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Thursday, June 11, 2020

i. “NBCC will not be held responsible for any existing disputes involving and in relation to the Projects; ii. NBCC will not be held responsible for any disputes arising from the contracts entered into by Amrapali in relation to the Projects; iii. NBCC will not be held responsible for any past or present liabilities in relation to the Projects, including on account of dues of homebuyers, vendors, contractors, government authorities, etc.; iv. NBCC will not be liable in relation to any disputes, including before any Court or Arbitrator, existing or arising at a later date, with the existing vendors, contractors, co-developers, landowners, homebuyers, banks, financial institutions, other lenders 2 and creditors and any government authority.”

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
I.A.NOS. 49238 OF 2020, 49239 OF 2020, I.A.NO.29350 OF 2020,
I.A.NOS. 166987 OF 2019, I.A.NO. 29699 OF 2020,
I.A.NOS.155624 OF 2019, I.A.NO.141062 OF 2019 AND
I.A.NO.49139 OF 2020
IN
WRIT PETITION [C] NO.940 OF 2017
BIKRAM CHATTERJI & ORS. … PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
O R D E R
In Re I.A.No.49238 of 2020 seeking directions filed by NBCC (I) Ltd.
1. By way of I.A. No.49238 of 2020, NBCC has submitted that it has
established the work on the following conditions:
i. “NBCC will not be held responsible for any existing
disputes involving and in relation to the Projects;
ii. NBCC will not be held responsible for any disputes
arising from the contracts entered into by Amrapali
in relation to the Projects;
iii. NBCC will not be held responsible for any past or
present liabilities in relation to the Projects,
including on account of dues of homebuyers,
vendors, contractors, government authorities, etc.;
iv. NBCC will not be liable in relation to any disputes,
including before any Court or Arbitrator, existing
or arising at a later date, with the existing vendors,
contractors, co-developers, landowners, homebuyers, banks, financial institutions, other lenders
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and creditors and any government authority.”
2. As NBCC is appointed as a Project Management Consultant to
complete various projects, it was permitted to float the tenders and
prepare DPRs. It is submitted that NBCC has completed two projects and
floated tenders for other projects, barring three projects. However,
various home buyers are approaching different courts in different
jurisdictions across the country, making NBCC a party. The
complaints/petitions are filed against NBCC seeking reliefs, such as
refund of amounts that home buyers have paid to the Amrapali Group or
to grant possession of flats, etc. The NBCC is forced to defend itself in
different Courts being a party to the said petitions. For instance, a
summon has been received from the State Consumer Redressal
Commission, Lucknow against the CMD. The NBCC has been arrayed as
respondent No.3. A complaint has also been preferred by one of the home
buyers of the Amrapali Golf Homes, Greater Noida. They are receiving
various letters, emails, messages, calls seeking updates regarding the
progress of work being undertaken by the NBCC for their respective
projects. Reply to every home buyer is a herculean task, and much time
is being consumed in the process. The NBCC is ready and willing to
submit monthly project reports with all relevant information and
photographs in respect of each project to the learned Receiver, which can
be made available on the blog/website for the information of home
buyers, for that the NBCC has already made a request to the learned
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Receiver as such various directions have been sought.
3. NBCC is asked by this Court to complete the incomplete projects.
It is not liable for any legal action. In view of the order that has been
passed by this Court, the NBCC is immune from any such actions, and
we request the Courts/ Consumer Redressal Commission and other
authorities not to permit impleadment of NBCC as respondent and not to
issue summons to NBCC as they are doing the work under the
supervision of this Court and are not answerable to any other court,
tribunal, authorities. They are granted immunity to be sued in any other
court or commission, and they are answerable to this Court only in the
pending proceedings. Thus, they cannot be dragged in the litigation filed
by existing home buyers, previous contractors, co-developers,
landowners, banks, financial institutions, other lenders and creditors,
and any Government authorities before any other Court/ Commission or
Authority.
4. It is also made clear that NBCC is not responsible for attending to
queries made by the home buyers. They have to report the progress to
the learned Receiver, and we request the learned Receiver to put progress
reports of projects on the blog/website.
With the said directions and observations, we dispose of I.A.
No.49238 of 2020.
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In Re I.A. No.29350 of 2020 in I.A. No.13175 of 2019 filed by
Royalgolf Link City Projects Private Limited
5. I.A. No.29350 of 2020 has been filed by Royalgolf Link City Projects
Private Limited for modification of order dated 11.9.2019, by which this
Court directed that a sum of Rs.48.52 crores, which was the principal
amount received by Royalgolf Link City Projects Private Limited from the
Amrapali Group to be repaid along with 12% interest by 10.1.2020 and
the attachment of 30 villas was to continue unless otherwise ordered. An
undertaking was also to be furnished by the Chief Finance Officer as well
as by all the Directors to deposit the amount as ordered. This Court
directed that 25% of the amount be paid by 30.10.2019, 30% by
30.11.2019, and the remaining amount on or before 10.1.2020. The
interest was to be calculated until the date of the payment.
6. The Royalgolf Link City Projects Private Limited, after construction,
was to give 30 villas to the Amrapali Ultra Homes as per the Agreement
entered into between them. A sum of Rs.48.52 crores was received as the
principal amount by Royalgolf Link City Projects Private Limited. The
present application has been filed to modify the order passed by this
Court because it deposited a sum of Rs.48.52 crores, but it has extreme
hardship in depositing 12% of interest on the amount mentioned above.
It is averred that due to litigation, the goodwill of the project has been
severely affected, and construction work is considerably slowed down due
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to lack of funds. The vendors have stopped offering credit. The existing
buyers are not making payments. The average yearly collections had also
dropped from Rs.61.86 crores in the year 2018-19 to Rs.17.85 crores in
2019-2020. Despite part injunction lifted by this Court, the project could
register new sales of only 15 units, and only Rs.1.42 crores could be
recovered. The banks have also stopped making further disbursement of
the retail loans to individual home buyers. Fourteen buyers have
cancelled their units. The RERA has ordered a refund of 6 units along
with interest upon the complaints filed before it. A loan was taken at a
very high rate of 21% in order to deposit the amount. It will be difficult
to repay the loan in case interest is not waived. Home buyers' interest is
at stake as the project has been delayed for more than three years due to
the injunction of this Court. This Court vide judgment dated 23.7.2019
directed various entities to deposit the amount with the Registry and did
not direct payment of any interest, but in the case of the applicant,
interest has been ordered to be paid.
7. Having heard Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel at length,
we are of the opinion that value of money increased at the hands of
Royalgolf Link City Projects Private Limited and the value of houses and
villas which were to be handed over to Ultra Homes, has also been
appreciated. Considering over all facts and circumstances of the case,
we have ordered a reasonable interest rate of 12%. As it was the money
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of home buyers, which was diverted, they must have a refund of their
money with a reasonable rate of interest. We find the hardships, which
are pointed out, are all commercial one and the Royalgolf Link City
Projects Private Limited is bound to disgorge the advantage it received
out of huge money of Rs.48.52 crores, which remained with it for a
substantial period; otherwise, it would tantamount to unjust enrichment.
It cannot be taken as a ground that in the judgment/ order dated
23.7.2019, the interest was not imposed on other entities. It has been
imposed on the facts and circumstances of the case on the Royalgolf Link
City Projects Private Limited. It is open to imposing interest and on other
persons/ entities. The question is quite open as interest was not dealt
with in the judgment dated 23.7.2019, and only the aspect of findings of
Forensic Auditors was dealt with. Thus, we find no merit in the
application, and the same is dismissed. Let interest be deposited within
six weeks, failing which appropriate action would be taken for violation
of undertaking furnished by the Chief Financial Officer and the Directors
and for violation of the order passed by this Court.
In Re. IA No.141062 of 2019 and IA No.155624 of 2019
(Release of FAR to the Noida and Greater Noida Authorities)
8. I.A. Nos.141062 of 2019 and 155624 of 2019 have been filed by the
Noida and Greater Noida Authorities respectively for issuance of direction
for return of unused FAR. The Noida Authority has prayed for the release
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of FAR of 98,445.77 sq. mtrs. as detailed in para 7 of the application.
Several other prayers have also been made. The Greater Noida Authority
also made similar prayer in the application. We are presently dealing
with the part of prayers with respect to the release of FAR.
9. It is submitted in the application that as per judgment dated
23.7.2019, directions were issued by this Court to execute tripartite
Agreement concerning projects, where flat buyers are residing within a
period of one month. The concerned authorities are duty-bound to
implement the judgment. As the Registry did not accept the review
petition, applications have been filed. The Noida Authority had allotted
a total of nine Group Housing Plots in favour of the Amrapali Group of
Companies. This Court ordered the cancellation of the lease of Amrapali
Group of Companies and the property vest in Receiver. The outstanding
dues of Rs.2,191.38 crores existed against the allotment of nine Group
Housing Plots as only partial payment has been made. This Court also
directed that the land dues can be recovered from other properties of
Amrapali Group, which have been attached. The Noida and Greater
Noida Authorities are entrusted with the task of holistic development of
the industrial area, which includes the construction of various
infrastructural projects and carrying out of municipal works, catering to
more than 15 lakhs population. The recovery of dues is necessary as it
is public money. It is submitted that as per the terms of allotment and
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lease deed, the builder was entitled to FAR at 2.75. Based on the layout
plan sanctioned by the Noida Authority, it was permissible to construct
a specified number of flats in each of the group housing plots. However,
all the flats that can be constructed within the permitted FAR are neither
under construction work nor sold. There remains unused FAR, as vacant
land, to which builder was entitled. Considering the flats that can be
constructed within the permitted FAR @ 2.75, and there are no flats
constructed on the available FAR, the unused FAR of 98,445.77 sq. mtrs.
which translates into 35,798.19 sq. mtrs. of land may be ordered to be
returned to Noida Authority. If FAR is ordered to be returned to the Noida
Authority, to some extent, the outstanding land dues can be recovered.
10. In I.A. No.155624 of 2019 filed by Greater Noida Authority, it is
submitted that there is a vacant area in square meter plot-wise within
the sanctioned FAR @ 2.75. It has also been prayed that NBCC may be
directed to complete the construction of 10,556 nos. of flats and not
11,469 nos. of flats on Plot No.GH 09, Sector Tech. Zone 4, Greater Noida.
Because of the availability of FAR @ 2.75, prayer made is to return it to
realize the dues, Rs.3,234.71 crores as on 15.1.2019, inclusive of
interest, 15% per annum with half-yearly compounding and penal
interest.
11. Learned Receiver has prayed to permit him and the Committee
assisting in proceeding to sell or otherwise transfer of unused sanctioned
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FAR, permissible FAR, and purchasable FAR, as well as additional FAR
due to existing or proposed metro line. The sale and transfer can be on
such terms as may be found profitable and expeditiously executable.
Learned Receiver shall be at liberty to invite applications from intending
purchasers by issuing public notices. Learned Receiver and the
Committee be authorized to require Noida and Greater Noida Authorities
to act in the facilitation of sale or transfer, and the authorities may be
directed to abide by instructions or compliances that may be sought by
the learned Receiver and the Committee. Learned Receiver has pointed
out that FAR's sale is necessary to complete the projects and fetch money
for incomplete projects left by the builders.
12. Our attention was drawn to a finding recorded by this Court in
judgment and order delivered on 23.7.2019 to the effect that basic
obligation was not complied with by promoter as such it was not entitled
to sell FAR. Learned Receiver pointed out that in Dream Valley Project in
Greater Noida, the authorities had sanctioned FAR @ 3.5, which include
up to 2.75 permissible FAR and 0.75 purchasable FAR. In Silicon City,
Noida, the Authority had sanctioned up to 2.75 FAR and an additional
15% FAR over and above 2.75 FAR. As this Court cancelled the leases
granted in favor of the Amrapali Group of Companies by the Noida and
Greater Noida Authorities, the rights have vested in the Receiver. The
Receiver has also attracted our attention to the findings recorded in the
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judgment to the effect that buyers have paid the dues of Noida and
Greater Noida Authorities as a component of the price for flats. Thus, the
premium and other dues payable under the lease deeds to the Noida and
Greater Noida Authorities cannot be recovered from the home buyers or
the projects in question. The directions have been issued to the effect
that Noida and Greater Noida Authorities could not sell the buildings or
demolish them nor could enforce the charge against home buyers/leased
land/projects, in the facts of the case and ultimately various directions
were issued by this Court. Relevant findings and directions are extracted
hereunder:
“122. As the basic obligations have not been complied
with by the promoters, they cannot also be entitled to FAR.
It was pointed out on behalf of Authorities that permissible
FAR is 2.75, whereas it has been wrongly mentioned and
worked out at 3.50 by the Amrapali Group. In the instant
case, we find that there is serious kind of fraud by the
promotors as such they cannot be said to be entitled to avail
the FAR to utilise it or to alienate and more so when they
have failed to complete the projects and pay the dues.
149. Because of the gross violations of the conditions of
lease deeds executed by the Noida and Greater Noida
Authorities in favour of Amrapali group of companies with
respect to various projects, are liable to be cancelled and
the rights thereupon shall vest in the Court Receiver.
150. There was no valid mortgage created in favour of
Banks and there was a huge diversion of money paid by
homebuyers which were more than required for payment of
dues of the Noida/ Greater Noida Authorities and banks.
The buyers have paid the dues of Noida and Greater Noida
authorities as a component of the price for flats. Thus, the
premium and other dues payable under the lease deeds to
the Noida and Greater Noida Authorities, cannot be
recovered from the home buyers or the projects in question.
The dues as may be ordered shall be recovered by sale of
other properties which have been created by the diversion
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of funds and have been attached by this Court. The banks
have also failed to ensure that the money was used in the
projects. As found in the forensic audit, there was no
necessity of obtaining loans from the banks and it has not
been used for the purpose it was obtained. The Authorities
and Bankers have violated the doctrine of public trust and
their officials, unfortunately, acted in collusion with
builders. The dues of the banks are also to be recovered
from the other attached properties as observed by us.
153. We have also found that non-payment of dues of the
Noida and Greater Noida Authorities and the banks cannot
come in the way of occupation of flats by home buyers as
money of home buyers has been diverted due to the inaction
of Officials of Noida/ Greater Noida Authorities. They
cannot sell the buildings or demolish them nor can enforce
the charge against homebuyers/ leased land/ projects in
the facts of the case. Similarly, the banks cannot recover
money from projects as it has not been invested in projects.
Homebuyers money has been diverted fraudulently, thus,
fraud cannot be perpetuated against them by selling the
flats and depriving them of hard-earned money and savings
of entire life. They cannot be cheated once over again by
sale of the projects raised by their funds. The Noida and
Greater Noida Authorities have to issue the Completion/
Part Completion Certificate, as the case may be, to execute
tripartite agreement and registered deeds in favour of the
buyers on part-completion or completion of the buildings,
as the case may be or where the inhabitants are residing,
within a period of one month.
154. Resultantly, we order as follows:
(i) The registration of Amrapali Group of Companies under
RERA shall stand cancelled;
(ii) The various lease deeds granted in favour of Amrapali
Group of Companies by Noida and Greater Noida
Authorities for projects in question stand cancelled and
rights henceforth, to vest in Court Receiver;
(iii) We hold that Noida and Greater Noida Authorities shall
have no right to sell the flats of the home buyers or the
land leased out for the realization of their dues. Their
dues shall have to be recovered from the sale of other
properties which have been attached. The direction holds
good for the recovery of the dues of the various Banks
also.
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(iv) We have appointed the NBCC to complete the various
projects and hand over the possession to the buyers. The
percentage of commission of NBCC is fixed at 8 percent.
(v) The home buyers are directed to deposit the outstanding
amount under the Agreement entered with the promoters
within 3 months from today in the Bank account opened
in UCO Bank in the Branch of this Court. The amount
deposited by them shall be invested in the fixed deposit
to be disbursed under the order of this Court on phasewise completion of the projects/work by the NBCC.
(vi) In view of the finding recorded by the Forensic Auditors
and fraud unearthed, indicating prima facie violation of
the FEMA and other fraudulent activities, money
laundering, we direct Enforcement Directorate and
concerned authorities to investigate and fix liability on
persons responsible for such violation and submit the
progress report in the Court and let the police also submit
the report of the investigation made by them so far.
(vii) We direct the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
to initiate the appropriate disciplinary action against Mr.
Anil Mittal, CA for his conduct as reflected in various
transactions and the findings recorded in the order and
his overall conduct as found on Forensic Audit. Let
appropriate proceedings are initiated and concluded as
early as possible within 6 months and a report of action
taken to be submitted to this Court.
(viii) We direct various Companies/ Directors and other
incumbents in whose hands money of the home buyers
is available as per the report of Forensic Auditors, to
deposit the same in the Court within one month from
today and to do the needful in the manner as observed.
The last opportunity of one month is granted to deposit
the amount and to do the needful failing which
appropriate action shall be taken against them.
(ix) Concerned Ministry of Central Government, as well as the
State Government and the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development, are directed to ensure that
appropriate action is taken as against leaseholders
concerning such similar projects at Noida and Greater
Noida and other places in various States, where projects
have not been completed. They are further directed to
ensure that projects are completed in a time-bound
manner as contemplated in RERA and home buyers are
not defrauded.
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(x) We appoint Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Senior
Advocate, as the Court Receiver. The right of the lessee
shall vest in the Court Receiver and he shall execute
through authorized person on his behalf, the tripartite
agreement and do all other acts as may be necessary and
also to ensure that title is passed on to home buyers and
possession is handed over to them.
(xi) We also direct Noida and Greater Noida Authorities to
execute the tripartite agreement within one month
concerning the projects where homebuyers are residing
and issue completion certificate notwithstanding that the
dues are to be recovered under this order by the sale of
the other attached properties. Registered conveyance
deed shall also be executed in favour of homebuyers, they
are to be placed in the possession and they shall continue
to do so in future on completion of projects or in part as
the case may be. We direct the Noida and Greater Noida
Authorities to take appropriate action to do the needful
in the matter. The Water Works Department of the
concerned area and the Electricity Supplier are directed
to provide the connections for water and electricity to
home buyers forthwith.”
13. Learned Receiver prayed for directions in respect of the sale of
balance FAR available within the sanctioned plan, unused FAR up to the
permissible limit of 2.75 or more and FAR beyond 2.75 up to 3.5 under
the purchasable scheme and other FAR which may be available due to
metro projects, etc.
14. A prayer has also been made to direct Noida and Greater Noida
Authorities/Other Authorities/Govt. Departments/Bodies to sanction
necessary plans. Concerning water and power, Electricity
Department/Authorities be directed to provide water, electricity & sewage
connection to the prospective Institution/Builders/Developers, who will
purchase the balance FAR as also to various Executing
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Agencies/Contractor who may be appointed by NBCC during (i) execution
of work, and (ii) after completion of work till handing over of possession
is also done.
15. We have heard the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
Noida and Greater Noida Authorities as well as the learned Receiver.
16. It was argued by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
Noida and Greater Noida Authorities that FAR is available at 2.75, and in
some projects, FAR at 3.50 was sanctioned by the Noida and Greater
Noida Authorities. The purchasable FAR can be 0.75, as the case may
be. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the huge
dues recoverable by Noida and Greater Noida Authorities, the FAR
deserve to be returned in favor of Noida and Greater Noida Authorities so
that they may sell it for the realisation of their dues as the recovery of
public money is to be made and authorities require money for various
development works.
17. While passing the judgment, we have noted that the Amrapali
Group of Companies worked out the price considering the premium
payable to the Noida and Greater Noida Authorities and have realized the
money from the buyers on that basis. It was also noted that diversion of
money was permitted not only by Noida and Greater Noida Authorities
but also by the bankers and other financial institutions. The concerned
15
authorities did not take timely action, and the financial institutions
resulted in projects being stalled, and now it has become tough to
complete the projects. Financial institutions/ Banks are not coming
forward to fund the incomplete projects, and the buyers who borrowed
the money from the banks have not been able to obtain possession of the
flats booked by them due to the non-completion of the projects. On the
other hand, the liability to pay the interest on the amount of loan, which
they had taken, is fastened upon them, and they have been duped by
diverting money by the builders.
18. In view of the finding recorded in the judgment delivered by this
Court on 27.3.2019, the FAR is made available only because of the
investment made by the home buyers, but for that, the FAR would not
have been available. Thus, they should have the first charge on it as they
have deposited the money which had been diverted. Thus, we find no
justification in the prayer made by the Noida and Greater Noida
Authorities to release the FAR, which was available to the erstwhile
Amrapali Group of Companies, and all the rights of the builders are now
vesting in the Receiver. A finding was recorded earlier that builders were
not entitled to release of FAR as they did not fulfil the obligation, does not
come in the way of availability of FAR to the Receiver, it can be permitted
to be sold by the Receiver and the Committee formed by this Court for
this purpose. A substantial amount has to be fetched out of the sale of
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permissible FAR, which is 2.75. Purchasable FAR, which is 0.75, as the
case may be, and due to other developments, if any other FAR is made
available, it is permitted to be sold by the Receiver and the Committee to
utilize the money to complete various projects. In case any surplus
amount of money remains after completion of the projects, appropriate
orders can be passed to release the amount to Noida and Greater Noida
Authorities after completion of projects, if the dues are not satisfied by
the sale of the property of Amrapali Group of Companies, which has been
attached pursuant to the orders of this Court. We do not find any
justification in the prayers made in I.A. Nos.141062 of 2019 and 155624
of 2019 concerning the release of FAR in favour of Noida and Greater
Noida Authorities. The prayer is resultantly rejected, and we issue the
following directions concerning the sale of FAR as prayed by the learned
Receiver:
(i) The sale of balance FAR shall be available within the Sanctioned
Plan;
(ii) The sale of unused FAR shall be up to permissible limit @ 2.75 or
more as available;
(iii) The sale of FAR beyond 2.75 up to 3.5 under the purchasable
scheme or otherwise granted in Dream Valley Project, Plot No.
GH-09, Tech Zone IV, Greater Noida, and other projects or any
increase in FAR beyond permissible/purchasable due to
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whatever reasons such as the coming up of Metro project are to
be sold & transferred under the Authority of Receiver and
Committee appointed by this Court.
(iv) The above direction will be notwithstanding any previous dues of
the Amrapali Group, their associate companies/ developers/
other contractors deployed by them, or any other
previous/present outstanding.
(v) The Noida / Greater Noida Authorities or any other Development
Authorities, where these projects are situated, will not take into
account any cost consideration and will provide additional FAR
as may be available due to existing/proposed metro line and
sanction their plans accordingly within a fixed time frame of 30
days after submission of the details and designs.
(vi) The Noida / Greater Noida Authorities / Public Authorities /
Various Service Departments / Authorities like
Water/Power/Sewage/Pollution etc. shall adhere to the advice/
request of the Receiver appointed by this Court and will consider
the same as a direction issued by this Court.
(vii) With respect to purchasable FAR, if any amount is payable to
Noida and Greater Noida Authorities it shall be paid after the sale
of the FAR.
19. Thus, I.A. Nos.141062 of 2019 and 155624 of 2019 relating to the
release of FAR are rejected. It is made clear that while passing this order,
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we have not commented on the other prayers made in the applications.
They are to be decided later on.
In Re. I.A. No.166987 of 2019 and I.A. No.29699 of 2020 in I.A.
No.166987 of 2019 filed by Vansh Consultants Private Limited.
20. I.A. No.166987 of 2019 has been filed by Vansh Consultants Private
Limited, seeking deletion of its name from the summary of Report of
Forensic Auditors contained in paragraph 60(17) of the judgment dated
23.7.2019. It is submitted that the applicant had invested Rs.10 crores
in the Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited. It has been mentioned in
the judgment that an amount of Rs.9.75 crores is recoverable from the
applicant. Due to some inadvertent error, the name of the applicant has
been mentioned as a debtor. Following is the summary of the report of
Forensic Audit in paragraph 60(17) :
“SUMMARY OF REPORT OF FORENSIC AUDIT
60. The summary of report submitted by
Forensic Auditors in the Court is as under:
17. Summary of amounts recoverable standing
as debit balances in books of accounts
Amrapali group of companies had several amounts lying in
debit balances in the form of advances recoverable on
account of long term loans to third parties, short term loans
given to third parties, advances given for purchase of plots,
advances given to creditors for materials/others etc.
Amrapali group of companies were mostly diverting loan
funds as well as home buyers funds to directors, key
managerial personnel, relatives, group companies and third
parties. They did construction activity only in part and
created a circle for movements of funds vide bogus expenses
or hollow transactions. Funds were given to several parties
in the garb of advances against purchase of land or for
19
purchasing material for construction and booked as sundry
creditors with debit balances. However, in effect such
amounts were neither returned nor any expense was
booked against them. Such amounts are as old as 2006-07,
which have not been returned or no expense has been
booked till date. Total of such recoverable amounts to
Rs.582 crore.
Top 20 of such parties with their balances are stated
hereunder:
Name of the
Company/Entity Total
Jaura Infratech
Private Limited

34,55,00,000
Mauria Udyog
Limited

22,24,34,199
Anil Kumar
Sharma

16,34,69,224
Shiv Priya
11,53,30,097
Prem Mishra
10,26,03,947
Vansh Consultants
Private Limited

9,75,00,000
Apex Infraventure
Private Limited

7,95,05,000
Rinku Computech
Private Limited

6,69,59,467
Sapphire Digital
Printers

4,46,83,088
Heart Beat City
Developers Pvt Ltd

4,29,32,000
Rubi Creations
Private Limited

4,26,27,790
Ajay Kumar
4,05,40,931
Star Land Craft
Private Limited

4,01,85,888
Heartland City
Developers Private
Limited

4,01,22,762
Vidhya Shree
Buildcon Private
Limited

4,00,00,000
Sky Tech Buildcon
Private Limited

3,88,53,775
Skyline Tele Media
Services Limited

3,48,02,771
20
Shantinath
Enterprises

3,24,71,100
Red Star Tradex P
Ltd.

3,00,00,000
Mohabbat S/o
Abbas

2,66,99,000
Total of top 20
companies/parties

1,64,72,21,039
It can be seen from records that the recoverable are due
since long and there are mostly no movements
subsequently either in the form of booking of expenses or
receipts. Out of the amounts recoverable from parties in
case of Ultra Home Construction Pvt Ltd, 20 parties having
huge balances recoverable were called for personal
interviews. 7 parties appeared and no satisfactory
explanation was provided
(Refer Annexure X.1, Volume IV page no 1015-1019).”
21. The applicant submitted that opening balances were not correctly
entered into Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited's accounting
software. The correctness of accounts of the Amrapali Group of
Companies escaped the attention of Forensic Auditors. It is submitted
that the applicant was incorporated and registered with the Registrar of
Companies, Delhi. The Amrapali Group needed infusion of money; as
such, it invested Rs.10 crores with Amrapali Leisure Valley Private
Limited in March/April 2014 and invested the amount bonafide. To
secure the return on the investment of Rs.10 crores, Amrapali Leisure
Valley Private Limited also offered allotment of flats to the applicant with
a condition of assured buy-back of flats. An agreement dated 28.3.2014
was entered into between Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited and the
applicant to secure investment of Rs.10 crores. The buy-back process
21
was to commence within 12 months from the date of the Agreement and
to be completed within 24 months. Amrapali Leisure Valley Private
Limited initially honoured its commitment of buy-back, and later on, it
started defaulting. Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited requested for
replacement of some cheques from time to time. Some cheques were
dishonoured. Proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act are pending before the Trial Court. A statement about
the receipt of Rs.8 crores has been filed.
22. Vide email dated 21.11.2018, the Forensic Auditors sought the
statement of accounts of inter-corporate deposits of the applicant with
the Amrapali Group of Companies. A reply to which was submitted on
29.11.2018 by the applicant. The Forensic Auditors made certain queries
on 30.11.2018. A reply to which was sent on 2.12.2018 by the applicant.
Thereafter, on 3.12.2018, the Forensic Auditors requested the presence
of the Directors of the company. On 6.12.2018, the Directors of the
company, along with their Chartered Accountant, visited the Forensic
Auditor's office. The Enforcement Directorate issued a letter dated
18.10.2019 to the applicant based on the judgment and facts mentioned
in the report of the Forensic Auditors. The applicant was not a party to
the petition. The applicant submitted that Rs.10 crores' investment was
not reflected in the opening balance of the Amrapali Leisure Valley Private
Limited. An amount of Rs.8 crores received by the applicant from
22
Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited has not been reconciled against
the payment of Rs.10 crores paid by the applicant. The applicant
company does not owe any loan to the Amrapali Group of Companies or
the home buyers. The applicant is entitled to receive money from
Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited. The incomplete entries in the
books of accounts of the Amrapali Group of Companies have resulted in
an incorrect appreciation of entries about the applicant company. Thus,
the prayer has been made to delete the applicant's name from the table
contained in paragraph 60(17) of the judgment dated 23.7.2019.
23. In continuation of I.A. No.166987 of 2019, I.A. No.29699 of 2020
has been filed for directions. It is submitted that the Forensic Auditor’s
report violates the principles of natural justice. The Forensic Auditors
have shown the applicant as an inter-corporate depositor. The Forensic
Auditors sent an email dated 6.2.2020 to Mr. Raj Kumar Jain, Mr. Balbir
Singh Malhotra, and Mr. Sandeep, requesting them to present for
examination on 11.2.2020 and a reminder was received on 10.2.2020.
The applicant's counsel sent an email on 10.2.2020, requesting for books
of accounts of Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited to be kept ready.
The Forensic Auditors called each of the Directors of the company
separately one by one. The Forensic Auditors made a fishing and roving
inquiry. The applicant submitted that the imposition of liability of
Rs.9.75 crores is an error.
23
24. We have heard Mr. Anoop G. Chaudhari, learned senior counsel and
Mr. Pawan Kumar Aggarwal, the Forensic Auditor at length. Learned
senior counsel on behalf of applicant argued that the applicant invested
Rs.10 crores in Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited's project between
28.3.2014 to 4.4.2014. The amount of Rs.10 crores was invested in
Vansh Consultants by M/s. Harsh International, a partnership firm of
two brothers Yogesh Jain and R.K. Jain, located in Noida SEZ, a part of
Mahak Group. To safeguard the investment and funds, Mr. R.K. Jain
was inducted as a Director in Vansh Consultants on 9.8.2014. By way
of post-dated cheques, the applicant received only Rs.8 crores so far. The
post-dated cheques of Rs.11.25 crores were dishonored; as such, five
complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were
filed. The Forensic Auditors had asked the applicant to submit the
statement of accounts of inter-corporate deposits between 1.4.2008 and
30.9.2018. The Forensic Auditors, before submission of the report to this
Court, asked the applicant for certain information, which were given on
6.12.2018. This Court asked the Forensic Auditors to clarify the position
vide order dated 13.1.2020. This is a case of an obvious error on the part
of the Forensic Auditors. The applicant cannot be an inter-corporate
depositor of Rs.10 crores as well as a debtor of Rs.9.75 crores to Amrapali
Leisure Valley Private Limited. The Forensic Auditors have failed to take
note of the credit entries, bank transfers, the return of Rs.8 crores
received by the applicant by post-dated cheques, cheque bouncing cases
24
pending before the Trial Court and debit and credit entries have not been
reconciled. It is submitted that the applicant has received notice from
the Enforcement Directorate based on the incorrect report of the Forensic
Auditors. Thus, prayer for deletion of the applicant's name from the
judgment and the report of Forensic Auditor has been made.
25. The Forensic Auditor, Shri Pawan Agrawal, pointed out in detail the
various facts in the documents submitted by the applicant itself. It was
pointed out that there was nothing to dispute the debit entries made in
the accounts of Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited, and on
interrogation, the facts could not be explained. Several shell companies
were created or used to divert the money of home buyers. Forensic
Auditor further pointed out that the agreement entered into between
Vansh Consultants Private Limited and Amrapali Leisure Valley Private
Limited is dubious and designed to hide actual transactions behind this
agreement. Forensic Auditor also pointed out that the tower number
given in the agreement is F2, having total 34 floors (G+33) and 102 flats.
Amrapali Leisure Valley Pvt. Ltd. has no sanction plan of constructing
any building of 34 floors. Further, there is no tower, namely, F2. The
tower and flats mentioned in the agreement were not in existence at any
point of time.
26. Forensic Auditor further pointed out that it was mentioned in the
agreement that an amount of Rs 10 crores would be returned in a year
25
and Rs. 10 crores would be paid over and above the principal of Rs.10
crores in the next two years. This has resulted into an interest of Rs.10
crores on an amount of Rs.10 crores used for a year and after refund
interest of Rs.10 crores was payable. The agreement is beyond any
financial prudence, and only an insane businessman will agree to borrow
funds at such a high interest rate of 100 percent. Forensic Auditor
pointed out that it is a case of money laundering and the agreement was
dubious. Vansh Consultants Private Limited was not having the money,
it came in bank account in order to route it to Amrapali Leisure Valley
Pvt. Ltd. The learned Auditor also pointed out from the bank statement
filed by the applicant along with the application that it did not have the
money for transaction. It was routed for the purpose. The transactions
were only a conduit to move the money. The bank account shows no
other activity. Thus, no case is made out by the applicant.
27. Considering the material on record, deficiencies pointed out by
Forensic Auditor and the books of accounts of Amrapali Leisure Valley
Private Limited, the entries made therein, there is nothing to doubt the
correctness of the report of the Forensic Auditors, who made detailed
enquiries. The Directors were heard during Forensic Audit, and we find
that no case is made out to delete the name of the applicant from the
report of Forensic Audit as reflected in the judgment and order passed by
this Court, and we find no ground to doubt the correctness of the report
26
of the Forensic Auditors. No doubt about it that queries were made with
respect to inter-corporate deposit. Merely mentioning in the letter or
query to furnish details of the inter-corporate deposit made to be
submitted by the applicant, is not decisive of the fact as to what is the
ultimate transaction of the applicant with Amrapali Leisure Valley Private
Limited. The transactions do not inspire confidence, the towers and flats
were never sanctioned. The Agreement, which has been filed concerning
the investment of Rs.10 crores, shows that it wanted to purchase the
flats. It cannot be said to be the case of simplicitor of investment made.
The rate of interest fixed was also a method to take out buyer’s money in
a dubious manner. The documents of applicant are contradicted by the
accounts maintained by Amrapali Leisure Valley Private Limited. In the
facts and circumstances of the case, we find that no case is made out to
allow the prayers made in the applications. The applications are bereft
of any merits and are hereby dismissed.
In Re. Financing of Home Buyers by Banks
28. Learned Receiver submitted that the RBI may be directed to advise
all banks and financial institutions such as insurance companies, and
employers of the establishments which have sanctioned home loans to
home buyers to disburse all balance loan amounts to the home buyers
whose accounts are regular and they will abide by instructions issued by
the Receiver in this regard. It is further pointed out that banks have
27
certain reservations regarding the funding of NPA accounts. In view of
current social and economic conditions, the Court may direct the RBI to
keep its circulars/guidelines relating to NPA in abeyance and permit all
banking and financial institutions, etc. to disburse loans to home buyers
notwithstanding the status of accounts as NPA. Banks and financial
institutions be directed to work out a long-term restructuring of all home
buyers' loans about Amrapali Projects as well as any charges on the
Amrapali project held by banks and financial institutions.
29. On the previous date of hearing, i.e., 27.5.2020, we requested
Mr.Vikramjit Banerjee, learned ASG to obtain instructions from the RBI
concerning the release of loans by the banks and other financial
institutions to the home buyers. It was clearly stated that RBI
instructions do not come in the way of releasing home buyers' loans
whose accounts are NPAs. It would be for the banks and other financial
institutions to release the loan. In the facts and circumstances,
appropriate directions can be issued by this Court, and the RBI
guidelines would not come in the way in the facts of the case. Learned
counsel appearing for the banks pointed out that they are ready to release
the loan to the home buyers. However, it would be in a phased manner
and as per the stage of construction, they would be releasing the loan to
the particular home buyer.
28
30. Considering the aforesaid and in the facts and circumstances of the
case, as projects have been stalled for the last several years, the home
buyers have obtained loans but cannot enjoy the fruits of their
investment. At the same time, if projects are not completed and home
buyers are not sure of handing over of flats, it would be difficult for them
to pay bank dues till eternity and it is in the interest of home buyers as
well as banks and financial institutions as they can recover money when
projects are completed in an effective manner. We direct the banks and
financial institutions to release loans to home buyers, whose loans have
been sanctioned, notwithstanding the fact that their accounts are
declared as NPAs. Let there be restructuring of the loan amount. It may
be released under the current norms of the RBI for releasing loans and
the rates fixed by the RBI therefor. The disbursement of further loans
may be based on the present rate of interest fixed by the RBI; this we
order in the peculiar facts of the case. It may be released stage-wise and
long-term restructuring of the loans may be done so that construction is
completed and buyers are able to repay the loan. Ordered accordingly.
In Re. I.A. No. 49139 of 2020 (Interest to be realized on the
outstanding dues by Noida and Greater Noida Authorities)
31. Learned Receiver has pointed out that there is a lack of clarity
concerning dues of local authorities/banks/lenders. It has been
submitted that proper relaxations and concessions are required to be
given concerning such dues.
29
32. In the interlocutory application filed by Ace Group of Companies,
precarious conditions in the entire Noida and Greater Noida region faced
by the developers have been pointed out. It is submitted that following
economic recession in the last decade, the entire real estate sector has
gone downwards and facing acute financial crunch and is fighting for its
survival. The projects are incomplete, there were various litigations
which created a huge financial impact and non-delivery of projects, which
reflects the pathetic condition of the real estate sector. Multiple issues
are pointed out, which are adding to the woes of the developers. It is
averred that the developers and the home buyers both are adversely
affected due to non-delivery of booked flats in the regions of Noida and
Greater Noida etc.
33. The Ace Group of Companies obtained the plots between the period
2010 and 2015 from the Authorities in the aforesaid areas. The Noida
Authority is raising additional demand at the rate of Rs.600 per square
meter, whereas Greater Noida Authority is raising demand at the rate of
Rs.1700 per square meter. Due to recession, developers operating in the
region were not able to receive the requisite amount on time from home
buyers. For one reason or the other, development work of the projects
was halted. The Authorities are levying excessive interest and penal
interest, which continues to rise exponentially, culminating into huge
dues, and in some cases, the cost of the allotted land has doubled than
30
what it was originally fixed at the time of allotment over a period of time
and that the premium of the land has enhanced manifold after adding
the interest and penal interest thereon, and other liabilities are also
fastened. There is also considerable delay in the completion of the
projects as scheduled initially. The cost of completion of the project has
thus increased manifold due to delay in construction and has also
resulted in price rise of important construction components, material,
and labour. The burden of Service Tax and other cess and statutory
charges have also increased manifold. Though various companies
managed to raise the construction, however, the cost of land originally
allotted has doubled. The real estate sector is facing financial distress
due to the various intervening factors. The rate of interest has also gone
down substantially. Due to delay, in may cases refund order has also
been passed by Consumer Forums, which is adding financial constraints
on the part of developers. They are on the verge of completely financially
drained out. It is urged that interest rate and the delayed penalty being
charged by the Authorities on the allotted plots of land is excessively
higher than the prevailing financial market scenario whereas there has
been gradual and consistent fall in the interest rates since 2010 itself.
However, the interest rates of the Authorities have remained exorbitant
contrary to the prevailing economic situation of the country. The rates of
interest charged by the Authorities are exremely high. Apart from that,
penal interest on delayed payment is also added. The rates have been
31
increased from 11% to 14% - 15% to 18% - 23% per annum.
34. It is submitted by SBI MCLR (Marginal Cost of Funds based Lending
Rate) rate of interest for three years is 7% to 8%, and in the last six
months, it has further come down to 7.85%. If the base rate of SBI MCLR
is compared with the interest rate charged by the Noida and Greater
Noida Authorities, one can easily find out that it has drastically been
reduced over the years and ranges between 7.5% to 8.15% over the last
ten years. The rate and historical data on the base rate of SBI is filed.
35. It is further averred that over a period of time in the last five years,
the Banks have also reduced the interest paid on Fixed Deposits and
currently, it ranges between 6% to 7% only. However, Noida and Greater
Noida Authorities, despite allotting encumbered and disputed land
coupled with various other issues, failed to take any step to either reduce
the exorbitant rate of interest or completely waive off the interest and
other charges on account of delay and default in paying the land dues.
The Developers and the applicants and home buyers have acquired
valuable right in the land by paying the hefty amount. The developers
have made numerous efforts by approaching the concerned authorities
for redressal of their grievances. Till date, there has been no resolution.
Neither the Authorities nor the State Government has taken the issues
seriously. The issue of the interest affects the public at large, particularly
the home buyers and the interest of banks and financial institutions as
32
well besides that of Authorities. It is not possible to pay their dues.
Presently, in the wake of COVID 19 pandemic and its outbreak in India,
there is a continuous nation-wide lockdown. There have been absolutely
no business and commercial activities in this sector, and the entire real
estate industry has come to a grinding halt causing further financial
losses and damages to the real estate sector, which is generally in a
precarious condition in the Delhi/ NCR region. Therefore, prayer has
been made that there should be a complete waiver of interest component
in the repayment of land dues of Noida and Greater Noida Authorities,
and payment schedule towards lease rent and premium may be extended.
It is further submitted that various companies have stopped production
of the construction/ building material in the wake of lockdown. Most of
the labourers have gone back to their home States resulting in shortage
of labourers. In short, it is submitted that the real estate sector is facing
a crisis, and due to various aforesaid reasons, the timeline for completion
of projects may be deferred by one more year. Due to excessive lease
rent, penalty and interest charged and levied, additional land costs
demanded, and charged on the land allotted, various projects are stalled.
Most of the projects have acquired the status of dormant projects.
36. We are considering prayer Nos.1 and 2 of the I.A. with respect to
interest to be realized on the outstanding dues by Noida and Greater
Noida Authorities.
33
37. The rates of SBI MCLR is reduced to 7.45 % in the year 2020 from
8.95% in the year 2016. It is clear that the Noida and Greater Noida
Authorities, on the outstanding dues, are realizing the dues from all such
projects, interest at exorbitant rate such as 15% per annum with halfyearly compounding and in addition are also realizing penal interest on
the amount as fixed from time to time.
38. We have noted in the judgment dated 23.7.2019 the figure given by
the Noida and Greater Noida Authorities that after 2005, 114 plots had
been allotted to various group housing societies. 81 plots were handed
over the possession on payment of 10% of the total premium. 29 projects,
out of 81 were completed. Out of the other 33 allotted earlier, 11 were
completed, and 7 obtained part-completion certificates. Thus, it is
apparent that more than 60% of projects have not been able to come up
so far. We have also noted that the Noida and Greater Noida Authorities
did not take the step of termination of leases for various reasons. A large
number of home buyers have been waiting now approximately for the last
8 to 10 years or more for completion of houses. It is not in dispute that
the real estate sector has suffered a setback at present. It contributes to
the GDP of the country. As a large number of projects have not come up,
at the same time, Noida and Greater Noida Authorities have not been able
to realize their dues from such projects which are being piled up for the
last several years, at the same time interest of home buyers has
34
intervened. Even on the plots where the land was allotted from 2005
onwards, the projects have not been completed so far, though the buyers
have paid their money. The Noida and Greater Noida Authorities are not
issuing completion certificates to such projects and they are not able to
realize their outstanding dues. For various reasons, constructions have
not been completed, including due to diversion of funds. There is a failure
to comply with the obligation to the home buyers whose money has been
invested in the partially constructed structure and partial dues have been
paid to the Noida and Greater Noida Authorities.
39. It cannot be disputed that the rate of interest, on which agreements
were entered into, has gone down by now. The present lending rate is
much below and the RBI has taken several steps to revive the economy.
In such a scenario, it would never be possible to make payment of interest
at the rate fixed by authorities and also a penal interest to be realized by
concerned authorities. The home buyers are not able to obtain fruits of
the investment and are deprived of legal title of the flats.
40. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for Noida and Greater
Noida Authorities. Learned senior counsel also drew our attention to the
following observations made by this Court in the judgment dated
23.7.2019:
"72. In our opinion, if the real estate business has to
survive in India, it has to be answerable to the public and
has necessarily to uphold the trust reposed in
35
builders/promoters. They have been paid huge amounts
not only by the home buyers but also, they have to pay a
huge amount for the public land given to them on lease by
Noida and Greater Noida Authorities for construction of
houses. The land has been given to them by the authorities
on a concessional basis by making payment of 10% amount
at the time of allotment. The builders have to be
accountable to public/home buyers as well as the
authorities and bankers. It is a matter relating to housing
needs dealing with shelter place, such an activity is of the
public importance as the real estate sector plays a pivotal
role in the fulfillment of needs of housing infrastructure."
41. It was also argued by the learned senior counsel that even if the
builder may have factored the valuation of price, including interest on the
cost of the land, the lease deed and the authorities will remain unaffected.
A prayer was made that the authorities may be given liberty to recover
their amount of interest from the builder at the contractually agreed rate
under the lease deed. It was lastly and rightly pointed out that the Court
can fix a reasonable rate of interest. Considering the present scenario,
we feel that the aforesaid submission is justified.
42. Considering the current state of real estate, the projects are
standstill, and in order to give impetus to such housing projects and
mainly considering plight of home buyers and as pointed out by Noida
and Greater Noida Authorities that 114 plots were allotted from 2005
onwards, most of projects are incomplete; we direct that rate of interest
on the outstanding premium and other dues to be realized in all such
cases at the rate of 8% per annum and let the Noida and Greater Noida
Authorities do a restructuring of the repayment schedule so that amount
36
is paid and Noida and Greater Noida Authorities are able to realize the
same. As to reasonable time frame, we would like to hear the parties. In
case of failure to pay, the concession granted shall stand withdrawn.
However, at the same time, the Noida and Greater Noida Authorities shall
also ensure that not only instalments/money are deposited, but also all
such projects are completed within the stipulated time.
 ...……………………J.
 (Arun Mishra)
 ...……………………J.
 (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi;
June 10, 2020.

negligent driving of the bus driver who hit a lorry from behind. As a consequence of the injuries suffered, the left leg of the appellant had to be amputated. The Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.4,08,850/­. The High Court in appeal enhanced 1 the same to Rs.5,10,350/­. The appeal preferred by the respondent Corporation was dismissed.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2551 OF 2020
(arising out of SLP (Civil) No(s). 1738 of 2018)
SRI ANTHONY alias ANTHONY SWAMY ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, K.S.R.T.C. ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellant is in appeal aggrieved by the order of the High
Court, claiming inadequacy of compensation granted to him in a
motor accident case.
3. The   appellant   was   travelling   in   a   bus   of   the   respondent
Corporation and met with an accident on 19.02.2010, due to rash
and negligent driving of the bus driver who hit a lorry from behind.
As   a   consequence   of   the   injuries   suffered,   the   left   leg   of   the
appellant   had   to   be   amputated.   The   Tribunal   awarded   a
compensation of Rs.4,08,850/­. The High Court in appeal enhanced
1
the same to Rs.5,10,350/­. The appeal preferred by the respondent
Corporation was dismissed. 
4. Shri   Ashwin   Kotemath,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant
submitted that the compensation enhanced by the High Court is
niggardly and grossly inadequate considering the nature of injuries
suffered.  The appellant was a painter by vocation. He had a daily
income of Rs.300/­ cumulated at Rs.9,000/­ per month, supported
by the evidence of his employer PW.2, which has been wrongly
rejected.  The permanent disability of the appellant contrary to the
evidence of PW.3, Dr. S. Ramachandra the treating Doctor, has been
wrongly fixed at 25% of the whole body without any reasoning to
support the same, in the nature of the injury, suffering, future
medical   treatment   and   loss   of   future   income   caused   to   the
appellant.
5. Shri S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted
that the High Court has reasonably enhanced the compensation
and   it   calls   for   no   interference.   The   appellant   had   failed   to
substantiate   the   claimed  income   with   substantive  evidence.  The
2
extent   of   disability   suffered   has   been   adequately   assessed.   The
evidence  of  the  employer  and  the  treating  doctor  have  all  been
considered adequately.
6. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties.
The appellant was initially taken to the government hospital on the
date   of   the   accident   but   was   shifted   to   a   private   hospital   on
25.02.2010 where he remained as an inpatient till 16.09.2010 and
also underwent surgery requiring amputation of his left leg from
above   the   knee.     PW.3,   the   treating   doctor,   deposed   that   the
appellant had suffered Type III ‘B’ commuted fracture of Tibia and
Fibula   of   the   left   leg   with   an   active   infection   of   Chronic
Osteomyelitis   emanating   foul   smell   which   prevented   him   from
mixing   and   socialising   in   public.   There   was   no   alternative   to
amputation and fixation of an artificial leg. The physical disability
suffered by the appellant of the left lower limb was assessed at 75%
which was about 37.5% of the whole body. PW.3 further opined that
the appellant had suffered shortening of the left lower limb by 3
cms. He could not stand independently or walk without aid of a
walker or attendant. The appellant cannot sit cross legged, squat or
3
use an Indian toilet. He could not climb up and down a staircase.
The appellant was incapable of any manual work including painting.
The appellant who was 45 years of age, considering average life
expectancy   of   65   years   would   require   at   least   three   further
replacements of the artificial limb in his lifetime, the cost of which
was assessed at approximately between Rs.75,000 to Rs.1,50,000/­.
7.  The High Court enhanced the monthly income of the appellant
to   Rs.5,500/­.   He   has   been   awarded   a   sum   of   Rs.1,00,000/­
towards   pain   and   suffering   and   Rs.7,350/­   towards   medical
expenses along with Rs.21,000/­ for attendant charges.  The loss of
earnings during the period of treatment has been enhanced by the
High Court to Rs.66,000/­. Conveyance charges have been paid at
Rs.10,000/­.  We find no reason to interfere to the aforesaid extent.
8.  The physical disability of the appellant without any reasoning
has been assessed at 25% of the whole body with which we are
unable to concur. The compensation granted towards loss of future
earning   on   account   of   disability   at   Rs.2,31,000/­   is   considered
grossly inadequate in the facts and circumstances of the case, as
4
also   the   compensation   of   Rs.50,000/­   towards   future   medical
expenses and only Rs.25,000/­ towards loss of amenities.   
9.  PW.3 had assessed the physical functional disability of the left
leg of the appellant at 75% and total body disability at 37.5%. The
High Court has considered it proper to assess the physical disability
at 25% of the whole body only. There is no discussion for this
reduction in percentage, much less any consideration of the nature
of permanent functional disability suffered by the appellant. The
extent of physical functional disability, in the facts of the case has
to   be   considered   in   a   manner   so   as   to   grant   just   and   proper
compensation to the appellant towards loss of future earning. The
earning capacity of the appellant as on the date of the accident
stands completely negated and not reduced.  He has been rendered
permanently incapable of working as a painter or do any manual
work. Compensation for loss of future earning therefore has to be
proper and  just to enable  him to  live a  life  of dignity and  not
compensation which is elusive.  If the 75% physical disability has
rendered   the   appellant   permanently   disabled   from   pursuing   his
normal vocation or any similar work, it is difficult to comprehend
5
the grant of compensation to him in ratio to the disability to the
whole body. The appellant is therefore held entitled to compensation
for loss of future earning based on his 75% permanent physical
functional disability recalculated with the salary of Rs.5,500/­with
multiplier of 14 at Rs. 6,93,000/­.
10.  Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and another, 2011 (1) SCC 343
lucidly sets out the principles for grant of compensation in cases of
permanent physical functional disability as follows:
“10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability
as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation
under the head of loss of future earnings would depend
upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability
on   his   earning   capacity.   The   Tribunal   should   not
mechanically   apply   the   percentage   of   permanent
disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of
earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of
economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning
capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be
different from the percentage of permanent disability.
Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a
particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability
would   result   in   a   corresponding   loss   of   earning
capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced
show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that
there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of
the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of
earning   capacity   to   the   extent   (percentage)   of
6
permanent disability will result in award of either too
low or too high a compensation.
11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the
effect   of   the   permanent   disability   on   the   earning
capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of
earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income,
it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at
the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard
multiplier   method   used   to   determine   loss   of
dependency). We may however note that in some cases,
on   appreciation   of   evidence   and   assessment,   the
Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning
capacity   as   a   result   of   the   permanent   disability,   is
approximately the same as the percentage of permanent
disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will
adopt   the   said   percentage   for   determination   of
compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this
Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance
Co. Ltd.  and  Yadava Kumar  v.  National Insurance Co.
Ltd.)
xxxx xxxx xxxx
13.   Ascertainment   of   the   effect   of   the   permanent
disability on the actual earning capacity involves three
steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities
the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent
disability and what he could not do as a result of the
permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding
compensation under the head of loss of amenities of
life).   The   second   step   is   to   ascertain   his   avocation,
profession and nature of work before the accident, as
also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the
claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of
livelihood,   or   (ii)   whether   in   spite   of   the   permanent
disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on
the   activities   and   functions,   which   he   was   earlier
carrying   on,   or   (iii)   whether   he   was   prevented   or
7
restricted from discharging his previous activities and
functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale
of activities and functions so that he continues to earn
or can continue to earn his livelihood.
14.   For   example,   if   the   left   hand   of   a   claimant   is
amputated,   the   permanent   physical   or   functional
disablement   may   be   assessed   around   60%.   If   the
claimant was a driver or a carpenter, the actual loss of
earning capacity may virtually be hundred per cent, if
he is neither able to drive or do carpentry. On the other
hand, if the claimant was a clerk in government service,
the   loss   of   his   left   hand   may   not   result   in   loss   of
employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as
he  could  perform his   clerical  functions;  and   in  that
event the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in
the case of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the
actual physical disability, but far less. In fact, there
may not be any need to award any compensation under
the head of “loss of future earnings”, if the claimant
continues  in  government  service,  though  he  may  be
awarded   compensation   under   the   head   of   loss   of
amenities   as   a   consequence   of   losing   his   hand.
Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in
service, but may not be found suitable for discharging
the duties attached to the post or job which he was
earlier holding, on account of his disability, and may
therefore be shifted to some other suitable but lesser
post   with   lesser   emoluments,   in   which   case   there
should be a limited award under the head of loss of
future   earning   capacity,   taking   note   of   the   reduced
earning capacity.
11. In  Nagarajappa   vs.   Divisional   Manager,   Oriental
Insurance   Company   Limited,  2011 (13) SCC 323, the physical
8
disability of the upper limb was determined as 68% in proportion to
22­23% of the whole­body.  This court opined as follows:
“9. On perusal of the doctor’s evidence with respect to the
nature of injuries suffered by the appellant, the appellant
was found, inter alia, to be suffering from the following
disabilities as a result of the accident—“gross deformity of
the left forearm, wrist and hand, wasting and weakness of
the muscles of the left upper limb and shortening of the
left upper limb by 1 cm”. As a result, the doctor stated
that the appellant could not work as a coolie and could
not also do any other manual work. The doctor assessed
permanent residual physical disability of the upper limb at
68% and 22­23% of the whole body.
10. The appellant is working as a manual labourer, for
which he requires the use of both his hands. The fact that
the   accident   has   left   him   with   one   useless   hand   will
severely affect his ability to perform his work as a coolie or
any other manual work, and this has also been certified
by the doctor. Thus, while awarding compensation it has
to be kept in mind that the appellant is to do manual work
for the rest of his life without full use of his left hand, and
this is bound to affect the quality of his work and also his
ability to find work considering his disability. Hence, while
computing   loss   of   future   income,   disability   should   be
taken   to   be   68%   and   not   20%,   as   was   done   by   the
Tribunal and the High Court. Our view is supported by the
ratio in Raj Kumar and from the fact that the appellant is
severely hampered and perhaps forever handicapped from
performing his occupation as a coolie.”
12. The High Court also erred in granting a sum of Rs.50,000/­
only   towards   future   medical   expenses.   PW.3   deposed   that   the
9
appellant would require three more replacements of the artificial left
leg during his lifetime.  We consider it proper to enhance the same
by Rs.2,50,000/­   in addition to that granted by the High Court.
The   compensation   granted   towards   loss   of   amenities   is   also
enhanced   to   Rs.50,000/­   considering   that   the   appellant   was
deprived of social mixing as deposed by PW.3.
13.  Thus,   the   compensation   awarded   by   the   High   Court   is
modified and recalculated as under:
Sr.
No.
Particulars Amount
(in Rs.)
1. Pain and sufferings 1,00,000
2. Medical expenses 7,350
3. Attendant charges 21,000
4. Loss   of   earnings   during   the   period   of
treatment
66,000
5. Conveyance charges 10,000
6. Loss   of   future   earnings   on   account   of
disability
6,93,000
7. Future medical expenses 2,50,000
8. Loss of amenities 50,000
TOTAL 11,97,350
10
14. We modify the award of the High Court accordingly to be paid
along with interest @ 6 per cent from the date of petition till the
realization.
15. The appeal is allowed.
.……………………….J.
(R.F. Nariman)
………………………..J.
   (Navin Sinha) 
………………………..J.
   (B.R. Gavai) 
New Delhi,
June 10, 2020
11

on three grounds, namely, arrears of rent, bonafide requirement for additional accommodation for the landlord’s business, and material damage to the premises, under Sections 11(2)(b), 11(8) and 11(4)(ii), respectively, of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 [“Kerala Rent Control Act”].

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2528-29 OF 2020
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) Nos.4492-4493 of 2018)
Addissery Raghavan …Appellant
Versus
Cheruvalath Krishnadasan …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
R.F. Nariman, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In the present case, the appellant is the tenant of two shop
rooms – one on the ground floor and the other on the first floor, each
admeasuring 60 square feet. The tenant is doing textile business in the
room situated on the ground floor, using the first floor as a godown.
The ground floor room was let to the tenant on 10.10.1991 at a
monthly rent of Rs.300/- which was later enhanced to Rs.800/-. The
first floor room was let to the tenant on 10.07.1998 at a monthly rent of
Rs.250/- which was later enhanced to Rs.317/-.
3. The respondent-landlord filed eviction petitions being RCP No.
175/2013 as well as RCP No.176/2013 on 11.10.2013 in respect of the
1
two rooms in question. The said petitions were filed on three grounds,
namely, arrears of rent, bonafide requirement for additional
accommodation for the landlord’s business, and material damage to
the premises, under Sections 11(2)(b), 11(8) and 11(4)(ii), respectively,
of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 [“Kerala
Rent Control Act”].
4. The trial court in its judgment dated 28.02.2015, held against the
landlord on the first and the third ground. However, so far as bonafide
requirement of additional accommodation was concerned, it was held
by the trial court that the landlord is the Managing Partner of M/s
Prabeesh Constructions, and that since the office of this firm was
presently only in a small room in the same building, the other two
rooms would be required by way of additional accommodation for
installing staff members and materials. The trial court found that the
Commissioner’s Report in the present case did not point out that any
particular rooms were vacant in the premises. Equally, the production
of Exhibit B3, i.e., the Building Tax Assessment Register, which
recorded that some rooms in the ownership of the landlord are vacant
could not be relied upon. Further, it was held that the tenant had in his
possession another room in a neighbouring building, albeit leased by
his mother-in-law, and stating that, since the mother-in-law was not
2
examined by the tenant, the reasonable inference that could be drawn
is that the aforesaid room is in possession of the tenant. Finally, on
comparative hardship, the trial court held that the landlord will be able
to run his establishment in a better manner, whereas the tenant is not
able to establish much hardship caused to him. In this view of the
matter, the eviction petitions were decreed under Section 11(8) of the
Kerala Rent Control Act.
5. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, by its judgment dated
30.01.2016, reversed the judgment of the trial court. It held:
“12. According to the appellant, if at all the respondent
needs any rooms for the purpose of expanding his office,
suitable rooms are available in his possession. It has
come in evidence that in the building in which the petition
schedule rooms are situated, there are as many as 36
rooms. According to the appellant, the same rooms are
lying vacant in this building. The respondent would deny
the contention. But in Ex.C1 report, the Commissioner
only would say that majority of the rooms in the building
are leased out. This shows that some of the rooms in the
occupation of the petitioner are lying vacant. It is true that
the Commissioner has not specified the number of rooms
lying vacant. The appellant also could not point out the
number of the rooms lying vacant in the possession of the
petitioner.”
Apart from this, it also relied upon several vacant rooms being
available in several other buildings owned by the landlord. So far as
Exhibit B3 is concerned, the trial court’s finding was reversed, stating:
“16. The lower court has blamed the appellant for not
producing any documents to show that vacant rooms are
3
available in the possession of the respondent. I cannot
agree with the observation made by the lower court.
When there is an admission by PW1 that there are vacant
rooms, there is no need to produce any document. It can
also be seen that the appellant has produced Ex.B3
series document Building Tax Assessment Register. It
would show that some of the rooms belonging to the
respondent are lying vacant. The lower court refused to
rely upon Ex.B3 series, observing that though the petition
schedule shop rooms are admittedly in the possession of
the appellant, one of the rooms is shown as lying vacant.
It is for the landlord to report about the occupation of the
rooms to the Panchayat. Without doing that, he cannot
blame the respondent or take advantage of the absence
of entry regarding the occupation of the building in the
Building Tax Assessment Register.”
On these grounds, therefore, the bonafide requirement of the landlord
for additional accommodation was turned down by the Appellate
Authority. So far as the room leased by the mother-in-law of the tenant
is concerned, and on comparative hardship, the Appellate Authority
found:
“18. … Even if it is conceded for a moment that the need
of the respondent is bonafide, I am of the view that the
hardship which would be caused to the tenant would
outweigh the advantage to the landlord in case of eviction
of the petition schedule shop rooms. While answering
point No.1 it has been found that the respondent has
constructed a building having 99 rooms on the
Pantheerankavu–bypass road and all those rooms are
lying vacant. Only for the reason that construction of the
building is not complete, the claim of the appellant that
the vacant space is available in the possession of the
respondent cannot be ignored. It has also come in
evidence that vacant shop rooms are available in the
Shyamala Building belonging to the petitioner at the time
of filing the petition. It was only after the institution of the
4
petition that the respondent would release his right in the
building to his children as per Ext.A13 document. Here is
a fight between a landlord, a person having 100 rooms at
his disposal, and a tenant, who is conducting a petty
textile business. So, without much hesitation, it can be
found that the hardship that would be caused to the
appellant would necessarily outweigh the advantage
obtained by the respondent on eviction of the appellant
from the petition schedule shop rooms.
19. The lower court has observed that the tenant has
vacant rooms available in the locality to shift his business.
It is true that there is no convincing evidence before the
court to show that the vacant rooms are not available in
the locality to shift the business being run in the petition
schedule shop rooms. For the failure on the part of the
appellant to prove that vacant rooms are not available in
the locality to shift the business, it cannot be said that the
hardship that would be caused to him would not outweigh
the advantage that would be received by the landlord.
20. The lower court has also observed that the building
belonging to one Abdul Rehman is in the occupation of
the tenant. This observation has been made by the lower
court relying on the inconsistency in the stand taken by
the tenant. In the counter, what has been stated is that
the said room in the building owned by Abdul Rehman
was taken on lease by his mother-in-law. But in the
evidence, the stand taken by the appellant is that it was
taken on lease by one Prameela and he used to keep his
textile goods in the said room when space in the petition
schedule shop rooms is not sufficient especially during
festival occasions. I am of the view that only for this
inconsistency, the case of the respondent that the
appellant is in occupation of the room in the building
owned by Abdul Rehman cannot be accepted. What has
been stated by the tenant when he was examined as
RW1 in the lower court is that when there was huge stock
which could not be kept in the petition schedule shop
rooms, he used to keep the stock in the room situated in
the building owned by Abdul Rehman on a temporary
basis. He also would speak that like this, he used to keep
the stock-in-trade in some other rooms also for there is a
lack of space in the petition schedule shop room in the
5
festival season. Any way from this evidence, it cannot be
said that the appellant is in vacant possession of another
room which is suitable for the business being conducted
in the petition schedule shop rooms. So I find that the
lower court is not at all justified in finding that the hardship
that would be caused to the tenant would not outweigh
the advantage that would be received by the landlord on
getting eviction of the petition schedule premises. So I
find that the order of eviction passed by the trial court
under Section 11(8) is liable to be set aside.”
6. In a revision petition filed by the respondent-landlord under
Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, the High Court interfered
with the findings of fact by the Appellate Authority by posing two
questions before itself, namely:
“(1) What is the scope and extent of enquiry under
Section 11(8) of the Act? (2) Where the landlord is
occupying a part of the building in which the petition
schedule building is situated, whether the availability of
other vacant room, in his possession, in any other
building would negative his claim under Section 11(8) of
the Act?”
After stating that Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Control Act speaks
of vacant space or rooms in the same building, it was held that the
Appellate Authority was wrong in considering vacant rooms in other
buildings. So far as the Commissioner’s Report was concerned, the
High Court reiterated the findings of the trial court, stating that the
Commissioner had not reported the availability of any vacant room,
and that the burden is on the tenant to show that the landlord had in
his possession other vacant rooms. So far as Exhibit B3, being the
6
Building Tax Assessment Register is concerned, it was held that the
entries in the said Register cannot be taken as conclusive proof and
must therefore be discarded. On comparative hardship, the High Court
agreed with the trial court, holding:
“13. Similarly, it has come out in evidence that the tenant
has been in occupation of another room in the building
owned by one Abdul Rehman. In the Rent Control
Petitions, the landlord has specifically stated that he is in
occupation of another shop room in the building of the
said Abdul Rehman. So, if an order of eviction is passed,
he will not be put to any hardship. The tenant's
occupation in the building owned by Abdul Rehman has
come out in evidence. In that view, we find that the Rent
Control Court is justified in finding that the hardship that
may be caused to the tenant, if an order of eviction is
passed, would not outweigh the advantage to the
landlord.”
7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. The
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant pointed out that
under Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, the High Court, in its
revisional jurisdiction, cannot act as if it is a second court of first appeal
by setting aside findings of fact by the Appellate Authority on
reappreciation of the same. He also argued that there being no
perversity on the detailed findings given by the Appellate Authority, the
High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in interfering with the
same and wrongly substituting the findings of the trial court for those of
the Appellate Authority. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
7
respondent, however, relied strongly upon the trial court’s judgment and
stated that the Appellate Authority perversely dealt with material facts on
the record and its judgement was, therefore, correctly set aside within
the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. He relied upon the judgment
in Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal
Mundada, (2003) 2 SCC 320 [“Badrinarayan”], in particular, paragraphs
10 and 13 thereof.
8. Section 11(8) and Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act are
set out hereinbelow:
“11. Eviction of tenants.–
xxx xxx xxx
(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building
may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing
any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the
remaining part of the building to put the landlord in
possession thereof, if he requires additional
accommodation for his personal use.
xxx xxx xxx
Provided that, in the case of an application made
under sub-section (8), the Rent Control Court shall reject
the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may
be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the
advantage to the landlord.
xxx xxx xxx”
“20. Revision.—(1) In cases, where the appellate
authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate
Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High
Court, may, at any time, on the application of any
aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating
to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act
by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or
8
proceedings, and may pass such order in reference
thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the
High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be
in its discretion.”
9. It is important in cases like the present to first keep in mind the
parameters of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9
SCC 78, a reference was made to a five-Judge Bench of this Court by
a reference order dated 27.08.2009, which reads as follows:
“The learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana
[Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana,
(1993) 1 SCC 499] wherein Section 20 of the Kerala Rent
Control Act was in question. It was held in the said
decision that though Section 20 of the said Act provided
that the Revisional Court can go into the ‘propriety’ of the
order but it does not entitle the Revisional Court to
reappreciate the evidence. A similar view was taken by a
two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ubaiba v. Damodaran
[Ubaiba v. Damodaran, (1999) 5 SCC 645].
On the other hand the learned counsel for the
respondent has relied upon a decision of this Court in
Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] which was also a threeJudge Bench decision. It has been held in that case that
the expression ‘legality and propriety’ enables the High
Court in revisional jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence
while considering the findings of the first appellate court. A
similar view was taken by another three-Judge Bench of
this Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan [Moti Ram v. Suraj
Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 655].
From the above it is clear that there are conflicting
views of coordinate three-Judge Benches of this Court as
9
to the meaning, ambit and scope of the expression
‘legality and propriety’ and whether in revisional
jurisdiction the High Court can reappreciate the evidence.
Hence, we are of the view that the matter needs to be
considered by a larger Bench since this question arises in
a large number of cases as similar provisions conferring
power of revision exists in various rent control and other
legislations, e.g. Section 397 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Accordingly, we direct that the papers be
placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for
constituting a larger Bench.”
After setting out the various revisional provisions under State Rent
Control Acts including Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, this
Court approved an earlier judgment of this Court construing the Kerala
Rent Control Act in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana & Ors., (1993) 1 SCC 499, as follows:
“38. Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499] holds, and in our view,
rightly that even the wider language of Section 20 of the
Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the High Court to
act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full
agreement with the view of the three-Judge Bench in
Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499] that the word “propriety”
does not confer power upon the High Court to
reappreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion
but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out
legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned
[Kallyani Sulochana v. Saradamma, 1991 SCC OnLine
Ker 213 : (1991) 2 KLJ 105] before it. We approve the
view of this Court in Rukmini [Rukmini Amma
Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499].”
xxx xxx xxx
“42. The observation in Ramdoss [Ramdoss v. K.
Thangavelu, (2000) 2 SCC 135] that the High Court in
exercise of its revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an
10
appellate court/authority and it is impermissible for the
High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision petition
filed under Section 25 of the Act is in accord with Rukmini
[Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana,
(1993) 1 SCC 499] and Sankaranarayanan [D.
Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank, 1995 Supp
(4) SCC 675]. Its observation that the High Court can
interfere with incorrect finding of fact must be understood
in the context where such finding is perverse, based on
no evidence or misreading of the evidence or such finding
has been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking the
material evidence or such finding is so grossly erroneous
that if allowed to stand, will occasion in miscarriage of
justice. Ramdoss [Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu, (2000) 2
SCC 135] does not hold that the High Court may interfere
with the findings of fact because on reappreciation of the
evidence its view is different from that of the first appellate
court or authority. The decision of this Court in V.M.
Mohan [V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan Dwarka, (2006) 9
SCC 606] is again in line with the judgment of this Court
in Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499].”
So far as the judgment in Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3
SCC 131, is concerned, the Court limited its finding as follows:
“32. Insofar as the three-Judge Bench decision of this
Court in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988)
3 SCC 131] is concerned, it rightly observes that
revisional power is subject to well-known limitations
inherent in all the revisional jurisdictions and the matter
essentially turns on the language of the statute investing
the jurisdiction. We do not think that there can ever be
objection to the above statement. The controversy centres
round the following observation in Ram Dass [Ram
Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131], “... that
jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in appropriate
cases, to examine the correctness of the findings of facts
also….” It is suggested that by observing so, the threeJudge Bench in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander,
(1988) 3 SCC 131] has enabled the High Court to
interfere with the findings of fact by reappreciating the
11
evidence. We do not think that the three-Judge Bench
has gone to that extent in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131]. The observation in Ram
Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131]
that as the expression used conferring revisional
jurisdiction is “legality and propriety”, the High Court has
wider jurisdiction obviously means that the power of
revision vested in the High Court in the statute is wider
than the power conferred on it under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; it is not confined to the
jurisdictional error alone. However, in dealing with the
findings of fact, the examination of findings of fact by the
High Court is limited to satisfy itself that the decision is
“according to law”. This is expressly stated in Ram Dass
[Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131].
Whether or not a finding of fact recorded by the
subordinate court/tribunal is according to law, is required
to be seen on the touchstone whether such finding of fact
is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any
illegality like misreading of the evidence or overlooking
and ignoring the material evidence altogether or suffers
from perversity or any such illegality or such finding has
resulted in gross miscarriage of justice. Ram Dass [Ram
Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not lay
down as a proposition of law that the revisional power of
the High Court under the Rent Control Act is as wide as
that of the appellate court or the appellate authority or
such power is coextensive with that of the appellate
authority or that the concluded finding of fact recorded by
the original authority or the appellate authority can be
interfered with by the High Court by reappreciating
evidence because Revisional Court/authority is not in
agreement with the finding of fact recorded by the
court/authority below. Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not exposit that the
revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide
as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the
evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the
finding recorded by the court/authority below. Rather, it
emphasises that while examining the correctness of
findings of fact, the Revisional Court is not the second
court of first appeal. Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not cross the limits of
12
Revisional Court as explained in Dattonpant [Dattonpant
Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval,
(1975) 2 SCC 246].”
So holding, the five-Judge Bench answered the reference, thus:
“43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent
Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the
findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first
appellate authority because on reappreciation of the
evidence, its view is different from the court/authority
below. The consideration or examination of the evidence
by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these
Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded
by the court/authority below is according to law and does
not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded
by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived
at without consideration of the material evidence or such
finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the
evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand,
it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to
correction because it is not treated as a finding according
to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts
shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being
not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy
itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any
decision or order impugned before it as indicated above.
However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness,
legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order,
the High Court shall not exercise its power as an
appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence
for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power
is not and cannot be equated with the power of
reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first
appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied
that the decision is according to law, it may examine
whether the order impugned before it suffers from
procedural illegality or irregularity.
13
44. We, thus, approve the view of this Court
in Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499] as noted by us. The
decision of this Court in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] must be read as explained
above. The reference is answered accordingly. The civil
appeals and the special leave petitions shall now be
posted before the regular Benches for decision in light of
the above.”
10. In the facts of the present case, when the Appellate Authority
relied upon the Commissioner’s Report stating that there are 36 rooms
in the building and that the majority of the rooms are let out, showing
that some of the rooms in the occupation of the landlord are lying
vacant, it cannot be said that there is any perversity in this finding of
fact. Even assuming that the High Court is correct in its construction of
Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Control Act, stating that vacant rooms
in other buildings cannot be looked at, this finding of fact of the
Appellate Authority puts paid to any bonafide requirement of additional
accommodation of the landlord in the facts of the present case.
11. The reliance upon the Building Tax Assessment Register by the
Appellate Authority, showing that some of the rooms belonging to the
landlord were lying vacant, again, is a finding of fact which cannot be
interfered with in the manner done by the High Court. Further, the finding
that a room leased by the mother-in-law of the tenant in another building
is not in the tenant’s possession only because he had his mother-in14
law’s permission to store goods when necessary, and especially during
festival occasions, on a temporary basis, would also show that he cannot
be considered to be in possession of the said room, as rightly held by
the Appellate Authority. Interfering with this finding of fact, again, without
any perversity or misappreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority
would clearly be outside the High Court’s ken in its revisional jurisdiction.
Equally, the finding of comparative hardship, which is a finding of fact not
otherwise found to be perverse, cannot be upset in the manner done in
the present case by the High Court.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied upon the
judgment of this Court in Badrinarayan (supra). This was a case which
arose under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act, 1947 [“Bombay Rent Act”], Section 13(2) of which states as
follows:
“13. When landlord may recover possession.—
xxx xxx xxx
(2) No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground
specified in clause (g) of sub-section (1) if the court is
satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of
the case including the question whether other reasonable
accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant,
greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree
than by refusing to pass it.
Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would
be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by
passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises,
the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part
only.
15
xxx xxx xxx”
The finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority and sustained by
the High Court as to bonafide requirement of the landlord in that case
was upheld by the Supreme Court. The only question that the Supreme
Court was called upon to decide is the exercise of discretion under
Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act so far as partial eviction is
concerned (see paragraph 5). Paragraph 10 strongly relied upon by
learned counsel for the respondent is in the context of a partial eviction
being ordered, in which this Court stated:
“10. …It is expected of the parties to raise necessary
pleadings, and the court to frame an issue based on the
pleadings so as to enable parties to adduce evidence and
bring on record such relevant material as would enable
the court forming an opinion on the issue as to
comparative hardship and consistently with such finding
whether a partial eviction would meet the ends of justice.
Even if no issue has been framed, the court may
discharge its duty by taking into consideration such
material as may be available on record.”
Paragraph 13 was then relied upon, which dealt with an English
judgment in Piper v. Harvey, (1958) 1 All ER 454, in which it was found,
on the evidence adduced in that case, that the comparative hardship
issue would have to be decided against the tenant. After going into the
facts in that case, this Court remanded the case to the appellate court to
frame two issues which related to whether a partial eviction would meet
the ends of justice (see paragraph 16).
16
13. Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Act is materially different from
Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act in that it does not provide for
partial eviction if comparative hardship of a landlord and a tenant are to
be weighed against each other. Even otherwise, on the facts of this
case, issue (3) was specifically raised, which reads as follows:
“(3) Whether the hardship which may be caused to the
respondent by granting eviction will outweigh the
advantage to the petitioner?”
This issue was answered by the trial court by merely stating that the
landlord will be able to run his establishment in a better manner if he
gets the schedule petition rooms, which will help to lead his
establishment to prosperity, as compared with the tenant, who is not able
to “establish much hardship to him”. This vague finding was rightly set
aside by the Appellate Authority, which has been set out by us in
extenso in paragraph 5 of this judgment. As has been stated
hereinabove, without finding this to be perverse, the High Court acted
outside its revisional jurisdiction in substituting the same in the manner
done hereinabove.
17
14. For all these reasons, we allow the appeals and set aside the
High Court’s judgment, restoring that of the Appellate Authority.
.……………………………J.
 (R.F. Nariman)
.……………………………J.
 (Navin Sinha)
……………………………J.
(B.R. Gavai)
New Delhi;
June 08, 2020.
18

Saturday, June 6, 2020

whether the liability towards previous electricity dues of the last owner could be mulled on to the respondent.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1815 OF 2020
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.19292/2018)
TELANGANA STATE SOUTHERN POWER
DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED & ANR. … Appellants
Versus
M/S. SRIGDHAA BEVERAGES …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The respondent is an auction-purchaser of a unit owned by M/s. SB
Beverages Private Limited, which failed to pay its dues, resulting in the
auction by Syndicate Bank (Secured Creditor) under the Securitisation
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SARFAESI Act’). The
1
moot point of law, which arises for consideration, is whether the liability
towards previous electricity dues of the last owner could be mulled on to
the respondent.
2. The unit in question is a mineral water bottling plan situated in
land measuring 1 acre 13 guntas in Sy. No.283 at Rampally Village,
Keesara Mandal, Medchal District. As mentioned aforesaid, on account
of failure to repay a loan, the creditor, Syndicate Bank, brought the
property to auction for which an E-auction sale notice dated 25.5.2017
was issued in this behalf, in which the respondent was the successful
auction-purchaser. In order to appreciate the controversy before us, it is
necessary to reproduce some of the relevant clauses of the auction notice:
“The property described below is being sold on “AS IS WHERE IS,
WHATEVER THERE IS AND WITHOUT RECOURSE BASIS” under
the rule no.8 & 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules
(hereinafter referred to as the rules) for the recovery of the dues detailed
as under:
…. …. …. …. …. ….
The total
amount due
as on 30-04-
2017
Rs.13,97,26,258.77 (Rs. Thirteen crores ninety seven
lakhs twenty six thousand two hundred fifty eight and
paisa seventy seven) with future interest & costs till
date of payment accounts no 1) 373OSLB140940002 &
2) 30151010006439
Details of
encumbrances
For property no.01 Nil
For property no.02: The subsequent to our MOD,
2
over the
property, as
known to the
bank
the following transactions observed in EC
1. As per the doc no 2611/2016 dated 15/06/2016, the
mortgager has sold the property to the extent of 540 sq
yds., to private party, for worth of Rs.972000/-
2. As per the doc no.657/2015 dated 05/02/2015, the
mortgager has sold the property to the extent of 620.83
sq.yds. to The Executive officer Ramapally
Gramapanchayat for worth of Rs.1242000/-.
3. As per the doc no 2721/2014 dated 05/08/2014, the
mortgager has sold the property to the extent of 204.75
sq yds to The Gramapanchayat Executive officer
Ramapally for worth of Rs.248000/-.
Details of
outstanding
dues of Local
Government
(Property tax,
Water
sewerage,
electricity
bills, etc.)
Rs.83,17,152/- (Eighty Three Lakhs Seventeen
Thousand One Hundred Fifty Two Only)
Reserve Price
of Property
For property no.01 Rs.77,63,000/-
For property no.02 Reserve Price: Rs.5,83,37,000/-
(Rupees five crores eighty three Lakhs thirty seven
Thousand Only)
Total 28 no of Machineries items reserve price:
Rs.3,25,28,000/- (three crores twenty five lakhs twenty
eight thousand only)
…. …. …. …. …. ….
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
…. …. …. …. …. ….
3
21. The successful bidder shall bear the stamp duties, charges including
those of sale certificate, registration charges, all statutory dues payable
to central/state government, taxes and rates and outgoing, both existing
and future relating to the properties.
…. …. …. …. …. ….
24. The property is sold in “AS IS WHERE IS, WHAT IS THERE IS
AND WITHOUT ANY RECOURSE BASIS” in all respects and subject
to statutory dues if any. The intending bidders should make discrete
enquiry as regards any claim, charges/encumbrances on the properties,
of any authority, besides the bank’s charges and should satisfy
themselves about the title, extent, quality and quantity of the property
before submitting their bid. For any discrepancy in the property the
participating bidder is solely responsible for all future recourses from
the date of submission of bid.
25. No claim of whatsoever nature regarding the property put for sale,
charges/encumbrances over the property or on any other matter etc., will
be entertained after submission of the bid/confirmation of sale.
26. The Authorised Officer will not be responsible for any charge, lien,
encumbrance, property tax dues, electricity dues, etc., or any other
dues to the Government, local authority or anybody, in respect of
the property under sale.”
3. The aforesaid auction notice shows that the unit was being
sold on “as is where is, what is there is and without any recourse basis”,
as per Rules 8 & 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Rules’). The aforesaid clauses of the
E-auction sale notice show that the total outstanding dues were much
4
larger, but the reserve price fixed was lower, and the actual sale
consideration of the successful auctioneer was Rs.9,18,65,000, which is
approximately Rs.10 lakh more than the minimum reserve price. Clause
24 reproduced aforesaid makes it clear that when the reference is to a sale
on “as is where is, what is there is and without any recourse basis”, the
same is “in all respects and subject to statutory dues”. This clause was
further subject to another Clause 26, where the Authorised Officer
carrying out the auction absolved himself of the liability for any charge,
lien, encumbrance, property tax dues, electricity dues, etc. The purpose
is to emphasise that a holistic reading of all these clauses left little in
doubt that the auction notice provided for a reserve price, with a bid
being made about Rs.10 lakh over and above that, and certain nature of
charges, lien, encumbrances, including electricity dues were clearly
beyond the sale consideration paid.
4. We may next turn to the sale deed dated 29.9.2017 executed in
pursuance of the auction, which provided for the sale “made free from all
encumbrances known to the Secured Creditor.” An indemnity was
provided by the vendor to the respondent against “any loss arising out of
any defect in the title, including recovery of statutory liabilities taxes, as
5
also litigation expenses arising out of such defects in title.” This
indemnity was, thus, confined to aspects mentioned in this clause, but
relatable to defects in title, and not to other liabilities like electricity dues.
5. The problem for the respondent arose when he applied to appellant
No.1 seeking sanction of a 500 KVA connection required for running the
bottling plant. This request was denied on the ground that there were
previous electricity dues to the tune of Rs.50,47,715, as on 26.10.2017.
Appellant No.1 asserted its right to recover this amount even from the
new purchaser (i.e. respondent), based on a reading of Clauses 5.9.6 and
8.4 of the General Terms and Conditions of Supply of Distribution &
Retail Supply Licensees in AP (for short ‘General Terms & Conditions of
Supply’), which clauses are reproduced hereinunder:
“5.9.6 Dismantlement of Service Line after Termination of
Agreement: On the termination of the LT or HT Agreement, the
company is entitled to dismantle the service line and remove the
materials, Meter, cut out etc. After termination of the Agreement,
the consumer shall be treated as a fresh applicant for the purpose of
giving supply to the same premises when applied for by him
provided there are no dues against the previous service
connection.”
…. …. …. …. …. ….
“8.4 Transfer of Service Connection
6
The seller of the property should clear all the dues to the Company
before selling such property. If the seller did not clear the dues as
mentioned above, the Company may refuse to supply electricity to
the premises through the already existing connection or refuse to
give a new connection to the premises till all dues to the Company
are cleared.”
6. We may also take note of the fact that the aforesaid dues partake
the character of statutory dues under the Electricity Act, 2003 read with
the General Terms & Conditions of Supply.
7. A writ petition was filed by the respondent before the High Court
of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh seeking quashing of these demands
predicated on a reasoning that as a subsequent purchaser, the respondent
was not responsible for the dues of the earlier owner, and in that behalf
relied upon the judgments of this Court in Isha Marbles v. Bihar State
Electricity Board & Anr.1
 and Southern Power Distribution Company
of Telangana Limited (through its CMD) & Ors. v. Gopal Agarwal &
Ors.2
 Reliance on these judgments persuaded the learned single Judge to
issue directions quashing the demand of appellant No.1. The appeal filed
1 (1995) 2 SCC 648
2 (2018) 12 SCC 644
7
before the Division Bench against this order was also dismissed on
30.4.2018.
8. We have examined the submissions in the contours of the aforesaid
controversy, and take note of the fact that in the case of Isha Marbles,3
the sale was in pursuance of Section 29(1) of the State Financial
Corporations Act, 1951, but the important aspect was that there was no
clause specifically dealing with the issue of electricity dues or such other
dues, as in the present auction notice. This Court elucidated the position
in the context of Section 24 of the Electricity Act, 1910, to emphasise
that under Section 2(c) of the Electricity Act, a consumer means any
person who is supplied with energy, and since liability to pay electricity
dues is fastened only on the consumer, at the relevant time, the purchaser
was not the consumer. It has also been stated that in the absence of
consumption of electricity, the subsequent purchaser was merely seeking
reconnection without there being any statutory dues towards consumption
charges. We had specifically posed a question to the learned counsel for
the respondent in the order dated 15.11.2019, that whether, in the context
of the judicial pronouncements sought to be relied upon, there was a
3 (supra)
8
specific clause in the nature of Clause 26 as in the present E-auction sale
notice, which absolved the Authorized Officer of various dues including
“electricity dues”. On the conspectus of the judgments referred to by the
respondent, there were no such clauses in the cases in question.
9. We may also notice that there have been subsequent judicial
pronouncements dealing with this aspect of electricity dues. A
three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the dues under the terms
and conditions of supply partake the character of statutory dues
(Hyderabad Vanaspathi Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board & Ors.4
).
The mere fact that agreements were entered into with every consumer
only served the purpose of bringing to the notice of the consumer the
terms and conditions of supply, but did not make the dues purely
contractual in character.
10. We can draw strength from the observations of this Court in
Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Paramount Polymers (P)
Ltd.,5
 where there was a similarity as in the present case, of a specific
clause dealing with electricity dues. It was observed that in such a
scenario if a transferee desires to enjoy the service connection, he shall
4 (1998) 4 SCC 470
5 (2006) 13 SCC 101 (2 Judges Bench)
9
pay the outstanding dues, if any, to the supplier of electricity and a
reconnection or a new connection shall not be given to any premises
where there are arrears on account of dues to the supplier unless they are
so declared in advance.
11. We may also notice that as an auction purchaser bidding in an “as
is where is, whatever there is and without recourse basis”, the respondent
would have inspected the premises and made inquiries about the dues in
all respects. The facts of the present case, as in the judgment aforesaid,
are more explicit in character as there is a specific mention of the
quantification of dues of various accounts including electricity dues. The
respondent was, thus, clearly put to notice in this behalf.
12. The same view in case of a similar clause has been taken in
Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited & Ors. v. DVS Steels and
Alloys Private Limited & Ors.6
 It has been further observed that if any
statutory rules govern the conditions relating to sanction of a connection
or supply of electricity, the distributor can insist upon fulfillment of the
requirements of such rules and regulations so long as such rules and
regulations or the terms and conditions are not arbitrary and
6 (2009) 1 SCC 210 (2 Judge Bench)
10
unreasonable. A condition for clearance of dues cannot per se be termed
as unreasonable or arbitrary.
13. We may notice a slightly contra view in Haryana State Electricity
Board v. Hanuman Rice Mills, Dhanauri & Ors.,7
 in a given scenario
where the pendency of electricity dues was not mentioned in the terms &
conditions of sale, and it was held in those facts that the dues could not
be mulled on to the subsequent transferee.
14. We may notice that in Special Officer, Commerce, North Eastern
Electricity Supply Company of Orissa (NESCO) v. Raghunath Paper
Mills Private Limited & Anr.,8
 a distinction was made between a
connection sought to be obtained for the first time and a reconnection. In
that case, no application had been made for transfer of a service
connection from the previous owner to the auction-purchaser, but in fact,
a fresh connection was requested. In light of the regulations therein,
previous dues had to be cleared only in the case of a reconnection.
Hence, the respondents were held to be free from electricity liability.
This Court in Southern Power Distribution Company of Telangana
Limited (through its CMD) & Ors.9
 found that the facts were similar to
7 (2010) 9 SCC 145 (2 Judge Bench)
8 (2012) 13 SCC 479 (2 Judge Bench)
9 (supra)
11
the NESCO10 case, and thus followed the same line.
15. We have gone into the aforesaid judgments as it was urged before
us that there is some ambiguity on the aspect of liability of dues of the
past owners who had obtained the connection. There have been some
differences in facts but, in our view, there is a clear judicial thinking
which emerges, which needs to be emphasized:
A. That electricity dues, where they are statutory in character
under the Electricity Act and as per the terms & conditions of
supply, cannot be waived in view of the provisions of the Act
itself more specifically Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003
(in pari materia with Section 24 of the Electricity Act, 1910),
and cannot partake the character of dues of purely contractual
nature.
B. Where, as in cases of the E-auction notice in question, the
existence of electricity dues, whether quantified or not, has
been specifically mentioned as a liability of the purchaser and
the sale is on “AS IS WHERE IS, WHATEVER THERE IS
AND WITHOUT RECOURSE BASIS”, there can be no doubt
10 (supra)
12
that the liability to pay electricity dues exists on the respondent
(purchaser).
C. The debate over connection or reconnection would not exist in
cases like the present one where both aspects are covered as per
clause 8.4 of the General Terms & Conditions of Supply.
16. In view of the aforesaid legal position, which has emerged, we are
of the view that the impugned orders cannot be sustained and are
accordingly set aside while opining that appellant No.1 would be well
within its right to demand the arrears due of the last owner, from the
respondent-purchaser.
17. The appeal is accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their
own costs.
...……………………………J.
[Sanjay Kishan Kaul]
...……………………………J.
[K.M. Joseph]
New Delhi.
June 01, 2020.
13