suo motu cognizance of the incident which happened in Rajkot, Gujarat on 26.11.2020 resulting in death of Covid patients in the Covid Hospital. The Court has also taken notice of earlier incidents of fire in Covid Hospitals.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

SUO MOTU WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.7 OF 2020

IN RE: THE PROPER TREATMENT OF COVID 19 PATIENTS AND

DIGNIFIED HANDLING OF DEAD BODIES IN THE HOSPITALS ETC.

O R D E R

1. We have heard Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor

General for India and learned counsel appearing for

various States. By our order dated 27.11.2020 passed in

this proceeding we have taken suo motu cognizance of the

incident which happened in Rajkot, Gujarat on 26.11.2020

resulting in death of Covid patients in the Covid

Hospital. The Court has also taken notice of earlier

incidents of fire in Covid Hospitals. Learned Solicitor

General had submitted that immediate steps shall be taken

and the report will be submitted. State of Gujarat was

also directed to submit the report.

2. Affidavits have been filed by Union of India on

30.11.2020 and 11.12.2020. The Union of India in its

affidavit dated 30.11.2020 has brought on record the

letter dated 28.11.2020 issued by Ministry of Home

Affairs, Government of India. The Government of India

issued advisory to all the States to prevent the

1

recurrence of fire incident in Covid Hospitals and

Nursing Homes. The Union of India has called for the

status of implementation of guidelines issued in

reference to preventing recurrence of fire accidents in

Hospitals, status of ‘No Objection Certificate’, report

regarding inspection and re-inspection of Hospitals and

Nursing Homes. In pursuance of the orders issued by Union

of India to all the States, status reports were sent to

the Union of India which has been compiled in Affidavit

dated 11.12.2020. Although different States and Union

Territories have taken measures and conducted

inspections, found out shortcomings regarding prevention

of occurrence of fire in the Hospitals and Nursing Homes,

further, audits and inspections are required to be taken.

Few States have also filed their separate affidavits

enumerating their steps taken by them in compliance of

the advisory and requirement for. The Union of India has

directed the States and Union Territories to update their

respective local building bye laws/fire services

synchronising them in line of “Model Bill on maintenance

of fire and emergency service, 2019”, circulated by

Ministry of Home Affairs on 16.09.2019.

3. The State of Gujarat has filed separate affidavit

2

bringing on record the directions issued by the State and

the details of inspection undertaken and audit of few

dedicated Covid hospitals. It has further stated that a

nodal officer for fire safety has been appointed in

dedicated covid hospitals (Government and Private

hospitals). We with regard to above, issue following

directions:-

1) All States/Union Territories should appoint one

nodal officer for each covid hospital, if not

already appointed, who shall be made responsible

for ensuring the compliance of all fire safety

measures.

2) In each district, State Government should

constitute a committee to carry fire audit of

each Covid hospital atleast once in a month and

inform the deficiency to the management of the

hospital and report to the Government for taking

follow up action.

3) The Covid hospital who have not obtained NOC from

fire department of the State should be asked to

immediately apply for NOC and after carrying

necessary inspection, decision shall be taken.

Those Covid hospitals who have not renewed their

3

NOC should immediately take steps for renewal on

which appropriate inspection be taken and

decision be taken. In event, Covid Hospital is

found not having NOC or not having obtained

renewal, appropriate action be taken by the

State.

4. The State of Gujarat has also brought on record the

notification appointing Justice D.A. Mehta to undertake

enquiry with regard to fire in Shrey Hospital,

Navrangpura, Ahmedabad, in addition to enquiry in to the

incident of fire in Uday Shivanand Hospital, Rajkot. The

State to extend all cooperation to the Enquiry Commission

so that Enquiry report be submitted at early date and the

appropriate remedial action be taken by the State.

5. Due to unprecedented Pandemic, everybody in the world

is suffering, one way or the other. It is a world war

against COVID-19. Therefore, there shall be Government

Public Partnership to avoid world war against COVID-19.

6. Right to health is a fundamental right guaranteed

under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Right to

health includes affordable treatment. Therefore, it is

the duty upon the State to make provisions for affordable

treatment and more and more provisions in the hospitals

4

to be run by the State and/or local administration are

made. It cannot be disputed that for whatever reasons

the treatment has become costlier and costlier and it is

not affordable to the common people at all. Even if one

survives from COVID-19, many times financially and

economically he is finished. Therefore, either more and

more provisions are to be made by the State Government

and the local administration or there shall be cap on the

fees charged by the private hospitals, which can be in

exercise of the powers under the Disaster Management Act.

7. Despite the Guidelines and SOPs issued, for lack of

implementation the Pandemic has spread like wild fire. A

strict and stern action should be taken against those who

are violating the Guidelines and SOPs, whoever he may be

and whatever position the violator is occupying.

8. Every State must act vigilantly and to work with the

Centre harmoniously. It is the time to rise to the

occasion. Safety and health of the citizens must be the

first priority, rather than any other considerations.

9. People should understand their duty and follow rules

very strictly. It is the duty of every citizen to

perform their fundamental duties as guaranteed under the

5

Constitution of India. By not following the

Guidelines/SOPs issued by the State from time to time,

such as, not wearing the masks, not keeping social

distances, to participate in the gatherings and the

celebrations without maintaining social distances, they

are ultimately not damaging themselves but they cause

damage to the others also. They cannot be permitted to

play with the lives of the others and they cannot be

permitted to infringe the rights of other citizens, like

right to health guaranteed under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India.

10. There is a need to help and guide our people to

implement the guidelines and the SOPs issued by the

Government, either the Union or the State, such as,

wearing of masks, keeping the social distance etc. In

many States, despite the huge fine recovered, such as,

Rs. 80 to 90 crores in the State of Gujarat alone, people

are not following the guidelines and the SOPs. There

must be a strict implementation by the authorities so as

to ensure that the SOPs and the guidelines issued from

time to time are strictly adhered to and followed by the

people. Additional Chief Secretary (Home)/Secretary

(Home) of respective States shall ensure the strict

6

implementation of the SOPs and the guidelines with the

help of the concerned Superintendent of Police/District

Superintendent of Police and the Police In-charge of the

concerned police station.

11. We have already issued various directions with regard

to measures to be taken to contain the Covid-19. We once

again reiterate the State to issue necessary directions

with regard to following measures so as to effectively

monitor and supervise the implementation of various SOPs

and guidelines.

i) More and more police personnel shall be deployed at

the places where there is likelihood of gathering by

the people, such as, Food Courts, Eateries, Vegetable

Markets (Wholesale or Retail), sabzi Mandies, bus

stations, railway stations, street vendors, etc.

ii) As far as possible, unless must, no permission shall

be granted by the local administration or the

Collector/DSP for celebration/gathering even during

the day hours and wherever the permissions are

granted, the local

administration/DSP/Collector/Police In-charge of the

local police station shall ensure the strict

7

compliance of the Guidelines/SOPs. There should be a

mechanism to check the number of people attending

such function/gathering, such as, the particulars

with respect to how many persons are going to attend

the celebration/gathering, timings during which the

celebration/gathering is to take place etc.

iii) There shall be more and more testing and to declare

the correct facts and figures. One must be

transparent in number of testing and declaring the

facts and figures of the persons who are Corona

Positive. Otherwise, the people will be misled and

they will be under impression that everything is all

right and they will become negligent.

iv) Whenever directions are issued under the Disaster

Management Act directing the corporate

hospitals/private hospitals to keep 50% or any other

percentage free municipal beds, it must be strictly

complied with and there shall be constant vigilance

and supervision.

v) There shall be free helpline numbers to redress the

grievances of common man, when there is noncompliance of the directions by the private

hospitals/corporate hospitals.

8

vi) Curfew on weekends/night be considered by States

where it is not in place.

vii) In a micro containment zone or in an area where

number of cases are on higher side, to cut the chain,

they should be sealed and there should be complete

lockdown so far as such areas are concerned. Such

containment areas need to be sealed for few days

except essential services. The same is required to

break the chain of virus spread.

viii) Any decision to impose curfew and/or lockdown must be

announced long in advance so that the people may know

and make provisions for their livelihood, like ration

etc.

ix) Another issue is a fatigue of front row health care

officers, such as, Doctors, Nurses as well as

workers. They are already exhausted physically and

mentally due to tireless work for eight months. Some

mechanism may be required to give them intermittent

rest.

12. One more issue has been raised before us regarding

gathering organised by Political parties. The Political

parties organise different proceedings in connection of

9

election as well as in reference to election of different

level including the General Election which are to take

place in few States next year.

13. The Election Commission of India has issued broad

guidelines for conduct of General Elections/Bye-Elections

during Covid-19 in August, 2020. With regard to campaign

of political parties following are the guidelines issued

by Election Commission of India: -

“13. CAMPAIGN BY THE POLITICAL

PARTIES/CONTESTING CANDIDATES

1) Door to Door Campaign: - Subject to any

other restriction(s) including extant

COVID-19 guidelines, a group of 5(five)

persons including candidates, excluding

security personnel, if any, is allowed to

do door to door campaigning.

2) Road Shows: -The Convoy of vehicles should

be broken after every 5(five) vehicles

instead of 10 vehicles (excluding the

security vehicles, if any). The interval

between two sets of convoy of vehicles

should be half an hour instead of gap of

100 meters. (In supersession of Para 5.8.1

of Returning Officer’s Handbook 2019)”

3) Election Meetings: - Public

gatherings/rallies may be conducted

subject to adherence to extant COVID-19

guidelines. District Election Officer

should take following steps for this

purpose.

(a) District Election Officer should,

in advance, identify dedicated

10

grounds for public gathering with

clearly marked Entry/Exit points.

(b) In all such identified grounds,

the District Election Officer

should, in advance, put markers to

ensure social distancing norms by

the attendees.

(c) Nodal District Health Officer

should be involved in the process

to ensure that all COVID-19

related guidelines are adhered to

by all concerned in the district.

(d) District Election Officer and

District Superintendent of Police

should ensure that the number of

attendees does not exceed the

limit prescribed by State Disaster

Management Authority for public

gatherings.

(e) DEO should depute Sector Health

Regulators to oversee that COVID19 instructions/guidelines are

being followed during these

meetings.

(f) The political parties and

candidates concerned should ensure

that all COVID-19 related

requirement like face masks,

sanitizers, thermal scanning etc.

are fulfilled during each of these

activities.

(g) Non-Compliance of Instructions: -

Anybody violating instructions on

COVID-19 measures will be liable

to proceeded against as per the

provisions of Section 51 to 60 of

the Disaster Management Act, 2005,

besides legal action under Section

11

1988 of the IPC, and other legal

provisions as applicable, as

specified in Order No.40-3/2020-

DM-I(A) dated 29th July, 2020 of

Ministry of Home Affairs. District

Election Officer should bring this

to the notice of all concerned.

4) Allocation of public spaces must be done

using Suvidha app in the manner already

prescribed by Commission.”

14. All the States / Union Territories to issue necessary

directions to ensure compliance of aforesaid guidelines

and guidelines although were issued by General

Election/Bye Election, that can be implemented by

different States with suitable modifications with

reference to Elections of other organisations to ensure

safety of people in general from Covid-19.

15. We allow further four weeks’ time to all the States

and Union of India to file affidavit bringing on record

various measures as indicated in this order for

consideration and further directions.

List after four weeks.

......................J.

 ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.

 ( R. SUBHASH REDDY )

......................J.

 ( M.R. SHAH )

New Delhi,

December 18, 2020.

12

ITEM NO.1 Court 7 (Video Conferencing) SECTION PIL-W

[FOR ORDERS]

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No(s).7/2020

IN RE THE PROPER TREATMENT OF COVID 19 PATIENTS AND DIGNIFIED

HANDLING OF DEAD BODIES IN THE HOSPITALS ETC.

(IA No. 63664/2020 - APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING ORIGINAL

VAKALATNAMA/OTHER DOCUMENT

 IA No. 54973/2020 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS

 IA No. 55794/2020 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS

 IA No. 56067/2020 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS

 IA No. 90409/2020 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS

 IA No. 54881/2020 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS

 IA No. 55938/2020 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS

 IA No. 68811/2020 - CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION

 IA No. 54900/2020 - EARLY HEARING APPLICATION

 IA No. 55936/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 56420/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 68639/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 56142/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 118651/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 55792/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 56124/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 68519/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 74588/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 90410/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 54885/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 55398/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 55939/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 72559/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 54982/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 72111/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 90398/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 68817/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING AFFIDAVIT

 IA No. 92849/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.

 IA No. 74671/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM PAYING COURT FEE

 IA No. 74670/2020 - INTERVENTION APPLICATION

 IA No. 55790/2020 - INTERVENTION APPLICATION

 IA No. 63659/2020 - INTERVENTION APPLICATION

 IA No. 54880/2020 - INTERVENTION APPLICATION

 IA No. 55937/2020 - INTERVENTION APPLICATION

 IA No. 90394/2020 - INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT

 IA No. 77370/2020 - INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT

 IA No. 54971/2020 - INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT

 IA No. 55935/2020 - INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT

 IA No. 68561/2020 - INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT

 IA No. 54897/2020 - INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT

 IA No. 57318/2020 - INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT

 IA No. 54902/2020 - PERMISSION TO APPEAR AND ARGUE IN PERSON

13

 IA No. 63660/2020 - PERMISSION TO APPEAR AND ARGUE IN PERSON

 IA No. 54978/2020 - PERMISSION TO APPEAR AND ARGUE IN PERSON

 IA No. 56419/2020 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL

DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

Date : 18-12-2020 This matter was called on for orders today.

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH

For Petitioner(s) By Courts Motion

For Respondent(s) Mr. Tushar Mehta, SG

Mr. K.M. Nataraj, ASG

Mr. Shantanu Sharma, Adv.

Mr. Gurmeet Singh Makker AOR

Mr. Rajat Nair, Adv.

Mr. Kanu Agrawal, Adv.

Mr. Prashant Singh B, Adv.

Mr. Raj Bahadur Yadav, Adv.

Mr. Saurabh Mishra, Adv.

Mr. Mohd. Akhil, Adv.

Mr. B. V. Balaram Das, AOR

Arunachal Pradesh Mr. Abhimanyu Tewari, AOR

Ms. Eliza Bar, Adv.

Assam Mr. Nalin Kohli, AAG

Mr. Shuvodeep Roy, Adv.

Mr. Ankit Roy, Adv.

Mr. Rahul Raj Mishra, Adv.

Ms. Nimisha, Adv.

GNCTD Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Chirag M. Shroff, AOR

Ms. Abhilasha Bharti, Adv.

Goa Mr. Arun R. Pedneker, Adv.

Mr. Sachin Patil AOR

Gujarat Mr. Tushar Mehta, SG

Ms. Manisha Lavkumar, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee AOR

Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Adv.

Ms. Aastha Mehta, Adv.

Haryana Mr. Anish Kumar Gupta, Adv.

Ms. Archana Preeti Gupta, Adv.

Mr. Chandra Shekhar Suman, Adv.

Mr. Puneet Sheoran, Adv.

14

Ms. Rita Gupta, Adv.

Ms. Deepshikha Bharati, Adv.,

Haryana Dr. Monika Gusain, AOR

H.P. Mr. Himanshu Tyagi, AOR

Jharkhand Mr. Kumar Anurag Singh, Addl. Standing Counsel

Mr. Saurabh Jain, Adv.

Mr. Anando Mukherjee, Adv.

J&K Mr. G.M. Kawoosa, Adv.

Ms. Manjula Gupta, Adv.

Kerala Ms. Priyanka Prakash, Adv.

Ms. Beena Prakash, Adv.

Mr. G. Prakash, Adv.

Manipur Mr. Pukhrambam Ramesh Kumar, Adv.

Ms. Anupama Ngangom, Adv.

Mr. Karun Sharma, Adv.

Maharashtra Mr. Rahul Chitnis ADV.

 Mr. Sachin Patil, AOR

Mr. Geo Joseph, Adv.

Meghalaya Mr. Amit Kumar, Adv.

Mr. Avijit Mani Tripathi, Adv.

Mr. T.K. Nayak, Adv.

Mr. Abhikalp, Adv.

Mizoram Mr. Siddhesh Kotwal, Adv.

Mr. Divyansh Tiwari, Adv.

Ms. Ana Upadhyay, Adv.

Nagaland Mrs. K. Enatoli Sema, Adv

Mr. Amit Kumar Singh, Adv.

Punjab Mr. Atul Nanda, AG

Ms. Uttara Babbar, Adv.

Ms. Bhavana Duhoon, Adv.

Mr. Manan Bansal, Adv.

Rajasthan Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Advocate

Mr. Sandeep Kumar Jha Advocate

T.N. Mr. Jayanth Muthuraj, Sr. Adv.

Mr. M.Yogeshkanna AOR

Mr. Rajarajeshwaran, Adv.

Mr. Aditya Chadha, Adv.

Telangana Mr. S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Adv.

Ms. Swati Bhardwaj, Adv.

15

Tripura Mr. Shuvodeep Roy, Adv.

Mr. Rahul Raj Mishra, Adv.

WB Mr. Suhaan Mukerji, Adv.

Ms. Liz Mathew, Adv.

Mr. Vishal Prasad, Adv.

Mr. Nikhil Parikshith, Adv.

Mr. Sayandeep Pahari, Adv.

For M/S. PLR Chambers And Co.

U.P. Ms. Garima Prashad, Adv.

Mr. Nagender Singh, Adv.

Sikkim Mr. Raghvendra Kumar, Adv.

Mr. Anand Kumar Dubey, Adv.

Mr. Narendra Kumar, AOR

Karnataka Mr. Shubhranshu Padhi, AOR

Mr. Ashish Yadav, Adv.

Mr. Rakshit Jain, Adv.

Mr. Vishal Bansal, Adv.

Odisha Mr. Shibashish Misra, Adv.

UTs

A & N Mr. K.V. Jagdishvaran, Adv.

Ms. G. Indira, AOR

Puducherry Mr. V.G. Pragasam, Adv.

Mr. S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, Adv.

Mr. Awanish Sinha, AOR

Mr. S.K. Mohanty, Adv.

Ms. Sweta Rani, Adv.

Ms. Gitanshi Arora, Adv.

I.A. 90394/20 Mr. Pawan Shree Agrawal, Adv.

& 90409/20 Ms. Abhipsa Anamika, Adv.

Applicant in person

Municipal Corporation Mr. Ashish Wad, Adv.

Of Greater Mumbai Ms. Tamali Wad, Adv.

Mr. Sidharth Mahajan, Adv.

Ms. Sukriti Jaggi, Adv.

Mr. Ajeyo Sharma, Adv.

M/S. J S Wad And Co.

Intervenor Mr. Subhash Chandran, Adv.

Mr. Biju P Raman, AOR

16

55937&55938 Mr. M. Shoeb Alam, Adv.

Mr. Talha Abdul Rahman, AOR

55935 Dr. Ishwar Gilada, Adv.

Mr. Rohit Rathi, AOR

54897/20 Mr. Shashank Deo Sudhi, Adv.

Mr. Mukesh Kumar, Applicant in person

Ms. Aparna Bhat, AOR

Ms. Karishma Maria, Adv.

 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

 O R D E R

Four weeks’ time is granted to all the States and Union of

India to file affidavit to bring on record various measures as

indicated in the signed reportable order for consideration and

further directions.

(MEENAKSHI KOHLI) (RENU KAPOOR)

ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS BRANCH OFFICER

[Signed reportable order is placed on the file]

17

whether a charge framed with the assistance of Section 149 IPC can later be converted to one read with Section 34 IPC or even a simplicitor individual crime? Second, whether lack of independent witnesses to a violent crime would undermine the prosecution case and whether closely related witnesses can be relied upon in such instances? And third, whether leniency ought to be shown to the present appellants given the extended period of liberty which they have enjoyed since being released on bail?

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 38 of 2011

Rohtas & Anr. ..... Appellant(s)

                                     VERSUS

State of Haryana .....Respondent

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 775 of 2011

Bijender ..... Appellant

                                     VERSUS

State of Haryana .....Respondent

JUDGMENT

Surya Kant, J:

These two criminal appeals, which have been heard through video

conferencing, are directed against the judgment dated 15.03.2010 of the

High Court of Punjab and Haryana whereby conviction of Rohtas and

Sanjay (appellants in Criminal  Appeal  No. 38 of 2011) and Bijender

(appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 775 of 2011) under Sections 307 and

148 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”)  has been upheld, though the

Page | 1

sentence   of   seven   years   rigorous   imprisonment   awarded   by   the

Additional Sessions Judge, Sonipat has been reduced to five years, with

a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 (Rupees One Lakh) payable as compensation to the

victim­complainant.

FACTS

2. The brief facts of the prosecution case are as follows. A complaint

was   lodged   with   the   police   by   the   victim­Ranbir   Singh   (PW­1)   on

26.01.1998 stating that two days ago while on his way to irrigate his

agricultural   field,   he   was   stopped   by   Rohtas,   Sanjay,   Bijender   (the

present   three   appellants)   and   Om   Prakash   (since   deceased)   who

collectively threatened him with death if he were to return to his fields for

irrigation. The complainant came back to his house and narrated the

incident to his family members who while cautioning him against picking

a quarrel, asked him to go about his normal routine. On the following

day,   i.e.   25.01.1998,   when   the   complainant   was   passing   by   the

Hudawala field while on his way to another agricultural plot (known as

Patewala  field), the four accused ­ Om Parkash, Rohtas, Sanjay and

Bijender   intercepted   him.   They   started   inflicting   blows   on   the

complainant’s body using axes, thereby causing him to fall down and

seriously   injuring   his   legs,   hand   and   head.   Another   group   of   three

accused   persons,   comprising   Hawa   Singh,   Virender   @   Beero   and

Rajinder also joined in thrashing the complainant. The assailants further

Page | 2

declared that they would not rest till they killed the complainant. Upon

hearing the complainant’s cries, his brother Balwan (PW­3) who was

irrigating a nearby  Budewala  field, rushed to the spot and raised an

alarm.   Thereafter,   all   seven   accused   ran   from   the   spot.   Balwan

subsequently carried his injured brother to Government Civil hospital at

Sonipat for treatment. Owing to the seriousness of multiple injuries,

Ranbir was referred to Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences at

Rohtak (in short, “PGIMS, Rohtak”). 

3. The jurisdictional police recorded the statement of the injured on

26.01.1998   at   PGIMS,   Rohtak   and   formally   registered   the   First

Information Report under Sections 307, 323, 325, 506, 148 and 149 of

the IPC. All the seven accused were then arrested. Post completion of

investigation,   they   were   committed   to   trial.   The   Additional   Sessions

Judge, Sonipat framed two charges; first, of rioting with deadly weapons

under Section 148, and  second,  of attempt to murder with common

object as part of an unlawful assembly under Section 307 read with

Section 149 of the IPC.  All seven accused pleaded not guilty and claimed

trial. During trial, however, Om Prakash died and proceedings against

him stood abated on 08.11.2000.

4. The   prosecution   examined   twelve   witnesses   to   establish   the

accused’s guilt, which included the victim­complainant ­ Ranbir Singh

(PW­1)   and   his   brother   and   only   eye­witness   ­   Balwan   (PW­3).   The

Page | 3

complainant very effectively corroborated his earlier version. He remained

firm   during   cross­examination   and   categorically   stated   that  “Om

Parkash,  Rohtas,  Sanjay  and  Bijender  and  after  a  minute  Beero,

Hawa  Singh  and  Rajinder  came  there.    All  the  accused  attacked

me  with  their  respective  weapons.”  He further mentioned that  “Om

Parkash  gave   two  axe   blows   on  my   head  while  Rohtas   inflicted

uncounted   injuries   on  my   right   leg...   Sanjay  gave   two­three  axe

blows on my left leg... Bijender gave one axe blow on the palm of

my left hand.”   It is relevant to be noticed here that the complainant

was candid enough to admit in his cross­examination that  “when the

accused   Rajinder,   Hawa   Singh   and   Beero   when   arrived   at   the

scene of occurrence, I have already suffered all the injuries on my

person.... [sic]”

5.  Eye­witness, Balwan (PW­3) stated on oath that on 25.01.1998 he

was irrigating  Budewala  field which he had taken on lease basis. At

about 12PM he heard noise towards the passage and after running in

that direction he witnessed that  “Om  Parkash,  Rohtas,  Sanjay  and

Bijender   armed   with   axes   were   causing   injuries   to   my

brother/Ranbir.” Like the injured­complainant, Balwan (PW­3) also gave

a detailed account of the assault and consequent injuries on the body of

Ranbir.   Despite   strong   suggestions   by   the   defence   counsel   on   the

Page | 4

unlikelihood   of   him   having   seen   the   incident,   Balwan   unequivocally

replied that “I saw the accused causing injuries to my brother from

distance of about half killa...”.

6. Dr. Suman Mathur (PW­4), who had medico­legally examined the

injured soon after the occurrence, lead the medical evidence. She found

the following seven injuries on various parts of the complainant’s (PW­1)

body:

“1.  Lacerated Wound 7 cm x 2 cm x bone deep on the lower 1/3rd of

right side.  Bone exposed muscle and tendons were crushed.  Fresh

bleeding was present and was advised x­ray.

2. Lacerated Wound 3 cm x 2 cms x bone deep present on the right

ankle foot.  Advised x­ray.

3. Lacerated Wound 3 cms x 2 cms x bone deep on the front and

middle of left leg.  Advised x­ray left leg. 

4.  Lacerated Wound 3 cms x 2 cms x muscle deep present on the

dorsum of the left leg.

5. Lacerated Wound 3 cms x 3 cms x skin deep on the palmer

aspect of left leg. Advised x­ray.

6. Lacerated Wound 5 cms x 2 cms x scalp deep on the left parieto

temporal region 5 cms above the left ear. Advised x­ray.

7. Lacerated Wound 2 cms x 2 cms x scalp deep on the right

parieto temporal region. Advised x­ray.”

7. The Orthopaedic Surgeon, Dr Ajay Goel (PW­10), deposed that he

was posted as Registrar in the Department of Orthopaedics, X­Ray and

Emergency Wing, at PGIMS Rohtak when he attended to the complainant

and diagnosed him with fracture of both the lower bones in both of his

legs, along with vascular and nerve injuries. External bilateral legs were

affixed and vascular repair was carried out on 26.01.1998. But, upon

Page | 5

deterioration of the complainant’s condition, the lower portion of his right

leg (below the knee) was amputated on 01.02.1998.  The need for this

amputation and its correlation with the initial set of injuries inflicted by

the accused, was elucidated by Dr SS Lochab (PW­12), who was posted

as   Head   of   Department   of   Cardiothoracic   and   Vascular   Surgery   at

PGIMS, Rohtak. He explained the damage caused to the tibial arteries

and how the massive blood loss had endangered the complainant’s life.

The Investigating Officer, S.I. Parkash Chand (PW­6) and other formal

police witnesses too deposed to substantiate the prosecution case.

8. The six­surviving accused in their statement under Section 313 of

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) claimed that they were falsely

implicated on account of local  village  politics.  They also led  defence

evidence and produced Dr Varsha (DW­1) posted then as the Medical

Officer, Civil Hospital, Sonipat who had found injuries on Om Prakash

(deceased)   and   Sanjay   (present   appellant)   during   a   medico   legal

examination on the day after the incident.

9. Analysing this substantial ocular and medical evidence, the learned

Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Sonipat   negated   the   defence’s   objection

against   reliance   on   testimony   of   PW­3,   for   he   being   related   to   the

complainant or that the medical evidence did not reconcile with the

ocular evidence. The trial Court noted that an ‘unlawful assembly’ with a

common object had caused serious injuries to the complainant. All the

six accused were consequently convicted for the offence under Section

Page | 6

307 read with Section 149 of the IPC (with sentence of seven years

rigorous imprisonment) and also under Section 148 of the IPC (with an

additional one year’s concurrent imprisonment). 

10. The High Court, in appeal, re­appraised the entire evidence and

took further notice of the complainant’s admission that three of the

accused,   namely   Rajinder,   Hawa   Singh   and   Beero   @   Virender,   had

arrived at the scene of occurrence after he had already suffered injuries

from the other accused. Sensing the possibility that the late­arriving

accused might have been named only to widen the net and settle past

scores, the High Court extended the benefit of doubt to Rajinder, Hawa

Singh   and   Beero   @   Virender   and   acquitted   them   of   all   charges.   As

regards the present three appellants ­ Rohtas, Sanjay and Bijender, the

High Court found no ground to interfere with their conviction, though it

reduced the quantum of sentence under the charge of Section 307 IPC

from seven years to five, with a combined additional fine of Rs 1,00,000

(Rupees One Lakh) to be paid to the victim­complainant (PW­1).  

11. These   three   remaining   convicts,   namely,   Rohtas   and   Sanjay

(jointly)   and   Bijender   have   assailed   their   conviction   and   sentence

through these two criminal appeals. 

CONTENTIONS:

12. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants at considerable

length and have perused the record in­depth. There are three principal

Page | 7

contentions which have been raised on behalf of the appellants.  First, it

was urged that the minimum number of persons required to constitute

an   ‘unlawful  assembly’  and  concomitantly sustain   any  charge  under

Section 149 IPC is five. Given that three of the original seven accused

have been acquitted by the High Court, the conviction for attempt to

murder as part of an unlawful assembly could not survive.  In support,

learned counsel for the appellants relied upon Amar Singh v. State of

Punjab,1

 and Dhupa Chamar v. State of Bihar2

. Further reliance was

placed on Subran v. State of Kerala3

, to urge that the case should not

be converted to one under Section 307 IPC simplicitor at an advanced

stage. Second, the prosecution story was highly doubtful as Balwan (PW3) was an interested witness and no other independent witness had been

examined. Third and finally, it was urged alternatively that the appellants

after having undergone some part of their sentence were enlarged on bail

by this Court almost a decade back, and it would not serve the ends of

criminal justice to return them to Jail at this juncture. The sentence

thus   ought   to   be   reduced   to   the   period   already   undergone   by   the

appellants.

13. Although learned State Counsel did not appear on the date of final

hearing, but the respondent’s stand on the intermittent dates of hearing

has been in total contrast to that of the appellants. The prosecution case

1

 (1987) 1 SCC 679.

2

 (2002) 6 SCC 506.

3

(1993) 3 SCC 32.

Page | 8

proceeds on the premise that there is an attempt to murder, involving

seven persons with a common intention and prior meeting of minds. The

emphasis of the State as usual is that no lenient view ought to be taken

in light of the nature of injuries. 

ANALYSIS:

14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to all the issues raised

on behalf of the appellants.  We first deem it appropriate to avert to the

contention whether a charge framed with the assistance of Section 149

IPC can later be converted to one read with Section 34 IPC or even a

simplicitor   individual   crime?  Second,  whether   lack   of   independent

witnesses to a violent crime would undermine the prosecution case and

whether closely related witnesses can be relied upon in such instances?

And third, whether leniency ought to be shown to the present appellants

given the extended period of liberty which they have enjoyed since being

released on bail? 

(i) Framing of charge and its subsequent alteration

15. The primary attack on the judgment of the High Court by learned

counsel for the appellants is on a question of law, which although seems

interesting   at   first   but   turns   out   to   be   superficial   upon   a   deeper

consideration. The oversight regarding Section 148 and 149 of the IPC as

highlighted by the appellants is indeed inescapable. Before the members

of an ‘unlawful assembly’ can be vicariously held guilty of an offence

Page | 9

committed in furtherance of common object, it is necessary to establish

that not less than five persons, as mandatorily prescribed under Section

141 read with Section 149 of the IPC had actually participated in the

occurrence. It is not uncommon, like in the present facts, when although

the number of accused is more than five at the time of charge­sheeting,

but owing to acquittals of some of them over the course of trial, the

remaining number of accused falls below five.  It may be true in such

cases, as rightly urged by the appellants that the charge under Section

148 and 149 IPC would not survive.  

16. This does not, however, imply that Courts can not alter the charge

and seek the aid of Section 34 IPC (if there is common intention), or that

they   cannot   assess   whether   an   accused   independently   satisfies   the

ingredients of a particular offence. Sections 211 to 224 of CrPC which

deal with framing of charges in criminal trials, give significant flexibility

to Courts to alter and rectify the charges. The only controlling objective

while deciding on alteration is whether the new charge would cause

prejudice to the accused, say if he were to be taken by surprise or if the

belated   change   would   affect   his   defence   strategy.4

  The   emphasis   of

Chapter XVII of the CrPC is thus to give a full and proper opportunity to

the defence but at the same time to ensure that justice is not defeated by

mere technicalities. Similarly, Section 386 of CrPC bestows even upon

the   appellate   Court   such   wide   powers   to   make   amendments   to   the

4

 Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy v. State of AP, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 60, ¶ 16­21.

Page | 10

charges which may have been erroneously framed earlier. Furthermore,

improper, or non­framing of charge by itself is not a ground for acquittal

under Section 464 of the CrPC. It must necessarily be shown that failure

of justice has been caused, in which case a re­trial may be ordered.5

17. The contention of the appellants to the contrary is nothing but

hyper­technical.   It   deserves   mention   that   the   extracts   of  Subran   v.

State of Kerala (supra) as relied upon by the appellants’ counsel have

been   subsequently   recalled   and   substituted   by   the   bench   in   review

jurisdiction.6

 The amended version makes clear that acquittal in Subran

(supra) was not because of improper framing of charges but on facts. In

that case, the injuries attributed to the accused failed to satisfy the

necessary   ingredients   of   the   relevant   provision   when   his   role   was

assessed individually. Indeed, such is the right approach. Courts are free

to weigh the evidence and determine whether an independent conviction

is possible in case group prosecution under Section 149 IPC fails. 

18. In another case relied upon by the appellants, i.e. Amar Singh v.

State of Punjab (supra), this Court in the penultimate paragraph notes

that “Apart from the fact that the appellants cannot be convicted

under Sections 148 and 149 IPC, it is difficult to convict them on

any  charge  on  the  basis  of  the  evidence  of  PW5.” This shows that

acquittal was based not merely upon failure by the prosecution to fulfil

5

 Kantilal Chandulal Mehta v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 3 SCC 166.

6

 (1993) 3 SCC 722.

Page | 11

the requirements of Section 149 IPC, but because even independently no

substantive offence was found to have been committed.

19. In fact, the law on this point has continuously been delved into and

reiterated by this Court from time to time.  A three­Judge Bench of this

Court in Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab7

, held that:

“8. It is true that there is substantial difference between the two

sections but as observed by Lord Sumner in Barendra Kumar

Ghosh v. Emperor I.L.R. 52 Cal. 197, they also to some extent

overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each

case whether the charge under section 149 overlaps the ground

covered by section 34. If the common object which is the subjectmatter   of   the   charge   under   section   149   does   not   necessarily

involve a common intention, then the substitution of section 34 for

section 149 might result in prejudice to the accused and ought not

therefore to be permitted.

But   if   the   facts   to   be   proved   and   the   evidence   to   be

adduced  with   reference   to   the   charge  under   section  149

would   be   the   same   if   the   charge  were  under   section  34,

then   the   failure   to   charge   the  accused  under   section  34

could  not   result   in  any   prejudice  and   in   such   cases   the

substitution of section 34 for section 149 must be held to

be a formal matter.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. The   above­extracted   position   of   law   was   further   concretised   in

Willie   (William)   Slaney   v.   State   of   MP8

  and   by   the   majority   in

7

 AIR 1954 SC 204.

8

 AIR 1956 SC 116, ¶ 49.

Page | 12

Chittarmal v. State of Rajasthan9

. The permissibility of convicting an

accused individually under a simplicitor provision after group conviction

with   the   aid   of   Section   149   of   IPC   fails,   was   further   explored   in

Atmaram  Zingaraji   v.   State   of  Maharashtra10

,  wherein this Court

held that:

“4. The next question that falls for our determination is whether,

after having affirmed the acquittal of all others, the High Court

could convict the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. (simpliciter).

The charges framed against the accused (quoted earlier) and the

evidence adduced by the prosecution to bring them home clearly

indicate that according to its case, the nine persons arraigned

before   the   trial   Court   ­   and,   none   others,   either   named   or

unnamed (totalling minimum five or more persons) ­ formed the

unlawful assembly. Consequent upon the acquittal of the other

eight the appellant could not be convicted with the aid of Section

149, I.P.C., more particularly, in view of the concurrent findings of

the learned Courts below that the other eight persons were not in

any way involved with the offences in question.

5. The same principle will apply when persons are tried with the

aid   of   Section   34,   I.P.C.   In   the   case   of   Krishna   v.   State   of

Maharashtra [1964]1SCR678 , a four Judge Bench of this Court

has laid down that when four accused persons are tried on a

specific   accusation   that   only   they   committed   a   murder   in

furtherance   of   their   common   intention   and   three   of   them   are

acquitted, the fourth accused cannot be convicted with the aid of

Section 34, I.P.C. for the effect of law would be that those who

were with him did not conjointly act with the fourth accused in

9

 (2003) 2 SCC 266, ¶ 14.

10 (1997) 7 SCC 41.

Page | 13

committing the murder.

6. In either of the above situations therefore the sole convict can

be convicted under Section 302, I. P. C. (simpliciter) only on proof

of the fact that his individual act caused the death of the victim.

To put it differently, he would be liable for his own act only. In

the instant case, the evidence on record does not prove that

the   injuries   inflicted   by   the   appellant   alone   caused   the

death;   on   the   contrary   the   evidence   of   the   eye­witnesses

and  the evidence  of  the  doctor  who held  the post­mortem

examination indicate that the deceased sustained injuries

by other  weapons also and his death was the outcome  of

all the injuries. The appellant, therefore, would be guilty of

the   offence   under   Section   326,   I.P.C.   as   he   caused   a

grievous  injury  to  the  deceased  with  the  aid  of   jambia  (a

sharp­cutting instrument).”

(emphasis supplied)

21. This position of law has finally been summed up very succinctly in

Nallabothu Venkaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh11:

“24. Analytical reading of catena of decisions of this Court, the

following   broad   proposition   of   law   clearly   emerges;   (a)  the

conviction   under   Section   302   simpliciter   without   aid   of

Section 149 is permissible if overt act is attributed to the

accused   resulting   in   the   fatal   injury   which   is

independently sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause   the   death   of   the   deceased   and   is   supported   by

medical   evidence;   (b)   wrongful   acquittal   recorded   by   the

High  Court, even  if it stood, that circumstance would  not

11 (2002) 7 SCC 117.

Page | 14

impede the conviction of the appellant under Section 302

r/w Section 149 I.P.C. (c) charge under Section 302 with the

aid   of   Section   149   could   be   converted   into   one   under

Section   302   r/w   Section   34   if   the   criminal   act   done   by

several persons less than five in number in furtherance of

common intention is proved.”

(emphasis supplied)

22. Although   both   Section   34   and   149   of   the   IPC   are   modes   for

apportioning vicarious liability on the individual members of a group,

there exist a few important differences between these two provisions.

Whereas Section 34 requires active participation and a prior meeting of

minds, Section 149 IPC assigns liability merely by membership of the

unlawful   assembly.   In   reality,   such   ‘common   intention’   is   usually

indirectly inferred from conduct of the individuals and only seldom it is

done through direct evidence.12

23. Applying these settled principles to the facts of the present case, it

may be seen that both the common object and the common intention are

traced back to the same evidence, i.e., evaluating the conduct of the

accused  as  narrated  by  the  injured  and  the  eye­witness.   Further,  a

perusal of Section 313 CrPC statement shows that the appellants were

expressly confronted with their specific role in the offence: that each of

them had individually attacked the complainant with a deadly object in

furtherance of the common intention of killing him. We, therefore, do not

12 Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118, pp. 153­154.

Page | 15

find that the appellants suffered any adverse effect when the High Court

held the three of them individually guilty for the offence of attempted

murder, without the aid of Section 149 IPC. 

24. We have no doubt that on facts, an offence under Section 307 IPC

is clearly made out against each of the three appellants.   The medical

experts have in their depositions clearly explicated that the weapons

used and the injuries inflicted were more than sufficient to cause death

in ordinary course of nature. The appellants made death threats to the

complainant on 24.01.1998 and then they used sharp edged weapons

the very next day and further declared that they would not rest till they

killed the complainant. It manifests the appellant’s intention to inflict

bodily injury knowing fully that such injuries would ordinarily lead to the

complainant’s death. The recovery of the axe (kulhari) from Rohtas, which

is on the record as Exhibit­P7, further punches holes in the mask of

denial worn by the appellants.

25. The gravity of the injuries is beyond doubt. Not only were there

seven injuries, some of which were deep cuts on vital parts of the body

including on the head (above the ear); but the appellants broke all the

bones in the complainant’s feet below the knee. Most appallingly, the

injuries   have   led   to   amputation   of   an   entire   limb,   leaving   the

complainant permanently disabled. This by itself shows the very likely

possibility of the complainant dying if not for the timely intervention of

PW­3   and   appropriate   medical   care   by   PGIMS   Rohtak.   Given   such

Page | 16

extreme   injuries,   we   can   fathom   no   rhyme   or   reason   for   either   the

complainant (PW­1) or his brother, Balwan (PW­3) to falsely implicate the

appellants and allow the actual culprits to go scot­free. On the contrary,

the candour of PW­1 and the responses of PW­3 inspire confidence and

provide undoubtable explanation of the incident. 

26. That apart, even the requirements of Section 34 of IPC are well

established as the attack was apparently pre­meditated. The incident was

not in a spur­of­the­moment. The appellants had previously threatened

the complainant with physical harm if he were to attempt to irrigate his

fields.  Their attack on 25.01.1998 was thus pre­planned and calculated.

There is nothing on record to suggest that the complainant caused any

provocation. Specific roles have been attributed to each of the appellants

by the injured and the solitary eye­witness, establishing their individual

active participation in the crime.

(ii) Independence of witnesses

27. It is  true  that the  duty of the prosecution  is  to  seek  not just

conviction but to ensure that justice is done.13   The prosecution must,

therefore,   put   forth   the   best   evidence   collected   in   the   course   of

investigation.   Although it is always ideal that independent witnesses

come forward to substantiate the prosecution case but it would be unfair

to   expect   the   presence   of   third­parties   in   every   case   at   the   time   of

incident, for most violent crimes are seldom anticipated. Any adverse

13  Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of UP, (1991) 1 SCC 212.

Page | 17

inference against the non­examination of independent witnesses thus

needs to be assessed upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In

fact,   it   must   first   be   determined   whether   the   best   evidence   though

available, has been actually withheld by the prosecution for oblique or

unexplained reasons.

28. The present crime took place in a private agriculture field and not

in the middle of a busy public place. The defence has not claimed that

other   farmers   also   gathered   at   the   scene   and   yet   have   not   been

examined. This shows that the appellants have in fact been blowing both

hot and cold with their arguments. Earlier in the trial they had tried to

discredit the ocular testimony of PW­3 by claiming that he might not

have been able to witness the incident owing to standing crops in the

field.   Nonetheless, they expect this Court to believe that there could

have been others who witnessed the incident but have deliberately been

suppressed by the prosecution. 

(iii) Sentencing and Leniency

29. This leaves us to explore the equitable considerations and plea of

consequential reduction in sentence as has been pleaded by learned

counsel on behalf of the appellants.  We have objectively considered this

prayer.  We, however, cannot be oblivious of the fact that the appellants

and their deceased co­accused were all armed with deadly weapons. They

Page | 18

surrounded   the   complainant   and   in   a   brutal   attack   caused   him

gruesome injuries and disabled him for life. 

30. The appellants have not  undergone even half of their sentence

period. Having enjoyed the more productive part of their lives outside jail

cannot be, per se, taken as a mitigating factor. Any misplaced sympathy

with the appellants is likely to cause injustice to the victim of the crime.

We, therefore, do not find any justification to show leniency and reduce

the sentence.  

31. Given that earlier the appellants had been ordered to serve their

two   sentences   of   five   years   under   Section   307   and   one   year   under

Section 148 of IPC concurrently, acquittal in the latter would effectively

have no impact on their outstanding period of sentence. 

CONCLUSION:

32. As a sequel to the above discussion, both the appeals are found to

be without any merit so far as conviction of the appellants under Section

307 IPC is concerned, and are dismissed accordingly. However, their

conviction under Section 148 is set­aside. Their bail bonds are cancelled

and the State of Haryana is directed to take the appellants into custody

Page | 19

       

to     serve the remainder of their five­year sentence as awarded by the

High Court.

…………………………….. J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

…………………………...J.

(SURYA KANT)

…………………………...J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

NEW DELHI

DATED : 10.12.2020

Page | 20

Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Act, 1996’ for short) seeking appointment of a Sole Arbitrator for resolving the disputes that have arisen between the parties in relation to the Sub­Lease deed dated 14.11.2018

1

REPORTABLE

     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

       ARBITRATION PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 08/2020 

Suresh Shah            .…  Petitioner(s)

Versus

Hipad Technology India Private Limited       …. Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

A.S. Bopanna, J.

1. The   petitioner   has   instituted   this   petition   under

Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

(‘Act,   1996’   for   short)   seeking   appointment   of   a   Sole

Arbitrator   for   resolving   the   disputes   that   have   arisen

between the parties in relation to the Sub­Lease deed dated

14.11.2018.  

2. The property bearing No.154­B, Block ‘A’ Sector 63,

Phase­III, NOIDA, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. having been

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initially   allotted   and   leased   by   New   Okhla   Industrial

Development Authority (‘NOIDA’ for short) under a Lease

dated 26.03.2003 had changed hands and the lease was

ultimately transferred in favour of the petitioner under a

Transfer Memorandum dated 13.04.2011.

3. The petitioner thus having acquired absolute long­term

leasehold right of the land and building referred supra has

Sub­Leased the same to the respondent under the SubLease Deed dated 14.11.2018.  In respect of the Sub­Lease

entered into between the parties, certain disputes are stated

to have arisen which is to be resolved.  Since the Sub­Lease

Deed   provides   for   resolution   of   the   disputes   through

arbitration vide Clause 12 thereof the petitioner invoked the

same by issuing a notice dated 11.12.2019, nominated the

Sole   Arbitrator   and   sought   concurrence   from   the

respondent.  The respondent did not respond to the same.

The   petitioner   is,   therefore,   before   this   Court   seeking

appointment of the Arbitrator.

4. Notice of this petition was ordered to the respondent

on 02.03.2020.   Despite service, the respondent has not

chosen to appear and oppose this petition.  In that light we

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have   heard   Mr.   Vikas   Dhawan,   learned   counsel   for   the

petitioner and perused the petition papers.

5. The parties to the petition have entered into a SubLease Deed dated 14.11.2018 whereunder the terms of lease

have been agreed to between the parties.  In respect of the

terms   and   conditions   agreed   under   the   Sub­Lease   Deed

certain disputes have arisen between the parties.   In the

Deed the parties have agreed that the disputes arising out of

the same shall be resolved through Arbitration.  The clause

thereto reads as hereunder:

“12.1   All   disputes,   differences   or

disagreements   arising   out   of,   in   connection

with or in relation to this Sub­Lease Deed,

including   w.r.t.   its   interpretation,

performance, termination, in the first instance

shall   be   endeavored   to   be   settled   through

good   faith   mutual   discussions   between   the

officials   of   the   Sub­Lessor   and   the   SubLessee.

12.2  If no settlement can be reached through

such discussions between the Parties within a

period of 21 (twenty one)days, then all such

unresolved   disputes,   differences   or

disagreements   shall   be   finally   decided

through arbitration, to be held in accordance

with   the   provisions   of   the   Arbitration   &

Conciliation   Act,   1996.     The   venue   of

arbitration   shall   be   New   Delhi   and   the

language of such arbitration shall be English.

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12.3  The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a

sole arbitrator to be mutually agreed by the

Parties.     In   the   event   of   any   disagreement

regarding   the   appointment   of   the   sole

arbitrator, the same shall only and exclusively

be appointed by the Hon’ble High Court of

Delhi at New Delhi.  The arbitral award shall

be final and binding.”

6. The   petitioner,   therefore,   got   issued   a   Notice   dated

11.12.2019   detailing   the   default   committed   by   the

respondent   which   gave   rise   to   the   dispute   between   the

parties   and   also   invoked   the   Arbitration   Clause.     The

petitioner   proposed   the   name   of   Justice   (Retired)   Mukul

Mudgal   as   the   Sole   Arbitrator   and   indicated   that   if   the

respondent does not agree to the same the petitioner would

seek appointment of Sole Arbitrator through Court.  It is in

that view the petitioner is before this Court.  

7. At the outset, a perusal of the above extracted Clause

indicates that the disputes between the parties is to  be

resolved   through   Arbitration.     A   further   perusal   of   the

Clause   indicates   that   the   parties   have   agreed   to   secure

appointment of the Arbitrator through the High Court of

Delhi at New Delhi.  It is in that view an indication to the

same effect is made in the notice dated 11.12.2019.  Though

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that be the position the description of the petitioner in the

Sub­Lease Deed as well as in the cause title to this petition

and also the averments in the petition indicate that the

petitioner is a citizen of Kenya and habitually is a resident

of Nairobi, Kenya.  Thus, the petitioner being an individual

who is a national of Kenya and is habitually a resident of

that   country;   having   entered   into   a   contract   and   since

disputes have arisen under the said document, the same

qualifies   as   an   ‘International   Commercial   Arbitration’   as

defined in Section 2(f) of Act, 1996.  In such circumstance,

Supreme   Court   is   to   appoint   an   Arbitrator   as   provided

under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 and not by the High

Court as stated in the contract entered into between the

parties.  

8. However,   before   considering   the   appointment   of

Arbitrator   the   first   part   of   Clause   12   providing   for

arbitration needs elaboration to consider the arbitrability of

the   dispute   relating   to   lease/tenancy   agreements/deeds

when such lease is governed by Transfer of Property Act,

1882 (‘TP Act’ for short) and iron out the creases on the

legal aspect.  The learned counsel for the petitioner asserts

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that the tenancy in the instant case is not created under;

nor is the leased/tenanted property governed by a special

statute where the tenant enjoys statutory protection and as

such   there   is   no   impediment   for   resolving   the   dispute

through arbitration.  On that aspect the position explained

by   the   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of  Booz   Allen   and

Hamilton Inc vs. SBI Home Finance Limited and Others

(2011) 5 SCC 532 leaves no doubt.   In order to put the

matter in perspective it would be profitable to extract para

35 and 36 which reads as hereunder:

“35. The Arbitral Tribunals are private fora

chosen   voluntarily   by   the   parties   to   the

dispute, to adjudicate their disputes in place

of courts and tribunals which are public fora

constituted under the laws of the country.

Every   civil   or   commercial   dispute,   either

contractual or non­contractual, which can be

decided by a court, is in principle capable of

being adjudicated and resolved by arbitration

unless   the   jurisdiction   of   the   Arbitral

Tribunals is excluded either expressly or by

necessary   implication.   Adjudication   of

certain categories of proceedings are reserved

by the legislature exclusively for public fora

as a matter of public policy. Certain other

categories   of   cases,   though   not   expressly

reserved   for   adjudication   by   public   fora

(courts   and   tribunals),   may   by   necessary

implication stand excluded from the purview

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of   private   fora.   Consequently,   where   the

cause/dispute   is   inarbitrable,   the   court

where a suit is pending, will refuse to refer

the parties to arbitration, under Section 8 of

the Act, even if the parties might have agreed

upon arbitration as the forum for settlement

of such disputes.

36. The   well­recognised   examples   of   nonarbitrable disputes are: (i) disputes relating

to rights and liabilities which give rise to or

arise out of criminal offences; (ii) matrimonial

disputes   relating   to   divorce,   judicial

separation,   restitution   of   conjugal   rights,

child custody; (iii) guardianship matters; (iv)

insolvency   and   winding­up   matters;   (v)

testamentary   matters   (grant   of   probate,

letters   of   administration   and   succession

certificate);   and   (vi)   eviction   or   tenancy

matters governed by special statutes where

the   tenant   enjoys   statutory   protection

against eviction and only the specified courts

are conferred jurisdiction to grant eviction or

decide the disputes.”

9. Notwithstanding the same, there is a deflection from

the settled position due to certain observations contained in

the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Himangni

Enterprises   vs.   Kamaljeet   Singh   Ahluwalia  (2017)   10

SCC 706.  In the facts therein the landlord had filed a civil

suit against the tenant for eviction.   In the said suit the

tenant filed an application under Section 8 of Act, 1996

seeking   reference   to   arbitration   since   the   parties   were

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governed by an arbitration agreement.  The Civil Court had

dismissed the application and that order was upheld by the

High Court.  The Supreme Court while deciding the same,

though relied on the decision in the case of Natraj Studios

(P) Ltd. vs. Navrang Studios (1981) 1 SCC 523 wherein the

issue   arose   in   respect   of   premises   governed   under   the

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control

Act,   1947   (Special   Statute)   and   the   case   of  Booz   Allen

(supra)   wherein   it   was   clearly   indicated   that   non

arbitrability is in respect of tenancy governed by special

statutes,   still   upheld   the   order   rejecting   the   application

under   Section   8   of   Act,   1996   seeking   reference   to

arbitration.

10. The   observations   contained   in   para   23   and   24   of

Himangni Enterprises (supra) has brought within its sweep

the   non­arbitrability   of   disputes   relating   to   the

lease/tenancy   governed   under   TP   Act.     The   said

observations read as hereunder:

“23. The learned counsel for the appellant,

however, argued that the provisions of the

Delhi Rent Act, 1995 are not applicable to

the premises by virtue of Section 3(1)(c) of

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the Act and hence, the law laid down in the

aforementioned two cases [Natraj Studios (P)

Ltd. v. Navrang   Studios,   (1981)   1   SCC

523] ,

[Booz   Allen   &   Hamilton   Inc. v. SBI

Home   Finance   Ltd.,   (2011)   5   SCC   532   :

(2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 781] would not apply. We

do not agree.

24. The Delhi Rent Act, which deals with the

cases   relating   to   rent   and   eviction   of   the

premises, is a special Act. Though it contains

a provision (Section 3) by virtue of it, the

provisions of the Act do not apply to certain

premises but that does not mean that the

Arbitration   Act,   ipso   facto,   would   be

applicable   to   such   premises   conferring

jurisdiction on the arbitrator to decide the

eviction/rent disputes. In such a situation,

the   rights   of   the   parties   and   the   demised

premises would be governed by the Transfer

of Property Act and the civil suit would be

triable   by   the   civil   court   and   not   by   the

arbitrator. In other words, though by virtue

of Section 3 of the Act, the provisions of the

Act  are  not   applicable  to   certain   premises

but no sooner the exemption is withdrawn or

ceased to have its application to a particular

premise, the Act becomes applicable to such

premises.   In   this   view   of   the   matter,   it

cannot be contended that the provisions of

the Arbitration Act would, therefore, apply to

such premises.”

11. The said observations are made by a Bench of two

Hon’ble Judges without detailed reference to the scope of

the   provisions   or   the   manner   of   right   and   protection

10

available to lessees/tenants under TP Act so as to exclude

arbitration.   In that light, another Bench of two Hon’ble

Judges speaking through R.F. Nariman J., in the case of

Vidya   Drolia   &   Ors.   vs.   Durga   Trading   Corporation

(2019)   SCC   online   SC   358   noticed   that   Natraj   Studios

(supra) had dealt with tenancy under Rent Act and Booz

Allen (supra) had made reference to special statutes and

had not stated with respect to non­arbitrability of cases

arising   under   TP   Act.     In   that   regard   having   noted   the

provision contained in Section 111, 114 and 114A of TP Act

had in para 16 concluded as follows:

“16.  In fact, a close reading of Section 114

would show that the rights of landlord and

tenant   are   balanced   by   the   aforesaid

provision. This is because where a lease of

immoveable   property   has   determined   by

forfeiture for non­payment of rent, and at the

hearing   of   the   suit,   the   lessee   pays   or

tenders   to   the   lessor   the   rent   in

arrears, together   with   interest   thereon   and

his full costs within 15 days, the Court in its

discretion may relieve the lessee against the

forfeiture. This shows two things ­ one that

the landlord's interest is secured not only by

the   deposit   of   rent   in   arrears   but   also

interest thereon and full costs of the suit.

The option given, of course, is that security

may also be given but what is important is

that   the   Court   is   given   a   discretion   in

making a decree for ejectment if this is done.

11

The discretion may be exercised in favour of

the tenant or it may not. This itself shows

that   Section   114   cannot   be   said   to   be   a

provision conceived for relief of tenants as a

class as a matter of public policy. The same

goes for Section 114A. Here again, a lessee is

given one opportunity to remedy breach of an

express condition, provided such condition is

capable of remedy. However, the exception

contained in this section shows that it is a

very limited right that is given to a tenant, as

this   would   not   apply   to   assigning,   subletting,   parting   with   the   possession,   or

disposing of the property leased, or even to

an express condition relating to forfeiture in

case of non­payment of rent. Thus, it is clear

that   every   one   of   the   grounds   stated   in

Section 111, whether read with Section 114

and/or   114A,   are   grounds   which   can   be

raised before an arbitrator to decide as to

whether a lease has or has not determined.”

12. Further, with specific reference to the consideration in

the case of Natraj Studios (supra) and Booz Allen (supra) it

was observed in para 24 of Vidya Drolia (supra) as follows:

“24. A   perusal   of   both   the   aforesaid

judgments, therefore, shows that a Transfer

of Property Act situation between a landlord

and   tenant   is   very   far   removed   from   the

situation in either Natraj  Studios (supra) or

in   sub­paragraph   (vi)   of   paragraph   36

of Booz   Allen (supra).   We   are,   therefore,   of

the respectful view that the question involved

in a Transfer of Property Act situation cannot

possibly be said to have been answered by

the two decisions of this Court, as has been

stated   in   paragraph   18   of   the   said

judgment.”

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13. In the reference made to a larger bench in the case of

Vidya Drolia (supra) several aspects arose for consideration

which has been adverted to therein.   However, the only

issue for our consideration is as to whether in the instant

case the  dispute arising under the  lease being governed

under the TP Act is arbitrable.  

14. To arrive at our conclusion, we have taken note of the

provisions contained in Section 111, 114 and 114A of the TP

Act which read as hereunder:

“111.  Determination  of  lease.— A lease of

immovable property, determines—

(a) by efflux of the time limited thereby;

(b) where such time is limited conditionally

on   the   happening   of   some   event—by   the

happening of such event;

(c)  where  the   interest  of   the   lessor  in   the

property   terminates   on,   or   his   power   to

dispose   of   the   same   extends   only   to,   the

happening of any event—by the happening of

such event;

(d) in case the interests of the lessee and the

lessor in the whole of the property become

vested at the same time in one person in the

same right;

(e) by express surrender; that is to say, in

case the lessee yields up his interest under

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the lease to the lessor, by mutual agreement

between them;

(f) by implied surrender;

(g) by forfeiture, that is to say, (1) in case the

lessee   breaks   an   express   condition   which

provides that on breach thereof the lessor

may   re­enter;   or   (2)   in   case   the   lessee

renounces his character as such by setting

up a title in a third person or by claiming

title   in   himself;   or   (3)   the   lessee   is

adjudicated   an   insolvent   and   the   lease

provides that the lessor may re­enter on the

happening of such event; and in any of these

cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice

in writing to the lessee of his intention to

determine the lease;

(h) on the expiration of a notice to determine

the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit,

the property leased, duly given by one party

to the other.”

“114.   Relief   against   forfeiture   for   nonpayment   of   rent.—   Where   a   lease   of

immovable property has been determined by

forfeiture for non­payment of rent, and the

lessor   sues   to   eject   the   lessee,   if,   at   the

hearing   of   the   suit,   the   lessee   pays   or

tenders   to   the   lessor   the   rent   in   arrear,

together with interest thereon and his full

costs of the suit, or gives such security as

the Court thinks sufficient for making such

payment within fifteen days, the Court may,

in lieu of making a decree for ejectment, pass

an   order   relieving   the   lessee   against   the

forfeiture;   and   thereupon   the   lessee   shall

hold the property leased as if the forfeiture

had not occurred.

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114A.  Relief  against   forfeiture   in  certain

other   cases.—Where a lease of immovable

property has been determined by forfeiture

for a breach of an express condition which

provides that on breach thereof the lessor

may re­enter, no suit for ejectment shall lie

unless and until the lessor has served on the

lessee a notice in writing—

(a)   specifying   the   particular   breach

complained of; and

(b)   if   the   breach   is   capable   of   remedy,

requiring the lessee to remedy the breach;

and the lessee fails, within a reasonable time

from the date of the service of the notice, to

remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedy.

Nothing   in   this   section   shall   apply   to   an

express condition against assigning, underletting,   parting   with   the   possession,   or

disposing, of the property leased, or to an

express   condition   relating   to   forfeiture   in

case of non­payment of rent.”

15. A  perusal  of the  provisions indicate  the  manner in

which the determination of lease would occur, which also

includes determination by forfeiture due to the acts of the

lessee/tenant   in   breaking   the   express   condition   agreed

between the parties or provided in law.  The breach and the

consequent forfeiture could also be with respect to nonpayment of rent. In such circumstance where the lease is

determined by forfeiture and the lessor sues to eject the

15

lessee and, if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or

tenders to the lessor the rent in arrear, Section 114 of TP

Act provides that the Court instead of passing a decree for

ejectment may pass an order relieving the lessee against the

forfeiture due to which the lessee will be entitled to hold the

property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred.  Under

Section 114A of the TP Act a condition for issue of notice

prior to filing suit of ejectment is provided so as to enable

the   lessee   to   remedy   the   breach.     No   doubt   the   said

provisions provide certain protection to the lessee/tenant

before   being   ejected   from   the   leased   property.   In   our

considered   view,   the   same   cannot   be   construed   as   a

statutory protection nor as a hard and fast rule in all cases

to waive the forfeiture. It is a provision enabling exercise of

equitable jurisdiction in appropriate cases as a matter of

discretion.   This   position   has   been   adverted   to   by   the

Supreme Court in one of its earliest decision in the case of

Namdeo  Lokman  Lodhi  vs.  Narmadabai  &  Others  (AIR

1953 SC 228) as under:  

“….. The argument of Mr. Daphtary that there

was no real discretion in the court and relief

could not be refused except in cases where

16

third party interests intervene is completely

negatived   by   the   decision   of   the   House   of

Lords in Hyman v. Rose.”

“…..With   great   respect   we   think   that   the

observations   cited   above   contain   sound

principles of law. We are, therefore, unable to

accede to the contention of Mr. Daphtary that

though section 114 of the Transfer of Property

Act   confers   a   discretion   on   the   court,   that

discretion except in cases where third party

interests intervene must always be exercised

in   favour   of   the   tenant   irrespective   of   the

conduct of the tenant.” 

16. Such   equitable   protection   does   not   mean   that   the

disputes relating to those aspects between the landlord and

the   tenant   is   not   arbitrable   and   that   only   a   Court   is

empowered   to   waive   the   forfeiture   or   not   in   the

circumstance stated in the provision.  In our view, when the

disputes arise between the landlord and tenant with regard

to determination of lease under the TP Act, the landlord to

secure   possession   of   the   leased   property   in   a   normal

circumstance is required to institute a suit in the Court

which   has   jurisdiction.     However,   if   the   parties   in   the

contract of lease or in such other manner have agreed upon

the alternate mode of dispute resolution through arbitration

the   landlord   would   be   entitled   to   invoke   the   arbitration

17

clause and make a claim before the learned Arbitrator. Even

in such proceedings, if the circumstances as contained in

Section 114 and 114A of TP Act arise, it could be brought

up before the learned Arbitrator who would take note of the

same and act in accordance with the law qua passing the

award.  In other words, if in the arbitration proceedings the

landlord   has   sought   for   an   award   of   ejectment   on   the

ground that the lease has been forfeited since the tenant

has   failed   to   pay   the   rent   and   breached   the   express

condition for payment of rent or such other breach and in

such proceedings the tenant pays or tenders the rent to the

lessor or remedies such other breach, it would be open for

the Arbitrator to take note of Section 114, 114A of TP Act

and pass appropriate award in the nature as a Court would

have considered that aspect while exercising the discretion.

17. On   the  other  hand,  the  disputes  arising  under  the

Rent Acts will have to be looked at from a different view

point and therefore not arbitrable in those cases.  This is for

the reason that notwithstanding the terms and conditions

entered into between the landlord and tenant to regulate the

tenancy, if the eviction or tenancy is governed by a special

18

statute, namely, the Rent Act the premises being amenable

to the provisions of the Act would also provide statutory

protection against eviction and the courts specified in the

Act alone will be conferred jurisdiction to order eviction or to

resolve such other disputes.   In such proceedings under

special   statutes   the   issue   to   be   considered   by   the

jurisdictional court is not merely the terms and conditions

entered into between the landlord and tenant but also other

aspects   such   as   the   bonafide   requirement,   comparative

hardship etc. even if the case for eviction is made out.  In

such circumstance, the Court having jurisdiction alone can

advert into all these aspects as a statutory requirement and,

therefore, such cases are not arbitrable.  As indicated above,

the   same   is   not   the   position   in   matters   relating   to   the

lease/tenancy  which  are  not   governed  under  the  special

statutes but under the TP Act.

18. In the backdrop of the above discussion, we are of the

considered view that insofar as eviction or tenancy relating

to matters governed by special statutes where the tenant

enjoys statutory protection against eviction whereunder the

Court/Forum is specified and conferred jurisdiction under

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the statute alone can adjudicate such matters. Hence in

such cases the dispute is non­arbitrable.   If the special

statutes   do   not   apply   to   the   premises/property   and   the

lease/tenancy created thereunder as on the date when the

cause of action arises to seek for eviction or such other relief

and in such transaction if the parties are governed by an

Arbitration   Clause;   the   dispute   between   the   parties   is

arbitrable and there shall be no impediment whatsoever to

invoke the Arbitration Clause.  This view is fortified by the

opinion   expressed   by   the   Co­ordinate   Bench   while

answering the reference made in the case of Vidya Drolia

wherein   the   view   taken   in   Himangni   Enterprises   is

overruled.       

19. As noted above, the petitioner in the instant case while

invoking the Arbitration Clause has proposed the name of

Justice (Retired) Mukul Mudgal as the Sole Arbitrator.  The

respondent neither replied to the said notice nor objected to

the Arbitrator proposed by the petitioner.  In that backdrop

since a dispute between the parties is to be resolved through

Arbitration, the prayer made in this petition is liable to be

accepted.

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20. In the  result, the petition  is allowed.   Shri  Justice

(Retired) Mukul Mudgal, former Chief Justice of Punjab and

Haryana High Court is appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to

resolve the dispute between the parties.   The arbitral fee

shall be payable as provided under the Fourth Schedule to

Act, 1996.   There shall be no order as to costs in this

petition.

  

..…………....................CJI.

      (S. A. Bobde)

…..…………....................J.

     (A. S. Bopanna)

..…..………......................J

      (V. Ramasubramanian)

December 18, 2020

New Delhi