What would be the date from which the policy becomes effective; whether it would be the date on which the policy is issued or the date of the commencement mentioned in the policy or it would be the date of the issuance of the deposit receipt or cover note. Headnotes Insurance – Insurance Policy – Date from which the policy becomes effective – Assured persons committed suicide – Claims filed by respondent, allowed – Revision filed by the appellant was dismissed, NCDRC affirmed the orders passed by the District Forum and the State Commission holding that the appellant was liable to pay the amount of the sum assured on the death of the assured – Forums below proceeded on the basis that the date of issuance of the initial deposit receipt of premium is the date of commencement of the Policy – Propriety: Held: Date of issuance of the policy would be the relevant date for all the purposes and not the date of proposal or the date of issuance of the receipt – Date of proposal cannot be treated to be the date of policy until and unless on the date of proposal, initial deposit as also the issuance of policy happens on the same date – Merely tendering a cheque may not be enough as till such time the cheque is encashed, the contract would not become effective – Clause 9 of the terms and conditions inter alia stated that the Company will not pay any claim on death if the Life Assured committed suicide within 12 months from the date of issue of the Policy or the date of any reinstatement of the Policy – Once it is mentioned in the Policy that the 12 months period is to commence from the date of the issuance of the policy or the date of any reinstatement of the policy, the reinstatement aspect 66 [2024] 1 S.C.R. DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS ought to have been considered – In the case of ‘US’, the date of reinstatement of the policy was clearly stated to be 25.02.2014 and that was also the date of commencement of policy, both the dates being the same – Thus, the date of incidence of suicide being 03.06.2014, it was well within 12 months – Further, in the case of ‘JW’, proposal form was submitted on 14.07.2012 with respect to the cheque dated 13.07.2012 – 14.07.2012 cannot be taken to be the date of issuance of policy – The date of issue of policy being 16.07.2012 was actually the date from which the policy commences and becomes effective – Period of 12 months from 16.07.2012 would complete on 15.07.2013 – It would be the last day of 12 months as from the next day, i.e., 16.07.2013 the next month will start – Incidence of suicide was on 15.07.2013, the last day of 12 months – Stand taken by the appellant approved – Impugned orders set aside – Claims of the respondent rejected. [Para 5, 8, 9-11, 15 and 16]

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 65 : 2024 INSC 10

Case Details

Reliance Life Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr.

v.

Jaya Wadhwani

(Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2024)

03 January 2024

[Vikram Nath* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

What would be the date from which the policy becomes effective;

whether it would be the date on which the policy is issued or the

date of the commencement mentioned in the policy or it would

be the date of the issuance of the deposit receipt or cover note.

Headnotes

Insurance – Insurance Policy – Date from which the policy

becomes effective – Assured persons committed suicide –

Claims filed by respondent, allowed – Revision filed by the

appellant was dismissed, NCDRC affirmed the orders passed

by the District Forum and the State Commission holding that

the appellant was liable to pay the amount of the sum assured

on the death of the assured – Forums below proceeded on the

basis that the date of issuance of the initial deposit receipt

of premium is the date of commencement of the Policy –

Propriety:

Held: Date of issuance of the policy would be the relevant date

for all the purposes and not the date of proposal or the date of

issuance of the receipt – Date of proposal cannot be treated to

be the date of policy until and unless on the date of proposal,

initial deposit as also the issuance of policy happens on the

same date – Merely tendering a cheque may not be enough as

till such time the cheque is encashed, the contract would not

become effective – Clause 9 of the terms and conditions inter alia

stated that the Company will not pay any claim on death if the

Life Assured committed suicide within 12 months from the date of

issue of the Policy or the date of any reinstatement of the Policy

– Once it is mentioned in the Policy that the 12 months period is

to commence from the date of the issuance of the policy or the

date of any reinstatement of the policy, the reinstatement aspect 

66 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ought to have been considered – In the case of ‘US’, the date of

reinstatement of the policy was clearly stated to be 25.02.2014

and that was also the date of commencement of policy, both the

dates being the same – Thus, the date of incidence of suicide

being 03.06.2014, it was well within 12 months – Further, in the

case of ‘JW’, proposal form was submitted on 14.07.2012 with

respect to the cheque dated 13.07.2012 – 14.07.2012 cannot be

taken to be the date of issuance of policy – The date of issue of

policy being 16.07.2012 was actually the date from which the policy

commences and becomes effective – Period of 12 months from

16.07.2012 would complete on 15.07.2013 – It would be the last

day of 12 months as from the next day, i.e., 16.07.2013 the next

month will start – Incidence of suicide was on 15.07.2013, the

last day of 12 months – Stand taken by the appellant approved –

Impugned orders set aside – Claims of the respondent rejected.

[Para 5, 8, 9-11, 15 and 16]

List of Citations and Other References

Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another vs.

Dharam Vir Anand [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 295:(1998)

7 SCC 348; Life Insurance Corpn. of India vs. Mani

Ram [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 342:(2005) 6 SCC 274 –

referred to.

List of Keywords

Consumer Protection; Insurance; Insurance Policy; Effective date

of policy; Suicide.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.35 of 2024.

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.02.2019 of the National

Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in RP

No.2909 of 2018.

With

Civil Appeal No.36 of 2024.

Appearances:

Sachin Subhash Daga, Rajesh Kandari, Vikas Upadhyay, Arjun Singh

Tomar, Ms. Ankita Kashyap, Advs. for the Appellants.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 67

RELIANCE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. & ANR. v.

JAYA WADHWANI

Nitin S. Tambwekar, Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, Advs. for the

Respondent.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

Leave granted.

2. These two appeals raise a common question of law. As such they are

being analogously dealt with by this common order. The challenge in

both these appeals is to the orders passed by the National Consumer

Disputes Redressal Commission1

, New Delhi, whereby the revision

filed by the appellant has since been dismissed and the orders

passed by the District Forum as also the State Commission have

been affirmed holding that the appellant is liable to pay the amount

of the sum assured on the death of the assured.

3. The sole question involved in these appeals is as to what would

be the date from which the policy becomes effective; whether it

would be the date on which the policy is issued or the date of the

commencement mentioned in the policy or it would be the date of the

issuance of the deposit receipt or cover note. The District Consumer

Disputes Redressal Forum2

, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission3

 and the National Commission have proceeded on the

basis that the date of issuance of the initial deposit receipt of premium

is the date of commencement of the Policy and have accordingly

allowed the complaint filed by the respondent.

4. The relevant dates in both the cases are summarised hereunder:

4.1 In the appeal of Jaya Wadhwani, the quotation of Policy was

issued on 14.07.2012. The proposal form was submitted by

the life assured on 14.07.2012. Receipt of the Cheque dated

13.07.2012 was also issued on 14.07.2012. On 16.07.2012, the

Policy was issued and at all relevant places, it was mentioned in

the policy that the date of commencement of the policy would be

16.07.2012. On 15.07.2013, the life assured committed suicide.

1 NCDRC

2 District Forum

3 State Commission

68 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

4.2 In the appeal of Usha Soni, the date of submission of proposal

form by the life assured is 26.09.2012. The date of issue of policy

as also the date of commencement of policy was 28.09.2012.

The date of next premium due was 28.09.2013. As the next

premium was not paid, the policy lapsed. The assured paid

the next premium on 25.02.2014 and the lapsed policy was

reinstated from that date. On 03.06.2014, the life assured

committed suicide.

5. The Clause relevant for consideration is clause 9 of the Policy

conditions and privileges and the terms and conditions mentioned

therein. Clause 9 reads as follows:

“9. Suicide: The Company will not pay any claim on death

if the Life Assured, whether sane or insane, commits suicide

within 12 months from the date of issue of this Policy or

the date of any reinstatement of this Policy.”

6. From the documents on record in the case of Usha Soni, we find

that the first cheque was issued on 26.09.2012. The policy issuance

and commencement date in the Policy is mentioned as 28.09.2012.

Further, the next premium due was on 28.09.2013. Grace period

is 30 days under Clause 1(iv) of the terms and conditions. Clause

5 mentions that the policy would lapse. Clause 6 provides for

reinstatement. However, since the renewal amount was not paid within

the time allowed, the policy stood lapsed and subsequently, upon

payment of the premium against the lapsed policy on 25.02.2014, the

policy was reinstated from the said date. The life assured committed

suicide on 03.06.2014, which was well within the period of 12 months.

7. On a perusal of the orders passed by the District Forum, the State

Commission, and the National Commission, we find that although

clause 9 of the terms and conditions has been referred to but the

aspect of reinstatement of a lapsed Policy has not been considered.

They have wrongly taken the date of issue of policy only as the

relevant date to count 12 months, i.e., from 28.09.2012.

8. Once it is mentioned in the Policy that the 12 months period is to

commence from the date of the issuance of the policy or the date of

any reinstatement of the policy, the reinstatement aspect ought to have 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 69

RELIANCE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. & ANR. v.

JAYA WADHWANI

been considered. The date of reinstatement of the policy is clearly

stated to be 25.02.2014 and that is also the date of commencement

of policy, both the dates being the same. Thus, the date of incidence

of suicide being 03.06.2014, it was well within 12 months.

9. Now, coming to the case of Jaya Wadhwani, the proposal form, no

doubt, was submitted on 14.07.2012 with respect to the cheque dated

13.07.2012 of the premium amount wherein also it was mentioned that

the receipt is issued subject to the clearance of the cheque and further

that the insurance protection shall only be provided effective from

the date of acceptance of the risk, which happened on 16.07.2012,

when the policy was issued and the date of commencement was

notified to be the same date.

10. 14th July 2012, therefore, cannot be taken to be the date of issuance

of policy. It is only the date of issue of receipt of the initial premium.

The date of issue of policy being 16.07.2012 is actually the date

from which the policy commences and becomes effective.

11. In the present case, period of 12 months from 16.07.2012 will complete

on 15.07.2013. It would be the last day of 12 months as from the

next day, i.e., 16.07.2013 the next month will start. Unfortunately, the

incidence of suicide is on 15.07.2013, the last day of 12 months. The

date of proposal cannot be treated to be the date of policy until and

unless on the date of proposal, initial deposit as also the issuance of

policy happens on the same date where, for example, the premium

is paid in cash then, immediately, the policy could be issued. Merely,

tendering a cheque may not be enough as till such time the cheque

is encashed, the contract would not become effective. The drawer

of the cheque may, at any time, after issuing, stop its payment or

there may not be enough funds in the account of which the cheque is

issued and there could be many other reasons for which the cheque

could be returned without being encashed.

12. We may also refer to the two judgments relied upon by the counsel

for the appellants, in support of his submission that the terms and

conditions of the contract as contained in the policy should be strictly

adhered to. Otherwise mentioning of the terms and conditions would

be a futile exercise, if any other interpretation is given or terms and

conditions are relaxed. 

70 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

13. In this connection, it would be useful to reproduce the extract which

form part of paragraph 6 in the case of Life Insurance Corporation

of India and Another vs. Dharam Vir Anand4

. It reads as follows:

“6. Having examined the rival submissions and having

examined the policy of insurance which is nothing but

a contract between the parties and having considered

the expressions used in Clause 4-B of the terms of the

policy, we are persuaded to accept the submissions made

by Mr. Salve, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the appellant. In construing a particular Clause of the

Contract, it is only reasonable to construe that the words

and the terms used therein must be given effect to. In other

words, one part of the Contract cannot be made otiose by

giving a meaning to the policy of the contract. Then again,

when the same Clause of a contract uses two different

expressions, ordinarily those different expressions convey

different meanings and both the expressions cannot be

held to be conveying one and the same meaning. Bearing

in mind the aforesaid principle of construction, if Clause

4-B of the terms of policy is scrutinized, it become crystal

clear that the date on which the risk under the policy has

commenced is different from the date of the policy. In the

case in hand, undoubtedly the date on which the risk under

the policy has commenced is 10.5.89 but the date of the

policy is 31.03.1990 on which date the policy had been

issued. Even though the Insurer had given the option to

the Insured to indicate as to whether the policy is to be

dated back and the insured indicated that the policy should

be dated back to 10.05.1989 and did pay the premium

for that period, thereby the risk under the policy can be

said to have commenced with effect from 10.5.1989 but

the date of the policy still remains the date on which the

policy was issued i.e. 31.03.1990. The death of the life

assured having occurred as a result of suicide committed

by the assured before the expiry of three years from the

4 (1998) 7 SCC 348

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 71

RELIANCE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. & ANR. v.

JAYA WADHWANI

date of the policy, the terms contained in Clause 4-B of the

policy would be attracted and, therefore, the liability of the

Corporation would be limited to the sum equal to the total

amount of premium paid under the policy without interest

and not the entire sum for which the life had been insured.

The Forums under the Consumer Protection Act committed

gross error in construing Clause 4-B of the policy and giving

the same meaning to the two expressions in the aforesaid

Clause 4-B namely “the date on which the risk under the

policy has commenced” and “the date of the policy”. The

construction given by us to the provisions contained in

Clause 4-B get support, if the proviso to Clause 4-B is

looked into. Under the proviso, if the life assured commits

suicide before expiry of one year reckoned from the date

of the policy, then the provisions of the Clause under the

heading “suicide” printed on the back of the policy would

apply. In a case therefore where a policy is dated back for

one year prior to the date of the issue of the policy, the

proviso contained in Clause 4-B cannot be operated at all.

When parties had agreed to the terms of the contract, it

is impermissible to hold that a particular term was never

intended to be acted upon. The proviso to Clause 4-B will

have its full play if the expression “the date of the policy”

is interpreted to mean the date on which the policy was

issued and not the date on which the risk under the policy

has commenced. In the aforesaid premises, we are of the

considered opinion that under Clause 4-B of the policy the

date of the policy is the date on which the policy had been

issued and not the date on which the risk under the policy

had commenced by way of allowing it to be dated back.

In view of our aforesaid construction to Clause 4-B, in the

case in hand, the respondent in law would be entitled to

only the sum equal to the total amount of premium paid

under the policy without any interest inasmuch as the

death of the life assured has occurred before the expiry

of three years from the date of the policy, i.e., 31.3.1990…

………”

72 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

14. Relying upon the above judgment in the case of Dharam Vir Anand

(supra), this Court again in the case of Life Insurance Corpn. of

India vs. Mani Ram5

, reiterated the same view and held that the

date of issue of policy would be the relevant date even if there was

backdating as has been done in the case of Dharam Vir Anand

(supra).

15. In the present appeals, we do not find any such issue of back

dating but the date of issuance of the policy would be the relevant

date for all the purposes and not the date of proposal or the date

of issuance of the receipt. In view of the above, the stand taken

by the appellant is approved. The impugned orders are thus liable

to be set aside.

16. Accordingly, the orders passed by the District Forum, the State

Commission, and the National Commission are set aside and the

claims of the respondent are rejected. The appeals are accordingly,

allowed as above.

17. There shall be no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

5 (2005) 6 SCC 274

Adverse possession – Suit by the appellant for the relief of injunction with alternative relief for possession – Dismissed by the High Court on the ground of limitation as the respondent perfected their rights by adverse possession having continued so since 1944 when the first suit for arrears of rent was filed – Justification: Held: Appellants g

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 40 : 2024 INSC 6

Case Details

Neeraj Sharma

v.

State of Chhattisgarh

(Criminal Appeal No. 1420 Of 2019)

03 January 2024

[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and

Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Conviction and sentence of the appellants, inter alia, for offence

u/s.364-A, Penal Code, 1860, if justified.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – s.364-A – Conditions to be met to make

out offence u/s.364-A – Conviction of the appellants u/

ss.307/120B, 364-A and 392/397, IPC – Prosecution if proved

its case u/s.364-A beyond reasonable doubt:

Held: In the present case, the most important witness is the

complainant himself-an injured witness, who was an 18 year old

boy who trusted his friends (appellants), not aware that he was

being taken by deceit by his friends who had planned his murder

– Unless there are compelling circumstances/evidence placed by

the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as an

extremely valuable evidence in a criminal trial – Injuries sustained

by the complainant match the case of the prosecution – An attempt

was made by the appellants to dispose of the body of the victim

by burning the body – There were burn injuries on both his legs

– The strong ligature mark on his neck was again significant as

it is the case of the prosecution that the two accused had tried to

strangulate him with the clutch wire – Prosecution proved its case

beyond reasonable doubt as regards robbery, abduction and attempt

to murder – However, in order to make out an offence u/s.364-A, the

necessary ingredients which the prosecution must prove, beyond

reasonable doubt, are not only an act of kidnapping or abduction

but thereafter the demand of ransom, coupled with the threat to

life of a person who has been kidnapped or abducted, must be

there – Prosecution miserably failed to establish the demand of

ransom – No worthwhile evidence placed by the prosecution in 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 41

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

this regard – There was no evidence at all to have convicted the

appellants u/s.364A – Trial Court and the High Court completely

misdirected in holding the present case to be a case u/s.364-A –

Findings of conviction u/s.364A converted to that of s.364, as the

appellants had committed an offence u/s.364 as the offence of

abduction in order to murder the victim stood proved – Appellants

sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 10 years each on this count

and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default further imprisonment of three

months – Rest of the conviction and sentence u/s.307 r/w s.120B

as well as u/s.392 r/w s.397, affirmed – Fine imposed retained.

[Paras 7, 9, 11, 14, 16 and 18]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.362, 364, 364-A, 365, 366 – Abduction

simpliciter not an offence, becomes a punishable offence

when combined with another act:

Held: While abduction simpliciter may not technically be an offence

under the IPC, it becomes a punishable offence when it is combined

with another act – Abduction in order to commit murder is an offence

u/s.364 – Abduction is an offence if done with an intent to secretly

or wrongfully confine a person u/s.365, or when done to compel

a woman for marriage etc. u/s.366 – s.364-A is an offence where

kidnapping or abduction is made and a person is put to death or

hurt; or a person is threatened with death or actually murdered,

on demand of ransom – Clarified, s.364-A does not merely cover

acts of terrorism against the Government or Foreign State but it

also covers cases where the demand of ransom is made not as a

part of a terrorist act but for monetary gains for a private individual

– Incorporation of s.364-A discussed. [Para 12]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.357(1), 357-A:

Held: A victim of a crime cannot be treated merely as a prosecution

witness – s.357(1) empowers the court to order that the fine

amount recovered be given to any person as compensation who

has suffered any loss or injury caused due to that offence – There

may be times when the situation may demand that a substantive

amount of compensation be paid to the victim and the convict

may not be financially that strong to bear that burden – For such

situations, s.357A was therefore introduced, where compensation

to the victims may be paid out of State funds, as the State had the

responsibility to protect the victim against the offence committed

against the victim of the crime – In the present case, the victim

suffered burn injuries of 45-48% and lost one leg, when he was

only eighteen years of age – Rs.5,00,000/- be paid by the State to 

42 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

the victim as compensation u/s.357A instead of Rs.1,00,000/- as

directed by the High Court. [Paras 19, 20]

Criminal Law – Criminal trial – Injured witness – Importance

– Discussed.

List of Citations and Other References

Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra 2023 SCC

OnLine SC 355; Vikram Singh v. Union of India [2015]

10 SCR 816:(2015) 9 SCC 502; Shaik Ahmed v. State of

Telangana (2021) 9 SCC 59; Rajesh v. State of Madhya

Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1202 – relied on.

Ravi Dhingra v. State of Haryana (2023) 6 SCC 76;

Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao and Another v. State of

A.P. [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 273:(1996) 6 SCC 241;

Sunil Kumar and Others v. State of M.P. [1997] 1 SCR

589:(1997) 10 SCC 570; Shrawan Bhadaji Bhirad and

Others v. State of Maharashtra [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR

158:(2002) 10 SCC 56; State of U.P. v. Veer Singh

and Others [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 790:(2004) 10 SCC

117; S. Arul Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu [2010] 9 SCR

356:(2010) 8 SCC 233 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords

Abduction; Attempt to murder; Robbery; Kidnapping or abducting

to murder; Kidnapping for ransom; Conviction converted; Beyond

reasonable doubt; Injured witness; Victim compensation.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1420

of 2019.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.06.2018 of the High Court

of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No.200 of 2015.

With

Criminal Appeal No.36 of 2024

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 43

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

Appearances:

Sameer Shrivastava, Ms. Yashika Varshney, Mrs. Priyanka

Shrivastava, Mrs. Sangeeta, Shivendra Dixit, Advs. for the Appellant.

Sumeer Sodhi, Ms. Bhawana Mapwal, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

Leave granted. 

2. Both these appeals arise out of a common judgment and order dated

26.06.2018 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in

Criminal Appeal No.200 of 2015, which has dismissed the Criminal

Appeal of the present appellants, upholding the conviction and

sentence of the trial court. The two appellants were convicted for

offences under Sections 307/120B, 364-A and 392/397 and were

sentenced, inter alia, for life imprisonment under Section 364A Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’).

The third accused in this case, called Ravi Kumar Dwivedi, was

acquitted by the trial court.

3. The case of the prosecution is that appellants had abducted one

Arjit Sharma (PW-6), a Class 12th student of KPS School, Durg. The

abduction, as per the prosecution, was for ransom, and a dastardly

attempt was also made by the accused to kill the victim, although

the victim miraculously escaped, but not before sustaining grievous

injuries, which eventually led to the amputation of his right leg.

The complainant/victim (PW-6) was at the relevant time residing

as a paying guest in the house of Smt. Seema Singh (PW-7)

at Priyadarshni Nagar, Durg. The accused, Neeraj Sharma and

complainant were known to each other and on 02.01.2013, the two

decided to go on a motorcycle ride to Nehru Nagar and Yugandar

College, Rajnandgaon. The complainant was picked from his guest

house by the two accused i.e., Neeraj Sharma and Ashwani Kumar

Yadav and the three took off on their motorcycle to a place called

“Doundilohara”. At about 1:00 am in the night when the complainant

was trying to ease himself, the two accused made an attempt to kill 

44 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

him by throttling his neck by the clutch wire of the motorcycle. As

a result, the complainant fell on the ground unconscious and the

appellants thinking that the complainant had died, poured petrol on

his body and set him on fire.

As per the prosecution case the body was set on fire, but before

setting the body on fire, the complainant/victim’s mobile phone and

cash of Rs.5000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) were looted from

him, by the two accused Neeraj Sharma and Ashwani Kumar Yadav.

4. The complainant, however, was not dead, but as it turned out

managed to escape from the scene and was later rescued by

strangers whom he met on his way while escaping who helped him

call an ambulance and he was taken to Doundilohara Hospital from

where he was referred to Rajnandgaon and ultimately to Sector -9

Hospital, Bhilai. While he was at Doundilohara hospital, the doctor

(PW-4) who had examined the complainant had also informed the

Police and therefore a “Dehati Nalishi”1

 (Ex.P/12) was recorded

on 03.01.2013. The doctor PW-4 (Jai Kumar Chunarkar) who had

examined the complainant/victim at Doundilohara hospital, notes the

following burn injuries in his report (Ex.P/09).

“Injured had worn underwear of dark chocolate colour,

which was not burnt and smell of skin burning was emitting

from his entire body and he was in semi-conscious

condition. He was very restless and he had complaint of

plain and burn on the burning spots.”

“Burn injuries were found on frontal and backside of both

legs of the injured and skin of that spots had peeled out

from surface. Burn injuries and many burning blisters on

the lower portion of his belly and burn injury was on the

waist and burn injury was on the upper portion of right side

on the chest and a ligature mark like a lining was present

on the frontal portion of neck of the injured, which was in

light red colour, it had length of 122 to 14 cms and abrasion

injuries were found on the frontal portion of his neck which

had size of 3x2, 2x2 and 2x2 cms respectively. In this

connection he had submitted his Report (exhibit P-9).”

1 Dehati Nalishi is something akin to a zero FIR.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 45

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

There were first degree burn injuries on the body of the victim as the

burnt area was 45% to 48% of his body. Statement of the victim (PW6) was recorded before a Nayab Tehsildar on 04.01.2013 at 12 noon.

The overall circumstances under which this statement was recorded

makes it an important piece of evidence. We must also remember

that this is a statement given by an eighteen year old boy who has

just come out of a harrowing incident where a dastardly attempt was

made on his life. He is also grievously injured and apparently had

consulted no one before giving this statement before an Executive

Magistrate. The veracity of this statement should not be in doubt.

He states how he was taken on a motorcycle by Neeraj Sharma and

Ashwani Kumar Yadav and how he was asked to consume alcohol

on the way and then at 1:00 AM in the night, how the two accused

first tried to strangulate him with clutch wire and later set his body

on fire, thinking he is dead. It is important here to note that there is

no mention here of any demand or talk of ransom.

5. The police after completing its investigation filed its Chargesheet

against the three accused under Sections 120B, 364A, 307, 392/397

and in the alternative section 394 of IPC. As it was a Sessions triable

offence, it was committed to Sessions from where it went to First

Additional Sessions Judge Balod, who ultimately framed charges on

15.04.2013 under Sections 364A, 307, 120B, 392, 397 and in the

alternative 394 of IPC against all the accused persons i.e., Neeraj

Sharma, Ashwani Kumar Yadav and Ravi Kumar Dwivedi.

The prosecution examined in all 11 witnesses and placed several

exhibits before the Court. The accused pleaded not guilty and faced

trial. The Trial Court passed its Judgement dated 03.01.2015 by which

the accused appellants were convicted for offences under sections

307/120B, 364A and 392/397 IPC for which they were sentenced to

life imprisonment inter alia for the major offence under section 364-A

IPC which has also been upheld by the High Court.

6. While issuing notice in the Special Leave Petition on 30.11.2018 this

Court in the case of Neeraj Sharma in fact issued a limited notice to

his conviction under section 364-A while confirming his conviction

under sections 307 read with 120B along with sections 392 read

with 397 of IPC. The said order is produced below:

“We do not find any good ground warranting interference

with the conviction of the petitioner under Section 307

IPC read with 120 (B) and Section 392 IPC read with 397.

46 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Issue notice limited to the conviction under Section 364A

returnable within eight weeks.”

All the same nothing of this nature has been observed by this Court

while issuing notice in the case of Ashwani Kumar Yadav which was

issued on 02.08.2021.

As far as an attempt to murder and robbery are concerned, we have

no doubt in our mind that the prosecution has been able to establish

its case beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, we have our

doubts about the conviction of the accused under 364-A of the IPC.

In fact, this doubt was also in the mind of this Court, at least in the

case of Neeraj Sharma, as this Court has issued a limited notice as

only to the applicability of 364-A in the case.

7. The most important witness in this case is the complainant himself.

He is also an injured witness. The injuries sustained by him in the

incident match the case of the prosecution. An attempt was made

by the two accused to dispose of the body of the victim by burning

the body. There were burn injuries on both his legs. The strong

ligature mark on his neck was again significant as it is the case of

the prosecution that the two accused had tried to strangulate him

with the clutch wire. The condition of the victim was precarious to say

the least, and he gave a statement before the Executive Magistrate,

B.K. Verma who was the Nayab Tehsildar and Executive Magistrate,

Durg, he said:

“At 6.30-7.00 hrs in the evening Neeraj Sharma and Ashwini

Yadav came to me and said that lets go to Youganthar

College Rajnandgaon. I had not seen Youganthar College

so I went along with them in motor cycle to see the college.”

He also said,

“In the night of 3rd at 1.30 hrs there is a plant towards

Balod I do not know its name, near to that, Neeraj Sharma

and Ashwini Yadav first strangulated me with clutch wire I

had stopped my breath they thought that me dead, then

set me fire by pouring petrol.”

8. Apart from this, the veracity of the incident is further established by

the deposition of Santosh Shukla (PW-1), who was the first person

in the Bhilai Plant who saw the complainant in a burnt condition and

who inquired from him as to what led to his injuries and was informed 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 47

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

that these injuries were caused by his friends, and his money was

also looted by them. PW-4, Dr. Jai Kumar Chunarkar, was the first to

medically examine the complainant at Doundilohara Hospital. He had

recorded burn injuries on his body which we have already referred

above. Praneet Sharma (PW-5), is the father of the complainant who

stated that on the midnight of 03.01.2013, he was informed by Aman

Singh, that his son Arijit Sharma is not well and his son has been

hospitalized at Sector -9 Hospital, Bhilai and when he reached the

hospital, he saw his son in burnt condition and in severe pain. His

son informed him that the two appellants were the ones who tried

to kill him. He also said that at 12 noon on 03.01.2023 he received

a phone call from the mobile number 7869590607, where the caller

demanded a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- as ramson for the release of his

son, Arijit Sharma. When he said that his son is in hospital with

him and he would file a complaint against the caller, the phone got

disconnected. This part of the statement of this witness (PW-5) who

is the father of the complainant/injured, as regards the demand of

ransom, however, has not been established in any manner.

The complainant himself was examined as PW-6 who said in his

examination in chief that he was staying in Bhilai as paying guest

and on 02.01.2013 the accused Neeraj Sharma who was known to

him called on his mobile phone and asked him to come to Nehru

Nagar, Bhilai, from where they were supposed to go somewhere on

a motorbike. After informing his land lady, he went to meet Neeraj

Sharma at Nehru Nagar. Neeraj Sharma arrived after a few minutes

on a motorcycle with Ashwani Kumar Yadav riding their pillion. The

three went on this motorcycle towards Yugandar College and on

their way, they also consumed liquor. They had also met Rahul, the

brother of Neeraj Sharma, on their way. Past midnight, he requested

Neeraj Sharma to stop the vehicle, as he wanted to ease himself

and when the complainant was talking to Neeraj Sharma, the other

accused Ashwani Kumar Yadav, came from behind and tied clutch

wire around his neck and then both Ashwani Kumar Yadav and

Neeraj Sharma made an attempt to strangulate him with the clutch

wire. As a result, he fell down semi-conscious and he was thought

to be dead by the two assailants who then poured petrol on him. He

also heard Neeraj Sharma and Ashwani Kumar fetching petrol from

their motorcycle. Neeraj Sharma also took away Rs.5000/- from his

purse, and his cell phone. Later petrol was poured on him and then 

48 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

he was set on fire. He somehow escaped and reached the nearby

Bhilai plant and he informed the guard about the incident and gave

the number of his landlord to him and subsequently ambulance was

called and he was sent to the hospital.

This witness was cross-examined at length by the defence counsel

but nothing has come out which may cast a doubt on any of his

statements.

9. PW-7 is the land lady Seema Singh, where the complainant was

staying as a paying guest who also testified against the accused.

She has said that the complainant had informed her that he is going

with his friend towards another place on 02.01.2013 for which he

sought her permission.

The mobile phone was traced by the police belonged to one of the

accused Ashwani Kumar Yadav. The police during their investigation

arrested Neeraj Sharma and Ashwani Kumar Yadav on 03.01.2013

and their Hero Honda Motorcycle and Mobile Phones were recovered.

The prosecution story therefore as far as abduction and attempt to

murder is concerned can hardly be in doubt. The prosecution has

been able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The most

important witness here is the complainant himself, who is an 18-yearold boy, studying at the relevant time in a college near Bhilai, who

trusted his friends, not aware that he is being taken by deceit by his

friends who had planned his murder. PW-6 is also an injured witness.

10. The first doctor who had examined PW-6 was Dr. Jai Kumar

Chunarkar (PW-4), who works at the District Hospital at Balod. He

had examined the injured complainant in the early hours of morning

on 03.01.2013. His observation as to the injuries of PW-6 and his

general condition are as follows :

“Opinion : - Burn injuries were found over the body of the

patient, which were of durmel peed burn nature, which

expressed the first degree burn. The area of burnt was

approximately 45 to 48 percentage. Exhibit P-9 is the

examination report given by me, part A to A of which bears

my signature.

 On the same date, on receiving the memo from the Station

House Officer Daundilohara for recording, statement of

injured Arjit Sharma, I had opined that, “injured Arjit Sharma 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 49

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

was not in the condition to give statement on 03.01.13 at

4:30 hours in the morning.”

The injured was then referred to Bhilai Hospital where he was

examined by Dr. Uday (PW-9). His observation is as follows :

“On examination, I found that both legs of the patient were

deeply burnt from top to bottom and some blisters were

therein stomach and both hands, which were burnt up to

40 to 45 percentage. There were mark in his neck, which

probably was comes due to pressure of clutch wire. The

treatment of which was undergone in my Hospital at about

60 days, in which he was operated twice, First operation

was done on 15.01.13, during which we compelled to cut

his right legs below the knee, which was rotten due to

heavily burnt.

Second operation was done on 12.02.13, wherein at the

place on deep injury, the skin from other places were

grafted. Therafter, it started improving gradually the

condition of the patient and on 04.03.13, he has been

discharged from the hospital. Registration Sheed (Bedhead

Ticket) of indoor patient regarding admission in our hospital

is Exhibit P-14, which is in 166 pages, wherein on each

pages at part A to A bears my signature.”

The other person who had met the injured while he had escaped

was PW-1 i.e. Santosh Shukla. The statement of PW-1 is as follows:

“I am posted to the post of Senior Executive H.R. in

Godawari Steel Plant Gidhali since January, 2009. It is the

matter of first week of the January of this year, at that time

I was on duty at night shift. On the night in between about

2 to 3, the Guard of the plant informed me that one boy

in burning condition has come inside the plant and then

reaching out from the office I saw that the boy was burnt

at leg, back and hand etc., he had worn underwear only.

On enquiring by me, the boy told that, “My friends carried

me to the forest and burnt me and looted money from me”.

Then I phoned to the Police-station of Daundilohara and

had also phone to Sanjivani 108. Thereafter, Sanjivani

Ambulance reached and had taken the boy to Daundilohara

Hospital for treatment.

50 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Police personnel Station House Officer Sahu had come

to investigate the incident and had prepared Nazari map

(Exhibit P-01) of the incident, part A to A of which bears

my signature. Similarly, Halka Patwari had prepared the

Nazari map (Exhibit P-02) of the incident, part A to A of

which bears my signature. The police personnel had seized

pants, which was burnt, burnt shirt and pants jeep in burnt

condition, disposal glass, cigarette box etc. before me

and two hand cuff persons. The said seizure proceeding

of above articles was done according to Seizure memo

(Exhibit P-3), from the place of the incident in the presence

of accused Neeraj Sharma, present in the Court, wherein

at part A to A, there was my signature. The Police personal

had recorded my statement after enquiry.”

11. The importance of injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be over

stated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed

by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as

an extremely valuable evidence in a criminal Trial.

In the case of Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra 2023

SCC OnLine SC 355 this Court summed up the principles which

are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an injured

eye-witness. This court held as follows:

“26. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be

appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated

by the Courts are required to be kept in mind:

(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time

and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless

there are material contradictions in his deposition.

(b) Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence,

it must be believed that an injured witness would not

allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate

the accused.

(c) The evidence of injured witness has greater

evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons

exist, their statements are not to be discarded

lightly.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 51

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

(d) The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted

on account of some embellishment in natural conduct

or minor contradictions.

(e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial

embellishments in the evidence of an injured

witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or

embellishment should be discarded from the evidence

of injured, but not the whole evidence.

(f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must

be taken into consideration and discrepancies which

normally creep due to loss of memory with passage

of time should be discarded.”

12. In the case at hand the case of abduction and attempt to murder

are well established by the prosecution. All that is now left for us

to determine is whether an offence under Section 364A of IPC is

made out?

While abduction simpliciter may not technically be an offence under

the IPC, it becomes a punishable offence when it is combined with

another act. For example, abduction in order to commit murder is

an offence under Section 364 IPC. So is abduction an offence if it is

done with an intent to secretly or wrongfully confine a person (Section

365, IPC), or when it is done to compel a woman for marriage etc.

(Section 366, IPC). Similarly, Section 364A is an offence where

kidnapping or abduction is made and a person is put to death or

hurt; or a person is threatened with death or actually murdered, on

demand of ransom.

Section 364A IPC was inserted in the Indian Penal Code by an Act

of Parliament (Act No.42 of 1993 with effect from 22nd May, 1993).

That was a period when kidnapping and abduction for the purposes

of ransom were on the rise and therefore, the Law Commission

of India in its 42nd Report in 1971 had recommended insertion of

Section 364A in IPC, though it was ultimately incorporated in the

year 1993, it reads as under:

“364-A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.—Whoever kidnaps

or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after

such kidnapping or abduction, and threatens to cause death

or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise to a 

52 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to

death or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in

order to compel the Government or [any foreign State or

international inter-governmental organisation or] any other

person to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a

ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment

for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

This Court in the case of Vikram Singh v. Union of India (2015) 9

SCC 502 has observed as follows:

“53. Applying the above to the case at hand, we find that the

need to bring in Section 364-A IPC arose initially because

of the increasing incidence of kidnapping and abduction

for ransom. This is evident from the recommendations

made by the Law Commission to which we have made

reference in the earlier part of this judgment. While those

recommendations were pending with the Government, the

spectre of terrorism started raising its head threatening not

only the security and safety of the citizens but the very

sovereignty and integrity of the country, calling for adequate

measures to curb what has the potential of destabilising any

country. With terrorism assuming international dimensions,

the need to further amend the law arose, resulting in the

amendment to Section 364-A IPC, in the year 1994. The

gradual growth of the challenges posed by kidnapping and

abductions for ransom, not only by ordinary criminals for

monetary gain or as an organised activity for economic

gains but by terrorist organisations is what necessitated

the incorporation of Section 364-A IPC and a stringent

punishment for those indulging in such activities.”

It needs to be clarified, as it was done in Vikram Singh (supra), that

Section 364A IPC does not merely cover acts of terrorism against

the Government or Foreign State but it also covers cases where the

demand of ransom is made not as a part of a terrorist act but for

monetary gains for a private individual.

13. In the present case, the evidence placed by the prosecution to

establish a case under Section 364-A is in the form of a phone call to

the father of the victim at 12 noon by Ravi Kumar Dwivedi (the third

accused who was acquitted by the Trial Court). Although, according 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 53

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

to the prosecution the number has been traced to Ashwani Kumar

Yadav, one of the two accused here, but no evidence to this effect,

as required under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, has been placed

before the Court.

The supplementary statement given by the complainant before the

police on 21.03.2013, (his first statement is on 03.01.2013), has little

relevance as PW-6 never speaks of this in his examination in chief.

14. This court in the case of Shaik Ahmed v. State of Telangana (2021)

9 SCC 59 has held that in order to make out an offence under Section

364 A, three conditions must be met:

A) There should be a kidnapping or abduction of a person or

a person is to be kept in detention after such kidnapping or

abduction;

B) There is a threat to cause death or hurt to such a person or the

accused by their conduct give rise to a reasonable apprehension

that such person may be put to death or hurt

C) Or cause death or hurt to such a person in order to compel

the Government or any foreign state or intergovernmental

organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing

any act or to pay a ransom.

The necessary ingredients which the prosecution must prove, beyond

a reasonable doubt, before the Court are not only an act of kidnapping

or abduction but thereafter the demand of ransom, coupled with the

threat to life of a person who has been kidnapped or abducted, must

be there. It was reiterated by this Court in the case of Ravi Dhingra

v. State of Haryana (2023) 6 SCC 76.

In the present case, what the prosecution has miserably failed to

establish is the demand of ransom. As per the prosecution, the

complainant’s father i.e., Praneet Sharma (PW-5) received a phone

call from which a demand of ransom was made. The phone call

was allegedly traced as being of one Ravi Kumar Dwivedi but no

evidence was placed on record to establish the demand of ransom

before the Court which was absolutely necessary in view of the law

laid done by this Court in Rajesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh,

2023 SCC OnLine SC 1202.

54 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

15. For making out a case under Section 364-A, the first condition i.e.,

kidnapping or abduction must be coupled with either the second or

the third condition as held by this Court in Shaik Ahmed (supra)2

.

Under the said provision, the accused is liable to be punished

either by death or imprisonment for life and is also liable to be fined

considering the gravity of the offence. In the present case, even if it

is presumed for the sake of argument that an offence under Section

364 is made out, we do not find that the offence would come under

the ambit of Section 364A.

‘Abduction’ is defined under Section 362 which reads as under:

“362. Abduction.—Whoever by force compels, or by any

deceitful means induces, any person to go from any place,

is said to abduct that person.”

The offence which is made out is definitely under Section 364 which

read as under:

“364. Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder.—

Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such

person may be murdered or may be so disposed of as

to be put in danger of being murdered, shall be punished

with [imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for

a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be

liable to fine.”

16. However, in order to come under the ambit of Section 364A,

something more than abduction is required, which is demand of

ransom. We do not find that there was a demand of ransom as

alleged by the prosecution. There is no worthwhile evidence placed

by the prosecution in this regard.

The demand of ransom does not come in the examination in chief of

the complainant (PW-6). He sticks to his theory of abduction, attempt

to murder, etc., but there is no whisper about any demand of ransom,

though in his supplementary statement before the Police (under

Section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code), on 21.03.2013, he says

that while he was lying on the ground after an attempt to strangulate

him was made by the two accused, he had heard Neeraj Sharma

telling Ashwani Kumar Yadav that they should now demand a ransom

2 Para 33

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 55

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

from his father. The only deposition in Court regarding demand of

ransom has come as a bald statement by Praneet Sharma (PW-5)

who is the father of the complainant that on 03.01.2013 when he was

in the hospital one Ravi Kumar Dwivedi demanded Rs.8,00,000/- as

ransom. Ravi Kumar Dwivedi the third accused, has already been

acquitted by the Trial Court. There was no evidence at all before the

Trial Court to have convicted the appellants under Section 364A,

IPC. The conviction of the appellants under Section 364A is not

made out and is therefore liable to be set aside.

17. Appellants’ conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under

Section 364A of IPC is therefore set aside. All the same, we do find

that PW-6 was abducted so that he could be murdered. We therefore

convert the findings under Section 364A to that of Section 364.

Appellants are hereby convicted under Section 364 of IPC, instead

of Section 364A IPC.

Both the trial court and the High Court have failed to detect the flaw

in the evidence led by the prosecution under Section 364A IPC.

The trial court as well as the appellate court have completely relied

upon the evidence of PW-5 (Praneet Sharma, father of the victim)

and PW-6 his son, the victim. As far as the evidence of PW-6 is

concerned, he makes no mention of any demand or ransom in the

court as a prosecution witness. In his first statement given to the

Executive Magistrate on 03.01.2013, again he makes no mention of

any ransom. He only mentions about ransom in his supplementary

statement recorded by the Police after two months on 21.03.2013.

The High Court believes it and calls it a “dying declaration”. The

statement given to the Police on 21.03.2023 cannot be called a

dying declaration. Dying declaration is defined under Section 32 of

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which is reproduced below:

32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person

who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.—

Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a

person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has

become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance

cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense

which under the circumstances of the case appears to the

Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the

following cases:—

56 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1) When it relates to cause of death.—When the

statement is made by a person as to the cause of

his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the

transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in

which the cause of that person’s death comes into

question.

Such statements are relevant whether the person who

made them was or was not, at the time when they were

made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be

the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his

death comes into question.

(2) Or is made in course of business.—When the

statement was made by such person in the ordinary

course of business, and in particular when it

consists of any entry or memorandum made by him

in books kept in the ordinary course of business,

or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an

acknowledgment written or signed by him of the

receipt of money, goods, securities or property of

any kind; or of a document used in commerce written

or signed by him; or of the date of a letter or other

document usually dated, written or signed by him.

(3) Or against interest of maker.—When the statement

is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the

person making it, or when, if true, it would expose him

or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution

or to a suit for damages.

(4) Or gives opinion as to public right or custom, or

matters of general interest.—When the statement

gives the opinion of any such person, as to the

existence of any public right or custom or matter of

public or general interest, of the existence of which,

if it existed, he would have been likely to be aware,

and when such statement was made before any

controversy as to such right, custom or matter had

arisen.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 57

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

(5) Or relates to existence of relationship.—When the

statement relates to the existence of any relationship

[by blood, marriage or adoption] between persons as

to whose relationship [by blood, marriage or adoption]

the person making the statement had special means

of knowledge, and when the statement was made

before the question in dispute was raised.

(6) Or is made in will or deed relating to family affairs.—

When the statement relates to the existence of any

relationship [by blood, marriage or adoption] between

persons deceased, and is made in any will or deed

relating to the affairs of the family to which any such

deceased person belonged, or in any family pedigree,

or upon any tombstone, family portrait or other thing

on which such statements are usually made, and

when such statement was made before the question

in dispute was raised.

(7) Or in document relating to transaction mentioned

in Section 13, clause (a).—When the statement is

contained in any deed, will or other document which

relates to any such transaction as is mentioned in

Section 13, clause (a).

(8) Or is made by several persons and expresses feelings

relevant to matter in question.—When the statement

was made by a number of persons, and expressed

feelings or impressions on their part relevant to the

matter in question.

The statement given by the complainant/victim (PW-6) on 03.01.2013

was firstly to the investigating officer (PW-10). But more importantly

it cannot be called “a dying declaration” simply because PW-6

had mercifully survived. This statement cannot be read as a dying

declaration because the person making this statement or declaration

had ultimately survived. This supplementary statement given to the

investigating officer on 21.03.2013 is nothing more than a statement

under Section 162 of Criminal Procedure Code (see: Gentela

Vijayavardhan Rao and Another v. State of A.P. (1996) 6 SCC 

58 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

2413

; Sunil Kumar and Others v. State of M.P. (1997) 10 SCC

5704

; Shrawan Bhadaji Bhirad and Others v. State of Maharashtra

(2002) 10 SCC 565

; State of U.P. v. Veer Singh and Others (2004)

10 SCC 1176

 and S. Arul Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 8

SCC 2337

.

18. In our considered opinion both the Trial Court as well as the High

Court were completely misdirected in holding this to be, inter alia,

a case under Section 364A of the IPC. There was no worthwhile

evidence placed by the prosecution on this aspect. The findings

of the Courts on this aspect therefore needs to be set aside. We,

therefore, partly allow the present appeals to the extent that findings

recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court of conviction under

Section 364A of the IPC are hereby set aside. We, however, find

that the accused had committed an offence under Section 364 IPC,

as the offence of abduction in order to murder the victim i.e., PW-6

stands proved. In other words, we convert the findings of conviction

under Section 364A to that of Section 364 IPC and sentence the two

accused (present appellants) for rigorous imprisonment of Ten years

each on this count and a fine of Rs.10,000/- each, and in default

further imprisonment of three months. The rest of the conviction and

sentence that is under Section 307 of the IPC read with Section

120B as well as under Section 392 of IPC read with Section 397 are

hereby affirmed. We are also aware that in addition to the sentence,

a fine of Rs.50,000/- each against the two accused was imposed

by the High Court. We retain the same and direct that the fine be

recovered from the present appellants, in default of payment of the

fine, the appellants shall undergo further imprisonment of one year

each. The above fine shall be thereafter remitted to the victim in

accordance with law.

19. A victim of a crime cannot be treated merely as a prosecution

witness. Section 357(1) of Criminal Procedure Code empowers the

court to order that the fine amount recovered be given to any person

3 Para 13

4 Para 20

5 Para 8

6 Para 5

7 Para 31

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 59

NEERAJ SHARMA v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

as compensation who has suffered any loss or injury caused due

to that offence. In this case, the victim had suffered burn injuries

of 45-48% and lost one leg, when he was only eighteen years of

age. There may be times when the situation may demand that a

substantive amount of compensation be paid to the victim and the

convict may not be financially that strong to bear that burden. For

such situations, Section 357A was therefore introduced in Criminal

Procedure Code for this reason, where compensation to the victims

may be paid out of State funds, as the State had the responsibility

to protect the victim against the offence that had been committed

against the victim of the crime.

20. In the present case, the victim i.e., PW-6 has suffered grievous

injuries, not only this, his left leg below his knee had to be amputated.

Consequently, we direct that an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Five

Lakhs only) be paid by the State of Chhattisgarh to the victim as

compensation under Section 357A of Cr.PC., instead of Rs.1,00,000/-

as directed by the High Court. Let the same be done within a period

of three months from today.

21. Ashwani Kumar Yadav shall be released, subject to the payment

of fine/compensation, provided he has completed his 10 years of

imprisonment and if not required in any other case. Order dated

17.09.2019 of this Court up to the extent of suspending the sentence

of appellant Neeraj Sharma and granting him bail is hereby vacated.

The bail bonds of appellant Neeraj Sharma stand cancelled and he

is directed to surrender within two weeks from today to complete

his remaining sentence.

 A copy of this judgment shall also be sent to the victim.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case: Appeals

partly allowed.

Service Law – Recruitment – Stoppage of salary – The District Basic Education Officer case was that by order dated 26.12.1997, only two additional posts of Assistant Teacher were created by the Joint Director of Education – It was averred that manipulation was made by the management in collusion with the appellants to show that three posts of Assistant Teacher were sanctioned – From October, 2005, abruptly salaries of appellants were stopped – Propriety: Held: Apart from the bare allegation, absolutely no material was placed on record to show how the appellants, who were the applicants from the open market, had colluded or were blameworthy for any manipulation – According to the State, two posts were, in fact, sanctioned and it was the School that manipulated it, to make it three – Even according to the State, admittedly, till date there is no order terminating their services – In an inquiry report initiated pursuant to the directions of the High Court, it was found that the Manager of the School had fraudulently changed the number of posts from two to three in the order dated 26.12.1997 and accordingly, an FIR was filed against the manager – There were no findings of collusion or blameworthiness against appellants for the alleged manipulation – Appellants were bona fide applicants from the open market – The alleged mischief, even according to the State, was at the end of the School and its Manager – In the light of the various Supreme Court decisions, it will be travesty of 22 [2024] 1 S.C.R. DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS justice if relief is denied to the appellants – Appellants were not at fault and the State could not have abruptly stopped their salaries – Accordingly, the State directed to pay salaries to the appellants for the period from 25.06.1999 till January, 2002 in full – Also, the State directed that insofar as the period from October, 2005 till today is concerned, the State shall pay the appellants 50% of the backwages – The State also directed to allow the appellants to commence work. [Paras 8, 14, 16, 30, 34, 35]

Service Law – Recruitment – Stoppage of salary – The

District Basic Education Officer case was that by order dated

26.12.1997, only two additional posts of Assistant Teacher were

created by the Joint Director of Education – It was averred that

manipulation was made by the management in collusion with

the appellants to show that three posts of Assistant Teacher

were sanctioned – From October, 2005, abruptly salaries of

appellants were stopped – Propriety:

Held: Apart from the bare allegation, absolutely no material was

placed on record to show how the appellants, who were the

applicants from the open market, had colluded or were blameworthy

for any manipulation – According to the State, two posts were, in

fact, sanctioned and it was the School that manipulated it, to make

it three – Even according to the State, admittedly, till date there is

no order terminating their services – In an inquiry report initiated

pursuant to the directions of the High Court, it was found that

the Manager of the School had fraudulently changed the number

of posts from two to three in the order dated 26.12.1997 and

accordingly, an FIR was filed against the manager – There were

no findings of collusion or blameworthiness against appellants for

the alleged manipulation – Appellants were bona fide applicants

from the open market – The alleged mischief, even according to

the State, was at the end of the School and its Manager – In the

light of the various Supreme Court decisions, it will be travesty of 

22 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

justice if relief is denied to the appellants – Appellants were not at

fault and the State could not have abruptly stopped their salaries

– Accordingly, the State directed to pay salaries to the appellants

for the period from 25.06.1999 till January, 2002 in full – Also,

the State directed that insofar as the period from October, 2005

till today is concerned, the State shall pay the appellants 50% of

the backwages – The State also directed to allow the appellants

to commence work. [Paras 8, 14, 16, 30, 34, 35]

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 21 : 2024 INSC 7

Case Details

Radhey Shyam Yadav & Anr. Etc.

v.

State of U.P. & Ors.

(Civil Appeal Nos.20-21 Of 2024)

03 January 2024

[J.K. Maheshwari and K.V. Viswanathan*, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Three appellants herein were appointed as Assistant Teachers

at the Junior High School on 25.06.1999. From October, 2005,

abruptly their salaries were stopped. Whether the State was justified

in abruptly stopping their salary.

Headnotes

Service Law – Recruitment – Stoppage of salary – The

District Basic Education Officer case was that by order dated

26.12.1997, only two additional posts of Assistant Teacher were

created by the Joint Director of Education – It was averred that

manipulation was made by the management in collusion with

the appellants to show that three posts of Assistant Teacher

were sanctioned – From October, 2005, abruptly salaries of

appellants were stopped – Propriety:

Held: Apart from the bare allegation, absolutely no material was

placed on record to show how the appellants, who were the

applicants from the open market, had colluded or were blameworthy

for any manipulation – According to the State, two posts were, in

fact, sanctioned and it was the School that manipulated it, to make

it three – Even according to the State, admittedly, till date there is

no order terminating their services – In an inquiry report initiated

pursuant to the directions of the High Court, it was found that

the Manager of the School had fraudulently changed the number

of posts from two to three in the order dated 26.12.1997 and

accordingly, an FIR was filed against the manager – There were

no findings of collusion or blameworthiness against appellants for

the alleged manipulation – Appellants were bona fide applicants

from the open market – The alleged mischief, even according to

the State, was at the end of the School and its Manager – In the

light of the various Supreme Court decisions, it will be travesty of 

22 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

justice if relief is denied to the appellants – Appellants were not at

fault and the State could not have abruptly stopped their salaries

– Accordingly, the State directed to pay salaries to the appellants

for the period from 25.06.1999 till January, 2002 in full – Also,

the State directed that insofar as the period from October, 2005

till today is concerned, the State shall pay the appellants 50% of

the backwages – The State also directed to allow the appellants

to commence work. [Paras 8, 14, 16, 30, 34, 35]

List of Citations and Other References

Chief Engineer, M.S.E.B and Another vs. Suresh

Raghunath Bhokare, (2005)10 SCC 465; Vikas Pratap

Singh and Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors.,

[2013] 10 SCR 1114:(2013) 14 SCC 494; Anmol Kumar

Tiwari and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Others,

2021 INSC 101: (2021) 5 SCC 424; Dr. M.S. Mudhol

and Another vs. S.D. Halegkar and Others, [1993] 1

Suppl. SCR 115:(1993) 3 SCC 591; Rajesh Kumar and

Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, [2013] 4 SCR

753:(2013) 4 SCC 690; K. Ameer Khan and Anr. Vs. A.

Gangadharan and Ors., (2001) 9 SCC 84; Sivanandan

C.T. and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Ors.,

(2023) SCC OnLine SC 994 – relied on.

Sachin Kumar and Ors. Vs. Delhi Subordinate

Service Selection Board (DSSSB) and Ors. [2021]

2 SCR 1073:2021 INSC 147: 2021 (4) SCC 631 –

distinguished.

Vivek Kaisth and Anr. Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh

and Ors., 2023 INSC 1007:2023 SCC OnLine SC

1485 – referred to.

List of Keywords

Service Law; Recruitment; Stoppage of salary; Bona fide

applicants; Open market; Full salary payment; Backwages.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.20-21 of 2024.

[From the Judgment and Order dated 15.09.2021 of the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad in Special Appeal Nos.1435 and 1445 of 2023]

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 23

RADHEY SHYAM YADAV & ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

Appearances:

Surender Kumar Gupta, Chitvan Singhal, Advs. for the Appellants.

Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Krishnanand Pandeya, Dhawal Uniyal, Naresh

Kumar, Himanshu Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Radhey Shyam Yadav, Lal Chandra Kharwar and Ravindra Nath

Yadav are the three appellants. On 25.06.1999, they were appointed

as Assistant Teachers at the Junior High School, Bahorikpur,

Maharajganj, District Jaunpur, U.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the

School’). From October, 2005, abruptly their salaries were stopped.

They moved the High Court for redressal. Both the learned Single

Judge and the Division Bench declined them relief. Aggrieved, they

are before us in these Appeals.

Brief facts:-

3. From the record, it appears that the School started as a recognized

unaided school in 1983-1984 with one post of Head Master, four posts

of Assistant Teacher, three posts of Peon and one post of Clerk. On

07.10.1996, two posts of Assistant Teacher were increased, raising

the sanctioned strength of Assistant Teacher to six.

4. On 26.12.1997, the Director of Education (Basic) sanctioned certain

additional posts of Assistant Teacher in the aforesaid School. While

the department claims that by the order of 26.12.1997, only two

posts of Assistant Teacher were sanctioned, the Manager/Principal

of the School claiming that three posts were sanctioned, went ahead

and sought permission from the District Basic Education Officer for

issuing advertisement. This was done by their letter of 28.01.1998.

The letter of 26.12.1997 has been placed before us by the State in

the form of an additional affidavit which indicates that only two posts

were sanctioned. The State does not dispute that by the above letter

two posts of Assistant Teacher were sanctioned. In 1998, the School

became an aided School.

24 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

5. Thereafter, responding to the letter of the School, the District Basic

Education Officer by his letter of 20.11.1998 accorded permission

to issue advertisement for appointment of three posts of Assistant

Teachers. On 25.11.1998, an advertisement was issued. The School,

thereafter, on 08.12.1998, wrote a letter to the District Basic Education

Officer to nominate a Member for the selection of the teachers.

In response, the District Basic Education Officer nominated the

Assistant District Basic Education Officer, Bahorikpur as a Member

of the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee duly met and

considered the twelve applications received by it. Seven out of the

twelve applicants, including the three appellants herein, participated

in the interview. By its letter of 27.12.1998, the Selection Committee

informed the District Basic Education Officer that the appellants, on

basis of their ability, have been selected and their case was being

submitted for approval. The order in which the Selection Committee

has sent subject-wise names were as follows:

i. Lal Chandra Kharwar – Science and Math

ii. Radhey Shyam Yadav – English

iii. Ravindra Nath Yadav – Agric & Gen.Topic

It is not disputed that by an order of 09.06.1999, the District Basic

Education Officer granted approval for the appointment of the

appellants. As stated earlier, they were appointed on 25.06.1999

and were working continuously.

6. The undisputed case is that from October, 2005, their salaries were

stopped from being disbursed, forcing them to file Writ Petitions in

the High Court, namely, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10286 of 2007

and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 18641 of 2008. The three appellants,

in all, filed two writ petitions. In the writ petitions, the prayer was

for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay the

arrears of salary from July, 1999 to January, 2002 and continue to

pay salary from October, 2005. It was their case that from the date

of appointment till January 2002, their salary had not been released.

7. The District Basic Education Officer filed counter affidavits to the

writ petitions. It was his case that, by order dated 26.12.1997, only

two additional posts of Assistant Teacher were created by the Joint

Director of Education. It was averred that manipulation was made by

the management in collusion with the appellants to show that three

posts of Assistant Teacher were sanctioned. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 25

RADHEY SHYAM YADAV & ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

8. Apart from this bare allegation, absolutely no material was placed on

record to show how the appellants had colluded or were blameworthy

for any manipulation.

9. Subsequent to the counter affidavit filed by the State, on 30.07.2013,

a compliance affidavit was filed. It is averred therein that a detailed

enquiry was conducted in the matter wherein it had transpired that

manipulation was got done at the level of the School in question by

overwriting the sanctioned posts of teachers of the School as “three”

in place of “two”.

10. The Learned Single Judge, by order dated 10.09.2013, held that

if based on the forged order, proceedings were initiated for the

selection of Assistant Teacher, then the entire selection needs to be

cancelled. It was also held that since forgery was committed by the

persons involved in the selection of Assistant Teachers and since

the selection process was not fair, being based on a forged letter,

the candidates who were selected in the selection process are not

entitled to be appointed and retained on the post of Assistant Teacher,

and holding so, the writ petitions were dismissed. The appellants filed

writ appeals. By the impugned order, the appeals were dismissed

reiterating the findings of the learned Singe Judge.

Contentions:

11. We have heard Mr. Surender Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for

the appellants and Ms. Sansriti Pathak, learned counsel for the

respondent-State.

12. Learned counsel for the appellants, after placing a comprehensive

overview of the facts, vehemently contended that there was no fault on

the part of the appellants and for any wrong computation of vacancy,

the appellants ought not to be prejudiced. He further contended that

the State admittedly does not dispute that two vacancies were, in

fact, created and that if at all there was any manipulation, it was at

the level of the School. In the absence of any blameworthy conduct

attributed to the appellants, they ought not to be prejudiced after

serving the School for very long. According to the appellants, they

were continuously teaching till 30.03.2016 by entering their names in

a separate register. However, according to the State, from October,

2005 their salaries have been stopped. In support of their claim,

learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgments of this 

26 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Court in Vikas Pratap Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh

and Ors., (2013) 14 SCC 494 and the recent judgment in Civil Appeal

Nos. 6233-34 of 2023 dated 20.11.2023 titled Vivek Kaisth and Anr.

Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., 2023:INSC:1007 =

2023 SCC OnLine SC 1485.

13. Ms. Sansriti Pathak, learned counsel for the State vehemently

defended the impugned judgment. She contended that where

there was fraud, the whole selection process shall be vitiated. She

relied on Sachin Kumar and Ors. Vs. Delhi Subordinate Service

Selection Board (DSSSB) and Ors. 2021:INSC:147 = 2021 (4)

SCC 631 in support of her proposition. Learned counsel submitted

that there was no case warranting interference under Article 136 of

the Constitution of India.

Discussion and Findings:

14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the matter and

considered the submissions of the rival parties and perused the

records. The correspondence between the School and the Directorate

of Education culminated in the order of 26.12.1997. There is a dispute

about the number of posts that were sanctioned. According to the

State, two posts were, in fact, sanctioned and it was the School that

manipulated it, to make it three. We will proceed on the basis that the

version of the State is correct. The nominee of the State participated

in the selection process. Twelve candidates had applied and ultimately

three appellants were empanelled for selection. Due approval was

given for the appointment and admittedly they discharged their duties

on their post from 25.06.1999 till September, 2005. Even according

to the State, admittedly, till date there is no order terminating their

services. What impelled the appellants to go to the High Court was

the stoppage of their salary.

15. There is not an iota of material to demonstrate how the appellants,

who were applicants from the open market, were guilty of colluding

in the manipulation.

16. We are also reinforced on this, by the findings in the inquiry report

initiated pursuant to the directions of the High Court in the writ

petitions. In the Inquiry Report, the conclusion was that, it was the

erstwhile District Basic Education Officer, Jaunpur and his office, in

collusion with the Manager of the School, who had taken steps for

appointment/approval. It was mentioned that there was involvement 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 27

RADHEY SHYAM YADAV & ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

of Shri Ram Dular Yadav, Principal, Shri Triloki Nath Singh, Manager

of the school, the erstwhile District Basic Education Officer, Jaunpur

and also the officials of the District Basic Education Officer, Jaunpur.

It was further found that the Manager of the School has fraudulently

changed the number of posts from two to three in the order dated

26.12.1997 and it was mentioned that Shri Triloki Nath Singh, the

Manager was guilty and accordingly, District Basic Education Officer,

Jaunpur has lodged an F.I.R. against Shri Triloki Nath Singh on

08.07.2013.

17. What is important to notice is, nothing has been mentioned as to

how the appellants, who were applicants from the open market,

were in any way responsible. There is no reference to any material

whatsoever that had been unearthed either in the departmental inquiry

launched or in the criminal investigation. On a pointed query to the

counsel for the State as to whether the appellants were arrayed as

accused in that criminal case, she candidly replied that they were

not. On being further asked as to whether any action has been taken

against the School, she replied that no action has been taken. The

School continues to function with grants-in-aid. She submitted that

the only action taken was to file an F.I.R. against the Manager of the

School, which F.I.R. has since resulted in a charge-sheet.

18. In the inquiry report, the following crucial findings occur. They are

extracted hereinbelow:

“(3) Two additional posts of Assistant Teachers were

created vide the Directorate’s letter No.Samanya(l)

Basic/2117-20/96-97 dated 26.12.1997 (certified copy

enclosed) as a result the number of sanctioned posts of

Asst. Teachers in the school in question became 06 (six).

Earlier this letter was typed for being sent to the Zonal

Assistant Education Director (Basic), Azamgarh which

was later on erased and ‘Varanasi’ was written with pen.

In this letter, in column No.2, the number of sanctioned

post is mentioned as 02 and against column No.5 the

number of Assistant Teachers is clearly mentioned as 8.

This file bears the signatures of Ex-Desk Assistant Shri

Rajnarain Trivedi and Deputy Education Director (Science)

Shri Harish Chandra Tiwari, who has since retired on the

note side of the file there is the order of creation of two 

28 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

posts dated 11.8.1997 of late Shri Vinay Kumar Pandey,

Deputy Education Director (Basic).

(4) In the aforesaid post creation order of the Directorate

dated 26.12.1997, the Manager of the institute, showing

03 (three) posts of Assistant Teachers fraudulently and

obtained approval for appointment of 03 Assistant Teachers

S/Shri Lal Chand Kharwar, Radhey Shyam Yadav and

Ravinder Nath from District, Jaunpur vide letter No

B-2/1313-14/99-2000 dated 9.6.98.

(5) The District, Jaunpur sought permission from the

Directorate for payment of salary of the aforesaid three

teachers vide letter No.3909 dated 28.8.2001. With this

letter the Directorate’s letter dated 16.12.1997, which was

sent by the Manager duly certified by the District, Jaunpur

was enclosed in which fraudulently 03(three) in place of 02

(two) in column No.3, 09 (nine) in place of 08 (eight) and

total 12 (twelve) in place of 11 (eleven) against column

No.5 were shown.

(6) After the verification of the said fraudulent letter dated

26.12.1997 sent by the District, Jaunpur, vide the registered

letter No.Arth(4)/1812/2004-05 dated 27.10.2004 and

Letter No.Arth(4)/2310-13/2004-05 dated 19.11.2004, the

District, Jaunpur was directed that in the post creation order

in question the Manager of the institute had fraudulently

mentioned three posts while in the post creation order

dated 28.12.1997 only two posts of Assistant Teachers

have been sanctioned. The Directorate directed the District,

Jaunpur to call for the explanation of the Manager and the

Principal of the institute responsible for the same, and to

furnish the information about the then District, Jaunpur who

had verified the posts and the name, designation and the

place of posting of the then Desk Assistant (photo copy

enclosed). On the aforesaid two letters of the Directorate

no action was taken by the then District, Jaunpur which

prima facie shows that the erstwhile District, Jaunpur and

his office in collusion with the Manager of the school, had

taken steps for appointment/approval in the school in which

the involvement of Shri Ram Dular Yadav, Principal, Shri

Triloki Nath Singh, Manager of the institute, the erstwhile 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 29

RADHEY SHYAM YADAV & ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

District, Jaunpur and the officials of the office of District,

Jaunpur, is clearly visible.

xxx xxx

(c) The erstwhile District, Jaunpur/erstwhile Finance and

Accounts Officer, Basic Education Office, Jaunpur and the

Desk Assistant are prima facie guilty in granting permission

for advertisement selection, approval and taking steps for

disbursement of salary on the basis of the forged letter

of creation of posts dated 26.12.1997 of the Manager of

the institute and in this respect the Education Director

(Basic) should submit proposal to the Government to

initiate disciplinary action against them. In addition take

action against the concerned Desk Assistants at his level.”

There was absolutely nothing found against the three appellants.

However, the following recommendations were made:-

“(d) The appointments of S/Shri Lala Chand Kharwar,

Radhey Shyam Yadav and Ravindra Nath Yadav, made

pursuant to the said forged letter dated 26.12.1997 are

illegal. They have been paid for the period February, 2002

to October, 2005, the salary is illegal. The same be counted

and action for proportionate recovery be taken against the

guilty erstwhile District/erstwhile Finance and Accounts

Officer, Basic Education and the concerned Desk Officer

by the Director of Education (Basic) as per the settled

procedure and steps taken to terminate the services of

illegally appointed Assistant Teachers S/Shri Lala Chand

Kharwar, Radhey Shyam Yadav and Ravindra Nath Yadav.”

19. In the inquiry, the appellants were not given any opportunity. Even

in the inquiry held behind the back of the appellants, there were

no findings of collusion or blameworthiness against them for the

alleged manipulation. Even as on date, the appointment order dated

25.06.1999 and the approval order of 09.06.1999 have not been

revoked. With no finding of guilt against the appellants and with no

material against them, their salaries had been stopped and they have

been prevented to sign on the regular attendance register, admittedly

from October, 2005. The contention of the appellants is that they

continued with their teaching work up till 30.03.2016 entering their

names on a separate attendance register. 

30 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

20. We may also note the fact that in the F.I.R. lodged by the State on

17.07.2015 also, there is no allegation against the appellants or any

other applicants and only two persons were named in that F.I.R.

They were Vinod Kumar Chaturvedi, Senior Assistant and Rajendra

Prasad Yadav, Senior Assistant. Both were employees in the office

of the District Basic Education Officer. The allegation was that the

documents related to approval of appointments/teacher listings from

the concerned schools were missing and that the said two officers

were responsible for maintaining the records.

21. In this background, the question that really falls for consideration is,

was the State justified in abruptly and without anything more, stopping

the salary? We are constrained to answer the question in negative.

22. Assuming the case of the State to be true and taking it at its highest,

the factual position would come to this, namely, that while the State

sanctioned two vacancies, the school went ahead and recruited

three. The State has no proof of commission of any malpractice

by the appellants. The State approved their appointments, and the

approval order till date has not been cancelled. The appointments

have not been terminated. No action has been taken against the

school and the school continues to receive the aid.

23. Chief Engineer, M.S.E.B. and Another vs. Suresh Raghunath

Bhokare, (2005) 10 SCC 465 is a case which, on facts, has a striking

resemblance to the case at hand. The respondent therein had been

recommended by the department and was selected as line-helper

in the appellant-Board. On the ground that the recommendation

was allegedly made fraudulently, the respondent was dismissed

from service. The complaint preferred by the respondent had been

dismissed by the Labour Court. The Industrial Court reversing

the findings of the Labour Court, quashed the termination of the

respondent therein and directed reinstatement. Writ Petition filed

by the appellant therein was dismissed by the High Court. This

Court, while observing that in the absence of any overt act being

attributed to the respondent, held that it could not be inferred that

the respondent had a role in sending fraudulent list, solely on the

basis of the presumption that he got the job. Para 5 of the judgment

which is crucial for the decision of the present case is extracted

herein below:-

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 31

RADHEY SHYAM YADAV & ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

“5.  The entire basis of the dismissal of the appellant

depends upon the factum of the alleged misrepresentation

attributed to the respondent. The Industrial Court in its

impugned order has noticed the fact that the respondent

was appointed in April 1994 pursuant to the selection

procedure followed by the competent authority and that

he was selected by the panel of Selection Committee

consisting of 6 members which included the very same

Social Welfare Officer who had sent the proposal including

the name of the respondent for appointment. It also noticed

the fact that the selection in question was made after an

oral interview and the required test as also the medical

examination. The Industrial Court also noticed the fact that

the appointment of the respondent was confirmed  after

one-year period and thereafter the respondent has been

working without any complaint. The said Industrial Court

also noticed the fact that the termination of the respondent

was based on a show-cause notice issued on 5-7-1999

which was replied to by the respondent on 17-7-1999

and the termination was made in a summary procedure

permissible under Rule 90(b) of the Service Regulations.

The Industrial Court after perusing the pleadings and the

notice issued to the respondent came to the conclusion

that the alleged misrepresentation which is now said to

be a fraud was not specifically pleaded or proved. In the

show-cause notice, no basis was laid to show what is the

nature of fraud that was being attributed to the appellant.

No particulars of the alleged fraud were given and the said

pleadings did not even contain any allegation as to how

the appellant was responsible for sending the so-called

fraudulent proposal or what role he had to play in such

proposal being sent. It also noticed from the evidence of Mr

Waghmare, Social Welfare Officer who sent the proposal

before the Labour Court that he did not utter a single word

as to whether the said supplementary list was ever called

for by the department concerned or not. Thus applying the

basic principle of rule of evidence which requires a party

alleging fraud to give particulars of the fraud and having

found no such particulars, the Industrial Court came to the

conclusion that the respondent could not be held guilty of 

32 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

fraud. The said finding of the Industrial Court has been

accepted by the High Court. Mr. Bhasme though contended

that the fraud in question was played in collusion with the

Social Welfare Officer and 2 other employees of the Board

and action against the said 2 employees of the Board has

been taken, but by that itself we are unable to accept the

argument of Mr. Bhasme that there is material to support

the contention of the Board that the appellant had also

contributed to making the misrepresentation at the time of

applying for the job with the Board. In the absence of any

such particulars being mentioned in the show-cause notice

or at the trial, attributing some overt act to the respondent,

we do not think the Board can infer that the respondent

had a role to play in sending a fraudulent list solely on the

basis of the presumption that since the respondent got a

job by the said proposal, the said list is a fraudulent one.

It was the duty of the Board to have specifically produced

the material to prove that the respondent himself had the

knowledge of such a fraud and he knowingly or in collusion

with other officials indulged in this fraud. Since there is no

such material on record, on the facts of the instant case,

the Industrial Court and the High Court have come to

the right conclusion that the alleged fraud has not been

established by the appellants, hence, this is not a fit case

in which interference is called for. This appeal, therefore,

fails and the same is dismissed.”

(emphasis supplied)

24. In Vikas Pratap Singh (supra), this Court, while protecting the

selection of the appellants, had the following to say:-

“27. Admittedly, in the instant case the error committed by

the respondent board in the matter of evaluation of the

answer scripts could not be attributed to the appellants

as they have neither been found to have committed any

fraud or misrepresentation in being appointed qua the

first merit list nor has the preparation of the erroneous

model answer key or the specious result contributed to

them. Had the contrary been the case, it would have

justified their ouster upon re-evaluation and deprived 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 33

RADHEY SHYAM YADAV & ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

them of any sympathy from this Court irrespective of

their length of service.”

25. Vikas Pratap Singh (supra) was followed in Anmol Kumar Tiwari

and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2021:INSC:101 =

(2021) 5 SCC 424. This Court, in para 11, held as follows:-

“11. Two issues arise for our consideration. The first relates

to the correctness of the direction given by the High Court

to reinstate the writ petitioners. The High Court directed

reinstatement of the writ petitioners after taking into account

the fact that they were beneficiaries of the select list that

was prepared in an irregular manner. However, the High

Court found that the writ petitioners were not responsible

for the irregularities committed by the authorities in

preparation of the select list. Moreover, the writ petitioners

were appointed after completion of training and worked

for some time. The High Court was of the opinion that the

writ petitioners ought to be considered for reinstatement

without affecting the rights of other candidates who were

already selected. A similar situation arose in Vikas Pratap

Singh case [Vikas Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh,

(2013) 14 SCC 494 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 100], where

this Court considered that the appellants therein were

appointed due to an error committed by the respondents in

the matter of valuation of answer scripts. As there was no

allegation of fraud or misrepresentation committed by the

appellants therein, the termination of their services was set

aside as it would adversely affect their careers. That the

appellants therein had successfully undergone training and

were serving the State for more than 3 years was another

reason that was given by this Court for setting aside the

orders passed by the High Court. As the writ petitioners

are similarly situated to the appellants in  Vikas Pratap

Singh case [Vikas Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh,

(2013) 14 SCC 494 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 100], we are

in agreement with the High Court that the writ petitioners

are entitled to the relief granted. Moreover, though on pain

of contempt, the writ petitioners have been reinstated and

are working at present.”

(emphasis supplied)

34 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

26. To the same effect is the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Dr.

M.S. Mudhol and Another vs. S.D. Halegkar and Others, (1993)

3 SCC 591 wherein, in para 6, it was observed as under:-

“6. Since we find that it was the default on the part of the

2nd respondent, Director of Education in illegally approving

the appointment of the first respondent in 1981 although

he did not have the requisite academic qualifications

as a result of which the 1st respondent has continued

to hold the said post for the last 12 years now, it would

be inadvisable to disturb him from the said post at this

late stage particularly when he was not at fault when his

selection was made. There is nothing on record to show

that he had at that time projected his qualifications other

than what he possessed. If, therefore, in spite of placing

all his cards before the selection committee, the selection

committee for some reason or the other had thought it

fit to choose him for the post and the 2nd respondent

had chosen to acquiesce in the appointment, it would be

inequitous to make him suffer for the same now. Illegality,

if any, was committed by the selection committee and the

2nd respondent. They are alone to be blamed for the same.”

27. In Rajesh Kumar and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2013)

4 SCC 690, this Court finding the appellants to be innocent parties

ruled that even if in the re-evaluation the appellants do not make

the grade, still the appellants appointments ought to be protected.

Para 21 & 22.3 are extracted herein below:-

“21.  There is considerable merit in the submission of

Mr Rao. It goes without saying that the appellants were

innocent parties who have not, in any manner, contributed

to the preparation of the erroneous key or the distorted

result. There is no mention of any fraud or malpractice

against the appellants who have served the State for

nearly seven years now. In the circumstances, while inter

se merit position may be relevant for the appellants, the

ouster of the latter need not be an inevitable and inexorable

consequence of such a re-evaluation. The re-evaluation

process may additionally benefit those who have lost

the hope of an appointment on the basis of a wrong key 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 35

RADHEY SHYAM YADAV & ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

applied for evaluating the answer scripts. Such of those

candidates as may be ultimately found to be entitled to

issue of appointment letters on the basis of their merit

shall benefit by such re-evaluation and shall pick up their

appointments on that basis according to their inter se

position on the merit list.

22.3.  In case the writ petitioners, Respondents 6 to 18

also figure in the merit list after re-evaluation of the answer

scripts, their appointments shall relate back to the date

when the appellants were first appointed with continuity

of service to them for purpose of seniority but without any

back wages or other incidental benefits.”

28. In K. Ameer Khan and Anr. Vs. A. Gangadharan and Ors., (2001)

9 SCC 84, a case involving the wrong computation of vacancies,

while protecting the promotion of the appellants, this Court had the

following to say:-

“2. .....The appellants have been selected quite some

time back and the first appellant has been promoted to

a higher grade. The appellants were not responsible for

the wrong computation of vacancies done by the second

respondent. After the empanelment and appointment of

the appellants, it is brought to our notice that there have

been fresh promotions to the post of Assistant Controller

of Stores at least on two occasions in June 1995 and May

1997. In a new selection, five Scheduled Caste candidates

and four Scheduled Tribe candidates have been selected.

The appellants could not participate in the same as they

had already been promoted to the higher grade. Now,

when the appellants have been working in the higher grade

from 1994 onwards, it would not be equitable to disturb

their promotions…….”

29. More recently, this Court in Vivek Kaisth (supra), following the

judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sivanandan C.T. and Others

vs. High Court of Kerala and Ors., (2023) SCC OnLine SC 994

protected the appointments of the appellants even after finding that

their appointments were in excess of the advertised vacancies. This

Court held as under:- 

36 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

“32. … …. Today, when we are delivering this judgment the

two appellants have already served as Judicial Officers for

nearly 10 years. Meanwhile, they have also been promoted

to the next higher post of Civil Judge (Senior Division). In

this process of their selection and appointment (which has

obviously benefitted them), nothing has been brought to

our notice which may suggest any favouritism, nepotism or

so-called blame as to the conduct of these two appellants,

in securing these appointments. The High Court in fact

notes this factor. While placing the blame on the State

Commission it records that “………. there is nothing on

record suggestive of the fact that any mala fides were

behind the selection of respondents Nos.4 and 6……….”

“34. The appellants were not entitled for any equitable relief

in view of the High Court as they were the beneficiaries

of an illegality committed by the Selection/appointing

authority. But then it failed to take this question further,

which in our opinion, it ought to have done. What the High

Court never answered was as to how much of this blame

of “illegal” selection and appointment would rest on the

High Court (on its administrative side). Undoubtedly, with

all intentions of timely filling of the vacancies, the High

Court still cannot escape the blame…..”

“36. What is also important for our consideration at this

stage is that the appellants in the present case have

been working as Judicial Officers now for nearly 10 years.

They are now Civil Judge (Senior Division). These judicial

officers now have a rich experience of 10 years of judicial

service behind them. Therefore, unseating the present

appellants from their posts would not be in public interest.

Ordinarily, these factors as we have referred above, would

not matter, once the very appointment is held to be wrong.

But we also cannot fail to consider that the appellants were

appointed from the list of candidates who had successfully

passed the written examination and viva voce and they

were in the merit list. Secondly, it is nobody’s case that

the appellants have been appointed by way of favouritism,

nepotism or due to any act which can even remotely be

called as “blameworthy”. Finally, they have now been 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 37

RADHEY SHYAM YADAV & ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

working as judges for ten years. There is hence a special

equity which leans in favour of the appellants. In a recent

Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Sivanandan

C.T. and Ors. v. High Court of Kerala and Ors. (2023)

SCC OnLine SC 994 though the finding arrived at by this

Court was that the Rules of the game were changed by

the High Court of Kerala by prescribing minimum marks

for the viva voce, which were not existing in the Rules

and therefore in essence the appointment itself was in

violation of the Rules, yet considering that those persons

who had secured appointments under this selection have

now been working for more than 6 years it was held that

it would not be in public interest to unseat them.”

(emphasis supplied)

30. The situation of the appellants in the present case is no different

from the individuals whose appointments were protected in the cases

cited hereinabove. They had no blameworthy conduct. They were

bona fide applicants from the open market. The alleged mischief,

even according to the State, was at the end of the School and its

Manager. It will be a travesty of justice if relief is denied to the

appellants. Enormous prejudice would also occur to them.

31. Ms. Sansriti Pathak, learned counsel, who ably defended the case for

the State, made a valiant attempt to draw support from the judgment

in Sachin Kumar (supra). In that case, what was in issue was the

validity of the cancellation of the selection process for recruitment

to the 231 vacancies in the post of Grade 2 (DASS) (Head Clerk).

This Court, while reversing the judgment of the Tribunal and the

High Court held that in that case there was a basic denial of access

to Tier I examination. The Court further held that the nature of the

allegations was found substantiated upon the careful examination by

the first Committee whose report showed that the credibility of the

process itself had been eroded. In that case, the total vacancies for

which recruitment was to be made was 231 and 61,179 candidates

were found to be eligible. The first Committee which enquired

found that there were serious irregularities including cheating and

impersonation in the course of both Tier 1 Screening examination

and Tier 2 Main examination. The Secretary (Vigilance) had also

pointed out in his opinion there was a huge difference between the 

38 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

number of applications received, namely, 62056 and the number of

candidates who had appeared in the Tier 1 examination i.e. 8224,

indicating thereby that proper information regarding the exam was not

given to the candidates. The second Committee had observed that no

irregularity was found in the documents of the 281 candidates. The

Tribunal holding that 281 candidates were free from blame, set aside

the order cancelling selection process, clarifying that the appointments

to be offered would be subject to the ACB investigation. The High

Court had held that the scope of the order of the Tribunal should

be confined to the six applicants who have moved the Tribunal. The

High Court had also held that it was possible to determine that at

least in respect of 281candidates there was no evidence of use of

unfair means and that it was a case where separation of the tainted

from the untainted was possible.

32. Reversing the judgment of the Tribunal and the High Court, this Court

held that the irregularities were not confined to acts of malpractice

or unfair means on the part of specific group of persons and that

the report of the Committee found deficiencies of a systemic nature

which cast serious doubts on the legitimacy of the entire process of

recruitment. This Court held that in such a situation where a decision

is taken by the government to cancel the entire process, the decision

cannot be held to be irrational or arbitrary.

33. This judgment in Sachin Kumar (supra) is clearly distinguishable

from the case at hand. First of all, Sachin Kumar (supra) involved

the cancellation of the selection process before any appointments

were made. No rights were crystallized to any of the candidates.

The issue was about the validity of the cancellation of the selection

process. Sachin Kumar (supra) falls in that genre of cases

concerning validity of cancellation of the selection process due to

largescale irregularities. The Case at hand is proximate to the facts

and ratio in Suresh Raghunath Bhokare (supra) and cases of that

ilk set out hereinabove.

34. We feel that the appellants were not at fault and the State could not

have abruptly stopped their salaries. Accordingly, we set aside the

judgments of the High Court dated 15.09.2021 in Special Appeal Nos.

1435/2013 and 1445/2013 and direct that the State shall pay the

salaries of the appellants for the period from 25.06.1999 till January,

2002 in full. We also direct that insofar as the period from October, 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 39

RADHEY SHYAM YADAV & ANR. ETC. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

2005 till today is concerned, the State shall pay the appellants 50%

of the backwages. Since the appointment order and the approval

order are still in force, we declare that the appellants have always

been and are deemed to be in service. Apart from 50% backwages,

as ordered above, we direct that all consequential benefits, including

seniority, notional promotion, if any, and fitment of salary and other

service benefits due, be granted to the appellants. We direct the

State to comply with these directions within four weeks from today.

We also direct that the appellants be allowed to commence work

within the said period of four weeks.

35. We notice from the record that the Committee of Management,

Junior High School, Bahorikpur was arrayed as fifth respondent

in the writ petition before the High Court. They are also arrayed

as fifth respondent before us in these appeals. Before us, even

though notice has been served on the Committee of Management,

Junior High School, Bahorikpur, nobody has entered appearance. It

appears that even before the learned Single Judge and the Division

Bench, the Committee of Management did not appear. We grant

liberty to the State to issue a show-cause notice to the Committee

of Management (R-5), after setting out clearly the charge pertaining

to the alleged manipulation of the sanction order and altering of

the figure from two to three. After receiving reply, if any, and after

holding an inquiry with an opportunity of personal hearing, the State

will be at liberty to pass an appropriate order. In the event of the

Committee of Management being exonerated, no further question

will arise. In the event of them being found guilty of the charge, in

view of any finding that may be arrived that the manipulation prior to

the recruitment was done at the level of the employees of the school

(whether by themselves or in collusion with the officials), we grant

liberty to the State to recover from the Committee of Management

one-third of the arrears, as ordered to be paid, hereinabove. This

direction will serve the ends of justice in the matter.

36. The appeals are allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case: Appeals allowed.