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Section 43(A) of the Electricity Supply Act,- In the present case, the clear agreement between the parties was that interest on the sum of `53.90 crores was payable for the specified period 01.07.2003 to 31.12.2009. Therefore, CLP's claim that any amount was payable, for any period prior to 01.07.2003, was not tenable. Had CLP wished so, nothing prevented it to claim for it during negotiations and have it included as a term of the contract. Once having settled for a specified sum, on an amount (`53.90 crores) that was only fictionally a loan - and treated as such, for purpose of fixing interest payable, considering the equity infused, in excess of the tariff regulations, the absence of any like item, such as interest for prior period, precludes a claim. But it was really part of the equity component. Therefore, interest was per se not payable, but could be paid in terms of the tariff notification or the agreement. No claim on any other legal or equitable considerations could have been made. The findings of the lower authorities are therefore, sound and reasonable. In view of the foregoing analysis and conclusions, both appeals have to fail. They are accordingly dismissed, without order on costs

Section 43(A) of the Electricity Supply Act,-
In the present case, the clear agreement between the parties was that interest on the sum of `53.90 crores was payable for the specified period 01.07.2003 to 31.12.2009.
Therefore, CLP's claim that any amount was payable, for any period prior to 01.07.2003, was not tenable. 
Had CLP wished so, nothing prevented it to claim for it during negotiations and have it included as a term of the contract. 
Once having settled for a specified sum, on an amount (`53.90 crores) that was only fictionally a loan - and treated as such, for purpose of fixing interest payable, considering the equity infused, in excess of the tariff regulations, the absence of any like item, such as interest for prior period, precludes a claim. 
But it was really part of the equity component. 
Therefore, interest was per se not payable, but could be  paid in terms of the tariff notification or the agreement. 
No claim on any other legal or equitable considerations could have been made. The findings of the lower authorities are therefore, sound and reasonable.  In view of the foregoing analysis and conclusions, both appeals have to fail. They are accordingly dismissed, without order on costs

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2793 OF 2010
CLP INDIA PVT. LTD. ...APPELLANT(S)
 VERSUS
GUJARAT URJA VIKAS NIGAM LTD. & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2969 OF 2010
JUDGMENT
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. The present judgment will dispose of two appeals preferred under Section 125
of the Electricity Act, 2003. One appeal (CA 2969/2010) has been preferred by the
Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. (hereafter,"Gujarat Urja"or "GUVN”);the second
(CA 2793/2010) has been preferred by CLP (India) Pvt. Ltd. (formerly, Gujarat
Torrent Energy Corporation Ltd; later, Gujarat Paguthan Energy Corporation Ltd, a
generating company, hereafter collectively "CLP”). Both appeals challenge a
common order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity(“APTEL” hereafter).
2. The erstwhile Gujarat Electricity Board (GEB) (now “Gujarat Urja”) entered
into a power purchase agreement (“PPA”)with CLP on 03.02.1994. In terms of the
PPA, Gujarat Urja was under an obligation to purchase - and CLP was under
corresponding obligation to supply - 635 MW of electricity; the tenure of the
agreement was 20 years. In terms of Section 43(A) of the Electricity Supply Act,
2
1948, (hereafter"the Act"), a generating company may enter into a contract for the
sale of electricity with the Electricity Board and the tariff for the sale of electricity
shall be determined by the authority through the notification issued by the Central
Government. Prior the PPA in this case, the Central Government had issued a
notification under Section 43A, on 30.03.1992, specifying the controlling norms,
terms and conditions for determination of tariff for sale of electricity by the
generating company to the Electricity Boards. One of those conditions was the
provision for incentive to units using naphtha. On 17.01.1994, an amendment to the
notification dated 30.03.1992 was made providing for Note (1) stating that the
incentive for generation above the target availability of 68.49% for fixed cost
recovery was to be capped.
3. After the signing of the PPA between the parties, an amendment notification
dated 06.11.1995 was issued by the Central Government amending the notification
(dated 30.03.1992). By this, the Central Government provided that there would no
longer be any deemed Generation Incentive payable to any generating company on
available declaration of Naphtha as fuel. Based on this notification, the Electricity
Board sought to enforce the said notification claiming that this generating company
is not entitled to get the incentive for deemed generation. The Electricity Board also
sent a letter dated 18.04.1996 informing the CLP, that it proposed to amend the
Clause 7.5.2.1 of the PPA to the effect that no deemed generation shall be
admissible beyond the level of generation in respect of Naphtha. CLP did not agree
to the proposal and by its reply dated 24.04.1996 stated that the notification of
06.11.1995 was inapplicable. Gujarat Urja did not agree to CLP's position and
reiterated its earlier position about the change in the incentive terms. A meeting was
held in respect of various issues on 06.10.1997 during which several issues were
discussed and decisions taken, between the parties. However, the minutes of
meeting did not record any decision on the issue of incentive restricted in terms of
the notification dated 06.11.1995. There was some more correspondence and
meetings, which however, did not lead to any result in regard to both parties
3
accepting that the incentive was payable in terms of the notification of
November,1995. Ultimately, with effect from December 1997, CLP started billing
Gujarat Urja for the power supplied, including the incentive (ignoring the amending
notification); Gujarat Urja continued to pay deemed generation incentive from June,
1998 to 2000.
4. The Union Ministry of Power issued a notification (dated 09.06.1998) which
clarified profits on operating norms; several components such as station heat rate,
auxiliary consumption and secondary fuel consumption were eliminated and income
tax on incentives was no longer permitted (as a pass through in tariff). It was stated
that this was prospective in operation and would apply to power purchase
agreements which were not executed and delivered by the parties by 09.06.1998.
For a long time, incentive continued to be paid, ignoring the notification of
06.11.1995 by Gujarat Urja, to CLP. On 05.12.2003, CLP and Gujarat Urja entered
into a supplementary agreement, amending the PPA, to incorporate concessions
offered by CLP to reduce tariff. Pursuant to execution of the supplementary
agreement dated 05.12.2003, Gujarat Urja issued a letter to CLP stating that all the
outstanding issues stood fully and finally resolved. Gujarat Urja continued to pay
deemed generation incentive from 05.12.2003 to 23.02.2005. In February, 2005, a
high-level committee was constituted to examine the issue of recovery of excess
payouts made on the basis of deemed generation incentive. The receipt of the report,
of that committee, led Gujarat Urja to file an application for recovery of the
amounts from CLP (Petition No.874/2006 under Section 86(1)(f) of the Act, before
the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission ("GERC"), claiming for recovery of
deemed generation incentive paid to CLP during the period from 1997-98 to 2005-
06.
5. CLP resisted Gujarat Urja's application, contending that principles of estoppel
precluded recovery; that in any event, parties had not agreed to change the terms of
the PPA and that the previous correspondence evidenced that the matter had been
closed, which meant that Gujarat Urja could not claim recovery of any so-called
4
excess amounts. The GERC, by its order held that Note 2 (introduced by the
notification of 06.11.1995) was applicable to the project and thus deemed
generation incentive is not payable to CLP. However, it permitted recovery of only
for a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the petition: the recovery for
the period prior to 14.09.2002 were held to be time-barred.
6. The second appeal, i.e. CA 2793/2010 by CLP Limited, questions the
impugned order of the APTEL which had upheld the rejection of its claim for
interest on deemed loan component.
7. The facts as far as this appeal is concerned are that a supplementary
agreement was executed between the parties on 05.12.2003. In terms of Article 4.6
of the Supplementary Agreement, original clause 7.5.14(a) of the PPA dated
03.02.1994 was substituted1
. CLP stated that the amount, i.e `53.90 crores was in
fact due as a loan. If it was deemed as a loan, then interest was payable on the basis
of normative repayment of principal amount during the period of the loan, i.e. the
loan would not remain as a constant. In this regard, CLP had relied upon Clause 1.5
of the notification dated 30.03.19922
. The PPA dated 03.02.1994 by Schedule VII
Clause 7.5.10 defined "Interest on Loan Capital" in the following terms:
"7.5.10: Interest on Loan Capital-shall mean the sum of all payment of
interest along with bank charges and all associated financing costs paid
to the bank annually on the outstanding loans paid by GTEC, converted,
as of the first day of the fortnight for the applicable fixed charge, into the
currencies in which it is payable employing exchange rates at bank's
selling rate prevailing on that day obtained from the source mutually
agreed."
1The substituted term, i.e. the new clause 7.5.14(a) reads as follows:
" The parties have agreed to recognize an amount of Rs.53.90 crores as"Own
Capital"deployed to meet with the Capital Cost and allowance of Payment of cost in the
form of "Cost of Own Capital"@ the rate of 14% per annum effective from 1.7.2003 and up
to 31.12.2009. No payment of any nature will accrue after the said date on the said
amount."
2Clause 1.5 reads as follows:
"1.5…………….(a) Interest on loan capital shall be computed on the outstanding loans,
including the schedule of repayment, as per the financial package approved by the
Authority….."
5
8. The CERC Tariff Regulations, 2001 which provided for "Interest on loan
capital”[clause 2.7(a)] and CERC Tariff Regulations,2004 were relied upon.
They are set out below:
"2.7(a)Interest on loan capital
Interest on loan capital shall be computed on the outstanding loans,
duly taking into account the schedule of repayment as per the financial
package approved by the Authority or an appropriate independent
agency, as the case may be."
9. CERC Tariff Regulations, 2004 inter alia provides as under:
“20.Debt-Equity Ratio:(1) In case of alia generating stations, declared
under commercial operation on or after 1.4.2004,debt-equity ratio as on
the date of commercial operation shall be 70:30 for determination of tariff.
Where equity employed is more than 30%,the amount of equity for
determination of tariff shall be limited to 30% and the balance amount
shall be considered as the normative loan.
Provided that in case of a generating station where actual equity employed
is less than 30%, the actual debt and equity shall be considered for
determination of tariff.
(2) The debt and equity amount arrived at in accordance with clause (1)
shall be used for calculating interest on loan, return on equity, Advance
against Depreciation and Foreign Exchange Rate Variation."
10. Gujarat Urja resisted this claim. After adjudication, the GERC rejected the
CLP's argument on a plain reading of the clause, saying that for the first time in the
supplementary agreement, which stated that the agreement too recognized ` 53.9
crores as own Capital for which the cost of Own Capital @ 14% was to be a pass
through. The effective date for such recognition was from 01.07.2003 to 31.03.2009
and no amounts were due and payable as interest after that date. It was specifically
stated that this condition constituted the complete bargain to the extent it provided
for treatment of cost of Own Capital @ 14% per annum for a defined period. The
agreement had to be and was given prospective operation. This excluded any
liability on part of Gujarat Urja for the past period, i.e. December 1997. It was also
6
held that the claim made in 2010 was substantially barred to the extent it sought for
any amount of interest beyond a period of three years.
11. The CLP claimed on another issue, i.e. interest on ` 14.48 crores @ 16% per
annum from July 2000 to 30.06.2003 was payable. In terms of the supplementary
agreement, the condition specifically stated that GPEC (i.e. CLC) had further
deployed a sum of ` 14,48,40,831/- from its internal accrual to complete shortfall
and disbursal of loan by the lenders, which agreed to allow payment on this amount
@ 16% per annum from July 2000 to 30.06.2012. Gujarat Urja stated that this
interest was payable on reducing balance terms, not as bullet payment of interest.
12. The CERC ruled that it was quite clear that the parties had agreed to allow
interest at the said rate, @ 16% on the said sum, i.e. 14.48 crores. Therefore, Gujarat
Urja could not argue that interest was payable on the reducing balance method and
that the payment of interest on a bullet repayment method was not permissible. The
Commission, i.e. GERC noted that the statutory notification, i.e. clause 1.5 of the
notification dated 30.03.1992 did not prohibit calculation of interest on bullet
repayment as regards clause 7.5.10 in Schedule VII of the PPA dated 03.02.1994,
the subject matter or its content was deemed loan. On this second aspect, therefore,
the terms of the contract contained in the supplementary agreement directing 16%
per annum interest on `14.48 crores is bullet repayment, was upheld.
13. The CLP Limited was aggrieved by that portion of GERC's order which
rejected its claim on the deemed loan component prior to the period 2003. It
appealed to the APTEL (Appeal No.44/2009). The APTEL concurred with the
decision of the GERC and held that clause 7.5.14(a) of the supplementary
agreement did not oblige Gujarat Urja to refund interest paid upon the deemed loan
component upon the equity portion treated as deemed loan, i.e. ` 53.9 crores for any
period prior to 01.07.2003. Therefore, CLP's appeal was rejected. It, therefore, has
appealed to this Court on the said findings.
Analysis and Findings
7
14. Section 43A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (hereafter "the Supply
Act") reads as follows:
"43A. Terms, conditions and tariff for sale of electricity by Generating
Company.-
(1) A Generating Company may enter into a contract for the sale of
electricity generated by it-
(a) with the Board constituted for the State or any of the States in which
a generating station owned or operated by the company is located;
(b) with the Board constituted for any other State in which it is carrying
on its activities in pursuance of sub-section(3) of section 15A; and
(c) with any other person with consent of the competent government or
governments.
(2) The tariff for the sale of electricity by a Generating Company to the
Board shall be determined in accordance with the norms regarding
operation and the Plant Load Factor as may be laid down by the
Authority and in accordance with the rates of depreciation and
reasonable return and such other factors as may be determined, from
time to time, by the Central Government, by notification in the Official
Gazette:
Provided that the terms, conditions and tariff for such sale shall, in
respect of a Generating Company, wholly or partly owned by the Central
Government, be such as may be determined by the Central Government
and in respect of a Generating Company wholly or partly owned by one
or more State Governments be such as may be determined, from time to
time, by the government or governments concerned."
15. At the outset, it is noticeable that on the issue, whether amounts paid to CLP,
for the period 1998 to 2005 onwards, were in excess of what was actually payable
by Gujarat Urja, the findings of GERC and the APTEL are concurrent. This court
does not discern any unreasonableness or facial omission of material factors, to
warrant appellate review. Nevertheless, the court would proceed to deal with the
submissions made on this aspect. Gujarat Urja contends that the concurrent
findings, to the extent they limit the refund to a period up-to 2002 are erroneous,
because in effect CLP has been unjustly enriched. Learned senior counsel for
Gujarat Urja, Mr. C.A. Sundaram, argued that once the GERC found, on a plain
8
reading and interpretation of the tariff order of 1992 – as amended by the
notification dated 06.11.1995, that incentive could not be paid in the same manner
as was contemplated by the parties, when they entered into the PPA (on
03.02.1994), as a matter of law, the amounts paid were excess; consequently, both in
law as well as in equity, CLP was under an obligation to refund the entire excess,
from the time it was not entitled to those amounts.
16. On the question of limitation, learned senior counsel argued that the APTEL
erred in law, in not following the decisions of this court in Hari Shankar Singhania
v. Gaur Hari Singhania3
and Sri Ram Mills Ltd.v. Utility Premises Ltd.4
in
considering that the issue was not time-barred. Counsel submitted that the question
was engaging the attention of the parties and CLP was aware of the fact that the
Central Electricity Authority and the Central Government had taken decisions on
this aspect. Moreover, as a matter of law, by reason of the amendment, to the
notification (dated 06.11.1995), CLP could not have legitimately claimed more tariff
based on the incentive policy that was no longer applicable. Therefore, the amounts
paid to the extent they were not in conformity with the said amendment, had to be
refunded in entirety.
17. On behalf of CLP it was urged, by Mr. Sajan Poovayya, learned senior
counsel, that both the authorities below erred in their interpretation of the terms of
the PPA, the notification of 30.03.1992 and the amendment of 06.11.1995. It was
argued that CLP's generation station is gas-based and not a Naphtha based station.
The notification dated 06.11.1995 applied only to 100% Naphtha based stations and
not to gas based stations like that of CLP, where Naphtha was used as a secondary
fuel when the Gas was not available. The expression "Naphtha based station" used
in the notification is a term of art; it refers merely to the physical characteristic of
the plant and not to the nature of fuel to be used. It was further contended that the
amending notification of 06.11.1995 itself makes a distinction between gas based
stations and naphtha based stations. CLP's plant, in terms of PPA is a gas based, not
3 (2006) 4 SCC 658
4 (2007) 4 SCC 599
9
Naphtha based. Therefore, the notification dated 06.11.1995 would not apply to its
plant. Also, urged counsel, since the PPA was entered into on 03.02.1994, the
amendment notification dated 06.11.1995 would not apply to the pre-existing PPA,
since it has a prospective effect. It was lastly submitted that Clause 6.5 of the PPA
dated 03.02.1994 regarding change of law is clarificatory in nature. It deals only
with the earlier part to protect the interest of the GPEC for change in law. "The
change in law" referred to in Clause 6.5 covers amendment to notification dated
30.03.1992. Therefore, the financial difficulties resulting from the amendment
notification dated 06.11.1995 are to be compensated in favour of the CLP.
18. It was argued that Note(2) of the amended notification dated 06.11.1995
unambiguously states that it applies only to Naphtha based stations for whom
generation incentive was inapplicable. Therefore, the gas based units like CLP were
clearly not covered by Note(2) since they used naphtha only as an alternative fuel or
substitute fuel. Therefore, the findings given by the GERC and APTEL to the effect
that Naphtha based station include those that are capable of firing Naphtha also as a
fuel, and not mean those which are capable of firing only Naphtha, is wrong.
19. The submissions of parties are with respect to two notifications dated
30.03.1992 and 06.11.1995. These Notifications were under Section 43(A) of the
Supply Act. Concededly, these notifications are statutory and are binding on the
parties. Any PPA between a generating company and the purchaser of electricity is
subject to such statutory notifications; parties by agreement cannot override
statutory provisions, or such notifications, as far as they relate to matters of tariff.
20. Therefore, the rights and obligations of the parties under the PPA have to be
read subject to the statutory provisions. The provisions of the PPA, if they are
contrary to the statutory provisions, cannot be given effect to. In terms of the PPA of
03.02.1994, "fuel" is defined as follows:
"Fuel natural gas and/or any liquid fuel selected by Gujarat Torrant
Electricity Company (GTEC) (now CLP) for use in power station for
generating electricity"
10
‘fuel management' is defined as follows:
"Fuel Management:-The power station of the GTEC is designed to use
natural gas and liquid fuel as fuel. GTEC shall decide selection and use
and proportion gas and other fuel in best economic way depending on
the situation from time to time."
21. The kind of alternative fuel and its long-term purchase contract could be
jointly decided by CLP and Gujarat Urja. The cost of the alternate fuel when used
by CLP shall be taken into account for calculation of variable charges as defined in
Schedule VII (of the PPA). Clause 7.1 and Clause 7.4 of Schedule VII to the PPA
are relevant.5
 Under the former, Gujarat Urja had to purchase power from CLP on
the basis of the notification of 30.03.1992 of the Central Government. It further
provided that the tariff for the first 6000 Kwh/kw (i.e 68.5% PLF – i.e. plant load
factor) of net availability in any year was to be the sum of (a) the fixed charge and
(b) the variable charge (i.e those terms defined by clauses 7.2 and 7.3). For all
excess energy of actual and deemed generation in excess of 68.5%, the tariff
payable was to be the sum of (a) incentive and (b) variable charge. Clause 7.4
provided for incentive, which was to be @ 0.575% for every 1% increase in the
generation above the normative level of 6000 hours per kWH/KW (i.e 68.5% PLF)
in accordance with the notification S.O. 251(E), dated 30.03.1992 (as amended on
17.01.1994).
5 For convenience,they are set out as follows:
" 7.1 Tariff GEB shall purchase power from GTEC, generally on the basis of GOI
notification No.SO 251(E) dtd. 30-3-1992. The Tariff for the first 6,000 kWH/KW (i.e. 68.5 PLF)
of Net Availability in any year during the terms of this Agreement shall be the sum of (a)the
Fixed Charge and (b) the Variable Charge. For all the energy of actual and deemed generation in
excess of 68.4 % PLF in any Year ,the Tariff payable by GEB shall be the sum of (a) the Incentive
described below and (b) the Variable Charge. Any tax or impost on or pertaining to sale of energy
or capacity shall be payable by GEB over and above the Tariff.
… …… …… …...
7.4 Incentive The incentive referred to in 7.1 above with respect to any fortnight shall be
in the form of additional return on equity at the rate of 0.575% for every 1% increase in the
generation above the normative level of 6000 hours per kWH/KW(i.e 68.5% PLF) in accordance
with the amendment dated 17.1.94 to the said notification No.SO 251(E)."
11
22. The argument of CLP that its unit was essentially gas-based and that the
definition of naphtha-based unit meant only that unit which depended entirely on
naphtha as a fuel, or that which used naphtha at least to the extent of 50%, in our
opinion is not correct.
23. The judgment of this court in India Thermal Power Ltd. vs. State of M.P. &
Ors.6
is an authority for the proposition that parties can agree to terms as they deem
appropriate, for generation and sale of electricity under Section 43A except that the
tariff is to be in accordance with the provision contained in Section 43A. The
decision in Binani Zinc Ltd. v. Kerala State Electricity Board7
; Tata Power
Company Ltd. vs. Adani Electricity Mumbai Ltd. and Ors.8
 too have taken a similar
approach.
24. Clause 6.5 of the PPA of 03.02.1994 dealt with a situation concerning
change of law. It also stated that any amendment in the Central Government's
notification dated 30.03.1992 would be taken into account for tariff calculation.9
6 (2000) 3 SCC 379, where it was held pertinently that:
" Section 43 empowers Electricity Board to enter into arrangement for purchase of
electricity on such terms as may be agreed. Section 43-A(1) provides that a generating company
may enter into a contract for the sale of electricity generated by it with Electricity Board. As
regards the determination of tariff for the sale of electricity by a generating company to the
Board, Section 43(1)(2) provides that the tariff shall be determined in accordance with the norms
regarding operation and plant load factor as may be laid down by the authority and in
accordance with the rates of depreciation and reasonable return and such other factors as may be
determined from time to time by the Central Government by a notification in the official gazette.
These provision clearly indicate that the agreement can be on such terms as may be agreed by the
parties except that the tariff is to be determined in accordance with the provision contained in
Section 43-A(2)and notifications issued thereunder. Merely because a contract is entered into in
exercise of an enacting power conferred by a statute that by itself cannot render the contract a
statutory contract. If entering into a contract containing prescribed terms and conditions is a
must under the statute than that contract becomes a statutory contract. If a contract incorporate
certain terms and conditions in it which are statutory then the said contract to that extent is
statutory. A contract may contain certain other terms and conditions which may not be of a
statutory character and which have been incorporated therein as a result of a mutual agreement
between the parties. Therefore, the PPAs can be regarded as statutory only to the extent that they
contain provisions regarding determination of tariff and other statutory requirements of Section
43A(2)."
7 (2009) 11 SCC 244
8 2019(7) SCALE 297
9 The stipulation reads as follows:
"6.5 Change in Law: In the event that as a result of any laws or regulations of any
Governmental Authority or any national ,regional or municipal authority thereof coming into
12
The relevant part of the notification of 30.03.1992 which dealt with charges
recoverable by the generating company was clause 1.6.10 That condition was
amended by the notification dated 06.11.1995 which clearly stated, by Note(2) that:
"Note:2-For Naptha based thermal plants, the extent of backing down,
as ordered by Regional Electricity Boards, beyond plant Load Factor of
6000 kwh/kw/year, shall not be reckoned as generation achieved for
incentive purpose."
25. There is no dispute that the PPA which the parties entered into specifically
referred to the notification of 30.03.1992 and further went on to state that for the
first Kwh/KW, a plant load factor of 68.5% fixed charges and variable charges were
deployed. For generation achieved over and above this by the concerned unit – CLP,
an incentive @ 5.75% for every 1% increase over and above the fixed and variable
charge payable was agreed to. Significantly, the fixed and variable charges are in
consonance with the statutory notification of 30.03.1992 (which was also later
amended on 17.01.1994). This much is clear from a plain reading of clause 7.1 of
the Schedule VII to the PPA itself. In view of the fact that the notification amended
on 06.11.1995 was a statutory one, there cannot be any doubt that it was binding
effect after the date hereof, and in force at the date hereof being amended, modified or repealed,
the interest of GTEC in the Project and/or GTEC's projected economic return net of tax (or other
imposition) on its investment in the Project is materially reduced prejudiced or otherwise
adversely affected (including without limitation, any restriction on the ability to convert Rupees
or remit funds in foreign currencies outside of India) then the parties hereto shall meet and
endeavour to agree on amendments to this Agreement to the effect that all of the increased cost or
lost return on investment incurred by GTEC that would result from complying with or being
subject to any such change in law shall be passed through to GEB under GTEC Tariff. Any
amendment in Government of India Notification No.S.O.251(E)dated 30.3.92 shall be taken into
account for Tariff calculation."
10 The said condition in the notification is as follows:
" 1.6 Full fixed charges shall be recoverable at generation level of 5500-6000
hours/KW/year: Payment of fixed charges below the level of 5500 KWh/KW/year shall be on prorata basis. There shall not be any payment of fixed charges for generation levels above 6000
hours./KW/year: However generation above 6000 hours./KW/Year shall be at negotiated rates
between the Generating companies and the Board, which shall not include fixed cost element.
While computing the level of generation, the extent of backing down, as ordered by the Regional
Electricity Board shall be reckoned as generation achieved. The payment of fixed charges shall be
on monthly basis, proportionate to the electricity drawn by the respective Boards. Necessary
adjustment based on actual sales and deemed sales shall be made at the end of each year:"
13
upon the parties. Therefore, the earlier notification which left it free to the parties to
negotiate on various aspects, including on the incentive payable, stood amended by
Note 2, which was added to clause 1.6 of the tariff. The effect of this statutory
incorporation by way of amendment was that incentive no longer became payable.
The arguments by the CLP, in the opinion of the Court, that the parties were bound
only by the terms of the agreement and that the amendment notification being
prospective, could not have altered the terms of the tariff, especially the incentive
payable, are insubstantial and have no force. The concurrent findings on this aspect,
therefore, are sound and do not call for interference. Likewise, the change of law
provision (Clause 6.5 of the PPA) clearly contemplated that any amendment to the
prevailing tariff notification (dated 30.03.1992) would bind the parties. Since Note
(2) was an amendment, which dealt with the issue of incentive, it cannot now be
said that it was inapplicable. The findings of the lower authorities, therefore, are
correct; no interference is called for.
26. The next question is whether the GERC and APTEL fell into error in
granting restricted refund calculable for the 3 year period prior to Gujarat Urja's
application. The concurred findings on this aspect, in the opinion of this court, are
reasonable. There is merit in CPL's submission that the earliest point in time, when
the cause of action arose, was in May,1996, when Gujarat Urja rejected its
contention that incentive was payable in terms of the PPA, notwithstanding the
notification of 06.11.1995. Despite this stated position, meetings continued to be
held and, what is more, incentive amounts, were paid to CLP. No doubt, no
document conclusively stated that CLP's claim was accepted. We do not find any
merit in the submission of Gujarat Urja that the issue was kept alive, due to a series
of communications. In this regard, APTEL's findings about inapplicability of
Section 18 of the Limitation Act, are correct. There was no admission on the part of
CLP, at least of the kind, that extended the time for preferring an application for
recovery of excess payments. It has been consistently ruled by this court that
14
repeated letters, or exchange of communications, do not extend the period of
limitation, provided by law.11
27. The third, and last issue, is with respect to payment of interest on deemed
equity. Clause 1.5 of the 30.03.1992 notification provided for interest on loan, as a
component of tariff; it stipulated that interest (on outstanding loan) shall be
computed as per financial package approved by the Authority (CEA). The PPA of
03.02.1994 (Schedule VII) clause 7.5.10 defined interest on loan capital as "the
sum of all payments of interest along with bank charges and all associated
financing costs paid to the bank annually on the outstanding loans paid by GTEC.
…" The Central Commission's order of 21.02.2000 led to a stipulation in the tariff
regulations of 2001. Eventually, the Tariff Regulations of 2004 was brought into
force; it provided for a debt ratio of 70:30 for determination of tariff. It also
provided that:
"Where equity employed is more than 30%, the amount of equity for
determination of tariff shall be limited to 30% and the balance amount
shall be considered as the normative loan"
28. The debt-equity ratio in this case, was disturbed; accordingly ` 53.9 crores
was treated as “deemed” or normative loan, for which the parties had to agree the
rate of interest payable, in accordance with the tariff notification. It was in the light
of these developments that the supplementary agreement was entered into. That
amended the existing PPA, to the following effect12:
"The parties have agreed to recognize an amount of Rs.53.90 crores as
"Own Capital" deployed to meet with the Capital Cost and allowance of
Payment of cost in the form of "Cost of Own Capital"@ the rate of
14%per annum effective from 1.7.2003 and up to 31.12.2009. No
payment of any nature will accrue after the said date on the said
amount."
11 S.S.Rathore v State of Madhya Pradesh 1989 (4) SCC 582; Union of India v Har Dayal 2010
(1) SCC 394; Schlumberger Asia Services Ltd vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. 2013
(7) SCC 562.
12 f.n.1 ibid.
15
29. It is thus apparent, that the parties did not harbor any doubt about the period
for which the specified interest was payable on such deemed loan. The rate of
interest was fixed; likewise, the date from which payment obligations were to arise,
too were known. Also, the date upto which the interest on such deemed loan
payments were to be made, was known and fixed. In these circumstances, CLP's
claim that the payment of interest for a prior period was outstanding, and constituted
Gujarat Urja's liability, is insubstantial. In a recent judgment13 a similar issue had
arisen. The court quoted from the decision in National Thermal Power Corporation
Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board14 where another previous decision
was cited with approval on the issue that the express provision for something, in an
agreement, meant that other similar matters stood excluded.15
30. A somewhat analogous issue, i.e. interest on normative deemed loan (i.e.
deemed loan), in the context of changed debt-equity ratios, under tariff regimes was
considered in a decision of this court16, where it was held that:
"20. In the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 23.11.2007 the
matter came to be dealt with under the heading 'debt equity ratio'.The
Tribunal went on to accept the case of the Appellant in respect of all old
projects of DVC and normative debt equity of 50:50 was assigned,
commissioned prior to 1992. In respect of recent projects such as Mejina,
13 Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.and Ors. vs. Adani Power Ltd. and Ors. 2019 (5) SCC
325
14 (2011)15 SCC 580
15 The relevant portions of this court's observations, in Uttar Haryana (f.n.13 ibid) are as
under.:
"25. In this connection, it is material to note that the claim in South Eastern Coalfields
(2003) 8 SCC 6487 was essentially covered Under Section 61 of the Sale of Goods
Act,1930, and the interest by way of damages was payable as per this statutory provision itself.
The liability had been crystallised and the interest had become payable because of the failure to
pay the amount as per the liability. Besides, there was nothing in the agreement between the
parties to the contrary on the issue of grant of interest. In the present matter, we have the second
proviso to Regulation 79(2) of the 1999 Regulations which permitted the generating company to
continue to charge the existing tariff for such period as may be specified in the notification by the
Commission, and the notifications permitted continuation of the existing tariff as on 31-3-2001,
until the final tariff was determined. There was no provision for payment of interest therein. The
very fact that interest came to be provided subsequently by a notification under the Regulations of
2004 is also indicative of a contrary situation in the present matter viz. that interest was not
payable earlier."
16 Damodar Valley Corporation vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors. 2018
(15) SCALE 451.
16
it was assigned debt equity ratio of 70:30 on capital structure as
specified in the Regulations. This finding has become final. It was
contended on behalf of the Appellant that equity has been the primary
source of capital. Thereafter,in paragraph A-10, it was found by the
Appellate Tribunal that owners take upon themselves business related
risk and are entitled to interest on capital investment,but the return is to
be governed by the scheme of determination of tariff for the supply of
electricity as mandated by the law in place. The Appellate Tribunal
further proceeds to hold that the scheme provides for assured Return on
Equity (ROE) which is at the rate of 14% on the equity employed for the
purpose of supplying electricity. The scheme does not permit return on
investment made on projects other than for supply of electricity to be
recovered from supply of electricity. The Tribunal went on to hold that
the DVC Act does not recognise capital as borrowings and there is no
reference about repayment of such capital to the participating
Governments. The Appellate Tribunal proceeds to hold that the capital
infused by participating Governments is in the nature of equity capital
and for the determination of tariff, the same would be eligible for return
on equity but the Appellate Tribunal does not end there. It clearly
provides that the return on equity is as may be permitted by the tariff
Regulation of 2004. It is thereafter that the Appellate Tribunal in para 15
proceeded to hold that the DVC Act provides for interest on capital which
is contributed by the participating Governments. The accrued interest
due to the Governments apparently has been allowed to be retained by
the Appellant. The same however came to be ploughed back into the
capital with the tacit consent of the participating Governments.
Thereafter, it is stated that this has to be provided to the DVC as per the
provisions of Section 38 of the DVC Act. It is thereafter paragraph A-16
which we have already extracted, the Tribunal proceeded to observe that
under the DVC Act if there is any deficit in the capital contributed by the
participating Governments,it is to be made good by taking loan on behalf
of the participating Governments. The said debt would attract interest.
The average interest rate of the repayment payable is to be applied on a
50:50 normative debt capital. This means that out of the aggregate equity
including reserves, equity considering the normative debt ratio of 50:50
would be eligible for return on equity as specified in the Regulations and
the excess of equity,if any, over the equity earning ratio of 14% is to be
considered as interest bearing debt. In the example which has been given
it is shown that if the debt equity ratio is 40:60, return on equity at 14%
will be available on 50% equity whereas interest would be available at
10% portion of equity and 40% loan which were reduced by repayments.
17
21. On the basis of the remand, the Commission has worked out the
debt equity ratio as directed by the Appellate Tribunal. It has further
provided return on equity at the rate of 14% on the equity portion,
namely 50%. In respect of the debt portion, interest has been calculated
no doubt after deducting depreciation, the legality of which is the subject
matter of the other contention which we will deal with separately. It is
quite clear to us that Appellant has already been given return on equity
in terms of the tariff Regulation in respect of capital on the basis of debt
equity ratio which has been fixed by the Appellate Tribunal on a ratio
which has become final between the parties.
22. Though a perusal of para A-9 of order dated 23.11.2007 may
appear to show that equity has been found to be the main source of
capital, a perusal of paragraph A-10,A-16 and more importantly E-13
would show that capital Under Section 38 of the DVC Act has been
understood as the value of the operating assets when they were first put
to commercial use. Capital is also understood not as equity alone but it
has been understood both as loan and equity. The ratio between loan and
equity is also fixed in respect of the old projects at 50:50 and under the
new projects it is at 70:30.It is further clear from paragraph E-13 of the
order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 23.11.2007 that the appellate
Tribunal contemplated that the equity component would remain static
and it would earn the rate of return as provided in the tariff Regulation.
As far as the loan component is concerned, it would get reduced on
account of repayments. Therefore, the recovery as contemplated under
the Regulations was found to be in two forms, namely, either as return on
equity in respect of the equity portion and as interest on the loan
component."
31. In the present case, the clear agreement between the parties was that interest
on the sum of `53.90 crores was payable for the specified period 01.07.2003 to
31.12.2009.Therefore, CLP's claim that any amount was payable, for any period
prior to 01.07.2003, was not tenable. Had CLP wished so, nothing prevented it to
claim for it during negotiations and have it included as a term of the contract. Once
having settled for a specified sum, on an amount (`53.90 crores) that was only
fictionally a loan - and treated as such, for purpose of fixing interest payable,
considering the equity infused, in excess of the tariff regulations, the absence of any
like item, such as interest for prior period, precludes a claim. But it was really part
of the equity component. Therefore, interest was per se not payable, but could be
18
paid in terms of the tariff notification or the agreement. No claim on any other legal
or equitable considerations could have been made. The findings of the lower
authorities are therefore, sound and reasonable.
32. In view of the foregoing analysis and conclusions, both appeals have to fail.
They are accordingly dismissed, without order on costs.
.............................................J.
 [ARUN MISHRA]

.............................................J.
 [VINEET SARAN]
.............................................J.
 [S. RAVINDRA BHAT]
New Delhi;

May 6, 2020

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

whether the case in hand would be covered under the exceptions predicated in Section 300, IPC, so as to apply Section 304, IPC – be it Part I or Part II thereof. The facts of the present case would indicate that the accused, in particular accused No. 5, at the relevant time, was deprived of the power of self­control by grave and sudden provocation due to repeated unauthorised entry on the fields belonging to accused party. Further, the solitary fatal blow on the vital part of the head by accused No. 5 caused the death of Bhura Ram (deceased). The provocation was not invited by the accused party, but was obviously at the instance of the complainant party, who entered the fields unauthorizedly despite the objection taken by the complainant party in that regard on the same day earlier. However, as the death of Bhura Ram (deceased) was caused by the act of accused No. 5 giving one fatal blow on the head, which was with the intention of causing his death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the case would be covered by Section 304 Part I, IPC. It is certainly not a case to simply proceed under Section 326 of the IPC, as held by the High Court. We disapprove that approach of 22 the High Court. Even if the High Court had justly applied Section 326, IPC, we fail to appreciate as to how the High Court could have imposed sentence only for a period (about five months) undergone considering the nature and gravity of the offence and the background in which it is committed by the accused party, in particular, accused No. 5.

 whether the case in hand   would   be   covered   under   the   exceptions   predicated   in Section 300, IPC, so as to apply Section 304, IPC – be it Part I or Part II thereof.  The facts of the present case would indicate that the accused, in particular accused No. 5, at the relevant time, was deprived of the power of self­control by grave and sudden provocation due to repeated unauthorised entry on the  fields belonging to accused party.  Further, the solitary fatal blow on the vital part of the head by accused No. 5 caused the death of Bhura Ram (deceased).  The provocation was not invited by the accused   party,   but   was   obviously   at   the   instance   of   the complainant party, who entered the fields unauthorizedly despite the objection taken by the complainant party in that regard on the same day earlier.   However, as the death of Bhura Ram (deceased) was caused by the act of accused No. 5 giving one fatal blow on the head, which was with the intention of causing his death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the case would be covered by Section 304 Part I, IPC.   It is certainly not a case to simply proceed under Section 326 of the IPC, as held by the High Court.  We disapprove that approach of 22 the   High   Court.     Even   if   the   High   Court   had   justly   applied Section 326, IPC, we fail to appreciate as to how the High Court could   have   imposed   sentence   only   for   a   period   (about   five months) undergone considering the nature and gravity of the offence and the background in which it is committed by the accused party, in particular, accused No. 5.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1894/2010
State of Rajasthan    …Appellant(s)
Versus
Mehram & Ors.           ...Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This   appeal   takes   exception   to   the   judgment   and   order
dated  5.11.2007  passed  by   the  High   Court  of   Judicature   for
Rajasthan at Jodhpur1
  in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 271/1982,
whereby the conviction of the respondent No. 1/original accused
No. 5 (Mehram S/o Mr. Chhagna Ram) under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code2
  has been converted into one under Section
326,   IPC   and   the   substantive   sentence   awarded   therefor   is
reduced only to the period already undergone (about five months)
by the accused No. 5.  At the outset, the learned counsel for the
1 For short, “the High Court”
2 For short, “IPC”
2
appellant­State   had   made   it   amply   clear   that   the   State   was
pursuing this appeal only against the accused No. 5 (Mehram
S/o Chhagna Ram) for restoration of his conviction under Section
302, IPC and to award him sentence of life imprisonment.
2. Briefly   stated,   five   accused   were   named   in   the   First
Information Report (FIR) registered on 14.8.1981 at P.S. Nagaur
in relation to an incident at village Gowa Khurd.  The case set out
in the stated FIR, as noted by the trial Court, reads thus: ­
“2. …
“On 14.08.1981 at 9:30 p.m. in the evening Complainant
injured Mangilal, lodged an oral report with the Officer
Incharge, Police Station Nagaur to the effect that he has
four fields at Village Gowa Khurd, out of which one field
is situated about a distance of one km. away from the
village. Complainant has further stated that for going to
that field they have to use an old way passing through
the fields of Heera, Chhagna and Jeevan. However, this
way is not recorded in Government record. In the report,
Complainant has further stated that last year sons of
accused Heera obstructed the sons of the complainant
party from going to their field by that unrecorded way.
But upon intervention of Anna Kaka, they were pacified.
Thereafter, this year after rainy season, accused Heera
and Chhagna closed that way. Therefore, they had to
cultivate their field having gone through Basni. In the
report,   complainant   has   further   stated   that   at   about
dusk when he along with his wife were going for removing
the weeds to another fields and at that time his younger
brother Ghewar and Sawanta were grazing goats at a
distance. At that time quarrel was taken place between
accused Ramnarayan and Ghewar on account of way and
they went to village. At 5 o’ clock in the evening, his wife
had also gone to village. Complainant has further stated
that at the time of sunset while he alone was coming
towards the village from the field. And when he reached
3
the village near pond, then accused persons­ Mehram
and   Baksharam,   having   armed   with   ‘Kassies’   and
accused   persons­   Ramnarayan,   Heeraram   and
Ramniwas, having lathies in their hands came out from
the   back   of   ‘Kai’   (bushes)   and   surrounded   the
Complainant. Accused Baksharam with the intention to
kill struck ‘Kassi’ blow from the sharpen side on the head
of Mangilal, but Mangilal managed to prevent it by lifting
the hand, due to which Mangilal sustained injury over
his   palm.   Accused   Baksharam   tried   to   inflict   another
‘Kassi’ blow to Mangilal, whereupon Bhuraram caught
hold the ‘Kassi’.  And Mehram, Moti and Annaram arrived
at the place of occurrence from their fields. Thereafter,
accused Mehram  S/o  Chhagana  struck  a ‘Kassi’ blow
from   sharpen   side   on   the   head   of   Bhura   from   the
backside,   due   to   which   Bhura   fell   down,   accused
Ramniwas inflicted a lathi blow over the head of Mehram
S/o Annaram. Thereafter, all the accused persons gave
beatings. Then Ratna, Moti and Annaram had intervened
after   reaching   on   the   spot.   Accused   persons   having
assumed Bhura died ran away. Complainant has further
stated that accused persons have given beatings with the
intention of taking revenge on account of way dispute…”
On   the   basis   of   the   above   complaint,   investigation   was
commenced for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148,
149, 323, 307 and 302, IPC.   The case was committed to the
Sessions Court by the  Chief Judicial Magistrate  in  February,
1982, which was numbered as Sessions Case No. 9/1982.  After
a full­fledged trial, in which fourteen (14) prosecution witnesses
came to be examined, the trial Court, on extensive analysis of the
evidence on record, vide judgment and order dated 21.7.1982,
running into around 115 loosely typed pages, found the named
4
accused   guilty   of   the   concerned   offences,   and   passed   the
following order: ­
“ORDER
Hence, accused Mehram son of Chhagna is hereby
held guilty of committing offence under Section 148, 302,
324/149 Indian Penal Code.
Accused   Ramniwas   is   hereby   held   guilty   of
committing   offence   under   Section   147,   323,   324/149
India   Penal   Code   and   accused   persons­   Heera   Lal,
Ramnarayan under Section 323, 324/149 Indian Penal
Code and accused Baksharam is hereby convicted under
Section 148, 324 I.P.C.
Accused   persons   Heeraram,   Ramnarayan,
Ramniwas   and   Baksharam   are   not   found   guilty   of
committing   offence   under   Section   302   and   302/149
Indian Penal Code.
Hence,   accused   Mehram   is   hereby   sentenced   to
undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.100/­ in
default of payment of fine to undergo additional three
months rigorous imprisonment under Section 302 Indian
Penal Code.
Accused persons­ Mehram and Baksharam each of
them is hereby sentenced to undergo six months simple
imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.100/­ in default of
payment of fine to undergo 15 days additional simple
imprisonment for committing offence under Section 148
and   accused   persons   Ramnarayan   and   Ramniwas   for
committing offence under Section 147 I.P.C.
Accused Baksharam for committing offence under
Section 324 and accused persons­ Ramniwas, Heeraram,
Ramnarayan and Mehram for committing offence under
Section 324/149 I.P.C. each of them is hereby sentenced
to undergo six months and to pay fine of Rs.100/­ in
default   to   undergo   15   days   simple   imprisonment.
Accused Ramniwas is further sentenced to undergo three
months simple imprisonment under Section 323 I.P.C. All
the sentences shall run concurrently.
Accused   persons­Heeraram,   Ramnarayan,
Ramniwas and Baksharam shall be entitled to get benefit
under Section 428 I.P.C.
5
Clothes   and   arms   (Art.1   to   Art.10)   shall   be
destroyed   after   the   expiry   of   period   of   limitation   for
appeal.   Copy   of   the   judgment   be   made   available   to
accused persons.”
As regards the accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram), he
came to be convicted for offences punishable under Sections 148,
302, 324/149, IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment
with fine of Rs.100/­ for the offence punishable under Section
302, six months’ simple imprisonment with fine of Rs.100/­ for
offence   punishable   under   Section   148,   IPC   and   six   months’
simple imprisonment with fine of Rs.100/­ for offence punishable
under Section 324/149, IPC. 
3. All the five accused preferred appeal before the High Court
being D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 271/1982.  The appeal filed by
Ram Niwas (respondent No. 2/original  accused No. 3), Heera
Ram (respondent No. 3/original accused No. 1), Ram Narayan
(respondent   No.   4/original   accused   No.   2)   and   Laxa   Ram
(respondent   No.   5/original   accused   No.   4)   came   to   be   partly
allowed and their conviction  under Section  149, IPC was  set
aside,   but   under   Sections   323,   324,   147   and   148,   IPC,   the
conviction was maintained.  They were sentenced for the period
already undergone for the stated offences.   As regards Mehram
6
S/o Chhagna Ram (respondent No. 1/accused No. 5), the High
Court converted the conviction under Section 302, IPC into one
under Section 326, IPC on the finding that the said accused had
exceeded his  right  of  private  defence.   Additionally,  the  High
Court confirmed his conviction under Section 148, IPC.  Despite
the charge of murder and intentionally causing death of Bhura
Ram   (deceased),   the   High   Court   awarded   sentence   of   period
already undergone (around five months) by the accused No. 5
and directed him to pay compensation of Rs.50,000/­ (Rupees
fifty thousand only) to the next of kin of the deceased – Bhura
Ram. 
4. As aforesaid, even though the State has filed the present
appeal against all the five accused persons, at the outset, it was
made clear by the counsel for the State that the appeal is being
pursued   only   against   the   respondent   No.   1/accused   No.   5
(Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram) in respect of nature of offence and
on   the   point   of   sentence.     The   counsel   for   accused   No.   5,
however, urged that the said accused had a right to challenge the
finding of guilt and conviction under Section 326 and 148, IPC,
recorded against him, even though the said accused had not
7
preferred a formal appeal against the impugned judgment.   To
make good this submission, reliance is placed on Chandrakant
Patil   vs.   State   through   CBI3
,  Sumer   Singh   vs.   Surajbhan
Singh   &   Ors.4
,  State   of   Rajasthan   vs.   Ramanand5
  and
Section   377(3)   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   19736
.
According to him, the accused No. 5 was entitled to acquittal, as
the prosecution had failed to substantiate the charges framed
against him.  In any case, in the alternative it is submitted, that
the incident had occurred on the spur of the moment due to
provocation   given   to   the   accused   and   the   said   accused   in
retaliation and in exercise of right of private defence, ended up in
causing single injury to the deceased (Bhura Ram) without any
intention to cause his death.  Even for that reason, the accused
No. 5 was entitled to benefit of doubt and it was not a fit case for
conviction even under Section 326/148, IPC.  It is urged that the
accused No. 5 is a senior citizen (aged about 70­75 years) and
suffering from various old age diseases and due to efflux of time,
the Court ought not to entertain this appeal filed by the State.
Learned counsel contends that even if it is a case of excessive
3 (1998) 3 SCC 38
4 (2014) 7 SCC 323
5 (2017) 5 SCC 695
6 For short, “Cr.P.C.”
8
exercise of right of private defence, the benefit should be given to
the  accused.   In support  of the  said contention, the  learned
counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in
Gottipulla Venkatasiva Subbrayanam & Ors. vs. the State of
Andhra Pradesh & Anr.7
,  Deo  Narain vs. The State of Uttar
Pradesh8
,  Subramani  &  Ors.  vs.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu9 and
State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Gajey Singh & Anr.10
.
5. We have heard Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned senior counsel
for the appellant and Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned senior
counsel for the respondent.
6. The accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram) is justified
in contending that it is open to the said accused to challenge the
finding   and   order   of   conviction   under   Section   326/148,   IPC
recorded against him in the appeal filed by the State, assailing
the impugned judgment of the High Court.  That being the settled
legal   position,   as   expounded   in  Chandrakant   Patil  (supra),
Sumer Singh  (supra) and Ramanand (supra) including Section
377(3) of the Cr.P.C., which predicates that in the appeal filed
7 (1970) 1 SCC 235 (paragraphs 17 and 18)
8 (1973) 1 SCC 347 (paragraph 5)
9 (2002) 7 SCC 210 (paragraphs 19 to 27)
10 (2009) 11 SCC 414 (paragraph 30)
9
against   the   sentence   on   the   ground   of   its   inadequacy,   the
accused   may   plead   for   his   acquittal   or   for   reduction   of   the
sentence.  Resultantly, we may have to consider the correctness
of the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court and the appeal
Court   (High   Court)   against   the   accused   No.   5   (Mehram   S/o
Chhagna Ram).
7. Reverting to the judgment of the trial Court, it is noticed
that the trial Court vide judgment and order dated 21.7.1982,
extensively analysed the evidence of each witness and the stand
taken by the rival parties.  On the basis of that analysis, the trial
Court proceeded to hold that the prosecution had succeeded in
substantiating the allegation that the accused party was hiding
behind the ‘Kair’ bushes and on arrival of the complainant party
at the scene of occurrence, came out of the bushes and assaulted
the complainant party including Bhura Ram (deceased).  The trial
Court recorded the following finding: ­
“24. …  Hence, it is established that place of occurrence
was the ‘Kair’ bushes land, the height of ‘Kair’ bushes
was 5 to 6 ft. and by the depositions of witness Mangilal
(PW­11)   and   spot   inspection   report   (Ex.   P­21)   and
accused persons were hiding behind the ‘Kair’ bushes.
Accordingly, the fact of accused persons duly armed with
weapons hiding behind the ‘Kair’ bushes has also been
established   and   that   accused   persons   were   the
10
assailants, otherwise they would not have hidden behind
the ‘Kair’ bushes.”
It then proceeded to find that before the incident, some quarrel
had taken place between accused No. 2 – Ram Narayan, Ghewar
and Motaram on account of grazing goats, in which Ram Narayan
had assaulted Ghewar, who belonged to complainant side.  The
circumstances clearly indicate that the accused persons intended
to take revenge and due to which they had arrived at the place of
occurrence   from   the   village   armed   with   lethal   weapon(s)   for
assaulting the complainant party at an opportune moment.  The
trial Court then found that the accused persons had not been
able to give any explanation for coming together at the place of
incident nor about the bringing of lethal weapon(s) like “kassi” at
the site.  The trial Court in that context observed thus: ­
“25.  ...  Fourthly, accused persons have not been able to
give   any   explanation   of   coming   all   the   five   accused
persons altogether.  Nor they have given any explanation
of   bringing   lethal   weapon   like   –   ‘Kassi’   with   them.
Therefore, by the fact viz. going of accused persons from
village,   having   armed   with   deadly   weapons,   giving
beatings to Ghewarram belonging to complainant side by
Ramnarayan   amongst   accused   persons   prior   to   the
occurrence, it has been fully established that accused
persons in order to take revenge, duly armed with lathies
and   ‘Kassies’   had   arrived   at   the   place   of   occurrence,
therefore,   accused   persons   are   proved   to   be   the
aggressor.
26. In my opinion, the arguments of learned counsel
appearing for the accused persons to the effect that by
11
the prosecution evidence, revolving lathi by Mangilal is
proved   and,   therefore,   Complainant   side   was   the
assailant, does not appear having any substance. Firstly,
in view of the aforesaid discussion, accused persons have
been proved to be the aggressor, therefore, first revolving
lathi by Mangilal after having surrounded, it cannot be
said   that   Mangilal   was   assailants.   Secondly,   by   the
depositions of prosecution witnesses viz. Ramratan (PW5), Motiram (PW­6), Annaram (PW­7), Mehram (PW­8) and
Mangilal (PW­11), it has been established that Mangilal
was revolving lathi while he was surrounded and was
raising   alarm   that   ‘Maare   Marre’.   Therefore,   revolving
lathi   by  the   complainant   side   after   assaulting  was   in
defence and, therefore, accused persons do not get the
right of private defence.” 
The trial Court then went on to find that the complainant side
and   accused   persons,   both,   had   sustained   injuries   in   the
incident in question.  The trial Court, however, opined that in the
present case, non­explanation of injuries sustained by accused
persons   by   the   prosecution   had   no   vital   impact   on   the
prosecution case, and observed thus: –
“28.   …     Firstly,   in   the   present   case   it   has   been
established that accused persons were the aggressor. It
has   also   been   established   that   accused   persons   have
started the occurrence. Therefore, prosecution side has
given explicit evidence with regard to the genesis of the
occurrence.   The   prosecution   evidence   is   unambiguous
and,   therefore,   non­submission   of   explanation   of   the
injuries sustained by accused persons, does not have any
effect on the prosecution case. …”
The trial Court unambiguously noted that the injuries sustained
by   the   accused   persons   are   superficial   and   minor.     After
analysing the medical and ocular evidence, the trial Court found
12
that during the scuffle, deceased Bhura Ram had caught hold of
“kassi” blow inflicted by Laxa Ram (accused No. 4) and thereafter,
Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram (accused No. 5) inflicted “kassi” blow
from the sharpen side on the head of Bhura Ram (deceased) with
intention to kill him, which blow struck on the vital part of his
head.  And as per the medical evidence, that injury was sufficient
to cause death of Bhura Ram.  The trial Court then proceeded to
analyse the evidence on record and noted as follows: ­
“39. Hence, depositions of witness Mangilal (PW­11) gets
corroboration by the depositions of eyewitnesses­ PW­5,
6, 7 and 8, Injury Reports Ex. P­9, 10 and PW­11 Post
mortem   report   of   deceased   Bhura,   Report   (Ex.   P­13)
lodged by Mangilal immediately after the incident, spot
condition   memo   (Ex.   P­1),   site­plan   of   the   place   of
occurrence   (Ex.   P­14),   recovery   of   blood   stained   lathi
(Article­8)   from   the   possession   of   accused   Ramniwas,
recovery of clothes of injured and deceased which have
been found to be stained with human blood and accused
persons being the aggressor and by giving beatings by
accused Ramnarayan to Ghewar and Motaram belong to
complainant   side,  prior to  the  occurrence  and  by the
depositions of PW­1 it is also proved that on 14.08.81 in
the   evening   time   at   village   Gowa   Khurd,   accused
persons­Heeraram, Ramnarayan, Ramniwas, Baksharam
and Mehram formed an unlawful assembly and at that
time accused Baksharam and Mehram were duly armed
with   lethal   weapons   like   ‘Kassies’   and   amongst   the
accused persons, in furtherance to their common object,
accused Baksharam intentionally inflicted simple injuries
with ‘Kassi’ from sharpen side on the hand of Mangilal
and when Bhura came to rescue, then accused Mehram
inflicted a ‘Kassi’ blow from sharpen side over the head of
Bhura. It is also established that when Mehram came to
13
rescue Bhura, then Ramniwas caused injuries with lathi
over the head and shoulder of Mehram.
40. Learned Advocate for the accused persons has also
contended that Bhura was come to rescue, suddenly he
sustained this injury, therefore, by the act of accused
Mehram, it cannot be said that he was having any motive
to kill and at the most the case of the accused falls within
the purview of Section 304 Clause II I.P.C. and, therefore,
accused shall be acquitted of the charge under Section
302 Indian Penal Code.
41. In   my   opinion,   no   substance   appears   in   the
contention raised by learned defence counsel, because by
the depositions of Dr. Ghodawat (PW­9) it is proved that
in the ordinary course of nature injury No.1 on the head
of Bhura was sufficient to cause death and due to this
injury Bhura died. Beneath this injury the complete bone
was cut in thickness. All the membranes over the brain
were cut. Accordingly, it is proved that injury No. 1 was
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature,
injury No. 1 placed over the vital part of body like head,
causing injury with a lethal weapon like ‘Kassi’ from the
sharpen side, arriving of Bhura to rescue from backside,
engaging   of   accused   persons   in   giving   beatings   and
causing very deep injuries, by which it is proved that
accused have forcefully inflicted injuries and falling of
Bhura   immediately   after   sustaining   injuries,   by   these
facts,   it   is   proved   that   accused   Mehram   was   having
intention to kill Bhura and he has caused head injury to
Bhura with the intention to kill, due to which Bhura died.
Therefore, accused Mehram S/o Chhagna caused injury
to   Bhura   with   the   intention   to   kill.   Thus,   he   has
committed   offence   of   homicidal   death   by   committing
murder of Bhura and, therefore, charge of committing
offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code has been
fully   established   against   accused   Mehram   son   of
Chhagna.
42. In   my   opinion,   no   substance   appears   in   the
argument of learned Advocate for the accused persons
that the act of accused falls within the purview of Section
304 Part II I.P.C. Firstly, Mehram was already assailant,
secondly   accused   Mehram   has   given   beatings   with
weapon, he was standing there after making preparations
and, therefore, it cannot be said that killing of Bhura by
accused Mehram S/o Chhagana was sudden. Rather, it is
proved that Mehram S/o Chhagna has caused injury to
14
Bhura with the intention to kill, therefore, his case falls
within Section 302 I.P.C.”
Indeed, the trial Court went on to hold that the prosecution had
not succeeded in substantiating common object of committing
murder of the person concerned and acquitted the accused of
charge under Section 149, IPC. 
8. When the matter travelled to the High Court at the instance
of the accused persons by way of appeal, the Division bench of
the High Court partly allowed the appeal and, if we may say so,
by a cryptic judgment, which reads thus: ­
“…..
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and   have   given   our   thoughtful   consideration   to   the
material available on record.
Admittedly the way to field which is being claimed
by the complainant party, is not a sanctioned way, so
much   so   that   it   is   not   even   recorded   in   the   revenue
record.   The   complainant   party   is   claiming   it   through
prescription. If prescription has such maturity in it that it
got converted into an actionable right, the complainant
party   could   have   sought   a   declaration   to   that   effect.
Without   taking   recourse   to   the   lawful   measures,   the
complainant party insisted on sing that way by courtesy
only. This puts the complainant party on the offensive,
and in that way the complainants stand on a weaker
footing   when   they   assert   that   the   accused   assaulted
them. There were enough provocations created by the
complainants to the accused persons by asserting a right,
which   was   not   a   legally   recognized   right.   In   that
background   when   the   complainants   and   the   accused,
entered   into   a   conflict,   then   the   question   of   common
object stands ruled out. Both the parties have quarrelled,
and have inflicted injuries to each other. It was almost a
case of free fight and in that view of the matter, invoking
15
Section  149  IPC  is  not  considered  proper  by us  and,
therefore, Section 149 IPC deserves to be excluded from
consideration.
When Section 149 IPC is taken out then individual
participation has to be seen to the deceased it was only
accused Meh Ram, who is said to have caused injuries.
All other accused persons were held guilty with the aid
[sic] of Section 149 IPC. Conviction with the aid of Section
149 IPC, therefore, deserves to be set aside. After setting
aside the conviction of other accused persons except Meh
Ram under Section 302 IPC they stand convicted under
Sections 323, 324, 147 and 148 IPC. For those offences
whatever   period   they   have   already   undergone   can   be
considered sufficient and in that view of the matter, the
appeal   of   the   accused   Ram   Niwas,   Heera   Ram,   Ram
Narayan and Baxa Ram is allowed to the extent that the
conviction under Section 302/149 IPC is set aside. Their
conviction under Sections 323, 324, 147 and 148 IPC is
maintained and the period already undergone which is
more than 5½ month is considered sufficient to meet out
the ends of justice.
Now we take up the case of accused Meh Ram. He
is said to have caused the total blow. But that was in the
background that both the parties fought a free fight. Meh
Ram himself has sustained injuries and in that view of
the   matter   it   can   be   said   that   he   cannot   have   the
intention of causing death of the deceased. It may be said
that he had exceeded his right of private defence. At best
a case under Section 326 IPC can be said to be made out
against him.
In the result, the appeal of accused Ram Niwas,
Heera   Ram,   Ram   Narayan   and   Boxa   Ram   accused   is
partly   allowed.   Their   conviction   and   sentence   under
Section 149 IPC is set aside and their conviction under
Sections 323, 324, 147 and 148 IPC is maintained. As
regards the sentence, the period already undergone is
considered sufficient to meet the ends of justice.
So   far   as   accused   Meh   Ram   is   concerned,   his
conviction under Section 302 IPC is converted into one
under Section 326 IPC and his conviction under Section
148 IPC is maintained. However, he is sentenced to the
period already undergone. Meh Ram is directed to pay
compensation to the tune of Rs.50,000/­ to the next of
kin of the deceased.”
16
9. After   having   gone   through   the   relevant   evidence   and
judgments of the trial Court and the appeal Court (High Court),
we have no reason to depart from the conclusion reached by the
trial Court that there were tangible circumstances and evidence
to indicate that the accused party was the aggressor, who was
hiding in the bushes and appeared only after the complainant
party arrived on the spot.  The accused party had assembled at
the spot with lethal weapon(s) and all the accused were waiting
for   the   complainant   party   to   arrive   at   the   spot   and   started
assaulting the complainant party.   The blows inflicted by the
concerned accused, in particular accused No. 5, were with an
intention to kill Bhura Ram (deceased).  The death of Bhura Ram
was caused due to the blow inflicted by accused No. 5 and was a
homicidal death.   We have no reason to depart from the said
findings recorded by the trial Court and if we may say so, the
same remained undisturbed by the High Court.  The High Court
by its cryptic judgment, proceeded on the erroneous assumption
that   the   accused   party   had   been   provoked   due   to   the
unauthorised entry of the complainant party on their fields and
to defend their possession, they had to resort to right of private
defence.     While   doing   so,   the   accused   party,   in   particular,
17
accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram), exceeded his right of
private   defence.     There   was   no   common   object   because   the
incident in question occurred due to provocation and spiralled
into a free fight, causing injuries to both sides.  The fallacy in the
reasoning of the High Court is palpable from the evidence of
prosecution witnesses, which has been elaborately analysed and
rightly accepted as truthful by the trial Court, substantiating the
allegations against the accused party of being the aggressors.
Once it is a case of accused party being the aggressors and they
commenced assault on the complainant party and further, the
accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram) having been found to
have assaulted Bhura Ram (deceased) with intention to kill him,
the question of invoking the right of private defence does not
arise.  In fact, no defence evidence was produced to substantiate
the plea of exercise of private defence.  The two theories (of being
aggressors as opposed to exercise of right of private defence) are
antithesis to each other.
10. Had it been a case of complainant party being the aggressor,
the accused party and accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna
Ram) in particular, could be heard on the factum of right of
18
private   defence.     The   nature   of   injuries   caused   to   the
complainant party and to the accused party are also indicative of
the fact that the accused party was the aggressor.  As regards the
injuries caused to the deceased (Bhura Ram) due to the assault
by the accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram), as noted in
the post­mortem examination (Exhibit P­11) by Dr. Ghodawat,
the same reads thus:­
“1. Incised wound of size 5.1 cm. x bone deep.  This
injury   was   in   the   middle   parietal   region   of   head.
Underneath  which  bone  was  fully  cut   in  obesity.  All
membranes covering brain were cut. Brain matter was
appearing from the deepness of wound.
2. One bruise of size 3.x2 cm. which was in the middle
of left foot on front portion. Injury was ante mortem in
nature.   Brain   matter   was   also   cut   parallel   to   the
deepness of wound, which was cut up to half cm.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the opinion of the doctor, the cause of death of Bhura Ram
(deceased) was brain injury and due to the injury No. 1.  The fact
that the death was caused by the injury No. 1 alone, does not
mean that it was not a case of homicidal death.  Nor there can be
presumption   that   there   was   no   intention   to   cause   death   by
inflicting such injury.   The evidence on record has been duly
analysed by the trial Court and it has been held that accused No.
5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram) had caused injury No. 1 with
19
intention to cause death of Bhura Ram (deceased) to teach lesson
to the complainant party for their repeated unauthorised entry on
the fields belonging to the accused party despite warnings and
obstructions caused in that behalf in the past. 
11. We may now usefully refer to the injury report (Exhibit D­7)
of accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram), who had suffered
simple injuries on his person caused by blunt weapon.   The
description of injuries therein reads thus: ­
“1. Abrasion 1 x 1 cm which was in the middle posterior
region of left fore­finger;
2. Abrasion 1 x .3 cm. in the middle top portion of left
index finger;
3. Bruise 6 x 1 cm. over Rt. Shoulder oblique placed.
4. Two abrasions 1.5 x 4 cm. in the lower portion of Rt.
Thigh, both were placed at a distance of 0.5 cm.
each other.
5. Injured was complaining pain in his left foot.”
From the description of injuries, it is amply clear that these
injuries are superficial and as rightly found by the trial Court,
will have no bearing on the prosecution case, even if the same
remain unexplained.   The fact that some of the accused had
received grievous injuries, does not belie the prosecution case
that the accused were the aggressors.  There was no reason for
the accused to remain in hiding position equipped with lethal
20
weapon(s), waiting for the arrival of the complainant party and on
their arrival, to immediately commence attack and cause fatal
injuries to the complainant party.  Such being the factual matrix,
it is unfathomable as to how the plea of right of private defence
could be invoked by the accused.  If such a plea is not available,
the question of answering the plea in favour of the accused that it
was a case of excessive exercise of right of private defence does
not arise at all.   The basis of the High Court judgment being
flawed in this regard, the conclusion recorded by it cannot stand
the test of judicial scrutiny.  For the same reason, the question of
converting the offence under Section 302 to one under Section
326 cannot be countenanced, both on facts and in law.
12. Indeed, the trial Court’s finding of guilt recorded against
accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram), is unexceptionable.
However, on the nature of offence, the trial Court considered the
plea of the accused only in reference to offence falling under
Section 304 Part II of the IPC.   The trial Court rejected that
argument   and   we   must   uphold   that   conclusion,   because   the
finding of fact is that the act was done by the accused with the
knowledge that it is likely to cause death, and with intention to
21
kill  Bhura  Ram  (deceased).    But  before  we express our  final
opinion, it is necessary to examine as to whether the case in
hand   would   be   covered   under   the   exceptions   predicated   in
Section 300, IPC, so as to apply Section 304, IPC – be it Part I or
Part II thereof.  The facts of the present case would indicate that
the accused, in particular accused No. 5, at the relevant time,
was deprived of the power of self­control by grave and sudden
provocation due to repeated unauthorised entry on the  fields
belonging to accused party.  Further, the solitary fatal blow on
the vital part of the head by accused No. 5 caused the death of
Bhura Ram (deceased).  The provocation was not invited by the
accused   party,   but   was   obviously   at   the   instance   of   the
complainant party, who entered the fields unauthorizedly despite
the objection taken by the complainant party in that regard on
the same day earlier.   However, as the death of Bhura Ram
(deceased) was caused by the act of accused No. 5 giving one fatal
blow on the head, which was with the intention of causing his
death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
the case would be covered by Section 304 Part I, IPC.   It is
certainly not a case to simply proceed under Section 326 of the
IPC, as held by the High Court.  We disapprove that approach of
22
the   High   Court.     Even   if   the   High   Court   had   justly   applied
Section 326, IPC, we fail to appreciate as to how the High Court
could   have   imposed   sentence   only   for   a   period   (about   five
months) undergone considering the nature and gravity of the
offence and the background in which it is committed by the
accused party, in particular, accused No. 5.
13. The learned counsel for the accused No. 5 was at pains to
persuade us that the said accused is now about 70­75 years of
age and at this distance of time, it may not be appropriate to
send him back to jail.  Taking overall view of the matter, we are
not impressed by this submission.  Even in case of offence under
Section 326, IPC, which commended to the High Court, the same
was punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment
of either description which may extend to ten years and also
liable to fine.   Had it been a conviction under Section 326, as
aforesaid, the sentence of only about five months in the facts of
the present case, by no stretch of imagination, was adequate.
14. Be that as it may, in our considered opinion, the accused
No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram) deserves to be convicted for
the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC.  For
23
the reasons already recorded, it is unnecessary for us to dilate on
the   decisions   of   this   Court   pressed   into   service   regarding
approach   to   be   adopted   by   the   Court   in   respect   of   cases
pertaining to accused exceeding his right of private defence.
15. Taking overall view of the matter, we are of the considered
opinion   that   in   this   case,   the   accused   No.   5   (Mehram   S/o
Chhagna Ram) deserves to be awarded sentence of ten (10) years
of simple imprisonment and he must pay compensation to the
tune of Rs.50,000/­ (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the next kin
of the deceased, if it is yet to be paid in terms of order of the High
Court.
16. Accordingly, we partly allow this appeal.   The impugned
judgment   of   the   High   Court   and   that   of   the   trial   Court   are
modified by convicting the accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna
Ram) for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I and Section
148, IPC.  He is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for
ten (10) years for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I
and six (6) months’ simple imprisonment for offence punishable
under Section 148 and fine of Rs.100/­ on each count, in default
to   undergo   fifteen   (15)   days’   additional   simple   imprisonment.
24
Both sentences to run concurrently.  Further, the period already
undergone by accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram) shall
be adjusted by giving the benefit under Section 428, Cr.P.C.  In
addition,   the   accused   No.   5   (Mehram   S/o   Chhagna   Ram)   is
directed to pay compensation to the tune of Rs.50,000/­ (Rupees
fifty thousand only) to the next of kin of the deceased (Bhura
Ram), if already not paid.   The bail bonds stand cancelled and
the accused No. 5 (Mehram S/o Chhagna Ram) is directed to
surrender within six weeks from the date on which lockdown in
the country due to pandemic COVID­19 including in the State of
Rajasthan is relaxed, to undergo the remaining sentence period.
17. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.   Pending
interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
..................................J.
  (A.M. Khanwilkar)
..................................J.
           (Dinesh Maheshwari)
New Delhi;

May 6, 2020.