LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Saturday, July 3, 2021

Public Interest seeking directions to the respondents – Central/State Governments to provide ex gratia monetary compensation of Rs. 4 lacs or notified ex gratia monetary compensation to the families of the deceased who have succumbed to the pandemic of Covid-19, in view of Section 12 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as ‘DMA 2005’). It is also further prayed for an appropriate direction to the respondents – State Governments to fulfil their obligation to take care of victims of the calamity and their family members.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 554 OF 2021

Reepak Kansal …Writ Petitioner

Versus

Union of India and others …Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 539 OF 2021

Gaurav Kumar Bansal …Writ Petitioner

Versus

Union of India and others …Respondents

(With applications for interventions)

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

1. The applications for interventions are allowed in terms of the prayer

made and the applicants are permitted to intervene in the present

proceedings.

1

2. These two writ petitions have been filed in Public Interest seeking

directions to the respondents – Central/State Governments to provide ex

gratia monetary compensation of Rs. 4 lacs or notified ex gratia monetary

compensation to the families of the deceased who have succumbed to the

pandemic of Covid-19, in view of Section 12 of the Disaster Management

Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as ‘DMA 2005’). It is also further prayed

for an appropriate direction to the respondents – State Governments to fulfil

their obligation to take care of victims of the calamity and their family

members. One another relief which is sought in Writ Petition (Civil) No.

554 of 2021 is to issue an appropriate direction to the respondents – State

Governments to issue any official document stating cause of death, to the

family members of the deceased who died due to Covid-19. One additional

relief which is sought in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 539 of 2021 is to issue an

appropriate writ of mandamus against the respondents – Union of India and

others to provide social security and rehabilitation to the victims of Covid19. Two applications have been filed in the aforesaid writ petitions by

intervenors – family members who have lost their family members due to

Covid-19, supporting the prayers sought in the respective writ petitions.

3. Shri S.B. Upadhyay, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf

of the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 554 of 2021. Shri Gaurav

Kumar Bansal, learned Advocate has appeared as Party in Person in Writ

2

Petition (Civil) No. 539 of 2021. Shri Sumeer Sodhi and Shri Anand S.

Jondhale, learned Advocates have appeared on behalf of the intervenors in

the respective intervention applications. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned

Solicitor General along with Shri K.M. Natraj and Ms. Aishwarya Bhati,

learned Additional Solicitor Generals have appeared on behalf of the Union

of India.

3.1 Shri S.B. Upadhyay, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of

the petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 554 of 2021 has submitted that

admittedly Covid-19 is a “Notified Disaster” and therefore the provisions of

the DMA 2005 shall apply. It is submitted that as such vide letter dated

14.03.2020, Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India has stated that the

Central Government, keeping in view the spread of Covid-19 virus in India,

has decided to treat it as “Notified Disaster” for the purpose of providing

assistance under State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF). It is submitted that

earlier as per the letter/communication dated 8.4.2015, the Government of

India, Ministry of Home Affairs (Disaster Management Division) issued

revised list and norms of assistance from SDRF and National Disaster

Response Fund (NDRF). It is submitted that as per the said letter, for any

death which is caused due to disaster, an amount of Rs. 4 lacs is to be paid to

the victim’s family, in addition to other reliefs. It is submitted therefore on

the same line and applying the same criteria, the family members of those

3

who have succumbed to Covid-19 are to be provided ex gratia monetary

compensation of Rs. 4 lacs, as Covid-19 is also treated, considered and

declared as “Notified Disaster”.

3.2 It is further submitted by Shri Upadhyay, learned Senior Advocate

appearing on behalf of the petitioner that Section 12 of the DMA 2005

mandatorily provides for the National Authority defined under Section 3 of

the said Act to recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to

be provided to persons affected by the disaster and it shall include, inter alia,

ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life. It is submitted therefore that it

is the statutory duty of the National Authority to provide in the guidelines

for ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life who died due to Covid-19,

which is declared as a “Notified Disaster”.

3.3 It is submitted that to provide such ex gratia assistance on account of

loss of life is not only a statutory obligation under Section 12 of the DMA

2005, but it is the constitutional obligation also since it also affects the right

to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is

submitted that the word “shall” occurring twice in Section 12 of the Act puts

a constitutional and statutory obligation on the part of the Central/State

Government to recommend guidelines for providing ex gratia assistance

which is in the nature of sustenance assistance. It is submitted that as such

keeping the aforesaid in mind, earlier for the years 2015-2020 vide Ministry

4

of Home Affairs letter dated 08.04.2015 the Government has fixed norms of

assistance from SDRF and NDRF for providing succour to the aggrieved

family.

3.4 It is further submitted that the word “shall” occurred in Section 12 of

the DMA 2005 should be construed as “mandatory” and shall not be read as

“may”, as contended on behalf of the Union of India. It is submitted that if

the word “shall” used in Section 12 of the DMA 2005 is read as “may”, as

sought to be canvassed on behalf of the Union of India, the concept of

“situation interpretation” evolved would negate the very object and purpose

enshrined in Section 12 of the DMA 2005 since the purpose is immediate

sustenance assistance to the aggrieved family. Heavy reliance is placed on

the decision of this Court in the case of DLF Universal Limited v. Director,

Town and Country Planning Department, Haryana (2010) 14 SCC 1 (para

13) and Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Limited, (2005) 7

SCC 234 (para 85).

3.5 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Bhavnagar

University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 (paras 25 &

26), it is submitted that when the language used in the section/provision is

plain and unambiguous, no words shall be added, altered or modified unless

it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being

unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable

5

with the rest of the statute. It is submitted that in the present case the

language used in Section 12 of the DMA 2005 is plain and unambiguous and

therefore the word “shall” shall be read as “shall” and the same should be

construed as mandatorily to be provided.

3.6 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Swaraj Abhiyan

v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 498 (paras 120 to 123), it is submitted that

as held by this Court, a plea of financial inability cannot be an excuse for

disregarding statutory duties. Reliance is also placed on the decisions of this

Court in the cases of Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichan, (1980) 4 SCC

162; and Khatri (2) v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 627 and it is submitted

that as observed the State may have its financial constraint and its priorities

in expenditure, the law does not permit any government to deprive its

citizens of constitutional rights on a plea of poverty. It is submitted

therefore that the plea taken by the Central Government that the prayer of

the petitioner for the payment of ex gratia compensation for loss of life due

to Covid-19 pandemic to the aggrieved families is beyond the fiscal

affordability may not be accepted. It is submitted that the fiscal

affordability/financial constraint cannot be a ground not to fulfil statutory

obligation under the DMA 2005 and the constitutional obligation as

provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

6

3.7 It is further submitted by Shri Upadhyay, learned Senior Advocate

appearing on behalf of the petitioner that it is the duty of every government,

either Central or State, to see that the correct/accurate death

certificates/official documents are issued mentioning the correct cause of

death arising out of Covid-19 pandemic. It is submitted that by not issuing

the accurate/correct death certificate/official document with correct cause of

death – Covid-19 pandemic, the family members of the deceased, who died

due to Covid-19 pandemic, will be deprived of the benefits of the schemes,

if any, declared by the Central/State Governments. It is submitted that not

only that but by not issuing the correct/accurate death certificates

mentioning the correct cause of death – Covid-19 pandemic, even the other

citizens would be misled and the correct figure of deaths arising out of

Covid-19 would not be known. It is submitted that if the number of persons

who died because of Covid-19 are shown less, people would be misled and

many a times they would become negligent. It is submitted therefore that it

is in the larger public interest also to issue correct/accurate death certificate

with correct cause of death. It is submitted that there is a requirement of

simplifying the procedure for issuance of death certificate mentioning the

cause of death arising out of Covid-19.

4. While adopting the submissions made by Shri Upadhyay, learned

Senior Advocate, Shri Gaurav Kumar Bansal, learned Advocate who has

7

appeared as Party in Person, in addition, has further submitted that in the

counter affidavit filed by the Union of India, one of the grounds to refuse to

pay ex gratia amount of compensation to those families whose members

have died due to Covid-19 is that Covid-19 is a continuous disaster which

was not envisaged by the Legislature at the time of enactment of DMA 2005

and therefore the provisions of DMA 2005 have to be implemented

differently. It is submitted that the submission on behalf of the Union of

India that term “disaster” which was envisaged while enacting DMA 2005,

there were broadly those disasters resulting from any catastrophe or calamity

which is one time happening or few incidents taking place periodically for

some time, hence considering the very nature of Covid-19, the Covid-19

disaster has to be treated differently from the term “Disaster” contemplated

by the Legislature, while enacting DMA 2005. To the aforesaid, it is

submitted that once Covid-19 is declared as a “Notified Disaster/Disaster”

and even otherwise as per Section 2(d) of the DMA 2005, Covid-19

Pandemic is a “Disaster” and therefore all the provisions including Section

12 of the DMA 2005 shall be applicable and come into play.

4.1 It is submitted that even otherwise recently in the year 2019, the

Union of India has issued National Disaster Management Plan 2019 (NDMP

2019), wherein two types of Disasters are defined, i.e., (1) Natural Hazards,

and (2) Man Made Disasters. It is further submitted that NDMP-2019 has

8

further classified its Natural Hazards and Biological Natural Hazards has

been included as “Disaster”. It is submitted that therefore Covid-19 being a

Biological Disaster comes within the purview and ambit of Section 2(d) of

the DMA 2005 and therefore is a “Disaster” under DMA 2005. It is

submitted that therefore to deny that Covid-19 is not a disaster has no

substance and may not be accepted as even the Central Government on

14.03.2020 decided to treat Covid-19 as “Notified Disaster”.

4.2 It is submitted that even the XVth Finance Commission’s Report

which is prepared after Covid-19 Pandemic suggests that the Central

Government has always considered Covid-19 as a “Disaster” as mentioned

in Section 2(d) of the DMA 2005. It is submitted therefore that the

submission on behalf of the Union of India that Covid-19 is not that kind of

disaster which Legislature envisaged while enacting DMA 2005 is nothing

but an afterthought.

4.3 Now so far as the stand taken on behalf of the Union of India that the

term “shall” used in Section 12 will have to be read as “may” while reading

the instances given in Section 12 (i) to (iii), it is submitted that the

Parliament has used the word “shall” twice in Section 12 of DMA 2005

which clearly shows that National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)

is not only bound to recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of

relief but such reliefs must contain the provisions of ex gratia assistance on

9

account of loss of life. It is submitted that further, use of word “shall” in

Section 12 of DMA 2005 clearly indicates the intention of the legislature

that the said provision is mandatory one and as such it is the statutory duty

of the Union Government/NDMA to issue guidelines providing ex gratia

compensation to the family members of persons who have died due to

Covid-19 virus while providing their services in relief operations or when

they were associated with preparedness activities to combat Covid-19

pandemic.

4.4 It is submitted that even the Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs

vide its letter dated 8.4.2015 also issued the revised list of items of norms of

assistance from SDRF/NDRF wherein it is clearly mentioned that Rs. 4 lacs

shall be provided for ex gratia payment to the families of deceased persons.

It is submitted that therefore the word “shall” used by the legislature in

Section 12 must be given its literal meaning unless context requires

otherwise.

4.5 It is further submitted by Shri Gaurav Kumar Bansal, learned

Advocate that granting ex gratia for one disease while denying the same to

the persons suffering from other disease would create unfairness and

invidious discrimination and the same cannot be permitted, more

particularly when the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Central Government

have themselves notified Covid-19 as “Notified Disaster” under DMA 2005.

10

It is submitted that granting ex gratia for one disaster (like earthquake,

floods, cyclones etc.) while denying the same to other disaster (like Covid19) would not only create unfairness and discrimination but also cause

undue hardship on those families who have lost their loved ones due to

Covid-19 virus.

4.6 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the Union of India pleading

fiscal affordability while making provisions for ex gratia to the families of

all Covid-19 deceased persons, it is submitted that as such there are some

States like States of Bihar, Karnataka, Delhi which are paying one time

compensation in the form of ex gratia to those families whose members have

died due to Covid-19 pandemic.

4.7 It is further submitted that item No. 23 of the Concurrent List of

Schedule VII of the Constitution of India deals with social security & social

insurance and it is on the basis of this item that Parliament enacted DMA

2005. It is submitted that one of the Foundation Stones of enacting DMA

2005 is to provide social security & social insurance to the persons and

families affected by disasters. It is submitted that therefore denying the ex

gratia payment to the families of Covid-19 deceased shall not only hit on the

foundation stone on which DMA 2005 is standing but shall also defeat the

whole purpose of DMA 2005. It is submitted that because of Covid-19

pandemic, lakhs of families have not only lost their near and dear but have

11

also lost the sole bread earner who was nurturing the range of persons, i.e.,

small kids to elderly persons. It is submitted that due to loss of sole bread

earner, lakhs of families have completely devastated and destroyed. It is

submitted that grant of respectable and reasonable one-time compensation in

the form of ex gratia as provided under Section 12(iii) of DMA 2005 to the

“lowest of the low” to the “needy and to the families of frontline workers”

who lost their lives while acting as “Corona Warrior” shall not only provide

a sense of social security to them but shall also serve the letter and spirit of

DMA 2005.

4.8 It is submitted that even the Finance Commission in its XVth Finance

Commission’s Report at point number 8.132 & 8.133 has also suggested the

Government of India to launch National Insurance Scheme for Disaster

Related Deaths in India which will not only be able to work as Social

Protection Scheme but will also not increase the administrative burden on

the Government.

5. Shri Sumeer Sodhi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the

intervenors has submitted that it is the constitutional obligation of the

Government to take steps to ensure that the minimum facilities of life are

provided to every person, and there are equalities of income and material

resources as far as democratically possible. It is submitted that the preamble

of the Constitution of India declares India as a “Socialist” country and this

12

term itself gives a substantial proof of the existence of social welfare

responsibilities of the government. It is submitted that Article 39A of the

Constitution of India lays down a duty on the government to frame its

policies in such a manner that the citizens get equal right to an adequate

means of livelihood. It is submitted that though no amount of money will be

enough to mitigate the loss of a family member but still the government as

its social responsibility shall frame a national scheme for providing

compensation to the families of those people who have died due to Covid-19

pandemic so that they all can live a dignified life and fulfil their basic

necessities.

5.1 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Charan Lal

Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 (popularly known as “Bhopal

Gas Leak Disaster case”, it is submitted that it is held in the aforesaid case

that the Government has the sovereign power of guardianship over the

persons under disability and it is its duty to protect them. Reliance is also

placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Samatha v. State of A.P.,

(1997) 8 SCC 191 (para 72).

5.2 It is further submitted by Shri Sodhi, learned Advocate appearing for

the intervenors that the Government cannot be permitted to abdicate from its

constitutional duty by claiming fiscal constraint or inability. It is submitted

that the submission of the Government that payment of ex gratia

13

compensation to all deceased persons who have died due to Covid-19, is

beyond their fiscal affordability cannot be allowed as a ground for escape. It

is submitted that if the Government is allowed to claim fiscal inability as a

ground to get away from its constitutional duty, then it will set a dangerous

precedent and every time when the government will be in a tight spot, it may

legally defy duties under the laws by hiding behind the shield of fiscal

inability to protect itself from providing relief.

5.3 It is submitted that when Covid-19 virus rapidly started spreading in

our country, the Union of India proactively notified “Covid-19” as a

pandemic in order to exercise powers under DMA 2005 vide letter dated

14.03.2020. It is submitted that now when the responsibility of mitigating

the loss of life under DMA 2005 arises, the government is abstaining from

its responsibility and trying to escape from its duty to provide compensation

to people who have lost their loved ones. It is submitted that in the modified

list of items and norms of assistance from SDRF vide letter dated

14.03.2020, the Government of India has withdrawn the clause of ex gratia

compensation. It is submitted that Section 12 of DMA 2005 explicitly states

that the NDMA shall recommend guidelines for minimum standards of relief

to be provided to the persons affected by disaster. It is submitted that special

emphasis should be laid on Section 12 (ii) and Section 12(iii) of DMA 2005.

14

5.4 It is further submitted that the said withdrawal has resulted in an

anomaly which has no justifiable reasoning. It is further submitted that there

must be a uniform policy on compensation. It is submitted that currently

different States are paying different amount of compensation to the families

of the deceased persons. It is submitted that the State of Bihar has

announced that it will provide Rs. 4 lacs compensation in case of Covid-19

death; State of Madhya Pradesh has announced that an amount of Rs. 1 lac

shall be provided and the Government of Delhi has recently announced that

the amount of compensation in case of Covid-19 death shall be Rs. 50,000/-.

It is submitted that such incongruity has crept in only because of the

wrongful and illegal act of withdrawal of monetary compensation by the

Central Government. It is submitted that there cannot be any discrimination

in benefits given to family members of those who have died due to Covid-19

pandemic.

6. While opposing the present petitions, Shri Tushar Mehta, learned

Solicitor General has submitted that it is not the case on behalf of the Union

of India that Covid-19 is not a “Notified Disaster/Disaster”. It is submitted

that it is also not in dispute that the provisions of DMA 2005 shall be

applicable with respect to Covid-19 pandemic. It is submitted that as such

various guidelines/SOPs are issued and the steps taken under the provisions

of DMA 2005. It is further submitted that even the Union government is also

15

not facing financial constraint and/or pleading fiscal affordability. It is

submitted that the issue is not of fiscal affordability, but rather of the most

rational, judicious and optimum usage of fiscal and all other resources of the

nation. It is submitted that question is of priorities and not facing financial

constraint. It is submitted that it may not be misconstrued that the

Government is opposing grant of ex gratia payment due to financial

constraint.

6.1 It is submitted that as mentioned in the detailed and comprehensive

affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India, important steps have been

taken by the Central Government under DMA 2005, as also, the steps taken

specifically as Nation’s response to Covid-19 pandemic wherein a much

more comprehensive, multi-pronged, multi-sectoral, whole of society and

whole of government, while at the same time dynamic approach has been

adopted, in tune with the evolving nature of Covid-19 virus.

6.2 It is submitted that various steps have been taken by the Union of

India, to strategize nation’s response to Covid-19, a once in a lifetime

pandemic inflicted on the entire world, wherein not just the funds of NDRF

and SDRF, but even from the Consolidated Fund of India are being utilised

as per the advice of the experts. It is submitted that specific steps have been

taken for ramping up the entire health infrastructure, preparedness, relief,

16

restoration, mitigation and reconstruction, in a very short time, to include,

inter-alia:

a) Testing, tracing, treatment and quarantine facilities;

b) Augmenting hospital facilities, oxygenated beds, ventilators, ICU

facilities etc.;

c) Augmentation of health workforce and their insurance;

d) Augmentation, allocation, supply and transportation of oxygen and

other essential drugs;

e) Research, development, enhanced production and administration of

vaccinations to rapidly cover one of world’s largest eligible population of

beneficiaries;

f) Ensuring food security to the vulnerable groups;

g) Minimising the adverse impact of large-scale economic disruptions by

multi-pronged approach; and

h) Rehabilitation, protection and education of children orphaned due to

Covid-19.

6.3 It is submitted that different disasters have different effects/impacts.

It is submitted that considering the very nature of Covid-19 pandemic and its

effects/impacts, the guidelines/reliefs provided/to be provided have to be

different from the disasters contemplated by the legislature while enacting

DMA 2005. It is submitted that in the “disaster” originally contemplated, is

a one-time occurrence or the same occurs repeatedly for few times like

floods, earthquake, cyclone, different kinds of “interim measures of relief”

are to be provided, as generally it is not difficult to deal with such disasters

17

which do not require day-to-day expenditure, day-to-day monitoring, day-today change in priorities and day-to-day change in the methods and

modalities to deal with the same. It is submitted that it is this difference

which is relevant while deciding the scope and ambit of Section 12 of DMA

2005, in the present context.

6.4 It is submitted that it is always desirable that any disaster of the nature

of earthquake, flood, cyclone etc., an ex-gratia payment to every deceased is

stipulated in the form of guidelines contemplated under Section 12.

However, when the disaster not only remains an on-going disaster but

requires governmental expenditure, spending from public exchequer,

monitoring the disaster on a daily basis and treating the persons with the

best, everchanging and modern facilities available, the concepts of

“Minimum Standards of Relief”, under Section 12 will differ. In a scenario

like an on-going pandemic, the Central Government will have to provide for

a different “Minimum Standards of Relief” keeping the population suffering

from the disaster in mind, broadening its own vision, providing for a multithronged approach and putting life, health and safety of the citizens at the

topmost priority, for which expenditure is needed on a daily basis.

6.5 It is submitted that the Central Government, by way of “Minimum

Standards of Relief” under Section 12, has already taken several steps

providing for substantial and speedy measures by way of increase in the

18

health, infrastructure, ensuring food safety to every citizen (as the present

disaster required several lockdowns resulting in loss of earning), insurance

cover to those who were dealing with the pandemic by directly remaining

near to Covid infected patients etc.

6.6 It is submitted that Covid-19 has come as a novel virus and disease

resulting in a pandemic for the entire world. The entire world has faced this

phenomenon with differing intensity, mutations and waves, impacting life

itself, healthcare systems, livelihood, access to amenities, liberties etc.,

making it a global public health challenge affecting all countries. It is

submitted that therefore the Central Government adopted a multi-pronged,

multi-sectoral, whole of society and a whole of government approach, along

with the National Plan, in order to tailor the response of the nation in tune

with the evolving nature of the virus. It is submitted that the Government of

India while implementing DMA 2005 has applied a different approach

keeping the unprecedented nature of disaster in mind, while supporting

individual States/UTs as per their specific needs. It is submitted that such

support for fighting the pandemic situation has consisted of ramping up the

health infrastructure in a short time, which include testing, treatment, and

quarantine facilities on large-scale on the one hand, and augmenting hospital

facilities, which include oxygenated beds, ventilators, and ICU facilities, on

the other, in which the fund of not only NDRF but even from the

19

Consolidated Fund of India is being spent. It is submitted that this is an ongoing effort, which will have to be and is being scaled up further in response

to successive waves of Covid-19. It is submitted that there is a large-scale

increase in the health structure during the course of the pandemic as under:

TYPE OF HEALTH

FACILITIES

BASELINE CURRENT

STATUS

NO OF

FOLD

INCREASE

Cat I. COVID dedicated

hospitals

163 4096 25-fold

increase

Cat II. Dedicated

COVID Health Center

0 7,929

Cat III. Dedicated

COVID Care Centre

0 9,954

Oxygen supported beds 50,583 3,81,758 7.5-fold

increase

Total isolation beds

(excluding ICU beds)

41,000 17,17,227 42-fold

increase

Total ICU beds 2,500 1,13,035 45-fold

increase

Isolation railway

coaches

0 5,601

AUGMENTATION OF HEALTH WORKFORCE

More than 150,000 health personnel engaged (7,024 MOs, 3,680

Specialists, 35,996 Staff Nurses, 18,649 NHWs, 1,01,155 community

volunteers, Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA)’s and ASHA

Facilitators, 48453 other support staffs).

INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR HEALTH WORKERS

Insurance coverage to 22.12 lakhs health workers including ASHAs

fighting COVID-19.

INCREASE IN TESTING CAPACITY

 2,621 testing labs (1,266 Government and 1,355 Private)

 Phenomenal increase in testing capacity: 30,000 tests/day in

April’20 increased to a high of 22 lakhs tests/day.

 Cumulative – over 36.1 crore tests conducted for COVID-19.

20

INCREASE IN SURVEILLANCE

 Screening at all port of entry/exit, State/District rapid response

teams.

 Contact tracing through extensive network of frontline health

workers.

 State/city-specific sero-surveillance studies to estimate and monitor

trends.

6.7 It is submitted that the due to the peculiar nature of the COVID-19

pandemic, it was advisable not to formulate a strait jacket guideline and a

cast in stone formula on “Minimum Standards of Relief". It is submitted that

in order to enable the authorities to deal with the ever changing situations in

the best possible manner, utilising all the financial, human, infrastructural

and all resources of the nation rationally, judiciously and keeping the future

contingencies in mind, as the world does not know how this pandemic will

take shape in the future, the Union of India has taken a conscious policy

decision to provide relief(s) depending upon the ever changing needs

through various Ministries/Departments and such actions are coordinated

and monitored by the National Executive Committee, as contemplated in the

Disaster Management Act, 2005 in general and under Section 10 in

particular.

It is submitted that the following measures have been taken by the

Union of India/NDMA:

(1)The regular funding to deal with COVID-19 has been provided under

the National Health Mission;

21

(2) In order to supplement the efforts of the State Governments, the

Central Government on 14th March 2020, by way of a special onetime dispensation, decided to treat COVID-19 as a “notified disaster”

for the purpose of providing limited assistance towards containment

measures under SDRF,

(i) Measures for quarantine for sample collection and screening

(ii) Procurement of essential equipments/ labs for response to

COVID-19.

(iii) To deal with problems of migrant labourers, on 28th March,

2020, the Central Government allowed use of SDRF for setting

up relief camps and to provide food, water, etc. to migrant

workers and other stranded people.

(iv) On 23rd September, 2020, the Central Government further

allowed use of SDRF by the States for oxygen generation for

COVID-19 patients in States, to strengthen transport services

for transporting oxygen, and setting up containment zones,

COVID-19 care centres.

(v) for the containment measures allowed under SDRF, State

Governments were allowed to spend up to a maximum of 35%

of the annual allocation of funds under SDRF for the financial

year 2019-20. The ceiling of 35% was further enhanced to 50%

during the financial years 2020-21.

(vi) The State Governments were allowed to utilize up-to 10% of

their opening balance of SDRF as on 01.04.2020 by way of

22

one-time special dispensation, for COVID-19 containment

measures during 2020-21.

(vii) Keeping in view the recent surge in COVID-19 cases in the

country, by way of a special dispensation, Central Government,

further extended the dispensation allowed to States to utilise up

to 50% of their annual allocation of SDRF, for containment

measure of COVID-19 during the financial year 2021-22.

6.8 It is further submitted that COVID-19 pandemic has also been an

economic disruption. However, the government has made herculean efforts

to deter it from becoming a matter of economic distress, especially for the

poorer and marginalised sections of society. Considering the economywide

impact, the Government of India has announced several packages, protecting

the poor and vulnerable groups, extending cheap credit to small and medium

18 businesses, and reducing taxes in many areas. It is submitted that these

packages consist of lakhs of crores announced through the Pradhan Mantri

Garib Kalyan Yojana (PMGKY) and the Prime Minister Atma Nirbhar

Swastha Bharat Yojana (PMANSBY). It is submitted that to sustain the

economic activities to deal with the economic impacts of disaster, the

Central Government had to come out with several schemes either itself or

through the directives issued by the Reserve Bank of India to the banks for

the purpose of waiver of interest and/or restructuring of loan accounts. This

has created a huge burden on the overall economy of the nation and

23

exchequer of the Central Government, in particular. However, the Central

Government is doing its best to maintain its financial equilibrium without

compromising on the health, safety, food security and economic stability of

the country.

6.9 It is further submitted that the Government of India has also decided

to vaccinate the people of India as the most reliable preventive measure. To

achieve this goal by the end of this year, the Government has taken all the

steps to scale up the production, supplies, and import of vaccines. In the

annual budget for 2021-22, the Government of India has allocated Rs.

35,000 crores for the mass vaccination campaign.

6.10 It is further submitted that, the release of funds under National Health

Mission for FY 2018-19, FY 2019-20, FY 2020-21 and 2021-22 are as

under:

F.Y. BUDGET

ESTIMATE

(B.E.)

REVISED

ESTIMATE

(R.E.)

RELEASE

2018-19 25,154.61 26,118.05 26,027.62

2019-20 27,989.00 28,783.60 28,168.81

2020-21 27,989.00 29,316.75 29,747.84

2021-22 31,100.00 N.A. 1621.70

6.11 It is further submitted that in FY 2019-20, in addition to the above,

funds to the tune of Rs. 1113.21 Crore were released to the States /UTs

towards management and containment of COVID-19 over and above their

24

normal resource envelope under NHM. The release was from the savings of

Department of Health and Family Welfare (DoHFW). Therefore, the total

Release under NHM (including COVID-19): Rs. 29,282.02 Crore (Rs.

28,168.81 Cr + Rs.1,113.21 Cr).

6.12 It is further submitted that with regard to FY 2020-21, in addition to

the above, funds to the tune of Rs. 8257.89 Crore have been released to the

States/UTs under the India COVID-19 Emergency Response and Health

Systems Preparedness Package through NHM, towards management and

containment of COVID-19 pandemic, details of which are as under:

FINANCIAL SUPPORT UNDER EMERGENCY COVID RELIEF

PACKAGE

S.

No.

Programme Approved

Budget (Dec.’

2020)

(in Rs. crores)

Actual Expenditure

(as on 2nd Jun 21)

(in Rs. crores) (%)

1 National Health Mission 8,310 7580.14 91.2

2 Indian Council for

Medical Research

2,475 1275.00 51.5

3 National Centre for

Disease Control

95 74.10 78.0

4 Central Procurement

Division

3,400 3389.70 99.7

5 Ministry of Railways 720 720.00 100.0

Total 15,000 13038.97 86.9

6.13 It is further submitted that with regard to the prayer of the petitioner

to allow ex gratia compensation/assistance to the family members of the

deceased persons who have died due to COVID-19, while providing their

25

services in relief operations or when they were associated with preparedness

activities to combat COVID-19 pandemic, the Central Government, by its

pro-active and pre-emptive approach, had launched the Pradhan Mantri

Garib Kalyan Package (PMGKP) as early as on 30.03.2020. Under the

scheme, a comprehensive personal accident cover of Rs. 50 Lakh has been

provided to 22.12 Lakh Health Care Providers throughout the country,

including community health workers and private health workers who may

have been in direct contact and care of COVID-19 patients and may be at

risk of being impacted/infected by this. It is submitted that, further on

account of the unprecedented situation, private hospital staff/retired/

volunteer/local urban bodies/contract/daily wage/ad-hoc/outsourced staff

requisitioned by states/central hospitals/autonomous hospitals of

central/states/UTs, AIIMS & Institute of National Importance

(INI)s/hospitals of Central Ministries specifically drafted for care of

COVID-19 patients were also covered under the scheme. The benefits under

the said scheme have been extended for a further period of 180 days (w.e.f.

24.04.2021). The scheme is being implemented through an insurance policy

of New India Assurance Company. In order to further expedite the

processing of claims, a new system has been introduced as per which the

claims are now being processed by the District Collectors and forwarded to

the insurance company for release of funds to the claimants. So far, 442.4 ₹

crore have been released to the insurance company in this regard. Herein,

26

477 claims of healthcare workers under the scheme have already been given

the benefits, and further 344 claims of healthcare workers are under process.

6.14 It is further submitted that the financing of Disaster Risk Management

(DRM) under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, is based on the

recommendations of successive Finance Commissions, constituted under

Article 280 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that, the

allocation of the amount under NDRF and SDRF; guidelines on constitution

and administration of SDRF and NDRF; and the items and norms for

providing for relief assistance from SDRF/NDRF are based on the

constitutional recommendations of the successive Finance Commissions. It

is further stated that the successive Finance Commissions, after considering

all the facets of disaster risk management, have recommended the

expenditure for providing financial relief against 12 identified disasters and

accordingly, the victims of 12 disasters, viz. cyclone, drought, earthquake,

fire, flood, tsunami, hailstorm, landslide, avalanche, cloud burst, pest attack

and frost & cold wave, are provided relief from these funds, which is

mentioned in the memorandum dated 08.04.2015. It is submitted that, the

XV-Finance Commission in para 8.11 of Chapter 8 of its report for the

period 2021-22 to 2025-26, while making allocation under NDRF and SDRF

inter alia, has chosen, to deal with the issue of financing of Covid-19

pandemic. It is submitted that the recommendations of XVth Finance

27

Commission’s Report have been made in light of the experience gained and

also the context of the unprecedented Covid-19. It is submitted that this

report made recommendations for Disaster Risk Management, covering the

period from 2021-2022 to 2025-2026, expanding the scope of Disaster

Management beyond the traditional response and relief functions, to include

preparedness, mitigation, recovery and reconstruction, as reflected in chapter

8 of the XVth Finance Commission’s Report. It is submitted that this report

of XVth Finance Commission along with the Explanatory Memorandum

was laid before the Parliament, as mandated under Article 281 of the

Constitution of India.

It is submitted that in accordance with the recommendations of XVth

Finance Commission and the domain subject matter experts, the Union of

India devised the strategy to deal with, the extremely contagious, volatile

and ever changing impact of the mutations of the virus COVID 19, in the

best possible manner, utilizing all the financial, human and infrastructural

resources of the nation, rationally and judiciously, also keeping in mind the

future contingencies, rather than formulating the response in the straitjacket

formula of Minimum Standards of Relief, as contemplated under the

National Disaster Management Act, 2005.

28

It is submitted that therefore the issue is not of fiscal affordability, but

rather of the most rational, judicious and optimum usage of fiscal and all

other resources of the nation.

6.15 It is further submitted that, to appreciate the context of an ‘Ex-Gratia’

payment, Section 12 of Disaster Management Act, 2005 needs to be read

with section 46, wherein sub-section 46(2) reads as under:

“The National Disaster Response Fund shall be made available

to the National Executive Committee to be applied towards

meeting the expenses for emergency response, relief and

rehabilitation in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the

Central Government in consultation with the National

Authority.”

The Central Government has already declared COVID-19 as a

“notified disaster” under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. It is thereby

submitted that, as provided under Section 12 of the Disaster Management

Act, 2005, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has

already issued general Guidelines for “Minimum Standards of Relief” under

Section 12 of the Disaster Management Act. However, on the issue of ‘exgratia’ assistance on account of loss of life, the guidelines provide that the

norms provided by Government of India (Ministry of Home Affairs) for

assistance from SDRF should be the Minimum Standards of Relief.

6.16 It is further submitted that, the XVth Finance Commission, in para

8.141 of its report, had considered the request of the State Governments for

inclusion of a number of calamities under the eligible list of disasters under

29

SDRF/NDRF. Herein, after consideration, in para 8.143 of its report, the

Commission had observed that the list of notified disasters eligible for

funding from State Disaster Risk Management Fund (SDRMF) and National

Disaster Risk Management Fund (NDRMF) [new nomenclature used by

XVth Finance Commission which includes Response Fund and Mitigation

Fund] covers the needs of the States to a large extent and thus did not find

much merit in the request to expand its scope.

6.17 It is further submitted that, in order to supplement the efforts of the

State Government, the Central Government, on 14th March, 2020 by way of

a special one-time dispensation, decided to treat COVID-19 as a “notified

disaster” for the purpose of limited assistance towards containment measures

under SDRF on (i) Measures for quarantine for sample collection and

screening (ii) Procurement of essential equipments/labs for response to

COVID-19. Further, to deal with problems of migrant labourers, on 28th

March, 2020, the Central Government allowed use of SDRF for setting up

relief camps and to provide food, water, etc. to migrant workers and other

stranded people. On 23th September, 2020, the Central Government further

allowed use of SDRF by the States for oxygen generation for COVID-19

patients in States, to strengthen transport services for transporting oxygen,

and setting up containment zones, COVID-19 care centres.

6.18 It is further submitted that, ex-gratia payment under SDRF/NDRF

guidelines issued under section 46(2) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005

30

is available to persons who have died, in case of 12 notified disasters and

other local natural disasters which are notified by the State Governments.

However, COVID-19 Pandemic/Disaster has not been recommended by the

XVth Finance Commission for financing of relief measures from

SDRMF/NDRMF, which includes ex-gratia payment.

6.19 So far as the recommendations of the XVth Finance Commission on

insurance is concerned, it is submitted that, the XVth Finance Commission,

in para 8.131 of its report, has proposed 4 insurance interventions, which

needs to be further studied by the NDMA and the relevant Ministries about

their feasibility. In this regard, it is submitted that the recommendations of

the Commission are under consultation by NDMA with the stakeholders

concerned.

6.19.1 It is submitted that, presently there is no

guideline/policy/scheme in NDMA which relates to National Insurance

mechanism that may be used to pay for disaster related deaths due to Covid19. In this regard it is submitted that, the XVth Finance Commission has

proposed four Insurance interventions which need to be studied further by

the NDMA and relevant ministries for their feasibility. These interventions

are:

16.1 National Insurance Scheme for Disaster-related Deaths

16.2 Synchronising Relief Assistance with Crop Insurance

16.3 Risk Pool for Infrastructure Protection and Recovery

31

16.4 Access to International Reinsurance for Outlier Hazard Events

6.19.2 It is submitted that, in this context, in February 2020, a

‘National Workshop on Risk Insurance’ was held in Mumbai which was

attended by Member Secretary National Disaster Management Authority

(NDMA), National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM), Insurance

Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI), States

Functionaries and leading insurance companies. Subsequently in the

Workshop, upon the suggestion of Member Secretary (NDMA), a Working

Group (WG) was constituted comprising members from NIDM, NDMA,

IRDAI as well as CEO’s/Chairman of Insurance Companies for

deliberations on risk insurance coverage against natural disasters in India.

In its final report submitted in April, 2021 to DM Division of Ministry of

Home Affairs, the WG has recommended a parametric trigger-based

insurance solution that can pay claims in the event of earthquake, cyclone,

extreme precipitation or river flood. In this regard, the NDMA has

requested NIDM to conduct a joint meeting/session with NDMA, NIDM,

and with the proposed States that have been selected for a pilot project, by

the WG.

6.19.3 It is submitted that, as States are the major stakeholders and

also beneficiaries of proposed insurance schemes, their recommendations

and availability of loss data are the crucial factors to be considered before

32

moving ahead. However, the insurance coverage being deliberated does not

cover risk insurance from pandemics or epidemics like the COVID-19.

6.19.4 It is further submitted that, the Asian Development Bank

(ADB) has also proposed a new ADB Technical Assistance (TA) concept for

promoting disaster risk transfer, including insurance in India. ADB through

its TA is looking forward to develop disaster risk financing solutions for

Indian States. In this regard, a meeting was also held on 05.04.2021

between ADB and NDMA. Herein, during the course of the meeting, ADB

proposed for a hybrid Insurance solution i.e., combination of Parametric

Insurance and Indemnity insurance; and also proposed for a joint meeting

between NDMA, Department of Financial Services (DFS), and MHA.

6.19.5 It is submitted that, NDMA has requested ADB to conduct the

proposed meeting as per convenience of MHA/DFS and inform NDMA

accordingly. However, the meeting scheduled on 12.04.2021, had to be

postponed due to the second wave of the pandemic. It is submitted that

however, as such, and as submitted hereinabove and so stated in the counter

affidavit, all frontline workers are covered under the insurance, the

particulars of which are stated hereinabove.

6.20 Now so far as the issue with respect to the issuance of the correct and

accurate death certificates with correct cause of death due to Covid-19 and

recording of Covid-19 deaths are concerned, it is submitted that there is a

statutory mechanism and any breach of the guidelines on the same would be

33

a criminal offence as stipulated under Section 188 of the IPC. It is

submitted that any death resulting from Covid-19 shall have to be certified,

i.e., as Covid death, failing which, everyone responsible (including the

certifying doctor) shall be responsible for penal consequences.

6.20.1 It is submitted that the broad guidelines for appropriate

recording of Covid-19 related deaths in India were prepared by the Indian

Council of Medical Research (ICMR) and were issued on 10.05.2020 for all

States for implementation and subsequently placed on the ICMR website.

This was further communicated to the MoHFW, Government of India.

Thereafter, the Ministry communicated it to all the States and UTs. This

guidance is to help and guide doctor’s certification for Covid-19 related

deaths. It is submitted that the guidelines clearly state that positive deaths,

implicate deaths relating to Covid-19. It is submitted that further these

guidelines are in sync with the World Health Organisation Mortality Coding.

6.20.2 It is further submitted that, on the question of issuance of death

certificates, the registration of birth and death is done under the provisions

of a Central Act, namely, Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969. This

Act was enacted in the year 1969 and was enforced in most of the

States/UTs from 1st April, 1970 to promote uniformity and comparability in

the registration of Births and Deaths across the country.

6.20.3 It is further submitted that the Registrar General of India at the

Central level coordinates and unifies the activities of registration throughout

34

the country and at the same time allowing enough scope for the State

Governments to evolve an efficient system of registration suited to the

characteristics of the respective administration.

6.20.4 It is submitted that, in the context of pandemic due to corona

virus, the office of the Registrar General of India (ORGI) had issued

directions/guidelines to the Chief Registrars of all States/UTs during April,

2020 to collect and certify the information on cause of death due to COVID19 as per two emergency codes created by World Health Organization

(WHO) for COVID-19 in the 10th revision of International Statistical

Classification (ICD-10) of Diseases and Related Health Problems. It is

submitted that recently in May, 2021, ORGI has also issued guidelines

regarding registration of death and recording the cause of death wherein it

has been advised that the death of a person should be registered within the

stipulated time of 21 days.

6.20.5 So far as the guidelines regarding death audit and death

certification, it is submitted that the MoHFW vide its letter dated 09.10.2020

has released guidelines on distinction between ‘Death Audit’ and ‘Death

Certification’.

It is submitted that ‘Death Certification’ is required to be done for

recording deaths in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the

Registrar General of India. The primary goal of certification of cause of

death (Death Certificate) is to identify and correctly classify all deaths due

35

to a medical condition (e.g., COVID-19) and to eliminate any discrepancy in

coding so as to obtain true estimates of burden of COVID-19 deaths. All

deaths with a diagnosis of COVID-19, irrespective of co-morbidities, are to

be classified as deaths due to COVID-19. It is submitted that the only

exception could be where there is a clear alternative cause of death, 47 that

cannot be attributed to COVID-19 (e.g., accidental trauma, poisoning, acute

myocardial infarction, etc), where COVID-19 is an incidental finding. 49.

Whereas, ‘Death Audit’ on the other hand is an administrative exercise to

identify gaps that contribute to deaths of patients. The aim is to improve

quality of healthcare services by suitable corrective measures to

prevent/minimize future deaths. It is submitted that the same is to be done

as per the indicative proforma.

6.21 Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of

the Union of India has vehemently submitted that while interpreting Section

12 of the DMA 2005, the term “shall” must be cohered as “may”, thereby

making the provision directory/discretionary and not mandatory, in the light

of peculiar facts and comprehensive steps taken by the Union of India. It is

submitted that this Court in a catena of judgments on the interplay between

“may”, “shall” and “must”, have seldom held the phrases to their literary

interpretation, but instead looked into the intent of the legislature against the

backdrop of the prevailing circumstances. Heavy reliance is placed on the

36

decision of this Court in the case of Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam,

Gorakhpur, (2008) 12 SCC 372.

7. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective

petitioners/intervenors and the reliefs sought in the respective petitions, the

reliefs/submissions on behalf of the petitioners/intervenors can be

summarized as under:

i) to direct the National Disaster Management Authority

(NDMA)/Central Government/State Governments to provide ex gratia

monetary compensation of Rs. 4 lacs or notified ex gratia monetary

compensation to the families of the deceased persons who have succumbed

to the pandemic of Covid-19, in view of Section 12 of DMA 2005;

ii) to direct the respondents/State Governments to fulfill their

obligation(s) to take care of victims of the calamity and their family

members;

iii) to issue an appropriate direction to the respondents – State

Governments to issue any official document stating cause of death, to the

family members of the deceased who died due to Covid-19; and

iv) to direct the respondents – Union of India and others to provide

social security and rehabilitation to the victims of Covid-19.

7.1 While considering the aforesaid submissions/reliefs sought, the scope

of judicial review on the policy decisions having financial implications

which might affect the economy of the country and which may also affect

37

the other priorities and which may affect the Government’s other schemes

declared to achieve the object and purpose of enactment of DMA 2005 are

required to be considered.

7.2 An identical question came to be considered by this Court in the

recent decision in Writ Petition (C) No. 476 of 2020 (Small Scale Industrial

Manufacturers Association (Regd.) v. Union of India and others), decided on

23.03.2021 (2021 (4) SCALE 415), and this Court had an occasion to

consider in detail the scope of judicial review. While considering the other

decisions of this Court on the limited scope of judicial review, in paragraphs

14 to 20, this Court has observed and held as under:

14. In catena of decisions and time and again this Court has considered

the limited scope of judicial review in economic policy matters. From

various decisions of this Court, this Court has consistently observed and

held as under:

i) The Court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with

intricacies of trade and commerce;

ii) It is neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of

judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular

public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be evolved. Nor

are the courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a petitioner

merely because it has been urged that a different policy would have been

fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical. Wisdom and advisability

of economic policy are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review;

iii) Economic and fiscal regulatory measures are a field where Judges

should encroach upon very warily as Judges are not experts in these

matters.

14.1 In R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC 675, it has been

observed and held that laws relating to economic activities should be

viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as

freedom of speech, religion etc. It is further observed that the legislature

should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with

complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire

38

or straitjacket formula and this particularly true in case of legislation

dealing with economic matters.

14.2 In the case of Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India (2013) 7

SCC 1, this Court had an occasion to consider the following observations

made the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Metropolis

Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 57 L Ed 730: 228 US 61 (1913):

“…The problems of Government are practical ones and may justify, if they

do not require, rough accommodation, illogical, if may be, and

unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What

is the best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be

disputed or condemned. Mere errors of Government are not subject to our

judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be

declared void…”

14.3 This Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4

SCC 566 has observed that the Government, as laid down in Permian

Basin Area Rate Cases, 20 L Ed (2d) 312, is entitled to make pragmatic

adjustments which may becalled for by particular circumstances. The

court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government

merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer

or wiser or more scientific or logical. The court can interfere only if the

policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide.

14.4 In the case of BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India

(2002) 2 SCC 333, this Court has observed that Wisdom and advisability

of economic policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless

it can be demonstrated that the policy is contrary to any statutory provision

or the Constitution. In other words, it is not for the courts to consider

relative merits of different economic policies and consider whether a wiser

or better one can be evolved.

It is further observed that in the case of a policy decision on economic

matters, the courts should be very circumspect in conducting an enquiry or

investigation and must be more reluctant to impugn the judgment of the

experts who may have arrived at a conclusion unless the court is satisfied

that there is illegality in the decision itself.

14.5 In the case of Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v.

RBI, (1992) 2 SCC 343, it is observed and held by this Court that the

function of the Court is to see that lawful authority is not abused but not to

appropriate to itself the task entrusted to that authority. It is further

observed that a public body invested with statutory powers must take care

not to exceed or abuse its power. It must keep within the limits of the

authority committed to it. It must act in good faith and it must act

reasonably. Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the

function of experts. It is not the function of the courts to sit in judgment

over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the

expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and doubtlessly

39

differ. Courts cannot be expected to decide them without even the aid of

experts.

It is further observed that it is not the function of the Court to amend and

lay down some other directions. The function of the court is not to advise

in matters relating to financial and economic policies for which bodies like

RBI are fully competent. The court can only strike down some or entire

directions issued by the RBI in case the court is satisfied that the directions

were wholly unreasonable or in violative of any provisions of the

Constitution or any statute. It would be hazardous and risky for the courts

to tread an unknown path and should leave such task to the expert bodies.

This Court has repeatedly said that matters of economic policy ought to be

left to the government.

14.6 In the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000)

10 SCC 664, in paras 229 & 233, it is observed and held as under:

“229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their

jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision. Whether to

have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be

undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policymaking

process and the courts are ill equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision

so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the

undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people’s fundamental

rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the

Constitution.

233. At the same time, in exercise of its enormous power the court

should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or

functions. The courts cannot run the Government nor can the

administration indulge in abuse or nonuse of power and get away with it.

The essence of judicial review is a constitutional fundamental. The role of

the higher judiciary under the Constitution casts on it a great obligation as

the sentinel to defend the values of the Constitution and the rights of

Indians. The courts must, therefore, act within their judicial permissible

limitations to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public

interest. It is precisely for this reason that it has been consistently held by

this Court that in matters of policy the court will not interfere. When there

is a valid law requiring the Government to act in a particular manner the

court ought not to, without striking down the law, give any direction which

is not in accordance with law. In other words, the court itself is not above

the law.”

14.7 In Prag Ice & Oil Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 1296, this

Court observed as under:

“We do not think that it is the function of the Court to set in judgment over

such matters of economic policy as must necessarily be left to the

government of the day to decide. Many of them are matters of prediction

of ultimate results on which even experts can seriously err and doubtlessly

differ. Courts can certainly not be expected to decide them without even

the aid of experts.”

40

14.8 In P.T.R Exports (Madras) P. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC

268, this Court observed as under:

“In matters of economic policy, it is settled law that the Court gives a large

leeway to the executive and the legislature Government would take diverse

factors for formulating the policy in the overall larger interest of the

economy of the country. The Court therefore would prefer to allow free

play to the Government to evolve fiscal policy in the public interest and to

act upon the same.”

15. What is best in the national economy and in what manner and to

what extent the financial reliefs/packages be formulated, offered and

implemented is ultimately to be decided by the Government and RBI on

the aid and advise of the experts. The same is a matter for decision

exclusively within the province of the Central Government. Such matters

do not ordinarily attract the power of judicial review. Merely because some

class/sector may not be agreeable and/or satisfied with such

packages/policy decisions, the courts, in exercise of the power of judicial

review, do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions, unless such

policy could be faulted on the ground of mala fide, arbitrariness,

unfairness etc.

16. There are matters regarding which Judges and the Lawyers of the

courts can hardly be expected to have much knowledge by reasons of their

training and expertise. Economic and fiscal regulatory measures are a field

where Judges should encroach upon very warily as Judges are not experts

in these matters.

17. The correctness of the reasons which prompted the government in

decision taking one course of action instead of another is not a matter of

concern in judicial review and the court is not the appropriate forum for

such investigation. The policy decision must be left to the government as it

alone can adopt which policy should be adopted after considering of the

points from different angles. In assessing the propriety of the decision of

the Government the court cannot interfere even if a second view is

possible from that of the government.

18. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the

policy, is the subject of judicial review. The scope of judicial review of the

governmental policy is now well defined. The courts do not and cannot act

as an appellate authority examining the correctness, stability and

appropriateness of a policy, nor are the courts advisers to the executives on

matters of policy which the executives are entitled to formulate.

19. Government has to decide its own priorities and relief to the

different sectors. It cannot be disputed that pandemic affected the entire

country and barring few of the sectors. However, at the same time, the

Government is required to take various measures in different fields/sectors

like public health, employment, providing food and shelter to the common

people/migrants, transportation of migrants etc. and therefore, as such, the

government has announced various financial packages/reliefs. Even the

41

government also suffered due to lockdown, due to unprecedented covid19

pandemic and also even lost the revenue in the form of GST. Still, the

Government seems to have come out with various reliefs/packages.

Government has its own financial constraints. Therefore, as such, no writ

of mandamus can be issued directing the Government/RBI to

announce/declare particular relief packages and/or to declare a particular

policy, more particularly when many complex issues will arise in the field

of economy and what will be the overall effect on the economy of the

country for which the courts do not have any expertise and which shall be

left to the Government and the RBI to announce the relief

packages/economic policy in the form of reliefs on the basis of the advice

of the experts. Therefore, no writ of mandamus can be issued.

20. No State or country can have unlimited resources to spend on any

of its projects. That is why it only announces the financial reliefs/packages

to the extent it is feasible. The court would not interfere with any opinion

formed by the Government if it is based on the relevant facts and

circumstances or based on expert advice. It is not normally within the

domain of any court to weigh the pros and cons of the policy or to

scrutinize it and test the degree of its beneficial or equitable disposition for

the purpose of varying, modifying or annulling it, based on howsoever

sound and good reasoning, only where it is arbitrary and violative of any

Constitutional, statutory or any other provisions of law. When Government

forms its policy, it is based on a number of circumstances on facts, law

including constraints based on its resources. It is also based on expert

opinion. It would be dangerous if court is asked to test the utility,

beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out on

affidavits.”

7.3 However, at the same time, if the statutory authority/authority has

failed to perform its statutory duty cast under the statute or constitutional

duty, a mandamus can be issued directing the authority to perform its duty

cast under the statute. In such a situation, the Court would be absolutely

justified in issuing a writ of mandamus directing the authority to perform its

statutory duty/constitutional duty.

42

8. The reliefs sought in the present petitions are required to be

considered in the light of the observations made hereinabove on the scope of

judicial review.

While praying for ex gratia compensation of Rs. 4 lacs to the family

members of the persons who have died due to Covid-19, heavy reliance is

placed on Section 12 of DMA 2005 and the earlier decision contained in the

letter dated 8.4.2015, by which it was provided to pay Rs. 4 lacs by way of

ex gratia to the kin/family members of the persons who died due to disaster,

to be paid from SDRF and NDRF. Section 12 of DMA 2005, which has

been heavily relied upon, reads as under:

12. Guidelines for minimum standards of relief. —The National

Authority shall recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief

to be provided to persons affected by disaster, which shall include, —

(i) the minimum requirements to be provided in the relief camps in

relation to shelter, food, drinking water, medical cover and

sanitation;

(ii) the special provisions to be made for widows and orphans;

(iii) ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life as also assistance on

account of damage to houses and for restoration of means of

livelihood;

(iv) such other relief as may be necessary.

8.1 It is the case on behalf of the respective petitioners that as mandated

by Section 12 of DMA 2005, the National Authority shall have to

recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be provided to

43

persons affected by disaster, which shall include ex gratia assistance on

account of loss of life… [Section 12(iii)].

8.2 On the other hand, it is the case on behalf of the Union of India that

the word “shall” used in Section 12 may be read as “may” and it should be

read as directory/discretionary and shall not be construed as “mandatory”. It

is also the case on behalf of the Union of India that as such by providing

various schemes and by taking various steps the Government has already

made a provision/provided the minimum standards of relief by making

provision from NDRF/SDRF, which can be said to be reliefs under Section

12 of DMA 2005. It is also the case on behalf of the Union of India that it is

not the question of financial inability, but the question is to give priorities to

other sectors/fields/reliefs, while taking other measures to deal with the

disaster or the mitigation or preparedness and capacity building for dealing

with the threatening disaster situation. It is the case on behalf of the Union

of India that instead of giving ex gratia compensation of Rs. 4 lacs to the

family members of the deceased of the persons who have died due to Covid19, a conscious decision has been taken by the Finance Commission and/or

Union of India to make provision and/or use the fund from NDRF/SDRF for

the purpose of creating infrastructure, hospitals, testing, vaccination, ICU

facilities and other allied matters including providing food to the

BPL/migrant labourers, and not to pay ex gratia assistance.

44

9. While appreciating the submission on behalf of the Union of India

that the word “shall” used in Section 12 of DMA 2005 may be read as

“may” and the same shall not be construed as “mandatory” and may be

considered as “directory/discretionary”, the object and purpose of enactment

of Disaster Management Act, 2005 and the relevant provisions of DMA

2005 are required to be referred to and considered.

9.1 The Disaster Management Act, 2005 has been enacted for prevention

and mitigation effects of disasters and for undertaking a holistic, coordinated

and prompt response to any disaster situation. It has been enacted on

disaster management to provide for requisite institutional mechanisms for

drawing up and monitoring the implementation of the disaster management

plans, ensuring measures by various wings of Government. With the above

aim and object, DMA 2005 has been enacted.

9.2 The DMA 2005 provides for setting up of a National Disaster

Management Authority under the Chairmanship of Hon’ble Prime Minister.

It also provides for constitution of State Disaster Management Authorities

under the Chairmanship of the Chief Ministers and District Disaster

Management Authorities under the Chairmanship of District Magistrates. It

also provides for concerned Ministries or Departments to draw up

department-wise plans in accordance with the national disaster management

plan. It also provides for constitution of a National Disaster Response Force

45

and setting up the National Institute of Disaster Management. It also further

provides for the constitution of the National Fund for Disaster Response and

the National Fund for Disaster Mitigation and similar funds at the State and

District levels. The National Authority has been constituted under Section 3

of DMA 2005. Section 6 provides for power and functions of National

Authority, which reads as under:

6. Powers and functions of National Authority. — (1) Subject to the

provisions of this Act, the National Authority shall have the responsibility

for laying down the policies, plans and guidelines for disaster management

for ensuring timely and effective response to disaster.

(2) Without prejudice to generality of the provisions contained in subsection (1), the National Authority may—

(a) lay down policies on disaster management;

(b) approve the National Plan;

(c) approve plans prepared by the Ministries or Departments of the

Government of India in accordance with the National Plan;

(d) lay down guidelines to be followed by the State Authorities in

drawing up the State Plan;

(e) lay down guidelines to be followed by the different Ministries or

Departments of the Government of India for the purpose of integrating the

measures for prevention of disaster or the mitigation of its effects in their

development plans and projects;

(f) coordinate the enforcement and implementation of the policy and

plan for disaster management;

(g) recommend provision of funds for the purpose of mitigation;

(h) provide such support to other countries affected by major disasters

as may be determined by the Central Government;

(i) take such other measures for the prevention of disaster, or the

mitigation, or preparedness and capacity building for dealing with the

threatening disaster situation or disaster as it may consider necessary;

(j) lay down broad policies and guidelines for the functioning of the

National Institute of Disaster Management;

(3) The Chairperson of the National Authority shall, in the case of

emergency, have power to exercise all or any of the powers of the National

46

Authority but exercise of such powers shall be subject to ex post facto

ratification by the National Authority.

9.3 Section 7 of the Act provides for constitution of advisory committee

by National Authority which shall consist of experts in the field of disaster

management and having practical experience of disaster management at the

national, State or district level to make recommendations on different

aspects of disaster management. Section 8 of the Act provides for

constitution of National Executive Committee to assist the National

Authority in the performance of its functions under the Act. Section 10

provides for powers and functions of National Executive Committee and the

National Executive Committee shall assist the National Authority in the

discharge of its functions and have the responsibility for implementing the

policies and plans of the National Authority and ensure the compliance of

directions issued by the Central Government for the purpose of disaster

management in the country. Section 10 of DMA 2005 reads as under:

“10. Powers and functions of National Executive Committee. — (1) The

National Executive Committee shall assist the National Authority in the

discharge of its functions and have the responsibility for implementing the

policies and plans of the National Authority and ensure the compliance of

directions issued by the Central Government for the purpose of disaster

management in the country.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in subsection (1), the National Executive Committee may—

(a) act as the coordinating and monitoring body for disaster

management;

(b) prepare the National Plan to be approved by the National

Authority;

47

(c) coordinate and monitor the implementation of the National Policy;

(d) lay down guidelines for preparing disaster management plans by

different Ministries or Departments of the Government of India and the

State Authorities;

(e) provide necessary technical assistance to the State Governments

and the State Authorities for preparing their disaster management plans in

accordance with the guidelines laid down by the National Authority;

(f) monitor the implementation of the National Plan and the plans

prepared by the Ministries or Departments of the Government of India;

(g) monitor the implementation of the guidelines laid down by the

National Authority for integrating of measures for prevention of disasters

and mitigation by the Ministries or Departments in their development plans

and projects;

(h) monitor, coordinate and give directions regarding the mitigation

and preparedness measures to be taken by different Ministries or

Departments and agencies of the Government;

(i) evaluate the preparedness at all governmental levels for the

purpose of responding to any threatening disaster situation or disaster and

give directions, where necessary, for enhancing such preparedness;

(j) plan and coordinate specialised training programme for disaster

management for different levels of officers, employees and voluntary rescue

workers;

(k) coordinate response in the event of any threatening disaster

situation or disaster;

(l) lay down guidelines for, or give directions to, the concerned

Ministries or Departments of the Government of India, the State

Governments and the State Authorities regarding measures to be taken by

them in response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster;

(m) require any department or agency of the Government to make

available to the Na material resources as are available with it for the

purposes of emergency response, rescue and relief;

(n) advise, assist and coordinate the activities of the Ministries or

Departments of the Government of India, State Authorities, statutory bodies,

other governmental or non-governmental organisations and others engaged

in disaster management;

(o) provide necessary technical assistance or give advice to the State

Authorities and District Authorities for carrying out their functions under

this Act;

(p) promote general education and awareness in relation to disaster

management; and

(q) perform such other functions as the National Authority may require

it to perform.”

48

9.4 Section 12 provides for the National Authority to recommend

guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons

affected by disaster, and which shall include …. (iii) ex gratia assistance on

account of loss of life as also assistance on account of damage to houses

and for restoration of means of livelihood. Section 12 reads as under:

12. Guidelines for minimum standards of relief. —The National

Authority shall recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief

to be provided to persons affected by disaster, which shall include, —

(i) the minimum requirements to be provided in the relief camps in

relation to shelter, food, drinking water, medical cover and

sanitation;

(ii) the special provisions to be made for widows and orphans;

(iii) ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life as also assistance on

account of damage to houses and for restoration of means of

livelihood;

(iv) such other relief as may be necessary.

9.5 Section 19 provides for similar guidelines for minimum standards of

relief by the State Authority. As per Section 46, the Central Government has

to constitute a fund to be called the National Disaster Response Fund

(NDRF) for meeting any threatening disaster situation or disaster. As per

sub-section 2 of Section 46, the NDRF shall be made available to the

National Executive Committee to be applied towards meeting the expenses

for emergency response, relief and rehabilitation in accordance with the

guidelines laid down by the Central Government in consultation with the

National Authority. Over and above the NDRF, the Central Government

49

may also constitute a fund to be called the National Disaster Mitigation Fund

for projects exclusively for the purpose of mitigation. A similar disaster

response fund is to be constituted by the State Authority, which is known as

State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF); District Disaster Response Fund;

State Disaster Mitigation Fund and District Disaster Mitigation Fund as per

Section 48 of DMA 2005.

9.6 “Disaster: as defined under Section 2(d) of DMA 2005 means a

catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence in any area, arising from

natural or manmade causes, or by accident or negligence which results in

substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and destruction of,

property, or damage to, or degradation of, environment, and is of such a

nature or magnitude as to be beyond the coping capacity of the community

of the affected area.

“Disaster Management” is also defined under Section 2(e) of DMA

2005, which reads as under:

(e) “disaster management” means a continuous and integrated process of

planning, organising, coordinating and implementing measures which are

necessary or expedient for—

(i) prevention of danger or threat of any disaster;

(ii) mitigation or reduction of risk of any disaster or its severity or

consequences;

(iii) capacity-building;

(iv) preparedness to deal with any disaster;

(v) prompt response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster;

(vi) assessing the severity or magnitude of effects of any disaster;

(vii) evacuation, rescue and relief;

(viii) rehabilitation and reconstruction

50

As per Section 2(i), “mitigation” means measures aimed at reducing the

risk, impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation. As per

Section 2(m) “preparedness” means the state of readiness to deal with a

threatening disaster situation or disaster and the effects thereof.

10. Considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons for enactment of

DMA 2005 and the relevant provisions of the DMA 2005, referred to

hereinabove, it is to be considered whether the word “shall” used in Section

12 is required to be interpreted and considered as “shall” or “may” and

whether it is “mandatory” or “directory/discretionary” for the National

Authority to recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to

be provided to persons affected by disasters including ex gratia assistance on

account of loss of life.

10.1 In Section 12 of DMA 2005, the word “shall” is used twice. The

intent of the legislature by using the word “shall” twice is very clear and the

same can be in tune with the Statement of Objects and Reasons for

enactment of DMA 2005 and the functions and powers of the National

Authority. One of the Objects and Purposes is “mitigation”. As per Section

6(1) and Sub-section 2(g) of Section 6, the National Authority shall have the

responsibility for laying down the policies, plans and guidelines for disaster

management and recommend provision of funds for the purpose of

mitigation. Section 12 specifically provides that the National Authority

51

“shall” recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be

provided to persons affected by disaster, which “shall” include, (i) the

minimum requirements to be provided in the relief camps in relation to

shelter, food, drinking water, medical cover and sanitation; (ii) the special

provisions to be made for widows and orphans; and (iii) ex gratia

assistance on account of loss of life as also assistance on account of

damage to houses and for restoration of means of livelihood. Therefore,

it is the statutory duty cast upon the National Authority to recommend

guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons

affected by disaster, which shall include the reliefs, as stated hereinabove.

The language used in the provision is very plain and unambiguous. As per

the settled proposition of law laid down by this Court in a catena of

decisions, when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous,

statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain

meaning. The beneficial provision of the legislation must be literally

construed so as to fulfil the statutory purpose and not to frustrate it. (See

Bhavnagar University (supra) (para 26).

10.2 Under Section 12 of DMA 2005, the National Authority is mandated

to recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief. Minimum

standards of relief are, as such, not defined under the Act. Then what is

somewhat intended by the legislature while providing minimum standards of

relief is to be gathered from Section 12 itself. Ex gratia assistance on

52

account of loss of life as also assistance on account of damage to houses and

for restoration of means of livelihood therefore can be said to be part of

minimum standards of relief of which the National Authority is required to

recommend guidelines.

10.3 As observed by this Court in the case of Bachahan Devi (supra), even

to interpret the legal import of the word “may”, the Court has to consider

various factors, namely, the object and the scheme of the Act, the context

and the background against which the words have been used, the purpose

and the advantages sought to be achieved by the use of this word, and the

like. In paragraph 18, it is observed and held as under:

“18. It is well settled that the use of the word “may” in a statutory provision

would not by itself show that the provision is directory in nature. In some

cases, the legislature may use the word “may” as a matter of pure

conventional courtesy and yet intend a mandatory force. In order, therefore,

to interpret the legal import of the word “may”, the court has to consider

various factors, namely, the object and the scheme of the Act, the context

and the background against which the words have been used, the purpose

and the advantages sought to be achieved by the use of this word, and the

like. It is equally well settled that where the word “may” involves a

discretion coupled with an obligation or where it confers a positive benefit

to a general class of subjects in a utility Act, or where the court advances a

remedy and suppresses the mischief, or where giving the words directory

significance would defeat the very object of the Act, the word “may” should

be interpreted to convey a mandatory force. As a general rule, the word

“may” is permissive and operative to confer discretion and especially so,

where it is used in juxtaposition to the word “shall”, which ordinarily is

imperative as it imposes a duty. Cases, however, are not wanting where the

words “may”, “shall” and “must” are used interchangeably. In order to find

out whether these words are being used in a directory or in a mandatory

sense, the intent of the legislature should be looked into along with the

pertinent circumstances.”

10.4 Therefore, to construe the word “shall” as “may” and as

directory/discretionary, the very object and purpose of the Act will be

53

defeated. The word “shall” used twice in Section 12 significantly imposes a

duty cast upon the National Authority to issue guidelines for the minimum

standards of relief which shall include ex gratia assistance on account of loss

of life as also assistance on account of damage to houses and for restoration

of means of livelihood. Nothing is on record that any guidelines/decision

has been taken by the National Authority recommending guidelines for the

minimum standards of relief in the form of ex gratia assistance on account of

loss of life of a person who has died due to Covid-19. At this stage, it is

required to be noted and it is not in dispute and cannot be disputed that

Covid-19 pandemic is a disaster within the meaning of Section 2(d) of DMA

2005. Not only that even in the letter dated 14.03.2020, the Central

Government has declared Covid-19 pandemic as “notified disaster”. Even,

all other steps including the guidelines and SOPs are issued under the

provisions of DMA 2005. Therefore, once the Covid-19 pandemic is

declared as “notified disaster”/national disaster, even otherwise the same can

be disaster within the meaning of Section 2 (d) of DMA 2005, the provisions

of Section 12 of DMA 2005 shall be applicable and it has to be applied to

the Covid-19 pandemic which is declared as “notified disaster”/national

disaster. The submission on behalf of the Union of India that considering

the peculiar nature of the Covid-19 pandemic, even if Covid-19 pandemic is

declared and/or considered as a disaster, Section 12 of DMA 2005 may not

be applicable and/or the word “shall” should be construed as “may” as

54

when DMA 2005 was enacted, the legislature might not have visualised that

such a pandemic/disaster would occur which would have a long-time

effect/impact. The aforesaid cannot be accepted for the simple reason that

every disaster as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act is a disaster and once

it is declared as a “notified disaster”/national disaster/disaster, Section 12 of

DMA 2005 shall be applicable and is mandatorily to be complied with, with

respect to any disaster, within the meaning of Section 2(d) of DMA 2005.

As observed hereinabove, nothing is on record that any

decision/guidelines has/have been issued by the National Authority for ex

gratia assistance on account of loss of life due to Covid-19 pandemic while

recommending guidelines for minimum standards of relief to be provided to

the persons affected by the disaster/Covid-19 pandemic. Once, it is

observed as above and it is held that the word “shall” have to be read as

“shall” and it is the mandatory statutory duty cast upon the National

Authority to recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief

which shall include ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life, not

recommending any

Guidelines for ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life due to Covid-19

pandemic, while recommending other guidelines for the minimum standards

of relief, it can be said that the National Authority has failed to perform its

statutory duty cast under Section 12 and therefore a writ of mandamus is to

be issued to the National Authority to recommend appropriate guidelines for

55

ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life due to Covid-19 pandemic

while recommending guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be

provided to persons affected by disaster/Covid-19 pandemic as mandatory

under Section 12 of DMA 2005.

11. Now the next question which is posed for the consideration of this

Court is, what further relief the petitioners are entitled to. Whether a writ of

mandamus can be issued directing the Central Government/National

Authority/State Governments to pay a particular amount by way of ex gratia

assistance, more particularly Rs. 4 lacs, as prayed by the petitioners?

Whether the Court can/may direct to pay a particular amount by way of ex

gratia assistance?

11.1 The scope of judicial review is discussed hereinabove. It cannot also

be disputed that Covid-19 pandemic is a peculiar disaster, which the country

and the world has experienced in a long time. It has an extraordinary spread

and impact from that of other natural disaster/disasters. Therefore, its

extreme spread and impact requires an approach different from the one that

is applied to other disasters/natural disasters. Other natural disasters would

have a different effect/impact. Covid-19 pandemic is having an on-going

impact/effect. The pandemic is still not over in the country as also the world

and it is extremely difficult to predict with accuracy, it’s further trajectory,

mutations and waves. Looking to its peculiarity and the impact and effect,

the Covid-19 pandemic is required to be viewed differently from other

56

disasters. There is a need to focus simultaneously on prevention,

preparedness, mitigation and recovery, which calls for a different order of

mobilization of both financial and technical resources. The Government is

required to and as so stated in the counter affidavit and as submitted by Shri

Mehta, learned Solicitor General, a huge fund is required for the purpose of

creating the infrastructure, hospitals, ventilators, oxygen, testing,

vaccination etc. According to the Central Government, the Government has

bonafidely and in the larger public interest has decided the priorities and

focused simultaneously on prevention, preparedness, mitigation and

recovery. According to the official figure, the pandemic has caused more

than 3,85,000 deaths, the same is likely to increase further. It cannot be

disputed that these deaths have affected the families from all classes – the

rich and poor, professionals and informal workers, and traders and farmers.

It has also affected the kins as well as elderly members, old parents. Many

have lost the sole bread earner. However, at the same time, and as observed

hereinabove, the impact and effect of the present pandemic/disaster would

be different from the other disasters/natural disasters for which ex gratia

assistance is provided. There shall not be any justification to provide for the

same/similar amount by way of ex gratia assistance as provided in the case

of other disasters/natural disaster, i.e., Rs. 4 lacs.

12. As observed hereinabove, the Government has to decide its own

priorities and reliefs to the different sectors/for different reliefs. The

57

Government is required to take various measures in different fields/sectors,

like public health, employment, providing food and shelter to the common

people/migrants, transportation to migrants etc. The Government is also

required to deal with the effect of the pandemic on the economy. As

observed hereinabove, a huge amount is required to be spent from the

NDRF/SDRF, even while providing minimum standards of relief. It cannot

be disputed that ex gratia assistance would also have financial implications

and which may affect the other minimum standards of relief to be provided

to the persons affected by disaster. No State or country has unlimited

resources. That is why it only announces the financial reliefs/packages to

the extent it is possible. When the Government forms its policy, it is based

on a number of circumstances, on facts, law including constraint based

governmental resources. As observed by this Court in the case of Nandlal

Jaiswal (supra), the Government, as laid down in Permian Basin Area Rate

Cases, 20 L Ed (2d) 312, is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments which

may be called for by particular circumstances. As observed by this Court

hereinabove, the function of the Court is to see that lawful authority is not

abused but not to appropriate to itself the task entrusted to that authority.

Therefore, the Courts would be very slow to interfere with priorities

fixed by the government in providing reliefs, unless it is patently arbitrary

and/or not in the larger public interest at all. The Government should be free

to take policy decisions/decide priorities (of course to achieve the ultimate

58

goal of DMA 2005, government should be free to take its own

decisions/priorities while providing minimum standards of relief and even

towards preparedness, mitigation, prevention and recovery), subject to the

availability of the resources/funds and the amount to be spent towards other

reliefs on the aid and advice of the experts and looking to the circumstances

from time to time. Therefore, no relief can be granted to direct the National

Authority/Central Government/State Governments to pay a particular

amount towards ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life to the family

members of the persons who have died due to Covid-19. It should be left to

the wisdom of National Authority while considering the

guidelines/recommendations of the Finance Commission in its XVth

Finance Commission Report and the funds required for other

reliefs/priorities. The recommendations of the Finance commission provide

sufficient guidelines. However, at the same time, as observed hereinabove,

while recommending guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be

provided to persons affected by disaster/Covid-19 pandemic, the authority

has to consider issuing/recommend guidelines on ex gratia assistance on

account of loss of life. As observed hereinabove, ex-gratia assistance on

account of loss of life is part of minimum standards of relief, which must be

considered by the National Authority while providing for the minimum

standards of relief to be provided to the persons affected by disaster – in the

present case Covid-19 pandemic.

59

12.1 At this stage, it is required to be noted and it is reported that some

States are paying ex gratia assistance to the family members of the persons

who have died due to Covid-19 pandemic, like State of Bihar paying Rs. 4

lacs, Karnataka paying Rs. 1 lac and Delhi paying Rs. 50,000/-. However, it

is to be noted that the same is paid from the Chief Minister Relief Fund or

other relief funds, but not from SDRF. To avoid any heart-burning and

discriminatory treatment, it would be appropriate for the National Authority

to recommend uniform guidelines while providing for the minimum

standards of relief in the form of ex gratia assistance on account of loss of

life, as mandated under Section 12 of the Act. However, at the same time, it

will always be open for the concerned States to provide for ex gratia

assistance on account of loss of life and other reliefs from their own relief

funds (other than SDRF) as it would be a policy decision by the concerned

States and they may provide such other relief/reliefs, looking to the

availability of the fund. However, merely because some States might have

been paying the ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life to the family

members of the persons who have died due to Covid-19 pandemic, for the

reasons stated hereinabove, no writ of mandamus can be issued directing the

Central Government/State Governments to pay a particular sum/amount by

way of ex gratia assistance as the utilization of the fund/money by the

Central Government would depend upon the priorities fixed by them which

includes the money/fund to be used for prevention, preparedness, mitigation,

60

recovery etc. Therefore, what amount to be paid by way of ex gratia

assistance to the family members of the persons who died due to Covid-19

pandemic should be left to the National Authority/Central Government.

13. Now so far as the prayer to issue appropriate direction to the

respondents – State Governments to issue an official document stating

Covid-19 related as cause of death, to the family members of the deceased

who died due to Covid-19 is concerned, it is required to be noted that it is

the duty of the every authority to issue accurate/correct death certificates

stating the correct and accurate cause of death, so that the family members

of the deceased who died due to Covid-19 may not face any difficulty in

getting the benefits of the schemes that may be declared by the Government

for the death of the deceased, who died due to Covid-19. In the death

certificate also, if a person has died due to Covid-19 and/or any other

complications/disease due to Covid-19, it should be specifically mentioned

in the death certificate.

We have gone through the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the

Union Government on the aforesaid and the guidelines issued by the ICMR

as well as the format and the guidelines issued to the Registering Authorities

of the concerned State Governments. However, we feel that the procedure

should be as simplified as it can be. Therefore, a simplified

procedure/guidelines is/are required to be issued by the Central Government

and/or appropriate authority for issuance of an official document/death

61

certificate stating the exact cause of death, i.e., “Death due to Covid-19”, to

the family members of the deceased who died due to Covid-19. For

guidance, such guidelines may provide if a person has died after he was

found covid positive and he has died within two to three months, either in

the hospital or outside the hospital or at home, the death certificate/official

document must be issued to the family members of the deceased who died

due to Covid-19 stating the cause of death as “Died due to Covid-19”.

He/she might have died even due to other complications, however, due to

Covid-19. In the guidelines, it may also be provided that if the family

member(s) of the deceased who died due to Covid-19 has/have any

grievance that in the death certificate/official document the correct/exact

cause of death is not mentioned, he/she must be provided with some remedy

to approach the appropriate authority to get the death certificate/official

document corrected.

14. Now so far as the prayer to issue an appropriate direction directing the

respondents – State Governments to fulfil their obligation to take care of the

victims of the calamity and their family members is concerned, the prayer

sought is too vague. Even otherwise, considering the counter affidavit filed

on behalf of the Union of India it demonstrates the various reliefs declared

by the Union Government. As such, no mandamus can be issued directing

the respondents – State Governments to declare a particular

62

policy/relief/relief package in general and the same shall be within the

domain of policy decision and would have financial implications also.

15. Now so far as one additional relief sought in Writ Petition (Civil) No.

539 of 2021 to issue appropriate direction directing the respondents – Union

of India and others to provide social security in the form of insurance is

concerned, from the XVth Finance Commission Report, it appears that the

Finance Commission in its report has already made recommendations of the

same and from the counter affidavit it appears that the Union Government

has actively considering the same in consultation with other stakeholders.

We hope and trust that the Union Government will consider the

recommendations made by the Finance Commission made in its XVth

Finance Commission Report and take an appropriate decision in

consultation with other stakeholders and the experts.

Even otherwise, from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the

Union of India, it appears that the Central Government has already launched

the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Package under which a comprehensive

personal accident cover of Rs. 50 lakhs have been provided to 22.12 lakh

health care providers throughout the country, including community health

workers and private health workers who may have been in direct contact and

care of Covid-19 patients and may be at risk of being impacted/infected by

this. It is further reported that on account of unprecedented situation, private

hospital staff/retired/volunteer/local urban bodies/contract/daily wage/ad63

hoc/outsourced staff requisitioned by States/Central Hospitals/autonomous

hospitals of Central/States/Union Territories, AIIMS & Institute of National

Importance (INI)/hospitals of Central Ministries specifically drafted for care

of Covid-19 patients are also covered under the scheme. The benefits under

the said scheme have been extended for a further period of 180 days with

effect from 24.04.2021. Therefore, it appears that sufficient care has been

taken. However, some class might have been left out, like those persons

working at premortem. Thus, the Union Government may look into the

same and cover them also who might have been left out and who can be said

to be in direct contact of dead bodies of Covid-19 patients. Even, Shri

Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General has also stated at the Bar that the

Union Government/appropriate authority shall look into the same.

16. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we dispose of

the present writ petitions with the following directions:

1) We direct the National Disaster Management Authority to recommend

guidelines for ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life to the

family members of the persons who died due to Covid-19, as

mandated under Section 12(iii) of DMA 2005 for the minimum

standards of relief to be provided to the persons affected by disaster –

Covid 19 Pandemic, over and above the guidelines already

recommended for the minimum standards of relief to be provided to

persons affected by Covid-19. However, what reasonable amount to

64

be offered towards ex gratia assistance is left to the wisdom of

National Authority which may consider determining the amount

taking into consideration the observations made hereinabove, such as,

requirement/availability of the fund under the NDRF/SDRF for other

reliefs and the priorities determined by the National Authority/Union

Government and the fund required for other minimum standards of

relief and fund required for prevention, preparedness, mitigation and

recovery and other reliefs to carry out the obligation under DMA

2005. The aforesaid exercise and appropriate guidelines be

recommended, as directed hereinabove, within a period of six weeks

from today;

2) The Appropriate Authority is directed to issue simplified guidelines

for issuance of Death Certificates/official document stating the exact

cause of death, i.e., “Death due to Covid-19”, to the family members

of the deceased who died due to Covid-19. While issuing such

guidelines, the observations made hereinabove in paragraph 13 be

borne in mind. Such guidelines may also provide the remedy to the

family members of the deceased who died due to Covid-19 for

correction of the death certificate/official document issued by the

appropriate authority, if they are not satisfied with the cause of death

mentioned in the death certificate/official document issued by the

appropriate authority; and

65

3) The Union of India to take appropriate steps on the recommendations

made by the Finance Commission in its XVth Finance Commission

Report bearing in mind paragraph 8.131 in consultation with other

stakeholders and experts.

17. As a sequel to the above, all pending interlocutory applications also

stand disposed of.

…………………………….J.

[ASHOK BHUSHAN]

…………………………….J.

[M.R. SHAH]

New Delhi;

June 30, 2021.

66

Whether any threat was extended by the accused to cause death or hurt to the victim or his conduct gave rise to reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt , is the essential condition for conviction under Sec.364A IPC ? held that We, thus, set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 364A. However, from the evidence on record regarding kidnapping, it is proved that accused had kidnapped the victim for ransom, demand of ransom was also proved. Even though offence under Section 364A has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt but the offence of kidnapping has been fully established to which effect the learned Sessions Judge has recorded a categorical finding in paragraphs 19 and 20. The offence of kidnapping having been proved, the appellant deserves to be convicted under Section 363. Section 363 provides for punishment which is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

Whether any threat was extended by the accused to cause death  or hurt to the victim or his conduct gave rise to reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt , is the essential condition for conviction under Sec.364A IPC ?

held that We, thus, set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 364A. However, from the evidence on record regarding kidnapping, it is proved that accused had kidnapped the victim for ransom, demand of ransom was also proved. Even though offence under Section 364A has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt but the offence of kidnapping has been fully established to which effect the learned Sessions Judge has recorded a categorical finding in paragraphs 19 and 20. The offence of kidnapping having been proved, the appellant deserves to be convicted under Section 363. Section 363 provides for punishment which is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.


REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.533 OF 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.308 of 2021)

SHAIK AHMED ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF TELANGANA ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been filed by the accused

challenging the judgment of the High Court dated

06.08.2019 by which Criminal Appeal No. 1121 of 2012

filed by the appellant questioning his conviction and

sentence under Section 364A IPC has been dismissed.

3. The prosecution case in brief is :-

3.1 The victim, PW-2 Prateek Gupta, was a

student in VIth standard in St. Mary’s High

School, Rezimental Banzar, Secunderabad,

Hyderabad. On 03.02.2011, PW-2 went to a

1

picnic organised by the school and returned

to school at around 3:00 pm. Usually, PW-2

would wait for a regular (fixed) auto to

drop him home from school but unfortunately

on the said date, the same did not turn up.

3.2 PW-2 waited till about 4.00 pm and

thereafter PW-2 phoned his father (PW-1)

from the cell phone of his school teacher

(PW-3). PW-1 instructed PW-2 to take

another auto to go home. PW-1 engaged the

services of an auto driven by the accused

(appellant herein) to take him home and

boarded the auto.

3.3 Thereafter, the accused took him from an

unknown route by informing PW-2 it is a

short cut and took him to some unknown

place by promising that he would call PW-1

and ascertain the correct address, after

which he would drop PW-2 at home. It is

alleged that the accused took PW-2 to the

2

house of his sister, PW-6, and told PW-2

that he would drop him at his home in the

morning of the next day. Thereafter, the

accused allegedly called PW-1 stating that

he had PW-2 in his custody and demanded a

ransom of Rs.2 lakhs to release PW-2.

3.4 On the same day at about 8.30 pm the

accused again called PW-1 and reiterated

his demand for release of PW-2. PW-1

conveyed his inability to pay the ransom

amount, subsequent to which the accused

demanded a sum of Rs. 1.50 lakhs for the

release of PW-2. PW-1 after receiving the

phone call went to the police station and

lodged report, which was marked as Ex.P-1.

The same was received and a case being CV

No. 37/2011 u/s 364S of IPC was registered

and handed over for further investigation.

3.5 As per the prosecution, at about 6:00 am

the Accused along with PW-2 left to

3

Borabanda from his sister's house in an

Auto and while travelling called PW-1 from

the phone of the auto driver (PW-5) to

enquire about the status of the ransom

money. PW-1 was instructed to come to

Pillar No 99, P.V. Narsimha Rao Expressway

on foot and raise his hand for

identification. When PW-1 reached the

location, he found the accused present at

the spot and raised his hand. When PW-1

was trying to handover the ransom to the

accused, the police who were in mufti

surrounded the accused and took him into

custody. The police seized 2 cell phones,

ID cards and Rs.200/- (Rupees Two Hundred

Only) from the accused.

3.6 The police found the victim seated in an

auto a short distance away, who was taken

to the police station and statement under

Section 161, Cr.P.C. of the victim (PW-2)

was recorded at P.S. Gopalapuram. After

4

investigation, charge sheet was filed

against the appellant under Section 364A

IPC. Charge was framed by the Additional

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad

against the accused under Section 364A IPC.

After appearance of the accused, learned

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate

committed the case to the learned Sessions

Judge. Prosecution examined eight

witnesses, the father of the victim and

defacto complainant, Sanjay Gupta was

examined as PW-1. Prateek Gupta, the

victim was examined as PW-2. Kumari Sujata

Rani, the school teacher was examined as

PW-3, who proved that from her cell phone,

the victim had spoken to his father, who

informed the victim to come by taking

another auto. PW-4, Krishna Yadav and PW7 were examined as Panch witnesses. PW-5

was examined as auto driver, who, on asking

of accused took the accused and victim to

Pillar No.78 of P.V.N.H. PW-8, the Sub5

inspector of police, K. Ramesh, who was

I.O. PW6 was another witness. Prosecution

marked Exh.P1 to P4 and M.O.1 to 3.

3.7 After recording evidence of prosecution,

the accused was examined under Section 313

Cr.P.C. On behalf of defence Exh. D1 and D2

were marked.

3.8 Learned Sessions Judge after considering the

evidence led by witnesses held that accused

kidnapped PW-2 and telephoned to PW-1

demanding Rs.2 lakhs for release of PW-2.

The learned Sessions Judge held that

prosecution clearly established the guilt

of the accused for the offence under

Section 364A IPC. After recording

conviction, he was sentenced to undergo

life imprisonment for offence under Section

364A IPC and also liable to pay fine of

Rs.5,000/- by judgment dated 01.11.2012.

6

3.9 The appellant filed an appeal before the

High Court. The appeal has been dismissed

by the High Court by the impugned judgment

dated 06.08.2019. The High Court held that

PW-2 was kidnapped by the accused and

ransom of Rs.2 lakhs was demanded from

PW-1. When the appellant-accused came to

collect the ransom amount demanded, he was

apprehended by the police. High Court held

that prosecution clinchingly proved the

guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable

doubt for the offence punishable under

Section 364A of IPC. The appeal was

accordingly dismissed.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

the prosecution failed to prove all ingredients for

conviction under Section 364A, hence the conviction

under Section 364A is not sustainable. Learned

counsel submits that there was neither any evidence

nor any findings returned by the Courts below that

any threat was extended by the accused to cause death

7

or hurt to the victim nor his conduct gave rise to

reasonable apprehension that such person may be put

to death or hurt. He submits that neither the

learned Sessions Judge nor the High Court adverted to

the above essential conditions for conviction under

Section 364A, hence the judgment of the Courts below

deserves to be set aside.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant referring to

the statement of PW-2, the victim submits that victim

himself in his statement has stated that he was

treated in a good manner. PW-1 in his statement has

also not alleged that any threat was extended to

cause death or hurt to the victim.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the State, Ms. Bina

Madhavan supported the judgments of learned Sessions

Judge as well as the High Court and took us to the

statements of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-8. She submits that

conviction under Section 364A of the accused does not

deserve any interference by this Court.

8

7. From the submissions made by the learned counsel

for the parties and materials on record, following

questions arise for consideration in this appeal:-

I. What are the essential ingredients of Section

346A to be proved beyond reasonable doubt by

the prosecution for securing the conviction

of an accused under Section 364A IPC?

II. Whether each and every ingredient as

mentioned under Section 364A needs to be

proved for securing conviction under Section

364A and non-establishment of any of the

conditions may vitiate the conviction under

Section 364A IPC?

III. Whether the learned Sessions Judge as well as

the High Court recorded any finding that all

ingredients of Section 364A were proved by

the prosecution?

IV. Whether there was any evidence or findings by

the Courts below that the accused had

threatened to cause death or hurt to the

9

victim or by his conduct gave rise to a

reasonable apprehension that victim may be

put to death or hurt?

8. The appeal having arisen out of order of

conviction under Section 364A, we need to notice the

provisions of Section 364A IPC before proceeding

further to consider the points for consideration.

9. Sections 359 to 374 of the Indian Penal Code are

contained in the heading “of Kidnapping, Abduction,

Slavery and Forced Labour”. Offence of Kidnapping

for lawful guardianship is defined under Section 361

and Section 363 provides for punishment for

kidnapping. Section 364 deals with kidnapping or

abduction in order to murder.

10. The Law Commission of India took up the revision

of Indian Penal Code and submitted its report, i.e.,

42nd Report (June, 1971). In Chapter 16, offences

affecting the human body was dealt with. The chapter

on kidnapping and abduction was dealt by the

10

Commission in paragraphs 16.91 to 16.112. Section

364 and 364A was dealt by the Commission in

paragraphs 16.99 to 16.100 which are as follows:-

“16.99. Section 364 punishes the

offence of kidnapping or abduction of a

person in order to murder him, the maximum

punishment being imprisonment for life or

for ten years. In view of our general

recommendation as to imprisonment for

life, we propose that life imprisonment

should be omitted and term imprisonment

increased to 14 years.

The illustrations to the section do

not elucidate any particular ingredient of

the offence and should be omitted.

16.100. We consider it desirable to

have a specific section to punish severely

kidnapping or abduction for ransom, as

such cases are increasing. At present,

such kidnapping or abduction is punishable

under section 365 since the kidnapped or

abducted person will be secretly and

wrongfully confined.

We also considered the question

whether a provision for reduced punishment

in case of release of the person kidnapped

without harm should be inserted, but we

have come to the conclusion that there is

no need for it. We propose the following

section:-

“364A. Kidnapping or abduction

for ransom .—Whoever kidnaps or

abducts any person with intent to

hold that person for ransom shall

be punished with rigorous

11

imprisonment for a term which may

extend to 14 years, and shall

also be liable to fine.”

11. Although the Law Commission has in paragraph

16.100 proposed Section 364A, which only stated that

whoever kidnaps or abducts any person with intent to

hold that person for ransom be punished for a term

which may extend to 14 years. Parliament while

inserting Section 364A by Act No.42 of 1993 enacted

the provision in a broader manner also to include

kidnapping and abduction to compel the Government to

do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom

which was further amended and amplified by Act No.24

of 1995. Section 364A as it exists after amendment

is as follows:-

“364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.—Whoever

kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a

person in detention after such kidnapping

or abduction and threatens to cause death

or hurt to such person, or by his conduct

gives rise to a reasonable apprehension

that such person may be put to death or

hurt, or causes hurt or death to such

person in order to compel the Government

or any foreign State or international

inter-governmental organisation or any

other person to do or abstain from doing

any act or to pay a ransom, shall be

12

punishable with death, or imprisonment for

life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

12. We may now look into section 364A to find out as

to what ingredients the Section itself contemplate

for the offence. When we paraphrase Section 364A

following is deciphered:-

(i) “Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or

keeps a person in detention after such

kidnapping or abduction”

(ii) “and threatens to cause death or hurt to

such person, or by his conduct gives rise

to a reasonable apprehension that such

person may be put to death or hurt,

(iii) or causes hurt or death to such person in

order to compel the Government or any

foreign State or international intergovernmental organisation or any other

person to do or abstain from doing any act

or to pay a ransom”

(iv) “shall be punishable with death, or

imprisonment for life, and shall also be

liable to fine.”

13. The first essential condition as incorporated in

Section 364A is “whoever kidnaps or abducts any

person or keeps a person in detention after such

kidnapping or abduction”. The second condition

begins with conjunction “and”. The second condition

13

has also two parts, i.e., (a) threatens to cause

death or hurt to such person or (b) by his conduct

gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such

person may be put to death or hurt. Either part of

above condition, if fulfilled, shall fulfill the

second condition for offence. The third condition

begins with the word “or”, i.e., or causes hurt or

death to such person in order to compel the

Government or any foreign State or international

inter-governmental organisation or any other person

to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a

ransom. Third condition begins with the word “or

causes hurt or death to such person in order to

compel the Government or any foreign state to do or

abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom”.

Section 364A contains a heading “kidnapping for

ransom, etc.” The kidnapping by a person to demand

ransom is fully covered by Section 364A.

14. We have noticed that after the first condition

the second condition is joined by conjunction “and”,

thus, whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps

14

a person in detention after such kidnapping or

abduction and threatens to cause death or hurt to

such person.

15. The use of conjunction “and” has its purpose and

object. Section 364A uses the word “or” nine times

and the whole section contains only one conjunction

“and”, which joins the first and second condition.

Thus, for covering an offence under Section 364A,

apart from fulfillment of first condition, the second

condition, i.e., “and threatens to cause death or

hurt to such person” also needs to be proved in case

the case is not covered by subsequent clauses joined

by “or”.

16. The word “and” is used as conjunction. The use

of word “or” is clearly distinctive. Both the words

have been used for different purpose and object.

Crawford on Interpretation of Law while dealing with

the subject “disjunctive” and “conjunctive” words

with regard to criminal statute made following

statement:-

15

“……………………..The Court should be extremely

reluctant in a criminal statute to

substitute disjunctive words for

cojunctive words, and vice versa, if such

action adversely affects the accused.”

17. We may also notice certain judgments of this

court where conjunction “and” has been used. In

Punjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. Vs. The CIT, West

Bengal, Calcutta (1971) 2 SCC 540, this Court had

occasion to consider Section 23-A Explanation b(iii)

of Income Tax Act, 1922 which provision has been

extracted in paragraph 5 of the judgment which is to

the following effect:-

“Explanation. — For the purposes of this

section a company shall be deemed to be a

company in which the public are

substantially interested—

(a) If it is a company owned by the

Government or in which not less than forty

per cent of the shares are held by the

Government.

(b) If it is not a private company as

defined in the Indian Companies Act, 1913

(7 of 1913) and—

(i) its shares (not being shares

entitled to a fixed rate of

dividend, whether with or without

a further right to participate in

profits) carrying not less than

fifty per cent of the voting

16

power have been allotted

unconditionally to, or acquired

unconditionally by, and were

throughout the previous year

beneficially held by the public

(not including a company to which

the provisions of this section

apply):

Provided that in the case of any

such company as is referred to in

sub-section (4), this sub-clause

shall apply as if for the words

‘not less than fifty per cent’

the words ‘not less than forty

per cent’, had been substituted;

(ii) the said shares were at any

time during the previous year the

subject of dealing in any

recognised stock exchange in

India or were freely transferable

by the holder to other members of

the public; and

(iii) the affairs of the company

or the shares carrying more than

fifty per cent of the total

voting power were at no time

during the previous year

controlled or held by less than

six persons (persons who are

related to one another as

husband, wife, lineal ascendant

or descendant or brother or

sister, as the case may be, being

treated as a single person and

persons who are nominees of

another person together with that

other person being likewise

treated as a single person:

Provided that in the case of any

such company as is referred to in

17

sub-section (4), this clause

shall apply as if for the words

‘more than fifty per cent’, the

words ‘more than sixty per cent’,

had been substituted.”

18. This Court held following in paragraph 8:-

 “8. …………………...The clear import of the

opening part of clause (b) with the word

“and” appearing there read with the

negative or disqualifying conditions in

sub-clause (b)(iii) is that the assessee

was bound to satisfy apart from the

conditions contained in the other subclauses that its affairs were at no time

during the previous year controlled by

less than six persons and shares carrying

more than 50 per cent of the total voting

power were during the same period not held

by less than six persons……………………….”

19. In another judgment, Hyderabad Asbestos Cement

Products and Anr. Vs. Union of India, (2000) 1 SCC

426, this Court had occasion to consider Rule 56-A of

Central Excise Act, 1944. The Court dealt with

interpretation of conjunctive and disjunctive “and”,

“or”. Proviso to Rule 56-A also uses the conjunctive

word “and”. The Provision of the Rule as quoted in

paragraph 4 is as below:-

“56-A. Special procedure for movement of

duty-paid materials or component parts for

18

use in the manufacture of finished

excisable goods.—(1) Notwithstanding

anything contained in these rules, the

Central Government may, by notification in

the Official Gazette, specify the

excisable goods in respect of which the

procedure laid down in sub-rule (2) shall

apply.

(2) The Collector may, on application made

in this behalf and subject to the

conditions mentioned in sub-rule (3) and

such other conditions as may, from time to

time, be prescribed by the Central

Government, permit a manufacturer of any

excisable goods specified under sub-rule

(1) to receive material or component parts

or finished products (like asbestos

cement), on which the duty of excise or

the additional duty under Section 2-A of

the Indian Tariff Act, 1934 (32 of 1934),

(hereinafter referred to as the

countervailing duty), has been paid, in

his factory for the manufacture of these

goods or for the more convenient

distribution of finished product and allow

a credit of the duty already paid on such

material or component parts or finished

product, as the case may be:

Provided that no credit of duty shall

be allowed in respect of any material or

component parts used in the manufacture of

finished excisable goods—

(i) if such finished excisable

goods produced by the manufacturer

are exempt from the whole of the

duty of excise leviable thereon or

are chargeable to nil rate of duty,

and

(ii) unless—

19

(a) duty has been paid for such

material or component parts under

the same item or sub-item as the

finished excisable goods; or

(b) remission or adjustment of duty

paid for such material or component

parts has been specifically

sanctioned by the Central

Government:

Provided further that if the duty

paid on such material or component

parts (of which credit has been

allowed under this sub-rule) be

varied subsequently due to any

reason, resulting in payment of

refund to, or recovery of more duty

from, the manufacturer or importer,

as the case may be, of such

material or component parts, the

credit allowed shall be varied

accordingly by adjustment in the

credit account maintained under

sub-rule (3) or in the accountcurrent maintained under sub-rule

(3) or Rule 9 or Rule 178(1) or, if

such adjustment be not possible for

any reason, by cash recovery from

or, as the case may be, refund to

the manufacturer availing of the

procedure contained in this rule.”

20. This court held that when the provisos 1 & 2 are

separated by conjunctive word “and”, they have to be

read conjointly. The requirement of both the proviso

has to be satisfied to avail the benefit. Paragraph 8

is as follows:-

20

“8. The language of the rule is plain and

simple. It does not admit of any doubt in

interpretation. Provisos (i) and (ii) are

separated by the use of the conjunction

“and”. They have to be read conjointly.

The requirement of both the provisos has

to be satisfied to avail the benefit.

Clauses (a) and (b) of proviso (ii) are

separated by the use of an “or” and there

the availability of one of the two

alternatives would suffice. Inasmuch as

cement and asbestos fibre used by the

appellants in the manufacture of their

finished excisable goods are liable to

duty under different tariff items, the

benefit of pro forma credit extended by

Rule 56-A cannot be availed of by the

appellants and has been rightly denied by

the authorities of the Department.”

21. Thus, applying the above principle of

interpretation on condition Nos. 1 & 2 of Section

364A which is added with conjunction “and”, we are of

the view that condition No.2 has also to be fulfilled

before ingredients of Section 364A are found to be

established. Section 364A also indicates that in case

the condition “and threatens to cause death or hurt

to such person” is not proved, there are other

classes which begins with word “or”, those

conditions, if proved, the offence will be

established. The second condition, thus, as noted

21

above is divided in two parts- (a) and threatens to

cause death or hurt to such person or (b) by his

conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that

such person may be put to death or hurt.

22. Now, we may look into few cases of this Court

where different ingredients of Section 364A came for

consideration. We may first notice the judgment of

this Court in Malleshi Vs. State of Karnataka, (2004)

8 SCC 95. The above was a case where kidnapping of a

major boy was made by the accused for ransom and

before this Court argument was raised that demand of

ransom has not been established. In the above case,

the Court referred to Section 364A and in paragraph

12 following was observed:-

“12. To attract the provisions of Section

364-A what is required to be proved is:

(1) that the accused kidnapped or abducted

the person; (2) kept him under detention

after such kidnapping and abduction; and

(3) that the kidnapping or abduction was

for ransom. Strong reliance was placed on

a decision of the Delhi High Court

in Netra Pal v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2001

Cri LJ 1669 (Del)] to contend that since

the ransom demand was not conveyed to the

father of PW 2, the intention to demand

was not fulfilled.”

22

23. This court in paragraphs 13 to 15 dealt with

demand for ransom and held that demand originally was

made to person abducted and the mere fact that after

making the demand the same could not be conveyed to

some other person as the accused was arrested in

meantime does not take away the effect of conditions

of Section 364A. In the above case, this Court was

merely concerned with ransom, hence, other conditions

of Section 364A were not noticed.

24. The next judgment is Anil alias Raju Namdev Patil

Vs. Administration of Daman & Diu, Daman and Another,

(2006) 13 SCC 36. In the above case, this Court

noticed the ingredients for commission of offence

under Section 364 and 364A. Following was laid down

in paragraph 55:-

“55. ………………………for obtaining a conviction

for commission of an offence under Section

364-A thereof it is necessary to prove

that not only such kidnapping or abetment

has taken place but thereafter the accused

threatened to cause death or hurt to such

person or by his conduct gives rise to a

reasonable apprehension that such person

may be put to death or hurt or causes hurt

or death to such person in order to compel

23

the Government or any foreign State or

international intergovernmental

organisation or any other person to do or

abstain from doing any act or to pay a

ransom.”

25. At this stage, we may also notice the judgment of

this Court in Suman Sood alias Kamaljeet Kaur Vs.

State of Rajasthan (2007) 5 SCC 634. In the above

case, Suman Sood and her husband Daya Singh Lahoria

were accused in the case of abduction. They were

tried for offence under Section 364A, 365, 343 read

with Section 120-B and 346 read with Section 120-B.

The trial court convicted the appellant for offence

under Sections 365 read with 120-B, 343 read with

120-B and 346 read with 120-B. She was, however,

acquitted for offence punishable under Section 364-A.

Her challenge against conviction and sentence for

offences punishable under Sections 365 read with 120-

B, 343 read with 120-B and 346 read with 120-B IPC

was negatived by the High Court. But her acquittal

for offences punishable under Sections 364-A read

with 120-B was set aside by the High Court in an

appeal and she was also convicted for the offence

24

under Section 364A and was sentenced to life

imprisonment. In the appeal filed by her challenging

her conviction under Section 364A, this Court dealt

with acquittal of Suman Sood under Section 364A by

trial Court. In Paragraph 64 this court noticed as

follows:-

“64. According to the trial court, the

prosecution had failed to prove charges

against Suman Sood for an offence

punishable under Sections 364-A or 364-A

read with 120-B IPC “beyond reasonable

doubt” inasmuch as no reliable evidence

had been placed on record from which it

could be said to have been established

that Suman Sood was also a part of

“pressurise tactics” or had terrorised the

victim or his family members to get

Devendra Pal Singh Bhullar released in

lieu of Rajendra Mirdha. The trial court,

therefore, held that she was entitled to

benefit of doubt.”

26. The findings of trial court that no reliable

evidence had been placed on record from which it

could be said to have been established that Suman

Sood was also a part of pressurise tactics or has

terrorized the victim or his family. This court

approved the acquittal of Suman Sood by trial court

and set aside the order of the High Court convicting

25

Suman Sood. In paragraph 71 following was held by

this Court:-

“71. On the facts and in the circumstances

in its entirety and considering the

evidence as a whole, it cannot be said

that by acquitting Suman Sood for offences

punishable under Sections 364-A read with

120-B IPC, the trial court had acted

illegally or unlawfully. The High Court,

therefore, ought not to have set aside the

finding of acquittal of accused Suman Sood

for an offence under Sections 364-A read

with 120-B IPC. To that extent, therefore,

the order of conviction and sentence

recorded by the High Court deserves to be

set aside.”

27. Thus, the trial court’s findings that there was

no evidence that Suman Sood was part of pressurize

tactics or terrorized the victim or his family

members, hence, due to non-fulfillment of the

condition as enumerated in Section 364A, the trial

court recorded the acquittal, which has been

confirmed by this Court. The above case clearly

establishes that unless all conditions as enumerated

in Section 364A are fulfilled, no conviction can be

recorded.

26

28. Now, we come to next judgment, i.e., Vishwanath

Gupta Vs. State of Uttaranchal (2007) 11 SCC 633. In

the above case, the victims were abducted from

district of Lucknow, State of U.P. demands for ransom

and threat was extended from another district, i.e.,

Nainital and the victim was done to death in another

district, i.e., Unnao in the State of U.P. This Court

had occasion to consider the ingredients of Section

364A and in paragraphs 8 and 9, the following was

laid down:-

“8. According to Section 364-A, whoever

kidnaps or abducts any person and keeps

him in detention and threatens to cause

death or hurt to such person and by his

conduct gives rise to a reasonable

apprehension that such person may be put

to death or hurt, and claims a ransom and

if death is caused then in that case the

accused can be punished with death or

imprisonment for life and also liable to

pay fine.

9. The important ingredient of Section

364-A is the abduction or kidnapping, as

the case may be. Thereafter, a threat to

the kidnapped/abducted that if the demand

for ransom is not met then the victim is

likely to be put to death and in the event

death is caused, the offence of Section

364-A is complete. There are three stages

27

in this section, one is the kidnapping or

abduction, second is threat of death

coupled with the demand of money and

lastly when the demand is not met, then

causing death. If the three ingredients

are available, that will constitute the

offence under Section 364-A of the Penal

Code. Any of the three ingredients can

take place at one place or at different

places. In the present case the demand of

the money with the threat perception had

been made at (Haldwani) Nainital. The

deceased were kidnapped at Lucknow and

they were put to death at Unnao.

Therefore, the first offence was committed

by the accused when they abducted Ravi

Varshney and Anoop Samant at Lucknow.

Therefore, Lucknow court could have

territorial jurisdiction to try the case.”

29. This Court in the above case, laid down that

there are three stages in the Section, one is

kidnapping or abduction, second is threat of death

coupled with demand of money and third when the

demand is not met, then causing death. The Court

held that if the three ingredients are available that

will constitute the offence under Section 364 of the

IPC. Dealing with Section 364A in context of above

case, following was laid down in paragraph 17:-

28

“17. ……………But here, in the case of Section

364-A something more is there, that is,

that a person was abducted from Lucknow

and demand has been raised at Haldwani,

Nainital with threat. If the amount is not

paid to the abductor then the victim is

likely to be put to death. In order to

constitute an offence under Section 364-A,

all the ingredients have not taken place

at Lucknow or Unnao. The two incidents

took place in the State of Uttar Pradesh,

that is, abduction and death of the

victims but one of the ingredient took

place, that is, threat was given at the

house of the victims at Haldwani, Nainital

demanding the ransom money otherwise the

victim will be put to death. Therefore,

one of the ingredients has taken place

within the territorial jurisdiction of

Haldwani, Nainital. Therefore, it is a

case wherein the offence has taken place

at three places i.e. at Haldwani,

Nainital, where the threat to the life of

the victim was given and demand of money

was raised, the victim was abducted from

Lucknow and he was ultimately put to death

at Unnao. ………………….”

30. Next case which needs to be noticed is a Three

Judge Bench Judgment of this Court in Vikram Singh

alias Vicky and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors.,

(2015) 9 SCC 502. In the above case, this Court

elaborately considered the scope and purport of

Section 364A including the historical background.

After noticing the earlier cases, this Court laid

29

down that section 364A has three distinct components.

In Paragraph 25, following was laid down with regard

to distinct components of Section 364A:-

“25. …………….Section 364-A IPC has three

distinct components viz. (i) the person

concerned kidnaps or abducts or keeps the

victim in detention after kidnapping or

abduction; (ii) threatens to cause death

or hurt or causes apprehension of death or

hurt or actually hurts or causes death;

and (iii) the kidnapping, abduction or

detention and the threats of death or

hurt, apprehension for such death or hurt

or actual death or hurt is caused to

coerce the person concerned or someone

else to do something or to forbear from

doing something or to pay

ransom…………………...”

31. We may also notice one more Three Judge Bench

Judgment of this Court in Arvind Singh Vs. State of

Maharashtra, (2020) SCC Online SC 400. In the above

case, an eight year old son of Doctor Mukesh Ramanlal

Chandak (PW1) was kidnapped by the accused A1 and A2.

Accused A1 was an employee of Dr. Chandak. It was

held that A1 had grievance against Dr. Chandak. A2

who accompanied A1 when the boy was kidnapped and

after the kidnapping of the boy it was found that boy

was murdered and at the instance of A1, the dead body

30

was recovered from a bridge constructed over a

Rivulet. Trial court had sentenced both A1 and A2 to

death for the offences punishable under Sections 364A

read with 34 and 302 read with 34. The High Court

had dismissed the appeal affirming the death

sentence. On behalf of A2, one of the arguments

raised before this Court was that although child was

kidnapped for ransom but there was no intention to

take the life of the child, therefore, offence under

Section 364A is not made out. This Court noticed the

ingredients of Section 364A, one of which was

“threatening to cause death or hurt” in paragraphs

90, 91 and 92, the following was observed:-

“90. An argument was raised that the child

was kidnapped for ransom but there was no

intention to take life of the child,

therefore, an offence under Section 364A

is not made out. To appreciate the

arguments, Section 364A of the IPC is

reproduced as under:

“364A. Kidnapping for ransom, etc.—

Whoever kidnaps or abducts any

person or keeps a person in

detention after such kidnapping or

abduction and threatens to cause

death or hurt to such person, or by

his conduct gives rise to a

reasonable apprehension that such

person may be put to death or hurt,

or causes hurt or death to such

31

person in order to compel the

Government or any foreign State or

international intergovernmental

organisation or any other person to

do or abstain from doing any act or

to pay a ransom, shall be

punishable with death, or

imprisonment for life, and shall

also be liable to fine.”

91. Section 364A IPC has three ingredients

relevant to the present appeals, one, the

fact of kidnapping or abduction, second,

threatening to cause death or hurt, and

last, the conduct giving rise to

reasonable apprehension that such person

may be put to death or hurt.

92. The kidnapping of an 8-year-old child

was unequivocally for ransom. The

kidnapping of a victim of such a tender

age for ransom has inherent threat to

cause death as that alone will force the

relatives of such victim to pay ransom.

Since the act of kidnapping of a child for

ransom has inherent threat to cause death,

therefore, the accused have been rightly

been convicted for an offence under

Section 364A read with Section 34 IPC. The

threat will remain a mere threat, if the

victim returns unhurt. In the present

case, the victim has been done to death.

The threat had become a reality. There is

no reason to take different view that the

view taken by learned Sessions Judge as

well by the High Court.”

32. We need to refer to observations made by Three

Judge Bench in paragraph 92 where this Court observed

that kidnapping of an eight year old victim for

32

ransom has inherent threat to cause death as it alone

will force the relatives of victim to pay ransom.

The Court further held that since the act of

kidnapping of a child has inherent threat to cause

death, therefore, the accused have been rightly

convicted for an offence under Section 364A read with

Section 34 IPC. In the next sentence, the Court held

that the threat will remain a mere threat, if the

victim returns unhurt, “the victim has been done to

death the threat has become a reality”. The above

observation made by Three Judge Bench has to be read

in context of the facts of the case which was for

consideration before this Court. No ratio has been

laid down in paragraph 92 that when an eight year old

child (or a child of a tender age) is

kidnapped/abducted for ransom there is inherent

threat to cause death and the second condition as

noted above, i.e., threatens to cause death or hurt

to such person, is not to be proved. The

observations cannot be read to mean that in a case of

kidnapping or abduction of an eight year old child

(or child of a tender age), presumption in law shall

33

arise that kidnapping or abduction has been done to

cause hurt or death. Each case has to be decided on

its own facts. In the foregoing paragraphs, we have

noticed that all the three distinct conditions

enumerated in Section 364A have to be fulfilled

before an accused is convicted of offence under

Section 364A. Thus, the observations in paragraph 92

may not be read to obviate the establishment of

second condition as noticed above for bringing home

the offence under Section 364A.

33. After noticing the statutory provision of Section

364A and the law laid down by this Court in the above

noted cases, we conclude that the essential

ingredients to convict an accused under Section 364A

which are required to be proved by prosecution are as

follows:-

(i) Kidnapping or abduction of any person or

keeping a person in detention after such

kidnapping or abduction; and

34

(ii) threatens to cause death or hurt to such

person, or by his conduct gives rise to a

reasonable apprehension that such person may

be put to death or hurt or;

(iii) causes hurt or death to such person in order

to compel the Government or any foreign State

or any Governmental organization or any other

person to do or abstain from doing any act or

to pay a ransom.

34. Thus, after establishing first condition, one

more condition has to be fulfilled since after first

condition, word used is “and”. Thus, in addition to

first condition either condition (ii) or (iii) has to

be proved, failing which conviction under Section

364A cannot be sustained.

35. The second condition which is “and threatens to

cause a death or hurt to such person, or by his

conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that

such person may be put to death or hurt” is relevant

35

for consideration in this case since appellant has

confined his submission only regarding nonfulfillment of this condition. We may also notice

that the appellant has filed grounds of appeal before

the High Court in which following was stated in

grounds No. 6 and 7:-

“6. The learned Judge failed to see that

PW-2 stated that he was treated well and

as such there was no threat to cause death

or hurt.

7. The learned Judge should have seen that

PW-1 did not state that the accused

threatened to cause death or hurt to his

son.”

36. Now, we may first look into the judgment of the

learned Sessions Judge regarding consideration of

fulfillment of second condition and the findings

recorded in that regard by learned Sessions Judge.

The Judgment of the learned Sessions Judge indicates

that from paragraphs 12 to 19, the learned Sessions

Judge has noticed the evidences of different

witnesses and in paragraph 20 following findings have

been recorded:-

“20. The learned counsel for the

defence contended that the prosecution

evidence are not at all sufficient to

36

establish the guilt of the accused for the

charge leveled against him. He further

contended that the accused is not real

culprit a false case was foisted against

him and he was no way connected to the

alleged kidnap. The said testimony of PWs

1 to 5 and PW-8 coupled with Ex.P.1 to P.4

and M.O.1 to 3 it clearly established that

the accused kidnapped PW-2 and telephoned

to PW-1 and demanded Rs. Two Lakhs for the

release of the PW-2. So the prosecution

clearly establishes the guilt of the

accused for the offence under Section

364(A) of IPC and he is liable to be

convicted. Accordingly, this point is

answered in favour of the prosecution and

against the accused.”

37. The findings in paragraph 20 reveals that the

learned Sessions judge held that it is clearly

established that the accused kidnapped PW-2 and

telephoned PW-1 and demanded Rs.2 lakhs for release

of PW-2. On this finding, the learned Sessions Judge

jumped to the conclusion that prosecution has clearly

proved the case for conviction under Section 364A.

There are no findings recorded by learned Sessions

Judge that condition no. 2 was also fulfilled.

38. The High Court in its judgment has also in para

27 observed:-

37

“27. There is cogent, convincing and

overwhelming evidence on record to connect

the appellant/accused with the alleged

offence. The prosecution clinchingly

proved the guilt of the accused beyond all

reasonable doubt for the offence

punishable under Section 364A of IPC. The

Court below had meticulously analysed the

entire evidence on record and rightly

convicted and sentenced the

appellant/accused, basing on the oral and

documentary evidence. There is nothing to

take a different view. All the contentions

raised on behalf of the appellant/accused

do fail. The Criminal Appeal is devoid of

merit and is liable to be dismissed.”

39. The High Court has not dealt with the grounds

taken before it by the accused that no threat to

cause death or hurt was extended by the accused. From

the judgment of the high court, thus, it can be said

that there is no finding regarding fulfillment of

condition No.2. Both the Courts having not held that

condition No.2 as noted above was found established

on the evidence led before the Court the conviction

under Section 364A become unsustainable. The present

is not a case where applicability of condition No.

(iii), i.e., “or causes hurt or death” is even

claimed. Thus, fulfillment of condition No.(ii) was

necessary for conviction under Section 364A.

38

40. We, however, proceed to examine the evidence on

record to satisfy ourselves as to whether there was

any evidence from which it can be proved that

condition No.2, i.e., “threatens to cause death or

hurt or conduct of the accused gives rise to a

reasonable apprehension that victim may be put to

death or hurt” was established. The complainant,

PW-1, in his cross examination, stated “my son was

not physically assaulted…………… My son did not

complain me about bad behavior or assault of

anything. My son was kept in a good health and

without any kind of problem to my son.” PW-2, the

victim himself was examined, who was 13 years of age

at the time of examination. In his cross

examination, victim states:-“I was not assaulted nor

having stab, beating on my body. They treated me in a

good manner.”

41. Thus, neither PW-1, the father of the victim, the

complainant, nor the victim says that any accused

threatened to cause death or hurt. The evidence

39

which was led before the court suggest otherwise that

the victim was not assaulted and he was treated well

in a good manner as was stated by victim.

42. Now, coming to the second part of the condition

No.2, i.e., “or by his conduct gives rise to a

reasonable apprehension that such person may be put

to death or hurt”. Neither there is any such conduct

of the accused discussed by the Courts below, which

may give a reasonable apprehension that victim may be

put to death or hurt nor there is anything in the

evidence on the basis of which it can be held that

second part of the condition is fulfilled. We, thus,

are of the view that evidence on record did not prove

fulfillment of the second condition of Section 364A.

Second condition is also a condition precedent, which

is requisite to be satisfied to attract Section 364A

of the IPC.

43. The Second condition having not been proved to be

established, we find substance in the submission of

the learned Counsel for the appellant that conviction

40

of the appellant is unsustainable under Section 364A

IPC. We, thus, set aside the conviction of the

appellant under Section 364A. However, from the

evidence on record regarding kidnapping, it is proved

that accused had kidnapped the victim for ransom,

demand of ransom was also proved. Even though offence

under Section 364A has not been proved beyond

reasonable doubt but the offence of kidnapping has

been fully established to which effect the learned

Sessions Judge has recorded a categorical finding in

paragraphs 19 and 20. The offence of kidnapping

having been proved, the appellant deserves to be

convicted under Section 363. Section 363 provides

for punishment which is imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to seven

years and shall also be liable to fine.

44. In the facts of the present case, we are

satisfied that the appellant deserves to be sentenced

with imprisonment of seven years and also liable to

pay fine of Rs. 5,000/-. The Judgment of the learned

Sessions Judge and the High Court is modified to the

41

above extent. The conviction and sentence of the

appellant under Section 364A is set aside. The

appellant is convicted for offence under section 363

of kidnapping and sentenced to imprisonment of seven

years and fine of Rs.5,000/-. After completion of

imprisonment of seven years (if not completed

already) the appellant shall be released.

45. The appeal is partly allowed to the above extent.

....................J.

 (Ashok Bhushan)


....................J.

 (R.Subhash Reddy)

NEW DELHI,

JUNE 28, 2021.

42

Thursday, June 24, 2021

Ram Awadh (Dead) by Lrs. and Others vs.Achhaibar Dubey and Another [(2000) 2 SCC428] was as under: “6. the obligation imposed by Section 16 is upon the court not to grant specific performance to a plaintiff who has not met the requirements of clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. A court may not, therefore, grant to a plaintiff who has failed to aver and to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement the specific performance whereof he seeks. There is, therefore, no question of the plea being available to one defendant and not to another. It is open to any defendant to contend and establish that he mandatory requirement of Section 16(c) has not been complied with and it is for the court to determine whether it has or has not been complied with and, depending upon its conclusion, decree or decline to decree the suit. We are of the view that the decision in Jugraj Singh case [(1995) 2 SCC 31] is erroneous.”

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.543 OF 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No(s).9175/2020

KADUPUGOTLA VARALAKSHMI APPELLANT(S)

 VERSUS

VUDAGIRI VENKATA RAO & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.544 OF 2021

 (Arising out of SLP (C) No(s) 1944/2021

O R D E R

Application for substitution is allowed.

Leave granted.

These appeals arise out of the judgment and order dated

20-04-2020 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at

Amravati in A.S. No. 531/2008.

Civil suit1 seeking specific performance of agreement

dated 09.10.2004 was dismissed by the Trial Court holding

inter alia that the plaintiff had failed to prove the

genuineness of the agreement dated 09.10.2004 and that the

appellant herein was a bonafide purchaser for consideration

without notice of said agreement dated 09.10.2004.

In paragraph 15 onwards of its judgment, the Trial

Court also noted certain facts touching upon the question of

1 O.S. No.209 of 2006 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram filed by

respondent no.1 in both appeals – Vudagiri Venkata Rao.

2

readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff.

In the first appeal arising therefrom, the matter was

considered by the High Court under Point No.2, in paragraphs

70 to 76 of its judgment as under:

“POINT No.2:-

70. The evidence of the appellant as P.W.1 is that

he was ready and willing to perform his part of the

contract in terms of Ex.A1. Reasons are assigned

while discussing point No.1 that the appellant had

established that he was in a position to raise

necessary funds to perform his part of the contract

under Ex.A1. In Ex.A2 notice, he clearly stated that

he was ready and willing to perform his part of the

contract thereunder and called upon the 1st

respondent to perform his part of the contract upon

receiving balance sale consideration and to execute

a regular sale deed as well as to get it registered.

References to these circumstances are also made in

the plaint, though specific averments to the effect

that the appellant was always ready and willing to

perform his part of the contract are not brought out

in the plaint. Nonetheless the manner in which the

appellant expressed his readiness and willingness in

so many words in the plaint as well as in Ex.A2

notice clarify the situation and making out this

omission insignificant.

71.The nature of defence of denial of execution of

Ex.A1 set up by the 1st respondent, without referring

or denying that the appellant was always ready and

willing to perform his part of the contract is a

factor to be considered in this respect.

72. The learned counsel for the appellant placed

reliance in Narinderjit Singh vs. North Star Estate

Promoters Limited [(2012) 5 SCC 712 26] in this

respect. In given facts and circumstances, referring

to denial of agreement of sale set up as defence in

a suit for specific performance, it is observed in

this ruling that objection that the plaintiff is not

ready and willing to perform his part of the

contract under agreement for sale, cannot stand. It

was thus observed that the defendant could not have

raised a plea relating to want of readiness and

willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform

his part of the contract.

73. Further reliance is placed by the learned

3

counsel for the appellant in this context in Silvey

and others vs. Arun Varghese and another[(2008) 11

SCC 45], apart from a judgment of Punjab & Haryana

High Court in Santa Singh v. Binder Singh and others

[2006 SCC OnLine P&H 442].

74. Contentions are also advanced on behalf of the

appellant, referring to the defence of 3rd

respondent, who is subsequent purchaser of the suit

property under Ex.B4 that she cannot raise such

objection. Reliance is placed in this context in M.

M.S.Investments, Madurai and others vs. V. Veerappan

and others [(2007) 9 SCC 660] . In para-6 of this

ruling, it is observed as under:

“6. Questioning the plea of readiness and

willingness is a concept relatable to an

agreement. After conveyance the question of

readiness and willingness is really not relevant.

Therefore, the provision of the specific Relief

Act, 1963 (in short “the Act”) is not

applicable.”

75. In Jugraj Singh and another vs. Labh Singh and

others[(1995) 2 SCC 31] in this respect it is observed

in para 5 referring to the celebrated judgment in

Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar{AIR 1967 SC

868 ] as under:

“5. This Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai v.

Palaniswami Nadar quoting with approval Ardeshir

case (AIR 1928 PC 208) had held as follows:

“But the respondent has claimed a decree for

specific performance and it is for him to

establish that he was , since the date of the

contract, continuously ready and willing to

perform his part of the contract. If he failed to

do so, his claim for specific performance must

fail.”

That plea is specifically available to the vendor/

defendant. It is personal to him. The subsequent

purchasers have got only the right to defend their

purchase on the premise that they have no prior

knowledge of the agreement of sale with the

plaintiff. They are bona fide purchasers for

valuable consideration. Though they are necessary

parties to the suit, since any decree obtained by

the plaintiff would be binding on the subsequent

purchasers, the plea that the plaintiff must

always be ready and willing to perform his part of

the contract must be available only to the vendor

4

or his legal representatives, but not to the

subsequent purchasers....”

76. Therefore, in the light of the above legal position,

it is not open for the 3rd respondent to raise this plea.

Thus, on the material it has to be held that the appellant

did succeed in making out that he was ready and willing to

perform his part of the contract under Ex.A1 at all

material times against the 1st respondent. Thus, this point

is answered.”

Thus, the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant i.e.

subsequent purchaser were not taken into account on the premise

that it would not be open to a subsequent purchaser to challenge

the readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff. The High

Court had relied upon the decision of this Court rendered in

Jugraj Singh and Another vs. Labh Singh and Others [(1995) 2 SCC

31] to come to such conclusion.

It must be stated here that the principles laid down in

Jugraj Singh and Another (supra) were not accepted by a larger

Bench of this Court. The relevant discussion in paragraph 6 in the

case of Ram Awadh (Dead) by Lrs. and Others vs.Achhaibar Dubey and

Another [(2000) 2 SCC428] was as under:

“6. The obligation imposed by Section 16 is upon the

court not to grant specific performance to a plaintiff

who has not met the requirements of clauses (a), (b)

and (c) thereof. A court may not, therefore, grant to a

plaintiff who has failed to aver and to prove that he

has performed or has always been ready and willing to

perform his part of the agreement the specific

performance whereof he seeks. There is, therefore, no

question of the plea being available to one defendant

and not to another. It is open to any defendant to

contend and establish that he mandatory requirement of

Section 16(c) has not been complied with and it is for

the court to determine whether it has or has not been

complied with and, depending upon its conclusion,

decree or decline to decree the suit. We are of the

view that the decision in Jugraj Singh case [(1995) 2

SCC 31] is erroneous.”

5

Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff - respondent

no.1 sought to support on facts the conclusion arrived by the

High Court on the issue of readiness and willingness.

However, the fact remains that the entire perspective with

which the matter was considered by the High Court was clearly

erroneous and as the observations made by the High Court in

paragraph 76 disclose, the High Court went on the footing that it

was not open to the appellant i.e. subsequent purchaser to raise

any submissions on the issue of readiness and willingness. Thus,

the judgment under challenge clearly fell in serious error.

We, therefore, deem it appropriate to set aside the

decision of the High Court and remit the matter for fresh

consideration on merits.

These appeals are, therefore, allowed, the judgment under

challenge is set aside and First Appeal being A.S. No.531 of 2008

is restored to the file of the High Court to be decided afresh on

merits.

No order as to costs.

……………………………J.

 [UDAY UMESH LALIT]

……………………………J.

[INDIRA BANERJEE]

……………………………J.

[K.M. JOSEPH]

New Delhi;

February 16, 2021.

6

ITEM NO.9 Court 4 (Video Conferencing) SECTION XII-A

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 9175/2020

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 20-04-2020

in AS No. 531/2008 passed by the High Court Of Andhra Pradesh At

Amravati)

KADUPUGOTLA VARALAKSHMI Petitioner(s)

 VERSUS

VUDAGIRI VENKATA RAO & ORS. Respondent(s)

(FOR ADMISSION and I.R. and

IA No. 72331/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED

JUDGMENT; IA No. 75121/2020 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL

DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

WITH

SLP(C) No. 1944/2021 (XII-A)

(FOR ADMISSION and I.R. and IA No.14100/2021-EXEMPTION FROM FILING

C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT and IA No.14102/2021-APPLICATION FOR

SUBSTITUTION and IA No.14101/2021-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)

Date : 16-02-2021 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT

 HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH

For Petitioner(s) Mr. A. Ramalingeswara Rao, Sr. Advocate,

Ms. E. R. Sumathy, AOR and

Ms. S. Spandana Reddy, advocate -[for

SLP(C) No. 1944/2021]

 Mr. Raavi Yogesh Venkata, AOR

Ms. Snigdha Singh [Adv.]

 Mr. Saurabh Ahluwalia [Adv.]


For Respondent(s) Mr. G. Ramakrishna Prasad, AOR

Mr. Suyodhan Byrapaneni, Adv.

Ms.Filza Moonis, Adv.(R-1)

Mr. A. Ramalingeswara Rao, Sr. Advocate,

Ms. E. R. Sumathy, AOR and

Ms. S. Spandana Reddy, advocate - for

Respondent Nos. 2.1, 2.2, 3.

7

 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

 O R D E R

Leave granted.

These appeals are allowed in terms of the signed

order.

Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

(INDU MARWAH) (VIRENDER SINGH)

COURT MASTER (SH) BRANCH OFFICER

(SIGNED ORDER IS PLACED ON THE FILE)

Cheque bounce case and counter case under Sec.420 of IPC are to be tried together by the same officer. Essentially, there are two criminal proceedings. On 1 November 2013, the petitioners filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 of which the JMFC took cognizance on 12 February 2014. It appears that on 22 August 2014, the respondent has filed a complaint before the JMFC under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 against the petitioners. Cognizance has been taken on 21 May 2015. Having regard to the common factual background in both the criminal cases, we are of the view that both the complaint filed by the petitioners and the complaint filed by the respondent should be tried by one and the same Judge.


Cheque bounce case and counter case under Sec.420 of IPC are to be tried together by the same officer.

Essentially, there are two criminal proceedings. On 1 November 2013, the petitioners filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 of which the JMFC took cognizance on 12 February 2014. It appears that on 22 August 2014, the respondent has filed a complaint before the JMFC under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 against the petitioners. Cognizance has been taken on 21 May 2015.

Having regard to the common factual background in both the criminal cases, we are of the view that both the complaint filed by the petitioners and the complaint filed by the respondent should be tried by one and the same Judge.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No 40 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (Crl) No 5142 of 2020)

Pitambar Lokwani & Anr .... Appellant(s)

Versus

Deepak Rao Khatke ....Respondent(s)

O R D E R

1 Leave granted.

2 While issuing notice in the present proceedings on 15 October 2020, the

following order was passed:

“Mr Shishir Kumar Saxena, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the petitioners states that the petitioners have filed a

complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act

1881 on 1 November 2013, which is pending trial. Learned

counsel submits that the complaint which has been filed by the

respondent before the JMFC under Section 420 read with

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code arises out of the same

cheque of Rs 4,60,000, which forms the subject matter of the

complaint under Section 138. He submits that the complaint

which has been filed by the petitioner prior in point of time

should be expedited and be disposed of first or in the alternate,

both the cases may be tried together.

2 Delay condoned.

3 Issue notice, returnable in four weeks.

4 Service be effected on the complainant-respondent through

Dasti.

5 Liberty to serve the Standing Counsel for the State of Madhya

Pradesh, in addition. “

2

3 Essentially, there are two criminal proceedings. On 1 November 2013, the

petitioners filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act

1881 of which the JMFC took cognizance on 12 February 2014. It appears that

on 22 August 2014, the respondent has filed a complaint before the JMFC under

Section 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 against the

petitioners. Cognizance has been taken on 21 May 2015.

4 Having regard to the common factual background in both the criminal cases, we

are of the view that both the complaint filed by the petitioners and the complaint

filed by the respondent should be tried by one and the same Judge. The CJM,

Gwalior shall accordingly pass necessary administrative directions to ensure that

both the criminal cases, RCT Nos 15668 of 2013 and 4118 of 2015, are placed

for trial before the same Court.

5 The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

6 Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

 …………...…...….......………………........J.

 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.

 [Sanjiv Khanna]

New Delhi;

January 13, 2021

-S-

3

ITEM NO.30 Court 6 (Video Conferencing) SECTION II-A

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).5142/2020

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 15-11-2019

in MCRC No. 27728/2017 passed by the High Court of M.P. at Gwalior)

PITAMBAR LOKWANI & ANR. Petitioner(s)

 VERSUS

DEEPAK RAO KHATKE Respondent(s)

(WITH I.R. and IA No.62179/2020-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE

IMPUGNED JUDGMENT and IA No.62181/2020-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.

and IA No.62184/2020-EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT)

Date : 13-01-2021 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Shishir Kumar Saxena, Adv.

Mr R. N.Pareek, Adv.

Ms. Pareena Swarup, Adv.

Mr. Ameet Singh, Adv.

 Mr. Praveen Swarup, AOR


For Respondent(s) Mr. Gopal Jha, AOR

Mr. Shreyash Bhardwaj, Adv.


UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

 O R D E R

1 Leave granted.

2 The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.

3 Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

 (SANJAY KUMAR-I) (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)

 AR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER

(Signed order is placed on the file)

Sec.138 Read with sec.147 of NI Act and under sec. 320[8] of Cr.P.C. - is a compoundable offence even after conviction and in appeal stage also in terms of the settlement, it is clarified that the appellant now stands acquitted of the charges levelled against him in terms of Section 147 of the Act read with Section 320(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Sec.138  Read with sec.147 of NI Act and under sec. 320[8] of Cr.P.C. - is a compoundable offence even after conviction and in appeal stage also 

in terms of the settlement, it is clarified that the appellant now stands acquitted of the charges levelled against him in terms of Section 147 of the Act read with Section 320(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.18 OF 2021

(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.181 of 2021

arising out of Diary No.8327 of 2020)

RAGHUNATH Appellant

 VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR. Respondents

O R D E R

Leave granted.

This appeal challenges the order dated 26.09.2019 passed

by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal

Revision (Crl. R.) No.26 of 2012.

The appellant was convicted under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“the Act” for short) and was

sentenced to suffer imprisonment for two weeks with imposition

of fine in the sum of Rs.4,50,000/-, out of which Rs.4,40,000/-

were to be made over to the original complainant.

The appeal arising therefrom having been dismissed, the

aforementioned revision application was preferred before the

High Court.

The High Court affirmed the view taken by the courts below

and dismissed the revision which order is presently under

challenge.

It must be mentioned that the original complainant and the

2

appellant have since then entered into a settlement, the terms

of which have been placed on record.

Mr. Robin Majumdar, learned counsel appearing for the

original complainant has accepted that a compromise has been

entered into between the parties. It is further accepted that

in terms of the compromise, a sum of Rs.4,00,000/- has been

received by the original complainant.

Since the parties have settled the matter, the settlement

is taken on record.

Disposing of the present appeal in terms of the settlement,

it is clarified that the appellant now stands acquitted of the

charges levelled against him in terms of Section 147 of the Act

read with Section 320(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

However, the relationship between the parties will be governed

by the terms of the compromise.

The appeal stands allowed in aforesaid terms.

......................J.

 [UDAY UMESH LALIT]

......................J.

 [HEMANT GUPTA]

......................J.

 [S. RAVINDRA BHAT]

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 7, 2021.

3

ITEM NO.38 COURT NO.3 SECTION II

(HEARING THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING)

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (CRL.) Diary No.8327 of 2018

RAGHUNATH Appellant(s)

 VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR. Respondent(s)

(FOR ADMISSION and I.R.; IA No.115927/2020 – FOR CONDONATION OF

DELAY IN FILING; and, IA No.115928/2020 – FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING

O.T.)

Date : 07-01-2021 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT

For Appellant(s) Mr. Saju Jacob, Adv.

Ms. Aruna Gupta, AOR


For Respondent(s) Mr. Robin Majumdar, AOR

 Ms. Akansha Srivastava, Adv.

 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

 O R D E R

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed, in terms of the Signed Order.

 (MUKESH NASA) (PRADEEP KUMAR)

 COURT MASTER BRANCH OFFICER

 (Signed Order is placed on the File)