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Wednesday, December 20, 2023

whether the true owner is entitled for permanent injunction without possession ? No. 2023:APHC:21779

whether the true owner is entitled for permanent injunction without possession ? No. 2023:APHC:21779

held that 

the appellant/plaintiff failed to establish his case and both Courts have rightly held that the appellant failed to establish his possession. Though the trial Court has held that the appellant is not entitled to the equitable relief, this Court need not delve into the said aspect. Even assuming that the appellant alone is entitled to maintain the suit, as he failed to establish his plea that he is in possession of the property, he is not entitled to the relief of injunction. Though the respondent has claimed ownership and title, he has not produced the sale deed. Even if the respondent has no title over the property, his possession is enough to nonsuit the appellant. Assuming that the appellant is the absolute/true owner of the property, as he is not in possession of the same, he is not entitled to the grant of 9 injunction. The appellant, if so advised, can only file a separate suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the property. 


IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

1

HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

SECOND APPEAL No.261 of 2023

THATIPARTHI SUBBA RAO
Versus

YADALA DANDEMMA

JUDGMENT:

The present Second Appeal is preferred by the

appellant aggrieved by the Decree and Judgment dated

14.07.2022 passed in A.S.No.5 of 2016 on the file of XII

Additional District Judge, Pithapuram, confirming the

decree and judgment dated 20.11.2015 passed in O.S

No.196 of 2008 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge,

Tuni.

2. Heard Sri T.N.M. Ranga Rao, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant and Sri G.Venkata Subba Raju,

learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

3. The appellant is the plaintiff and the respondents

are the defendants in O.S.No.196 of 2008 on the file of

Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tuni (for short “the trial

Court”).

4. For convenience and clarity, the parties are

hereinafter referred to as arrayed in the suit. 

2

5. The plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint

schedule property, which is devolved upon him on the death

of his father and thus he is in peaceful possession and

enjoyment of the same. Pattadar passbook and title deeds

were also issued to him by the revenue authorities. The No.3

Adangal copy was also issued in favour of him. The 1st

defendant is the cousin sister and the defendants No.2 to 4

are cousin brothers of him. The defendants No.5 and 6 are

henchmen of the defendants No.1 to 4. As the defendants

and their henchmen are tried to remove the soil of seed bed

from the plaint schedule property, neighboring ryots rushed

to there and resisted the illegal activity of the defendants,

due to which, the defendants and their men flew away

proclaiming that they shall trespass and occupy the plaint

schedule property illegally. Therefore the plaintiff filed suit

for grant of permanent injunction.

6. The defendants No.5 and 6 were set ex parte. The

1st defendant filed written statement and the same was

adopted by the defendants No.2 to 4 denying all the

averments made in the plaint. The father of 1st defendant

married one Gangamma and there were disputes between 

3

the parents of this defendant. It is stated that on

19.05.2015 the plaint schedule property was given to 1st

defendant on registered settlement deed. Since then, he has

been in possession and enjoyment and the Government

issued Pattadar passbooks etc., in favour of 1st defendant.

It is also stated that even knowing the above fact, the

plaintiff has filed the false suit.

7. Basing on the pleadings, the trial Court famed the

following issues:

1. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule

properties by the date of filing the suit?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of permanent

injunction as prayed for?

3. To what relief?

8. During the course of trial, on behalf of the plaintiff,

he himself examined as PW.1 and got examined one Villager

as PW.2 and Ex.A1 to Ex.A4 were marked. On behalf of the

defendants, DW.1 to DW.4 were examined and Ex.B1 to

Ex.B3 were marked.

9. The trial Court upon hearing the arguments of both

the counsels, and on consideration of entire oral and

documentary evidence, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the

said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred an appeal, 

4

which ended in dismissal confirming the judgment and

decree of the trial Court. Hence, the second appeal came to

be filed.

10. This Second Appeal is filed under Section 100

CPC on the ground that the judgment and decree of both

courts below is totally basing on the presumption, surmises

and conjectures, ignoring the material facts available on

record and interpretation of law.

11. There cannot be any dispute that, under the

amended Section 100 C.P.C., a party aggrieved by the decree

passed by the first appellate court has no absolute right of

appeal. He can neither challenge the decree on a question of

fact or on a question of law. The second appeal lies only

where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a

substantial question of law. The word ‘substantial’ as

qualifying ‘question of law’, means and conveys – of having

substance, essential, real, or sound worth, important,

considerable, fairly arguable, in contradiction with –

technical, formal, or no substance, no consequence or

academic only. A substantial question of law should directly

and substantially affect the rights of the parties. A question 

5

of law can be said to be substantial between the parties if

the decision in appeal turns one way or the other on the

particular view of law. But, if the question does not affect

the decision, it cannot be said to be substantial question

between the parties. Recording a finding without any

evidence on record; disregard or non consideration of

relevant or admissible evidence; taking into consideration

irrelevant or inadmissible evidence; perverse finding- are

some of the questions, which involve substantial questions

of law.

12. According to Section 100 CPC, a definite

restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second

appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to

record that the Code of Civil Procedure introduced such an

embargo for such definite objectives and since the Courts

are required to further probe on that score and the Courts

while detailing out, but the fact remains in second appeal

finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be

disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand

vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and

conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity 

6

involved therein, the High Court will be within its

jurisdiction to deal with the issue. The High Court can

interfere with such finding recorded by the trial Court

though not on law in view of judgment reported in Kulavant

Kaur v Gurdial Singh Mann1

10. Keeping in mind the scope of Section 100 CPC, I

would like to decide the present appeal at the stage of

admission.

11. The main contention before the trial Court in the

written statement is that when the defendants were in joint

family the plaint schedule property was given to 1st

defendant with a limited right to enjoy the property and the

same was given on registered settlement deed. Since then

the 1st defendant has been in possession and enjoyment and

the Government has also issued pattadar passbook etc., in

his favour.

12. On a perusal of the material on record, it is clear

that, the plaint schedule property is joint family and

ancestral property of 1st respondent’s father and appellant’s

father and their brothers. On the one hand, the appellant


1 2001 (4 SCC 262

7

contended that the plaint schedule property fell to him. But

on the other hand, the 1st respondent contended that all the

brothers gave the plaint schedule property to the mother of

1st respondent for life time enjoyment and later respondents

No.2 to 4 who are brothers of 1st respondent settled the

plaint schedule property in favour of 1st respondent under

registered settlement deed. This Court observed that there

was no positive evidence or substantial evidence adduced by

both parties to decide to whom the plaint schedule property

succeeds.

13. This Court further observed that the suit was filed

for grant of permanent injunction and the appellant/plaintiff

has to prove that he is in possession and enjoyment of the

property on the date of filing of the suit. But, on verification

of the record, the documents filed by the appellant/plaintiff

did not disclose that he was in lawful possession and

enjoyment of plaint schedule property on the date of filing of

suit. Admittedly, a person, who can seek relief of permanent

injunction, it is necessary to prove that plaintiff, was in

lawful possession of the plaint schedule property and the

defendant tried to interfere or disturb such lawful 

8

possession. Further, in this case, an Advocate

Commissioner was also appointed and filed his report

stating that the plaint schedule property is situated in

S.No.214/6, 214/7 and 214/8 and not in S.No.216/2,

where the appellant/plaintiff claiming possession of plaint

schedule property in S.No.216/2.

14. Viewed from any angle, this Court observed that

the appellant/plaintiff failed to establish his case and both

Courts have rightly held that the appellant failed to

establish his possession. Though the trial Court has held

that the appellant is not entitled to the equitable relief, this

Court need not delve into the said aspect. Even assuming

that the appellant alone is entitled to maintain the suit, as

he failed to establish his plea that he is in possession of the

property, he is not entitled to the relief of injunction.

Though the respondent has claimed ownership and title, he

has not produced the sale deed. Even if the respondent has

no title over the property, his possession is enough to nonsuit the appellant. Assuming that the appellant is the

absolute/true owner of the property, as he is not in

possession of the same, he is not entitled to the grant of 

9

injunction. The appellant, if so advised, can only file a

separate suit for declaration of title and recovery of

possession of the property.

15. For the above-mentioned reasons, I do not find

any reason to interfere with the well-considered judgments

of the Courts below.

16. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed at

the stage of admission. No order as to costs.

As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous

applications shall stand closed.

______________________________

DR. K. MANMADHA RAO, J.

Date : 06 -07-2023

Gvl 

10

HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

SECOND APPEAL No.261 of 2023

Date : 06.07.2023

Gvl 

Whether the plaintiff is in wrongful possession of the plaint schedule property without having title? held that the plaintiff came and traced his right under unregistered sale agreement, thereupon unregistered Will, those documents have also not seen in the light of the day and claiming injunction against his landlord, who is the real owner by setting up a false title. Therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to permanent injunction against true owner i.e defendant. Further the plaintiff is bound to show his prima facie right and title or he has to amend the suit for declaration, but the plaintiff has not to do so. 2023:APHC:33555

 Whether the plaintiff is in wrongful possession of the plaint schedule property without having title?

 held that the plaintiff came and traced his right under unregistered sale agreement, thereupon unregistered Will, those documents have also not seen in the light of the day and claiming injunction against his landlord, who is the real owner by setting up a false title. Therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to permanent injunction against true owner i.e defendant. Further the plaintiff is bound to show his prima facie right and title or he has to amend the suit for declaration, but the plaintiff has not to do so. 2023:APHC:33555

suit for permanent injunction against the respondent/ defendant in respect of the plaint schedule property contending that the suit schedule property was purchased by one Pinnamaneni Venkata Ratnam under a Sale Agreement dated 11.05.1973 from the defendant and his father S. Yesudasu. Later said Venkata Ratnam executed a Will dated 21.11.1984 in favour of his two sons namely Pinnamaneni Ranga Rao and Pinnamaneni Krishna Rao bequeathing his properties to them. Later he died on 19.06.2000. Therefore the said Will came into operation. Subsequently P. Krishna Rao gifted his properties to his two sons namely plaintiff and Babji under Registered Gift Deed dated 30.04.2015, since then they have been possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. While so, the defendant and his men developed an evil eye to knock away the said property and threatened with dire consequences. Hence the suit. 

held that 

25. Upon perusal of the Judgment of the first appellate court have discussed at length on the decisions relied by the appellant and given finding that the plaintiff came and traced his right under unregistered sale agreement, thereupon unregistered Will, those documents have also not seen in the light of the day and claiming injunction against his landlord, who is the real owner by setting up a false title. Therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to permanent injunction against true owner i.e defendant. Further the plaintiff is bound to show his prima facie right and title or he has to amend the suit for declaration, but the plaintiff has not to do so. Therefore the first appellate court dismissed the appeal

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI1

1

THE HON’BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

SECOND APPEAL Nos.260 and 262 of 2023

PINNAMANENI BABJI
Versus
SATHULURI PARASURAMUDU

COMMMON JUDGMENT:

 Second Appeal No. 260 of 2023 has been filed assailing the

Judgment and Decree dated 21.03.2023, passed in A.S.No.78 of

2015 by the learned XII Additional District Judge, Vijayawada (in

short “the first appellate court”) in dismissing the Appeal by

confirming the Judgment and decree dated 24.03.2015 in

O.S.No.586 of 2014 passed by the learned I Additional Junior Civil

Judge, Vijayawada (in short “the trial court)”.

 Second Appeal No. 262 of 2023 has been filed assailing the

Judgment and Decree dated 21.03.2023, passed in A.S.No.83 of

2015 by the learned XII Additional District Judge, Vijayawada (in

short “the first appellate court”) in dismissing the Appeal by

confirming the Judgment and decree dated 08.04.2015 in

O.S.No.587 of 2014 passed by the learned VI Additional Junior

Civil Judge, Vijayawada (in short “the trial court)”.

 2. The parties will herein after be referred to as they are

arrayed in the Original Suit for the sake of convenience.

 3. Since the facts and issue involved in all the Second

Appeals are one and the same, I find it expedient to decide these

matters by a Common Judgment.

 

2

 4. For the sake of convenience, S.A.No. 260 of 2023 is taken

as leading case.

 5. The appellant herein is the appellant/ plaintiff;

respondent is the respondent/ defendant in the courts below. The

appellant/ plaintiff is different and respondent/ defendant is

common in both the Appeals and also before the courts below.

 6. Initially the appellant/ plaintiff before the court below has

filed the suit for permanent injunction against the respondent/

defendant in respect of the plaint schedule property contending

that the suit schedule property was purchased by one

Pinnamaneni Venkata Ratnam under a Sale Agreement dated

11.05.1973 from the defendant and his father S. Yesudasu. Later

said Venkata Ratnam executed a Will dated 21.11.1984 in favour

of his two sons namely Pinnamaneni Ranga Rao and Pinnamaneni

Krishna Rao bequeathing his properties to them. Later he died on

19.06.2000. Therefore the said Will came into operation.

Subsequently P. Krishna Rao gifted his properties to his two sons

namely plaintiff and Babji under Registered Gift Deed dated

30.04.2015, since then they have been possession and enjoyment

of the suit schedule property. While so, the defendant and his men

developed an evil eye to knock away the said property and

threatened with dire consequences. Hence the suit. 

3

 7. The defendant filed Written Statement denying all material

averments made in the plaint and contended that the father of the

defendant has leased out an extent of Ac. 1.00 cents in

R.S.No.117/2D of Gunadala Village in 1970 to one Pinnamaneni

Venkata Ratnam on monthly makta at Rs. 1,000/- to Yesudasu till

1976 till his death. Later his sons Ranga Rao and Krishna Rao

used to continue the tenancy by paying makta at Rs. 3,000/- till

2012. Later they stopped to pay makta. The defendant and or his

father never sold their land including the plaint schedule rpoeprty

to the plaintiff or his ancestors, the alleged agreement of sale is

forged, which is not referred to in the alleged Will also. The said

land was assigned by Government noted in Resettlement Register

of Gunadala Revenue Village, as such it cannot be alienated. The

plaintiff has no right over the plaint schedule property. Therefore

the suit is liable to be dismissed.

 8. Based on the above pleadings, the trial court eventually

framed the following issues for trial:

(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction, as prayed for?

(2) Whether the plaintiff is in wrongful possession of the plaint schedule

property without having title?

(3) To what relief?

 9. During the course of trial PWs-1 to 3 were examined on

behalf of the plaintiff and Ex.A1 to A7 were marked and on behalf 

4

of the defendant, Dws-1 and 2 were examined and Ex.B1 to B13

were marked.

 10. After thorough enquiry, the trial court holding that the

plaintiff is in possession of the schedule property, but his

possession is wrongful and at the same time he cannot be

protected by way of permanent injunction and hence the trial court

dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on 24.03.2015.

 11. Assailing the said Judgment and decree of the trial court,

the defendants therein have preferred an appeal in A.S.No. 78 of

2015. The first appellate court has framed the following points for

determination in the Appeal:

1. Whether plaintiff has got legal title and lawful possession over the plaint

schedule property, so as to seek relief of injunction against the defendant,

who is real owner?

2. Whether learned trial judge appreciated both facts and law properly or

committed serious error in dismissing plaintiff’s suit filed for bare

injunction?

3. Whether judgment of learned trial judge suffers from any illegality or

perversity and same is liable to be set aside in this appeal?

 12. The First Appellate Court after considering the facts and

circumstances of the case dismissed the appeal on merits on

21.03.2023 by confirming the decree and judgment of the trial

court. 

5

 13. Assailing the Judgment of the First Appellate Court, the

appellants herein, who are defendants before the trial court has

filed these Second Appeals, seeking to set aside the decree and

Judgment of the courts below.

 14. The appellant raised the following question of law in the

grounds of Appeal, which are as under:

a) Whether in law the First Appellate Court is right in

confirming the Judgment and the Decree of the Trial Court when

it is proved, and also admitted by the respondent, as to the

appellant/ plaintiff's possession in the Plaint Schedule Property?

 b) Whether in law the First Appellate Court is right in not

taking into consideration of the well settled legal position that a

suit for mere injunction is maintainable if the Plaintiff is in

possession of the property as on date of filing of the suit?

 c) Whether the First Appellate Court is right in not taking

into consideration of the Legal Position settled by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in AIR 1996(SC) 1807 wherein it was held that

the mere suit for injunction can't be converted into suit for

probation of Will and direct parties to adduce evidence, be it

primary or Secondary.

 d) Whether the First Appellate Court is right in dismissing

the Appeal and confirming the Trial Court Judgment without

there being any specific finding about the Title of the Defendant,

particularly when defendant has failed to establish his title

either by producing documentary evidence or through oral

evidence.

 e) Whether the 1st Appellate Court is right in relying upon

the principle of law evaluated in Balram Singh VS Kelo Devi

(2022(6) ALD 200 (SC)] to the present facts of the case, and

whether the finding in Balram Singh VS Kelo Devi (2022(6) ALD

200 (SC)| suffers per-incuraim. For, the basis for the observation

is that the plaintiff cannot file the suit for specific performance, 

6

as the sale agreement is an unregistered one. There is no

reference in the said Judgment about the proviso under Section

49 of the Registration Act. It is submitted that the three bench

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in 2018 (7)

SCC- Pg. 639 held that "An unregistered Agreement of Sale can

be admitted as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific

performance in view of proviso to Section 49 of the Registration

Act." The Judgment considered by the first appellate court is

rendered by a bench consisting of two judges only. The earlier

larger bench judgment or the proviso to Section 49 of the

Registration Act is not referred to in the said Judgment. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment reported in 2022(5)

Supreme- Pg. 412 held that a decision or judgment can be perincuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which

was not brought to the notice of the court. It can also be perincuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a

previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger bench?

 f) Whether the Appellate Court is right in making

observation that Will Deed, dated 21.11.1984, which was

marked as Ex A6 has never seen day light as the same was not

filed, when the said Document is Marked as Ex A6?

 g) Whether the Courts below right in observing as to nonfiling of link documents in a Suit for Permanent Injunction is a

ground to dismiss the suit, when more particularly when the

possession over the property is undisputed and admitted.

 h) Whether the first appellate court is right in not even

mentioning about the Additional Evidence Petition filed under m

Order. 41 Rule 27 of CPC in I.A. No. 1356/2019?

15. Heard Mr. P. Rajasekhar, learned counsel representing

Mr. T.V.P. Sai Vihari, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.

V.L.N.Sarma, learned counsel for the respondent.

16. During hearing learned counsel for the appellant would

contend that the first appellate court failed to consider very crucial 

7

circumstance as to the pleading of the respondent/defendant that

the plaint schedule property was let out to the father of the

plaintiff and his brother, and that they did not pay the Maktha,

and that the respondent/ defendant has been demanding them to

vacate the land. Although the said contention of respondent/

defendant is totally false, baseless and untruthful and without any

iota of proof, yet in view of the said plea of the respondent/

defendant, it cannot be held that the appellant's possession is

illegal in the plaint schedule property. Thus, the 1st Appellate court

has totally gone into a serious confusion as to the appreciation of

the facts, pleadings and evidence on record.

17. It is further contended that the first Appellate court

finding as to the title of the appellant is quite erroneous, both on

fact and in law. For, the suit is filed only for a permanent

injunction and the primary question to be considered while

granting or refusing the injunction is possession as on date of the

filing of the suit, and whether such possession is lurking or

settled. Question of title is only incidental and even without giving

a finding as to the title, the court has to decide the possession

independently. The first Appellate court has failed to note that any

finding on title in a suit for permanent injunction does not operate

as res-judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties as

to the title of the property. 

8

18. It is further contended that the first appellate court has

failed to take into consideration several admissions made by the

respondent/defendant (DW-1) apart from his pleading that the

land has been let out to the father of the plaintiff, as to possession

of the appellant/ plaintiff as on the date of the filing of the suit

and much prior to that. The first appellate court ought to have

held that on facts of the case that the appellant/plaintiff is entitled

to be protected his possession in the plaint schedule property, as

per the doctrine of part-performance. Therefore the findings of the

first appellate court are based on mere surmises and the same is

liable to be set aside.

19. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of

Hon’ble Apex Court in “Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram

Locharam @ Brijaramand and Others”1 wherein it was held as

follows:

“26. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar the

principle that emerges is that if at the time of the passing of the

decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis

of which the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the

existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed

that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction

apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be

valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence

recorded or produced in the case or, it may partly or wholly be in

the shape of an express or implied admission made in the

compromise agreement itself. Admission is true and clear are by

far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings


1

 AIR 1974 SC 471 

9

or judicial admission admissible under Section 58 of the

Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the

hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary

admission. The former class of admissions are fully binding on

the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof.

They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of

the parties. On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are

receivable at the rival as evidence are by themselves not

conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong”.

In the case of “State of Rajsthan and Others vs. Shiv

Dayal and Another”2 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as

follows:

“13. We do not agree with the aforementioned reasoning

and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. It is not the

principle of law that where the High Court finds that there is a

concurrent finding of two courts (whether of dismissal or

decreeing of the suit), such finding becomes unassailable in the

second appeal.

14. True it is as has been laid down by this Court in

several decisions that "concurrent finding of fact" is usually

binding on the High Court while hearing the second appeal

under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). However, this rule of law

is subject to certain well-known exceptions mentioned infra.

15. It is a trite law that in order to record any finding on

the facts, the trial court is required to appreciate the entire

evidence (oral and documentary) in the light of the pleadings of

the parties. Similarly, it is also a trite law that the Page: 640

appellate court also has the jurisdiction to appreciate the

evidence de novo while hearing the first appeal and either affirm

the finding of the trial court or reverse it. If the appellate court

affirms the finding, it is called "concurrent finding of fact"


2

 (2019) 8 SCC 637 

10

whereas if the finding is reversed, it is called "reversing finding".

These expressions are well known in the legal parlance.

16. When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in

second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad

in law because it was recorded dehors the pleadings or it was

based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material

documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision

of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting

judicially could reasonably have reached. (See observation made

by learned Judge, Vivian Bose, J., as his Lordship then was a

Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath

Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar para 43.)

 17. In our opinion, if any one or more ground, as

mentioned above, is made out in an appropriate case on the

basis of the pleading and evidence, such ground will constitute

substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of

the Code.”

 The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically discussed the

principles relating to Section 100 CPC in “Nazir Mohamed vs. J.

Kamala and Others”3 which reproduced hereunder:

“ 37. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant

for this case may be summarized thus:

 (iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere

with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an

absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where

(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on

no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from

proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts

have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no

evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total

dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence,


3

 Civil Appeal Nos. 2843-2844 of 2010, dated 27.08.2020 

11

taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the

finding”.

 20. Whereas learned counsel for the respondent reiterated

the defence taken before the courts below and vehemently opposed

to allow the Second Appeals and relied on catena of decisions of

various High Courts and also Hon’ble Supreme Court.

 21. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the

respondents relied on a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in

“Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji (deceased) through L.Rs vs.

Maniben Jagmalbhai (deceased) through L.Rs and Others”4

wherein it was held as follows:

“13. Therefore, the short question, which is posed for the

consideration of this Court is, whether, in case where the

plaintiff has lost so far as the title is concerned and the

defendant against whom the permanent injunction is sought is

the true owner of the land, whether the plaintiff is entitled to a

relief of permanent injunction against the true owner, more

particularly, when the plaintiff has lost so far as the title is

concerned and can thereafter the plaintiff be permitted to

contend that despite the fact that the plaintiff has lost so far as

the title is concerned, her possession be protected by way of

injunction and that the true owner has to file a substantive suit

claiming the possession.

….

 24….Injunction may be granted even against the true

owner of the property, only when the person seeking the relief is

in lawful possession and enjoyment of the property and also

legally entitled to be in possession, not to disposes him, except in

due process of law.”


4

 (2002) 12 SCC 128 

12

 In “K. Ankaiah vs. Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams”5,

wherein this Court held as follows:

 “21. Their possession is prima facie unlawful inasmuch as

the alleged licence in their favour already expired. They had not

shown that they have got any right to be in lawful possession of the

plaint schedule property. Therefore, they cannot seek temporary

injunction against the defendants-TTD, who are the true owners of

the suit property.

 …..

 23……Therefore, on the date of the suit they have no prima

facie right to be in lawful possession of the disputed property. Their

possession cannot be treated as settled possession or long or

continuous possession. Further, they are not entitled to seek

injunction against the true owner on the basis of their sole unlawful

possession or possession without any right to be lawfully in

possession of the disputed property…. ”

 The above case i.e K. Ankaiah’s case has been discussed in

the case of “Syed Jameel vs. K.V.V.Nageshwara Rao and

Another”6. Further in “Smt. Rohini Devi @ Rajeswari Dasi vs.

Babaji Jagannath Das and Others”7, wherein it was held as

follows:

“7. Perusal of the records, i.e the judgments of the Courts

below, the plaint, the written statements, documents exhibited

by both parties and evidence shows that there are neither any

pleadings or nor any evidence of the appellant with regard to

declaration of title. This question has been raised for the first

time before this Court. Where a point of law has not been

pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the


5

 2002 LawSuit(AP) 485

6

 2004(2) ALT 499 (S.B)

7

 AIR 2006 Orissa 141 

13

absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to

raise that question as substantial question of law in second

appeal……”

Learned counsel for the respondent further relied on a

decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in “Balaram Singh vs. Kelo

Devi”8 wherein it was held that the plaintiff cannot get relief

indirectly, which otherwise he/she cannot get in suit for

substantive relief. Further, plaintiff cannot get relief of permanent

injunction on basis of such unregistered document/ agreement to

sell, more particularly, when defendant specifically filed counterclaim for getting back possession which was allowed by trial court.

 Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that

the case succeeds only on the strength of his own title and not on

the weakness of case of the defendants. The defendants need not

plead and prove possible defects in plaintiff’s title. Even if

defendants to establish their own title, plaintiff must be non-suited

if he fails to establish his title as per decision of erstwhile High

Court of Andhra Pradesh in “Sajana Granites, Madras and

Another vs. Manduva Srinivasa Rao and Others”9.

22. Perused the record.

 23. Learned counsel for the plaintiff drawn the attention of

this Court with regard to Para 18 of the Judgment of the first


8

 2022(6) ALD 200 (SC)

9

 2002(1) ALT 466 (D.B) 

14

appellate court that the plaintiff came and traced his right under

unregistered agreement of sale, thereupon unregistered Will, those

documents also have not seen the light of the day and claiming

injunction against his landlord, who is the real owner by setting

up false title and that the plaintiff is not entitled the equitable

relief of permanent injunction against the defendant, who is a

rightful owner, which is incorrect. Further it is contended that

there is no need or necessity to investigate the title, it can be

incidentally gone when the defendant denied the title of plaintiff.

But the first appellate court held that the plaintiff is bound to

show his prima facie right and title or he has to amend the suit for

declaration but, plaintiff having failed to do so, claiming injunction

without having legal title and lawful possession, thereby not

entitled injunction against the defendant. Therefore, the first

appellate court has dismissed the appeal.

 24. In Ex.A2, which is copy of Adangal would show that the

plaintiff though he has been in possession of the schedule

property, but it was stands in the name of father of the defendant.

Ex.A3 is the tax receipt would show that the land tax was paid by

Pinnamaneni Venkata Ratnam. In fact, the tax can be paid either

by the land owner or any person on behalf of the land owner and

the person who paid the amount and whose name is to be noted.

Ex.A7 is the demand notice, it was issued in the name of the

plaintiff, but in fact the schedule property is a vacant site and the 

15

question of payment of house tax does not arise as held by the

trial court.

 25. Upon perusal of the Judgment of the first appellate court

have discussed at length on the decisions relied by the appellant

and given finding that the plaintiff came and traced his right under

unregistered sale agreement, thereupon unregistered Will, those

documents have also not seen in the light of the day and claiming

injunction against his landlord, who is the real owner by setting

up a false title. Therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to permanent

injunction against true owner i.e defendant. Further the plaintiff is

bound to show his prima facie right and title or he has to amend

the suit for declaration, but the plaintiff has not to do so.

Therefore the first appellate court dismissed the appeal.

 26. There is some force in the argument of learned counsel

for the respondent and that the decisions submitted by the learned

counsel for the respondent, cited supra are applicable to the facts

of this case and would enable the Court to come to a just

conclusion and as the pleadings of the parties have crystallized the

questions in dispute. Therefore, the observations made by the

courts below are very specific and finds no impropriety or

irregularity in its Judgments. As the appellant raised the

substantial question of law is not satisfactory, the Second Appeals

are deserves to be dismissed. 

16

27. Since common issues were involved in the both the

suits, the discussion made in S.A.No.260 of 2023 is adopted in

S.A.No.262 of 2023 also.

 28. After close scrutiny of the findings of the both trial court

as well as first appellate court, this Court opines that the both

Second Appeals are dismissed.

 29. Accordingly, the Second Appeals are dismissed, at the

stage of admission, by a common order. There shall be no order as

to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any,

shall also stand closed.

___________________________________

DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

Date: 15.09.2023.

Note: L.R.Copy marked

B/o

KK 

17

THE HON’BLE Dr.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

SECOND APPEAL Nos.260 and 262 of 2023

Date: 15.09.2023.

Note: L.R.Copy marked

B/o

KK 

18

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

+ SECOND APPEAL Nos.260 and 262 of 2023

% 15.09.2023

Second Appeal No.260 of 2023

# Pinnamaneni Ratheesh Kumar

 … Appellant.

Vs.

$ Sathuluri Parasuramudu

… Respondent.

Second Appeal No.262 of 2023

# Pinnamani Babji

 … Appellant.

Vs.

$ Sathuluri Parasuramudu

… Respondent.

! Counsel for the Appellants :

Mr.P. Rajasekhar, learned counsel

representing Mr. T.V.P.Sai Vihari.

! Counsel for the Respondents: Mr. V.V.L.N.Sarma,

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1. AIR 1974 SC 471

2. (2019) 8 SCC 637

3. Civil Appeal Nos. 2843-2844 of 2010, dated 27.08.2020

4. (2002) 12 SCC 128

5. 2002 LawSuit(AP) 485

6. 2004(2) ALT 499 (S.B)

7. AIR 2006 Orissa 141

8. 2022(6) ALD 200 (SC)

9. 2002(1) ALT 466 (D.B)

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED: 15.09.2023 

19


* THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No

 may be allowed to see the Judgments?

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No

 Marked to Law Reporters/Journals.

3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish Yes/No

 to see the fair copy of the Judgment?

___________________________

DR.K. MANMADHA RAO, J

Without possession - no permanent injunction be granted - 2023:APHC:27507

Without possession - no permanent injunction be granted - 2023:APHC:27507

suit for permanent injunction - dismissed - appeal also dismissed - SA Held that  Since the plaintiff failed to establish his possession over the suit schedule property as on the date of suit and contrary to the case of the plaintiff, the defendant established his possession in the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. Therefore, the plaintiff ought to have file the suit for recovery of possession. Since the plaintiff failed to prove his possession as on the date of suit, he is not entitled for the relief of permanent injunction”

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI1

THE HON’BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

SECOND APPEAL No.272 OF 2023

CHAPPIDI HARINATH REDDY
Versus

CHAPPIDI VENKATA REDDYJUDGMENT:

 The Second Appeal has been filed assailing the Judgment

and Decree dated 21.02.2022, passed in A.S.No.1 of 2017 by the III

Additional District Judge, Rajampet. The learned first Appellate

Court, while dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiff, had

confirming the decree and Judgment dated 28.04.2014 of the

learned Junior Civil Judge, Nandalur, passed in O.S.No.50 of

2007.

 2. The parties will herein after be referred to as they are

arrayed in the Original Suit for the sake of convenience.

 3. The plaintiff filed suit in O.S.No.50 of 2007 on the file of

the Court of the Junior Civil Judge, Nandalur against the

defendant for grant of permanent injunction restraining the

defendant and his men from interfering with plaintiff’s peaceful

possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. The

averments in the plaint, in brief are as under:-

 Originally Revenue Authorities assigned the plaint schedule

property to grandfather of the plaintiff by name Chappidi

Ankireddygari Pitchi Reddy on 16.09.1961, since then he has been

in possession and enjoyment of the same and after his demise, his

father and after him the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint 

2

schedule property. During the life time of his father, the defendant,

who is having lands adjacent to the plaint schedule property tried

to nab the same and his father also made a complaint before the

revenue authorities also. The defendant has no way concerned

with the plaint schedule property. Hence the suit.

 4. Per contra, the defendant filed Written Statement denying

the material averments made in the plaint and contended that the

plaintiff’s grandfather and Ankireddygari Pitchi Reddy and

defendant’s father Chappidi Ankireddy are brothers and sons of

Chappidi Gangi Reddy and they were living as Hindu joint family

along with their another brother Chappidi Bali Reddy. It is further

contended that Ankireddygari Pitchi Reddy being the elder brother

and Kartha of joint family obtained DKT Patta in his favour in

respect of the plaint schedule property with joint funds of the

defendant’s father and the defendant. Since then defendant’s

father and plaintiff’s grandfather were in joint possession and

enjoyment of the suit schedule property till their death.

Subsequently, they got divided orally and respective shares were

allotted among them and the plaint schedule property fell to the

share of defendant’s father C. Ankireddy and after his death the

defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the same with

absolute rights till date. The father of the plaintiff moved mediation

during his lifetime and requested the defendant to pay some money 

3

to discharge his debts and plaintiff’s father himself executed an

agreement of sale dated 10.04.2004 in favour of the defendant

agreeing to sell the suit schedule property and received advance

amount from the defendant and he discharged the debts and died

in the year 2006. After death of father of plaintiff, the plaintiff with

a malafide intention made false representations to take possession

of the plaint schedule property. Therefore the plaintiff is not

entitled to claim any relief in the suit and same is liable to be

dismissed.

 5. Based on the above pleadings, the trial court eventually

framed the following issues for trial:

1. Whether the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule

property as on the date of filing of the suit?

2. Whether the agreement of sale dated 10.04.2004 is true and correct?

3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and there is a

cause of action?

4. To what relief?

5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?

(Issue No.5 is additional issue).

 6. During the course of trial PW-1 was examined on behalf of

the plaintiff and Exs.A1 to A6 were marked and on behalf of the

defendants, DW-1 was examined and marked Ex.B1 to B5. The

Tahsildar, Pullampeta is examined as CW-1 and Ex.C1 to C6 were

marked through him. 

4

 7. After full-fledged trial, the trial could hold that the plaintiff

has failed to prove his possession and enjoyment of the plaint

schedule property and that plaintiff is not entitled for permanent

injunction. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed.

 8. Assailing the said judgment and decree of the trial court,

the plaintiff has preferred an appeal in A.S.No. 1 of 2017. The first

appellate court has framed the following points for consideration in

the Appeal:

1. Whether the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint

schedule properties as on the date of suit with semblance of legal

right?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?

3. Whether the decree and judgment of the trial court warrants any

interference by way of this appeal?

4. To what relief?

 9. The First Appellate Court after considering the facts and

circumstances of the case, held as follows:

29.Since the plaintiff failed to establish his possession

over the suit schedule property as on the date of suit and

contrary to the case of the plaintiff, the defendant established

his possession in the suit schedule property as on the date of

filing of the suit. Therefore, the plaintiff ought to have file the suit

for recovery of possession. Since the plaintiff failed to prove his

possession as on the date of suit, he is not entitled for the relief

of permanent injunction”.

and dismissed the appeal on merits on 21.02.2022, by confirming

the findings of the trial court. Assailing the Judgment of the First 

5

Appellate Court, the appellant herein, who is plaintiff before the

both courts below filed this Second Appeal, seeking to set aside the

decree and Judgment of the courts below.

 10. This court while admitting the Second Appeal has framed

the following substantial question of law, which are as under:-

1. Whether the appellate court is justified in dismissing the appeal by

confirming the Decree and Judgment in contrary to Sections 2(1)(6) and

3 of A.P.Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977?.

2. The first appellate court and trial court applied its mind while

dismissing the suit and appeal in contrary to Ex.A1 to A6 and C1 to C6

and relied on Ex.B1 and B2 dismissed the suit and first appeal?

11. Heard Mr.Nagaraju Naguru, learned counsel for the

appellant and Mr.G.Ramesh Babu, learned counsel for the

respondent.

12. The appellant herein is the plaintiff/ appellant before the

courts below.

13. During hearing learned counsel for the appellant

submitted that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint

schedule property, having acquired from his father. The revenue

authorities issued DKT Patta in favour of grandfather of the

plaintiff, after him his son and after him the plaintiff succeeded

the same, since then he has been inducted into possession and

that the defendant has no manner of any right, title or possession

trying to interfere with the plaint schedule property, for which the 

6

plaintiff resisted his attempts. The defendant has got nothing to do

with the plaint schedule property.

14. Whereas, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently

contended that in the oral settlement of the joint family, the plaint

schedule property fell to the share of the defendant’s father Anki

Reddy. After his demise, the defendant is in possession and

enjoyment of the same. The plaintiff obtained Pattadar Pass Book

by false representation, without physical possession in respect of

the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff’s father himself executed

an agreement of sale in favour of the defendant agreeing to sell the

suit schedule property and received advance amount. After demise

of plaintiff’s father, the plaintiff making attempts to take over the

possession of the plaint schedule property. No.3 adangal would

show that the name of the defendant in respect of plaint schedule

property. Hence the claim of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed.

15. Perused the records.

16. From the evidence adduced by both parties, it is clear

that the oral evidence let in by the plaintiff as P.W.1 was

disbelieved by the trial Court. On the contrary, the respondent has

filed unregistered Agreement of Sale marked as Ex.B1 and No.3

Adangal as Ex.B2. Pitted against the documentary evidence

produced by the defendant, the oral evidence of the plaintiff

regarding possession paled into insignificance. Therefore, both the 

7

Courts below have held that the plaintiff failed to establish his

possession. Though the trial Court has held that the plaintiff is not

entitled to the equitable relief, this Court need not delve into the

said aspect.

17. Even assuming that the plaintiff alone is entitled to

maintain the suit, as he failed to establish his plea that he is in

possession of the property, he is not entitled to the relief of

injunction. Though the defendant has claimed ownership and title,

he has not produced the sale deed. Even if the defendant has no

title over the property, his possession is enough to non-suit the

plaintiff. Assuming that the plaintiff is the true owner of the

property, as he is not in possession of the same, he is not entitled

to the grant of injunction. The plaintiff, if so advised, can only file

a separate suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of

the property. In “Vallabhneni Bangaraiah Vs. Panamala Peda

Musili”1 the learned Single Judge of unified High Court of A.P also

discussed the similar facts and liberty also given to the appellant

therein to file a separate suit for declaration of title and recovery of

possession of the property and dismissed the said appeal.

18. In view of the forgoing discussion, I find no merit to

interfere with the findings of the both courts, except granting

liberty to the plaintiff to approach proper fora for redressal of the


1

 S.A.No.974 of 2013, dated 05.06.2014 

8

title dispute between the parties, in respect of plaint schedule

property, if so advised.

19. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. There shall

be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any,

shall also stand closed.

___________________________________

DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

Date: 08.08.2023.

KK 

9

THE HON’BLE Dr.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO

Second Appeal No.272 OF 2023

Date: 08.08.2023.

KK 

Whether declaration of title is necessary inrespect of public Roads for grantingMandatory injunction ? 2023:APHC:27415

Whether declaration of title is necessary inrespect of public Roads for grantingMandatory injunction ? 2023:APHC:27415

suit for mandatory injunction on the margin of public Road - decreed - appeal also allowed - Held that requirment of declaration is not necessary in respect of public Road - and also avaiability of other access points not necessary to be considered whiling granting decree for mandatory injunction -.  No person can be allowed to occupy a portion of a public road, a highway or even a public pathway, and argue that even after his encroachment there is sufficient space left for public to pass by. He cannot be the judge of the requirements of the public, nor can he decide for himself what extent must be left for public use and what extent must be occupied by him. At this rate, anybody will be free to occupy a portion of such public streets, highways and roads with the specious argument that there is still space left for public to pass by. Slowly these encroachments may become permanent. It is evident that such a course cannot be permitted. 


IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO

SECOND APPEAL No.275 of 2023

SANABOINA SATYANARAYANA
Versus
CHERUKURI RAJESWARI

JUDGMENT:

The appellants are the defendants 6 to 9 in O.S.No.61

of 2012 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Palakol.

The 1st respondent is the plaintiff.

2. The 1st respondent had filed O.S.No.61 of 2012,

for mandatory injunction, for removal of the houses and other

structures constructed by the appellants herein on the road

margin and puntha in R.S.No.110/3 of Sangamcheruvu

Village adjoining the R & B road passing through

R.S.No.110/1 from Palakol to Myzarugunta. It is the case of

the 1st respondent that she had agricultural land in

R.S.No.112/2, 2-A and R.S.No.111/2C of Gorinthada Village

which is hamlet of Sangamcheruvu Village. The 1st

respondent contends that her access to the R & B road is

being affected by the constructions made by defendants 6 to

9. It is the further contention of 1st respondent that she had

approached the officials in the area, who are arrayed as

defendants 1 to 5 in the suit, for removal of these 

2

encroachments. As the defendants 1 to 5 did not take any

action, the 1st respondent moved the suit.

3. The appellants herein, who are defendants 6 to 9

filed their written statements and also participated in the trial

by being examined as D.Ws. 4 to 8.

4. The stand of the appellants had been that they

had not encroached into the road margin and that their

constructions were not illegal. The further defence taken by

the appellants is that the 1st respondent had access to her

land from various directions and that the alleged

encroachment by the appellants would not in any manner

affect her ingress and egress into her land from the road and

consequently there was no requirement to remove the

structures or houses of the appellants.

5. The trial Court, after completion of trial and

consideration of the respective submissions of the parties,

had allowed the suit by way of decree and judgment dated

11.10.2017.

6. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the

appellants had moved the Court of the X Additional District

Judge, Narasapur, by way of A.S.No.39 of 2017. This appeal 

3

came to be dismissed on 14.02.2023. Thereupon the

appellants have approached this Court, by way of the Second

Appeal.

7. Sri K.Chidambaram, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for Sri T. Sai Surya would contend that the suit as

framed by the 1st respondent is not maintainable as a

mandatory injunction cannot be granted without seeking a

declaration of title and a declaration that the rights of the

plaintiff are affected by the alleged encroachments. He would

further submit that there is no finding given by either the

trial Court or appellate Court that the appellants had

encroached into the road margin of the R & B road. He would

submit that in such circumstances, the judgments of both

the trial Court and the appellate Court require to be set

aside. He relied upon the judgment of a learned Single Judge

of the combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh in

L.Narasimha Reddy vs. L.Yella Reddy1 for the proposition

that a mandatory injunction cannot be sought without

seeking a declaration of rights.


1

2008 (2) ALD 142::2010(5) ALT 784

4

8. Sri M. Santosh Reddy, the learned counsel

appearing for the respondents would submit that there is a

finding by the appellate Court, on the basis of the admissions

made by the defendants, as D.Ws.4 to 8, that the defendants

(appellants herein) had encroached on to the road margin

while constructing their houses/structures. He would draw

the attention of this Court, paragraphs 25 to 55 wherein the

extracts of the said evidence has been set out.

9. Sri M. Santosh Reddy would also rely upon a

judgment of the learned Single Judge of the combined High

Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in Josyula Hanuma

Venkata Rao vs. Nandam Subbarayudu and others.,

2 and

the judgment of another learned Single Judge of the

combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Thummalapenta

Seetharamaiah vs. Ulchi Venkateswarlu and Others.,

3 to

contend that no person is entitled to encroach on to any

public road and it would be open to any person to seek relief

against such encroachments by way of seeking the relief of

mandatory injunction for removal of encroachments on the


2

1992 (3) ALT 375

3

2010(6) ALD 495

5

road margin. He would submit that the judgment relied upon

by the learned Senior Counsel arose in the case of a dispute

relating to a private passage whereas the present case arises

on the question of encroachment on to public roads and

public road margin. He would also point out that the learned

judge who had delivered the judgment in the case of

L.Narasimha Reddy vs. L.Yella Reddy had also delivered

the subsequent judgment relied upon by Sri M. Santosh

Reddy in the case of Thummalapenta Seetharamaiah vs.

Ulchi Venkateswarlu and Others., wherein the learned

Single Judge was pleased to hold, following the Full Bench

judgement of the combined High Court in Sataraboina

Someswara Rao vs Sangasetti Tirupathamma and others4,

that any citizen can move the Court for the relief of

mandatory injunction for removal of encroachments on road

margins. He would also draw the attention of this Court to

the paragraph in Sataraboina Someswara Rao vs

Sangasetti Tirupathamma and others case, wherein the

Full Bench had held that—


4

 1989(1) ALT 36

6

“In my opinion, the said principle also involves public

policy. No person can be allowed to occupy a portion of a

public road, a highway or even a public pathway, and

argue that even after his encroachment there is sufficient

space left for public to pass by. He cannot be the judge of

the requirements of the public, nor can he decide for

himself what extent must be left for public use and what

extent must be occupied by him. At this rate, anybody

will be free to occupy a portion of such public streets,

highways and roads with the specious argument that

there is still space left for public to pass by. Slowly these

encroachments may become permanent. It is evident that

such a course cannot be permitted. It is true that Section

39 expressly speaks of discretion in the Court in the

matter of granting a mandatory injunction; but, the said

discretion has to be exercised in accordance with law and

having regard to the facts and circumstances of a given

case. Maybe that granting a mandatory injunction would

result in eviction of the poor people living in the huts, or

the displacement of the school which is said to be

running there for the last several decades; but that can

be taken care of by making appropriate directions.”

10. In these circumstances, this Court would have to

accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the 1st

respondent that there is a clear finding of fact relating to the

encroachment of road margin by the appellants herein and

that a person can always seeks the relief of removal of

encroachments, by way of a mandatory injunction, in case 

7

where the encroachments take place on public roads or

public road margins.

11. Accordingly, this Court does not find any merits

in this Second Appeal and dismissed. No costs.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any,

shall stand closed.

 ____________________________

R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J.

08.08.2023

RJS

8

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO

SECOND APPEAL No.275 of 2023

08-08-2023

RJS

Suit for specific performance - respondent terminated the agreement of sale and refund the advance amount due to his personal reasons - Plaintiff claimed that only 370 Sq.Yards avaialbe but not 672 Sq.Yards as mentioned in the agreement of sale and filed suit for specific performance for 370 Sq.Yards- trail court decreed - appeallant court set aside the trial court decree and judgment - SA Burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that the avaialbe extent is only 370 Sq.Yards and not 672 Sq.Yards as mentioned in the agreement of sale. 2023:APHC:25048


Suit for specific performance - respondent terminated the agreement of sale and refund the advance amount due to his personal reasons - Plaintiff claimed that only 370 Sq.Yards avaialbe but not 672 Sq.Yards as mentioned in the agreement of sale and filed suit for specific performance for 370 Sq.Yards- trail court decreed - appeallant court set aside the trial court decree and  judgment - SA

Burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that the avaialbe extent is only 370 Sq.Yards and not 672 Sq.Yards as mentioned in the agreement of sale. 2023:APHC:25048

Held that The agreement of sale stated that the extent of land in the plot was 672 sq yards. The appellant claimed that only 370 sq. yards was  available while the respondent claimed 672 sq. yards was available. The appellant filed a suit for specific performance calling upon the respondent to execute a deed of sale for the said plot by receiving sale consideration for an extent of 370 sq. yards. In such circumstances, the burden of demonstrating that the extent of land available was only 370 sq. yards, falls squarely on the appellant. Such burden had not been discharged by the appellant. The appellant never called upon the respondent to come forward for a joint measurement of the land. Further, the appellant did not demonstrate before the trial Court or the appellate Court that the land available in the plot was only 370 sq. yards and that he was entitled for a deed of sale on that basis. No attempt was made before the trial Court for adducing any evidence in relation to the actual extent of land available on the site. Consequently, it cannot be said that the appellant was ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement of sale, as the said offer is conditional on rejection of the extent of land available. 2023:APHC:25048

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO

Second Appeal No.284 of 2023

ALAKA SATYAVATHI
Versus
MUDDIREDDIPALLI ANJANAPPA

JUDGMENT:

Heard Sri M.P.V.N.V. Sastry, learned counsel for the appellant.

2. The appellant is the plaintiff in the suit. The appellant had

entered into an agreement of sale with the respondent on 13.09.2011 for

purchase of a plot of land, situated in Eluru, said to be admeasuring 672

Sq. Yds., belonging to the respondent. It was to be purchased by the

appellant at the rate of Rs.2300/- per sq. yard. An advance of

Rs.1,00,000/- was paid. The agreement also stipulated that the appellant

was to keep the sale price ready within one month and 15 days from the

date of agreement and inform of the respondent. Upon such information,

the respondent was to get the plot of land measured after excluding

certain crosses, which were on the plot, and receive the sale consideration

at the rate of Rs.2300/- per sq. yard for the land which was actually

available on the site. The respondent was to execute and register

necessary deed of sale in the registrar office upon receipt of the sale

consideration.

3. On 03.10.2011, the respondent sent a letter to the appellant

stating that he was unable to sell the plot of land to the appellant due to

family reasons and enclosed a cheque for Rs.1,00,000/- towards

repayment of the advance taken by him. In reply to this letter, the 

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appellant got a legal notice dated 13.10.2011 issued to the respondent,

stating that the respondent had got the site measured with the help of a

private surveyor, and this survey had revealed that the actual extent of

the land available for sale is only 370 sq. yards, after excluding the

crosses on all sides of the plot. The appellant also took the stand that

refusal of the respondent to go through with the sale transaction and

returning the advance amount was not permissible and was not

acceptable to the appellant.

4. After setting out her position, the appellant called upon the

respondent to be present on 15.10.2011 at the registrar office, Vatluru,

for receiving the sale consideration calculated on the basis of the extent of

land available being 370 sq. yards and to register necessary deed of sale

failing which the appellant would be constrained to file a suit for specific

performance of the agreement of sale.

5. In reply to this notice, the respondent stated that he had got

the land surveyed by the Mandal Surveyor and as per the said survey an

extent of 612 sq. yards is available in the plot of land for sale, while 60 sq.

yards had been given to the respondent for road widening; physical

possession of the land had never been given to the appellant; the

agreement of sale was signed by the respondent at his residence at

Gudimalkapur at Mehadipatnam, Hyderabad as the agreement of sale had

been brought to Hyderabad by the husband of the appellant.

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6. The respondent took objection to the action of the appellant

in cutting the trees and bushes on the land and demolition of the cement

pillars which were erected by the respondent. The respondent also denied

the allegation of the appellant that the measurement of the site was done

jointly by the appellant and respondent with the help of a private surveyor

as the respondent had not visited Eluru from the date of the signing of

the agreement of sale.

7. After receipt of the said reply notice, the appellant filed

O.S.No.405 of 2011 before the Senior Civil Judge, Eluru for specific

performance of the agreement of sale, dated 13.09.2011. The respondent

had entered appearance and filed his written statement. After both sides

had adduced their evidence in the trial and after hearing both sides, the

trial Court allowed the suit by judgment and decree dated 05.03.2018.

Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, the respondent moved the

II Additional District Judge, Eluru, by way of A.S.No.45 of 2018. This

appeal was allowed by the appellate Court by judgment and Decree dated

23.02.2023. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appellant

has moved this Court by way of the present second appeal.

8. The trial Court accepted the contention of the appellant that

the termination of agreement by the respondent was untenable and that

the respondent was liable to execute necessary deed of sale after

receiving the sale consideration calculated on the basis of the extent of 

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land being 370 sq. yards, as the appellant was always ready and willing to

perform her part of promise made in the agreement of sale.

9. The appellate Court took the view that in the absence of any

cogent evidence or proof that the actual extent of land available on the

site is only 370 sq. yards as opposed to the extent of 672 sq. yards

mentioned in the agreement of sale, the appellant was not entitled to

contend that only 370 sq. yards of land was available and to offer the sale

consideration on that basis. The appellate Court recorded that, as per the

pleadings of the appellant, the site was measured by the respondent in

the presence of the appellant and the actual extent of land was fixed at

370 sq. yards. The appellate Court also recorded that the legal notice

dated 10.10.2011, issued on behalf of the appellant, marked as Ex.A.4,

states that the appellant had measured the schedule land in the presence

of the respondent through a private surveyor. The appellate Court, while

holding that there was a contradiction in the version of the appellant, had

also taken the view that neither of these facts was elicited in the crossexamination of the witnesses of the respondent.

10. The appellate Court, thereupon, allowed the appeal on both

these grounds by holding that the appellant was not entitled for the relief

of specific performance of the agreement of sale.

11. Sri M.P.V.N.V. Sastry, learned counsel for the appellant

would argue that the burden of demonstrating the alleged shortfall in the 

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extent of land was actually on the respondent and that the said burden

had not been discharged by the respondent in any manner as there was

no pleading on this issue. He further submitted that the appellate Court

ought to have appreciated that the respondent had initially taken the

stand that he was rescinding the agreement due to family reasons, while

this stand changed during the cross-examination that the respondent

stated that he had refused to execute the deed of sale on account of the

objections raised by the appellant in relation to the extent of land

available. He would submit that such a discrepancy is sufficient to show

that there was no valid reasons for refusal to execute necessary deed of

sale and the appellate Court instead of considering this issue, had gone

into the question of whether the appellant is entitled to specific

performance on account of the difference in extent of land.

12. A perusal of the pleadings and the evidence show that the

agreement required the appellant to indicate that the sale consideration

was made ready upon which the plot was to be measured for fixing the

actual sale consideration payable. This stage never occurred. The

respondent sent a letter dated 03.10.2011 for cancellation of the

agreement of sale, while the appellant, in reply to this letter, called upon

the respondent to execute sale deed for an extent of 370 sq. yards by

accepting sale consideration for that extent of land.

13. The agreement of sale stated that the extent of land in the

plot was 672 sq yards. The appellant claimed that only 370 sq. yards was 

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available while the respondent claimed 672 sq. yards was available. The

appellant filed a suit for specific performance calling upon the respondent

to execute a deed of sale for the said plot by receiving sale consideration

for an extent of 370 sq. yards. In such circumstances, the burden of

demonstrating that the extent of land available was only 370 sq. yards,

falls squarely on the appellant. Such burden had not been discharged by

the appellant. The appellant never called upon the respondent to come

forward for a joint measurement of the land. Further, the appellant did not

demonstrate before the trial Court or the appellate Court that the land

available in the plot was only 370 sq. yards and that he was entitled for a

deed of sale on that basis. No attempt was made before the trial Court for

adducing any evidence in relation to the actual extent of land available on

the site. Consequently, it cannot be said that the appellant was ready and

willing to perform her part of the agreement of sale, as the said offer is

conditional on rejection of the extent of land available.

14. In the said circumstances, the finding of the appellate Court,

that the specific performance of the agreement cannot be ordered on

account of the appellant failing to demonstrate the extent of land, is in

accordance with law.

15. This Court does not find any question of law that needs to

be answered by this Court. In any event, this Court does not find any

defect or shortcoming in the judgment and decree of the appellate Court.

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16. For all the aforesaid reasons, the second appeal is dismissed.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.

__________________________

R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J.

______ July, 2023

Js.

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S.A.No.284 of 2023


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HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO

Second Appeal No.284 of 2023

_____ July, 2023

Js.