We, therefore, hold that when an insured has lodged the FIR immediately after the theft of a vehicle occurred and when the police after investigation have lodged a final report after the vehicle was not traced and when the surveyors/investigators appointed by the insurance company have found the claim of the theft to be genuine, then mere delay in intimating the insurance company about the occurrence of the theft cannot be a ground to deny the claim of the insured.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.653    OF 2020
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 24370 of 2015)
GURSHINDER SINGH                                  ....APPELLANT(S)
                                         
                               VERSUS
SHRIRAM GENERAL INSURANCE CO.       
LTD. & ANR.           .... RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
     Leave granted.
2. Noticing that there is a conflict between the decisions of the
Bench of the two Judges of this Court in Om Prakash  vs. Reliance
General Insurance & Anr.1
  and in the case of  Oriental Insurance
Co. Ltd.  vs. Parvesh Chander Chadha2
, on the question, as to
whether  delay  in  informing  the   occurrence   of   the  theft  of   the
vehicle to the insurance company, though the FIR was registered
immediately, would disentitle the claimant of the insurance claim.
The   Bench   of   two   Judges   of   this   Court  vide  Order   dated
09.01.2018 has referred the matter to a three­Judge Bench.
1 Civil Appeal No.15611/ 2017 decided on 04.10.2017
2 Civil Appeal No.6739/ 2010  decided on 17.08.2010;  2009 (1) CLT 552]
2
3. The   appellant   had   got   his   tractor   insured   with   the
respondent(s)   on   19.06.2010.   On   28.10.2010,   the   tractor   was
stolen and an FIR was lodged on the same day. However, the claim
was   submitted   to   the   respondent(s)   on   15.12.2010.     It   was
rejected on the ground that intimation was given belatedly after 52
days.   The   appellant   herein,   therefore,   approached   the   District
Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Forum,   Jalandhar,   Punjab,
(hereinafter referred to as the “District Forum”) vide Complaint No.
380 of 2011. The District Forum, relying on the decisions of the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘National Commission’) in the case of  Parvesh
Chander Chadha (supra) and T.D.P. Gram Sewa Sahakari Samiti
Ltd. & Ors.  vs.  Charanjit Kaur and Ors.3
.,  allowed the complaint
and directed the respondents to pay a sum of Rs.4,70,000/­ being
the declared insured value of the vehicle to the complainant within
one month from the date of receipt of copy of the order, failing
which, the respondents were made liable to pay interest   at the
rate of 12% per annum from the date of order till payment.
4. Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the   respondents   preferred   an
appeal   before   the   State   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal
3 2011(3) CPC 422
3
Commission,   Punjab   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   “State
Commission”).  The State Commission dismissed the appeal vide
order dated 26.03.2013.
5. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal by the State
Commission, the respondents preferred a Revision Petition before
the National Commission. The National Commission relying on its
earlier judgment in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs.
Trilochan Jane4
 allowed the revision petition thereby setting aside
the orders of the District Forum as well as the State Commission
and   dismissed   the   complaint.   Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the
appellant is before this Court.
6. When the matter was heard by the two­Judge bench of this
Court, it noticed that though in the case of Om Prakash (supra),
the theft of the vehicle was reported to the police on the day after
the   theft   occurred,   the   intimation   was   sent   to   the   insurance
company   much   later.   This   Court   took   the   view   that   delay   in
informing the insurance company would not debar the insured to
get the insurance claim. Per contra, it noticed that in the case of
Parvesh   Chander   Chadha  (supra),   this   Court   accepted   the
contention of the insurance company that on account of delay in
4 (2012) CPJ 441 (NC)
4
intimating the insurance company about the theft, though the FIR
was lodged immediately, the insurance company was entitled to
repudiate the claim of the claimant. Hence, the present appeal.
7. It will be relevant to refer to Condition No.1 of the Standard
Form for Commercial  Vehicles  Package  Policy,  which reads as
follows:
“1.    Notice   shall   be   given   in   writing   to   the   Company
immediately upon the occurrence of any accidental loss or
damage and in the event of any claim and thereafter the
insured shall give all such information and assistance as the
Company   shall   require.   Every   letter   claim   writ   summons
and/or process or copy thereof shall be forwarded to the
Company immediately on receipt by the insured. Notice shall
also be given in writing to the company immediately the
insured shall have knowledge of any impending prosecution
inquest or fatal inquiry in respect of any occurrence which
may give rise to a claim under this policy. In case of theft or
criminal act which may be the subject of a claim under this
policy the insured shall give immediate notice to the police
and co­operate with the company in securing the conviction
of the offender.”
8. The condition which falls for consideration in the present
case is identical with the condition that fell for consideration in
both the cases, namely, Om Prakash (supra) and Parvesh Chander
Chadha (supra). In the case of Parvesh Chander Chadha (supra),
the vehicle was stolen between 18.01.1995 and 20.01.1995. The
FIR for the alleged theft of car was registered on 20.01.1995.
However, the intimation was given to the insurer on 22.05.1995.
5
On   account   of   the   delay,   the   claim   for   compensation   was
repudiated by the insurance company for breach of policy. In the
said case, the District Forum had allowed the complaint of the
claimant, which order was maintained by the State Commission
as   well   as   the   National   Commission.   However,   reversing   the
concurrent   orders,   this   Court   held   that   though   the   theft   had
occurred between 18.01.1995 and 20.01.1995, the intimation to
the insurance company was given only on 22.05.1995. It observed
that no explanation for such an unusual delay in informing the
insurer was given by the claimant. This Court found that in terms
of   the   policy   issued   by   the   insurer   (appellant   therein),   the
respondent was duty bound to inform it about the theft of the
vehicle immediately after the incident. It further observed, that on
account of delay in intimation, the insurer was deprived of its
legitimate right to get an inquiry conducted into the alleged theft
of the vehicle and make an endeavour to recover the same.
9. Per contra, in the case of  Om Prakash  (supra), the vehicle
was   stolen   on   23.03.2010   at   around   9.00   p.m.   The   claimant
lodged   an   FIR   immediately   on   24.03.2010.   He   lodged   the
insurance claim on 31.03.2010. Since the claim of the claimant
was   repudiated,   he   filed   complaint   before   the   District   Forum
6
which was allowed. The State Commission also maintained the
order of the District Forum. However, in the revision, the National
Commission reversed the same. In an appeal, this Court found
that   the   claimant   (the   appellant   therein)   had   assigned   cogent
reasons for the delay of 8 days in lodging the complaint. It further
found that the word “immediately”’ cannot be construed narrowly
so as to deprive  claimant the benefit of the settlement of genuine
claim, particularly when the delay was explained. It further held,
that rejection of the claim on purely technical grounds and in a
mechanical   manner   will   result   in   loss   of   confidence   of   policy
holders   in   the   insurance   industry.   It   further  held,   that   if   the
reasons for delay in making a claim is satisfactorily explained,
such a claim cannot be rejected on the ground of delay. This Court
also held that it would not be fair and reasonable to reject the
genuine claims which have already been verified and found to be
correct   by   the   investigator.   It   further  held,   that   the   condition
regarding   the   delay   shall   not   be   a   shelter   to   repudiate   the
insurance claims which have been otherwise proved to be genuine.
This Court observed that the Consumer Protection Act aims at
providing better protection of the interest of the consumers. It is a
beneficial legislation that deserves a liberal construction.
7
10. We are of the view that much would depend upon the words
‘co­operate’ and ‘immediate’, in condition No. 1 of the Standard
Form for Commercial Vehicles Package Policy. Before we analyze
this   case   any   further,   we   need   to   observe   the   rules   of
interpretation applicable to a contract of insurance. Generally, an
insurance   contract   is   governed   by   the   rules   of   interpretation
applicable   to   the   general   contracts.   However,   due   to   the
specialized   nature   of   contract   of   insurance,   certain   rules   are
tailored to suit insurance contracts. Under the English law, the
development of insurance jurisprudence is given credence to Lord
Mansfield, who developed the law from its infancy. Without going
much into the development of the interpretation rules, we may
allude   to   Justice   Neuberger  in  Arnold   v.   Britton5
,     which   is
simplified as under:
(1) reliance placed in some cases on commercial
common sense and surrounding circumstances
was   not   to   be   invoked   to   undervalue   the
importance   of   the   language   of   the   provision
which is to be construed.
(2) the less clear the words used were, the more
ready the court could properly be to depart from
their natural meaning, but that did not justify
departing from the natural meaning.
5 [2015] UKSC 36
8
(3)   commercial   common   sense   was   not   to   be
invoked retrospectively, so that the mere fact that
a contractual arrangement has worked out badly,
or even disastrously, for one of the parties was
not   a   reason   for   departing   from   the   natural
language.
(4)   a   court   should   be   very   slow   to   reject   the
natural meaning of a provision as correct simply
because it appeared to be a very imprudent term
for one of the parties to have agreed.
(5) when interpreting a contractual provision, the
court   could   only   take   into   account   facts   or
circumstances which existed at the time that the
contract  was  made  and   which  were  known   or
reasonably available to both parties.
 (6) if an event subsequently occurred which was
plainly   not   intended   or   contemplated   by   the
parties, if it was clear what the parties would
have intended, the court would give effect to that
intention.6
11. A perusal of the aforesaid shows that this contract is to be
interpreted according to the context involved in the contract. The
contract   we   are   interpreting   is   a   Commercial   Vehicle   Package
Policy. There is no gainsaying that in a contract, the bargaining
power is usually at equal footing. In this regard, the joint intention
of the parties is taken into consideration for interpretation of a
contract. However, in most standard form contracts, that is not
so.   In   this   regard,   the   Court   in   such   circumstances   would
6 Robert Merkin QC et el., Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (11th Eds.),
p. 159.
9
consider the application of the rule of  contra preferatum, when
ambiguity exists and an interpretation of the contract is preferred
which favors the party with lesser bargaining power.
12. It is argued on behalf of the respondents and rightly so, that
the insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the
insured and the parties would be strictly bound by the terms and
conditions as provided in the contract between the parties.
13. In our view, applying the aforesaid principles, Condition No.
1  of the Standard Form for Commercial Vehicles Package Policy
will have to be divided into two parts. The perusal of the first part
of Condition No. 1 would reveal, that it provides that ‘a notice
shall be given in writing to the company immediately upon the
occurrence of any accidental loss or damage’.  It further provides,
that in the event of any claim and thereafter, the insured shall
give all such information and assistance as the company shall
require. It provides, that every letter claim writ summons and/or
process   or   copy   thereof   shall   be   forwarded   to   the   insurance
company   immediately   on   receipt   by   the   insured.     It   further
provides,   that   a   notice   shall   also   be   given   in   writing   to   the
company immediately by the insured if he shall have knowledge of
10
any impending prosecution inquest or fatal inquiry in respect of
any occurrence, which may give rise to a claim under this policy.
14. A perusal of the wordings used in this part would reveal,
that all the things which are required to be done under this part
are related to an occurrence of an accident. On occurrence of an
accidental   loss,   the   insured   is   required   to   immediately   give   a
notice in writing to the company. This appears to be so that the
company  can   assign   a  surveyor  so  as   to   assess  the   damages
suffered by the insured/vehicle. It further provides, that any letter
claim   writ   summons   and/or   process   or   copy   thereof   shall   be
forwarded to the company immediately on receipt by the insured.
As such, the intention would be clear. The question of receipt of
letter claim writ summons and/or process or copy thereof by the
insured, would only arise in the event of the criminal proceedings
being initiated with regard to the occurrence of the accident. It
further   provides,   that   the   insured   shall   also   give   a   notice   in
writing  to the company immediately if the insured shall have the
knowledge of any impending prosecution inquest or fatal inquiry
in respect of any occurrence which may give rise to a claim under
this   policy.   It   will   again   make   the   intention   clear   that   the
11
immediate   action   is   contemplated   in   respect   of   an   accident
occurring to the vehicle.
15. We find, that the second part of Condition No. 1 deals with
the ‘theft or criminal act other than the accident’. It provides, that
in case of theft or criminal act which may be the subject of a claim
under the policy, the insured shall give immediate notice to the
police and co­operate with the company in securing the conviction
of the offender. The object behind giving immediate notice to the
police appears to be that if the police is immediately informed
about the theft or any criminal act, the police machinery can be
set   in   motion   and   steps   for   recovery   of   the   vehicle   could   be
expedited.  In a case of theft, the insurance company or a surveyor
would have a limited role. It is the police, who acting on the FIR of
the insured, will be required to take immediate steps for tracing
and   recovering   the   vehicle.     Per   contra,   the   surveyor   of   the
insurance   company,   at   the   most,   could   ascertain   the   factum
regarding the theft of the vehicle.
16. It   is   further   to   be   noted   that,   in   the   event,   after   the
registration   of   an   FIR,   the   police   successfully   recovering   the
vehicle and returning the same to the insured, there would be no
12
occasion to lodge a claim for compensation on account of the
policy. It is only when the police are not in a position to trace and
recover the vehicle and the final report is lodged by the police after
the vehicle is not traced, the insured would be in a position to
lodge his claim for compensation. As observed by the bench of two
learned Judges in the case of Om Prakash (supra), after the vehicle
is stolen,  a person, who lost his vehicle, would immediately lodge
an FIR and the immediate conduct that would be expected of such
a person would be to assist the police  in search of the vehicle. The
registration of the FIR regarding the theft of the vehicle and the
final report of the police after the vehicle is not traced would
substantiate the claim of the claimant that the vehicle is stolen.
Not   only   that,   but   the   surveyors   appointed   by   the   insurance
company are also required to enquire whether the claim of the
claimant regarding the theft is genuine or not. If the  surveyor
appointed by the insurance company, upon inquiry, finds that the
claim   of   theft   is   genuine   then   coupled   with   the   immediate
registration of the FIR, in our view, would be conclusive proof of
the vehicle being stolen.
17. That the term ‘co­operate’ as used under the contract needs
to be assessed in facts and circumstances. While assessing the
13
‘duty to co­operate’ for the insured,  inter alia  the Court should
have   regards   to   those   breaches   by   the   insured   which   are
prejudicial   to   the   insurance   company.   Usually,   mere   delay   in
informing the theft to the insurer, when the same was already
informed to the law enforcement authorities, cannot amount to a
breach of ‘duty to co­operate’ of the insured.
18. We concur with the view taken in the case of  Om Prakash
(supra), that in such a situation if the claimant is denied the claim
merely on the ground that there is some delay in intimating the
insurance company about the occurrence of the theft, it would be
taking a hyper technical view.   We find, that this Court in  Om
Prakash  (supra) has rightly held that it would  not be fair and
reasonable   to   reject   genuine   claims   which   had   already   been
verified and found to be correct by the investigator.
19. We find, that this Court in Om Prakash (supra) has rightly
held that  the Consumer Protection  Act aims at protecting the
interest   of   the   consumers   and   it   being  a  beneficial   legislation
deserves pragmatic construction. We find, that in  Om Prakash
(supra) this Court has rightly held that mere delay in intimating
the insurance company about the theft of the vehicle should not
14
be a shelter to repudiate the insurance claim which has been
otherwise proved to be genuine.
20. We, therefore, hold that when an insured has lodged the FIR
immediately after the theft of a vehicle occurred and when the
police   after   investigation   have   lodged   a   final   report   after   the
vehicle   was   not   traced   and   when   the   surveyors/investigators
appointed by the insurance company have found the claim of the
theft to be genuine, then mere delay in intimating the insurance
company about the occurrence of the theft cannot be a ground to
deny the claim of the insured.
21. We, therefore, answer the reference accordingly. 
22.  In the present case, the facts are undisputed. The theft had
occurred on 28.10.2010. The FIR was lodged at P.S. Nakodar,
Jalandhar, Punjab on the same day i.e. 28.10.2010. The police
have   admittedly   lodged   the   final   report.   The   investigators
appointed   by   the   insurance   company   have   submitted   their
investigation   report   on   25.02.2011,   finding   the   claim   of   the
appellant   to   be   genuine.   In   this   background,   the   National
Commission was not justified in reversing the concurrent orders of
15
the   District  Forum  and  the   State   Commission.  The   appeal   is,
therefore,   allowed.   The   impugned   Judgment   and   order   dated
17.03.2015 passed by the National Commission is quashed and
set aside.  The order of the District Forum dated 09.05.2012 as
maintained by the State Commission vide order dated 26.03.2013
is maintained.
23.  The amount, i.e., 75% of the claim amount deposited by the
respondents,   pursuant   to   the   orders   of   this   Court   dated
09.01.2018, in this Registry shall be permitted to be withdrawn by
the appellant herein along with interest accrued thereon.   The
remainder shall be paid by the respondents within a period of six
weeks   from   today   along   with   interest   at   the   rate   of   12%   per
annum on the entire amount of Rs.4,70,000/­ from the date of the
order of the District Forum till its realisation.
…………...................J.
                             [N.V. RAMANA]
…………....................J.
                             [R. SUBHASH REDDY]
................................J.
                                                  [B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 24, 2020

Merely because an employee is given a temporary charge to do a particular work of a particular post, it cannot be said that in fact he has been promoted to the said post. At this stage, it is required to be noted that subsequently when the respondent was transferred in the year 2005 from Noida Office (Electrician) to Kanpur DCO (Electrician), the respondent opposed the said transfer contending, inter alia, that there is no post of an Electrician at Kanpur and therefore he should be continued at Noida (Electrician). Therefore, even on 04.03.2005, the respondent himself claimed to 19 be the Electrician. Therefore, now it is not open to the respondent that he was already promoted to the post of Section Officer in the year 1996. Therefore also, the High Court has committed a grave error in directing the appellant to promote the respondent to the post of Section Officer under the TBPS.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 200 OF 2020
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India .. Appellant
Versus
J.R. William Singh .. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   dated   05.02.2019   passed   by   the   Division
Bench of the High Court of Delhi in LPA No. 245 of 2018, by which
the Division Bench of the High Court has allowed the said appeal
preferred by the respondent herein and has quashed and set aside
the judgment and order dated 02.04.2018 passed by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court and consequently has directed the
appellant herein to grant the respondent herein­original appellant
the pay scale and designation of a Section Officer with effect from
2
05.03.1993   and   the   pay   scale   and   designation   of   an   Executive
Officer   with   effect   from   05.03.2002   under   the   Time­Bound
Promotion Scheme (hereinafter referred to as the TBPS) on notional
basis since the respondent had already superannuated, the original
respondent­ Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (for short
“ICAI”)   has   preferred   the   present   appeal.       By   the   impugned
judgment and order, the Division Bench of the High Court has also
directed the appellant to pay the arrears of salary and emoluments
to the respondent, as revised for the aforesaid scales from time to
time.
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as
follows:
That the respondent herein was appointed as an ‘Electrician’
on   terms   and   conditions   mentioned   in   the   order   of
appointment/letter   dated   26.02.1974.     That,   by   the   office
memorandum dated 01.05.1976, the respondent was confirmed in
the permanent post of ‘Electrician’ with effect from 16.04.1976.
That the respondent was also released the increments from time to
time.  That a settlement dated 10.01.1984 was reached between the
3
appellant­Institute and its Employees’ Association with respect to
time   bound   promotions/change   to   the   next   grade.       The   said
settlement was to take effect from 01.01.1984.   According to the
appellant, the said TBPS was applicable to only two categories of
employees,   namely,   Peons/Chowkidars/Sweepers   (Class   IV)   and
LDC to Executive Officers Grade (Class III).  In the said settlement,
under   Clause   1(v)   it   was   further   provided   that   the   decision   in
respect of cases not falling under the two broad categories referred
to   hereinabove,   e.g.   Jamadar,   Drivers,   Gestetner   Operators,
Electricians, Electrical Foreman and Library Attendant will be taken
up by the President.   It appears that thereafter and in light of
Clause 1(v) of the memorandum of settlement dated 10.01.1984, a
decision was taken by the President of the appellant Institute on
25.02.1984,   by   which   it   was   provided   that   Jamadar,   Drivers,
Gestetner Operators, Electricians etc., as mentioned in Clause 1(v)
of the memorandum of settlement dated 10.01.1984 shall only be
entitled   to   get   the   next   grade.     That   thereafter,   vide   office
memorandum dated 13.03.1984, the respondent was informed that
his basic pay was fixed at Rs.370/­ with effect from 01.01.1984.  He
4
was   further   informed   with   respect   to   the   next   increment.
According to the appellant, as per the settlement dated 10.01.1984
and the subsequent decision of the President dated 25.02.1984, the
respondent was given the benefit of enhancement in the salary in
the next grade.   That thereafter vide office memorandum dated
08.07.1986,   the   appellant   informed   the   respondent   that   on   his
completion of 12 years of service on 04.03.1986, his pay scale has
been revised from 330­10­180­EB­12­500­EB­15­560 to the higher
scale of 425­15­500­EB­15­560­20­700­EB­25­800 with effect from
05.03.1986 and that his basic pay has been fixed at Rs.425/­ in
that   grade.     He   was   also   informed   with   respect   to   the   next
increment to fall due on 05.03.1987.   It appears that thereafter
upon   acceptance   of   the   recommendations   of   the   Fourth   Pay
Commission and in accordance with the option exercised by the
respondent, the pay scale of the respondent was revised to Rs.1200­
30­1560­EB­40­2040 with retrospective effect from 01.01.1986 and
that his pay in that grade was fixed at Rs.1320/­.  It appears that
thereafter in the year 1987­88, the Employees’ Association raised
certain   demands.     With   respect   to   the   demands   raised,   a
5
memorandum of settlement dated 02.08.1988 was reached between
the appellant Institute and its Employees’ Association.  It appears
that, in terms of the aforesaid settlement dated 02.08.1988, the
time span provided in the TBPS as mentioned in the settlement
dated 10.01.1984 came to be reduced.  It appears that thereafter
the   Employees’   Association   raised   several   demands   in   the   year
1991.     With   respect   to   the   fresh   demands,   a   memorandum   of
settlement   dated   15.06.1991   was   reached.     It   appears   that
thereafter the respondent vide his letter dated 12.05.1995 made a
request   for   promotion   under   the   TBPS   provided   under   the
settlement   dated   02.08.1988   as   well   as   the   settlement   dated
15.06.1991.  According to the respondent, he was entitled to get the
promotion after expiry of seven years’ period and that his promotion
became due on  05.03.1993.   Pending such representation, vide
office order dated 20.03.1996, the respondent was transferred to
Diary/Dispatch Section.   He was asked to look after the work of
Diary/Dispatch   Section.     However,   his   designation   came   to   be
continued   as   Electrician.     That   vide   representation   dated
15.11.1999 the respondent requested the Secretary of the appellant
6
Institute for promoting him to the post of Section Officer. It was the
case   of   behalf   of   the   respondent   that   he   was   appointed   on
05.03.1974 and that he was given the higher pay scale from time to
time and that he was also given the pay scale of Assistant and
therefore he is entitled to promotion to the next promotional post
i.e.   Section   Officer   with   retrospective   effect   from   05.03.1993.
Thereafter, a number of representations were made.  Thereafter, in
the   year   2004,   the   respondent   was   transferred   from   the
Diary/Dispatch Section (Head Office) to HRD (Noida).  In the order
dated   28.04.2004   also,   the   designation   of   the   respondent   was
mentioned as Electrician.  The prayer of the respondent to promote
him to the post of Section Officer under the TBPS came to be
rejected on the ground that as per the settlement dated 10.01.1984
and, more particularly, Clause 1(v) read with the decision of the
President dated 25.02.1984, the respondent shall not be entitled to
the promotion being an Electrician and shall only be entitled to the
next grade which has been given to him.   That vide office order
dated 14.02.2005, the respondent was transferred from Noida Office
(Electrician) to Kanpur DCO (Electrician).   The said transfer was
7
opposed by the respondent.  That thereafter the respondent filed a
Writ Petition (C) No. 8681 of 2005 before the High Court of Delhi,
inter alia, praying to grant him the higher scale and designation of
Section Officer and from Section Officer to the post of an Executive
Officer.  He also prayed to quash and set aside the transfer orders
dated 28.04.2004 and 14.02.2005.   That, during pendency of the
said   petition,   the   respondent   retired   on   attaining   the   age   of
superannuation.       That   by   the   judgment   and   order   dated
02.04.2018, the learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed
the aforesaid writ petition.  That thereafter the respondent preferred
the Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High
Court   and   by   the   impugned   judgment   and   order,   the   Division
Bench of the High Court has allowed the said appeal and has
quashed   and   set   aside   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   and   has   directed   the
appellant to grant the respondent the pay scale and designation of
Section Officer with effect from 05.03.1993 and the pay scale and
designation   of   an   Executive  Officer  with  effect  from   05.03.2002
8
under the TBPS along with the arrears of salary and emoluments,
as revised for those scales from time to time.
2.1 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and  order  passed  by the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court, the Institute­ICAI has preferred the present appeal.
3. Learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   has
vehemently submitted that the High Court has materially erred in
directing the appellant to promote the respondent to the post of
Section Officer and designation of an Executive Officer under the
TBPS.  It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that the High Court has failed to appreciate
and consider the fact that the respondent being Electrician was not
entitled   to   the   time­bound   promotion   in   view   of   the
settlement/agreement   dated   01.10.1984   and,   more   particularly,
Clause 1(v) and the decision of the President dated 25.02.1984.
3.1 Learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant   has   further
submitted that in fact in the promotional channel there was no
promotion from the post of Electrician to that of the Section Officer
and therefore there was no question of granting promotion to the
9
respondent to the post of Section Officer under the TBPS.   It is
further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant that the High Court has materially erred in directing the
appellant to promote the respondent to the post of Section Officer
under   the   TBPS   relying   and/or   considering   the   subsequent
settlements   dated   02.08.1988   and   15.06.1991.     It   is   further
submitted   by   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
appellant that the High Court has materially erred in observing that
in the subsequent settlements dated 02.08.1988 and 15.06.1991
there was no specific exclusion, as provided in the earlier settlement
dated 10.01.1984.   It is submitted that in the settlement dated
02.8.1988   it   has   been   specifically   provided   that   the   earlier
settlement dated 10.01.1984 shall be continued and/or applicable.
It is submitted that, in fact, by the subsequent settlement dated
02.08.1988, only the time gap was reduced.   It is submitted that
therefore the case of the respondent was specifically covered by the
earlier settlement dated 10.01.1984 and the subsequent decision of
the President dated 25.02.1984 which was in terms of Clause 1(v) of
the said settlement.
10
3.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that, as such, the respondent was entitled to
only   the   next   higher   scale   which   was/were   being   paid   to   the
respondent from time to time.
3.3 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf   of   the   appellant   that   merely   because   for   some   time   the
respondent was directed to look after the work in Diary/Dispatch
Section   as   a   Section   Officer,   it   cannot   be   said   that   he   was
appointed/promoted as Section Officer.   It is submitted that all
throughout he was continued to be an Electrician and therefore,
being   an   Electrician,   he   was   not   entitled   to   the   time­bound
promotion.
3.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that the High Court has materially erred in
not appreciating the fact that there was a clear distinction with
regard to the policies applicable to the employees falling in Class­III
and Class­IV categories and other employees such as Jamadars,
Electricians, Drivers etc. who fall under a special category.   It is
further  submitted  that   the  employees  of  the  aforesaid category,
11
including the Electricians, were squarely excluded from the terms of
the agreement dated 10.01.1984.  It is submitted that therefore the
Division Bench of the High Court has materially erred in allowing
the   petition   and   in   quashing   and   setting   aside  a  well­reasoned
judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge.
4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. Tamali Wad,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.
4.1 It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Division Bench of the High Court has not committed any error in
directing the appellant to grant promotion to the respondent under
the TBPS.
4.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent that, as such, the order of the President
dated 25.02.1984 was not communicated to the respondent and
therefore the same was not binding to the respondent. 
4.3 It   is   further   submitted   that,   even   otherwise,   as   rightly
observed   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court,   in   the
subsequent settlements dated 02.08.1988 and 15.06.1991, there
12
was no specific exclusion with respect to the post of Electrician,
from granting the time bound promotions. 
4.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent that, even subsequently, the respondent
was appointed as a Section Officer in the Diary/Dispatch Section
and therefore it cannot be said that the respondent continued to
serve as an Electrician.  It is submitted that even the respondent
was   also   given   the   pay   scale   of   Assistant   with   effect   from
05.03.1996 and therefore was entitled to promotion to the next post
of Section Officer under the TBPS.
4.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf   of   the   respondent   that   if   the   submission/contention   on
behalf   of   the   appellant   is   accepted,   in   that   case,   there   will   be
stagnation   and   the   respondent   would   never   get   any   chance   of
promotion under the TBPS, which shall be against the policy of
granting time bound promotion.
4.6 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal.
5. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length.
13
6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the dispute is with
respect to the promotion under the TBPS.  An employee is entitled
to   the   promotion   under   the   TBPS   only   in   accordance   with   the
scheme and the promotion to the next higher post is provided under
the TBPS.  It is to be noted that, in the present case, the terms and
conditions of the service of the employees of the appellant­ICAI were
governed by the settlements/agreements arrived at from time to
time   between   ICAI   and   its   Employees’   Association.       The   first
settlement/agreement was arrived at on 10.01.1984 which, inter
alia, provided for Time­bound promotions/change to the next grade
for its Class III and Class IV employees.  It provided that if any LDC
had already completed five years in the pay­scale of Rs.260­400 he
is to be placed in the pay­scale of UDC­Steno Typist i.e. Rs.330­560
and so on.   Under Clause 1(v) of the said settlement/agreement, it
was specifically provided that in respect of cases not falling under
the two broad categories i.e. Clause III and Class IV, the decision
was to be taken by the President of ICAI.   This included the cases
of   Jamadar,   Driver   and   Electrician.       The   respondent   was   an
Electrician and therefore he was governed under Clause 1(v) of the
14
settlement   dated   10.01.1984.     In   terms   of   Clause   1(v)   of   the
settlement/agreement   dated   10.10.1984   which   was   arrived   at
between ICAI and its Employees’ Association, the President of ICAI
took   a   decision   on   25.02.1984,   by   which   it   was   provided   that
Jamadars, Drivers, Electricians etc., as mentioned in Clause 1(v) of
the memorandum of settlement dated 10.01.1984, shall only be
entitled to get the next grade.   Accordingly, the respondent herein
was put in the pay scale of Rs.330­560 and his basic pay was fixed
at   Rs.370/­   with   retrospective   effect   from   01.01.1984.     At   this
stage,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the   said   fixation   was   in
accordance with the decision taken by the President of ICAI dated
25.02.1984.  That, thereafter the respondent was granted the next
higher pay­scale of the grade of Assistant i.e. Rs.425­800.   That,
thereafter   the   next   settlement   between   ICAI   and   its   Employees’
Association was arrived at on 02.08.1988 and thereafter in the year
1991.     On a bare reading of the subsequent settlements dated
02.08.1988 and 15.06.1991 it appears that only the time gap for
promotion under the TBPS came to be reduced.  According to the
respondent, there was no such clarification/clause like Clause 1(v)
15
of the settlement/agreement dated 10.01.1984 excluding the post of
Jamadar,   Electrician   etc.   in   the   subsequent   settlements   dated
02.08.1988   and   15.06.1991   and   therefore   he   was   entitled   to
promotion to the post of Assistant and thereafter to the post of
Section Officer.   The High Court in paragraph 17 has accepted the
same   and   has   observed   and   held   that   in   the   subsequent
settlements dated 02.08.1988 and 15.06.1991 it was not clarified
that such of those who had earlier been covered under Clause 1(v)
of the settlement dated 10.01.1984 and who had been granted the
scale of an Assistant, would not be entitled to any further timebound promotion under the settlement dated 02.08.1988, or for
that   matter,   of   the   further   settlement   dated   15.06.1991   and
therefore in the absence of any exclusion of such of those who had
been granted the pay­scale of an Assistant, would be entitled to the
next   higher   pay­scale   of   the   Section   Officer   on   completion   of
requisite years of service in terms of settlements dated 02.08.1988
and   15.06.1991.     However,   the   High   Court   has   not   properly
considered the subsequent settlement dated 02.08.1988.  The High
Court has absolutely mis­read and mis­interpreted the settlement
16
dated 02.08.1988 when it has come to the conclusion, so stated in
paragraph 17 of the impugned judgment and order, that in the
subsequent   settlement   dated   02.08.1988   there   is   no   specific
exclusion which was   there under the special Clause 1(v) of the
settlement dated 10.01.1984.   In the memorandum of settlement
dated 02.08.1988, the only change was with respect to the time gap
for promotion under the TBPS as per the earlier settlement dated
10.01.1984 and the period for getting the promotion under the
TBPS came to be reduced.  That was the only change/modification.
In the memorandum of settlement dated 02.08.1988 it has been
specifically provided and so stated that except for and subject to the
changes made by the said settlement, namely, reduction of time
period for getting the promotion under the TBPS, all other terms
and   conditions   relating   to   the   TBPS,   as   contained   in   the
settlement/agreement dated 10.01.1984, shall remain in force and
be   applicable   during   the   period   of   the   said   agreement.     By   a
subsequent settlement dated 15.06.1991 the period was further
reduced.       Therefore,   whatever   was   stated/provided   in   the
settlement/agreement dated 10.01.1984, more particularly, Clause
17
1(v) and the subsequent decision of the President dated 25.02.1984
continued to be in operation.  Therefore, those employees like the
respondent herein serving as Electricians etc. were not entitled to
any   promotion   under   the   TBPS,   as   contained   in   the
settlement/agreement dated 10.01.1984 and/or such subsequent
memorandum   of   settlements   dated   02.08.1988   and   15.06.1991.
Being an Electrician, the respondent was already given the payscale of an Assistant as per the decision of the President dated
25.02.1984, which was as per Clause 1(v) of the memorandum of
settlement   dated   10.01.1984.     Therefore,   the   High   Court   has
committed   a   grave   error   in   observing   and   holding   that   the
respondent shall be entitled to promotion under the TBPS as per
the memorandum of settlements dated 02.08.1988 and 15.06.1991.
At the cost of repetition, it is to be noted that the employees of ICAI
were governed by the memorandum of settlement dated 10.1.1984
so   far   as   the   time­bound   promotion   is   concerned   and   the
subsequent settlements dated 02.08.1988 and 15.06.1991 were in
continuation of the same.   No new rights of promotion under the
18
TBPS were conferred under the memorandum of settlements dated
02.08.1988 and 15.06.1991. 
7. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the respondent that
subsequently even the respondent was working as a Section Officer
and, therefore, shall be entitled to promotion under the TBPS to the
post of Section Officer is concerned, it is required to be noted that
as such there was no specific order of promotion promoting the
respondent   to   the   post   of   Section   Officer.   For   some   time,   the
respondent was directed to look after the work of Diary/Dispatch
Section.       However,   his   designation   came   to   be   continued   as
Electrician.     Merely   because   an   employee   is   given   a   temporary
charge to do a particular work of a particular post, it cannot be said
that in fact he has been promoted to the said post.  At this stage, it
is required to be noted that subsequently when the respondent was
transferred   in   the   year   2005   from   Noida   Office   (Electrician)   to
Kanpur DCO (Electrician), the respondent opposed the said transfer
contending, inter alia, that there is no post of an Electrician at
Kanpur and therefore he should be continued at Noida (Electrician).
Therefore, even on 04.03.2005, the respondent himself claimed to
19
be the Electrician.  Therefore, now it is not open to the respondent
that he was already promoted to the post of Section Officer in the
year 1996.   Therefore also, the High Court has committed a grave
error in directing the appellant to promote the respondent to the
post of Section Officer under the TBPS.  However, at the same time,
the   respondent   shall   be   entitled   to   the   same   salary   of   Section
Officer for the period during which he worked as a Section Officer
either on officiating basis and/or he was given the charge, if not
paid so far.
8. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the respondent that
if the respondent is not promoted to the post of Section Officer
under the TBPS, in that case, the object and purpose of providing
the promotion under the TBPS, namely, to remove the stagnation at
the work place shall be frustrated is concerned, it is true that the
TBPS   is   intended   to   remove   the   stagnation   at   the   work   place.
However, at the same time, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the
promotion shall be governed as per the promotion scheme only. At
no   point   of   time,   Clause   1(v)   of   the   main   settlement   dated
10.01.1984 and the decision of the President dated 25.02.1984 not
20
providing any promotion under the TBPS so far as Electrician etc.
are concerned, has been challenged.     It is not that there is a
complete stagnation so far as the respondent is concerned.   He has
been   granted   the   next   higher   grade   as   per   the   decision   of   the
President dated 25.02.1984 which was as per Clause 1(v) of the
main settlement dated 10.01.1984.  It is to be noted that, being an
employee   and   the   member   of   the   Employees’   Association,   the
settlement arrived at between the management and its Employees’
Association was binding on the respondent.
9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are
of the firm opinion that the impugned judgment and order passed
by Division Bench of the High Court directing the appellant to
promote the respondent to the post of Assistant and thereafter to
the post of Section Officer under the TBPS as per the memorandum
of   settlements   dated   02.08.1988   and   15.06.1991   cannot   be
sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
Accordingly,   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   is   quashed   and   set   aside.
However, it is observed and directed that the respondent shall be
21
entitled to the same salary which was being paid to the Section
Officers for the period during which he worked as a Section Officer
either on officiating basis and/or he was given the charge and the
appellant is directed to pay the same, if not paid so far.   The appeal
is allowed accordingly.  No costs.
………………………..J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
…………………………..J.
(M. R. SHAH)
New Delhi;
January 24, 2020.

Whether the presence of a purchaser of immovable property before the authority under the Registration Act, 1908 at the time of effecting registration of a deed of conveyance is necessary ?. - No- Apex court held that There is evidence to the effect that the second defendant (Manchegowda) had not come to the office of the Sub­Registrar at the time of execution of the sale deed. But as per law as it stood at the material point of time, there was no necessity of presence of purchaser at the Registration Office during the registration of sale deed. The deed was executed by Madegowda and that aspect has not been disputed. The deed in question does not fall within Sections 31, 88 and 89 of the Registration Act. Section 32 of the said Act does not require presence of both parties to a deed of sale when the same is presented for registration.

Whether the  presence of a purchaser of immovable property before the authority under the Registration Act, 1908 at the time of effecting registration of a deed of conveyance is necessary ?. - No-
Apex court held that 
There is evidence to the effect that the second defendant (Manchegowda) had not come to the office of the Sub­Registrar at the time of execution of the sale deed.  
But as per law as it stood at the material point of time, there was no necessity of presence of purchaser at the Registration Office during the registration of sale deed. The deed was executed by Madegowda and that aspect has not been disputed. 
The deed in question does not fall within Sections 31, 88 and 89 of the Registration Act. Section 32 of the said Act does not require presence of both parties to a deed of sale when the same is presented for registration.   


1
                                                              (Non­ Reportable)
     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3975 OF 2010
H.P.Puttaswamy   ..……. Appellant
     Versus
       Thimmamma & Ors.                                 ……,..Respondents
        J U D G M E N T
ANIRUDDHA BOSE,J.
               The main dispute involved in this appeal concerns the
question of necessity of presence of a purchaser of immovable
property before the authority under the Registration Act, 1908 at
the time of effecting registration of a deed of conveyance. In the
suit,   out   of   which   this   appeal   arises,   the   plaintiff   claimed
declaration of himself as the lawful owner in possession of the
suit property. The plaintiff is the appellant before us. This suit
was instituted on 31st March 1989 and was registered as Original
Suit No.132 of 1989 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division)
Malavalli.     The   plaintiff   also   claimed   permanent   injunction
against the defendants restraining them from interfering with his
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peaceful possession of the suit property and enjoyment thereof.
The property in question comprises of approximately 4500 square
ft. of land in a village by the name of Hittanahalli Koppalu in
Malavallu   Taluk   in   the   State   of   Karnataka.   Originally,   this
property bore site No.21 which was subsequently numbered 23.
The plaintiff’s case before the Trial court was that this property
was allotted to one Gende Veeregowdana Nathegowda under a
village shifting scheme.  In the suit, the plaintiff contended that
he had come in possession of the subject property initially as a
tenant and subsequently as the purchaser thereof.  He has run a
case before the Trial Court that he has been in possession of the
suit property for about twenty years prior to filing of the suit.
Respondent Nos. 7 to 9 in this appeal derived their interest in the
property through one Madegowda (since deceased), son of the
original allottee Gende Veeregowdana Nathegowda. In the suit,
these three respondents were defendant Nos.1(a), 1(b) and 1(c).
Their   predecessor,   Madegowda   was   originally   impleaded   as
defendant   No.1.   The   Respondent   Nos.   1   to   6   are   legal
representatives   of   one   Manchegowda   (since   deceased),   who
contested the claim of ownership of the plaintiff over the subjectproperty.   Said   Manchegowda   was   impleaded   as   the   second
3
defendant in the suit. On his demise, respondent Nos.1 to 6 were
substituted as defendant Nos.2(a) to 2(f).   They have disputed
plaintiff’s possession of the suit property.  They claim to be actual
owners of the property through their predecessor.
2. There   have   been   litigations   in   the   past   over   the   same
property among the same set of parties or their predecessors.
Madegowda had instituted a suit for declaration and permanent
injunction against Manchegowda.  The earlier suit registered as
O.S. No.675 of 1971, was instituted in the Court of Munsiff at
Mandya in the year 1971 (subsequently renumbered as O.S. No.
61/1974) in  the  Court  of  Munsiff, Malavalli. Madegowda  had
impleaded the plaintiff and Manchegowda as defendants in the
said suit. Complaint of Madegowda in that suit was disturbance
of his possession. After contest at different levels of the judicial
hierarchy,  that   suit   was   ultimately   dismissed   on   23rd  March,
1989 at the instance of the plaintiff Madegowda only. The order
of dismissal was made on as it appears from paragraph 4 of the
plaint of the suit from which the present proceeding originates
records:­
“For objection if any objection filed.  Heard Sri
N.G.,   C.S.S.   K.S.S.  The   defts.   2  right   as  a
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tenant shall not be affected by disposes of the
suit as per memo filed by plff.
Suit is dismissed without cost.”
(quoted verbatim from the paper book)
3. In the present proceeding, basis of the plaintiff’s claim was
an agreement for sale executed on 10th April, 1981 between the
plaintiff and Madegowda in respect of the same property, which
was followed by execution of a deed of sale on 28th May 1981. We
must point out here that the date of execution of sale deed in
favour of the plaintiff has been referred to in the Trial Court
judgment in some places as 21st May 1981. But that factor does
not have any major impact on the outcome of the case as both
these dates are subsequent to the date on which sale is claimed
to have been executed by Madegowda (since deceased) in favour
of Manchegowda (since deceased). That is the source of dispute in
the subject suit. We shall, however, treat 28th May 1981 as the
date of registration of the said deed as in course of submission,
that was the date referred to by the learned counsel for the
appellant. The subject suit was contested by the two sets of
defendants, being legal representatives of said Madegowda (the
first  set)    and  the   legal  representatives  of  Manchegowda  (the
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second set). First set of defendants disputed genuineness of the
sale   deed   of   28th  May   1981   which   formed   foundation   of   the
plaintiff’s claim.  Plea was taken by the second set of defendants
that the original owner, on 21st April, 1981, had executed a deed
of sale in favour of Manchegowda (since deceased). This set of
defendants have also disputed title of Madegowda over the suit
property.  It has been contended on their behalf that the Village
Panchayat had cancelled the allotment to Gende Veeregowdana
Nathegowda and had resolved to issue grant certificate in respect
of   the   same   site   on   15th  November,   1963   in   favour   of
Manchegowda and the latter was put in possession thereof. 
4. This stand of the second set of defendants was not accepted
by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.  The Trial Court
sustained the plaintiff’s case primarily on the ground that the
sale deed through which legal representatives of Manchegowda
staked their claim over the property was not genuine. The Trial
Court found that the original defendant No.2 i.e. Manchegowda,
as a purchaser was not present at the time of execution of the
sale   deed   before   the   Sub­Registrar   and   on   that   count   the
aforesaid finding was rendered.  Otherwise, the execution of the
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deed in favour of Manchegowda, as claimed, was prior in point of
time (on 21st April 1981). The Trial Court proceeded on the basis
that the sale deed through which the plaintiff claimed to be the
owner of the property was valid. We find from the judgment of the
Trial Court that the plaintiff had proved the sale deed in course of
the trial. The claim of cancellation of the allotment of the suit
property in favour of Madegowda’s predecessor and subsequent
allotment in favour of Manchegowda was not believed by Trial
Court   and   the   First   Appellate   Court.   The   second   set   of
defendants were unsuccessful before the First Appellate Court.
The First Appellate Court on the whole accepted the reasoning of
the Trial Court. In the appeal filed by the legal representatives of
Manchegowda under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, the High Court found the sale deed dated 21st April, 1981
to be valid relying on Sections 32, 34 and 36 of the Registration
Act, 1908 read with Rule 41 and 71, Karnataka Registration Rule
1965. The High Court observed and held:­
“14.A combined reading of the above sections
of   the   Registration   Act   and   the   Rules
mentioned   above   makes   it   clear   that   the
presence   of   the   purchaser   is   not   required
when   the   document   is   presented   for
registration   before   the   Sub­Registrar.   The
7
Trial   Court   has   failed   to   take   note   of   the
aforesaid provision of law of the Registration
Act   and   has   erred   in   holding   that   merely
because the defendant was not present the
sale deed in his favour cannot be taken as
valid in law. The said conclusion reached is
contrary to the above mentioned provisions of
the Registration Act and the Rules. As such,
the said finding cannot be sustained in law.
15.Once   the   sale   deed   in   favour   of   the
defendant is held to be valid in law and the
said sale deed Ex.D­1 being executed earlier
in point of time by the vendor Manchegowda,
the question of the said vendor Manchegowda
retaining any interest in the suit property will
not  arise and, as such, he could not  have
once again sold the very same property on a
later   date   i.e.   28.5.1981   in   favour   of   the
plaintiff. Therefore, the substantial question
of law raised is answered in the negative.”
5. On the question of possession of the suit property asserted
by the second set of defendants, however, the High Court held:­
“Coming to the possession aspect of the case,
though the learned counsel for the appellants
referred to the evidence of D.W.4 to submit
that the plaintiff was thrown out of the suit
property   by   the   police   and   the   panchayat
members, yet the evidence of the said witness
will have to be assessed in the light of the
other   evidence   on   record   and   more
particularly,   the   evidence   of   the   plaintiff
himself.   The   plaintiff,   in   the   course   of   his
evidence, has denied all the suggestions put
to him and has reiterated that he has been in
possession of the suit property from a very
long   time   and   right   from   the   agreement   of
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sale. Considering the overall evidence placed
on record, the trial court has held that the
possession has been with as plaintiff and the
lower appellate court also concurred with the
trial court. As such, the said finding, being a
concurrent finding of fact of the courts below
and also not appearing to be either a perverse
finding of a finding based on no evidence, in
so far as the conclusion reached by the trial
court   as   regards   the   plaintiff   being   in
possession of the suit property is concerned,
the said finding requires no interference.”
6. So   far   as   the   provisions   of   Registration   Act,   1908   is
concerned, the law requires presentation of the document to be
registered at the proper registration office by following categories
of persons:­
“32. Persons to present documents for
registration.—Except   in   the   cases
mentioned in [Sections 31, 88 and 89],
every   document   to   be   registered   under
this   Act,   whether   such   registration   be
compulsory   or   optional,   shall   be
presented   at   the   proper   registration
office,­
(a) by some person executing or claiming
under the same, or, in the case of a copy
of a decree or order, claiming under the
decree or order, or
(b) by the representative or assign of such
a person, or
(c)   by   the   agent   of   such   a   person,
representative or assign, duly authorised
by   power­of­attorney   executed   and
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authenticated   in   manner   hereinafter
mentioned.”
7. The plaintiff has not disputed that the vendor or seller i.e.
Madegowda had executed the document (first sale deed) and we
do not find any doubt expressed over his presence before the
Registering Authority. No case has been made out either that
the deed of conveyance carried any collateral obligation on the
part of the purchaser, in this case being Manchegowda (since
deceased). The plaintiff has not made out a case of acquiring
title under the principle of part performance as incorporated in
Section 53 (A) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. No pleading
to that effect in the plaint has been made out. 
8. We find from the judgment of the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court that the respective parties had led evidence of
execution and subsequent registration of the deeds but the first
two courts did not reject the contention of the second set of
defendants that there was no execution by Madegowda (since
deceased) of the deed of sale to Manchegowda (since deceased).
The case has been decided in favour of the plaintiff on the
ground   that   the   buyer   was   not   present   at   the   time   of
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registration of sale deed. There is evidence to the effect that the
second defendant (Manchegowda) had not come to the office of
the Sub­Registrar at the time of execution of the sale deed.  But
as per law as it stood at the material point of time, there was no
necessity of presence of purchaser at the Registration Office
during the registration of sale deed. The deed was executed by
Madegowda and that aspect has not been disputed. The deed in
question does not fall within Sections 31, 88 and 89 of the
Registration Act. Section 32 of the said Act does not require
presence of both parties to a deed of sale when the same is
presented for registration.   In such circumstances, we do not
find any reason to interfere with the judgment of the High
Court. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.
    …………………………….J.
     (Deepak Gupta)
…………………………….J.
              (Aniruddha Bose)
New Delhi,
Dated:   24th January, 2020.

Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC”) -the ratio concerning the mandatory nature of the timeline prescribed for filing of written statement and the lack of discretion with Courts to condone any delay is applicable only to commercial disputes, but not to non commerical disputes - unamended discretion holds in the courts. At the outset, it must be noted that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 through Section 16 has amended the CPC in its application to commercial disputes to provide as follows: “16. Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in its application to commercial disputes.—(1) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule. (2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a specified value. (3) Where any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by the State Government is in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this Act shall prevail.” Hence, it is clear that post coming into force of the aforesaid Act, there are two regimes of civil procedure. Whereas commercial disputes [as defined under Section 2(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015] are governed by the CPC as amended by Section 16 of the said Act; all other non­commercial disputes fall within the ambit of the unamended (or original) provisions of CPC. The judgment of Oku Tech (supra) relied upon the learned Single Judge is no doubt good law, as recently upheld by this Court in SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. v. KS Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.,3 but its ratio concerning the mandatory nature of the timeline prescribed for filing of written statement and the lack of discretion with Courts to condone any delay is applicable only to commercial disputes, as the judgment was undoubtedly rendered in the context of a commercial dispute qua the amended Order VIII Rule 1 CPC. As regard the timeline for filing of written statement in a noncommercial dispute, the observations of this Court in a catena of decisions, most recently in Atcom Technologies Ltd. v. Y.A. Chunawala and Co.,4 holds the field. Unamended Order VIII Rule I, CPC continues to be directory and does not do away with the inherent discretion of Courts to condone certain delays.

Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC”)  -the ratio concerning the mandatory nature of the timeline prescribed for filing   of   written   statement   and   the   lack  of  discretion   with   Courts   to condone   any   delay   is   applicable  only   to   commercial   disputes,   but not to non commerical disputes - unamended discretion holds in the courts.

 At the outset, it must be noted that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
through Section 16 has amended the CPC in its application to commercial
disputes to provide as follows:
“16.  Amendments  to  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  in  its
application   to   commercial   disputes.—(1)   The   provisions   of  the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall, in their application to
any suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value,
stand amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule.
(2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow the
provisions   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   (5   of   1908),   as
amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial
dispute of a specified value.
(3) Where any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional High Court or
any amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by the State
Government is in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this Act shall prevail.”
 Hence, it is clear that post coming into force of the aforesaid Act, there are two regimes of civil procedure. Whereas commercial disputes [as defined   under   Section   2(c)   of   the   Commercial   Courts   Act,   2015]   are governed by the CPC as amended by Section 16 of the said Act; all other
non­commercial   disputes   fall   within   the   ambit   of   the   unamended   (or original) provisions of CPC. 

The judgment of  Oku  Tech  (supra)  relied upon the learned Single Judge is no doubt good law, as recently upheld by this Court in  SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. v. KS Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.,3 but its ratio concerning the mandatory nature of the timeline prescribed for filing   of   written   statement   and   the   lack   of   discretion   with   Courts   to condone   any   delay   is   applicable  only   to   commercial   disputes,   as   the judgment   was   undoubtedly   rendered   in   the   context  of   a   commercial dispute qua the amended Order VIII Rule 1 CPC.
As   regard   the   timeline   for   filing   of   written   statement   in   a   noncommercial dispute, the observations of this Court in a catena of decisions, most recently in Atcom Technologies Ltd. v. Y.A. Chunawala and Co.,4 holds   the   field.  
Unamended   Order   VIII   Rule   I,   CPC   continues   to   be directory and does not do away with the inherent discretion of Courts to condone certain delays. 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.433  OF 2020
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 6217 of 2019]
Desh Raj ..... Appellants(s)
                             VERSUS
Balkishan (D) Through Proposed LR Ms. Rohini  .....Respondents(s)
JUDGMENT
Leave granted.
2. This Civil Appeal is directed against order dated 26.11.2018 passed
by the Delhi High Court whereby appellant’s revision petition against the
order of the Civil Court which closed his right to file written statement
under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
“CPC”)   and   struck­off   his   defence   owing   to   repeated   delays   and   nonadherence of prescribed deadlines, has been dismissed.
Page | 1
FACTS
3. The appellant and the respondent are brothers and own one floor
each of ancestral property bearing No. 142 in Devli Village, Delhi. The
ground floor was possessed and owned by the respondent, whereas the
first floor was in the name of the appellant.
4. It   has   been   claimed   that   in   February   2017,   the   respondent
approached   the   appellant   offering   to   purchase   the   first   floor   of   the
ancestral property. Subsequently, an agreement to sell was entered into
between the parties on 17.03.2017 for total consideration of Rs 7.5 lakhs,
of which an amount of Rs 1 lakh was paid as earnest money to  the
appellant. This agreement was subsequently not honoured and a legal
notice was served upon the appellant by the respondent on 13.04.2017,
calling upon  him to   accept  consideration   and  perform  his  part  of  the
contract.
5. Claiming that the appellant was attempting to sell the suit property
to third parties, the respondent later approached the Civil Court praying
for   a   decree   of   specific   performance   of   the   agreement   to   sell   dated
17.03.2017   by   directing   the   appellant   to   receive   the   balance   sale
consideration   and   execute/register   the   sale   deed   in   favour   of   the
respondent. Additionally, the respondent sought to permanently injunct
the appellant from alienating the property in favour of any third party.
Page | 2
Alternatively, recovery of damages of Rs 2 lakhs with pendent lite and
future interest @ 18% per annum was sought by the respondent.
6. The appellant was served on 01.05.2017, and he appeared through
counsel on 15.05.2017 wherein the Civil Court granted the appellant 30
days to file his written statement. On 17.07.2017, noting that no written
statement had been filed till then, the Court granted the appellant a final
opportunity of two weeks to file his written statement. On 18.09.2017, the
Court observed that despite the last opportunity having been accorded
more   than   two   months   ago,   no   written   statement   had   been   filed.
Nevertheless,   the   Court   granted   another   final   opportunity,   subject   to
payment of Rs 3,000 costs and the matter was posted for 11.10.2017. On
this date, appellant sought multiple pass overs but his Counsel did not
appear before the Court. After noticing that despite several opportunities
(including one beyond the maximum period of 90 days) the appellant had
failed to file any written statement or deposit costs and that the matter
could   not   be   adjourned   repeatedly,   the   Civil   Court   thus   closed   the
appellant’s   opportunity   of   filing   written   statement   and   struck   off   his
defence. Even on the next hearing on 03.11.2017, the appellant’s Counsel
did not appear or supply a copy of the written statement to the respondent,
as noted in the Trial Court’s daily order.
Page | 3
7. The aggrieved appellant approached the High Court in revision, which
noted how he had been granted repeated opportunities and yet the written
statement was not filed within 120 days of notice. Relying upon the order
of its co­ordinate bench in Oku Tech Pvt Ltd v. Sangeet Agarwal and
Others1 wherein it was held that there was no discretion with courts to
extend the time for filing the written statement beyond 120 days after
service   of   summons,   the   Delhi   High   Court   summarily   dismissed   the
petition.
CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES
8. The appellant’s primary contention is that the reliance on Oku Tech
(supra) was erroneous as it was rendered in light of Order VIII Rule 1 of
CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 which in turn was
applicable   to   commercial   disputes   only.   The   present   matter   was
highlighted   as   being   non­commercial,   and   it   was   urged   that   the   unamended   Order   VIII   Rule   1   of   CPC   would   be   applicable,   wherein   no
consequences for not complying with the shorter timeline of 90 days has
been provided. This provision, it was contended, was merely procedural
and concomitantly directory as held by this Court in various decisions
including Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India2
.
1 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6601.
2 (2005) 6 SCC 344.
Page | 4
9. Given this, the appellant put forth his contention that the deadline of
90 days could be relaxed keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a
case; and argued that he himself had personally appeared on all dates of
hearing and the lapse was on the part of his Counsel, due to which written
statement could not be filed. The appellant claims that severe prejudice
would be caused to him if the delay is not condoned for he would be left
defenceless in the civil suit. He accordingly seeks that this Court invoke its
inherent discretion under Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC and grant one final
opportunity to file his written statement.
10. This was opposed on behalf of the respondent who asserted that
multiple chances had already been granted to the appellant by the Civil
Court, including opportunities beyond the maximum statutory period of 90
days as provided for filing of written statement under Order VIII Rule I of
CPC.   It   was   argued   that   continued   failure   to   adhere   to   the   multiple
deadlines set by the Civil Court and violation of Court directions, was
evidence   of   gross   negligence   on   part   of   the   appellant   at   best,   and   a
deliberate delaying tactic and abuse of the process of law at the worst.
ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION
11. At the outset, it must be noted that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
through Section 16 has amended the CPC in its application to commercial
disputes to provide as follows:
Page | 5
“16.  Amendments  to  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  in  its
application   to   commercial   disputes.—(1)   The   provisions   of  the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall, in their application to
any suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value,
stand amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule.
(2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow the
provisions   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   (5   of   1908),   as
amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial
dispute of a specified value.
(3) Where any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional High Court or
any amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by the State
Government is in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this Act shall prevail.”
12. Hence, it is clear that post coming into force of the aforesaid Act,
there are two regimes of civil procedure. Whereas commercial disputes [as
defined   under   Section   2(c)   of   the   Commercial   Courts   Act,   2015]   are
governed by the CPC as amended by Section 16 of the said Act; all other
non­commercial   disputes   fall   within   the   ambit   of   the   unamended   (or
original) provisions of CPC. 
13. The judgment of  Oku  Tech  (supra)  relied upon the learned Single
Judge is no doubt good law, as recently upheld by this Court in  SCG
Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. v. KS Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.,3
but its ratio concerning the mandatory nature of the timeline prescribed for
filing   of   written   statement   and   the   lack   of   discretion   with   Courts   to
condone   any   delay   is   applicable  only   to   commercial   disputes,   as   the
3 AIR 2019 SC 2691.
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judgment   was   undoubtedly   rendered   in   the   context   of   a   commercial
dispute qua the amended Order VIII Rule 1 CPC.
14. As   regard   the   timeline   for   filing   of   written   statement   in   a   noncommercial dispute, the observations of this Court in a catena of decisions,
most recently in Atcom Technologies Ltd. v. Y.A. Chunawala and Co.,4
holds   the   field.   Unamended   Order   VIII   Rule   I,   CPC   continues   to   be
directory and does not do away with the inherent discretion of Courts to
condone certain delays. 
15. Let us, therefore, consider whether the appellant has made out a case
of exercising such discretionary jurisdiction? The present civil suit had
been filed by the respondent for a decree of specific performance of an
agreement to sell one floor of an ancestral property located in Devli Village,
Delhi   and   permanent   injunction   against   alienation   of   the   same   by
petitioner to third parties. Counsel for respondent has not contested the
non­commercial nature of the dispute, and even independently we are
satisfied that the dispute does not fall within the parameters specified
under Section 2(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and in particular
sub­clause (vii), as the immovable property here is not of a nature which is
“used exclusively in trade or commerce”. Hence, the appellant is correct in
contending that the High Court overlooked the nature of the dispute and
4 (2018) 6 SCC 639.
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mistakenly applied the ratio of a case rendered in light of a modified
version of the Code of Civil Procedure, which would only be applicable to
commercial disputes.
16. However, it would be gainsaid that although the unamended Order
VIII Rule 1 of CPC is directory, it cannot be interpreted to bestow a free
hand to on any litigant or lawyer to file written statement at their own
sweet­will   and/or   to   prolong   the   lis.   The   legislative   objective   behind
prescription of timelines under the CPC must be given due weightage so
that the disputes are resolved in a time­bound manner. Inherent discretion
of Courts, like the ability to condone delays under Order VIII Rule 1 is a
fairly defined concept and its contours have been shaped through judicial
decisions over the ages. Illustratively, extreme hardship or delays occurring
due to factors beyond control of parties despite proactive diligence, may be
just and equitable instances for condonation of delay. 
17. However,   it   is   clear   from   the   facts   on   record   that   numerous
opportunities   had   been   accorded   to   the   appellant.   He   was   served   on
01.05.2017 and entered appearance through counsel on 15.05.2017. As
per Order VIII Rule I of CPC, the appellant ideally ought to have filed his
written statement by 31.05.2017; and at the very latest by 30.07.2017. In
addition to two separate deadlines for filing of the written statement within
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the 90­day timeframe prescribed by the ‘original’ Order VIII Rule 1, the
Civil Court even post expiry of the 90­day period again gave one last and
final opportunity on 18.09.2017 subject to payment of costs of Rs 3,000.
None of these deadlines were complied with. Even on 11.10.2017, when the
Court finally closed the appellant’s ability to file written statement and
struck­off his defence from the record, no attempt was made to comply
with the process of law.
18. It   was   only   on   02.11.2017,   after   a   delay   of   95   days   post   the
maximum extendable period under the Proviso of Order VIII Rule 1, CPC
that the appellant claimed to have filed his written statement. Curiously
however, even by the next hearing on 03.11.2017, the appellant had failed
to provide a copy of the written statement to the respondent as had been
noted by the Civil Court.
19. The only defence taken to these repeated and blatant lapses is that
the appellant’s counsel was not turning up. No attempt has been made to
even proffer a reasoned justification or explanation, and it is clear that
appellant is seeking condonation in a casual manner. This ought not to be
permitted or encouraged. Courts must act stringently to ensure that all
proceedings are decided within reasonable time, and it is but the duty of
the judicial system to cultivate a culture of respecting deadlines and time
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of the Court, its officers as well as of adversaries.
20. Routine condonations and cavalier attitudes towards the process of
law affects the administration of justice. It affects docket management of
Courts and causes avoidable delays, cost escalations and chaos. The effect
of this is borne not only by the litigants, but also commerce in the country
and the public­in­general who spend decades mired in technical processes.
21. It is obvious from the record that nothing prevented the appellant
from filing the written statement through counsel or in person.  He has,
thus, failed to give any cogent reason for the delay and is unable to satisfy
due diligence on his part though he is right in his submission that the
High Court erroneously relied upon the ratio of Oku Tech (supra).
22. Having held so, there could be no escape but to dismiss this appeal.
However, taking a lenient view given the unique circumstances of the case,
and without laying down the discretion being exercised hereinafter, as a
precedent, we direct that the written statement filed by the appellant on
02.11.2017 (as claimed), be taken on record with a copy to counsel for the
respondent within one week from today and further subject to payment of
costs of Rs. 25,000/­ to the respondent.
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23. The orders of the courts below are thus set aside and the appeal is
disposed of in the above terms.
……………………….. CJI.
   (S. A. BOBDE)
  ………………………… J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
…………………………. J.
(SURYA KANT)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 20.01.2020
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