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Thursday, February 25, 2021

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of Bhutan, 2013 = as per Clause 67 (ii) of the Contract, the arbitration would be governed by the Bhutan Act, 2013 and the place of arbitration shall be at Thimphu, Bhutan as provided by Clause 67 (vii) (a). =all disputes arising out of the Agreement dated 14.04.2009 shall be conducted in accordance with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of Bhutan, 2013 with the seat of arbitration at Thimphu. The tribunal will, however, be at liberty to conduct some of the hearings, in consultation with the parties, at such venues as may be convenient

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of Bhutan, 2013 = as per Clause 67 (ii) of the Contract, the arbitration would be governed by the Bhutan Act, 2013 and the place of arbitration shall be at Thimphu, Bhutan as provided by Clause 67 (vii) (a). =all disputes arising out of the Agreement dated 14.04.2009 shall be conducted in accordance with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of Bhutan, 2013 with the seat of arbitration at Thimphu. The tribunal will, however, be at liberty to conduct some of the hearings, in consultation with the parties, at such venues as may be convenient

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 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.693 OF 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2544 / 2021)

Punatsangchhu – 1 Hydroelectric Project

Authority, Bhutan …APPELLANT

Versus

Larsen & Toubro Ltd. … RESPONDENT

O R D E R

Leave granted.

1. On 14.04.2009, a Contract Agreement was executed between the

Appellant and the Respondent-Contractor for the Construction of Diversion

Tunnel, Dam, Intake and Desilting Arrangement including Hydro-mechanical

Works of the Punatsangchhu-I Hydro-electric Project located in Wangdue

Phodrang District in Bhutan. The contract provided for resolution of disputes

through arbitration. The relevant terms of the Contract are as under :

Clause 5 (i) (b)

The law to which the Contract is to be subject and according to which the

Contract is to be construed shall be the law for the time being in force in

Bhutan and within the jurisdiction of Thimphu courts.

Clause 67

(ii) Except where the decision has become final, binding and conclusive in

terms of Sub Para (i) above disputes or differences shall be referred for

arbitration through to an Arbitral Tribunal of three arbitrators appointed jointly

by the PHPA and the Contractor. Where the mandate of an arbitrator

terminates a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that

were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.

In the absence of an Arbitration Act in Bhutan, the Arbitral Tribunal shall

follow / be guided by the basic principles and procedures as contained in the

Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. The parties shall be free to agree

on a procedure for appointing the Arbitrators. Failing any agreement for

appointment of Arbitrators, each party shall appoint one Arbitrator and the two

appointed Arbitrators shall appoint the third Arbitrator, who shall act as the

presiding Arbitrator.

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Clause 67 (iv)

If either of the parties fail to appoint its arbitrators in pursuance of sub-clause

(ii) above, within 30 days after the receipt of the notice of the appointment of

its arbitrators or the two appointed Arbitrators fail to agree on third Arbitrator

within thirty days from the date of their appointment then the appointment shall

be made, upon request of a party, by the Chief Justice, Delhi High Court,

India/Thimphu High Court, Bhutan or any person or institutions designated by

him.

Clause 67 (vii)(a)

All arbitration shall be held at New Delhi, India/ Thimphu, Bhutan.

2. On 25.02.2013, the Kingdom of Bhutan enacted the Alternative

Dispute Resolution Act, 2013 (“the Bhutan Act”) to provide for settlement

of disputes through arbitration. The Act came into force w.e.f. 14.03.2013.

3. Disputes arose between the parties with respect to certain claims

made by the Respondent-Contractor.

 On 28.07.2020, the Respondent-Contractor sent a notice of arbitration

to the Appellant-Authority under Clause 67 (ii) of the Contract, and

nominated a retired Judge of this Court as its nominee arbitrator.

4. In response to the Notice dated 28.07.2020, the Appellant replied vide

Letter dated 04.08.2020, stating that it was agreeable for settlement of

disputes through arbitration. However, as per Clause 67 (ii) of the Contract,

the arbitration would be governed by the Bhutan Act, 2013 and the place of

arbitration shall be at Thimphu, Bhutan as provided by Clause 67 (vii) (a).

5. In October, 2020, the Respondent-Contractor filed an application u/S.

11 (6) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Delhi High Court

for appointment of an arbitrator on behalf of the Appellant-Authority.

6. The Delhi High Court vide Order dated 11.12.2020 held that Clause

67 (ii) of the Agreement did not indicate that the applicability of the 1996 Act

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would cease on the enactment of the Bhutan Act. The enactment of the

Bhutan Act, 2013 would not result in the 1996 Act becoming inapplicable.

The arbitration would be governed by the 1996 Act. Since the Hydro-electric

Authority had failed to appoint its arbitrator, the Court exercised its

jurisdiction u/S.11, and made the appointment. It was further directed that

the two arbitrators would proceed to appoint the presiding arbitrator, and the

arbitral proceedings would be governed by the provisions of the 1996 Act.

7. Aggrieved by the Order dated 11.12.2020, the Hydro-electric Authority

filed the present special leave petition.

 We have heard Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India

and Mr. Ranjeet Kumar, Senior Advocate on behalf of the AppellantAuthority, and Mr. Gourab Banerji, Senior Advocate on behalf of the

Respondent-Contractor.

 On 16.02.2021, the matter was taken up for admission hearing. We

were informed by the Senior Counsel for the parties that in the meanwhile,

the arbitral tribunal had been constituted, as the two arbitrators had

appointed Justice (Retd.) R.C. Lahoti, former Chief Justice of India, as the

presiding arbitrator.

 The learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Authority

fairly submitted that the Appellant herein did not have an issue with respect

to the panel of arbitrators appointed for adjudication of the disputes. Their

grievance was limited to the applicability of the Indian Arbitration &

Conciliation Act, 1996 and the seat of arbitration at New Delhi.

8. The matter was then taken up on 22.02.2021 for further hearing. Mr.

Gourab Banerji, learned Senior Advocate for the Respondent-Contractor

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submitted that his clients were agreeable to the arbitration being conducted

in accordance with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2013 of Bhutan,

with the seat of arbitration at Thimphu.

9. In view of the consensus arrived between the parties, the Order of the

High Court stands modified to the extent that all disputes arising out of the

Agreement dated 14.04.2009 shall be conducted in accordance with the

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of Bhutan, 2013 with the seat of

arbitration at Thimphu. The tribunal will, however, be at liberty to conduct

some of the hearings, in consultation with the parties, at such venues as

may be convenient.

 The Civil Appeal is disposed of, with no order as to costs.

 Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

.…………………………J.

 (INDU MALHOTRA)

…….…………………….J.

 (AJAY RASTOGI)

New Delhi;

February 22, 2021.

Friday, February 12, 2021

court fee = there was no compulsion for the plaintiff to, at the stage of filing the suit, prove or establish the claim that the suit lands were revenue paying and the details of such revenue paid. Once it is conceded that the value of the land [per explanation to Section 7 (iv-A)] is to be determined according to either sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of the Act, this meant that the concept of “market value” – a wider concept in other contexts, was deemed to be referrable to one or other modes of determining the value under sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of Section 7 (iv-A). This aspect was lost sight of by the High Court, in the facts of this case. The reasoning and conclusions of the High Court, are therefore, not sustainable.

 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1722 OF 2020

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No. 18008 OF 2019)

AGRA DIOCESAN TRUST ASSOCIATION ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

ANIL DAVID AND ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1723 OF 2020

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No. 18007 OF 2019)

J U D G M E N T

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1. Leave granted. With consent of counsel for the parties, the appeals were

heard finally.

2. The appellant, (hereafter “the plaintiff”) had filed a suit (O.S. 24/ 2013) in

the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dehradun for cancellation of a sale

deed dated 08.03.2013, executed by the defendant-respondent no.1. The third

respondent, (hereafter called the “purchaser”) had acquired the property from the

defendant-respondent no.1. Another suit (O.S. No. 25/ 2013, also titled as Agra

Diocesan Trust Association v. Anil David and Others), was filed by the plaintiff for

cancellation of the sale deed dated 08.03.2013 executed by the first two respondents

in favour of the purchaser. A further relief sought was for permanent injunction

against the respondents/ defendants restraining them from interfering in the

plaintiff’s peaceful possession of the property in dispute. The defendants filed their

written statements, contending inter alia that although the relief of cancellation of

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the sale deed in question has been sought, the plaintiff had improperly valued the

suit and the court fee paid was insufficient.

3. The trial court on the pleadings of the parties, framed the issues; the

relevant issues, Nos. 8 and 10 in both suits were (a) whether the suit filed by the

plaintiff was undervalued and (b) whether the court fee paid by the plaintiff was

insufficient.

4. The trial court by its order dated 23.04.2016, recorded the findings against

the plaintiff / petitioner and held that the suits filed were under-valued and the court

fee paid by the plaintiff was insufficient. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff filed

the writ petition before the High Court, contending that the land in dispute was

agricultural land. Further, it was stated that the appellant-plaintiff was not party to

the sale deed, and therefore, the learned trial court has committed an illegality in

deciding the issues against the plaintiff and in directing the plaintiff to pay ad

valorem court fee on the market value of the land. It was also submitted that as the

land in dispute was agricultural land, the petitioner was obliged to pay the court fee

on the revenue payable as fixed by the state government in view of Section 7(iv-A)

of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

5. The High Court, by the impugned judgment, after hearing counsel for the

parties, accepted the respondent/defendants’ contentions that the circle rate fixed by

the collector to charge stamp duty took into account the actual market value of the

property situated in the area. It was held that fixation of circle rate by the collector

is the proper mode for fixation or determination of the market value (for purposes

of payment of court fees), unless an aggrieved person challenges that the circle rate

fixed by the Collector is not the correct market value of the property.

6. Mr. P.N. Mishra, learned senior counsel, argued that the land in dispute is

revenue payable land. Accordingly, the suits were correctly valued at 30 times of

the revenue fixed by the state. It was urged that being a stranger to the sale deed in

question, the plaintiff had to pay 1/5th on the market value as assessed, i.e. on 30

times the revenue. It was urged that the market value in the sale deed was

mentioned at ₹11,79,09,000/- and ₹ 7,20,36,000/- respectively as the market value

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assessed in view of the circle rate fixed by the collector, which was not the correct

market value. Counsel relied on a textual interpretation of Section 7(iv-A) of the

Court Fees Act. Reliance was placed on Shailendra Bhardwaj v. Chandra Pal &

Anr., (2013) 1 SCC 579 to say that the circle rate fixed by the collector for charging

stamp duty is not the correct market value of the property for the purpose of court

fees. Therefore, the market value mentioned in the sale deed in order to pay the

stamp duty, i.e. ₹ 11,79,09,000/- and ₹ 7,20,36,000/- respectively, is not the correct

market value of the property in dispute. Mr. Mishra also argued that the suits were

properly valued and the proper court fee was paid. The courts below, according to

him, erred in holding that the suits were under-valued by the plaintiff and that the

court fee paid was insufficient.

7. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent

defendants, resisted the present proceedings. He urged that this court should desist

from interfering with the concurrent findings of the courts below, under Article 226

of the Constitution of India. It was also submitted by him that the circle rate fixed

by the collector for charging stamp duty was so fixed in terms of the actual market

value of the property situated in the area. It is argued that the fixation of circle rate

by the collector is the correct mode for fixation of market value, unless an

aggrieved person challenges that the circle rate fixed by the collector is incorrect. It

is submitted that the appellants, in an arbitrary manner, valued the market value of

the suit property for payment of court fee and jurisdiction of the court.

8. In the impugned judgment, the High Court reasoned as follows:

“19. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners

that to ascertain the market value and for the purpose of

payment of court fee and jurisdiction of the court, should be

considered from plaint averments alone and what has been

stated in the written statement is not relevant is acceptable to

the extent that what has been contended in the written

statement is not relevant, but the court has to consider while

determining the market value for the purpose of court fee and

jurisdiction of the court, the court has to consider the

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averments of plaint, whether the suit has been valued for the

purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as per the relief claimed

and in accordance with the provisions contained in the Court

fee and Suit Valuation Act. The court is not supposed to accept

the plain averment in regard to the payment of court fee and

jurisdiction as contended by the plaintiff. On a perusal of the

plaint averments and the provisions contained in Section 7(ivA), this Court is of the view that at one place the plaintiff has

valued the suit for cancellation of sale deed and for the purpose

of payment of court fee and jurisdiction Rs. 2,00,00,000/- and

immediately thereafter at thirty times of the revenue payable

i.e. Rs. 3,000/- and paid the court fee on 1/5 of the valuation of

Rs. 3,000/-.

20. It is nowhere stated in the plaint that how the plaintiff has

valued the market value of the property in question at Rs.

2,00,00,000/- whereof as per the circle rate fixed by the

Collector, the market value of the property in dispute is Rs.

11,00,00,000/-. The stamp duty has been paid on an amount of

Rs. 2,00,00,000/- sale consideration but in view of the

provisions contained in Section 7(iv-A) of the Act the sale

consideration is not the relevant factor for the purpose of

payment of court fee and jurisdiction of the court. It is only the

market value of the suit property the court fee is to be paid and

jurisdiction of the court be fixed. The plaintiff cannot take two

contradictory market value in his plaint, as in one place he has

fixed the market value of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- and the jurisdiction

of hearing the suit for valuation of Rs. 1,00,000/- vests in Civil

Judge (Sr. Div.), whereof a suit valued for an amount of Rs.

3,000/- for the purpose of payment of court fee and jurisdiction,

the jurisdiction to try the suit of the valuation of Rs. 3,000/-

vests in the court of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.).

21. Section 15 the Code of Civil Procedure provides that every

suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade

competent to try it. Section 15 of CPC is quoted hereunder:

"15. Court in which suits to be instituted.- Every suit shall be

instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it."

22. Assuming that the market value of the suit property is Rs.

3,000/-, as per the averment of the plaint, then the suits could

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not have been filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.). If it is

a valuation of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- as per the plaint averment for

the purpose of payment of court fee and jurisdiction and the

suits have been instituted in the competent court of jurisdiction,

then there is no basis of it that the market value of the suit is

Rs. 2,00,00,000/-. The submission of learned counsel for the

petitioners that circle rate is not the correct mode to ascertain

the market value has some force, but it is not the absolute

proposition. In some cases, the market value may be higher or

lower then the circle rate but to ascertain the market value, the

party assailing the market value as fixed in the circle rate has

to prove that the circle rate has not been fixed on the real

market value. Unless otherwise market value is proved on

higher or lower side, the market value assessed on the basis of

circle rate cannot be said improper/incorrect market value.

23. A perusal of the impugned order would show that the trial

court having considered the market value as mentioned in the

sale deed has found the correct market value of the suit

property and held that the suits have not been valued properly.

Thus, I am of the considered view that since no other market

value has been proved by the petitioners/plaintiff that the

settled revenue of the land is Rs. 3,000/- and in absence of any

evidence in this regard, the trial court has rightly considered

the market value of the property in dispute in accordance with

the market value fixed by the Collector in order to charge the

stamp duty, which is the correct market value.

24. So far the findings recorded by the trial court that the

petitioners/plaintiff is required to pay the ad valoram court fee

on the market value is incorrect in view of the provisions

contained in Sub Section (2) of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fee

Act. Since the petitioners/plaintiff or its predecessor-in-interest

is not the party to the instrument, therefore, the

petitioners/plaintiff is obliged to pay 1/5 of the value of the

subject matter as mentioned in the instrument involved in the

suit.

25. In view of the findings recorded above, I am of the

considered view that the trial court has rightly held that O.S.

no. 24 of 2013 and O.S. 25 of 2015 have been undervalued and

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court fee paid is insufficient and in fixation of market value as

mentioned in the sale deed Rs. 11,79,09,000/- (in O.S. no. 24 of

2013) and Rs. 7,20,36,000/- (in O.S. no. 25 of 2013) is correct,

whereof the finding in regard to the payment of ad valorem

court free are illegal and is liable to set aside. Thus, the

judgment and order passed by the trial court on issue nos. 8

and 9 are modified to the extent that the plaintiff shall value the

suit no. 24 of 2013 at the rate of Rs. 11,79,09,000-and O.S. no.

25 of 2013 at the rate of Rs. 7,20,36,000/- respectively, and

shall pay the court fee on 1/5 of the aforesaid value thereon. So

far Relief 'B' and 'C' are concerned, the petitioners have paid

the fixed court fee. The petitioners shall pay the remaining

court fee within two months from today, on payment of

remaining court fee the trial court shall proceed to decide both

the suits in accordance with law.”

9. For a proper appreciation of the issue, it would be essential to extract the

relevant provisions of law. Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Court Fees Act, 1870 reads

as follows:

“7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits- The amount

of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter

mentioned shall be computed as follows: -

XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX

For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decrees.

(iv-A) In suit for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void

or voidable decree for money or other property having a

market value, or an instrument securing money or other

property having such value:

(1) where the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title was a party to

the decree or the instrument, according to the value of the

subject-matter, and

(2) where he or his predecessor-in-title was not a party to the

decree or instrument, according to one-fifth of the value of the

subject matter, and such value shall be deemed to beif the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the

amount for which or value of the property in respect of which

the decree is passed or the instrument executed, and if only a

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part of the decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the

amount or value of the property to which such part relates.

Explanation - ‘The value of the property’ for the purposes of

this sub-section, shall be the market-value, which in the case of

immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as

computed in accordance with the sub-section (v), (v-A) or (v-B)

as the case may be.

For easement.- (iv-B) In suits – (a) for a right to some benefit

(not herein otherwise provided for) to arise out of land;

For an injunction – (b) to obtain an injunction:

To establish an adoption – (c) to establish an adoption or to

obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is valid;

To set aside an adoption- (d) to set aside an adoption or to

obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid or

never, in fact, took place;

To set aside an award other than awards mentioned in Section

8. - (e) to set aside an award not being an award mentioned in

Section 8;

according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in

the plaint:

[Provided that such amount shall not be less than one fifth of

the market value of the property involved in or effected by the

relief sought or Rs.200 whichever is greater:

Provided further that in the case of suits falling under clauses

(a) and (b), the amount of court fee leviable shall in no case

exceed Rs.500].

Explanation 1.- When the relief sought is with reference to any

immovable property the market value of such property shall be

deemed to be the value computed in accordance with subsection (v), (v-A) or (v-B) of this section, as the case may be.

Explanation 2 – In the case of suits-

(i) falling under clauses (a) and (b), the property which is

affected by the relief sought, and where properties of both the

plaintiff and defendant are affected, the property of the plaintiff

so affected;

(ii) falling under clauses (c) and (d), the property to which title

by succession or otherwise may be diverted or affected by the

alleged adoption; and

(iii) falling under clause (e), the property which forms the

subject-matter of the award;

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shall be deemed to be the property involved in or affected by

the relief sought within the meaning of the proviso to this subsection.

For restitution of conjugal rights – (iv-C) in suits – (a) for the

restitution of conjugal rights;

For marital rights – (b) for establishing or annulling or

dissolving a marriage;

For guardianship – (c) for establishing a right to the custody or

guardianship of any person such as a minor, including

guardianship for the purpose of marriage.

according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in

the plaint, but in no case shall such amount be less than

Rs.200.

For possession of lands, buildings or gardens – (v) in suits for

the possession of land, buildings or gardensaccording to the value of the subject matter; and such value

shall be deemed to be-

(I) where the subject-matter is land, and

(a) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite

share of an estate, paying annual revenue to

Government, or forms part of such an estate and is

recorded in the Collector's register as separately

assessed with such revenue; and such revenue is

permanently settled—ten times the revenue so

payable;

(b) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite

share of an estate, paying annual revenue to

Government, or forms part of such estate and is

recorded as aforesaid and such revenue is settled, but

not permanently—

ten times the revenue so payable;

(c) where the land pays no such revenue, or has been

partially exempted from such payment, or is charged

with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue, and

net profits have arisen from the land during the year

next before the date of presenting the plaint—

twenty times the annual average of such net profits;

but when no such net profits have arisen therefrom

the market value which shall be determined by

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multiplying by twenty the annual average net profits

of similar land for the three years immediately

preceding the date of presenting the plaint;

(d) where the land forms part of an estate paying

revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of

such estate and does not come under clause (a), (b)

or (c) abovethe market value of the land which shall be

determined by multiplying by fifteen the rental value

of the land, including assumed rent on proprietary

cultivation, if any;

(II) where the subject matter is a building or gardenExplanation.—The word “estate”, as used in this

sub-section, means any land subject to the payment

of revenue, for which the proprietor or a farmer or

raiyat shall have executed a separate engagement to

Government, or which, in the absence of such

engagement, shall have been separately assessed

with revenue;

For possession of superior proprietary and under-proprietary

land – (v-A) In suits for possession -

(1) of superior proprietary rights where under-proprietary or

sub-proprietary rights exist in the landaccording to the market value of the subject matter, and such

value shall be determined by multiplying by fifteen the annual

net profits of the superior proprietor;

(2) of under proprietary or sub-proprietary land as such -

according to the value of the subject matter, and such value

shall be determined by multiplying by ten the annual underproprietary or sub-proprietary rent, as the case may be,

recorded in the Collector’s register as payable for the land for

the year next before the presentation of the plaint.

If no such rent is recorded in the collector’s register the value

shall be determined in the manner laid down in clause (c) of

sub-section (v) of this section save that the multiple will be ten.

Explanation – Land held by any permanent lessees shall be

treated for the purposes of this sub-section, as underproprietary or sub-proprietary land.

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Possessory suit between tenants – (v-B) In suits for possession

of land between rival tenants and by tenants against trespasser

according to the value of the subject-matter and such value shall

be determined if such land is the land of-

(a) a permanent tenure-older or a fixed rate tenant – by

multiplying by twenty the annual rent recorded in the Collector’s

register as payable for the land for the year next before the

presentation of the plaint;

(b) an ex-proprietary or occupancy tenant – by multiplying by

two such rent in case of suits for possession of land between

rival tenants, and by annual rent in suits by tenants against

trespassers;

(c) any other tenant – by annual rent.

If no such rent is recorded in the Collector’s register, the value

shall be determined in the manner laid down in clause (c) of

sub-section (v) of this section save that the multiple shall be that

entered in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of this sub-section according

as the class of tenancy affected is governed by clauses (a), (b) or

(c) of this sub-section.”

10. In OS No. 24/2013, the averment with respect to suit valuation and court fee

was as follows:

"15. That the valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fee

and jurisdiction is as under: -

(a) Relief "A" is for cancellation of sale deed.

The relief "A" is valued for the purpose of court fee and

jurisdiction at Rs.2,00,00,000/- Hence, relief "A" is valued for

the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction at 30 times of the land

revenue, i.e., Rs.3,000/-. The plaintiff was not a party to the

sale deed, hence the court fee of 1/5 of Rs.3,000/- is being paid.

(b) For Relief "B" - Rs.5,00,000/-, on which the prescribed

court fee has been paid.

(c) For Relief "C" -Rs.5,00,000/-, on which the prescribed

court fee has been paid."

In O.S. No. 25 of 2013, the averment with respect to valuation for purposes

of court fees, is as below:

11

"15. That the valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fee

and jurisdiction is as under: -

(a) Relief "A" is for cancellation of sale deed.

The relief "A" is valued for the purpose of court fee and

jurisdiction at Rs.1,00,00,000/- Hence, relief "A" is valued for

the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction at 30 times of the

land revenue, i.e., Rs.3,000/-. The plaintiff was not a party to

the sale deed, hence the court fee of 1/5 of Rs.3,000/- is being

paid.

(b) For Relief "B" - Rs.5,00,000/-, on which the prescribed

court fee has been paid.

(c) For Relief "C" -Rs.5,00,000/-, on which the prescribed

court fee has been paid."

11. The reliefs sought in each case were:

(i) for a decree for declaration that the sale deed dated 08.03.2013

executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 3 (suit no. 24 of

2013) is void and not binding on the plaintiff and a decree of

cancellation thereof;

(ii) for a decree for declaration that the sale deed dated 08.03.2013

executed by defendant nos. 1 and 2 in favour of defendant no. 3 (suit

no. 25 of 2013), is void and not binding on the plaintiff and a decree of

cancellation thereof;

(iii) a decree for permanent injunction restraining defendant nos. 1 to

3, their agents, employees, representatives etc. from interfering in any

way with the property more fully described in the schedule of the

plaint, till the disposal of the suit (in both suits); and

(iv) a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant no. 3, his

agents, employees, representatives etc. from in any way transferring,

alienating or creating third party interest in the property more fully

described in the schedule of the plaint till the disposal of the suit (in

both suits).

12. In Suhrid Singh alias Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh & Ors. (2010) 12 SCC

112, this court noted that the trial court ruled that the claims relating to the sale

deeds amounted to seeking cancellation of the sale deeds and therefore, ad valorem

12

court fee was payable on the sale consideration in respect of the sale deeds. The

said view was affirmed in the revision. The court addressed the issue of court fee

payable in regard to the claim for a declaration that the sale deeds were void and not

"binding on the coparcenary", and for the consequential relief of joint possession

and injunction. After referring to the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as

amended in Punjab (as the controversy arose from the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana), the Court held:

“Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has

to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks

annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed

is invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him.

The difference between a prayer for cancellation and

declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be

brought out by the following illustration relating to A and B,

two brothers. A executes a sale deed in favour of C.

Subsequently A wants to avoid the sale. A has to sue for

cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B, who is not the

executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a

declaration that the deed executed by A is invalid/void and non

est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be

suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding.

But the form is different and court fee is also different. If A, the

executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to

pay ad valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale

deed. If B, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for

a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind

him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs.

19.50 Under Article 17(iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act.

But if B, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not

only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the

consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad valorem

court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act.

Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree

with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed

according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in

the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the

13

suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with

reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than

the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for

by Clause (v) of Section 7.”

13. In Shailendra Bhardwaj & Ors. v. Chandra Pal & Anr. (supra), this court had

to consider whether a suit for declaration that a will and a sale deed are void

resulting in their cancellation, fell under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act,

1870 as amended by the U.P. Amendment Act (Act 19 of 1938) or Article 17(iii) of

Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, 1870 for the purpose of valuation. The trial court

had held that the court fee had to be paid under Section 7(iv-A) and the High Court

affirmed that view. This court noted the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as

amended by the U.P. Amendment Act (Act 19 of 1938) and held as follows:

“On comparing the above mentioned provisions, it is clear that

Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act is applicable

in cases where the Plaintiff seeks to obtain a declaratory decree

without any consequential relief and there is no other provision

under the Act for payment of fee relating to relief claimed.

Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act makes it

clear that this Article is applicable in cases where the Plaintiff

seeks to obtain a declaratory decree without consequential

reliefs and there is no other provision under the Act for payment

of fee relating to relief claimed. If there is no other provision

under the Court Fees Act in case of a suit involving cancellation

or adjudging/declaring void or voidable a will or sale deed on

the question of payment of court fees, then Article 17(iii) of

Schedule II shall be applicable. But if such relief is covered by

any other provisions of the Court Fees Act, then Article 17(iii)

of Schedule II will not be applicable. On a comparison between

the Court Fees Act and the U.P. Amendment Act, it is clear that

Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act covers suits for or

involving cancellation or adjudging/declaring null and void

decree for money or an instrument securing money or other

property having such value.”

14

14. The Court observed that the suit was filed after the death of the testator, and

that the suit property covered by the will had to be valued. The court felt that since

Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act specifically provided that payment of

court fees in cases where the suit is for, or involving cancellation or

adjudging/declaring null and void a decree for money or an instrument, Article

17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act was inapplicable. The U.P. Amendment

Act, therefore, was applicable despite the fact that no consequential relief had been

claimed. Consequently, in terms of Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act,

court fees were to be computed according to the value of the subject-matter. The

trial court and the High Court correctly held it to be so. The court distinguished

Suhrid Singh's case (supra) stating that:

“10. We are of the view that the decision of this Court in Suhrid

Singh (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

First of all, this Court had no occasion to examine the scope of

the U.P. Amendment Act. That was a case in which this Court

was dealing with Sections 7(iv)(c), (v) and Schedule II Article

17(iii), as amended in the State of Punjab. The position that we

get in the State of Punjab is entirely different from the State of

U.P. and the effect of the U.P. Amendment Act was not an issue

which arose for consideration in that case. Consequently, in our

view, the said judgment would not apply to the present case.

11. The Plaintiff, in the instant case, valued the suit at Rs. 30

lakhs for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction. However, for the

purpose of court fee, the Plaintiff paid a fixed court fee of Rs.

200 Under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act.

The Plaintiff had not noticed the fact that the above mentioned

Article stood amended by the State, by adding the words "not

otherwise provided for by this Act". Since Section 7(iv-A) of the

U.P. Amended Act specifically provides for payment of court fee

in case where the suit is for or involving cancellation or

adjudging/declaring void or voidable an instrument securing

property having money value, Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the

Court Fees Act shall not be applicable.”

15

15. It is evident from the above discussion that it is undisputed that the point in

issue was with respect to valuation for purposes of court fee; equally, it is not in

issue that since the plaintiff (i.e. petitioner herein) sought, in addition to a

declaration, in both the suits, decrees of cancellation, the crucial point was what the

correct value for purposes of court fee was. Now, market value has been

specifically defined, in the context of a litigation like the present one. According to

Section 7 (iv-A), in case the plaintiff (or his predecessor-in-title) was not a party to

the decree or instrument, the value was to be according to one-fifth of the value of

the subject matter, “and such value shall be deemed to be” under Section 7 (iv-A),

“if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or

value of the property in respect of which the decree is passed or the instrument

executed”. Importantly, the explanation to Section 7 (iv-A) created a deeming

fiction as to what constitutes the “value of the property” by saying that “in the case

of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance

with the sub-section (v), (v-A) or (v-B) as the case may be.”

16. The plaintiff/petitioners’ contention was and continues to be that the value

determinable is in terms of clause (v) of Section 7, by reason of Section 7 (iv-A).

Section 7 (v) (i) contains two clauses- (a) and (b): both are in respect of revenue

paying lands. The petitioner valued its suits on the basis of revenue which

according to it, was payable. While so stating, the value (for purposes of court fee)

was determined to be ₹ 3000/- in each of the suits.

17. A plain reading of the impugned judgment reveals that what weighed heavily

with the High Court was the fact that the plaintiff valued the suits differently for the

purposes of court fees and jurisdiction, and secondly that:

“no other market value has been proved by the

petitioners/plaintiff that the settled revenue of the land is Rs.

3,000/- and in the absence of any evidence in this regard, the

trial court has rightly considered the market value of the

property in dispute in accordance with the market value fixed by

the Collector in order to charge the stamp duty, which is the

correct market value.”

16

In the opinion of this court, there was no compulsion for the plaintiff to, at

the stage of filing the suit, prove or establish the claim that the suit lands were

revenue paying and the details of such revenue paid. Once it is conceded that the

value of the land [per explanation to Section 7 (iv-A)] is to be determined according

to either sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of the Act, this meant that the concept of

“market value” – a wider concept in other contexts, was deemed to be referrable to

one or other modes of determining the value under sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of

Section 7 (iv-A). This aspect was lost sight of by the High Court, in the facts of this

case. The reasoning and conclusions of the High Court, are therefore, not

sustainable.

18. In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgment and order, and that

of the trial court, cannot stand. Consequently, the question of what is the market

value, based on the revenue payable, would be an issue to be tried in the suit.

Resultantly, the appeals succeed and are allowed without any order on costs.

.…....................…….....................J.

 [ARUN MISHRA]

.…....................…….....................J.

 [M. R. SHAH]

..……….......................................J.

 [S. RAVINDRA BHAT]

New Delhi,

February 19, 2020.

Wednesday, February 10, 2021

whether there are any material on record to determine the computation of yield and benefits arising of the land, both the counsel have very candidly admitted that there are no material on the record to determine the benefits arising out of the land during the period the respondents were deprived the enjoyment of the possession. As noted above, the litigation with regard to said land has 15 continued for at-least for last 45 years and we are of the view that in the facts of the present case, the parties need not to be relegated to any other Forum for determination of compensation with regard to benefits of the land to which they were entitled during the period they were deprived of the possession. 14. We are of the view that the ends of justice be met by allowing the claim of compensation to the respondents to the extent of 50% of value of the land as computed by Tehsildar and noted in the judgment of learned Single Judge. We, thus, determine the compensation to be paid to the respondents @50% of the value computed by the Tehsildar as the value of the land which would be payable to the respondents. The judgment of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court is modified to the above extent. We direct that 50% of compensation as directed by learned Single Judge in its judgment dated 19.01.2007 shall be paid to the respondents within a period of three months from 16 today failing which the respondents shall be entitled to receive the payment with interest @7% p.a. The appeal is partly allowed to the above extent. Parties shall bear their own costs.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO._414 of 2021

(arising out of SLP(C)Nos.27651 of 2008)

THE CONSERVATOR AND

CUSTODIAN OF FOREST & ORS. ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SOBHA JOHN KOSHY & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

 ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been filed by the Conservator and

Custodian of Forest and other appellants challenging

the judgment of the Division Bench of Kerala High

Court dated 05.06.2008 dismissing the writ appeal

filed by the appellants. Writ Appeal was filed by

the appellants questioning the judgment of the

learned Single Judge dated 19.01.2007 allowing the

writ petition filed by the respondents directing the

respondents, appellants herein, to pay to the writ

1

petitioners compensation for the land directed to be

restored to them by the earlier judgment of the High

Court.

3. Brief facts of the case giving rise to this

appeal are:-

3.1 The land which is subject matter of this

appeal alongwith other land situate at Pannu

Valley in Wayanad, State of Kerala was said

to be vested in the Government under the

Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and

Assignment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred

to as “Act, 1971”). The respondents with

their predecessor-in-interest filed

application in the Forest Tribunal under

Section 8 of the Act, 1971 for declaration

that the lands were not vested forest.

3.2 The Forest Tribunal rejected the claim,

against which matter was taken to the High

Court, the High Court remanded the matter to

the Tribunal for fresh determination. After

prolong litigation, ultimately by Division

2

Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court dated

10.02.1998, the MFA filed by the respondents

was allowed by the High Court and it was

declared that land in questions are exempted

from provisions of Act, 1971. The High Court

also held that writ petitioners proved

cultivation and that the area was cultivated

with plantation and crop. The judgment of

the Forest Tribunal was set aside declaring

that land not vested in the Government on the

appointed date under Act, 1971.

3.3 After the above judgment of the High Court,

it was incumbent upon the custodian to

restore back the possession of the land.

Restoration of several other pockets of land

which were subject matter of MFA No.934 of

1990 before the High Court were done to the

owners, but the land, which were subject

matter of O.A. No.67 of 1995 and O.A. No. 68

of 1995 could not be restored due to one or

other reasons.

3.4 On part of land, Adivasis were in possession,

who could not be dispossessed by the State.

3

For certain period, there was interim order

operating in favour of the Adivasis against

their dispossession of the land. There were

correspondences between respondents as well

as State Forest Officer regarding restoration

of land. A proposal was submitted by the

Divisional Forest Officer to allot

alternative land to the respondents, which

could not be materialised. Divisional Forest

Officer recommended that instead of

restoration of the land, compensation be paid

to the land owners whose land could not be

restored, the respondent expressed their

agreement to receive compensation.

3.5 A Writ Petition No. 3340 of 2004 was filed by

the respondents in Kerala High Court. In the

writ petition, it was submitted that land in

question was valued by Tehsildar Mananthavady

recommending value of land involved in O.A.

No.67 as Rs.1,000/- per cent and the land

involved in O.A. No.68 as Rs.800/- per cent.

In the writ petition, writ petitioners prayed

4

that either they may be restored the original

land or they may be paid compensation as

assessed by the District Tehsildar. The

learned Single Judge allowed the writ

petition. In paragraph 6 of the judgment,

following was held by the High Court:-

“6. ......................In view

of these developments, I am of

opinion that in so far as the

respondents are not able to

restore the land in compliance

with the judgment of this Court,

the petitioners are certainly

entitled to compensation for the

land, which is to be restored to

them. Now that the Tahsildar has

assessed the value of the land

which, according to him, is very

reasonable compared to the market

value of the land in the area, I

am of opinion that the petitioners

should be paid compensation for

their land at the rate assessed by

the Tahsildar as per Ext. P10.

Accordingly, there would be a

direction to the respondents to

pay to the petitioners

compensation for the land directed

to be restored to them as per Ext.

P1 judgment of this Court in

respect of the lands covered by

O.A.Nos. 67 and 68 of 1975 at the

rates assessed by the Tahsildar as

per Ext. P10. Amounts calculated

as above shall be disbursed to the

respective petitioners within a

5

period four months from the date

of receipt of a copy of this

judgment. The writ petition is

allowed as above.”

3.6 The Conservator of Forest and other State

authorities aggrieved by the judgment filed a

Writ Appeal No.1757 of 2007 before the

Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. The

writ appeal has been dismissed by the

Division Bench. The Division Bench held that

under Section 8 of Act, 1971, the custodian

had statutory duty to restore the possession

of such land on the basis of the order, which

having not done, the statutory duty is

violated. By holding so, the writ appeal was

dismissed. The Conservator of Forest and

other State respondents have filed this

appeal challenging the judgment of the

Division Bench.

4. Shri Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel

appearing for the appellants submits that under

Section 8(2), all the land in dispute is a ecological

6

fragile land within the meaning of Kerala Forest

(Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile

Lands) Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as “Act,

2003”). It is submitted that notification dated

03.04.2007 has already been issued under Section 3 of

Act, 2003 whereby the said land vested in State for

which no compensation is payable. Learned senior

counsel has referred to Section 8(2) of the Act,

2003, which provides that no compensation shall be

payable for the vesting in Government of any

ecologically fragile land or for the extinguishment

of the right, title and interest of the owner or any

person thereon under sub-section(1) of Section 3.

There being no challenge to the notification dated

12.03.2007 by respondents, no compensation is payable

by the State under Section 8(2). It is submitted

that prior to 2003 enactment, ordinance was

promulgated namely Kerala Forests (Vesting and

Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Ordinance,

2000. It is further submitted that by virtue of

interim order dated 06.12.2000 passed by the High

Court in OP No. 30181 of 2000 filed by Adivasi

7

Vikasana Pravarthaka Samithy, possession cannot be

delivered to the respondents. There being no

challenge to the vesting under Act, 2003, learned

Single Judge could not have been directed for payment

of compensation.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents,

Shri Kuriakose Varghese refuting the submissions of

the learned senior counsel for the appellants

contends that right of possession is a crystallised

right. When it became impossible for the State to

evict Adivasis, who were occupying the land, the

respondents were left with no other option but to

accept the compensation in lieu of their valuable

land. The action of non-restoration of the land by

the State was in the teeth of Section 8(3) of the

Act, 1971. The judgment delivered by learned Single

Judge has rightly recognised the legitimate right of

the respondents. The judgment of the High Court

dated 10.02.1998 in favour of the respondents being

prior in time to Act, 2003, the valid and just

compensation claim of the respondents could be

8

negated. In any event, even if notification dated

19.01.2007 published on 12.03.2007 has been validly

passed, the same cannot alter the respondents’ right

to claim compensation for the land, which could not

be restored by the State. It is further submitted

that Act, 2003 is not applicable in the facts of the

present case. It is submitted that the land in

question does not fall in the definition of

ecologically fragile lands as given in Section 2(b)

(i) of Act, 2003. The land is not a fragile land

rather it was land, which was cultivated with

cardamom and pepper. The land which is under

cultivation would not qualify as forest land and,

therefore, could not have declared as ecologically

fragile land under Section 2(b)(i). The custodian

having violated his duty as entrusted under Section 8

of Act, 1971, there was denial of rightful claim of

the appellant for enjoyment of their property for a

period of 45 years. It is submitted that even the

compensation assessed by Tehsildar which was offered

was also a meagre compensation.

9

6. We have considered the submissions of the learned

counsel for the parties and have perused the records.

7. From the facts noticed above, it is undisputed

that the subject land, which was claimed to be vested

with the Government under Act, 1971 was not

ultimately accepted and Kerala High Court allowed the

objection of the land owners declaring that land is

not covered under the Act, 1971 and has been exempted

from Act, 1971. In paragraph 18 of the judgment,

following was held by the High Court:-

“18. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

...................They have pleaded

and proved that the lands in question are

exempted from the provisions of Act 26 of

1971. They have proved cultivation and

that the area cultivated with plantation

crops cannot be forest. The appellants

have proved positively their case as on

the appointed day.”

8. The order of the Forest Tribunal was set aside.

Result of the judgment of the High Court was that the

respondents were entitled for immediate restoration

of their land. Further, there is no dispute that

land could not be restored to the respondents and

10

some alternative proposals were submitted including

allotment of alternative land at three different

places. Allotment of alternative land was not

possible as was communicated by Forest authorities.

Divisional Forest Officer had informed the

Conservator of Forests that owners suggested that

they are prepared to accept the compensation for the

land. The High Court informed that a communication

has been received from the Tehsildar of the District

Collector, Wayanad where Tehsildar has assessed the

value of the land as Rs. 1000/- per cent covered by

O.A. No. 67 of 1976 and Rs. 800/- per cent of the

land covered by O.A. No.68 of 1975. The learned

Single Judge, thus, allowed the writ petition

directing payment of compensation as per computation

by the Tehsildar.

9. We need now to consider the consequence of

subject land being notified under Act, 2003. Under

Section 2(b), “ecologically fragile lands” has been

defined. As per Section 3, ecologically fragile land

is to vest in the Government. Section 3 is as

11

follows:-

“3. Ecologically fragile land to vest in

Government: - (1) Notwithstanding anything

contained in any other law for the time

being in force, or in any judgment, decree

or order of any Court or Tribunal or in

any custom, contract or other documents,

with effect from the date of commencement

of this Act, the ownership and possession

of all ecologically fragile lands held by

any person or any other form of right over

them, shall stand transferred to and

vested in the Government free from all

encumbrances and the right, title and

interest of the owner or any other person

thereon shall stand extinguished from the

said date.

(2) The lands vested in the Government

under sub-section (1) shall be notified in

the Gazette and the owner shall be

informed in writing by the custodian and

the notification shall be placed before

the Advisory Committee constituted under

section 15 for perusal.”

10. Section 4 further empowers the Government to

declare ecologically fragile land. There is no

dispute in the present case that a notification has

already been issued notifying the subject land as

ecologically fragile land vide notification published

on 12.03.2007. Although, learned counsel for the

respondents contend that subject land is not

12

ecologically fragile land and is not covered by

definition of forest land under Act, 2003 but in view

of the fact that the notification dated 12.03.2007

being not under challenge, we need not dwell on the

question any further. In these proceedings, it has

been submitted by the respondents that neither they

are challenging the validity of vires of Act, 2003

nor they are challenging the notification dated

12.03.2007. We, thus, have no option but to accept

that subject land is ecologically fragile land and is

now vested in the Government.

11. Learned senior counsel for the appellant is also

right in his submission that as per Section 8 of the

Act, 2003 in respect of land, which is vested in the

Government under Section 3(1) of The Act, 2003, no

compensation is payable. The present is a case where

the respondents claim is not based on any

compensation under the Act, 2003. The learned Single

Judge directed for payment of compensation to the

respondents in view of adjudication under Act, 1971

where it was held after prolonged litigation that

13

land is not covered by Act, 1971 and the respondents

are the owner of the land, entitled to restoration of

possession to the respondents. The State being the

custodian having not been able to restore the

possession, two alternatives were suggested by Forest

Officer themselves, first, of allotment of

alternative land and second for payment of

compensation. The valuation of the land was done by

the Tehsildar in the above context.

12. It is also relevant to notice that the learned

Single Judge directed for compensation as an

alternative for not being able to restore the

possession to the respondents. The very same land

having been declared as ecologically fragile land

under Act, 2003, the right and entitlement of the

respondents to the land is lost in view of Section 3

of Act, 2003 as extracted above. But right on land

lost by the respondents under Act, 2003 shall in no

manner wipe out their right to enjoy the possession

and yield of the land during the period prior to 2003

enactment, which right was held to be established by

the High Court vide its judgment dated 10.02.1998 as

14

noticed above. Due to the claim of the State that

subject land vests in the Government under Act, 1971,

the respondents were deprived of the possession and

enjoyment of land. After 1971, they were kept out of

possession of the property and denied the enjoyment

of land. It is just and proper that even if the

respondents are not compensated for the value of the

land, they need to be compensated for the benefits

arisen out of the lands for the period they were kept

out of possession by action of the respondents,

treating it to be vested land under Act, 1971, which

did not find favour by the High Court.

13. On our enquiry from learned counsel for the

parties, as to whether there are any material on

record to determine the computation of yield and

benefits arising of the land, both the counsel have

very candidly admitted that there are no material on

the record to determine the benefits arising out of

the land during the period the respondents were

deprived the enjoyment of the possession. As noted

above, the litigation with regard to said land has

15

continued for at-least for last 45 years and we are

of the view that in the facts of the present case,

the parties need not to be relegated to any other

Forum for determination of compensation with regard

to benefits of the land to which they were entitled

during the period they were deprived of the

possession.

14. We are of the view that the ends of justice be

met by allowing the claim of compensation to the

respondents to the extent of 50% of value of the land

as computed by Tehsildar and noted in the judgment of

learned Single Judge. We, thus, determine the

compensation to be paid to the respondents @50% of

the value computed by the Tehsildar as the value of

the land which would be payable to the respondents.

The judgment of the learned Single Judge and the

Division Bench of the Kerala High Court is modified

to the above extent. We direct that 50% of

compensation as directed by learned Single Judge in

its judgment dated 19.01.2007 shall be paid to the

respondents within a period of three months from

16

today failing which the respondents shall be entitled

to receive the payment with interest @7% p.a. The

appeal is partly allowed to the above extent.

Parties shall bear their own costs.

......................J.

( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.

 ( R. SUBHASH REDDY )

......................J.

 ( M.R. SHAH )

New Delhi,

February 10, 2021.

17

“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 123 of 2021

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1876 of 2018]

M/s. Kalamani Tex & Anr ..... Appellant(s)

                                       VERSUS

P. Balasubramanian ..... Respondent

JUDGEMENT

Surya Kant, J:

Leave Granted.

2. M/s. Kalamani Tex (Appellant No.1) and its managing partner–

B.   Subramanian   (Appellant   No.2)   are   in   appeal   challenging   the

judgment dated 09.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Madras, whereby the order of acquittal of the Judicial Magistrate,

Tiruppur was reversed and the appellants have been convicted under

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, ‘NIA’).

Consequently, Appellant No.2 has been sentenced to undergo three

months Simple Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/­.

Page | 1

Facts

3. The   instant   proceedings   have   originated   out   of   a   complaint

preferred by P. Balasubramanian (Complainant­Respondent) against

the appellants. The respondent is the proprietor of a garment company

named   and   styled   as   ‘Growell   International’,   which   along   with

Appellant No.1 was engaged in a business arrangement, whereby they

agreed   to   jointly   export   garments   to   France.   Certain   issues   arose

regarding delays in shipment and payment from the buyer, due to

which, the appellants had to pay the respondent a sum of Rs 11.20

lakhs.   To   that   end,   Appellant   No.2   issued   a   cheque   on   behalf   of

Appellant No. 1 bearing no.897993 dated 07.11.2000 in favour of the

respondent and also executed a Deed of Undertaking on the same day

wherein Appellant No.2 personally undertook to pay the respondent in

lieu of the initial expenditure incurred by the latter. The respondent

presented the said cheque to the bank on 29.12.2000 for collection

but it was returned with an endorsement that there were insufficient

funds   in   the   account   of   appellants.   In   wake   of   the   cheque   being

dishonoured, the respondent issued a notice dated 08.01.2001 asking

the appellants to pay the amount within 15 days. The appellants in

their reply dated 27.01.2001 denied their liability and claimed that

blank cheques and signed blank stamp papers were issued to help the

respondent in some debt recovery proceedings, and not because of any

Page | 2

legally enforceable debt. 

4. The respondent then lodged a private complaint under section

138 and 142 of the NIA read with Section 200 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure,   1973   (in   short   ‘CrPC’)   before   the   Judicial   Magistrate,

Tiruppur. In order to substantiate his claim, the respondent himself

entered the witness box and produced documentary evidence such as

the cheque issued by Appellant No.2. The respondent in his chiefexamination initially contended that the subject amount had been

received by the appellants from the foreign buyer. However, when

recalled   on   a   later   date,   the   respondent   produced   the   Deed   of

Undertaking dated 07.11.2000, whereunder, the 2nd Appellant had

acknowledged the liability towards respondent. One PS Shanmugham

(PW­2) who was working as Manager in State Bank of India, Tiruppur

Overseas Branch, was also examined by the respondent. 

5. Appellant No.2 in his statement under Section 313 CrPC plainly

denied   the   allegations   and   disputed   the   existence   of   any   liability

towards   the   respondent.   The   appellants   also   examined   one   V.

Rajagopal (DW­1) who at the relevant time was working as Assistant

Manager in State Bank of India, Tiruppur Overseas Branch. DW­1

mainly deposed on the inability of the respondent to pay back the

credit that was advanced to him, and the subsequent debt recovery

proceedings initiated against him. The appellants did not lead any

documentary evidence in their defence. 

Page | 3

6. The trial Court disbelieved the respondent’s claim and observed

that he had failed to establish a legally enforceable liability on the date

of issue of cheque. The Court held that since the basic ingredients of

an   offence   under   Section   138   of   the   NIA   were   not   satisfied,   the

complaint was liable to be dismissed. 

7. Discontented with the order of the trial Court, the respondent

preferred a criminal appeal before the High Court, wherein, the Court

noted that Appellant No.2 had admitted his signatures on both the

Cheque and the Deed of Undertaking and had thus acknowledged the

appellants’ liability. The High Court therefore vide impugned judgment

allowed the criminal appeal and convicted both the appellants under

Section 138 of NIA. Appellant No. 2 was awarded a sentence of three

months simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000/­ (or 20 days

simple imprisonment in lieu thereof). Additionally, Appellant No.1 was

directed to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/­, in default of which, Appellant

No. 2 would undergo another one­month simple imprisonment. 

8. The aggrieved appellants are now before this Court. It may be

mentioned at the outset that when the SLP came up for hearing on

12.03.2018, their learned Counsel agreed to deposit the entire amount

in   dispute   and   in   deference   thereto,   the   appellants   have   on

11.04.2018 deposited a sum of Rs. 11.20 lakhs with the Registry of

this Court.

Page | 4

CONTENTIONS

9. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, nonetheless, desired

to argue the case on merits and contended that there was no legally

enforceable liability on the date of issuance of the cheque and that

blank stamp papers signed by Appellant No.2 were misused by the

respondent   to   forge   the   Deed   of   Undertaking   dated   07.11.2000.

Placing   reliance   on  Murugesan   v.   State   Through   Inspector   of

Police1

, he urged that the view taken by the trial Court was a possible

view, and the High Court committed patent illegality and exceeded its

jurisdiction in reversing the acquittal. Learned Senior Counsel also

cited  Reena  Hazarika  v.  State  of  Assam2

to argue that the High

Court did not take notice of the defence raised by the appellants which

has caused serious prejudice to them. He passionately put forth the

principles laid down in  Basalingappa v. Mudibasapp3

 and  Kumar

Exports  v.  Sharma  Carpets4

, and submitted that the presumption

drawn against an accused under Section 118 and Section 139 of the

NIA is rebuttable through a standard of “preponderance of probability”,

which has been successfully met by the appellants in the present

case. 

10. On   the   other   hand,   learned   Counsel   for   the   respondent

1

(2012) 10 SCC 383, ¶ 32.

2

(2019) 13 SCC 289, ¶ 20.

3

(2019) 5 SCC 418.

4

(2009) 2 SCC 513.

Page | 5

maintained that the decision of the High Court is well reasoned and

founded upon due consideration of all relevant factors of the case.

Laying stress on the undisputed signatures on the cheque and the

Deed   of   Undertaking   dated   07.11.2000,   he   asserted   that   the

appellants have admitted  their existing liability of Rs.11.20 lakhs.

Lastly, while pointing out the financial loss suffered by the respondent

and the adverse impact on his business, learned Counsel prayed for

suitable compensation.

ANALYSIS

11. The short question which falls for our consideration is whether

the High Court erred in reversing the findings of the trial Court in

exercise of its powers under Section 378 of CrPC? 

12. Having   given   our   thoughtful   consideration   to   the   rival

submissions, we do not find any valid ground to interfere with the

impugned judgment. It is true that the High Court would not reverse

an order of acquittal merely on formation of an opinion different than

that of the trial Court. It is also trite in law that the High Court ought

to have compelling reasons to tinker with an order of acquittal and no

such interference would be warranted when there were to be two

possible conclusions.5

  Nonetheless, there are numerous decisions of

this Court, justifying the invocation of powers by the High Court under

Section 378 CrPC, if the trial Court had, inter alia, committed a patent

5 CK Dasegowda and Others v. State of Karnatak, (2014) 13 SCC 119 ¶14.

Page | 6

error of law or grave miscarriage of justice or it arrived at a perverse

finding of fact.6

13. On a similar analogy, the powers of this Court under Article 136

of   the   Constitution   also   do   not   encompass   the   re­appreciation   of

entirety of record merely on the premise that the High Court has

convicted the appellants for the first time in exercise of its appellate

jurisdiction. This Court in Ram Jag v. State of UP7

, Rohtas v. State

of  Haryana8 and  Raveen Kumar v. State  of  Himachal  Pradesh9

,

evolved its own limitations on the exercise of powers under Article 136

of   the   Constitution   and   has   reiterated   that   while   entertaining   an

appeal by way of special leave, there shall not ordinarily be an attempt

to re­appreciate the evidence on record unless the decision(s) under

challenge are shown to have committed a manifest error of law or

procedure or the conclusion reached is ex­facie perverse.  

14. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its

judgment that the trial Court completely overlooked the provisions

and   failed   to   appreciate   the   statutory   presumption   drawn   under

Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once

the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument

are established, then these ‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative. In

6 State of UP v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271,¶ 27; Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., 

(2008) 10 SCC 450, ¶70.

7

(1974) 4 SCC 201, ¶ 14.

8

(2019) 10 SCC 554, ¶ 12.

9 2020 SCC Online SC 869, ¶ 14.

Page | 7

such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge

the   presumption   imposed   upon   him.   This   point   of   law   has   been

crystalized by this Court in  Rohitbhai  Jivanlal  Patel   v.   State   of

Gujarat10 in the following words:

“In   the   case  at   hand,   even   after   purportedly   drawing   the

presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial court

proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the

complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan

to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses

who   allegedly   extended   him   money   for   advancing   it   to   the

accused. This approach of the trial court had been at variance

with   the   principles   of   presumption   in   law.   After   such

presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the

accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such

facts   and   circumstances   as   to   show   the   preponderance   of

probabilities   tilting   in   his   favour,   any   doubt   on   the

complainant's  case   could  not  have   been   raised  for  want  of

evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to

the appellant­accused…..”

15. Once  the 2nd  Appellant had  admitted his signatures on the

cheque and the Deed, the trial Court ought to have presumed that the

cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The

trial   Court   fell   in   error   when   it   called   upon   the   ComplainantRespondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants

were liable to pay. Such approach of the trial Court was directly in the

10 (2019) 18 SCC 106, ¶ 18.

Page | 8

teeth   of   the   established   legal   position   as   discussed   above,   and

amounts to a patent error of law. 

16. No doubt, and as correctly argued by senior counsel for the

appellants, the presumptions raised under Section 118 and Section

139 are rebuttable in nature. As held in  MS  Narayana  Menon   v.

State of Kerela11, which was relied upon in Basalingappa (supra), a

probable defence needs to be raised, which must meet the standard of

“preponderance   of   probability”,   and   not   mere   possibility.   These

principles were also affirmed in the case of Kumar Exports (supra),

wherein   it   was   further   held   that   a   bare   denial   of   passing   of

consideration would not aid the case of accused. 

17. The   appellants   have   banked   upon   the   evidence   of   DW­1   to

dispute the existence of any recoverable debt. However, his deposition

merely highlights that the respondent had an over­extended credit

facility with the bank and his failure to update his account led to debt

recovery proceedings. Such evidence does not disprove the appellants’

liability and has a little bearing on the merits of the respondent’s

complaint.   Similarly,   the   appellants’   mere   bald   denial   regarding

genuineness of the Deed of Undertaking dated 07.11.2000, despite

admitting the signatures of Appellant No. 2 thereupon, does not cast

any doubt on the genuineness of the said document. 

18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face

11 (2006) 6 SCC 39, ¶ 32.

Page | 9

value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were

given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be

obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar12, where

this court held that:

“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over

by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract

presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments

Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the

cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”

19. Considering the fact that there has been an admitted business

relationship   between   the   parties,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   the

defence raised by the appellants does not inspire confidence or meet

the standard of ‘preponderance of probability’. In the absence of any

other relevant material, it appears to us that the High Court did not

err   in   discarding   the   appellants’   defence   and   upholding   the   onus

imposed upon them in terms of Section 118 and Section 139 of the

NIA.

20. As regard to the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the

respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object

of Chapter XVII of the NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory

and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for

criminal liability for dishonour of cheque as well as civil liability for

realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there

12 (2019) 4 SCC 197, ¶ 36.

Page | 10

needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation

and   unless   there   exist   special   circumstances,   the   Courts   should

uniformly levy fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple

interest at the rate of 9% per annum.13

21. The   respondent,   nevertheless,   cannot   take   advantage   of   the

above   cited   principles   so   as   to   seek   compensation.   The   record

indicates that neither did the respondent ask for compensation before

the   High  Court  nor has   he   chosen   to  challenge   the  High   Court’s

judgment. Since, he has accepted the High Court’s verdict, his claim

for compensation stands impliedly overturned. The respondent, in any

case, is entitled to receive the cheque amount of Rs.11.20 lakhs which

the appellant has already deposited with the Registry of this Court. 

CONCLUSION:

22. For the reasons stated above, the present appeal is liable to be

dismissed. We order accordingly. Ordinarily and as a necessary sequel

thereto, Appellant No.2 would be liable to undergo the sentence of

simple imprisonment as awarded by the High Court. However, given

the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, namely, that the

appellants   volunteered   and   thereafter   have   deposited   the   cheque

amount with the Registry of this Court in the year 2018, we are

inclined to take a lenient view. The impugned judgment of the High

Court   dated   09­11­2017   is   thus   modified,   and   it   is   directed   that

13 R. Vijian v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260 ¶20.

Page | 11

Appellant No.2 shall not be required to undergo the awarded sentence.

The   registry   of   this   Court   is   directed   to   transfer   the   amount   of

Rs.11.20   lakhs   along   with   interest   accrued   thereupon   to   the

respondent within two weeks.

………………………….. J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

………..………………… J.

(SURYA KANT)

…………………………...J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

NEW DELHI

DATED :10.02.2021

Page | 12

seaman’s Claim for disability compensation= Dilated Cardiomyopathy condition would not facilitate any benefit to the appellant under Section 47 of the Disability Act.

[REPORTABLE]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.150 OF 2021

NAWAL KISHORE SHARMA APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Hrishikesh Roy, J.

1. The appellant challenges the judgement dated

26.03.2019 in the Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case

No.3160/2012, whereunder, the High Court of

Judicature at Patna had rejected the seaman’s Claim

for disability compensation[under clause 21 of the

National Maritime Board Agreement (hereinafter

referred to as “the Agreement”)] and thereby

endorsed the order dated 07.10.2011 (Annexure P21)

of the Shipping Corporation of India (hereinafter

1

referred to as the ‘SCI’ for short).According to

the SCI, the appellant’s was not a case of

accidental injury during duty on the vessel and

therefore,only severance compensation is payable to

the appellant. This is because the Seaman is

capable of performing other kinds of job and his

day-to-day normal work is not affected.

2. The appellant was earlier registered in the

SCI’s offshore fleet service but at the relevant

time he was released at his own request with effect

from 19.08.1996 and transferred to the SCI’s

foreign going seaman’s roster, with fresh

registration. Those in seaman’s roster category,

are engaged oncontract,specific for the sea going

vessel. The appellant joined as a crew on the

foreign going vessel on 18.09.2009 and he was

discharged on 18.06.2010 with the declaration of

being permanently unfit for sea service, due to

Dilated Cardiomyopathy.

2

3. On the above facts, Mr. V. Chidambresh, the

learned Senior Counsel argues that seaman is

entitled to100% disability compensation under

Clause 21 of the Agreement. According to the Senior

Counsel, Dilated Cardiomyopathy or heart’s reduced

blood pumping capacity, should be understood as an

internal injury covered by Clause 5.9.F (ii) of the

Agreement which speaks of “A rating on being

medically unfit for sea service at seas as a

result of injurywhilst in employment”.The term

“injury”,according to the counsel should cover

anything impairing the health of the appellant. Mr.

Chidambresh argues that injury need not be

manifested externally or blood oozing kind but

should alsocoveran impaired heart. The appellant’s

counsel relies on anarticle on Marine Safety, by

Mr.Dilipan Thomas and also the writings of

Mr.Markas Ollie Barker to argue that cardio

vascular disease is one of theseveral occupational

diseases about which, the seafarers have been

cautioned by the authors. The failure by the SCI to

accommodate the seaman in an alternative

3

job(suitable for the appellant’s medical condition)

is next contended to be in contravention of Section

47 of the Personswith Disabilities (Equal

Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full

Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to

as“the Disability Act”).

4. Mr. Shiv Kumar Suri, the learned counsel for

the SCI per contra contends that the seaman never

suffered any accidental injury during the sea

voyage on the vessel and since the disability

compensation is restricted only to cases of

incapacitation resulting from injury during the

voyage, the claim for disability compensation was

rightly rejected by the High Court and the SCI

authority. Mr. Suri highlights that the Claimant’s

heart condition does not fall within the contours

of an “injury” for the purpose of Clause 5.9.F

(ii). It is, therefore, argued that the appellant

is covered by Clause 25, which applies to cases of

persons declared medically unfit for sea service

4

instead of Clause 21, which is triggered in cases

of 100% disability suffered during and in course of

employment. According to the SCI’s counsel, a

person may be unfit for Seaman’s duty but may be

100% fit for doing another job of general nature.

Refuting the appellant’s argument on the footing of

the Disability Act, Mr. Suri argues that Dilated

Cardiomyopathy is nowhere mentioned in the

Disability Act and therefore an alternatejob,

suitable for the seaman’s medical condition, cannot

be claimed under the Act. Adverting to the

temporary nature of the appellant’s engagement as a

freelance seafarer and his contractual engagement

for about 9 months (from 29.09.2009 to 18.06.2010),

the SCI counsel contends that the short stint on

the vessel cannot reasonably be the basis for the

impaired heart function, particularly when, no

injury was suffered during the sea voyage.The

medical condition of the appellant is attributed by

the counsel to excessive liquor consumption and the

same has nothing to do with the seaman’s work on

the vessel.

5

5. In his turn, Mr. Viramjit Banerjee, the

learned ASG contends that there is no causal

connection between the Claimant’s medical condition

with the nature of his employment in the sea going

vessel. The Counsel submits that unless proximate

connection between the seaman’s work on the vessel

and his medical condition is established,

disability compensation cannot be allowed.

6. While rejecting the claim for disability

compensation, the SCI recorded in the impugned

order dated 07.10.2011 (Annexure P21) that this was

not a case of a seaman becoming incapacitated on

account of an accidental injury suffered on the

vessel. Since, the relevant Clause 5.9. F(ii)

specifically speaks of being medically unfit as a

result of injury while in employment and the claim

was not based on injury, the disability

compensation was held to be unmerited.

6

7. The High Court while considering the challenge

to the SCI’s rejection order, considered the

literature relied upon by the appellant.The learned

Judge while appreciating that reduced blood pumping

capacity of the heart could be one of the

occupational diseasesof the seafarer, the

disability compensation is not merited unless 100%

incapacity is found in course of employment on the

vessel. Here however, there is nothing to show that

the seaman was not fit for another job of general

nature.The High Court interpreted both Clause 21

and Clause 25 and found that the appellant’s

casedoes not fall in the category of Clause 21

since there is no impediment inhis performance of

normal day to day affairs. In other words,the seafaring work may not be feasible but the person is

capable of discharging duty of another job of

general nature. The High Court,therefore, found no

basis to overturn the SCI’s rejection of the claim

for Disability compensation.

7

8. It would be appropriate at this stage to

extract Clause 5.9.F (ii) of the Agreement

providing for 100% disability compensation. The

same reads as under:

“A rating on being medically unfit for

sea service at seas as a result of

injury whilst in employment shall be

paid 100% compensation”.

9. The above Clause is part of the National

Maritime Board Agreement which governs the parties.

The National Maritime Board Agreement is the

outcome of collective bargaining between Indian

Ship Owners Association and the Seafarers’ Union,

governing the terms and conditions of a seaman.

10. Since, the purport ofClause 21 covering

disability compensation and Clause 25 covering

severance compensation are to be

considered,bothclauses are extractedbelow:-

“21. Death and Disability Compensation:

8

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Death compensation-Rs.12.85 Lacs.

100% disability compensation-Rs.14.85

Lacs.

In case of rating declared partially

incapacitated whilst in employment above

Disability Compensation shall be paid on

proportionate basis. This Death

&Disability Compensation shall not be

paid if the death and/or disability has

resulted due to the rating’s own wilful

act.”

“25. Severance Compensation:

With effect from 01/04/2006, a Rating

borne on a Company’s Roster continuously

for a period of not less than 5 years if

declared permanently medically unfit for

sea service by Company’s Medical

Officer, severance compensation to be

paid to such

Rating as under:

For Ratings below age of 55 years:

@3 months’ Basic Wages per year of

articled service including applicable

leave periods on Company’s vessels and

@1 ½ months’ Basic Wages per year of

prospective service subject to a minimum

compensation of Rs.2,75,000/-.

9

For Ratings between age of 55 to 58

years:

@ 3 months Basic Wages per year of

prospective service subject to 4 months

Basic Wages of Compensation of

Rs.1,75,000/- whichever is higher.

For Ratings above age of 58 years:

@3 months’ Basic Wages per year of

prospective service subject to 4 months

Basic Wages or Compensation of

Rs.1,25,000/- whichever is higher.

The above provision of compensation will

not be applicable to a rating dealt with

under the provisions Death and

Disability Compensation.”

11. As can be seen from above, 100% compensation

is payable to a seaman under Clause 5.9. F (ii) in

a situation where a seaman is found medically unfit

for sea service, as a result of injury, while in

employment. But it is not the case of either side

that the appellant had suffered anyaccidental

injury in course of his engagement in the sea

vessel. The question then is, whether the term

10

“injury”, should be construed in the manner

suggested by the appellant’s counsel as anything

which diminishes the health status of a seaman.

Such broad interpretation in the context of the

specific expression in the agreement would in our

view,efface the intent of the agreement between the

parties. Merely because of the beneficial

objective, the clear expression in the agreement

must not be ignored to give another meaning which

could not have been the intention or the

understanding, of the contracting parties.

12. To secure coverage of Clause 5.9.F (ii), the

incapacity must relate to injury being suffered

whilst in employment.In the present case, the

appellant never claimed to have suffered any injury

during his ship duty. Moreover, the impaired

heart function cannot reasonably be attributed to

his nine month engagement. In such circumstances,

although the seaman commenced his engagement with a

fitness certificate, it would be unreasonable, in

11

our view,to relate the medical condition of the

appellantas having causal connection with his sea

voyage engagement.

13. In the above context, we have also perused the

extracted passage from the article on marine safety

and cardiovascular disease of MrDilipan Thomas.

According to the author, “Cardio-vascular disease

is as commonly found in seafaring community as in

the general population”. Thus, it can at best be a

general observation relating to both seamen and

people in general and not specific for the

seafaring community.

14. Insofar as the other extract relied by the

appellant’s counsel, there is some confusion. This

is because the extract was attributed to MrMarkas

Ollie Barkarbut a search on the origin of the

quoted portion revealed that this was actually

lifted from the abstract of the article titled

“Risk of Cardiovascular Diseases in Seafarers” by

MrMarcus Oldenburg, in the International Maritime

Health,2014. Since the concerned passage was quoted

12

in the High Court’s judgment and also relied upon

by the appellant, we have examined the context in

which it was written. It is then seen that subject

of the studyi.e.German seafarers, were only assumed

to have slightly increased risk of coronary

disease, even though they displayed similar

predicated risk as the reference population for

comparison.The concerned passagespeaks of jobrelated cardio risk factors for seafarers. But in

the present case no material is produced to

correlate the appellant’s impaired heart function

with the 9 month engagement in the ship. In the

absence of any connecting link between the job and

the medical condition, thedisability compensationin

our opinion is not merited.

15. The Clause 21 applies to a case of total

disability but this is not a case of 100%

disablement.To say it another way, the Dilated

Cardiomyopathy condition may prevent the man from

performing sea service but the same will not be an

impediment for him to perform other jobs. With this

13

interpretation,the High Court held that only

severance compensation under Clause 25 is payable

for the seaman. We see no reason to reach another

conclusion on the implication of Clause 21

andClause 25,for the appellant.

16. The appellant’s counsel has relied on,

Divisional Controller, NEKRTC vs. Sangamma and

Ors.1

, and Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs.

Rita Fernandez2. In these cases, the impairment

had occurred in the course of employment. For

instance, in Sangammacase, the bus conductor

suffered chest pain while on duty and was admitted

to the hospital.Howeverin the case in hand, no

linkage between the on ship duty and the

appellant’s medical condition, could be

established. Thus, the first cited case will be of

no assistance to the appellant.

17. In the Rita Fernandez (supra), which related

to a seafarer’s cardiac ailment, the log-book of

the ship had recorded entry relating to the

12005 (2) LLN 776

21969 (2) LLJ 812

14

employee’s hospitalization for treatment of cardiac

ailment. But in the present case nosuch log entry

from the vessel had been produced.In Rita

Fernandez judgement, the Court itself had

highlighted the need for establishing the causal

connection for considering compensation under

Section 3 of the Workmen Compensation Act,1923.But

in the present case, the appellant’s medical

condition could not be linked to his shortterm

engagement.Therefore, the cited ratio is of no

assistance for the disability compensation claim.

18. Let us now deal with the appellant’s argument

that his heart ailment should be understood as a

disability under the Disability Act and

consequential benefits be accorded to him. Section

2(i) of the Act takes into account visual

disability, locomotor disability, mental

illness,mental retardation, hearing impairment and

leprosy. A heart ailment is not covered within the

definition of disabilityin the Act and we would

hesitate to import words, which the legislature

15

chose not to, in their definition of disability.

When the 1995 Act was replaced by the Rights of

Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, “a person

with disabilities” was defined under Section 2(s)

as a person with long term physical, mental,

intellectual, or sensory impairment which prevent

his full and effective participation in society.

Section 2(zc) defines, “specified disability” as

those mentioned in the Schedule to the 2016 Act. In

the said Schedule, “physical disability”,

“intellectual disability”, “mentalbehaviour”, are

specified.The dilated Cardiomyopathy conditionof

the appellantis neither a specified disability

noris the same relatable to the broad spectrum

ofimpairments, which hindershis full and effective

participation in society. Therefore, we are of the

considered opinion that Dilated Cardiomyopathy

condition of the appellant does not bring his case

within the ambit of either the 1995 Act or of the

2016 Act.The High Court, therefore, was correct in

concluding that Dilated Cardiomyopathy condition

16

would not facilitate any benefit to the appellant

under Section 47 of the Disability Act.

19. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is found

devoid of merit and is dismissed leaving the

parties to bear their own cost.

………………………………………………J.

[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]

………………………………………………J.

[DINESH MAHESHWARI]

………………………………………………J.

 [HRISHIKESH ROY]

NEW DELHI

FEBRUARY10, 2021

17