Exhibit P-68);

(iv) sale agreement in favour of Thangaveni Ammal, mother of

Rajaram, executed on 19.08.1981 (Exhibit P-69).

9. Chinta Kodanda Rao (PW-30), Inspector of Police, PS Grand Bazaar,

the investigating officer in FIR No. 204 of 2008 relating to the murder

of Rajaram by unknown persons, has testified on the disclosure

statement made by the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal (Exhibit

P-37). The relevant portion of the disclosure statement reads:

“…myself and xxx pull Rajni’s xxx, put him in the sump

tank near the bathroom and closed it…

…took xxx, Iron box, Home theatre, xxx, xxx, rental

documents of my uncle’s house at Chittankudi, Hero Honda

CD Dawn motorcycle, RC book and key, Rajini’s passport

book, Rajini’s passport size photo, birth registration of

grandmother, family ration card of uncle and the copy of

documents written in English, bunch of keys of the house

and my uncle Ranjith’s notebook, xxx xxx xxx, took Hero

Honda CD Dawn motorbike of my uncle Rajaram…..one

bag was put by Mohan xxx xxx xxx the house of Mohan

nearby to the Tollgate of Ariyankuppam, kept 2 bags in

Mohan’s house…

…I, immediately, went to N (name withheld) house and

gave him document, ration card, bunch of keys, Rajini’s

passport, by keeping them in Ranjith notebook and stated

to keep them safe…

…I took the already kept 3 sack bags, rope, curry knife,

showed the sump tank to xxx. When he opened the cover

of the sump tank, he bend down and lifted the hand of the

body of Rajini, who was already killed and put in the sump

by us, since Rajini’s body was in decomposed stage, his

hand had alone come. I put the hand in sack bag. Then we

tied rope in chest, myself and xxx pulled the body outside

from sump. Then, head has come alone. I put head in the 

98 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

sack bag. Then xxx took knife from me and cut Rajini’s

body into two pieces and put them in two sack bags, then

put knife and xxx in another sack bag and kept the sack

bags near kitchen, then xxx closed the sump…

…via Chinnavaikal Street and Gandhi Street, turned on

the left side of the street, in front of small clock tower,

via Varnarapettai Billu Shop, on the centre of the bridge

of Railway Crossing on the left side, threw the two bags,

containing the decomposed body of Rajini, on the right

side threw the sack bag, containing knife and xxx…

…Also, I gave statement that if I was taken, I would identify

the Chinnavaikal street, which is the place of occurrence,

my maternal uncle’s house which is in the same street..

the place where I had left the motor cycle of my (nc) and

the place where I had put the body of Rajini... ”

10. On the aspect of the recovery of two nylon sack bags with body

parts, we have affirmative depositions of Chinta Kodanda Rao (PW30), Inspector of Police, PS Grand Bazaar, public witness Devadass

(PW-21) and Satyamurthy (PW-11). The recovery was photographed

by Selvaganapathy (PW-26), police photographer vide photographs

marked Exhibit P-19. The recovery was duly recorded in the rough

sketch plan (Exhibit P-30) and the mahazar (Exhibit P-31).

11. On 29.04.2008, accused no. 4 - Mohan Kumar @ Mohan was

arrested. On the same day, stolen items including, the motorcycle

and ignition key of motorcycle, original registration book, insurance

certificate of the motorcycle, iron box, home theatre and speaker

box belonging to the deceased were recovered, as recorded vide

seizure mahazar (Exhibits P-44, P-45, P-46 and P-47).

12. On 30.04.2008, eight articles were recovered from the water sump

tank at the house of the deceased, namely, gloves, lower jaw, rib,

cervical vertebrae, tarsal and metatarsal, small and big size bone

pieces, and knee cap. T. Bairavasamy (PW-32), Circle Inspector, PS

Odiansalai has deposed about the recovery and proved the Mahazar

(Exhibit P-48). The recovery was photographed by Subburayan (PW25), police photographer vide photographs marked Exhibit P-18 and

duly witnessed by public witness Devadass (PW-21).

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 99

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

13. To determine the identity of the deceased person, some of the

body parts were sent for a superimposition test to C. Pushparani

(PW-29), who was working as a Scientific Assistant Grade II,

Anthropology Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai.

She has deposed about having received the case properties,

consisting of a skull with mandible on 10.09.2008. The mandible

was attached with the skull by means of a spring. For the purpose

of identification, she had two identical colour photographs of a

male individual sent to her in a sealed envelope as Item Nos.

2 and 3. The photographs were enlarged to the size of a selfportrait. Using the computer aided video superimposition technique,

she had examined the skull and mandible viz. the photographs.

For the purposes of the examination, the flesh thickness and

the anthroposcopic landmarks in the face were also taken into

consideration. C. Pushparani (PW-29), Scientific Assistant Grade

II, Anthropology Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai

opined that the landmarks on the face matched well with those of

the skull. She submitted her forensic report dated 20.01.2009 with

analysis on the anthroposcopy and superimposition test (Exhibit

P-25). The skull, as per C. Pushparani (PW-29), Scientific Assistant

Grade II, Anthropology Division, Forensic Sciences Department,

Chennai belonged to the male individual seen in the photograph

at serial no.4. With the report, Exhibit P-25, C. Pushparani (PW29), Scientific Assistant Grade II, Anthropology Division, Forensic

Sciences Department, Chennai had enclosed the computer laser

printouts taken by her at the time of examination to establish and

prove that the photographs of deceased – Rajini @ Rajinikanth

match with the mandible and the skull (Exhibits P-26 to P-28).

We have carefully examined the computer laser print outs, and

are of the opinion that the findings of the High Court affirming the

judgment of the trial court are justified.

14. On behalf of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal, it is submitted

that as per Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department

of Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital, Puducherry no

definite cause of death could be ascertained due to decomposition

of the body. However, it is pertinent to note that Dr. S. Diwakar

(PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,

Government General Hospital, Puducherry has also deposed that

the deceased could be between 25-30 years of age and probable 

100 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

death could have occurred six months prior to the autopsy. It must

be further noted that the deceased – Rajini @ Rajinikanth was about

30 years of age and he had been missing for about six months prior

to the date on which the autopsy was conducted.

15. It has been submitted with considerable emphasis that Dr. S. Diwakar

(PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,

Government General Hospital, Puducherry has accepted that the

lower jaw (mandible) was not found. Whereas, deposition of C.

Pushparani (PW-29), Scientific Assistant Grade II, Anthropology

Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai and the photo

superimposition done by her specifically refer to the lower jaw. We

have examined this contention. Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior

Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine, Government

General Hospital, Puducherry, in his examination-in-chief, has testified

that the police had sent the skull, sternum and right femur which

were preserved by him from the autopsy material. Dr. S. Diwakar

(PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,

Government General Hospital, Puducherry has also stated that the

lower jaw and the left lower first premolar tooth were preserved by

him from the skeleton remains for onward transmission to Central

Forensic Science Laboratory, Hyderabad, for necessary photo

superimposition and DNA test through the Judicial Magistrate-II,

Puducherry. The mahazar dated 21.5.2008 (Exhibit P-15) was

prepared after collecting the aforesaid body parts.

16. We do not find that any confusion or doubt arises from the deposition

of Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of

Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital, Puducherry.

He had conducted the post mortem examination (Exhibit P-16) on

26.04.2008, wherein he had examined the remains/body parts of the

deceased which were found in the two nylon sack bags on the same

day. Other body parts including, the lower part of the skull i.e. the

mandible and the tooth were found subsequently in the sump tank

on 30.04.2008. Therefore, Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical

Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine, Government General

Hospital, Puducherry, in his deposition, while referring to Exhibit

P-17 dated 19.05.2008, has referred to the lower jaw (mandible)

and the left lower first premolar tooth, to send the said body parts

to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory at Hyderabad.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 101

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

17. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant – Perumal Raja

@ Perumal that Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer,

Department of Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital,

Puducherry, in his cross-examination, has accepted that body parts

were sent to him in two nylon sack bags only once, and nothing was

sent thereafter. The post mortem was completed on 26.04.2008, vide

the post mortem report (Exhibit P-16) of the same date.

18. Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of

Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital, Puducherry had

issued bone-case certificate (Exhibit P-17) on 19.05.2008. Dr. S.

Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic

Medicine, Government General Hospital, Puducherry has clarified that

while he did not mention the lower jaw in the post mortem 26.04.2008

(Exhibit P-16), he had mentioned that the lower jaw was preserved

in the bone-case certificate (Exhibit P-17) dated 19.05.2008.7

Further, the aforesaid deposition of Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior

Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine, Government

General Hospital, Puducherry has to be read with the testimony

of T. Bairavasamy (PW-32), Circle Inspector, PS Odiansalai, who

had deposed that he had taken the letter written by Dr. S. Diwakar

(PW-24), Senior Medical Officer, Department of Forensic Medicine,

Government General Hospital, Puducherry and had obtained the

signatures of Judicial Magistrate-II, Puducherry for conducting DNA

test. Thereafter, the material objects were sent through Form 95

No. 02876 (Exhibit P-60) to the Judicial Magistrate-II, Puducherry.

The skull and the mandible were sent for photo superimposition test

after addressing a letter to Judicial Magistrate-II, Puducherry which

was signed by Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-24), Senior Medical Officer,

Department of Forensic Medicine, Government General Hospital,

Puducherry (Exhibit P-61).

19. The prosecution’s case, in the absence of eye witnesses, is based

upon circumstantial evidence. As per Section 25 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 18728, a confession made to a police officer is

prohibited and cannot be admitted in evidence. Section 26 of the

Evidence Act provides that no confession made by any person whilst

7 The recovery of lower jaw from the sump took place on 30.04.2008. Thus, it could not have been mentioned in the post mortem report dated 26.04.2008.

8 For short ‘the Evidence Act’.

102 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

he is in the custody of a police officer shall be proved against such

person, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.

Section 279

 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Sections 25

and 26 of the Evidence Act. It makes that part of the statement

which distinctly leads to discovery of a fact in consequence of the

information received from a person accused of an offence, to the

extent it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered, admissible

in evidence against the accused. The fact which is discovered as

a consequence of the information given is admissible in evidence.

Further, the fact discovered must lead to recovery of a physical object

and only that information which distinctly relates to that discovery can

be proved. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is based on the doctrine

of confirmation by subsequent events – a fact is actually discovered

in consequence of the information given, which results in recovery

of a physical object. The facts discovered and the recovery is an

assurance that the information given by a person accused of the

offence can be relied.

20. In Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor10, the Privy Council held that

the fact discovered embraces the place from which the physical object

is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the

information given, must distinctly relate to this fact.

21. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru11, this

Court affirmed that the fact discovered within the meaning of Section

27 of the Evidence Act must be some concrete fact to which the

information directly relates. Further, the fact discovered should refer

to a material/physical object and not to a pure mental fact relating

to a physical object disassociated from the recovery of the physical

object.

22. However, we must clarify that Section 27 of the Evidence Act, as held

in these judgments, does not lay down the principle that discovery

of a fact is to be equated to the object produced or found. The

discovery of the fact resulting in recovery of a physical object exhibits

9 27. How much of information received from accused may be proved. – Provided that, when any

fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or

not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.

10 AIR 1947 PC 67.

11 (2005) 11 SCC 600.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 103

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

knowledge or mental awareness of the person accused of the offence

as to the existence of the physical object at the particular place.

Accordingly, discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place

from which it was produced and the knowledge of the accused as to

its existence. To this extent, therefore, factum of discovery combines

both the physical object as well as the mental consciousness of the

informant accused in relation thereto. In Mohmed Inayatullah v.

State of Maharashtra12, elucidating on Section 27 of the Evidence

Act, it has been held that the first condition imposed and necessary

for bringing the section into operation is the discovery of a fact which

should be a relevant fact in consequence of information received from

a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of

such a fact must be deposed to. A fact already known to the police

will fall foul and not meet this condition. The third is that at the time

of receipt of the information, the accused must be in police custody.

Lastly, it is only so much of information which relates distinctly to

the fact thereby discovered resulting in recovery of a physical object

which is admissible. Rest of the information is to be excluded. The

word ‘distinctly’ is used to limit and define the scope of the information

and means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’ or ‘unmistakably’. Only that

part of the information which is clear, immediate and a proximate

cause of discovery is admissible.

23. The facts proved by the prosecution, particularly the admissible

portion of the statement of the accused, would give rise to two

alternative hypotheses, namely, (i) that the accused had himself

deposited the physical items which were recovered; or (ii) only the

accused knew that the physical items were lying at that place. The

second hypothesis is wholly compatible with the innocence of the

accused, whereas the first would be a factor to show involvement

of the accused in the offence. The court has to analyse which of the

hypotheses should be accepted in a particular case.

24. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is frequently used by the police, and

the courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility

of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse. However, this

does not mean that in every case invocation of Section 27 of the

Evidence Act must be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded

as perfunctory and unworthy of credence.

12 (1976) 1 SCC 828.

104 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

25. The pre-requisite of police custody, within the meaning of Section

27 of the Evidence Act, ought to be read pragmatically and not

formalistically or euphemistically. In the present case, the disclosure

statement (Exhibit P-37) was made by the appellant – Perumal Raja

@ Perumal on 25.04.2008, when he was detained in another case,

namely, FIR No. 204/2008, registered at PS Grand Bazar, Puducherry,

relating to the murder of Rajaram. He was subsequently arrested

in this case, that is FIR.No.80/2008, which was registered at PS

Odiansalai, Puducherry. The expression “custody” under Section 27 of

the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody. It includes any kind

of restriction, restraint or even surveillance by the police. Even if the

accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information,

the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the

custody of the police.

26. Reference is made to a recent decision of this Court in Rajesh

& Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh13, which held that formal

accusation and formal police custody are essential pre-requisites

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In our opinion, we need not

dilate on the legal proposition as we are bound by the law and ratio

as laid down by the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court

in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya14. The law laid down by

this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is

binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength.15

This Court in Deoman Upadhyay (supra) observed that the bar

under Section 25 of the Evidence Act applies equally whether or not

the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal

trial was in custody at the time of making the confession. Further,

for the ban to be effective the person need not have been accused

of an offence when he made the confession. The reason is that

the expression “accused person” in Section 24 and the expression

“a person accused of any offence” in Sections 26 and 27 have the

same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence

13 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1202.

14 (1961) 1 SCR 14.

15 See Judgments of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community

and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2005) 2 SCC 673 and Union of India and Anr. v. Raghubir Singh

(Dead) By Lrs., (1989) 2 SCC 754. Raghubir Singh (supra) and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community (supra) have been subsequently followed and applied by this Court in Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v.

Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1247.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 105

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. The adjectival clause

“accused of any offence” is, therefore, descriptive of the person

against whom a confessional statement made by him is declared

not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person at

the time of making the statement.

27. Elaborating on this aspect, a three judge Bench of this Court in

Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar16 has held that if the FIR is given

by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional

statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by Section 25 of the

Evidence Act. The confession includes not only the admission of the

offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the

offence, except to the extent that the ban is lifted by Section 27 of the

Evidence Act. While dealing with the admission of part of confession

report dealing with motive, subsequent conduct and opportunity, this

Court rejected the severability test adopted by some High Courts. The

statement can, however, be relied upon and admitted to identify the

accused as the maker, and the portion within the purview of Section

27 of the Evidence Act is admissible. Aghnoo Nagesia (supra) has

been applied and followed by this Court in Khatri Hemraj Amulakh

v. State of Gujarat.

17

28. The words “person accused of an offence” and the words “in the

custody of a police officer” in Section 27 of the Evidence Act are

separated by a comma. Thus, they have to be read distinctively.

The wide and pragmatic interpretation of the term “police custody”

is supported by the fact that if a narrow or technical view is taken, it

will be very easy for the police to delay the time of filing the FIR and

arrest, and thereby evade the contours of Sections 25 to 27 of the

Evidence Act. Thus, in our considered view the correct interpretation

would be that as soon as an accused or suspected person comes

into the hands of a police officer, he is no longer at liberty and is

under a check, and is, therefore, in “custody” within the meaning of

Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act. It is for this reason that the

expression “custody” has been held, as earlier observed, to include

surveillance, restriction or restraint by the police.

16 AIR 1966 SC 119.

17 (1972) 3 SCC 671.

106 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

29. This Court in Deoman Upadhyay (supra), while rejecting the

argument that the distinction between persons in custody and persons

not in custody violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India, observed

that the distinction is a mere theoretical possibility. Sections 25 and

26 were enacted not because the law presumed the statements to

be untrue, but having regard to the tainted nature of the source of

the evidence, prohibited them from being received in evidence. A

person giving word of mouth information to police, which may be

used as evidence against him, may be deemed to have submitted

himself to the “custody” of the police officer. Reference can also be

made to decision of this Court in Vikram Singh and Ors. v. State

of Punjab18, which discusses and applies Deoman Upadhyay

(supra), to hold that formal arrest is not a necessity for operation of

Section 27 of the Evidence Act. This Court in Dharam Deo Yadav

v. State of Uttar Pradesh19, has held that the expression “custody”

in Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody,

but includes any kind of surveillance, restriction or restraint by the

police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of

giving information, the accused is, for all practical purposes, in the

custody of the police and the bar vide Sections 25 and 26 of the

Evidence Act, and accordingly exception under Section 27 of the

Evidence Act, apply. Reliance was placed on the decisions in State

of A.P. v. Gangula Satya Murthy20 and A.N.Vekatesh and Anr. v.

State of Karnataka21.

30. However, evidentiary value to be attached on evidence produced

before the court in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be

codified or put in a straightjacket formula. It depends upon the facts

and circumstances of the case. A holistic and inferential appreciation

of evidence is required to be adopted in a case of circumstantial

evidence.

31. When we turn to the facts of the present case, the body parts of

the deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth were recovered on the pointing

out of appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal in his disclosure

18 (2010) 3 SCC 56.

19 (2014) 5 SCC 509.

20 (1997) 1 SCC 272.

21 (2005) 7 SCC 714.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 107

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

statement. Rajini @ Rajinikanth had been missing for months and

was untraceable. In the present case, as discussed above, the

homicidal death of Rajini @ Rajinikanth, the disclosure statement

marked Exhibit P-37, and the consequent recovery as elucidated

above have been proved beyond doubt and debate.

32. In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh22, this Court in the facts therein

held that recovery of a dead body, which was from the place pointed

out by the accused, was a formidable incriminating circumstance.

This would, the Court held, reveal that the dead body was concealed

by the accused unless there is material and evidence to show that

somebody else had concealed it and this fact came to the knowledge

of the accused either because he had seen that person concealing

the dead body or was told by someone else that the dead body was

concealed at the said location. Here, if the accused declines and

does not tell the criminal court that his knowledge of the concealment

was on the basis of the possibilities that absolve him, the court can

presume that the dead body (or physical object, as the case may be)

was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the person

who can offer the explanation as to how he came to know of such

concealment is the accused. If the accused chooses to refrain from

telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption

is that the concealment was by the accused himself.

33. The aforesaid view has been followed subsequently and reiterated in

Harivadan Babubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat23, Vasanta Sampat

Dupare v. State of Maharashtra24, State of Maharashtra v. Damu

S/o Gopinath Shinde and Ors.25, and Rumi Bora Dutta v. State

of Assam26.

34. Our reasoning, which places reliance on Section 106 of the Evidence

Act, does not in any way dilute the burden of proof which is on the

prosecution. Section 106 comes into play when the prosecution is

able to establish the facts by way of circumstantial evidence. On

this aspect we shall delve upon subsequently.

22 (2000) 1 SCC 471.

23 (2013) 7 SCC 45.

24 (2015) 1 SCC 253.

25 (2000) 6 SCC 269.

26 (2013) 7 SCC 417.

108 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

35. Apart from Section 27 of the Evidence Act, Section 8 of the said

Act would be also attracted insofar as the prosecution witnesses,

namely, the investigating officers, Chinta Kodanda Rao (PW-30),

Inspector of Police, PS Grand Bazaar and T. Bairavasamy (PW32), Circle Inspector, PS Odiansalai, have referred to the conduct

of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal with regard to any fact

in issue or a relevant fact when the appellant – Perumal Raja @

Perumal was confronted and questioned.27 Reference in this regard

may also be made to the judgment of this Court in Sandeep v. State

of U.P.28 which held that:

“52. (…) It is quite common that based on admissible

portion of the statement of the accused whenever and

wherever recoveries are made, the same are admissible

in evidence and it is for the accused in those situations

to explain to the satisfaction of the court as to the nature

of recoveries and as to how they came into possession

or for planting the same at the places from where they

were recovered.”

36. On the basis of the prosecution evidence, the following factual

position has been established:

(i) Rajini @ Rajinikanth was missing for months before his father

Rajaram came from France to India, on 20.04.2008.

(ii) On return, Rajaram had noticed that the articles in the property

No.13, Chinna Vaikkal street, Puducherry, where deceased

Rajini @ Rajinikanth used to reside and was owned by Rajaram,

were scattered. The motorcycle owned by Rajaram, which the

deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth used to use, was missing.

(iii) Rajaram was murdered on 21.04.2008.

(iv) The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal is a close relative of

Rajini @ Rajinikanth and Rajaram (son of sister of Rajaram).

(v) Rajaram as the owner of the immovable property No.13, Chinna

Vaikkal street, Puducherry and Rajini @ Rajinikanth, as the

son of Rajaram, were hindrance in the way of the appellant –

27 See State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, ¶¶ 190, 204-206, 219-223, 225.

28 (2012) 6 SCC 107.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 109

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

Perumal Raja @ Perumal acquiring the said property. There

were also inter se family disputes relating to the property in

Kurumbapet. This was the motive for the offence.

(vi) On the basis of the disclosure statement made by the appellant

– Perumal Raja @ Perumal on 25.04.2008 (Exhibit P-37) – (a)

two nylon sack bags were recovered containing decomposed

human body parts; and (b) human bones were also recovered

from the sump tank in property bearing No.13, Chinna Vaikkal

street, Puducherry.

(vii) The superimposition report dated 20.01.2009 (Exhibit P-25) by C.

Pushparani (PW-29), Scientific Assistant Grade II, Anthropology

Division, Forensic Sciences Department, Chennai states that

the skull and the mandible which were recovered from the

river and the sump tank were that of the deceased Rajini @

Rajinikanth. The report relies on the computer laser print out of

the skull and the mandible for comparison with the photograph

of the deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth. It is shown that the skull

and the mandible were of the deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth.

(viii) As per the post mortem report (Exhibit P-16), though the cause

of death could not be ascertained due to decomposition of the

body, the bones were that of a person between 25-30 years of

age. Further, the death had probably occurred six months prior

to the autopsy. The deceased Rajini @ Rajinikanth was of 30

years in age and he had been missing for about six months.

(ix) Motorcycle bearing registration No. PY 01 X 9857 belonging to

Rajaram (which was then at Rajaram’s house and in possession

of Rajini @ Rajinikanth, as Rajaram was in France), keys,

insurance papers, as well as other personal belongings were

recovered from Mohan Kumar @ Mohan and a juvenile, whose

name is withheld.

37. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra29, this

Court referred to Hanumant  v. State of Madhya Pradesh30, and

laid down the five golden principles (‘panchsheel’) that should be

satisfied before a case based on circumstantial evidence against an

accused can be said to be fully established:

29 (1984) 4 SCC 116.

30 (1952) 2 SCC 71.

110 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be

drawn should be fully established;

(ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the

hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they

should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that

the accused is guilty;

(iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and

tendency;

(iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one

to be proved; and

(v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave

any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the

innocence of the accused and must show that in all human

probability the act must have been done by the accused.

38. This Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) rejected the

contention that if the defence case is false it would constitute an

additional link as to fortify the case of the prosecution. However, a

word of caution was laid down to observe that a false explanation

given can be used as a link when:

(i) various links in the chain of evidence laid by the prosecution

have been satisfactorily proved;

(ii) circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with reasonable

definiteness; and

(iii) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation.

If these conditions are fulfilled only then the court can use the

false explanation or a false defence as an additional link to lend

an assurance to the court and not otherwise. Thus, a distinction

has to be drawn between incomplete chain of circumstances and a

circumstance after a chain is complete and the defence or explanation

given by the accused is found to be false, in which event the said

falsehood is added to reinforce the conclusion of the court.

39. This Court in Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar31 has laid down

the following principle regarding circumstantial evidence and the

failure of accused to adduce any explanation:

31 (1955) 2 SCR 570.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 111

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

“It is true that in a case of circumstantial evidence not only

should the various links in the chain of evidence be clearly

established, but the completed chain must be such as to

rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the

accused. But in a case like this where the various links

as stated above have been satisfactorily made out and

the circumstances point to the appellant as the probable

assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in proximity

to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he

offers no explanation, which if accepted, though not

proved, would afford a reasonable basis for a conclusion

on the entire case consistent with his innocence, such

absence of explanation or false explanation would itself

be an additional link which completes the chain. We are,

therefore, of the opinion that this is a case which satisfies

the standards requisite for conviction on the basis of

circumstantial evidence.”

40. The appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal in his statement under

Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 plainly denied

all accusations without furnishing any explanation regarding his

knowledge of the places from which the dead body was recovered.

In this circumstance, the failure of the appellant – Perumal Raja @

Perumal to present evidence on his behalf or to offer any cogent

explanation regarding the recovery of the dead body by virtue of his

special knowledge must lead to a reasonable adverse inference, by

application of the principle under Section 106 of the Evidence Act,

thus forming an additional link in the chain of circumstances. The

additional link further affirms the conclusion of guilt as indicated by

the prosecution evidence.

41. The whereabouts of Rajini @ Rajinikanth were unknown. The

perpetrator(s) were also unknown. It is only consequent to the

disclosure statement by the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal,

that the police came to know that Rajini @ Rajinikanth had been

murdered and his body was first dumped in the sump tank and after

some months, it was retrieved, cut into two parts, put in sack bags,

and thrown in the river/canal. The police, accordingly, proceeded on

the leads and recovered the parts of the dead body from the sump

tank and sack bags from the river/canal. It has been also established

that Rajini @ Rajinikanth was murdered. In addition, there have been 

112 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

recoveries of the motorcycle and other belongings at the behest

of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal. These facts, in the

absence of any other material to doubt them, establish indubitable

conclusion that the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal is guilty

of having committed murder of Rajini @ Rajinikanth. The presence

of motive reinforces the above conclusion.

42. It has been contended before us that the appellant – Perumal Raja

@ Perumal had been acquitted in the case arising out of crime No.

204 of 2008 relating to the murder of Rajaram. The judgment passed

by the trial court32 has been taken on record as additional evidence.

However, we do not find this judgment in any way relevant or negating

the prosecution evidence, which we have referred to and elucidated

earlier in the prosecution case against the appellant, because the

murder trial of Rajaram was primarily based upon an entirely different

set of evidence. The evidence we have mentioned in the present case

is not relevant and directly connected with the murder of Rajaram.

The two occurrences are separate, albeit the appellant – Perumal

Raja @ Perumal was accused of the murder of Rajaram and his

son Rajini @ Rajinikanth. The murders certainly were committed

on two different dates – 23.11.2007 (or thereabout) and 21.04.2008

respectively, approximately five months apart. Except for the fact that

the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal was taken into custody

during the course of investigation in FIR No. 204 of 2008 for murder

of Rajaram and thereupon on 25.04.2008 his disclosure statement

(Exhibit P-37) was recorded, there is no connection between the two

offences. The conviction of the appellant is, therefore, sustainable

in view of the evidence placed on record in the present case. The

judgment of acquittal would not qualify as relevant and of evidentiary

value so as to acquit the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal in

the present case.33

43. Acquittal of the co-accused, as noticed in paragraph 4 above, again

is for want of evidence against them. At best, they were found in

possession of the articles connected with the crime on the basis of

the disclosure statement (Exhibit P-37) dated 25.04.2008 made by

the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal. Section 27 of the Evidence

32 Dated 13.06.2017.

33 See §§ 40-43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 113

PERUMAL RAJA @ PERUMAL v.

STATE, REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

Act could not have been applied to the other co-accused for the

simple reason that the provision pertains to information that distinctly

relates to the discovery of a ‘fact’ that was previously unknown, as

opposed to fact already disclosed or known. Once information is

given by an accused, the same information cannot be used, even if

voluntarily made by a co-accused who is in custody. Section 27 of

the Evidence Act does apply to joint disclosures, but this is not one

such case.34 This was precisely the reason given by the trial court

to acquit the co-accused. Even if Section 8 of the Evidence Act is

to apply, it would not have been possible to convict the co-accused.

The trial court rightly held other co-accused not guilty. For the same

reason, acquittal of co-accused Chella @ Mukundhan, who was

earlier absconding, is also of no avail.

44. As far as acquittal of the juvenile is concerned, reference can be

made to the provisions of Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.

45. In view of the above discussion, we have no difficulty in upholding

the conviction of the appellant – Perumal Raja @ Perumal. The

appeal is dismissed.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case: Appeal

dismissed.

34 See State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, ¶ 145. 

Suit – Suit for declaration – Decreed by the High Court – Sustainability of, when on perverse findings and ignoring relevant material findings – Suit by the respondent seeking declaration that the sale deed executed was null and void; that suit property belonged to the respondents and for relief of an injunction against the defendants, on the basis of an oral partition whereby property was bequeathed to the respondents whereas the defendants denied the oral partition – Suit dismissed by the trial court and subordinate court – However, the High Court allowed the second appeal relying on certain documents, to s

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 81 : 2024 INSC 12

Case Details

Rajendhiran

v.

Muthaiammal @ Muthayee & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No.37 of 2024)

03 January 2024

[Vikram Nath* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the Second

Appeal filed by the respondents and setting aside the concurrent

judgments of the trial court and the Sub-Judge dismissing the suit

of the respondents and decreeing the suit.

Headnotes

Suit – Suit for declaration – Decreed by the High Court –

Sustainability of, when on perverse findings and ignoring

relevant material findings – Suit by the respondent seeking

declaration that the sale deed executed was null and void;

that suit property belonged to the respondents and for relief

of an injunction against the defendants, on the basis of

an oral partition whereby property was bequeathed to the

respondents whereas the defendants denied the oral partition

– Suit dismissed by the trial court and subordinate court –

However, the High Court allowed the second appeal relying

on certain documents, to support the existence of an oral

partition – Correctness:

Held: Trial court and the first appellate court dealt with the sale

deeds, and found that those were not sufficient to prove the oral

partition or in any manner establish the oral partition with respect to

the survey number in question – High Court failed to consider the

oral as also the documentary evidence – Only on the basis of the

two sale deeds and one mortgage deed, which relate to different

piece and parcels of land, the High Court recorded a perverse

finding that oral partition had taken place – It also did not deal

with the other findings recorded by the courts below – Thus, the

impugned judgment cannot be sustained as it does not conform to

the scope of s. 100 CPC as also it was perverse on appreciated

evidence, and also ignored material evidence – Impugned judgment

and order of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court 

82 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

and the first appellate court is confirmed, dismissing the suit of

the respondent. [Paras 12-15]

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.37 of 2024.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.07.2022 of the High Court

of Judicature at Madras in SA No.351 of 2021.

Appearances:

M. A. Chinnasamy, K. S. Gnanasambandan, Mrs. C. Rubavathi,

C. Raghavendren, Saurabh Gupta, Ch. Leela Sarveswar, Vinod

Kumar Teng, Manoj Kumar Chowdhary, V. Senthil Kumar, Advs. for

the Appellant.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal, by the defendants, assails the correctness of the

judgment and order dated 28.07.2022 of the High Court of Judicature

at Madras whereby the Second Appeal No.351/2021 filed by the

plaintiff was allowed and the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court

and the Sub-Judge dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-respondents

were set aside and the suit was decreed.

3. Facts in nutshell are :

3.1 The respondent instituted a suit before the Munsiff Court,

Tiruchengode registered as OS No.200/2011 claiming relief of

declaration that the sale deed dated 10.02.2011 executed by

the first defendant in favour of second defendant was null and

void and to declare that suit property belonged to the plaintiffs

and further for relief of an injunction against the defendants.

3.2 According to the plaint case, the property in question originally

belonged to one Avinashi Gounder who had four sons namely,

Arunachalam, Arumugam, Ramasamy and Palaniyappan.

Plaintiff No.1 is the wife and plaintiff no.2 is the adopted

son of Arunachalam. The first defendant is the daughter of 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 83

RAJENDHIRAN v. MUTHAIAMMAL @ MUTHAYEE & ORS.

Palaniyappan and the second defendant is the vendee of the

suit property from defendant no.1.

3.3 According to the plaintiffs, the four brothers had entered into

an oral partition and the suit property came to the share of

Arunachalam. Subsequently Arunachalam on 16.07.2003, had

executed a will whereby the suit property and other properties

belonging to Arunachalam were bequeathed in favour of the

plaintiffs. Upon the death of Arunachalam on 30.04.2006, the

plaintiffs became the absolute owners of the property in suit.

Further case of the plaintiffs was that plaintiff no.2 and defendant

no.2 were running a partnership business and the property in

suit was offered as a security to the Karur Vysya Bank. It was

the second defendant who had signed the loan papers and

the security papers with the Bank. As the loan amount could

not be repaid by defendant no.2, it was plaintiff no.2 who had

cleared the outstanding loan of the Bank. Further it is claimed

that defendant no.2 clandestinely obtained the sale deed on

10.02.2011 in respect of the suit property from the first defendant.

It was further the case of the plaintiff that the entire property

which was allotted to Palaniyappan (father of defendant no.1)

had been sold by defendant no.1 on 15.07.1981 with specific

boundaries to one Mathiyalagan. It was thus the claim of the

plaintiffs that the defendants would not have any right over

the properties of Avinashi Gounder and that the plaintiffs were

in possession and were cultivating the land in suit but as the

defendant no.2 tried to trespass the suit property on 24.07.2011,

the necessity for filing the suit arose.

3.4 The defendants filed their written statement denying that there

was any oral partition between the sons of Avinashi Gounder

with respect to the suit property. They also denied that plaintiff

no.2 was the adopted son of Arunachalam. The defendants

had further pleaded that survey number in question had a total

area of 2.17 cents in which Avanashigounder’s family had 1/3rd

share i.e. 72 cents. These 72 cents were partitioned amongst

the three sons of Avanashigounder namely, Arunachalam,

Ramasamy and Palaniyappan. The fourth son Arumugam had

died issueless and his share was equally shared by the three

brothers. Thus, each brother became entitled to 24 cents.

Palaniyappan, father of defendant no.1 had 24 cents in this 

84 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

property, out of which 12 cents fell to the share of defendant

no.1, out of which, she sold 11 cents to the second defendant.

Plaintiffs had set up a case without any basis only in order to

deprive the defendants of their property. It was also pleaded

that there were other co-owners in survey number in question

who had not been impleaded as defendants, as such the suit

was bad in law for non-joinder of necessary parties.

4. The Trial Court framed the following six issues on the basis of the

pleadings of the parties:

(i). Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of declaration as

prayed for?

(ii). Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of permanent injunction

as prayed for?

(iii). Whether the husband of the 1st plaintiff executed a will on

16.07.2003?

(iv). Whether the 2nd plaintiff is the legal heir of the deceased

Arunachalam?

(v). Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?

(vi). To what other relief?

5. The parties led oral and documentary evidence. Both the plaintiffs

examined themselves as PW 1 and PW 2 and one Mathiyalagan

was examined as PW 3 and they proved six papers Exh.A1 to A6.

On behalf of the defendants one Balarajendra was examined as

DW1 and he proved six papers Exh.B1 to B6. Both the defendants

did not enter the witness box.

6. The Trial Court discussed the evidence threadbare and recorded

the following findings:

(i). Both the plaintiffs had pleaded that Arunachalam had executed

a will on 16.07.2003 but they failed to prove the said will deed

in accordance to the statutory provisions contained in Section

68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and also under Section

63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1956. Thus, their claim on the

basis of the will was not found to be substantiated;

(ii). The suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as the

co-owners/co-sharers were not impleaded as defendants;

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 85

RAJENDHIRAN v. MUTHAIAMMAL @ MUTHAYEE & ORS.

(iii). The plaintiffs were not the owners of the property in suit, they

had not been able to prove the oral partition and as such were

found to be not entitled to any relief.

7. Accordingly, it dismissed the suit, vide judgment dated 08.09.2015.

8. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal which was registered as Appeal Suit

No.55/2016. The Subordinate Court, Tiruchengodu, vide judgment

dated 27.11.2020, after considering the evidence on record, approved

the findings recorded by the Trial Court and, accordingly, dismissed

the appeal. Once again specific findings were recorded that the oral

partition had not been proved by the plaintiffs. For the said purpose,

both the Courts below had relied upon the evidence led by the parties,

both oral and documentary.

9. The First Appellate Court also approved the finding regarding nonjoinder of necessary parties.

10. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs preferred Second Appeal before

the High Court, registered as Second Appeal No.351/2021. The

High Court proceeded on the premise that the only dispute was with

respect to the oral partition, as to whether oral partition had taken

place or not and if yes, whether it was duly proved? The High Court

relied upon Ex.A-3, A-4 and Ex.B-3 to hold that there had been an

oral partition. Ex.A-3 is the Mortgage Deed dated 13.10.2009. Ex.A-4

is the Sale Deed dated 15.07.1981. Ex.B-3 is the Sale Deed dated

02.05.2008. All these three documents were relied upon only for the

reason that they mentioned boundaries. Based only on the finding

that oral partition was proved, the High Court allowed the second

appeal and after setting aside the judgments of the Courts below

decreed the suit.

11. Heard counsel for the appellants. Despite service of notice, no one

appeared on behalf of the respondents.

12. The two sale deeds relate to different properties and not to survey

number in question. Whether any partition with respect to the survey

number in question had taken place or not, is not borne out from

the record. The suit property was never recorded in the name of

the plaintiffs or for that matter, husband of plaintiff no.1, at any time.

The will which was the basis of the claim of the plaintiff, had not

been found to be proved in accordance to law. The Trial Court and

the First Appellate Court had dealt with the documents Exh.A-4 and 

86 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

B-3, the two sale deeds, and found that these were not sufficient to

prove the oral partition or in any manner establish the oral partition

with respect to the survey number in question.

13. Interestingly although the plaintiffs set up a case that the land in suit

was coming from Avinashi Gounder but on record, two pattas were

filed which establish that the survey number in question had been

allotted in the name of plaintiff no.1 and eight others jointly with respect

to which there was no partition. This fact had been admitted by the

plaintiffs in their deposition. All these aspects had been considered

by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court but the High Court

failed to consider the oral as also the documentary evidence. Only

on the basis of the two sale deeds and one mortgage deed, which

relate to different piece and parcels of land, the High Court recorded

a perverse finding that oral partition had taken place. It also did not

deal with the other findings recorded by the Courts below.

14. In view of the above discussion and on the findings recorded above,

the impugned judgment cannot be sustained as it not only does not

conform to the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 but also as it was perverse on appreciated evidence, and also

ignoring material evidence.

15. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned judgment and

order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court and

the First Appellate Court is confirmed. The suit of the respondentplaintiff stands dismissed.

16. There shall be no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

The High Court granted default bail to the respondent u/s. 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Whether the High Court committed an error in allowing the petition and granting default bail to the respondent. Headnotes Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.201/120-B – Arms Act, 1959 – ss. 13/18/20 – The High Court had relied upon the judgment in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and others wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of s.20(4) (bb) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and had observed that the period for granting extension of investigation could not be extended in a casual manner – Propriety: Held: In the instant case, the period of 90 days expired on 15.09.2020 – Before the expiry of the said period on the request of the Investigating Officer, the time for investigation was extended by order dated 11.09.2020 for a further period of two months till 11.11.2020 – Investigation was not completed – Public Prosecutor moved another application dated 07.11.2020 requesting for further extension of time for investigation for a period of 30 days as per the provisions contained in s. 43D (2) (b) of UAPA – The said application was allowed by the Trial Court on 10.11.2020 and the period of investigation was further extended till 30.11.2020 – The respondent moved an application on 11.11.2020 itself u/s. 167 of the CrPC for release on bail – The said application was rejected by the Trial Court vide order dated 17.11.2020 – However, the High Court granted the default 74 [2024] 1 S.C.R. DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS bail – Reliance placed upon the judgment in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur by the High Court was misplaced – It was a case relating to TADA, whereas the present case related to UAPA – The provisions under UAPA s.43D(2)(b) are different and give other reasons also for extension of time for investigation – The High Court also committed an error in recording a finding that sanction had already been received prior to the date of making the application for extension in November 2020 – The recording of the said fact is not correct – The Public Prosecutor in the application had clearly mentioned that the sanction u/s. 45(1) of UAPA had been obtained from Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and was attached with the case file – However, the sanction u/s. 45(2) of UAPA was awaited from GNCT Delhi and that the sanction u/s. 39 of the Arms Act was to be obtained after the results from the FSL was received – The High Court also fell in error in not taking into consideration the reasons given u/s. 43D(2) (b) were clearly made out and explained in the extension letter dated 07.11.2020 giving the details of the progress of the investigation as also the reasons for detaining the respondent – The High Court also failed to consider that after completing the investigation, Police report u/s. 173(2) CrPC had already been submitted prior to 30.11.2020 which was the last date of the extended period – The High Court committed an error in allowing the petition and granting default bail to the respondent – The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. [Paras 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 5, 8, 10, 12] Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.43D(2)(b): Held: From a perusal of the provision i.e. 43 D(2)(b), the extension for investigation could be granted up to a maximum period of 180 days for the following reasons: (i) Completion of the investigation; (ii) Progress in the investigation was explained; and (iii) Specific reasons for detention beyond a period of 90 days. [Para 6]

The High Court granted default bail to the respondent u/s. 167(2)

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Whether the High Court

committed an error in allowing the petition and granting default

bail to the respondent.

Headnotes

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Penal Code, 1860 –

ss.201/120-B – Arms Act, 1959 – ss. 13/18/20 – The High Court

had relied upon the judgment in the case of Hitendra Vishnu

Thakur and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and others

wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions

of s.20(4) (bb) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1987 and had observed that the period for

granting extension of investigation could not be extended in

a casual manner – Propriety:

Held: In the instant case, the period of 90 days expired on

15.09.2020 – Before the expiry of the said period on the

request of the Investigating Officer, the time for investigation

was extended by order dated 11.09.2020 for a further period of

two months till 11.11.2020 – Investigation was not completed –

Public Prosecutor moved another application dated 07.11.2020

requesting for further extension of time for investigation for a

period of 30 days as per the provisions contained in s. 43D (2)

(b) of UAPA – The said application was allowed by the Trial

Court on 10.11.2020 and the period of investigation was further

extended till 30.11.2020 – The respondent moved an application

on 11.11.2020 itself u/s. 167 of the CrPC for release on bail –

The said application was rejected by the Trial Court vide order

dated 17.11.2020 – However, the High Court granted the default 

74 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

bail – Reliance placed upon the judgment in the case of Hitendra

Vishnu Thakur by the High Court was misplaced – It was a case

relating to TADA, whereas the present case related to UAPA –

The provisions under UAPA s.43D(2)(b) are different and give

other reasons also for extension of time for investigation – The

High Court also committed an error in recording a finding that

sanction had already been received prior to the date of making

the application for extension in November 2020 – The recording

of the said fact is not correct – The Public Prosecutor in the

application had clearly mentioned that the sanction u/s. 45(1)

of UAPA had been obtained from Government of India, Ministry

of Home Affairs and was attached with the case file – However,

the sanction u/s. 45(2) of UAPA was awaited from GNCT Delhi

and that the sanction u/s. 39 of the Arms Act was to be obtained

after the results from the FSL was received – The High Court

also fell in error in not taking into consideration the reasons

given u/s. 43D(2) (b) were clearly made out and explained in

the extension letter dated 07.11.2020 giving the details of the

progress of the investigation as also the reasons for detaining

the respondent – The High Court also failed to consider that

after completing the investigation, Police report u/s. 173(2) CrPC

had already been submitted prior to 30.11.2020 which was the

last date of the extended period – The High Court committed

an error in allowing the petition and granting default bail to the

respondent – The impugned order passed by the High Court is

set aside. [Paras 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 5, 8, 10, 12]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.43D(2)(b):

Held: From a perusal of the provision i.e. 43 D(2)(b), the extension

for investigation could be granted up to a maximum period of 180

days for the following reasons: (i) Completion of the investigation;

(ii) Progress in the investigation was explained; and (iii) Specific

reasons for detention beyond a period of 90 days. [Para 6]

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 73 : 2024 INSC 11

Case Details

State of NCT of Delhi

v.

Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @Lovely

(Criminal Appeal No.43 of 2024)

03 January 2024

[Vikram Nath* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The High Court granted default bail to the respondent u/s. 167(2)

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Whether the High Court

committed an error in allowing the petition and granting default

bail to the respondent.

Headnotes

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Penal Code, 1860 –

ss.201/120-B – Arms Act, 1959 – ss. 13/18/20 – The High Court

had relied upon the judgment in the case of Hitendra Vishnu

Thakur and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and others

wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions

of s.20(4) (bb) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1987 and had observed that the period for

granting extension of investigation could not be extended in

a casual manner – Propriety:

Held: In the instant case, the period of 90 days expired on

15.09.2020 – Before the expiry of the said period on the

request of the Investigating Officer, the time for investigation

was extended by order dated 11.09.2020 for a further period of

two months till 11.11.2020 – Investigation was not completed –

Public Prosecutor moved another application dated 07.11.2020

requesting for further extension of time for investigation for a

period of 30 days as per the provisions contained in s. 43D (2)

(b) of UAPA – The said application was allowed by the Trial

Court on 10.11.2020 and the period of investigation was further

extended till 30.11.2020 – The respondent moved an application

on 11.11.2020 itself u/s. 167 of the CrPC for release on bail –

The said application was rejected by the Trial Court vide order

dated 17.11.2020 – However, the High Court granted the default 

74 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

bail – Reliance placed upon the judgment in the case of Hitendra

Vishnu Thakur by the High Court was misplaced – It was a case

relating to TADA, whereas the present case related to UAPA –

The provisions under UAPA s.43D(2)(b) are different and give

other reasons also for extension of time for investigation – The

High Court also committed an error in recording a finding that

sanction had already been received prior to the date of making

the application for extension in November 2020 – The recording

of the said fact is not correct – The Public Prosecutor in the

application had clearly mentioned that the sanction u/s. 45(1)

of UAPA had been obtained from Government of India, Ministry

of Home Affairs and was attached with the case file – However,

the sanction u/s. 45(2) of UAPA was awaited from GNCT Delhi

and that the sanction u/s. 39 of the Arms Act was to be obtained

after the results from the FSL was received – The High Court

also fell in error in not taking into consideration the reasons

given u/s. 43D(2) (b) were clearly made out and explained in

the extension letter dated 07.11.2020 giving the details of the

progress of the investigation as also the reasons for detaining

the respondent – The High Court also failed to consider that

after completing the investigation, Police report u/s. 173(2) CrPC

had already been submitted prior to 30.11.2020 which was the

last date of the extended period – The High Court committed

an error in allowing the petition and granting default bail to the

respondent – The impugned order passed by the High Court is

set aside. [Paras 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 5, 8, 10, 12]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.43D(2)(b):

Held: From a perusal of the provision i.e. 43 D(2)(b), the extension

for investigation could be granted up to a maximum period of 180

days for the following reasons: (i) Completion of the investigation;

(ii) Progress in the investigation was explained; and (iii) Specific

reasons for detention beyond a period of 90 days. [Para 6]

List of Citations and Other References

Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others vs. The State

of Maharashtra and others [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR

360:(1994) 4 SCC 602 – held inapplicable.

State of Maharashtra vs. Surendra Pundlik Gadling

and others [2019] 3 SCR 310:(2019) 5 SCC 178 –

referred to.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 75

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI v.

RAJ KUMAR @ LOVEPREET @LOVELY

List of Acts

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.43D(2)(b); Penal

Code, 1860 – ss.201/120-B; Arms Act, 1959 – ss. 25/54/59;

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 167(2).

List of Keywords

Default bail; Extension of time for investigation.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.43

of 2024.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.02.2021 of the High Court

of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC No.2312 of 2020.

Appearances:

Suryaprakash V. Raju, ASG, Ms. Sairica Raju, Ashutosh Ghade,

Guntur Pramod Kumar, Dr. Arun Kumar Yadav, Shreekant Neelappa

Terdal, Advs. for the Appellant.

Ms. Tara Narula, Ms. Supriya Juneja, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

Leave granted.

2. The State of NCT of Delhi1

 is in appeal assailing the correctness

of the order dated 11.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Delhi

granting default bail to the respondent under section 167(2) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732

.

3. Relevant facts for appropriate application of this controversy are

briefly stated here under:

1 GNCTD

2 CrPC

76 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

3.1 A First Information Report3

 No.154 of 2020 was registered on

16.06.2020 with Police Station, Special Cell, New Delhi against

the respondent for offences under Sections 13/18/20 of the

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 19674

, Sections 201/120-

B of the Indian Penal Code, 18605

, Sections 25/54/59 of the

Arms Act, 19596

. Pursuant to the said FIR, the respondent was

arrested on 18.06.2020.

3.2 He was initially remanded to Police Custody for a period of three

days and thereafter to Judicial Custody and has since been in

Mandoli Jail, New Delhi. The period of 90 days expired on 15th

September, 2020. Before the expiry of the said period on the

request of the Investigating Officer7

, the time for investigation

was extended by order dated 11.09.2020 for a further period of

two months till 11.11.2020. The investigation was not complete

till 11.11.2020 and no Police report under section 173(2) CrPC

was filed.

3.3 Before the expiry of the extended period of investigation which

was valid until 11.11.2020, the Public Prosecutor moved another

application dated 07.11.2020 requesting for further extension of

time for investigation for a period of 30 days as per the provisions

contained in section 43D (2) (b) of UAPA. The reasons given

for moving the said application were manifold which are noted

as follows:

i) Sanction under section 45(2) of UAPA was awaited from

GNCTD.

ii) FSL results of arms recovered from accused persons were

also awaited; and

iii) Sanction under section 39 of the Arms Act was to be

obtained.

3.4 The said application was allowed by the Trial Court on

10.11.2020 and the period of investigation was further extended

3 FIR

4 UAPA

5 IPC

6 The Arms Act

7 IO

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 77

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI v.

RAJ KUMAR @ LOVEPREET @LOVELY

till 30.11.2020. In the said order of 10.11.2020, although all the

reasons mentioned in the application dated 07.11.2020 seeking

extension of the period of investigation were mentioned but in

the operative portion, the Trial Court noted that the extension

had been sought on the ground of obtaining mandatory

sanction which was still pending before the GNCT Delhi and

had accordingly granted the extension till 30.11.2020. The

investigation has since been completed and Police report under

section 173(2) CrPC was submitted on 26.11.2020 before the

expiry of the period of extension for concluding the investigation

up to 30.11.2020.

3.5 The respondent moved an application on 11.11.2020 itself

under section 167 of the CrPC for release on bail. The said

application was rejected by the Trial Court vide order dated

17.11.2020. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent preferred

a petition under section 482 CrPC for setting aside the order

dated 11.09.2020 and 10.11.2020 which was registered as Crl.

M.C. No.2312 of 2020. This petition has since been allowed by

the impugned order giving rise to the present appeal.

4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that

the High Court committed an error in allowing the petition and granting

default bail to the respondent. In this connection, the High Court had

relied upon the judgment in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur

and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and others8 wherein

this Court was dealing with the provisions of section 20(4) (bb) of

the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 19879

 and

had observed that the period for granting extension of investigation

could not be extended in a casual manner for reasons other than

those mentioned in the above noted provision which stated that it

could be for completion of investigation only.

5. Reliance placed upon the said judgment in the case of Hitendra

Vishnu Thakur (supra) by the Delhi High Court was misplaced. It

was a case relating to TADA, whereas the present case related to

UAPA. The provisions under UAPA section 43D(2)(b) are different

and give other reasons also for extension of time for investigation.

8 (1994) 4 SCC 602

9 TADA

78 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Section 43D(2) reads as under:

“43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other

law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed

to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of

section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in that

clause shall be construed accordingly.

(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving

an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification

that in sub-section (2),-

(a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and “sixty

days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as

references to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety days”

respectively; and

(b) After the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted,

namely: -

“Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation

within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied

with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of

the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the

accused beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said

period up to one hundred and eighty days:

Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under

this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody

from judicial custody of any person in judicial custody, he shall file

an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain

the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.

xxxxxx ”

6. From a perusal of the above provision i.e. 43 D(2)(b), the extension

for investigation could be granted up to a maximum period of 180

days for the following reasons:

● Completion of the investigation;

● Progress in the investigation was explained; and

● Specific reasons for detention beyond a period of 90 days.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 79

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI v.

RAJ KUMAR @ LOVEPREET @LOVELY

7. Provisions of section 43D(2)(b) were considered by this Court in the

case of State of Maharashtra vs. Surendra Pundlik Gadling and

others10. In the said case, the FSL report was awaited and it also

required the detention of the accused wherein financial details of the

respondent were still being ascertained in view of the huge conspiracy

spreading over a number of cities were being investigated. The High

Court failed to take into consideration the above judgment of 2019

relating to UAPA. It had relied upon a judgment of 1994 relating to

provisions of TADA.

8. The High Court also committed an error in recording a finding that

sanction had already been received prior to the date of making the

application for extension in November 2020. The recording of the

said fact is not correct. The Public Prosecutor in the application had

clearly mentioned that the sanction under section 45(1) of UAPA had

been obtained from Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs

and was attached with the case file. However, the sanction under

section 45(2) of UAPA was awaited from GNCT Delhi and that the

sanction under section 39 of the Arms Act was to be obtained after

the results from the FSL was received.

9. We are, therefore, of the view that the reason mentioned in the

impugned order that the application had been filed for extension

without any valid basis as the sanction had already been granted,

was not correct.

10. The High Court also fell in error in not taking into consideration

the reasons given under section 43D(2) (b) were clearly made out

and explained in the extension letter dated 07.11.2020 giving the

details of the progress of the investigation as also the reasons for

detaining the respondent. The Public Prosecutor had mentioned in

the request that major investigation of the case had been completed

and the draft chargesheet had been prepared. However, for want of

remaining sanctions and FSL report some more time was required

for completing the investigation.

11. Insofar as the reasons for detention are concerned, it was mentioned

that during the course of investigation one Mr. Gurtej Singh had

been arrested who had links with Pakistan based terrorists and had

been planning to go to Pakistan for weapons training along with his

associate respondent No.2 Rajkumar alias Lovely and others.

10 (2019)5 SCC 178

80 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

12. The High Court also failed to consider that after completing the

investigation, Police report under section 173(2) CrPC had already

been submitted prior to 30.11.2020 which was the last date of the

extended period.

13. One more aspect to be considered is the nature of offence which

involved terrorist activities having not only Pan India impact but also

impact on other enemy States. The matter should not have been

taken so lightly.

14. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed

by the High Court is set aside. The respondent No.2 be taken into

custody forthwith, if not already in custody.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case: Appeal allowed.