No Person could have been tried for the same offence twice at the behest of the the complainant who himself a complainant in both the FIRs. Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows: “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence. (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from 7 the one made against him might have been made under sub­Section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub­Section (2) thereof.” 13. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside. The appeal is allowed.

No Person  could have been tried for the same offence twice at   the   behest   of   the   the   complainant  who himself a complainant  in both the FIRs.

Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows: “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.  (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent   jurisdiction   for   an   offence   and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from 7 the one made against him might have been made under sub­Section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub­Section (2) thereof.” 13. In view of the conclusion that the  substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the considered opinion  that  the  subsequent prosecution  of  the appellant   in   FIR   No.   114   of   2008   dated   09.10.2008   is completely   unsustainable.     In   the   result,   the   FIR   dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside.  The appeal is allowed.

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  237 OF 2020
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4592 of 2017)
PREM CHAND SINGH ..........APPELLANT(s)
Versus
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND ANOTHER         ......RESPONDENT(s)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
Leave granted. 
2. The appellant has challenged the order dated 18.12.2015
rejecting his application for discharge and the affirmation of
the same on 31.05.2016 in Criminal Revision No. 70 of 2016
by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Gonda (U.P.).
1
3. The respondent no.2 is stated to have given a general
power of attorney to the appellant on 02.05.1985 and on the
basis of which the appellant sold certain lands belonging to
the respondent.  The respondent lodged FIR No. 160 of 1989
on 14.09.1989 that he had never executed any general power
of attorney in favour of the appellant and that the appellant
has forged general power of attorney to sell his lands illegally.
The appellant was acquitted in the trial as the charge could
not   be   established.     Though   no   records   are   available,   the
acquittal   is   not   disputed   by   counsel   for   respondent.     The
respondent then filed Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 to cancel the
general power of attorney.   On 09.10.2008, the respondent
filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the
court which was forwarded to the police leading to registration
of   FIR   No.   114   of   2008   on   09.10.2008   alleging   that   the
appellant had forged general power of attorney and on the
basis of the same had sold certain lands of the respondent.
2
That   earlier   also   the   appellant   had   sold   lands   of   the
respondent in like manner.
4. The appellant filed an application for discharge referring
to his acquittal dated 07.08.1998 under Section 419 or 420
Cr.P.C.   pleading   that   he   could   not   be   tried   for   the   same
offence twice and that the FIR was based on concealment of
facts   with   regard   to   the   earlier   acquittal.     The   Judicial
Magistrate Class II Gonda rejected the discharge application
simplicitor on the ground that the order of acquittal dated
07.08.1998 had not been brought on record.  Revision against
the same was dismissed holding that the grounds urged on
behalf of the appellant can more appropriately be urged at the
time of framing of the charges.
5. Mr. Pradeep Kant, learned senior counsel appearing for
the   appellant,   submitted   that   the   order   of   acquittal   dated
07.08.1998   and   the   subsequent   institution   of   Civil   Suit
No.353 of 2007 for the cancellation of the general power of
attorney executed by the respondent is not in dispute.   The
3
subsequent   FIR   on   09.10.2008   itself   refers   to   the   general
power of attorney which was the subject matter of FIR No. 160
of 1989 but conceals the order of acquittal of the appellant.  It
is submitted that in the facts of the case, the institution of the
FIR on 09.10.2008 long years after execution of general power
of attorney dated 02.05.1985 is, therefore, a complete abuse of
the process of law and the proceedings are fit to be quashed.
Referring   to   Section   300   Cr.P.C.   it   is   submitted   that   the
appellant could not have been tried for the same offence twice
at   the   behest   of   the   respondent   who   is   the   complainant
himself in both the FIRs.
6.     Mr.   Amit   Yadav,   learned   Counsel   for   the   respondentcomplainant,   submits   that   the   High   Court   has   declined
interference   since   the   ingredients   of   the   two   FIRs   were
different.  While the FIR No. 160 of 1989 was under Section
419 or 420 IPC the second FIR was under Sections 467, 468
and   471   also.     Furthermore,   the   second   FIR   contains
allegations that the appellant put up an imposter in place of
4
the   respondent   before   the   registration   authorities   and
collusively executed sale deed in respect of his lands along
with   Sushil   Kumar   Singh   and   Arvind   in   pursuance   of   a
general   power   of   attorney   which   respondent   had   never
executed.   The discharge application was, therefore, rightly
rejected and interference declined in revision.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. The FIR No. 160 of 1989 alleges that the respondent on
account of his job invariably stayed outside.   The appellant
had   created   a   forged   general   power   of   attorney   from   the
respondent in his name with regard to his lands bearing Gata
no. 77/0.87 decimal and sold it on the basis of the forged
general power of attorney which the respondent became aware
of   on   25.07.1989.     The   respondent   denied   having   ever
executed   any   general   power   of   attorney   in   favour   of   the
appellant. The respondent does not dispute that the appellant
was acquitted of the charge by judgment dated 07.08.1998.
5
The fact that the judgement may not have been made available
is therefore inconsequential.
9. The   institution   of   Civil   Suit   No.   353   of   2007   by   the
respondent for cancellation of the general power of attorney,
after   the   acquittal   of   the   appellant,   is   nothing   but   an
acknowledgment of the genuineness of the general power of
attorney executed by the respondents which he now wished to
revoke.
10. The respondent then filed an application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. which was forwarded by the Magistrate to the
police leading to registration of FIR dated 09.10.2008.   The
allegations are similar that the appellant put up an imposter
in place of the respondent and along with one Sushil Kumar
Singh and Arvind on the basis of a general power of attorney,
which the respondent had never executed, sold his lands.  The
FIR itself recites that earlier also the appellant had sold the
lands of the respondent on the basis of same general power of
6
attorney, but conceals the order of acquittal dated 07.08.1998,
and   also   the   institution   of   Civil   Suit   No.   353   of   2007   for
annulment of the same.
11. It is, therefore, apparent that the subject matter of both
the   FIRs   is   the   same   general   power   of   attorney   dated
02.05.1985 and the sales made by the appellant in pursuance
of the same.  If the substratum of the two FIRs are common,
the   mere   addition   of   Sections   467,   468   and   471   in   the
subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different ingredients
to justify the latter FIR as being based on different materials,
allegations and grounds.
12. Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. provides as follows:
“300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be
tried for same offence.
(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of
competent   jurisdiction   for   an   offence   and
convicted or acquitted of such offence shall,
while such conviction or acquittal remains in
force, not be liable to be tried again for the
same offence, nor on the same facts for any
other offence for which a different charge from
7
the one made against him might have been
made under sub­Section (1) of Section 221, or
for which he might have been convicted under
sub­Section (2) thereof.”
13. In view of the conclusion that the  substratum of the two
FIRs are the same and that the appellant has already stood
acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging
any general power of attorney of the respondent, we are of the
considered opinion  that  the  subsequent prosecution  of  the
appellant   in   FIR   No.   114   of   2008   dated   09.10.2008   is
completely   unsustainable.     In   the   result,   the   FIR   dated
09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the
impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside.  The appeal is
allowed.
……….………………………..J.
   (Navin Sinha)                       
………………………………….J.
 (Krishna Murari)                 
New Delhi,
February 07, 2020
8

whether the appellants were required to pay the price of coal consumed in their manufacturing process at a preferential rate, known in the trade parlance as “linked price”, or the price under a Liberalised Sales Scheme (LSS).

 whether the appellants were required to pay the price of coal consumed in their manufacturing process at a preferential rate, known in the trade parlance as “linked price”, or the price under a Liberalised Sales Scheme (LSS). 

(Non-Reportable)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8153 OF 2009
M/s. S.K.J. Coke Industries Ltd.& Anr. ..….Appellants
Versus
Coal India Ltd. & Ors. …..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
The core dispute in this appeal involves the question as to
whether the appellants were required to pay the price of coal
consumed in their manufacturing process at a preferential rate, known
in the trade parlance as “linked price”, or the price under a Liberalised
Sales Scheme (LSS). The latter pricing mechanism is similar to open
market price of coal. The predecessor in title of the first appellant
were a firm under the trade name Mahabir Coke Industries. At the
material time, they were engaged in production of low ash
metallurgical coal at a location close to Guwahati. They wanted to be
under the preferential pricing regime on the strength of an
Page 1 of 19
arrangement with the respondent coal companies agreed upon in the
year 1989. Under such arrangement Mahabir Coke Industries were
permitted to lift 4000 metric tonnes of coal per month. Traditionally,
the coal industry has been deeply regulated by the Government of
India. The Colliery Control Order, 1945 was one of such regulating
instruments. This Control Order has been replaced by Colliery
Control Order, 2000 with effect from 1st January, 2000 but that factor
is not of much significance so far as the present appeal is concerned.
The basic coal mining industry is nationalised and largely controlled
by the Coal India Ltd., a public sector undertaking. The appellants
were approved linkage of said 4000 metric tonnes of low ash coal
from Tirup and Tikak mines of North Eastern Coalfields (NEC). The
said coal company is a subsidiary of Coal India Limited (CIL). The
linking order was issued on 20th September, 1989. The respondent
coal companies in course of hearing before us have sought to
distinguish between “linkage” and “allocation”. Their stand is that in
the case of the appellants, there was monthly allocation of the said
quantity of coal only for which they cannot claim preferential price.
As cokeries, they were allocated coal suitable for use in steel plants
Page 2 of 19
subject to availability. The respondents’ case is that linkage at
preferential price is given to the industries or thermal plants out of
coal not suitable for use in steel plants. For that reason, according to
the respondent coal companies, appellants were not given linkage but
allocated specified quantity. Clause 3 of the 1945 Control Order
empowered categorisation and gradation of coal by the Central
Government. Clause 4 thereof authorised the Central Government to
fix different prices of coal for different classes, grades, sizes of coal as
also prices of different collieries.
2. On 16th June 1994, a notification was issued by the Central
Government in pursuance of the aforesaid two Clauses of the 1945
Control Order stipulating the classes and grades in which coal and
coke were to be categorised. That notification also stipulated the sale
prices for such coal, at which they could be sold by the colliery owner
at pitheads. Table I thereof provided gradation with grade
specifications of different types of coal. There was no such grading in
respect of coal produced in the State of Assam and certain other states
in the North Eastern Region in that Table. We shall henceforth refer to
Page 3 of 19
coal lifted by the appellants as “Assam coal”. The second Table (Table
II) to this notification dealt with sale prices of different types of coal
mainly on the basis of “Useful heat value in kilo calories per
kilogram”. For coal from Assam and that region, price for ungraded
coal with ash content not exceeding 25% was specified to be “not
exceeding Rs.741.00 p.” NEC made provisional declaration of grade
of Assam coal under Clause 3A(1) of the 1945 Control Order on 11th
June 1997. By a further notification dated 26th August 1997 the
revised prices thereof were notified. Thereafter, by another
notification dated 24th February 1999, the gradation formalities for
coal produced in Assam and other States in the said region was
completed by effecting suitable amendments to the notification dated
16th June 1994. In Clause 9 (ii) of the 1994 notification, there was
stipulation to the following effect for computing the price of coal
depending upon their ash content:-
“9. (i)…………………..
(ii) In case of coal produced in the State of
Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya
and Nagaland the price payable shall be
increased at the rate of Rs.1/- per tonne for
each percentage of ash by which the ash
Page 4 of 19
content falls below 22 per cent. Similarly
when ash content exceeds 25 per cent, the
price shall be reduced at the same rate of
Rs. 11 per tonne per cent of ash by which
the ash content exceeds 25 per cent.”
3. The first appellant, whose predecessors were the petitioners
before the First Court continued with receiving coal in terms of the
notification dated 16th June, 1994 at the price stipulated therein till
18th January 1996. Admitted position is that coal lifted by the
appellants had ash content below 25%. From 19th January 1996, the
price NEC was charging the appellants stood substantially enhanced.
The reason for this, according to the respondent companies, was that a
Liberalised Sales Scheme (LSS) was implemented by the CIL under
authorisation of the Central Government to that effect. The LSS
under which price was enhanced was on the basis of a notification
dated 9th January, 1996. That notification was followed by another
notification dated 11th March, 1996. On the latter date, a Liberalised
Sales Scheme (Modified) was introduced. The notification of 9th
January, 1996 reads:-
“S.O. 21(E). In pursuance of the provisions of
clause 18 of the Colliery Control Order, 1945,
as continued in force by section 16 of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1995 (10 of 1955),
Page 5 of 19
the Central Government, having regard to the
stock position of coal, hereby exempts the Coal
India Ltd., Subsidiaries of Coal India Limited
and the Singareni Collieries Company Limited
in respect of coal sold by them under any
Liberalized sale Scheme (LSS) of the
Government of India from the provisions of
clauses 4, 4A and 4B of the said order.
This notification shall remain in force on
and from the date of its publication in the
official Gazette and until the 31st day of March,
1996.”
4. As pleaded in paragraph 22 of the appellant’s writ petition,
clause 2.3 of that Scheme specified that the declaration of source
under “LSS” was not to affect rail loading for linked/sponsored
consumers or coal supplies to road linked/sponsored consumers. The
appellants continued to lift coal under protest on payment of such
higher price. Subsequently on 16th November 1996, the linkage
committee of the Coal India Limited in its 85th meeting took the
following decision under agenda item nos. 23 and 24:
“23. ‘Linkage’ of coal to SSF units & cokery
units –
The Committee deliberated on the agenda
items and decided that SSF units and cokery
units which have been allocated coal by Coal
India Ltd., should be treated as ‘linked unit’, in
Page 6 of 19
the same manner as other linked industrial units
in the non-core sector. The committee also
decided that-
(a) Coal Clearance Letter/Coal Allocation
Letters issued to SSF units and Cokery units
should be treated as ‘Linkage Advice Letters’
which are issued to other non-core sector units;
(b) The present system of capacity
assessment for SSF units by CMPOI and cokery
units by a joint team of officers from Coal
Co/CMPOI/CIL, should continue;
(c) All cokery units should be required to
obtain sponsorship/recommendation letters from
the concerned State Govts., in the same manner
as sponsorship/recommendation is required for
other non-core sector units.
24. Case of M/s Mahabir Coke Industries,
Guwahati, AssamThe agenda item was discussed by the
Committee. As already decided in the previous
agenda item (i.e. item No.23), all cokery units
and SSF units who have been allocated coal by
CIL, should be treated as ‘linked’ units.
 Regarding the ‘price’ to be charged for supply
of low ash coal to M/s. Mahabir Coke
Industries, Guwahati, this matter should be
decided by NEC-Assam as prevalent at any
point of time.”
5. On 12th March, 1997, a notification was issued by the Central
Government in substance deleting clause 4 of the Control Order of
Page 7 of 19
1945 from the notification dated 16th June 1994. The relevant
portion of the notification dated 12th March 1997 stipulated:-
“S.O. 190 (E). – In pursuance of clauses 3 and 4
of the Colliery Control Order, 1945, as
continued in force by Section 16 of the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), the
Central Government hereby makes the
following further amendments to the
notification of the Government of India in the
Ministry of Coal No.S.O.- -453(E) dated the 16th
June, 1994 on and from the date of publication
of this notification in the Official Gazette,
namely:-
In the said Notification:-
(a) in the preamble:-
(i) for the words and figures “clauses 3
and 4”, the word and figure “clause 3”
shall be substituted,
(ii) the words and figures “and fixes in
Tables II, V and VI below the sale price
at which coal or coke may be sold by
the colliery owners at pit-heads” shall
be omitted.
(b) Table II relating to non-cooking coal, Table
V relating to hard coke, Table VI relating to soft
coke and the Notes and the Annexure thereunder
shall be omitted.”
6. The appellants founded their writ petition projecting them as
“linked consumer” and contended that they were to pay the price of
Page 8 of 19
coal not beyond that notified on 16th June 1994. The reliefs asked for
in their petition included a prayer for writ in the nature of mandamus
commanding CIL and NEC to charge the appellants notified price as
applicable to linked or sponsored units. Prayer was also made for
refund of excess sum realised from them as LSS price.
7. Before the First Court, the respondents had run a case that till
12th March, 1997, price for NEC coal was fixed by the Government of
India for linked consumers. It has been submitted before us on behalf
of the coal companies that till 18th January 1996, prices for the linked
consumers and for the consumers lifting coal on allocation had
remained the same. For those other than linked consumers, price was
fixed by the CIL with effect from 19th January, 1996 in accordance
with the LSS as from that point of time, these coal companies were
exempted from Clause 4 of the 1945 Control Order.
8. The main point argued on behalf of the appellants before the
First Court was that in not charging the appellants coal price as
applicable to a linked unit, the authorities had ignored the resolution
adopted in the 85th meeting of the Linkage Committee for non-core
sector consumers. As a corollary, the appellants contended that they
Page 9 of 19
were not obliged to pay the LSS price as enhanced from 19th January,
1996. The First Court, however, rejected such plea referring to the
second part of the aforesaid resolution of the Linkage Committee.
Under that part, the appellants were required to pay the “price
prevalent at any point of time”. The case of the appellants that “price”
referred to in that part was “linkage price” was not accepted by the
First Court. The reasoning of the First Court would appear from the
following passage of the judgment:-
 “After taking into consideration all relevant
facts and circumstances and having regard to the
submission made by learned counsel for the
parties, this Court, however, finds it difficult to
appreciate the grievance raised herein on behalf
of the writ petitioner. The very basis of the
claim of the writ petitioner, as referred to earlier,
is the resolution adopted in the 85th meeting. It
was specifically mentioned that while the
petitioner could be treated as a linked unit, the
price was to be charged as decided by the NEC,
Assam as prevalent at any point of time.”
9. The stand of the appellants before the Division Bench was that
since Assam coal remained ungraded under the 16th June 1994
notification and the relevant entry in the Table I was removed only on
24th February 1999, the coal companies did not have authority to
Page 10 of 19
grade the coal prior to that date. Before the Division Bench,
appellants’ case was that since there was no specification as regards
gradation under Clause 3 by the Central Government, the coal
companies could not have had exercised their power for such
gradation as also price specification in terms of Clause 3A thereof.
The authority cited before the Division Bench of the High Court was
the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of
India [(2007) 2 SCC 640]. This judgment has been referred to before
us also in support of the argument of the appellants that there could be
no pricing discrimination in respect of two sets of non-core
consumers. This was a case where constitutionality of e-auction
system was challenged and that was the focus of that decision.
Paragraph 161 of the said report was relied upon before us in which it
has been held and observed:
“161. The effect is that today, while the core
sector (92%) on its own and non-core nonlinked SSI/tiny units (through NCCF/other
agencies) (1%) are being supplied coal at a fixed
price, on the other hand, the non-core linked
SSI/tiny units (4%) are being subjected to
differential treatment, without any rational
classification, by supplying the coal to the latter
on the price to be ascertained by the traderPage 11 of 19
controlled process of e-auction and thereby
putting the petitioner units on a par with the
trader. The scheme of e-auction is, therefore,
ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.”
10. The Division Bench of the High Court in appeal instituted by
the appellants found that the said decision did not have any impact so
far as appellant’s claim was concerned once the dual system of pricing
was found to be acceptable. This is the judgment which is under
appeal before us. We also confirm this view of the Appellate Bench as
we find such view to be the correct view so far as applicability of the
ratio of the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (supra) is
concerned.
11. It has also been urged before us on behalf of the appellants that
in the Resolution of 16th November 1996, the appellants had been
specifically referred to as “linked consumer” and in that context the
expression “price” as contained in the second part of the Resolution
ought to imply the price for linked consumers only. The case of CCT,
Ranchi and Another Vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd.
and Others [(2004) 6 SCC 689] was relied upon by the learned
Page 12 of 19
counsel for the appellants mainly for interpretation of the aforesaid
Resolution (agenda item no.24). The appellants seek to contend that
while interpreting a provision by which a legal fiction is created, the
Court must ascertain the purpose for which the fiction was created
and having done so, Court should assume those facts and
consequences exist, which are incidental to and inevitable corollaries
for giving effect to such fiction. The rationale behind the appellants’
citing this decision is the wording of the aforesaid Resolution of 16th
November 1996. It has been specified in agenda items 23 and 24 of
that Resolution that all cokery units which have been allocated coal
by CIL ought to be treated as linked units. The appellants have argued
that once they were treated as a linked unit, the price benefit attached
to a linked unit should automatically follow. From the said
Resolution, however, we find a specific agenda item concerning the
first appellant, and the Resolution as adopted specifically stipulates
that the price to be charged from the appellants was to be decided by
the NEC Assam as prevalent at any point of time. In view of this
specific treatment of pricing along with reference to the first appellant
as a linked unit, in our opinion, said Resolution has to be construed to
Page 13 of 19
mean that treatment of the appellant as a linked unit was for the
purpose of regular supply of coal and the pricing factor was separated
from such deemed linking. This would be apparent from the decision
taken against agenda item no.23, in which reference has been made to
SSF units and cokery units which had been allocated (emphasis
supplied) coal, and it was these units which were to be treated as
linked units. The distinction between “allocation” and “linking”
clearly emerges from the said decision of the linking committee. It is
a fact that the first appellant’s treatment as a linked unit was a fiction.
But such fiction was replaced by reality on the basis of a specific
provision in the Resolution (agenda item no.24) so far as pricing is
concerned. As the Resolution dealt with “linking” and “pricing”
separately, the fictional linking could not be extended to actual
pricing. The respondents have taken consistent plea that the
expression “linked” has been loosely used and for non-core sector
units, it meant allocation of specified quantity of coal only. In
paragraphs 16 and 17 of NEC’s affidavit-in-opposition to the writ
petition, it has been stated:-
Page 14 of 19
“16. At the said meeting, the decision was
taken to treat SSF and cokery units including
Mahabir Coke as a “linked units”. Such
treatment as a linked unit do not mean grant of
actual linkage. So, Mahabir Coke cannot claim
to be a linked unit. The advantage of being
treated as a linked unit was that Mahabir Coke
will be assured for monthly supply of 4000 MT
coal per month by NEC. The said
resolution/decision also provides that the price
to be charged for supply of low ash coal to
Mahabir Coke will be decided by NEC on the
basis of price prevalent at any point of time i.e.
current price prevailing at the time of supply.
17. There are nearly 200 Cokery units, in India
out of them only three cokery unit, including
cokery unit of Mahabir Coke, are located at
Assam. Mahabir Coke, along with other two
cokery units have been getting low ash Assam
coal which is of superior grade than what the
other cookeries of all over India have been
getting from their respective coal companies.
Normally all other cookeries are getting the
higher ash content coal. The other cookeries
located outside Assam get coal having ash
content of 25 – 30%, whereas the cookeries
located in Assam are getting low ash coal of
NEC having ash content of only 7%. The other
cookeries located outside Assam take supply of
low ash coal from NEC, under LSS for blending
the same with higher ash content coal which
they have been getting from other coal
companies. All other cookeries including three
cookeries of Assam, who are buying the same
low ash coal as supplied to Mahabir Coke, have
been paying the LSS price as notified from time
to time.”
Page 15 of 19
12. Learned counsel for the appellants has brought to our notice the
following observations of the Division Bench in different parts of the
judgment:-
“At the time the Linkage Committee stipulated
that the price payable by the appellant company
would be as per the prevailing rate to be decided
by the fifth Respondent, no coal company had
any authority to supersede the price fixed by the
Central Government by a notification issued
under the Colliery Control Order, 1945. At the
highest, such conditional treatment of the
appellant company as a linked unit, could come
into play only if the price of coal was
deregulated by the Central Government; ipso
facto by reason of the Linkage Committee
decision of November 16, 1995 the appellant
company could not be charged at a rate in
derogation of what the Central Government
notified.”
xx xx xx xx xx xx
“The price of Assam coal at Rs. 741/- per MT
(subject to the variation on account of ash
content) became inoperative upon the
notification of March 12, 1997.”
xx xx xx xx xx xx
“The appellants remain liable to pay the
difference in price on the basis of price fixed by
the respondents subsequent to the notification of
March 12, 1997.”
Page 16 of 19
13. In our opinion, the exemption granted by the Central
Government by the notification dated 9th January, 1996 to Coal India
and their subsidiaries from the provisions of Clauses 4, 4A and 4B of
the 1945 Control Order in respect of sale of coal under LSS, the fetter
imposed by the aforesaid notification of June 1994 got effectively
removed. Specific stand taken by the respondents is that the linking
of the first appellant was only in respect of the quantum of coal to be
obtained by them and they were not entitled to price benefits of linked
consumers. For the appellants, it was only a case of allocation. Thus,
the point of time from when the appellants became liable to pay LSS
rate would be the time when LSS price was raised after 9th January
1996. Prior to that date, we have already reproduced the coal
companies’ submission that the linked price and non-linked price had
remained the same. So far as the aforesaid observations in the
impugned judgment is concerned, such reasoning does not appear to
us to be correct. But our views on this point would not advance the
case of the appellants. That is so because in our opinion, it was within
the power of the NEC to enhance the price for LSS consumers upon
Page 17 of 19
CIL and their subsidiaries being exempted from Clause 4 of the 1945
Control Order on and from 9th January 1996.
14. It appears that a liberalised pricing system has been prevailing
since the year 1993. We find no reason to disbelieve the coal
companies when they assert that there was only allocation of coal in
favour of the first appellant. Thus the appellants did not have vested
legal right to preferential pricing as linked consumers. The 9th
January 1996 notification empowered Coal India Ltd. and their
subsidiaries to charge price to consumers beyond that notified on 16th
June 1994 in respect of Assam coal. The appellants were in the noncore sector. Around that point of time only parity between LSS price
and linked price was broken and the first appellant was required to
pay the LSS price. So far as allocation is concerned, the agenda 24 of
the 85th meeting of the linkage committee retained the supply volume.
But that Resolution is in tune with the NEC’s stand taken before us
that LSS price ought to be charged to the appellants. The factual
argument of the appellants that the two other cokery units in Assam
were not linked, are of no relevance. The appellants have not been
able to sustain a case before us that their linking agreement covered
Page 18 of 19
both allocation and pricing as is the case of other linked consumers.
So far as the other cokery units are concerned, it has been clarified by
the learned counsel for the coal companies that they lift coal of high
ash content between 25-30% which would automatically take them
out of the price advantage specified in Table II of the 1994
notification. We accordingly do not find any reason to set aside the
judgment of the Division Bench.
15. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. The
interim orders, if any, shall stand dissolved.
…………….………..…..J.
(Deepak Gupta)
 ………………………….J.
 (Aniruddha Bose)
New Delhi,
Dated: 7th February, 2020.
Page 19 of 19

The suit filed by the plaintiff was for specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance dated 23.04.1975. Alternatively, he had also sought for a declaration that the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 was null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. whether the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants is a nominal sale deed obtained as security for the loan advanced by the defendants.?The deed of re-conveyance, contains a clause for payment of interest on the consideration amount of Rs.35,000/-. However, the plaintiff has pleaded that there is no agreement to pay the interest. This shows that the plaintiff was not ready to perform his part of the obligation as per the agreement. Further, the plaintiff had mortgaged the property with the bank and the bank had obtained an award against the plaintiff. When the suit property was put up for auction, the defendants paid the entire amount to the bank which was payable by the plaintiff under this award. This aspect also indicates the conduct of the plaintiff.Taking an overall view of the matter, the trial court has rightly held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The High Court, in our view, was not justified in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court. In the result, this appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court in R.F.A. No.626 of 2001 dated 21.08.2006 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in O.S. No.3308 of 1988 dated 12.04.2001 is restored.

The suit filed by the plaintiff was for specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance dated 23.04.1975. Alternatively, he had also sought for a declaration that the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 was null and void and not binding on the plaintiff.
whether the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants is a nominal sale deed obtained as security for the loan advanced by the defendants.?The deed of re-conveyance, contains a clause for payment of interest on the consideration amount of Rs.35,000/-. However, the plaintiff has pleaded that there is no agreement to pay the interest. This shows that the plaintiff was not ready to perform his part of the obligation as per the agreement. Further, the plaintiff had mortgaged the property with the bank and the bank had obtained an award against the plaintiff. When the suit property was put up for auction, the defendants paid the entire amount to the bank which was payable by the plaintiff under this award. This aspect also indicates the conduct of the plaintiff.Taking an overall view of the matter, the trial court has rightly held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The High Court, in our view, was not justified in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court. In the result, this appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court in R.F.A. No.626 of 2001 dated 21.08.2006 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in O.S. No.3308 of 1988 dated 12.04.2001 is restored.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8425 OF 2009
C.S. VENKATESH … APPELLANT
VERSUS
A.S.C. MURTHY (D) BY
LRS. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in RFA No.626 of
2001 dated 21.08.2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore,
whereby the High Court has allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and
decree in O.S. No. 3308 of 1988 passed by the Civil Judge, Bangalore City.
2. A.S.C. Murthy was the plaintiff in the suit. He died during the pendency
of the suit. Therefore, his wife Smt. Jayashree was brought on record as his
legal representative. She is the first respondent in this appeal. C.S. Venkatesh,
the appellant herein, was defendant No.2 in the suit. C. Sethurama Rao, was the
defendant No.1 in the suit. He also died during the pendency of the suit,
1
therefore, his wife Smt. C.S. Lalithamma was brought on record as his legal
representative. She is arrayed as respondent No. 2A in this appeal. Defendant
Nos. 3 and 4 are respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in this appeal. The parties are
hereinafter referred to in their respective capacities before the trial court.
3. The subject matter of the suit was the property situated at Site No. 522,
17th Main Banashankari, I Stage, First Block, Srinagar, Bangalore – 560 050
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the schedule property’).
4. A.S.C. Murthy had filed the above suit against defendants for specific
performance of the agreement of reconveyance dated 23.04.1975 in respect of
the schedule property and alternatively to declare that the sale deed dated
23.04.1975 executed by him in favour of the defendants is null and void. It was
alleged in the plaint that the City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore (for
short ‘CITB’) had allotted the site in question in favour of the plaintiff.
Thereafter, he commenced construction of the building on the said site. Since
he did not have sufficient funds, he approached the defendants for certain
financial assistance. Accordingly, the defendants advanced a sum of Rs.2,000/-
as loan. Subsequently, a further sum of Rs.10,000/- was advanced on the
condition of payment of interest at the rate of 18% p.a. However, the plaintiff
failed to pay the interest on the said sum as agreed, except for a period of two
months. Since the defendants were in need of accommodation, the plaintiff put
them in possession of the schedule property by executing a deed of mortgage
dated 11.10.1973. According to the plaintiff, the defendants have advanced, in
all, a sum of Rs.29,000/-. As the plaintiff could not pay the interest regularly,
2
the defendants asked the plaintiff to execute a nominal sale deed in order to
ensure prompt payment of interest. Accordingly, the plaintiff executed a deed
of sale dated 23.04.1975 in favour of the defendants for a sale consideration of
Rs.35,000/- by receiving Rs.6000/-, the difference in the sale price. It was
alleged that the sale deed was executed as a security for the amount advanced
by the defendants. It was contended that the defendants executed an agreement
of reconveyance in respect of the schedule property dated 23.04.1975 in favour
of the plaintiff. It was also agreed that the defendants were put in possession of
the schedule property on the understanding that they need not pay rent and the
plaintiff need not pay interest on the amount advanced by them to the plaintiff.
After the expiry of five years and the defendants having received the sum of
Rs.35,000/- advanced by them, the plaintiff demanded that the defendants
execute a reconveyance deed in terms of the agreement of reconveyance dated
23.04.1975. However, the defendants have failed to execute sale deed.
5. The second defendant filed the written statement admitting the execution
of the mortgage deed dated 11.10.1973 and borrowing of a sum of Rs.29,000/-
by the plaintiff. It was contended that the defendants agreed to reconvey the
property and executed the reconveyance agreement prior to the execution of the
sale deed. However, the plaintiff did not agree for reconveyance. The plaintiff
gave up his demand for reconveyance and executed the sale deed. It was
contended that even otherwise the reconveyance agreement was not to be acted
upon. It was further contended that the plaintiff had borrowed the loan from the
3
bank on different occasions by mortgaging the title deeds of the property. As the
plaintiff failed to discharge his debt to the bank, the defendants paid the said
dues in order to save the schedule property from auction. It was also contended
that there was no plea or proof regarding readiness and willingness to perform
the plaintiff’s part of the contract as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act’). It was denied that the sale deed dated
23.04.1975 was nominal and was executed for the purpose of security for the
loan advanced by the defendants.
6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the
relevant issues. In support of the suit claim, wife of the deceased plaintiff was
examined as PW-1 and exhibited documents P-1 to P-19 in her evidence. The
second defendant was examined as DW-1 and exhibits D-1 to D-15 were marked
in his evidence. On consideration of the evidence of the parties and materials on
record, the trial court came to a conclusion that the plaintiff has established the
execution of agreement of reconveyance. The Court also came to a conclusion
that the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 was not a nominal one, as contended by the
plaintiff. The Court recorded a finding that the plaintiff has averred in the plaint
that there was sufficient plea in relation to readiness and willingness of the
plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. However, it was held that the
plaintiff had failed to prove that he was ready and willing to perform the
contract. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the suit.
7. The plaintiff filed R.F.A. No. 626 of 2001, challenging the judgment and
decree of trial court. The High Court on consideration of the rival contentions
4
of the parties held that the sale deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of the
defendants was security for the loan advanced by the defendants. Consequently,
the High Court allowed the appeal. The defendants were directed to execute a
deed of reconveyance in respect of the schedule property in favour of the
plaintiff.
8. Appearing for the appellant/defendant No.2, Shri S.N. Bhat, learned
counsel submits that the suit filed by the plaintiff was for specific performance
of an agreement to reconvey. Therefore, he has to plead and prove his readiness
and willingness to pay the consideration amount to the defendants. In this case,
the plaintiff has failed to plead and prove his readiness and willingness. He had
no financial capacity to pay the consideration amount. He did not discharge the
earlier debt owed by him to Sri Thyagaraja Co-operative Bank and the
defendants had to pay off the debt in order to save the property. He had no
capacity to pay the consideration amount. It is further argued that the sale deed
dated 23.04.1975 was not a nominal sale deed, as contended. The High Court
instead of upholding the well-reasoned judgment of the trial court has set aside
the said judgment and decreed the suit.
9. On the other hand, Ms. Sanya Kumar, learned advocate appearing for the
respondent-plaintiff has sought to justify the impugned judgment and decree of
the High Court.
10. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel
made at the Bar.
11. The suit filed by the plaintiff was for specific performance of the
agreement of reconveyance dated 23.04.1975. Alternatively, he had also sought
5
for a declaration that the sale deed dated 23.04.1975 was null and void and not
binding on the plaintiff. On appreciation of the materials on record, the trial
court has held that the plaintiff has proved the existence and execution of
agreement of reconveyance. It has negatived the plaintiff’s claim that the sale
deed was a nominal one. However, the High Court has held that the plaintiff
had executed the sale deed in favour of the defendants as security for the loan
advanced by the defendants and that it cannot be considered a sale. Further, the
High Court has directed specific performance of the agreement of
reconveyance. Therefore, the first question for consideration is whether the sale
deed dated 23.04.1975 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants is a
nominal sale deed obtained as security for the loan advanced by the defendants.
12. Execution of the sale deed and the deed of reconveyance are not in
dispute. According to the plaintiff, he could not pay the interest except for two
months after the execution of the sale deed and that the understanding between
the parties was that the defendants need not pay any rent and plaintiff need not
pay the interest on the amount advanced by them to the plaintiff. It was
contended that sale deed was executed to ensure prompt payment of the
amounts. But a reading of the sale deed marked at Exhibit P-8, along with
other surrounding circumstances, would clearly indicate that it is an outright
sale.
13. It is settled that the real character of the transaction has to be ascertained
from the provisions of the documents viewed in the light of surrounding
circumstances. Since two documents were executed on the same day, the
6
transaction cannot be a mortgage by way of conditional sale in view of the
express provisions contained in Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. A perusal of the recitals contained in the sale deed at Exhibit P-8 shows
that the property was agreed to be sold absolutely for a total consideration of
Rs.35,000/-. The plaintiff has also stated that since possession has already been
delivered earlier under a deed of mortgage, delivery of possession under this
document does not arise. It was further stated that henceforth neither himself
nor his heirs have any right, title or interest in the property and that the plaintiff
is entitled to water, air, right of easement, etc. concerning the property together
with all rights, title and interest and right of disposal of the property. The
defendant, his son and grandson, etc. unto posterity are entitled to enjoy the
property without any obstruction or trouble either by the plaintiff or from
anyone claiming under him. He has delivered the possession certificate issued
by the CITB and Khata certificate for transfer of Khata from Bangalore City
Corporation. Thus, the language employed in this document is plain and
unambiguous and the intention of the parties is also very clear from its recitals.
Even the evidence led by the parties does not indicate to the contrary. Thus, a
careful perusal of all the clauses of the sale deed and the evidence on record
would clearly show that the intention of the parties was to make the transaction
a sale. We are also of the view that since the execution of the reconveyance
deed has already been established, question of holding the sale deed to be
nominal cannot be accepted.
7
14. The next question for consideration is in relation to compliance of
Section 16(c) of the Act by the plaintiff. Though a question was raised before
the trial court that there are no pleadings as regards the plaintiff’s readiness and
willingness to perform the contract, the trial court has rightly held that there is
sufficient compliance of Section 16(c) of the Act to the extent of pleadings.
Therefore, the question to be considered is whether the plaintiff was ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract.
15. The words ‘ready and willing’ imply that the plaintiff was prepared to
carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend
upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of
the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the
plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether
the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must
take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the
filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which
he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available.
Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he
must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The
court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was
ready and was always ready to perform his contract.
8
16. In N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs. v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and
Others1
, it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the
plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance.
This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by
the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to
either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into
consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of
the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration
which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available.
17. In Pushparani S. Sundaram and Others v. Pauline Manomani James
(deceased) and Others2
, this Court has held that inference of readiness and
willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of
circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus:
“So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing
to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading,
we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not
sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing
in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This
requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now
examining the first of the two circumstances, how could
mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a
circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff.
This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have
this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed
raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes
it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved.”
1 1995 (5) SCC 115
2 2002 (9) SCC 582
9

18. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Manjunath Anandappa
URF Shivappa Hanasi v. Tammanasa and Others3
and Pukhraj D. Jain and
Others v. G. Gopalakrishna4
.
19. The judgment of this Court in Umabai and Anr. v. Nilkanth Dhondiba
Chavan (Dead) by LRs. and Anr.,
5
 is almost similar to the case at hand where
the plaintiff had filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to reconvey property. The plea of the plaintiff was that the transaction was one of
mortgage and the sale stood redeemed and the plaintiff was discharged from the
debt and he was ready to pay the defendant the amount for the property only in
the alternative that the plea of mortgage was not accepted by the Court, would
show that his readiness was conditional. The plaintiff did not have any income
and could not raise the amount required for re-purchase of the property. In the
totality of the circumstances, it was held that the plaintiff was not ready and
willing to perform the contract. The conditions laid for the specific performance
of the contract are in para 30, which is as under:
“30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties,
with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiffrespondents were all along and still are ready and willing to
perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required
under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be
determined having regard to the entire attending
circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement
made in the examination-in-chief would not suffice. The
conduct of the plaintiff-respondents must be judged having
3 2003 (10) SCC 390
4 2004 (7) SCC 251
5
(2005) 6 SCC 243
10
regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidences
brought on records”.
20. In the instant case, the plaintiff has alleged that he was ready to pay
Rs.35,000/- to the defendants and called upon them to execute the reconveyance deed. However, in para 11 of the plaint it is pleaded that the
plaintiff was running contract business wherein he suffered heavy loss and as
such he gave up the business. It is also pleaded that at present the plaintiff has
no business or profession and has no source of income. He has no property,
either movable or immovable. Mere plea that he is ready to pay the
consideration, without any material to substantiate this plea, cannot be accepted.
It is not necessary for the plaintiff to produce ready money, but it is mandatory
on his part to prove that he has the means to generate the consideration amount.
Except the statement of PW-1, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the
plaintiff has the means to make arrangements for payment of consideration
under the reconveyance agreement.
21. It is relevant to state here that before filing the suit, the plaintiff had filed
an application before the competent authority under the Karnataka Debt Relief
Act seeking extinguishment of the debt and delivery of the property back to him.
No doubt, the application was dismissed by the authority. But the fact remains
that the intention of the plaintiff was not to pay the amount as per the reconveyance agreement.
22. The deed of re-conveyance, contains a clause for payment of interest on
the consideration amount of Rs.35,000/-. However, the plaintiff has pleaded that
11
there is no agreement to pay the interest. This shows that the plaintiff was not
ready to perform his part of the obligation as per the agreement. Further, the
plaintiff had mortgaged the property with the bank and the bank had obtained an
award against the plaintiff. When the suit property was put up for auction, the
defendants paid the entire amount to the bank which was payable by the plaintiff
under this award. This aspect also indicates the conduct of the plaintiff.
23. Taking an overall view of the matter, the trial court has rightly held that
the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The
High Court, in our view, was not justified in reversing the well-reasoned
judgment of the trial court.
24. In the result, this appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The
judgment of the High Court in R.F.A. No.626 of 2001 dated 21.08.2006 is set
aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in O.S. No.3308 of
1988 dated 12.04.2001 is restored.
25. There will be no order as to costs.

 …………………………J.
 (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
 .…………………………J.
 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
New Delhi;
February 07, 2020.                                12             13

Corporate Laws :- Sales Tax -Sales Tax Holidays = whether the Government Order No.CI 30 SPC 96 dated 15th March, 1996, namely, the Industrial Policy merely provides for sales tax concession and incentives and nothing more.? The core issue raised in these appeals, in our opinion, is no more res integra. It has been answered in the decision of this Court in “Malnad Areca Processing and Marketing Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Assessment) and Others”, reported in (2008) 11 SCC 536. This very Industrial Policy, 1996 was considered by the Court. The Court opined that the same provides for exemption only in respect of sales tax and not for purchase tax as such. As observed in the case of Malnad (supra), the State can levy tax both at the sale point and/or at the purchase point. That distinction being clear, the question of assuming that the purchase tax was also part of the industrial policy under consideration cannot be countenanced. As a result, we find no reason to deviate from the view taken by the High Court in following the principle expounded in the decision of Malnad (supra).

Corporate Laws :- Sales Tax -Sales Tax Holidays =
 whether the Government Order No.CI 30 SPC 96 dated 15th March, 1996, namely, the Industrial Policy merely provides for sales tax concession and incentives and nothing more.? 
The core issue raised in these appeals, in our opinion, is no more res integra. It has been answered in the decision of this Court in “Malnad Areca Processing and Marketing Limited vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Assessment) and Others”, reported in (2008) 11 SCC 536.
This very Industrial Policy, 1996 was considered by the Court. The Court opined that
the same provides for exemption only in respect of sales tax and not for purchase tax as such. 

As observed in the case of Malnad (supra), the State can levy tax both at the sale point and/or at the purchase point. That distinction being clear, the question of assuming that the purchase tax was also part of the industrial policy under consideration cannot be countenanced. As a result, we find no reason to deviate from the view taken by the High Court in following the principle expounded in the decision of Malnad (supra).

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).10680-10683 OF 2011
M/S HIGH RANGE COFFEE CURING PVT.LTD. APPELLANT(S)
 VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.ETC. RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10684 OF 2011
O R D E R
1. Heard counsel for the parties.
2. The opening ground urged by the
appellant is that the High Court ought not to
have entertained the appeals on merits without
condoning the delay in filing of appeals. This
argument though attractive at the first blush,
does not take the matter any further as we find
the delay was only of 71 and 283 days
respectively and sufficient explanation has been
offered by the respondent(s) which could be
condoned in the interest of justice and we order
accordingly.
2
3. The core issue raised in these appeals,
in our opinion, is no more res integra. It has
been answered in the decision of this Court in
“Malnad Areca Processing and Marketing Limited
vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes
(Assessment) and Others”, reported in (2008) 11
SCC 536.
4. This very Industrial Policy, 1996 was
considered by the Court. The Court opined that
the same provides for exemption only in respect
of sales tax and not for purchase tax as such.
The relevant discussion in this behalf can be
discerned from paragraph Nos.15 to 19 of the
said decision, which read thus:
“15. In the government order what is
provided to new industrial units is
the sales tax exemption or deferral
of sales tax under the Act and the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (in short
“the CST Act”).
16. Clause 5 of the Government
Order dated 15-3-1996 of the
Industrial Policy, 1996-2001 provides
for sales tax concession and
incentives. The said clause provides
for an option to industrial
investments in the tiny/SSI/medium
3
and large-scale sectors to claim
either sales tax exemption or sales
tax deferral.
17. A sale and a purchase are two
different aspects of the same
transaction. Whether sale or
purchase, it will have same
ingredients, both in common law and
also under the Sale of Goods Act. As
stated by this Curt in Devi Das Gopal
Krishnan v. State of Punjab1, the
transaction, which the sales tax laws
are concerned with, is a transfer of
property in goods for price, inter
vivos, both in the case of sale as
well as purchase.
18. In the government order, what
is provided to the new industrial
units, is an option to claim sales
tax exemption or deferment of sales
tax both under the Act and the CST
Act. In the field of taxation, it is
recognized that the power to classify
the objects or persons to be taxed or
exempted from levy is with the
legislature. It also enjoys the power
to select persons or transactions. A
law of the State, could therefore,
levy tax both at the sale point and
at the purchase point.
1 AIR 1967 SC 1895 = (1967) 3 SCR 557
4
19. Under the government order, the
policy of the Government as spelt out
is, that tiny and small-scale
industries and medium-and large-scale
industries may exercise their option
either for sales tax exemption or
sales tax deferment for number of
years prescribed in the government
order itself. In the context in which
these expressions are used, they only
mean “sales tax holiday” or exemption
from payment of sales tax for number
of years specified, depending on
where the tiny or small-scale
industry is located. “Sales tax”
refers to any tax which includes
within its scope all “business of
sale of goods” specified in the
Schedule. Similarly, “sales tax
deferral” only means the aforesaid
industries are entitled to collect
tax but they need not pay sales tax
collected immediately to the State.
If understood in this manner and
thereafter the New Industrial Policy
of the State Government for the years
1993-1998 and the exemption
notification is looked into, the only
conclusion that can be drawn is, what
is exempted under the notification
issued by the State Government is tax
5
leviable under Section 5 of the Act
on the goods manufactured and sold by
an industrial unit. Therefore, the
notification is in no way in variance
or contrary to the industrial policy
for the years 1993-1998. the above
position has been rightly highlighted
by the High Court.”
5. We are in agreement with the opinion as
recorded in the aforesaid decision, that the
Government Order No.CI 30 SPC 96 dated 15th
March, 1996, namely, the Industrial Policy
merely provides for sales tax concession and
incentives and nothing more.
6. Counsel for the appellant was at pains
to distinguish the judgment on the argument that
it has only considered the situation covered
under Section 6 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act,
1957, whereas Section 5 of the Act deals with
both sale as well as purchase, and purchase
being the part of the same sale, the benefit
under the policy concerned must be extended also
for purchase, especially, because of the
amendment to the policy by inserting the
industry of the appellant in Appendix-IV. We are
6
not impressed by this submission.
7. The fact that the appellant/assessee’s
industry has been included or added in AppendixIV does not mean that the substance of the
policy has undergone any change. The purport of
amendment is only to include more industries
which were left out in the first notification of
15th March, 1996.
8. Counsel for the appellant had also
placed reliance on the Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in Devi Das Gopal
Krishnan (supra), in particular, paragraph 24,
which reads as under:
"Bearing that in mind let us look at
clause (ff) in Section 2 of the
Principal Act in which the said
clause was inserted. The ingredients
of the definition of "purchase" are
as follows : (i) there shall be
acquisition of goods; (ii) the
acquisition shall be for cash or
deferred payment or other valuable
consideration; (ii) the said valuable
consideration shall not be other than
under a mortgage, hypothecation,
charge or pledge. Clause (h) of
Section 2 defines thus :
7
"sale" means any transfer of
property in goods other than
goods specified in Schedule C
for cash or deferred payment or
other valuable consideration
but does not include a
mortgage, hypothecation, charge
or pledge.”
If we turn to the Sale of Goods Act,
Section 4 thereof define contract of
sale of goods. It reads :
"Contract of sale of goods is a
contract whereby the seller
transfers or agrees to transfer
the property in goods to the
buyer for a price...“
The essential requisite of sale are
(i) there shall be a transfer of
property or agreement to transfer
property by one party to another; and
(ii) it shall be for consideration of
money payment or promise thereof by
the buyer. A sale and a purchase are
different aspects of the same
transaction. If we look at it from
the standpoint of a purchaser it is
purchase and if we look at it from
the standpoint of the seller it is a
sale. Whether purchase or sale it
shall have the said ingredients both
in common law and under the Indian
8
Contract Act. 'Price' has been
defined in the Sale of Goods Act to
mean money consideration for the sale
of goods : see Section 2(10) of the
Indian Sale of Goods Act. It will,
therefore, be seen that the
definition of “purchase” in the Act
prima facie appears to be wider in
scope than “sale”. While transfer of
goods from one person to another is
the ingredient of “sale” in general
law, acquisition of goods, which may
in its comprehensive sense take in
voluntary as well as involuntary
transfers, is an ingredient of
“purchase” in clause (ff). While
“price”, i.e., money consideration,
is the ingredient of “sale”, cash,
deferred payment or any valuable
consideration is an ingredient of
'purchase’. But a closer scrutiny
compels us to give a restricted
meaning to the expression
"acquisition" and "price".
Acquisition is the act by which a
person acquires property in a thing.
"Acquire" is to become the owner of
the property. One can, therefore,
acquire a property either by
voluntary or involuntary transfer.
But the Sales Tax Act applies only to
9
"sale" as defined in the Act. Under
clause (ff) of Section 2 of the Act
it is defied as a transfer of
property. As purchase is only a
different, aspect of sale, looked at
from the stand point of the
purchaser, and as the Act imposes tax
at different points in respect of
sales, having regard to the purpose
of the sale, it is unreasonable to
assume that the Legislature
contemplated different categories of
transactions when the taxable event
is at the purchase point. Whether it
is sale or purchase the transaction
is the same. If it was a transfer
inter vivos, in the case of a sale,
it must equally be so in the case of
a purchase. Context, consistency and
avoidance of anomaly demand a
restricted meaning. That it must only
mean transfer is also made clear by
the nature of the transactions
excluded from the acquisition,
namely, mortgage, hypothecation,
charge or pledge-all of them belong
to the species of transfer. We must,
therefore, hold that the expression
"acquisition" in clause (ff) of
Section 2 of the Act means only
"transfer".
10
9. The exposition in paragraph 24 of the
stated decision extracted above itself
recognizes the distinction between sale and
purchase as different aspects of the same
transaction. As observed in the case of Malnad
(supra), the State can levy tax both at the sale
point and/or at the purchase point. That
distinction being clear, the question of
assuming that the purchase tax was also part of
the industrial policy under consideration cannot
be countenanced. As a result, we find no reason
to deviate from the view taken by the High Court
in following the principle expounded in the
decision of Malnad (supra).
10. The companion appeal, Civil Appeal
No.10684 of 2011, again raises a technical plea
regarding justness of exercise of jurisdiction
by the High Court in recalling the entire
decision dated 9th March, 2004 at the instance of
the appellant, who had merely moved an
application for recall/clarification of one
sentence occurring in the said decision. The
fact remains that the appellant, after recall of
11
the entire decision, participated in the appeal
proceedings before the Division Bench and argued
the matter on merits. As a result, this
technical plea cannot be the basis to undo the
entire judgment which otherwise is in conformity
with the legal principle stated in the case of
Malnad (supra).
11. Hence, these appeals must fail and the
same are dismissed accordingly. All pending
applications are also disposed of.
..................,J.
 (A.M. KHANWILKAR)
..................,J.
 (DINESH MAHESHWARI)
 NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 05, 2020
12
ITEM NO.101 COURT NO.7 SECTION IV-A
 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 10680-10683/2011
M/S HIGH RANGE COFFEE CURING PVT.LTD. Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. Respondent(s)
WITH
C.A. No. 10684/2011 (IV-A)
Date : 05-02-2020 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI
For Appellant(s) Mr. Yashraj Singh Deora, Adv.
Ms. Shivangi Sud, Adv.
Ms. Sonal Mashankar, Adv.
 For M/S. Mitter & Mitter Co., AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Basava prabhu S. Patil, Sr. Adv.
 Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
Mr. Manendra Pal Gupta, Adv.
Ms. Rachitha Hirenath, Adv.
Ms. Rudrali Patil, Adv.
 Mr. Joseph Aristotle S., AOR
 Ms. Radha Rangaswamy, AOR

 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
 O R D E R
The appeals are dismissed and all pending
applications are also disposed of in terms of
the signed reportable order.
(NEETU KHAJURIA)
COURT MASTER
(VIDYA NEGI)
COURT MASTER
(Signed reportable order is placed on the file.)

whether the service rendered by the petitioners in the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee and Supreme Court Legal Services Committee prior to the promulgation of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee Rules, 2000 is to be counted while calculating their qualifying service for determination of pension. ? The Union of India has raised a two­fold submission. It is first submitted that the service of the petitioners rendered prior to 03.07.2000 cannot be taken into consideration while quantifying the qualifying service or determining their retiral benefits. It is secondly contended that this plea could have been taken in the earlier writ petition and, in fact, such a plea was raised but finally the Court did not grant this relief and, therefore, they cannot file the second petition. From the facts narrated above, it is apparent that the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee was created under administrative instructions of the Government. Thereafter, the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 came into force. The services of the officers and employees were governed by Rule 3A and after 2000, they are governed by the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee Regulations, 2000. They have been rendering service uninterruptedly as employees of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and no distinction can be made between the service prior to 03.07.2000 and the service rendered thereafter. The petitioners have been regular employees of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and their entire service must be counted for determining their pension and other retiral benefits. This entire service is to be treated as their qualifying service in accordance with the Rules. As far as the second submission made on behalf of the Union of India is concerned, we have carefully gone through the earlier order and the writ petition. Though it is correct that in the writ petition there was a general claim to grant all the benefits under Rule 6 which would include retiral benefits but it appears that the Court did not go into the same. There is no rejection of the plea and as such we are of the considered view that this petition is maintainable and cannot be rejected on this hyper­technical ground. In relation to applicability of Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 this Court has held in Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others1 as follows: 1 AIR 1962 SC 1334 7 “12. …The bar of O.2 R. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code on which the High Court apparently relied may not apply to a petition for a high prerogative writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution, but the High Court having disallowed the claim of the appellant for salary prior to the date of the suit, we do not think that we would be justified in interfering with the exercise of its discretion by the High Court.” Placing reliance on the case of Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma (supra), this Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat2 in relation to Order II Rule 2 held as follows: “23. …By its very language, these provisions do not apply to the contents of a writ petition and consequently do not apply to the contents of a subsequent suit…” In view of the above, we allow the petition and direct that the entire service rendered by the petitioners in the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee and the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee shall be treated as qualifying service for the purpose of pension and shall be taken into consideration for calculating their retiral benefits. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

whether the service rendered   by   the   petitioners   in   the   Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid Committee and Supreme Court Legal Services Committee prior to the promulgation of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee Rules, 2000 is to be counted while calculating their qualifying service for determination of pension.  ?

The Union of India has raised a two­fold submission.  It is first submitted that the service of the petitioners rendered prior to   03.07.2000   cannot   be   taken   into   consideration   while
quantifying   the   qualifying   service   or   determining   their   retiral benefits.  It is secondly contended that this plea could have been taken in the earlier writ petition and, in fact, such a plea was
raised   but   finally   the   Court   did   not   grant   this   relief   and, therefore, they cannot file the second petition.   From   the   facts   narrated   above,   it   is   apparent   that   the
Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid   Committee   was   created   under administrative instructions of the Government.   Thereafter, the Legal   Services   Authorities   Act,   1987   came   into   force.     The
services of the officers and employees were governed by Rule 3A and after 2000, they are governed by the Supreme Court Legal Services   Committee   Regulations,   2000.     They   have   been
rendering service uninterruptedly as employees of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and no distinction can be made between the service prior to 03.07.2000 and the service rendered
thereafter.   The petitioners have been regular employees of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and their entire service must be counted for determining their pension and other retiral
benefits.  This entire service is to be treated as their qualifying service in accordance with the Rules.  
 As far as the second submission made on behalf of the Union of India is concerned, we have carefully gone through the earlier order and the writ petition.  Though it is correct that in
the   writ   petition   there   was   a   general   claim   to   grant   all   the benefits under Rule 6 which would include retiral benefits but it appears that the Court did not go into the same.   There is no
rejection of the plea and as such we are of the considered view that this petition is maintainable and cannot be rejected on this hyper­technical ground.   In relation to applicability of Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 this Court has held in Devendra   Pratap   Narain   Rai   Sharma v. State   of   Uttar Pradesh and Others1  as follows: 1 AIR 1962 SC 1334 
7
“12. …The bar of O.2 R. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code on
which the High Court apparently relied may not apply to
a petition for a high prerogative writ under Art. 226 of the
Constitution, but the High Court having disallowed the
claim of the appellant for salary prior to the date of the
suit,   we   do   not   think   that   we   would   be   justified   in
interfering with the exercise of its discretion by the High
Court.”
Placing reliance on the case of  Devendra  Pratap  Narain
Rai   Sharma  (supra),   this   Court   in  Gulabchand   Chhotalal
Parikh v. State of Gujarat2
 in relation to Order II Rule 2 held as
follows:
“23. …By its very language, these provisions do not apply
to the contents of a writ petition and consequently do not
apply to the contents of a subsequent suit…”
 In view of the above, we allow the petition and direct that the entire service rendered by the petitioners in the Supreme Court   Legal   Aid   Committee   and   the   Supreme   Court   Legal Services Committee shall be treated as qualifying service for the purpose of pension and shall be taken into consideration for calculating their retiral benefits.   Pending application(s), if any,
stand(s)          disposed of.


NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 59 OF 2019
BRAHMA SINGH AND OTHERS  …PETITIONER(S)
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS       …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
The short issue involved in this case is whether the service
rendered   by   the   petitioners   in   the   Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid
Committee and Supreme Court Legal Services Committee prior to
the promulgation of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee
Rules, 2000 is to be counted while calculating their qualifying
service for determination of pension.  
2. The petitioners are serving and retired employees of the
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee in various capacities.
They claim that the entire service rendered by them should be
1
treated as qualifying service for the purpose of fixing the retiral
benefits.  The respondent no.1­Union of India has rejected their
claim on 11.09.2017 and 08.12.2017, leading to the filing of this
petition.  The case of the petitioners is that their claim is squarely
covered by the judgment already rendered in their favour in Writ
Petition (Civil) No.267 of 2008 wherein considering the effect of
the Rules which are now under consideration, their entire service
was taken into consideration for fixing the pay and allowances
and they were given complete benefit of Rule 6 of The Supreme
Court Legal Services Committee Rules,2000.   According to the
Union of India, the benefit can be given only from the date of
promulgation of the Rules and not prior to that.   Some of the
petitioners joined in the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee as
far back as in 1981 and the service not taken into consideration
is more than 18 years and 8 months.
3. The Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee was constituted by
the Ministry of Law & Justice under executive instructions on
10.07.1981.   Para 7 of the said instructions provides that the
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee shall be entitled to make
necessary arrangements for staff and other facilities necessary for
2
the discharge of its functions.   These instructions were issued
with the concurrence of the Ministry of Finance, Department of
Expenditure.  Therefore, the posts were sanctioned posts though
no rules were framed for filling up the same.  Pursuant to these
instructions,   the   petitioners   were   appointed   in   different
capacities in the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee.  In 1987,
the Parliament enacted the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.
The   National   Legal   Services   Authority   was   constituted   under
Section 3.  Sub­section (5) and (6) of Section 3 provide that the
Central Authority can appoint officers and other employees.  The
appointment of such employees and their pay and allowances are
to be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with
the  Chief Justice of  India.   Section  3A of  the Legal Services
Authorities   Act   provides   for   the   constitution   of   the   Supreme
Court Legal Services Committee and sub­section (5) and (6) are
identical to sub­section (5) and (6) of Section 3.  Rule 9 of The
National Legal Services Authority Rules, 1995 provides that the
conditions of service and salary and allowances of officers and
other employees of the Central Authority shall be at par with the
Central Government employees holding equivalent posts and it
further provides that in all matters like age of retirement, pay
3
and   allowances,  the  rules  applicable  to  the   employees  of  the
Central Government shall also apply to the employees of the
Central Authority.   The Central Authority framed the Supreme
Court   Legal   Services   Committee   Regulations,   1996   and
Regulations 3(1) and 3(2) thereof read as follows;
“3. General effect of vesting. – On and from the date of
commencement of these regulations, ­
(1)All the assets, liabilities, rights, title and interest of the
erstwhile   Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid   Committee   stand
transferred to, and vest in, Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee; 
3(2) The   staff,   who   have   been   serving   under   the
erstwhile Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee shall be
deemed   to   be   working   for   the   Supreme   Court   Legal
Services Committee;
xxx xxx xxx”
4. The Supreme Court Legal Services Committee Rules, 2000
were framed by the Central Government in consultation with the
Chief Justice of India and came into effect on 03.07.2000.  Rule 6
is relevant for our purpose and reads as follows:
“6.  The   conditions   of   service   and   the   salary   and
allowances  payable  to  the  officers  and  employees  of
the  Supreme  Court  Legal  Services  Committee  under
sub­section (6) of section 3A.­(1) The officers and other
employees   of   the   Supreme   Court   Legal   Services
Committee shall be entitled to draw pay and allowances
in the scale of pay indicated against each post in the
Schedule   to   these   rules   or   at   par   with   the   Central
Government employees holding equivalent posts.
4
(2)In   all   matters   like   age   of   retirement,   pay   and
allowances,   benefits   and   entitlements   and   disciplinary
matters, the officers and employees of the Supreme Court
Legal   Services   Committee   shall   be   governed   by   the
Central Government rules as are applicable to persons
holding equivalent posts.
(3)The officers and other employees of the Supreme Court
Legal Services Committee shall be entitled to such other
facilities and benefits as may be notified by the Central
Government from time to time.
Explanation.  –   The   words   “benefits”,   “allowances”,
“entitlements”, “facilities” occurring in these rules shall
be   deemed   to   include,   the   entitlement   to   gratuity,
provident fund, housing, medical benefits, pension, group
insurance,   and   all   other   benefits   as   are   available   to
employees of the Central Government holding equivalent
posts.”
Sub­rule (2) of Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee Rules clearly states that in all matters like age of
retirement, pay and allowances and benefits on retirement the
officers   and   employees   of   the   Supreme   Court   Legal   Services
Committee shall be governed by the Central Government rules. 
5. Earlier, the petitioners had approached this Court by filing
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 267 of 2008 whereby they had claimed
that they were entitled to pay and allowances and other benefits
under Rule 6 quoted hereinabove.  That writ petition was allowed
and the respondents were directed to give full benefit of Rule 6 of
the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee Rules by fixing the
pay and allowances of the petitioners and other similarly situated
5
employees in the pay scales specified in the Schedule appended
to the Rules or at par with the Central Government employees
holding equivalent posts.  They were also directed to pay arrears
from the date of promulgation of the Rules i.e. 03.07.2000. 
6. The Union of India has raised a two­fold submission.  It is
first submitted that the service of the petitioners rendered prior
to   03.07.2000   cannot   be   taken   into   consideration   while
quantifying   the   qualifying   service   or   determining   their   retiral
benefits.  It is secondly contended that this plea could have been
taken in the earlier writ petition and, in fact, such a plea was
raised   but   finally   the   Court   did   not   grant   this   relief   and,
therefore, they cannot file the second petition.  
7. From   the   facts   narrated   above,   it   is   apparent   that   the
Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid   Committee   was   created   under
administrative instructions of the Government.   Thereafter, the
Legal   Services   Authorities   Act,   1987   came   into   force.     The
services of the officers and employees were governed by Rule 3A
and after 2000, they are governed by the Supreme Court Legal
Services   Committee   Regulations,   2000.     They   have   been
rendering service uninterruptedly as employees of the Supreme
6
Court Legal Services Committee and no distinction can be made
between the service prior to 03.07.2000 and the service rendered
thereafter.   The petitioners have been regular employees of the
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and their entire service
must be counted for determining their pension and other retiral
benefits.  This entire service is to be treated as their qualifying
service in accordance with the Rules.  
8. As far as the second submission made on behalf of the
Union of India is concerned, we have carefully gone through the
earlier order and the writ petition.  Though it is correct that in
the   writ   petition   there   was   a   general   claim   to   grant   all   the
benefits under Rule 6 which would include retiral benefits but it
appears that the Court did not go into the same.   There is no
rejection of the plea and as such we are of the considered view
that this petition is maintainable and cannot be rejected on this
hyper­technical ground.   In relation to applicability of Order II
Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 this Court has held in
Devendra   Pratap   Narain   Rai   Sharma v. State   of   Uttar
Pradesh and Others1
 as follows:
1 AIR 1962 SC 1334 
7
“12. …The bar of O.2 R. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code on
which the High Court apparently relied may not apply to
a petition for a high prerogative writ under Art. 226 of the
Constitution, but the High Court having disallowed the
claim of the appellant for salary prior to the date of the
suit,   we   do   not   think   that   we   would   be   justified   in
interfering with the exercise of its discretion by the High
Court.”
Placing reliance on the case of  Devendra  Pratap  Narain
Rai   Sharma  (supra),   this   Court   in  Gulabchand   Chhotalal
Parikh v. State of Gujarat2
 in relation to Order II Rule 2 held as
follows:
“23. …By its very language, these provisions do not apply
to the contents of a writ petition and consequently do not
apply to the contents of a subsequent suit…”
9. In view of the above, we allow the petition and direct that
the entire service rendered by the petitioners in the Supreme
Court   Legal   Aid   Committee   and   the   Supreme   Court   Legal
Services Committee shall be treated as qualifying service for the
purpose of pension and shall be taken into consideration for
calculating their retiral benefits.   Pending application(s), if any,
stand(s)          disposed of.
………………………………..J.
(L. Nageswara Rao)
2 AIR 1965 SC 1153
8
…………………………………J.
(Deepak Gupta)
New Delhi
February 05, 2020
9