REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2528-29 OF 2020
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) Nos.4492-4493 of 2018)
Addissery Raghavan …Appellant
Versus
Cheruvalath Krishnadasan …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
R.F. Nariman, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In the present case, the appellant is the tenant of two shop
rooms – one on the ground floor and the other on the first floor, each
admeasuring 60 square feet. The tenant is doing textile business in the
room situated on the ground floor, using the first floor as a godown.
The ground floor room was let to the tenant on 10.10.1991 at a
monthly rent of Rs.300/- which was later enhanced to Rs.800/-. The
first floor room was let to the tenant on 10.07.1998 at a monthly rent of
Rs.250/- which was later enhanced to Rs.317/-.
3. The respondent-landlord filed eviction petitions being RCP No.
175/2013 as well as RCP No.176/2013 on 11.10.2013 in respect of the
1
two rooms in question. The said petitions were filed on three grounds,
namely, arrears of rent, bonafide requirement for additional
accommodation for the landlord’s business, and material damage to
the premises, under Sections 11(2)(b), 11(8) and 11(4)(ii), respectively,
of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 [“Kerala
Rent Control Act”].
4. The trial court in its judgment dated 28.02.2015, held against the
landlord on the first and the third ground. However, so far as bonafide
requirement of additional accommodation was concerned, it was held
by the trial court that the landlord is the Managing Partner of M/s
Prabeesh Constructions, and that since the office of this firm was
presently only in a small room in the same building, the other two
rooms would be required by way of additional accommodation for
installing staff members and materials. The trial court found that the
Commissioner’s Report in the present case did not point out that any
particular rooms were vacant in the premises. Equally, the production
of Exhibit B3, i.e., the Building Tax Assessment Register, which
recorded that some rooms in the ownership of the landlord are vacant
could not be relied upon. Further, it was held that the tenant had in his
possession another room in a neighbouring building, albeit leased by
his mother-in-law, and stating that, since the mother-in-law was not
2
examined by the tenant, the reasonable inference that could be drawn
is that the aforesaid room is in possession of the tenant. Finally, on
comparative hardship, the trial court held that the landlord will be able
to run his establishment in a better manner, whereas the tenant is not
able to establish much hardship caused to him. In this view of the
matter, the eviction petitions were decreed under Section 11(8) of the
Kerala Rent Control Act.
5. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, by its judgment dated
30.01.2016, reversed the judgment of the trial court. It held:
“12. According to the appellant, if at all the respondent
needs any rooms for the purpose of expanding his office,
suitable rooms are available in his possession. It has
come in evidence that in the building in which the petition
schedule rooms are situated, there are as many as 36
rooms. According to the appellant, the same rooms are
lying vacant in this building. The respondent would deny
the contention. But in Ex.C1 report, the Commissioner
only would say that majority of the rooms in the building
are leased out. This shows that some of the rooms in the
occupation of the petitioner are lying vacant. It is true that
the Commissioner has not specified the number of rooms
lying vacant. The appellant also could not point out the
number of the rooms lying vacant in the possession of the
petitioner.”
Apart from this, it also relied upon several vacant rooms being
available in several other buildings owned by the landlord. So far as
Exhibit B3 is concerned, the trial court’s finding was reversed, stating:
“16. The lower court has blamed the appellant for not
producing any documents to show that vacant rooms are
3
available in the possession of the respondent. I cannot
agree with the observation made by the lower court.
When there is an admission by PW1 that there are vacant
rooms, there is no need to produce any document. It can
also be seen that the appellant has produced Ex.B3
series document Building Tax Assessment Register. It
would show that some of the rooms belonging to the
respondent are lying vacant. The lower court refused to
rely upon Ex.B3 series, observing that though the petition
schedule shop rooms are admittedly in the possession of
the appellant, one of the rooms is shown as lying vacant.
It is for the landlord to report about the occupation of the
rooms to the Panchayat. Without doing that, he cannot
blame the respondent or take advantage of the absence
of entry regarding the occupation of the building in the
Building Tax Assessment Register.”
On these grounds, therefore, the bonafide requirement of the landlord
for additional accommodation was turned down by the Appellate
Authority. So far as the room leased by the mother-in-law of the tenant
is concerned, and on comparative hardship, the Appellate Authority
found:
“18. … Even if it is conceded for a moment that the need
of the respondent is bonafide, I am of the view that the
hardship which would be caused to the tenant would
outweigh the advantage to the landlord in case of eviction
of the petition schedule shop rooms. While answering
point No.1 it has been found that the respondent has
constructed a building having 99 rooms on the
Pantheerankavu–bypass road and all those rooms are
lying vacant. Only for the reason that construction of the
building is not complete, the claim of the appellant that
the vacant space is available in the possession of the
respondent cannot be ignored. It has also come in
evidence that vacant shop rooms are available in the
Shyamala Building belonging to the petitioner at the time
of filing the petition. It was only after the institution of the
4
petition that the respondent would release his right in the
building to his children as per Ext.A13 document. Here is
a fight between a landlord, a person having 100 rooms at
his disposal, and a tenant, who is conducting a petty
textile business. So, without much hesitation, it can be
found that the hardship that would be caused to the
appellant would necessarily outweigh the advantage
obtained by the respondent on eviction of the appellant
from the petition schedule shop rooms.
19. The lower court has observed that the tenant has
vacant rooms available in the locality to shift his business.
It is true that there is no convincing evidence before the
court to show that the vacant rooms are not available in
the locality to shift the business being run in the petition
schedule shop rooms. For the failure on the part of the
appellant to prove that vacant rooms are not available in
the locality to shift the business, it cannot be said that the
hardship that would be caused to him would not outweigh
the advantage that would be received by the landlord.
20. The lower court has also observed that the building
belonging to one Abdul Rehman is in the occupation of
the tenant. This observation has been made by the lower
court relying on the inconsistency in the stand taken by
the tenant. In the counter, what has been stated is that
the said room in the building owned by Abdul Rehman
was taken on lease by his mother-in-law. But in the
evidence, the stand taken by the appellant is that it was
taken on lease by one Prameela and he used to keep his
textile goods in the said room when space in the petition
schedule shop rooms is not sufficient especially during
festival occasions. I am of the view that only for this
inconsistency, the case of the respondent that the
appellant is in occupation of the room in the building
owned by Abdul Rehman cannot be accepted. What has
been stated by the tenant when he was examined as
RW1 in the lower court is that when there was huge stock
which could not be kept in the petition schedule shop
rooms, he used to keep the stock in the room situated in
the building owned by Abdul Rehman on a temporary
basis. He also would speak that like this, he used to keep
the stock-in-trade in some other rooms also for there is a
lack of space in the petition schedule shop room in the
5
festival season. Any way from this evidence, it cannot be
said that the appellant is in vacant possession of another
room which is suitable for the business being conducted
in the petition schedule shop rooms. So I find that the
lower court is not at all justified in finding that the hardship
that would be caused to the tenant would not outweigh
the advantage that would be received by the landlord on
getting eviction of the petition schedule premises. So I
find that the order of eviction passed by the trial court
under Section 11(8) is liable to be set aside.”
6. In a revision petition filed by the respondent-landlord under
Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, the High Court interfered
with the findings of fact by the Appellate Authority by posing two
questions before itself, namely:
“(1) What is the scope and extent of enquiry under
Section 11(8) of the Act? (2) Where the landlord is
occupying a part of the building in which the petition
schedule building is situated, whether the availability of
other vacant room, in his possession, in any other
building would negative his claim under Section 11(8) of
the Act?”
After stating that Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Control Act speaks
of vacant space or rooms in the same building, it was held that the
Appellate Authority was wrong in considering vacant rooms in other
buildings. So far as the Commissioner’s Report was concerned, the
High Court reiterated the findings of the trial court, stating that the
Commissioner had not reported the availability of any vacant room,
and that the burden is on the tenant to show that the landlord had in
his possession other vacant rooms. So far as Exhibit B3, being the
6
Building Tax Assessment Register is concerned, it was held that the
entries in the said Register cannot be taken as conclusive proof and
must therefore be discarded. On comparative hardship, the High Court
agreed with the trial court, holding:
“13. Similarly, it has come out in evidence that the tenant
has been in occupation of another room in the building
owned by one Abdul Rehman. In the Rent Control
Petitions, the landlord has specifically stated that he is in
occupation of another shop room in the building of the
said Abdul Rehman. So, if an order of eviction is passed,
he will not be put to any hardship. The tenant's
occupation in the building owned by Abdul Rehman has
come out in evidence. In that view, we find that the Rent
Control Court is justified in finding that the hardship that
may be caused to the tenant, if an order of eviction is
passed, would not outweigh the advantage to the
landlord.”
7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. The
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant pointed out that
under Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, the High Court, in its
revisional jurisdiction, cannot act as if it is a second court of first appeal
by setting aside findings of fact by the Appellate Authority on
reappreciation of the same. He also argued that there being no
perversity on the detailed findings given by the Appellate Authority, the
High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in interfering with the
same and wrongly substituting the findings of the trial court for those of
the Appellate Authority. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
7
respondent, however, relied strongly upon the trial court’s judgment and
stated that the Appellate Authority perversely dealt with material facts on
the record and its judgement was, therefore, correctly set aside within
the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. He relied upon the judgment
in Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal
Mundada, (2003) 2 SCC 320 [“Badrinarayan”], in particular, paragraphs
10 and 13 thereof.
8. Section 11(8) and Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act are
set out hereinbelow:
“11. Eviction of tenants.–
xxx xxx xxx
(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building
may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing
any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the
remaining part of the building to put the landlord in
possession thereof, if he requires additional
accommodation for his personal use.
xxx xxx xxx
Provided that, in the case of an application made
under sub-section (8), the Rent Control Court shall reject
the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may
be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the
advantage to the landlord.
xxx xxx xxx”
“20. Revision.—(1) In cases, where the appellate
authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate
Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High
Court, may, at any time, on the application of any
aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating
to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act
by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or
8
proceedings, and may pass such order in reference
thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the
High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be
in its discretion.”
9. It is important in cases like the present to first keep in mind the
parameters of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9
SCC 78, a reference was made to a five-Judge Bench of this Court by
a reference order dated 27.08.2009, which reads as follows:
“The learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana
[Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana,
(1993) 1 SCC 499] wherein Section 20 of the Kerala Rent
Control Act was in question. It was held in the said
decision that though Section 20 of the said Act provided
that the Revisional Court can go into the ‘propriety’ of the
order but it does not entitle the Revisional Court to
reappreciate the evidence. A similar view was taken by a
two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ubaiba v. Damodaran
[Ubaiba v. Damodaran, (1999) 5 SCC 645].
On the other hand the learned counsel for the
respondent has relied upon a decision of this Court in
Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] which was also a threeJudge Bench decision. It has been held in that case that
the expression ‘legality and propriety’ enables the High
Court in revisional jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence
while considering the findings of the first appellate court. A
similar view was taken by another three-Judge Bench of
this Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan [Moti Ram v. Suraj
Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 655].
From the above it is clear that there are conflicting
views of coordinate three-Judge Benches of this Court as
9
to the meaning, ambit and scope of the expression
‘legality and propriety’ and whether in revisional
jurisdiction the High Court can reappreciate the evidence.
Hence, we are of the view that the matter needs to be
considered by a larger Bench since this question arises in
a large number of cases as similar provisions conferring
power of revision exists in various rent control and other
legislations, e.g. Section 397 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Accordingly, we direct that the papers be
placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for
constituting a larger Bench.”
After setting out the various revisional provisions under State Rent
Control Acts including Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, this
Court approved an earlier judgment of this Court construing the Kerala
Rent Control Act in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana & Ors., (1993) 1 SCC 499, as follows:
“38. Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499] holds, and in our view,
rightly that even the wider language of Section 20 of the
Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the High Court to
act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full
agreement with the view of the three-Judge Bench in
Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499] that the word “propriety”
does not confer power upon the High Court to
reappreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion
but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out
legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned
[Kallyani Sulochana v. Saradamma, 1991 SCC OnLine
Ker 213 : (1991) 2 KLJ 105] before it. We approve the
view of this Court in Rukmini [Rukmini Amma
Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499].”
xxx xxx xxx
“42. The observation in Ramdoss [Ramdoss v. K.
Thangavelu, (2000) 2 SCC 135] that the High Court in
exercise of its revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an
10
appellate court/authority and it is impermissible for the
High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision petition
filed under Section 25 of the Act is in accord with Rukmini
[Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana,
(1993) 1 SCC 499] and Sankaranarayanan [D.
Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank, 1995 Supp
(4) SCC 675]. Its observation that the High Court can
interfere with incorrect finding of fact must be understood
in the context where such finding is perverse, based on
no evidence or misreading of the evidence or such finding
has been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking the
material evidence or such finding is so grossly erroneous
that if allowed to stand, will occasion in miscarriage of
justice. Ramdoss [Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu, (2000) 2
SCC 135] does not hold that the High Court may interfere
with the findings of fact because on reappreciation of the
evidence its view is different from that of the first appellate
court or authority. The decision of this Court in V.M.
Mohan [V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan Dwarka, (2006) 9
SCC 606] is again in line with the judgment of this Court
in Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499].”
So far as the judgment in Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3
SCC 131, is concerned, the Court limited its finding as follows:
“32. Insofar as the three-Judge Bench decision of this
Court in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988)
3 SCC 131] is concerned, it rightly observes that
revisional power is subject to well-known limitations
inherent in all the revisional jurisdictions and the matter
essentially turns on the language of the statute investing
the jurisdiction. We do not think that there can ever be
objection to the above statement. The controversy centres
round the following observation in Ram Dass [Ram
Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131], “... that
jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in appropriate
cases, to examine the correctness of the findings of facts
also….” It is suggested that by observing so, the threeJudge Bench in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander,
(1988) 3 SCC 131] has enabled the High Court to
interfere with the findings of fact by reappreciating the
11
evidence. We do not think that the three-Judge Bench
has gone to that extent in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131]. The observation in Ram
Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131]
that as the expression used conferring revisional
jurisdiction is “legality and propriety”, the High Court has
wider jurisdiction obviously means that the power of
revision vested in the High Court in the statute is wider
than the power conferred on it under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; it is not confined to the
jurisdictional error alone. However, in dealing with the
findings of fact, the examination of findings of fact by the
High Court is limited to satisfy itself that the decision is
“according to law”. This is expressly stated in Ram Dass
[Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131].
Whether or not a finding of fact recorded by the
subordinate court/tribunal is according to law, is required
to be seen on the touchstone whether such finding of fact
is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any
illegality like misreading of the evidence or overlooking
and ignoring the material evidence altogether or suffers
from perversity or any such illegality or such finding has
resulted in gross miscarriage of justice. Ram Dass [Ram
Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not lay
down as a proposition of law that the revisional power of
the High Court under the Rent Control Act is as wide as
that of the appellate court or the appellate authority or
such power is coextensive with that of the appellate
authority or that the concluded finding of fact recorded by
the original authority or the appellate authority can be
interfered with by the High Court by reappreciating
evidence because Revisional Court/authority is not in
agreement with the finding of fact recorded by the
court/authority below. Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not exposit that the
revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide
as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the
evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the
finding recorded by the court/authority below. Rather, it
emphasises that while examining the correctness of
findings of fact, the Revisional Court is not the second
court of first appeal. Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not cross the limits of
12
Revisional Court as explained in Dattonpant [Dattonpant
Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval,
(1975) 2 SCC 246].”
So holding, the five-Judge Bench answered the reference, thus:
“43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent
Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the
findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first
appellate authority because on reappreciation of the
evidence, its view is different from the court/authority
below. The consideration or examination of the evidence
by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these
Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded
by the court/authority below is according to law and does
not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded
by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived
at without consideration of the material evidence or such
finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the
evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand,
it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to
correction because it is not treated as a finding according
to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts
shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being
not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy
itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any
decision or order impugned before it as indicated above.
However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness,
legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order,
the High Court shall not exercise its power as an
appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence
for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power
is not and cannot be equated with the power of
reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first
appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied
that the decision is according to law, it may examine
whether the order impugned before it suffers from
procedural illegality or irregularity.
13
44. We, thus, approve the view of this Court
in Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499] as noted by us. The
decision of this Court in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] must be read as explained
above. The reference is answered accordingly. The civil
appeals and the special leave petitions shall now be
posted before the regular Benches for decision in light of
the above.”
10. In the facts of the present case, when the Appellate Authority
relied upon the Commissioner’s Report stating that there are 36 rooms
in the building and that the majority of the rooms are let out, showing
that some of the rooms in the occupation of the landlord are lying
vacant, it cannot be said that there is any perversity in this finding of
fact. Even assuming that the High Court is correct in its construction of
Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Control Act, stating that vacant rooms
in other buildings cannot be looked at, this finding of fact of the
Appellate Authority puts paid to any bonafide requirement of additional
accommodation of the landlord in the facts of the present case.
11. The reliance upon the Building Tax Assessment Register by the
Appellate Authority, showing that some of the rooms belonging to the
landlord were lying vacant, again, is a finding of fact which cannot be
interfered with in the manner done by the High Court. Further, the finding
that a room leased by the mother-in-law of the tenant in another building
is not in the tenant’s possession only because he had his mother-in14
law’s permission to store goods when necessary, and especially during
festival occasions, on a temporary basis, would also show that he cannot
be considered to be in possession of the said room, as rightly held by
the Appellate Authority. Interfering with this finding of fact, again, without
any perversity or misappreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority
would clearly be outside the High Court’s ken in its revisional jurisdiction.
Equally, the finding of comparative hardship, which is a finding of fact not
otherwise found to be perverse, cannot be upset in the manner done in
the present case by the High Court.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied upon the
judgment of this Court in Badrinarayan (supra). This was a case which
arose under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act, 1947 [“Bombay Rent Act”], Section 13(2) of which states as
follows:
“13. When landlord may recover possession.—
xxx xxx xxx
(2) No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground
specified in clause (g) of sub-section (1) if the court is
satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of
the case including the question whether other reasonable
accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant,
greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree
than by refusing to pass it.
Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would
be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by
passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises,
the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part
only.
15
xxx xxx xxx”
The finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority and sustained by
the High Court as to bonafide requirement of the landlord in that case
was upheld by the Supreme Court. The only question that the Supreme
Court was called upon to decide is the exercise of discretion under
Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act so far as partial eviction is
concerned (see paragraph 5). Paragraph 10 strongly relied upon by
learned counsel for the respondent is in the context of a partial eviction
being ordered, in which this Court stated:
“10. …It is expected of the parties to raise necessary
pleadings, and the court to frame an issue based on the
pleadings so as to enable parties to adduce evidence and
bring on record such relevant material as would enable
the court forming an opinion on the issue as to
comparative hardship and consistently with such finding
whether a partial eviction would meet the ends of justice.
Even if no issue has been framed, the court may
discharge its duty by taking into consideration such
material as may be available on record.”
Paragraph 13 was then relied upon, which dealt with an English
judgment in Piper v. Harvey, (1958) 1 All ER 454, in which it was found,
on the evidence adduced in that case, that the comparative hardship
issue would have to be decided against the tenant. After going into the
facts in that case, this Court remanded the case to the appellate court to
frame two issues which related to whether a partial eviction would meet
the ends of justice (see paragraph 16).
16
13. Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Act is materially different from
Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act in that it does not provide for
partial eviction if comparative hardship of a landlord and a tenant are to
be weighed against each other. Even otherwise, on the facts of this
case, issue (3) was specifically raised, which reads as follows:
“(3) Whether the hardship which may be caused to the
respondent by granting eviction will outweigh the
advantage to the petitioner?”
This issue was answered by the trial court by merely stating that the
landlord will be able to run his establishment in a better manner if he
gets the schedule petition rooms, which will help to lead his
establishment to prosperity, as compared with the tenant, who is not able
to “establish much hardship to him”. This vague finding was rightly set
aside by the Appellate Authority, which has been set out by us in
extenso in paragraph 5 of this judgment. As has been stated
hereinabove, without finding this to be perverse, the High Court acted
outside its revisional jurisdiction in substituting the same in the manner
done hereinabove.
17
14. For all these reasons, we allow the appeals and set aside the
High Court’s judgment, restoring that of the Appellate Authority.
.……………………………J.
(R.F. Nariman)
.……………………………J.
(Navin Sinha)
……………………………J.
(B.R. Gavai)
New Delhi;
June 08, 2020.
18
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2528-29 OF 2020
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) Nos.4492-4493 of 2018)
Addissery Raghavan …Appellant
Versus
Cheruvalath Krishnadasan …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
R.F. Nariman, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In the present case, the appellant is the tenant of two shop
rooms – one on the ground floor and the other on the first floor, each
admeasuring 60 square feet. The tenant is doing textile business in the
room situated on the ground floor, using the first floor as a godown.
The ground floor room was let to the tenant on 10.10.1991 at a
monthly rent of Rs.300/- which was later enhanced to Rs.800/-. The
first floor room was let to the tenant on 10.07.1998 at a monthly rent of
Rs.250/- which was later enhanced to Rs.317/-.
3. The respondent-landlord filed eviction petitions being RCP No.
175/2013 as well as RCP No.176/2013 on 11.10.2013 in respect of the
1
two rooms in question. The said petitions were filed on three grounds,
namely, arrears of rent, bonafide requirement for additional
accommodation for the landlord’s business, and material damage to
the premises, under Sections 11(2)(b), 11(8) and 11(4)(ii), respectively,
of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 [“Kerala
Rent Control Act”].
4. The trial court in its judgment dated 28.02.2015, held against the
landlord on the first and the third ground. However, so far as bonafide
requirement of additional accommodation was concerned, it was held
by the trial court that the landlord is the Managing Partner of M/s
Prabeesh Constructions, and that since the office of this firm was
presently only in a small room in the same building, the other two
rooms would be required by way of additional accommodation for
installing staff members and materials. The trial court found that the
Commissioner’s Report in the present case did not point out that any
particular rooms were vacant in the premises. Equally, the production
of Exhibit B3, i.e., the Building Tax Assessment Register, which
recorded that some rooms in the ownership of the landlord are vacant
could not be relied upon. Further, it was held that the tenant had in his
possession another room in a neighbouring building, albeit leased by
his mother-in-law, and stating that, since the mother-in-law was not
2
examined by the tenant, the reasonable inference that could be drawn
is that the aforesaid room is in possession of the tenant. Finally, on
comparative hardship, the trial court held that the landlord will be able
to run his establishment in a better manner, whereas the tenant is not
able to establish much hardship caused to him. In this view of the
matter, the eviction petitions were decreed under Section 11(8) of the
Kerala Rent Control Act.
5. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, by its judgment dated
30.01.2016, reversed the judgment of the trial court. It held:
“12. According to the appellant, if at all the respondent
needs any rooms for the purpose of expanding his office,
suitable rooms are available in his possession. It has
come in evidence that in the building in which the petition
schedule rooms are situated, there are as many as 36
rooms. According to the appellant, the same rooms are
lying vacant in this building. The respondent would deny
the contention. But in Ex.C1 report, the Commissioner
only would say that majority of the rooms in the building
are leased out. This shows that some of the rooms in the
occupation of the petitioner are lying vacant. It is true that
the Commissioner has not specified the number of rooms
lying vacant. The appellant also could not point out the
number of the rooms lying vacant in the possession of the
petitioner.”
Apart from this, it also relied upon several vacant rooms being
available in several other buildings owned by the landlord. So far as
Exhibit B3 is concerned, the trial court’s finding was reversed, stating:
“16. The lower court has blamed the appellant for not
producing any documents to show that vacant rooms are
3
available in the possession of the respondent. I cannot
agree with the observation made by the lower court.
When there is an admission by PW1 that there are vacant
rooms, there is no need to produce any document. It can
also be seen that the appellant has produced Ex.B3
series document Building Tax Assessment Register. It
would show that some of the rooms belonging to the
respondent are lying vacant. The lower court refused to
rely upon Ex.B3 series, observing that though the petition
schedule shop rooms are admittedly in the possession of
the appellant, one of the rooms is shown as lying vacant.
It is for the landlord to report about the occupation of the
rooms to the Panchayat. Without doing that, he cannot
blame the respondent or take advantage of the absence
of entry regarding the occupation of the building in the
Building Tax Assessment Register.”
On these grounds, therefore, the bonafide requirement of the landlord
for additional accommodation was turned down by the Appellate
Authority. So far as the room leased by the mother-in-law of the tenant
is concerned, and on comparative hardship, the Appellate Authority
found:
“18. … Even if it is conceded for a moment that the need
of the respondent is bonafide, I am of the view that the
hardship which would be caused to the tenant would
outweigh the advantage to the landlord in case of eviction
of the petition schedule shop rooms. While answering
point No.1 it has been found that the respondent has
constructed a building having 99 rooms on the
Pantheerankavu–bypass road and all those rooms are
lying vacant. Only for the reason that construction of the
building is not complete, the claim of the appellant that
the vacant space is available in the possession of the
respondent cannot be ignored. It has also come in
evidence that vacant shop rooms are available in the
Shyamala Building belonging to the petitioner at the time
of filing the petition. It was only after the institution of the
4
petition that the respondent would release his right in the
building to his children as per Ext.A13 document. Here is
a fight between a landlord, a person having 100 rooms at
his disposal, and a tenant, who is conducting a petty
textile business. So, without much hesitation, it can be
found that the hardship that would be caused to the
appellant would necessarily outweigh the advantage
obtained by the respondent on eviction of the appellant
from the petition schedule shop rooms.
19. The lower court has observed that the tenant has
vacant rooms available in the locality to shift his business.
It is true that there is no convincing evidence before the
court to show that the vacant rooms are not available in
the locality to shift the business being run in the petition
schedule shop rooms. For the failure on the part of the
appellant to prove that vacant rooms are not available in
the locality to shift the business, it cannot be said that the
hardship that would be caused to him would not outweigh
the advantage that would be received by the landlord.
20. The lower court has also observed that the building
belonging to one Abdul Rehman is in the occupation of
the tenant. This observation has been made by the lower
court relying on the inconsistency in the stand taken by
the tenant. In the counter, what has been stated is that
the said room in the building owned by Abdul Rehman
was taken on lease by his mother-in-law. But in the
evidence, the stand taken by the appellant is that it was
taken on lease by one Prameela and he used to keep his
textile goods in the said room when space in the petition
schedule shop rooms is not sufficient especially during
festival occasions. I am of the view that only for this
inconsistency, the case of the respondent that the
appellant is in occupation of the room in the building
owned by Abdul Rehman cannot be accepted. What has
been stated by the tenant when he was examined as
RW1 in the lower court is that when there was huge stock
which could not be kept in the petition schedule shop
rooms, he used to keep the stock in the room situated in
the building owned by Abdul Rehman on a temporary
basis. He also would speak that like this, he used to keep
the stock-in-trade in some other rooms also for there is a
lack of space in the petition schedule shop room in the
5
festival season. Any way from this evidence, it cannot be
said that the appellant is in vacant possession of another
room which is suitable for the business being conducted
in the petition schedule shop rooms. So I find that the
lower court is not at all justified in finding that the hardship
that would be caused to the tenant would not outweigh
the advantage that would be received by the landlord on
getting eviction of the petition schedule premises. So I
find that the order of eviction passed by the trial court
under Section 11(8) is liable to be set aside.”
6. In a revision petition filed by the respondent-landlord under
Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, the High Court interfered
with the findings of fact by the Appellate Authority by posing two
questions before itself, namely:
“(1) What is the scope and extent of enquiry under
Section 11(8) of the Act? (2) Where the landlord is
occupying a part of the building in which the petition
schedule building is situated, whether the availability of
other vacant room, in his possession, in any other
building would negative his claim under Section 11(8) of
the Act?”
After stating that Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Control Act speaks
of vacant space or rooms in the same building, it was held that the
Appellate Authority was wrong in considering vacant rooms in other
buildings. So far as the Commissioner’s Report was concerned, the
High Court reiterated the findings of the trial court, stating that the
Commissioner had not reported the availability of any vacant room,
and that the burden is on the tenant to show that the landlord had in
his possession other vacant rooms. So far as Exhibit B3, being the
6
Building Tax Assessment Register is concerned, it was held that the
entries in the said Register cannot be taken as conclusive proof and
must therefore be discarded. On comparative hardship, the High Court
agreed with the trial court, holding:
“13. Similarly, it has come out in evidence that the tenant
has been in occupation of another room in the building
owned by one Abdul Rehman. In the Rent Control
Petitions, the landlord has specifically stated that he is in
occupation of another shop room in the building of the
said Abdul Rehman. So, if an order of eviction is passed,
he will not be put to any hardship. The tenant's
occupation in the building owned by Abdul Rehman has
come out in evidence. In that view, we find that the Rent
Control Court is justified in finding that the hardship that
may be caused to the tenant, if an order of eviction is
passed, would not outweigh the advantage to the
landlord.”
7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. The
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant pointed out that
under Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, the High Court, in its
revisional jurisdiction, cannot act as if it is a second court of first appeal
by setting aside findings of fact by the Appellate Authority on
reappreciation of the same. He also argued that there being no
perversity on the detailed findings given by the Appellate Authority, the
High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in interfering with the
same and wrongly substituting the findings of the trial court for those of
the Appellate Authority. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
7
respondent, however, relied strongly upon the trial court’s judgment and
stated that the Appellate Authority perversely dealt with material facts on
the record and its judgement was, therefore, correctly set aside within
the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. He relied upon the judgment
in Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada v. Govindram Ramgopal
Mundada, (2003) 2 SCC 320 [“Badrinarayan”], in particular, paragraphs
10 and 13 thereof.
8. Section 11(8) and Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act are
set out hereinbelow:
“11. Eviction of tenants.–
xxx xxx xxx
(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building
may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing
any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the
remaining part of the building to put the landlord in
possession thereof, if he requires additional
accommodation for his personal use.
xxx xxx xxx
Provided that, in the case of an application made
under sub-section (8), the Rent Control Court shall reject
the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may
be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the
advantage to the landlord.
xxx xxx xxx”
“20. Revision.—(1) In cases, where the appellate
authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate
Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High
Court, may, at any time, on the application of any
aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating
to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act
by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or
8
proceedings, and may pass such order in reference
thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the
High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be
in its discretion.”
9. It is important in cases like the present to first keep in mind the
parameters of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9
SCC 78, a reference was made to a five-Judge Bench of this Court by
a reference order dated 27.08.2009, which reads as follows:
“The learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana
[Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana,
(1993) 1 SCC 499] wherein Section 20 of the Kerala Rent
Control Act was in question. It was held in the said
decision that though Section 20 of the said Act provided
that the Revisional Court can go into the ‘propriety’ of the
order but it does not entitle the Revisional Court to
reappreciate the evidence. A similar view was taken by a
two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ubaiba v. Damodaran
[Ubaiba v. Damodaran, (1999) 5 SCC 645].
On the other hand the learned counsel for the
respondent has relied upon a decision of this Court in
Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] which was also a threeJudge Bench decision. It has been held in that case that
the expression ‘legality and propriety’ enables the High
Court in revisional jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence
while considering the findings of the first appellate court. A
similar view was taken by another three-Judge Bench of
this Court in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan [Moti Ram v. Suraj
Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 655].
From the above it is clear that there are conflicting
views of coordinate three-Judge Benches of this Court as
9
to the meaning, ambit and scope of the expression
‘legality and propriety’ and whether in revisional
jurisdiction the High Court can reappreciate the evidence.
Hence, we are of the view that the matter needs to be
considered by a larger Bench since this question arises in
a large number of cases as similar provisions conferring
power of revision exists in various rent control and other
legislations, e.g. Section 397 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Accordingly, we direct that the papers be
placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for
constituting a larger Bench.”
After setting out the various revisional provisions under State Rent
Control Acts including Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, this
Court approved an earlier judgment of this Court construing the Kerala
Rent Control Act in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana & Ors., (1993) 1 SCC 499, as follows:
“38. Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499] holds, and in our view,
rightly that even the wider language of Section 20 of the
Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the High Court to
act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full
agreement with the view of the three-Judge Bench in
Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499] that the word “propriety”
does not confer power upon the High Court to
reappreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion
but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out
legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned
[Kallyani Sulochana v. Saradamma, 1991 SCC OnLine
Ker 213 : (1991) 2 KLJ 105] before it. We approve the
view of this Court in Rukmini [Rukmini Amma
Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499].”
xxx xxx xxx
“42. The observation in Ramdoss [Ramdoss v. K.
Thangavelu, (2000) 2 SCC 135] that the High Court in
exercise of its revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an
10
appellate court/authority and it is impermissible for the
High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision petition
filed under Section 25 of the Act is in accord with Rukmini
[Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana,
(1993) 1 SCC 499] and Sankaranarayanan [D.
Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank, 1995 Supp
(4) SCC 675]. Its observation that the High Court can
interfere with incorrect finding of fact must be understood
in the context where such finding is perverse, based on
no evidence or misreading of the evidence or such finding
has been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking the
material evidence or such finding is so grossly erroneous
that if allowed to stand, will occasion in miscarriage of
justice. Ramdoss [Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu, (2000) 2
SCC 135] does not hold that the High Court may interfere
with the findings of fact because on reappreciation of the
evidence its view is different from that of the first appellate
court or authority. The decision of this Court in V.M.
Mohan [V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan Dwarka, (2006) 9
SCC 606] is again in line with the judgment of this Court
in Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499].”
So far as the judgment in Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3
SCC 131, is concerned, the Court limited its finding as follows:
“32. Insofar as the three-Judge Bench decision of this
Court in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988)
3 SCC 131] is concerned, it rightly observes that
revisional power is subject to well-known limitations
inherent in all the revisional jurisdictions and the matter
essentially turns on the language of the statute investing
the jurisdiction. We do not think that there can ever be
objection to the above statement. The controversy centres
round the following observation in Ram Dass [Ram
Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131], “... that
jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in appropriate
cases, to examine the correctness of the findings of facts
also….” It is suggested that by observing so, the threeJudge Bench in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander,
(1988) 3 SCC 131] has enabled the High Court to
interfere with the findings of fact by reappreciating the
11
evidence. We do not think that the three-Judge Bench
has gone to that extent in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131]. The observation in Ram
Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131]
that as the expression used conferring revisional
jurisdiction is “legality and propriety”, the High Court has
wider jurisdiction obviously means that the power of
revision vested in the High Court in the statute is wider
than the power conferred on it under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; it is not confined to the
jurisdictional error alone. However, in dealing with the
findings of fact, the examination of findings of fact by the
High Court is limited to satisfy itself that the decision is
“according to law”. This is expressly stated in Ram Dass
[Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131].
Whether or not a finding of fact recorded by the
subordinate court/tribunal is according to law, is required
to be seen on the touchstone whether such finding of fact
is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any
illegality like misreading of the evidence or overlooking
and ignoring the material evidence altogether or suffers
from perversity or any such illegality or such finding has
resulted in gross miscarriage of justice. Ram Dass [Ram
Dass v. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not lay
down as a proposition of law that the revisional power of
the High Court under the Rent Control Act is as wide as
that of the appellate court or the appellate authority or
such power is coextensive with that of the appellate
authority or that the concluded finding of fact recorded by
the original authority or the appellate authority can be
interfered with by the High Court by reappreciating
evidence because Revisional Court/authority is not in
agreement with the finding of fact recorded by the
court/authority below. Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not exposit that the
revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide
as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the
evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the
finding recorded by the court/authority below. Rather, it
emphasises that while examining the correctness of
findings of fact, the Revisional Court is not the second
court of first appeal. Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] does not cross the limits of
12
Revisional Court as explained in Dattonpant [Dattonpant
Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval,
(1975) 2 SCC 246].”
So holding, the five-Judge Bench answered the reference, thus:
“43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent
Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the
findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first
appellate authority because on reappreciation of the
evidence, its view is different from the court/authority
below. The consideration or examination of the evidence
by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these
Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded
by the court/authority below is according to law and does
not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded
by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived
at without consideration of the material evidence or such
finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the
evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand,
it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to
correction because it is not treated as a finding according
to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts
shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being
not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy
itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any
decision or order impugned before it as indicated above.
However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness,
legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order,
the High Court shall not exercise its power as an
appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence
for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power
is not and cannot be equated with the power of
reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first
appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied
that the decision is according to law, it may examine
whether the order impugned before it suffers from
procedural illegality or irregularity.
13
44. We, thus, approve the view of this Court
in Rukmini [Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani
Sulochana, (1993) 1 SCC 499] as noted by us. The
decision of this Court in Ram Dass [Ram Dass v. Ishwar
Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131] must be read as explained
above. The reference is answered accordingly. The civil
appeals and the special leave petitions shall now be
posted before the regular Benches for decision in light of
the above.”
10. In the facts of the present case, when the Appellate Authority
relied upon the Commissioner’s Report stating that there are 36 rooms
in the building and that the majority of the rooms are let out, showing
that some of the rooms in the occupation of the landlord are lying
vacant, it cannot be said that there is any perversity in this finding of
fact. Even assuming that the High Court is correct in its construction of
Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Control Act, stating that vacant rooms
in other buildings cannot be looked at, this finding of fact of the
Appellate Authority puts paid to any bonafide requirement of additional
accommodation of the landlord in the facts of the present case.
11. The reliance upon the Building Tax Assessment Register by the
Appellate Authority, showing that some of the rooms belonging to the
landlord were lying vacant, again, is a finding of fact which cannot be
interfered with in the manner done by the High Court. Further, the finding
that a room leased by the mother-in-law of the tenant in another building
is not in the tenant’s possession only because he had his mother-in14
law’s permission to store goods when necessary, and especially during
festival occasions, on a temporary basis, would also show that he cannot
be considered to be in possession of the said room, as rightly held by
the Appellate Authority. Interfering with this finding of fact, again, without
any perversity or misappreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority
would clearly be outside the High Court’s ken in its revisional jurisdiction.
Equally, the finding of comparative hardship, which is a finding of fact not
otherwise found to be perverse, cannot be upset in the manner done in
the present case by the High Court.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied upon the
judgment of this Court in Badrinarayan (supra). This was a case which
arose under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act, 1947 [“Bombay Rent Act”], Section 13(2) of which states as
follows:
“13. When landlord may recover possession.—
xxx xxx xxx
(2) No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground
specified in clause (g) of sub-section (1) if the court is
satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of
the case including the question whether other reasonable
accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant,
greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree
than by refusing to pass it.
Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would
be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by
passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises,
the court shall pass the decree in respect of such part
only.
15
xxx xxx xxx”
The finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority and sustained by
the High Court as to bonafide requirement of the landlord in that case
was upheld by the Supreme Court. The only question that the Supreme
Court was called upon to decide is the exercise of discretion under
Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act so far as partial eviction is
concerned (see paragraph 5). Paragraph 10 strongly relied upon by
learned counsel for the respondent is in the context of a partial eviction
being ordered, in which this Court stated:
“10. …It is expected of the parties to raise necessary
pleadings, and the court to frame an issue based on the
pleadings so as to enable parties to adduce evidence and
bring on record such relevant material as would enable
the court forming an opinion on the issue as to
comparative hardship and consistently with such finding
whether a partial eviction would meet the ends of justice.
Even if no issue has been framed, the court may
discharge its duty by taking into consideration such
material as may be available on record.”
Paragraph 13 was then relied upon, which dealt with an English
judgment in Piper v. Harvey, (1958) 1 All ER 454, in which it was found,
on the evidence adduced in that case, that the comparative hardship
issue would have to be decided against the tenant. After going into the
facts in that case, this Court remanded the case to the appellate court to
frame two issues which related to whether a partial eviction would meet
the ends of justice (see paragraph 16).
16
13. Section 11(8) of the Kerala Rent Act is materially different from
Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act in that it does not provide for
partial eviction if comparative hardship of a landlord and a tenant are to
be weighed against each other. Even otherwise, on the facts of this
case, issue (3) was specifically raised, which reads as follows:
“(3) Whether the hardship which may be caused to the
respondent by granting eviction will outweigh the
advantage to the petitioner?”
This issue was answered by the trial court by merely stating that the
landlord will be able to run his establishment in a better manner if he
gets the schedule petition rooms, which will help to lead his
establishment to prosperity, as compared with the tenant, who is not able
to “establish much hardship to him”. This vague finding was rightly set
aside by the Appellate Authority, which has been set out by us in
extenso in paragraph 5 of this judgment. As has been stated
hereinabove, without finding this to be perverse, the High Court acted
outside its revisional jurisdiction in substituting the same in the manner
done hereinabove.
17
14. For all these reasons, we allow the appeals and set aside the
High Court’s judgment, restoring that of the Appellate Authority.
.……………………………J.
(R.F. Nariman)
.……………………………J.
(Navin Sinha)
……………………………J.
(B.R. Gavai)
New Delhi;
June 08, 2020.
18
