Extra Judicial Confession - supported by other materials - chain completes attackting conviction =In the extra-judicial confession, Darshan Singh has deposed that he has given a Kursi (Chair) blow on the flank of Surjit Kaur. The postmortem report (Ex. PJ) shows fracture of Hyoid bone, an irregular wound over the left breast and fracture of the 6th and 7th rib. Therefore, the extra-judicial confession made by Darshan Singh is also supported by medical evidence. Further, Darshan Singh had also disclosed that he had kept concealed a 15 folding iron chair in house of Avtar Singh, the said chair was recovered. The prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances to hold the appellants guilty of the offences charged.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1688 OF 2009
DARSHAN SINGH .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB .....RESPONDENT(S)
W I T H
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1690 OF 2009
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The judgment and order dated 19th February, 2009 passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in an appeal
filed by the three appellants is subject matter of challenge in the
present appeals. It is admitted at Bar that the appellant Swaran
Kaur died during pendency of the present appeals after she was
released on bail by this Court on 4th October 2010.
2. An FIR was lodged by Jarnail Singh (PW-7) on 28th March, 2005 at
12:35 pm. He was the member of Nagar Palika, Morinda and had
taken 7 Bigha of land on lease from Pritpal Singh, Mohan Singh
sons of Khushal Singh on which he had sown wheat crop. He had
1
also taken 7 Bigha of land on lease from Faqir Chand where again
he had sown wheat crop. He stated that the wheat in the land of
Faqir Chand is of small size but the wheat in the land of Pritpal
Singh was 2½ feet in height. He further stated that at about 10:30
am in the morning on that day, he along with Mohinder Singh
Lamberdar (Village Headman) and Hari Pal had gone to his field but
noticed a foul smell emanating from the land of Pritpal Singh near
dump of wheat husk. He noticed a jute bag with maggots around it
and suspected it to be a dead body of a man or a woman. The land
was near the bye-pass that was frequented by people, however, it
was lying closed because of rains. He left Hari Pal and Mohinder
Singh Lamberdar at the spot and went to report the matter to the
Police. Such statement was recorded by Balwant Singh, SHO who
later appeared as PW-15. The investigations were initiated, dog
squad and finger print experts were called at the spot. Case was
registered against unknown persons. Copy of FIR was sent to the
concerned Magistrate.
3. On examination of the body in the inquest proceedings (Ex.PL), one
telephone diary, a plastic bag, a jute bag and ladies wearing cloth
were found. The body was found to be decomposed and could not
be identified. A Dupatta was found around the neck. The
postmortem was conducted on 30th March, 2005. The dead body
was identified by Ujjagar Singh and Kuldeep Singh (PW-13).
4. Dr. Harbhajan Singh (PW-6) along with Dr. Navtejpal Singh and Dr.
2
Gulshan conducted the postmortem and gave their report (Ex.PG).
The Dupatta was found wrapped around the neck with two turns.
No ligature mark was found present but skin over the Hyoid bone
taken for Histopathological examination. The underlying Hyoid
bone was found fractured. The probable time of death was 10 days
between death and postmortem examination. The chemical
examination report (Ex.PH) stated that Aluminum Phosphide
Insecticide was detected in the samples containing parts of small
and large intestine of the deceased. Phosphine, a constituent of
Aluminum Phosphide, was detected in decomposed pieces of liver,
spleen and kidney. Dr. Harbhajan Singh on the request of the
police opined that the cause of death is poisoning due to Aluminum
Phosphide Insecticide, haemorrhage and haemo-thorax due to
injury in the left chest as described in the postmortem report.
5. After completion of the investigations including recording of the
statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 19731
, accused Avtar Singh, Jagmohan Singh,
Swaran Kaur and Darshan Singh were made to stand trial. The
deceased, Surjit Kaur, was mother of accused Avtar Singh. Swaran
Kaur is wife and Jagmohan Singh is son of Avtar Singh. The accused
Darshan Singh was a servant at Avtar Singh’s house.
6. The prosecution story is that Surjit Kaur (deceased) had inherited 5
Bigha of land of Gurmit Singh (other son of deceased) who died
issueless and accused Avtar Singh, Jagmohan Singh and Swaran
1 for short, ‘Code’
3
Kaur were not happy with this inheritance. Out of this land, she
sold 1 bigha and gave the remaining 4 bighas on theka (lease) to
accused Avtar Singh at the rate of Rs.4,000/- per bigha. However,
Avtar Singh had not been paying the lease amount to her.
Panchayats had also been convened over this dispute, where the
four accused threatened the deceased.
7. The learned Sessions Judge vide judgment and order dated 23rd
May, 2007/26th May, 2007 acquitted Avatar Singh but convicted
Jagmohan Singh, Swaran Kaur and Darshan Singh.
8. The prosecution relied upon PW-7 Jarnail Singh, on whose
statement the prosecution process was initiated. He deposed that
the investigating officer had recovered one small diary from the
inner pocket of undershirt of the deceased which had some
telephone numbers and was taken in possession vide memo Ex.PM.
PW-8 Jagtar Singh, a milk man, deposed that he kept some acid
with him for checking the fat of milk. He further stated that
accused Swaran Kaur had come to him to get some acid to clean
the rust on a cooking vessel and a toilet seat. She took ½ a bottle
of acid from him. PW-10, Sohan Singh Patwari, had produced the
record of the land of Gurmit Singh inherited by the deceased. He
produced mutation Ex-PR and Jamabandi Ex.PS. PW-11 is Harpal
Singh, the Sarpanch of Village Sahauran. He deposed that the
deceased came to him on 15th March, 2005 with a grievance that
Avtar Singh had not been paying lease money to her and he should
4
facilitate the payment. He requested Avtar Singh and Swaran Kaur
to give the lease money to Surjit Kaur and they promised to give
the lease money of Rs.2000/- by 20th March, 2005. He later got to
know that Surjit Kaur had died.
9. The material witness is Kuldeep Singh (PW-13), son-in-law of the
deceased, married to Gurnam Kaur, daughter of Amar Singh about
36 years back. He stated that his mother-in-law Surjit Kaur has
been residing in a room (Chaubara). Out of 5 bighas of land, she
had sold 1 Bigha of land for Rs.1,02,000/-. Out of sale
consideration, Rs.95,000/- was deposited by her in the Post Office.
The remaining 4 Bigha of land was given on lease to Avtar Singh at
the rate of Rs.4,000/- per Bigha. Since, Avtar Singh was not paying
lease money, there were differences between mother and son. He
deposed that in the month of March, 2005, Swaran Kaur, daughterin-law of the deceased informed him that Surjit Kaur had left after
taking Rs.1,000/- from them towards lease money. It was on 29th
March, 2005, he received a telephone call and also read in the
newspaper that a dead body was found. He identified the dead
body of his mother-in-law which was kept in the mortuary. He
alleged that she has been murdered by Avtar Singh, his wife
Swaran Kaur, his son Jagmohan Singh and one Darshan Singh.
10. Sukhdev Singh (PW-14) has been examined as a person of last
seen. He deposed that on 22nd March, 2005 at about 5:30 am, one
man and one woman came on TVS Motor Cycle and they were
5
carrying a gunny bag. He did not identify the accused in Court. He
read in the newspaper on 28th March, 2005 that a dead body was
lying on by-pass road.
11. The investigating officer Balwant Singh was examined as PW-15.
He deposed that on 29th March, 2005, Kuldeep Singh (PW-13) and
Ujjagar Singh, son-in-laws of the deceased identified the dead body
from clothes as the face was disfigured by pouring acid. Kuldeep
Singh and Ujjagar Singh had named the accused as suspects.
Thereafter, the Investigating Officer conducted the raids for
arresting the accused. He stated that the accused could not be
traced in village Sahauran and other places. Thereafter, on 30th
March, 2005, Bhupinder Singh (PW-16) brought the accused
Darshan Singh, Jagmohan Singh and Swaran Kaur and got their
statements recorded. He arrested the accused. Further, accused
Swaran Kaur made a disclosure in police custody that she had kept
concealed half empty bottle of acid in her house behind a photo on
a shelf and could get the same recovered. The said acid bottle was
recovered. On 31st March, 2005, he arrested accused Avtar Singh in
a raid conducted in Village Sahauran. Further, on 1st April, 2005,
accused Jagmohan Singh gave a disclosure statement that he has
kept concealed his TVS Motor Cycle in a room and he could get it
recovered. Thereafter, accused Darshan Singh disclosed that he
had kept a folding iron chair concealed in the house of Avtar Singh
and he could get it recovered. Both the TVS Motor Cycle and folding
iron chair were recovered from the disclosed places and were taken
6
into possession.
12. The prosecution also examined Bhupinder Singh (PW-16) as the
witness of extra-judicial confession. He stated that he was present
in his house on 30th March, 2005. At about 10 am, accused Swaran
Kaur, Jagmohan Singh and Darshan Singh present in the court
came to his house. Swaran Kaur told him that they have committed
a big blunder and that she had put a Dupatta on the neck of her
mother-in-law Surjit Kaur and was strangulated. Darshan Singh
gave a Kursi (chair) blow on the flank of Surjit Kaur when Jagmohan
Singh caught hold of Surjit Kaur by her arms and, as a result
thereof, Surjit Kaur died. Swaran Kaur also told him that she
poured acid on deceased face. The dead body was kept in a gunny
bag and put in a cupboard. Swaran Kaur further stated that the
dead body was taken on a motor cycle for being thrown in the
canal along with Jagmohan Singh. However, when they reached the
bridge there was “Kacha Rasta” (unmetalled path) and because of
the water, the motor cycle could not pass through and they threw
the gunny bag in the fields of wheat. Swaran Kaur also said that
police were looking for them and asked him to produce them
before the police as he was acquainted with the police. Accused
Jagmohan Singh also confessed that a big mistake had been
committed by them and they had killed Surjit Kaur. Darshan Singh
also confessed that he along with Swaran Kaur and Jagmohan
Singh have committed the murder of Surjit Kaur and recounted the
same story. They also disclosed the motive of the murder being
7
that Surjit Kaur was asking for lease money of her land. Further,
Bhupinder Singh (PW-16) stated that he produced the accused
before the police on 30th March, 2005. He also stated that prior to
the visit of the accused persons to his house on 30th March, 2005,
he had no idea about the death of deceased Surjit Kaur. However,
he stated that he does not remember whether he has mentioned
the confessions in his statement recorded under Section 161 of the
Code before the police.
13. The learned trial court relied upon the statement of Bhupinder
Singh (PW-16) and that of Kuldeep Singh (PW-13) to convict the
accused Jagmohan Singh, Swaran Kaur and Darshan Singh.
Learned trial court found that the testimony of Sukhdev Singh (PW14) cannot be used to prove the culpability as he could not
establish the identity of those persons in the court. The learned
trial court found that there is no challenge to the testimony of
Kuldeep Singh (PW-13) that deceased Swaran Kaur had been living
alone in a room which shows that she was not living with her son
Avtar Singh and his family in the old age indicating that relations of
the deceased with her son and daughter-in-law were not cordial.
Statement of Harpal Singh (PW-11) Sarpanch was referred to come
to the conclusion that Surjit Kaur approached him complaining nonpayment of lease money by her son Avtar Singh. He came to know
about death of Surjit Kaur from the newspaper reports.
14. The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants
8
relying upon the statements of Kuldeep Singh (PW-13) and
Bhupinder Singh (PW-16) and the motive proved by Harpal Singh
(PW-11).
15. Before this Court, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the prosecution has failed to complete the chain of events so
as to lead only one conclusion that the appellants and the
appellants alone have committed the crime. The evidence of last
seen has not been believed by the trial court. In the absence of
evidence of last seen, the other evidence is of extra judicial
confession. It is argued that extra judicial confession is a weak
evidence and can be made basis of conviction if the person before
whom confession is made appear to be unbiased and not even
remotely inimical to the accused. Reference was made to the
judgment reported as Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra
2
 and
S. Arul Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu
3
.
16. It is also argued that no motive can be attributed to the accused as
the deceased was last seen by Kuldeep Singh (PW-13) on 20th
March, 2005 and as per medical evidence, the probable time of
death is 20th March 2005 or so. It is thus argued that the witness
was the only person who had met the deceased immediately prior
to her death and it is he who has to explain the death of the
deceased. The deceased was staying in Village Behrampur, Village
of Kuldeep Singh (PW-13). Therefore, in the absence of any
2 (2007) 12 SCC 341
3 (2010) 8 SCC 233
9
evidence that deceased was staying in Village Sahauran, the
findings recorded by the courts below are not sustainable. It is also
argued that as per postmortem report (Ex. PJ), cause of death is
poisoning due to Aluminium Phosphide insecticide, haemorrhage
and haemo-thorax, but there is no evidence as to how the poison
was administered nor there was any recovery of poison. It is
contended that if the death was due to strangulation, poison in the
body negates the prosecution story. It is also argued that a
fracture of Hyoid bone does not necessarily mean strangulation. He
placed reliance upon Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra
4
 and Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan
5 as to how
the circumstantial evidence can be made basis for conviction and
that none of the circumstances are satisfied by the prosecution.
17. On the other hand, Ms. Gogia, learned counsel for the State argued
that though the evidence of last seen has not been accepted but
the fact remains that the statement of Sukhdev Singh (PW-14) is
relevant to the extent that he had seen one man and a woman on
TVS Motorcycle though he could not identify the person who were
riding on such motorcycle. Still further, Harpal Singh (PW-11), the
Sarpanch had deposed in respect of motive of the offence as the
deceased had inherited the property of Gurmit Singh, her other son
who died issueless. It is the share of the property of Gurmit Singh
which became the point of conflict inasmuch as the said land was
given on lease by the deceased to her other son Avtar Singh.
4 (1984) 4 SCC 116
5 2019 SCC OnLine 39
10
Surjit Kaur had even approached Sarpanch for non-payment of
lease money by the accused. Learned counsel for the State also
refers to the statement of Kuldeep Singh (PW-13), son-in-law of the
deceased to the effect that she was living separately and not with
her son and daughter-in-law. He deposed about the inheritance of
land of Gurmit Singh and lease of land to Avtar Singh at the rate of
Rs.4,000/- per Bigha. In cross-examination, he stated that Gurmit
Singh died in the year 2003. He also stated that deceased was first
married to Bant Singh and her second marriage was with Amar
Singh. She had a girl child from her first marriage. Ujjagar Singh is
the husband of that girl. The statement of Ujjagar Singh was also
recorded in the Police Station identifying dead body of the
deceased. Further, Kuldeep Singh states that on 29th March, 2005,
he received a telephone call and read in the newspaper that a dead
body has been found giving description of the body and the
clothes. He identified the dead body as that of his mother-in-law.
In cross-examination, he deposed that on 20th March, 2005, Surjit
Kaur had not come to his house (in Village Behrampur Zimidara)
but he met her in Panchayat, Village Sahauran. He had not gone to
visit in-laws house on 20th March, 2005. He inquired from several
relatives about the availability of Surjit Kaur. He deposed that none
of the accused were present at the time of cremation in the Village
Sahauran and none of Avtar Singh’s children were present at the
time of cremation. Further, a prayer meeting was held after seven
days of cremation on a Sunday, here one son of Avtar Singh along
11
with his younger daughter was present. He further stated that the
deceased had visited his house 25 days prior to the occurrence for
2 days and that he never telephoned her between the time she left
his place till 20th March, 2005, when he met her in the Panchayat at
Village Sahauran. He denied the suggestions that deceased never
went back to Village Sahauran.
18. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that Balwant Singh
(PW-15), Investigating Officer deposed that he opened gunny bag
wherein a dead body of woman was recovered. He got photograph
of the dead body. On further search of the dead body on 29th
March, 2005, he recovered a small telephone diary which was lying
in the inner side pocket of the undershirt of the dead body and was
having telephone numbers of some persons. Such diary was taken
in possession vide recovery memo Ex- PM. He got published the
photograph and news of the recovery of unidentified dead body of
a woman. He had also tried to contact by calling the numbers
noted in the diary. It was on 29th March, 2005, Kuldeep Singh and
Ujjagar Singh, son-in-laws of the deceased came to the Mortuary
and identified the dead body as that of Surjit Kaur from the clothes
as the face of dead body was dis-figured by pouring acid. The
photographs produced in evidence proves the disfigurement of the
face and that the body could be identified only by the clothes worn
by the deceased. He deposed that he conducted raids for
arresting the accused named by Kuldeep Singh and Ujjagar Singh
but could not found the accused in Village Sahauran. It was on 30th
12
March, 2005, Bhupinder Singh (PW-16) produced the accused
Darshan Singh, Swaran Kaur and Jagmohan Singh before whom
they have made confessional statements. It was stated that Avtar
Singh has not suffered any extra judicial confession before
Bhupinder Singh (PW-16). On the basis of disclosure statement of
Swaran Kaur (Ex- PZ), empty half bottle of acid was recovered from
her house.
19. Learned counsel for the State relies upon judgment of this Court
reported as Ram Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh
6
 to contend
that the evidence of extra judicial confession need not in all cases
be corroborated. It was held as under:
“14. It is well settled that conviction can be based on a
voluntarily confession but the rule of prudence requires
that wherever possible it should be corroborated by
independent evidence. Extra-judicial confession of
accused need not in all cases be corroborated.
In Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC
204, this court after referring to Piara Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 452 held that the law does not
require that the evidence of an extra-judicial confession
should in all cases be corroborated. The rule of
prudence does not require that each and every
circumstance mentioned in the confession must be
separately and independently corroborated.”
20. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and find no merit in
the present appeals.
21. Gurmit Singh, other son of deceased, passed away in 2003. The
deceased inherited his share of land. Out of the 5 Bighas of land so
inherited, she sold 1 Bigha for Rs.1,02,000/- whereas she leased
6 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1730
13
the remaining 4 Bighas to her other son, Avtar Singh. The lease
money was not being paid to her and this fact has been stated by
Sarpanch (Harpal Singh) (PW-11) and also by Kuldeep Singh (PW13), the son-in-law of the deceased. The lease money was the only
source of survival of the old woman who was living in a separate
room and not with her son, Avtar Singh. Harpal Singh (PW-11) has
also deposed that only a sum of Rs.1,000/- had been paid with a
promise to pay another sum of Rs.1,000/- later. It, thus, transpires
that the deceased was living separately and was not being paid the
lease money which was necessary for her survival.
22. Further, the appellants were not found in the village soon after the
occurrence as deposed by Kuldeep Singh (PW-13) and investigating
officer Balwant Singh (PW-15). They did not attend the cremation
or the prayer ceremony which was held after one week. The
conduct of the appellants of not being available in the village is a
strong circumstance of their conduct post death.
23. There is no evidence led by the prosecution of administering
Aluminum Phosphide but the postmortem report indicates fracture
of Hyoid bone. As per postmortem report, the Dupatta around the
neck of the deceased had two turns which is unusual for a woman,
more so, for a woman of the age of deceased. The argument that
no ligature mark was found on the deceased is of no relevance as
the body had been infected with maggots. Therefore, the ligature
mark on the soft tissue would not have survived.
14
24. Furthermore, the bottle of acid was recovered on the basis of
disclosure made by accused Swaran Kaur. The photographs that
were taken showed disfigurement of the face of the deceased.
Such disfigurement was caused by pouring of acid with intention to
avoid identification of the dead body.
25. Although the witness (PW-14) of last seen could not identify the
appellants, but the fact remains that he identified that a jute bag
was thrown by a man and a woman who came on a TVS
Motorcycle. Therefore, even though the witness could not identify
the appellants in court as the persons who had thrown the jute bag,
the fact that the jute bag was thrown by a man and a woman on a
TVS motorcycle is relevant in chain of events in support of the
prosecution case.
26. Another argument raised by Mr. D.P. Singh which needs mention is
that Darshan Singh is not a member of family and has no motive in
the commission of crime. It is observed that Darshan Singh was
convicted on the basis of extra-judicial confession made before
Bhupinder Singh (PW-16). In the extra-judicial confession, Darshan
Singh has deposed that he has given a Kursi (Chair) blow on the
flank of Surjit Kaur. The postmortem report (Ex. PJ) shows fracture
of Hyoid bone, an irregular wound over the left breast and fracture
of the 6th and 7th rib. Therefore, the extra-judicial confession made
by Darshan Singh is also supported by medical evidence. Further,
Darshan Singh had also disclosed that he had kept concealed a
15
folding iron chair in house of Avtar Singh, the said chair was
recovered. The prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances
to hold the appellants guilty of the offences charged.
27. In view of the evidence led and the finding recorded by the Courts
below, we do not find any merit in the present appeals. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. The sentence of the appellants were suspended by this Court. They shall now surrender to
undergo the remaining sentence.
.............................................J.
(L. NAGESWARA RAO)
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 06, 2019.
16

need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged = Therefore, the lack of sanction was rightly found not to be a ground for quashing of the proceedings.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1662 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 3632 OF 2019)
THE STATE OF TELANGANA .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SRI MANAGIPET @ MANGIPET SARVESHWAR
REDDY .....RESPONDENT(S)
W I T H
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1663 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 4074 OF 2019)
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The order dated 24th December, 2018 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Hyderabad is the subject matter of challenge in the
present appeals, one by the State and the other by the Accused
Officer.
2. The High Court partly allowed the petition filed by the Accused
Officer under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731
qua the proceedings arising out of Crime No. 28/ACB-CIU-HYD/2011
1 for short, ‘Code’
1
dated 9th November, 2011.
3. Such FIR was registered on the basis of the statement given by Ch.
Sudhakar, Deputy Superintendent of Police2
 at about 10 am. The
FIR reads as under:
“On receipt of credible information that Sri. Managipet @
Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy S/o. Late Narsimha Reddy,
Age 51 years, Occ: OSD, Rang Reddy District, Vikarabad
R/o Flat No. 401, Venkatadri Apartments, Behind HPCL
Petrol Pump, Gachibowli, Hyderabad is a native of
Chilkatonipally (V) Veltoor (Post), Wanaparthy Tq.,
Mahaboobnagar District. The S.O. joined Govt. service
on 19-09-1985 as Sub Inspector of Police and promoted
as Inspector of Police on 04-04-1995 and Dy. Supdt. of
Police, in the year 2007. He worked as SI at
Rayadurgam, Hayathnagar, Malkajigiri, as Circle
Inspector at Huzurnagar of Nalgonda District Narsingi,
Uppal, Rajendranagar of Cyberabad Commissionerate,
R.R. District as ACP., Rajendranagar for about 4 years and
presently working as OSD, Ranga Reddy District,
Vikarabad.
During the period of his service he acquired Six
Multistoried Buildings, One Multistoried commercial
complex, 27 plots and 26 Acres of land at Hyderabad,
Ranga Reddy and Mahboobnagar Districts and one
Scorpio car, one Hyundai Verna car and Maruti Car, all
worth Rs.3,55,61,500/-.
The probable income of the A.O. and his family members
from all their known sources of income when calculated
roughly would be Rs.60,00,000/-. The probable
expenditure of the accused officer including household
expenditure and expenditure on children education is
tentatively estimated at Rs.23,00,000/-.
The likely savings of the accused officer is Rs.37,00,000/-
i.e., the probable income of Rs. 60,00,000 - minus the
probable expenditure of Rs.23,00,000/-.
As against the likely savings of Rs.37,00,000/- the
Accused Officer has acquired assets approximately worth
Rs.3,55,61,500/-. Thus, the A.O. is in possession of
assets worth Rs.3,18,61,500/- which are disproportionate
2 for short, ‘DSP’
2
to the known sources of his income for which he cannot
satisfactorily account for and thereby committed the
offence punishable U/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of P.C. Act
1988.
Permission has been obtained from the competent
authority to register a case against the above official U/s
13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988.
Hence, the FIR.”
4. A charge sheet was filed on 9th October, 2017 on completion of the
investigations. As per the Report, the Accused Officer was said to
be in possession of assets worth Rs.3,18,61,500/- alleged to be
disproportionate to his known sources of income. The total worth
of the property against his savings of Rs.37 lakhs was found to be
approximately Rs.3,55,61,500/-. During the investigations, as
many as 114 witnesses were examined. Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, CIU,
ACB, Hyderabad and five more investigating officers conducted the
investigations and prepared the final report.
5. The High Court in a petition for quashing of the charge sheet, held
that there was no authorization to register the crime and that the
informant cannot be the investigating officer and, thus, quashed
the same. The State is aggrieved against the said two findings
whereas, the Accused Officer has challenged the findings of the
High Court not accepting the grounds pressed by him in seeking
the quashing of the charge sheet - that there is no preliminary
inquiry before the registration of the crime; that there is no
sanction and that there is a delay in the completion of the
3
investigation which has prejudiced the rights of the Accused
Officer.
6. Ms. Bina Madhavan, learned counsel for the State submitted that
the Accused Officer joined as Sub Inspector on 19th September,
1985 and was promoted as Inspector on 4th April, 1997. He was
further promoted as DSP in the year 2007. In pursuance of the FIR
filed, a draft final report was prepared on 30th April, 2015 but the
same was submitted on 9th October, 2017 after the Accused Officer
retired on 31st May, 2017. Section 17 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 19883
 pertains to investigation into cases under the
Act. A Police officer not below the rank of Inspector, authorized by
the State Government by general or special order, may also
investigate any such offence. An offence under clause (e) of subsection (1) of Section 13 of the Act cannot be investigated without
an order of the Police Officer not below the rank of Superintendent
of Police. Section 17 of the Act reads as under:
“17. Persons authorised to investigate.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no police officer
below the rank,—
a) xx xx xx
b) xx xx xx
c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a
police officer of equivalent rank, shall investigate any
offence punishable under this Act without the order of a
Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class,
as the case may be, or make any arrest therefor without
a warrant:
3 for short, ‘Act’
4
Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of
an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State
Government in this behalf by general or special order, he
may also investigate any such offence without the order
of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first
class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefor
without a warrant:
Provided further that an offence referred to in clause
(e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 shall not be
investigated without the order of a police officer not
below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.”
7. Learned counsel for the State referred to Government Order No.
3168 dated 24th May, 2008 re-employing Sri K. Sampath Kumar,
Joint Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau as Officer on Special Duty
after his superannuation on 31st May, 2008 for a period of one year.
Such order of re-employment was renewed on 5th March, 2009; 13th
May, 2010 and on 30th May, 2011, each extending the term of reemployment by one year. It was on 9th November, 2011, the Joint
Director, CIU & SES, Anti-Corruption Bureau authorized Ch.
Sudhakar, DSP to register a case against the Accused Officer under
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Act and inspect any
premises, bankers books of the Accused Officer or of any other
person concerned with the affairs of the Accused Officer and take
or cause to be taken certified copies of the relevant entries
therefrom for the purpose of investigation. It is in pursuance of
such authorization that the FIR was lodged, premises were
searched and the Accused Officer was arrested.
8. The High Court relied upon the judgment reported as Union Public
5
Service Commissioner v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela & Ors.
4
to
hold that the statutory rules do not permit to extend the age of
superannuation without compliance of Article 16 of the Constitution
of India. A person who was appointed for a short period of six
months or till availability of a regular selectee, whichever is earlier
is practically appointed on a contract basis and could not be called
a government servant. The High Court returned the following
findings:
“21. It is neither pleaded nor is there any material to
show that the appointment of Respondent 1 had been
made after issuing public advertisement or the body
authorised under the relevant rules governing the
conditions of service of Drugs Inspectors in the Union
Territory of Daman and Diu had selected him. His
contractual appointment for six months was dehors the
rules. The appointment was not made in a manner which
could even remotely be said to be compliant with Article
16 of the Constitution. The appointment being purely
contractual, the stage of acquiring the status of a
government servant had not arrived. While working as a
contractual employee Respondent 1 was not governed by
the relevant service rules applicable to Drugs Inspector.
He did not enjoy the privilege of availing casual or
earned leave. He was not entitled to avail the benefit of
general provident fund nor was he entitled to any
pension which are normal incidents of a government
service. Similarly, he could neither be placed under
suspension entitling him to a suspension allowance nor
could he be transferred. Some of the minor penalties
which can be inflicted on a government servant while he
continues to be in government service could not be
imposed upon him nor was he entitled to any protection
under Article 311 of the Constitution. In view of these
features it is not possible to hold that Respondent 1 was
a government servant.”
9. We find glaring illegality in the line of reasoning and the findings
4 (2006) 2 SCC 482
6
recorded by the High Court. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela was a
case where Shri Vaghela was appointed on a short term contract
basis, on a fixed salary till a candidate was selected by the Union
Public Service Commission on a regular basis. The advertisement
to fill up the post on regular basis contemplated relaxation of five
years in age for government servants. He claimed relaxation in
age being a government servant for appointment on regular basis.
It was held that it was a contract which governed his terms of
service and not the rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution of India in as much as he was not appointed in
accordance with the Rules and, thus, was not eligible for any
relaxation in upper age for appointment on a regular basis in a post
advertised by Union Public Service Commission.
10. Article 310 of the Constitution contemplates that except as
expressly provided, every person who is a member of a defence
service or of a civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or
holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the
Union, holds office at the pleasure of the President. In respect of
the State Services, however, he or she holds office at the pleasure
of the Governor. In the present case, Sri K. Sampath Kumar was reemployed for a period of one year by the State Government in
exercise of powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution
of India. There is no prohibition in any of the service rules that
there cannot be any re-employment of a person who was once in a
civil service of either the Center or the State.
7
11. Entry 2 of List II of the State List is the Police (including railway and
village police) subject to the provisions of Entry 2A of List I.
Therefore, various facets of Policing in the State fall within the
legislative competence of the State and the re-employment of a
retired personnel who was a member of Indian Police Service, falls
within the executive power of the State. As a re-employed officer,
he was holding a civil post as his salary was being paid from the
State Exchequer. He was discharging duties and responsibilities in
the Anti-Corruption Bureau.
12. In P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian v. P. Veldurai
5
, it has been held that
the executive power of the State is coterminous with the legislative
power of the State Legislature i.e. if the State Legislature has
jurisdiction to make law with respect to a subject, the State
executive can make regulations and issue government orders with
respect to it. This Court held as under:
"48. The powers of the executive are not limited merely
to the carrying out of the laws. In a welfare State the
functions of the executive are ever widening, which cover
within their ambit various aspects of social and economic
activities. Therefore, the executive exercises power to fill
gaps by issuing various departmental orders. The
executive power of the State is coterminous with the
legislative power of the State Legislature. In other words,
if the State Legislature has jurisdiction to make law with
respect to a subject, the State executive can make
regulations and issue government orders with respect to
it, subject, however, to the constitutional limitations.
Such administrative rules and/or orders shall be
inoperative if the legislature has enacted a law with
respect to the subject. Thus, the High Court was not
justified in brushing aside the Government Order dated
5 (2011) 5 SCC 214
8
16-11-1951 on the ground that it contained
administrative instructions.”
13. In Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan & Ors. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors.
6
, it was held that the executive power of the State
Government cannot be circumscribed if it does not go against the
provisions of the Constitution or any law. The Court held as under:
"20. …………….. In Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of
Punjab [AIR 1955 SC 549 : (1955) 2 SCR 225 : 1955 SCJ
504] Mukherjea, C.J., dealt with the scope of Articles 73
and 162 of the Constitution. The learned Chief Justice
observed that neither of the two Articles contains any
definition as to what the executive function is or gives an
exhaustive enumeration of the activities which would
legitimately come within its scope. It was observed:
“Ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of
governmental functions that remain after legislative and
judicial functions are taken away.” It is neither necessary
nor possible to give an exhaustive enumeration of the
kinds and categories of executive functions which may
comprise both the formulation of the policy as well as its
execution. In other words, the State in exercise of its
executive power is charged with the duty and the
responsibility of carrying on the general administration of
the State. So long as the State Government does not go
against the provisions of the Constitution or any law, the
width and amplitude of its executive power cannot be
circumscribed. If there is no enactment covering a
particular aspect, certainly the Government can carry on
the administration by issuing administrative directions or
instructions, until the legislature makes a law in that
behalf. Otherwise, the administration would come to a
standstill.”
14. Sri K. Sampath Kumar was re-employed initially for a period of one
year after his retirement. He was not being recruited for holding a
civil post for the first time which may warrant compliance of rigour
of Article 16 of the Constitution. He had crossed all bridges, when
6 (1982) 1 SCC 39
9
he was appointed and discharged duties before attaining the age of
superannuation. Such re-employment by the State is in exercise of
the powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India.
Such executive powers of the State do not contravene any other
statutory provisions; therefore, re-employment in this regard is
supplementing the statutory rules and regulations and not
supplanting them. Therefore, Sri K. Sampath Kumar has
discharged the duties of Joint Director in the Anti-Corruption Bureau
in exercise of the powers conferred by the State Government.
15. We further find that Sri K. Sampath Kumar’s acts whilst discharging
the duties of Joint Director in the Anti-Corruption Bureau were
within the scope of the assumed official authority in public interest
and not for his own benefit. Therefore, acts undertaken in this
regard by the officer will be taken to be valid. This Court in a
judgment reported as Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra
Pradesh
7
 held as under:
“17. A judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a
mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office,
under colour of lawful authority, though his
appointment is defective and may later be found to be
defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the
office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by
him when he was clothed with the powers and functions
of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy
as judgments pronounced and acts done by a judge de
jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity
and public policy to prevent needless confusion and
endless mischief…
19. In our view, the de facto doctrine furnishes an
answer to the submissions of Shri Phadke based on
7 (1981) 3 SCC 132
10
Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 21
of the Constitution. The judges who rejected the appeal
in one case and convicted the accused in the other case
were not mere usurpers or intruders but were persons
who discharged the functions and duties of judges
under colour of lawful authority. We are concerned with
the office that the Judges purported to hold. We are not
concerned with the particular incumbents of the office.
So long as the office was validly created, it matters not
that the incumbent was not validly appointed. A person
appointed as a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions
Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge, would be exercising
jurisdiction in the Court of Session and his judgments
and orders would be those of the Court of Session. They
would continue to be valid as the judgments and orders
of the Court of Session, notwithstanding that his
appointment to such Court might be declared invalid.
On that account alone, it can never be said that the
procedure prescribed by law has not been followed. It
would be a different matter if the constitution of the
court itself is under challenge. We are not concerned
with such a situation in the instant cases. We, therefore,
find no force in any of the submissions of the learned
Counsel.”
16. The aforesaid judgment relies upon Pulin Behari Das v. King
Emperor
8
, wherein Justice Mookerjee held the following:-
“The doctrine that the acts of officers de
facto performed by them within the scope of their
assumed ??? authority in the interest of the public or
third persons and not for their own benefit, are
generally as valid and binding as if they were the acts
of officers de jure, dates as far back as the Year-Books,
and it stands confirmed, without any qualification or
exception, by a long line of adjudications. Viner says
“acts done by an officer de facto and not de jure are
good, for the law favours one in a refuted authority”
(Abridgment, Tit. Officers and Officers G. 4). In fact the
question for determination in cases involving the
application of the de facto doctrine, is not, as a rule,
whether the challenged acts, assuming the officer to
be de facto, as such are valid, but whether the person
whose title is questioned is or was really a de
facto officer.
8 1911 SCC OnLine Cal 159 : (1911-12) 16 CWN 1105
11
xx xx xx
It is not necessary for our present purposes to
investigate exhaustively all the qualifications or
limitations subject to which the de facto doctrine has to
be applied. The substance of the matter is that the de
facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter
of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the
public and the individual where those interests were
involved in the official acts of persons exercising the
duties of an office without being lawful Officers. The
doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy
of the law and to preserve peace and order in the
community at large. Indeed, if any individual or body of
individuals were permitted at his or their pleasure to
collaterally challenge the authority of and to refuse
obedience to the Government of the State and the
numerous functionaries through whom it exercised its
various powers, on the ground of irregular existence or
defective title, insubordination and disorder of the worst
kind would be encouraged. For the good order and
peace of society their authority must be upheld until in
some regular mode their title is directly investigated
and determined, [See the observations
in Scadding v. Lorant [???] and Norton v. Shelby
County [118 U.S. 425 (1886).] In the matter now before
us, the sanction under sec. 196 of the Criminal
Procedure Code was granted by the de facto Local
Government and the cognizance of the case has been
taken by the de facto Sessions Judge. In my opinion, it
is not open to the Appellants to question collaterally the
legality of the conviction upon the allegation that the
Local Government was irregularly constituted and the
Sessions Judge irregularly appointed. The first ground
upon which the legality of the trial is assailed must
consequently be overruled.”
17. The de facto doctrine as encapsulated above has been reiterated
by this Court, even in the context of an executive appointment, in
the judgment reported as Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M. L.
Wadhawan, Additional Secretary, Government of India and
Ors.
9
. In this case, the Additional Secretary to the Government of
9 (1987) 3 SCC 367
12
India had detained Mohanlal Jatia vide a Government order under
sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, on
being satisfied that it was necessary to detain him. Herein, the
Additional Secretary relied on statements recorded by one R.C.
Singh whom the appellant contended was not a “gazetted officer”
of enforcement under FERA, and therefore statements recorded by
the officer could not be relied upon to detain him. It was discussed:
“17. In any event, the learned Counsel further contends
that R.C. Singh was clothed with the insignia of office and
he was purporting to exercise the functions and duties of
a gazetted officer of Enforcement under Section 40(1) of
the FERA and therefore the de facto doctrine was
attracted. He relies upon the decision of this Court
in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(1981)
3 SCC 132: 1981 SCC (Cri) 652: (1981) 3 SCR 474]
enunciating the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and
public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless
mischief. In other words, he contends that where an
officer acts under the law, it matters not how the
appointment of the incumbent is made so far as the
validity of his acts are concerned.
18. We are inclined to the view that in this jurisdiction
there is a presumption of regularity in the acts of officials
and that the evidential burden is upon him who asserts
to the contrary. The contention that R.C. Singh was not a
gazetted officer of Enforcement within the meaning of
Section 40(1) of the FERA appears to be wholly
misconceived besides being an afterthought. The validity
of appointment of R.C. Singh to be an officer of
Enforcement under this Act cannot be questioned…….
20. … Where an office exists under the law, it matters
not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so
far as validity of his acts are concerned. It is enough that
he is clothed with the insignia of the office, and exercises
its powers and functions. The official acts of such persons
are recognised as valid under the de facto doctrine, born
of necessity and public policy to prevent needless
confusion and endless mischief. In Gokaraju Rangaraju
13
case [(1981) 3 SCC 132 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 652 : (1981) 3
SCR 474] Chinnappa Reddy, J., explained that this
doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and
necessity to protect the interest of the public.”
18. Further, a Full Bench of Kerala High Court in a judgment reported as
P.S. Menon v. State of Kerala
10 held that the de facto doctrine
was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the
interest of the public as well as the individuals involved in the
official capacity of persons exercising the duty of an officer without
actually being one in strict point of law. These officers may not be
the officers de jure but by virtue of particular circumstances, their
acts should be considered valid as a matter of public policy.
19. In another Division Bench judgment reported as P. Mahamani v.
Tamil Nadu Magnesite, Ltd., Salem & Ors.
11
, the Madras High
Court held as under:
“12. An officer de facto is one who by some colour or
right is in possession of an office and for the time being
performs his duties with public acquiescence, though
having no right in fact. Whereas an intruder is one who
attempts to perform the duties of an office without
authority of law, and without the support of public
acquiescence. No one is under obligation to recognise
or respect the acts of an intruder, and for all legal
purposes they are absolutely void. But for the sake of
order and regularity, and to prevent confusion in the
conduct of public business and in security of private
rights, the acts of officers de-facto arc not suffered to
be questioned because of the want of legal authority
except by some direct proceeding instituted for the
purpose. In all other cases the acts of an officer de
facto are as valid and effectual, while he is suffered to
retain the office as though he were an officer by right,
and the same legal consequences will flow from them
10 AIR 1970 Ker 165
11 (1993) 2 LLN 353
14
for the protection of the public and of third parties.
There is an important principle, which finds concise
expression in the legal maxim that the acts of
officers de facto cannot be questioned collaterally. A
person may be entitled to his designation although he is
not a true and rightful incumbent of the office, yet he is
no more usurper but holds it under colour of lawful
authority. The de facto doctrine was introduced into the
law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the
interest of the public and the individual where these
interests were involved in the official act of persons
exercising the duties of an office without being lawful
officers. The doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain
the supremacy of the law and lo preserve peace and
order in the community at large. Indeed, if any
individual or body of individuals were permitted, at his
or their pleasure, lo collaterally challenge the authority
of and lo refuse obedience lo the Government of the
State and the numerous functionaries through whom it
exercised its various powers on the ground of irregular
existence of defective title insubordination and disorder
of the worst kind would be encouraged. For the good
order and peace of society, their authority must be up
held until in some regular mode their title is directly
investigated and determined. When one holds office
under colour of lawful authority, whatever be the defect
of his title lo the office, acts done by him when he was
clothed with the powers and functions of the office,
albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy and acts done
by an officer de jure. The defective appointment of a de
facto officer may be questioned directly in a proceeding
lo which he may be a party but it cannot be permitted
to be questioned in a litigation between two private
litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or
consequence lo the officer concerned. So the writ
petitioner cannot be heard to say that Sri Madhavan
Nair, the second respondent had no authority to preside
over the meeting of the Board of Directors wherein it
was resolved lo place him under suspension and initiate
disciplinary action.”
20. The de facto doctrine was reiterated yet again in a recent Supreme
Court judgment reported as Veerendra Kumar Gautam & Ors. v.
Karuna Nidhan Upadhyay & Ors.
12
.
12 (2016) 14 SCC 18
15
21. Therefore, we find that Sri K. Sampath Kumar was discharging the
duties of Joint Director in Anti-Corruption Bureau under the
authority conferred by the State. The authorisation in favour of Ch.
Sudhakar was issued when he was performing his duties in public
interest and not for his own benefit. Therefore, such authorisation
is valid and binding as if it was an act of an officer de jure.
22. We further find that the High Court, while deciding a petition for
quashing of proceedings under Section 482 of the Code, could not
have commented upon the nature of employment of Sri K. Sampath
Kumar, as such a question does not fall within the jurisdiction of the
High Court whilst deciding the aforementioned petition.
23. Sri K. Sampath Kumar has authorised Ch. Sudhakar and the final
report had been filed after the investigation conducted by the
latter, in terms of clause (c) of Section 17 of the Act. In this regard,
it cannot be said that the investigation was not conducted in a
manner contemplated under law. Thus, Ch. Sudhakar was an
authorized Officer, competent to investigate and file a report for
the offences under the Act including of an offence under Section
13(1)(e) of the Act.
24. Another finding recorded by the High Court is that the informant
cannot be the investigating officer. Such a finding is based upon
Ch. Sudhakar being both the informant and the initiator of the
investigations. The High Court derives support from the judgment
16
of this Court reported as Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab
13
to hold
that a fair investigation is the very foundation of fair trial, which
necessarily postulates that the informant and the investigator must
not be the same person.
25. The said judgment however has been held to be prospective in the
judgment reported as Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal
Pradesh
14
 wherein, this Court has succinctly put as under:
"18. The criminal justice delivery system, cannot be
allowed to veer exclusively to the benefit of the offender
making it uni-directional exercise. A proper
administration of the criminal justice delivery system,
therefore requires balancing the rights of the accused
and the prosecution, so that the law laid down in Mohan
Lal (supra) is not allowed to become a spring board for
acquittal in prosecutions prior to the same, irrespective
of all other considerations. We therefore hold that all
pending criminal prosecutions, trials and appeals prior to
the law laid down in Mohan Lal (supra) shall continue to
be governed by the individual facts of the case.”
26. Thus, we find that the orders of the High Court to quash the
proceedings against the Accused Officer are not sustainable and
are consequently, set aside. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the
State is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the learned trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with law.
27. Coming to the appeal filed by the Accused Officer, Mr. Guru Krishna
Kumar, learned senior counsel vehemently argued that a
preliminary inquiry before the registration of a crime is mandatory.
Reference was made to a judgment reported as Lalita Kumari v.
13 (2018) 17 SCC 627
14 2019 SCC OnLine SC 170
17
Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
15
 as well as the judgment
reported as State by Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station,
Bengaluru v. M.R. Hiremath
16
.
28. In Lalita Kumari, the Court has laid down the cases in which a
preliminary inquiry is warranted, more so, to avoid an abuse of the
process of law rather than vesting any right in favour of an
accused. Herein, the argument made was that if a police officer is
doubtful about the veracity of an accusation, he has to conduct a
preliminary inquiry and that in certain appropriate cases, it would
be proper for such officer, on the receipt of a complaint of a
cognizable offence, to satisfy himself that prima facie, the
allegations levelled against the accused in the complaint are
credible. It was thus held as under:-
“73. In terms of the language used in Section 154 of the
Code, the police is duty bound to proceed to conduct
investigation into a cognizable offence even without
receiving information (i.e. FIR) about commission of such
an offence, if the officer in charge of the police station
otherwise suspects the commission of such an offence.
The legislative intent is therefore quite clear, i.e., to
ensure that every cognizable offence is promptly
investigated in accordance with law. This being the legal
position, there is no reason that there should be any
discretion or option left with the police to register or not
to register an FIR when information is given about the
commission of a cognizable offence. Every cognizable
offence must be investigated promptly in accordance
with law and all information provided under Section 154
of the Code about the commission of a cognizable
offence must be registered as an FIR so as to initiate an
offence. The requirement of Section 154 of the Code is
only that the report must disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence and that is sufficient to set the
investigating machinery into action.”
15 (2014) 2 SCC 1
16 (2019) 7 SCC 515
18
29. The Court concluded that the registration of an FIR is mandatory
under Section 154 of the Code if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is
permissible in such a situation. This court held as under:
“111. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of
the Code, if the information discloses commission of a
cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is
permissible in such a situation.
ii) If the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to
ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where
preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy
of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first
informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must
disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and
not proceeding further.
iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering
offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be
taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if
information received by him discloses a cognizable
offence.
v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the
veracity or otherwise of the information received but only
to ascertain whether the information reveals any
cognizable offence.
vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary
inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The category of cases in
which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes
19
b) Commercial offences
c) Medical negligence cases
d) Corruption cases.”
30. It must be pointed that this Court has not held that a preliminary
inquiry is a must in all cases. A preliminary enquiry may be
conducted pertaining to Matrimonial disputes/family disputes,
Commercial offences, Medical negligence cases, Corruption cases
etc. The judgment of this court in Lalita Kumari does not state
that proceedings cannot be initiated against an accused without
conducting a preliminary inquiry.
31. In M.R. Hiremath, this Court set aside an order on an application
for discharge under Section 239 of the Code, inter alia, for the
reason that a certificate under Section 65B of Evidence Act had not
been produced while relying upon the evidence of a spy camera.
An argument was raised that the spy camera has been given by
the investigating officer even before investigations were formally
started. On the strength of such fact, an argument was raised by
Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the Accused Officer,
that without conducting a preliminary inquiry the FIR could not
have been lodged. This Court in M.R. Hiremath held that when
the investigating officer had handed over the spy camera to the
complainant, the purpose was to ascertain, in the course of the
preliminary inquiry, whether information furnished by the
complainant could form the basis of lodging an FIR. It was held to
be a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether the information
20
revealed a cognizable offence. The Court held as under:
“23. In the present case, on 15-11-2016, the
complainant is alleged to have met the respondent.
During the course of the meeting, a conversation was
recorded on a spy camera. Prior thereto, the
investigating officer had handed over the spy camera to
the complainant. This stage does not represent the
commencement of the investigation. At that stage, the
purpose was to ascertain, in the course of a preliminary
inquiry, whether the information which was furnished by
the complainant would form the basis of lodging a first
information report. In other words, the purpose of the
exercise which was carried out on 15-11-2012 was a
preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether the
information reveals a cognizable offence.”
32. The said judgment does not help the learned counsel for the
Accused Officer. The scope and ambit of a preliminary inquiry
being necessary before lodging an FIR would depend upon the
facts of each case. There is no set format or manner in which a
preliminary inquiry is to be conducted. The objective of the same
is only to ensure that a criminal investigation process is not
initiated on a frivolous and untenable complaint. That is the test
laid down in Lalita Kumari.
33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows that the information
collected is in respect of disproportionate assets of the Accused
Officer. The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to screen wholly
frivolous and motivated complaints, in furtherance of acting fairly
and objectively. Herein, relevant information was available with the
informant in respect of prima facie allegations disclosing a
21
cognizable offence. Therefore, once the officer recording the FIR is
satisfied with such disclosure, he can proceed against the accused
even without conducting any inquiry or by any other manner on
the basis of the credible information received by him. It cannot be
said that the FIR is liable to be quashed for the reason that the
preliminary inquiry was not conducted. The same can only be
done if upon a reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is
disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a judgment of this
Court reported as State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
17 wherein, this
Court held inter alia that where the allegations made in the FIR or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused and also where a
criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.
34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary inquiry warranted in Lalita
Kumari is not required to be mandatorily conducted in all
corruption cases. It has been reiterated by this Court in multiple
instances that the type of preliminary inquiry to be conducted will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. There are no
fixed parameters on which such inquiry can be said to be
conducted. Therefore, any formal and informal collection of
17 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
22
information disclosing a cognizable offence to the satisfaction of
the person recording the FIR is sufficient.
35. We also do not find any merit in the argument that there has been
no sanction before the filing of the report. The sanction can be
produced by the prosecution during the course of trial, so the
same may not be necessary after retirement of the Accused Officer.
This Court in K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP
18
 held as under:
“15. The question relating to the need of sanction under
Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be
considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the
allegations contained therein. This question may arise at
any stage of the proceeding. The question whether
sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined
from stage to stage…”
36. The High Court has rightly held that no ground is made out for
quashing of the proceedings for the reason that the investigating
agency intentionally waited till the retirement of the Accused Officer. The question as to whether a sanction is necessary to prosecute the Accused Officer, a retired public servant, is a question
which can be examined during the course of the trial as held by
this Court in K. Kalimuthu. In fact, in a recent judgment in Vinod
Kumar Garg v. State (Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi)
19
, this Court has held that if an investigation was
not conducted by a police officer of the requisite rank and status
required under Section 17 of the Act, such lapse would be an irregularity, however unless such irregularity results in causing preju18 (2005) 4 SCC 512
19 Criminal Appeal No. 1781 of 2009 decided on 27th November, 2019
23
dice, conviction will not be vitiated or be bad in law. Therefore, the
lack of sanction was rightly found not to be a ground for quashing
of the proceedings.
37. Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar further refers to a Single Bench judgment
of the Madras High Court in M. Soundararajan v. State through
the Deputy Superintendant of Police, Vigilance and Anti
Corruption, Ramanathapuram20
 to contend that amended provisions of the Act as amended by Act XVI of 2018 would be applicable as the Amending Act came into force before filing of the charge
sheet. We do not find any merit in the said argument. In the aforesaid case, the learned trial court applied amended provisions in the
Act which came into force on 26th July, 2018 and acquitted both the
accused from charge under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the
Act. The High Court found that the order of the trial court to apply
the amended provisions of the Act was not justified and remanded
the matter back observing that the offences were committed prior
to the amendments being carried out. In the present case, the FIR
was registered on 9th November, 2011 much before the Act was
amended in the year 2018. Whether any offence has been committed or not has to be examined in the light of the provisions of the
statute as it existed prior to the amendment carried out on 26th
July, 2018.
20 Crl. A. (MD) No. 488 of 2018 and Crl. M.P. (MD) No. 8712 of 2018 decided on 30th October,
2018.
24
38. In view thereof, we do not find any merit in the reasonings
recorded by the High Court in respect of contentions raised by the
Accused Officer. The arguments raised by the Accused Officer cannot be accepted in quashing the proceedings under the Act. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 1663 of 2019 filed by the Accused
Officer is dismissed whereas Criminal Appeal No. 1662 of 2019 filed
by the State is allowed.
.............................................J.
(L. NAGESWARA RAO)
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 06, 2019.
25

whether the minimum qualifying service prescribed under the Pension Rules can be ignored for the purpose of consideration of invalid pension under Rule 39 of the Pension Rules. = The respondent’s husband had not served for ten years and was therefore, he disentitled for regular pension. For the same reason, he cannot also be held entitled to invalid pension. The different provisions of the Pension Rules cannot be read in isolation and must be construed harmoniously and the requirement of qualifying service cannot be said to be irrelevant for claiming different service benefits under the same Rules. Here the employee did not satisfy the requirement of qualifying service and therefore the invalid pension could not have been ordered for him, under Rule 39 of the Pension Rules.

whether the minimum qualifying service prescribed under the Pension Rules can be
ignored for the purpose of consideration of invalid pension under Rule 39 of the Pension Rules. =

The respondent’s husband had not served for ten years and was therefore, he disentitled for regular pension. For the same reason, he cannot also be held entitled to invalid pension. The different provisions of the Pension Rules cannot be read in isolation and must be construed harmoniously and the requirement of qualifying service cannot be said to be irrelevant for claiming different
service benefits under the same Rules. 
Here the employee did not satisfy the requirement of qualifying service and therefore the invalid pension could not have been ordered for him, under Rule 39 of the Pension Rules.

[REPORTABLE]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9204 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.16283 of 2017
STATE OF ODISHA & ORS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MANJU NAIK RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated
29.11.2016 in W.P. (C)No. 14413 of 2016 whereunder the High
Court of Orissa has dismissed the appellants’ challenge to
the order dated 3.8.2015 of the Odisha Administrative
Page 1 of 17
Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) under
which the authorities were directed to consider sanction of
invalid pension in favour of late Sagar Naik (husband of the
respondent) and thereafter settle family pension in favour
of the applicant, under the provisions of the Orissa Civil
Services (Pension) Rules- 1992 (hereafter referred to as
“the Pension Rules”).
3. The respondent filed the OA No. 18(B)/2010 before the
Tribunal praying for fixation of pay of late Sagar Naik and
for disbursal of his accrued financial benefits with effect
from 1.1.1996 until he was retired on 6.7.1996 on being
mentally incapacitated. The applicant also prayed for
sanction of family pension from the date of death of her
husband i.e. 24.7.1996.
4. The applicant projected before the Tribunal that her
husband on being found incapacitated was made to retire from
service on 6.7.1996 and he died soon thereafter on 24.7.1996
and therefore, the widow is entitled to family pension. She
also tried to make out a case for grant of invalid pension
in favour of her late husband.
Page 2 of 17
5. Opposing the prayers, the Government Advocate on behalf
of the State contended before the Tribunal that the
applicant’s husband had not rendered the qualifying period
of service so as to make him eligible for pension. Opposing
the claim for invalid pension for the deceased husband, the
appellants contended that Rule 39 of the Pension Rules
governing invalid pension has to be read together with Rule
47 which specifies the qualifying service of ten years for
grant of pension and accordingly it was argued that the
applicant is disentitled to any relief from the Tribunal.
6. Notwithstanding the State’s above contention, the
Tribunal concluded that the applicant’s husband is entitled
to invalid pension under Rule 39 of the Pension Rules and
accordingly, the authorities were directed to sanction the
invalid pension for the applicant’s husband and after his
death, to settle the family pension for the applicant, after
regularizing the services of the deceased employee.
7. The above decision was challenged by the appellants
through W.P.(C) No. 14413/2016 where the State projected
that Rule 39 has to be read jointly with Rule 47 of the
Pension Rules and if Rules are applied as it should be,
conjointly, the deceased government employee is ineligible
Page 3 of 17
for invalid pension. However, without adverting to the
specific contention raised by the appellants, the High Court
observed that a reasoned order was passed by the Tribunal
declaring entitlement for the invalid pension and
accordingly the Tribunal’s impugned order was left
undisturbed and the writ petition came to be dismissed.
8. Representing the State of Odisha and other appellants,
Ms. Anindita Pujari, learned counsel submits that the
deceased government employee was unauthorizedly absent from
service from 1.2.1995 to 23.7.1995 and was under suspension
from 24.7.1995 to 6.7.1996 and this period cannot be counted
for determining the qualifying service. Thus, in his
credit, the deceased employee had net qualifying service of
4 years 6 months and 29 days until he was superannuated on
6.7.1996. The learned counsel then refers to the
provisions of Rule 47(2)(b) and 47(5)(i) to argue that
without completing the qualifying service of ten years, the
deceased employee is ineligible for pension. Due to such
non-entitlement, the widow was granted the alternate benefit
i.e., the service gratuity amount by computing the
entitlement under Rule 47(5)(i)of the Pension Rules.
Page 4 of 17
9. On account of the short duration of service rendered by
the deceased employee, the State’s counsel then argues that
the respondent’s husband cannot be granted invalid pension
under Rule 39 as the provision has to be conjointly read
with Rule 47 and Rule 56 of the Pension Rules which specify
the qualifying service of ten years and also the
consequences for those who do not satisfy the eligibility
criterion for qualifying service.
10. Per-contra, Mr. Kedar Nath Tripathi, learned counsel
for the respondent/applicant, would however argue that the
government employee was allowed to retire from service on
6.7.1996 on the ground of mental incapacity and since
invalid pension is envisaged under Rule 39 of the Pension
Rules for such prematurely retiring employees suffering
permanent incapacity, the Tribunal and the High Court have
rightly ordered for grant of invalid pension for the
respondent’s husband.
11. The learned counsel then submits that since the
government servant died within few days of retirement,
firstly he must be paid the invalid pension under Rule 39
and after his death on 24.7.1996, the respondent as the
widow, should be held entitled to family pension.
Page 5 of 17
12. The issue to be considered here is whether the minimum
qualifying service prescribed under the Pension Rules can be
ignored for the purpose of consideration of invalid pension
under Rule 39 of the Pension Rules. As a corollary, whether
the Tribunal or the High Court erred in directing invalid
pension for a government employee who did not have the
qualifying service, prescribed under the Pension Rules.
13. At this stage, the relevant provisions of the Pension
Rules are extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:-
“. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39. Invalid Pension – (1) invalid
pension may be granted if a Government
servant retires from the service on
account of bodily or mental infirmity
which permanently incapacitates him for
the service.
(2) A Government servant applying for
an invalid pension shall submit a medical
certificate of incapacity from the
following medical authority, namely : -
(a) Medical Board, in the case of all
Gazetted and specially declared Gazetted
Government servants, and
(b) A Chief District Medical Officer or
Medical Officer of equivalent status in
case of other Government servants.
47. Amount of pension (1)
******** ******** ****
Page 6 of 17
2 (a) ******** ******** ****
 (b) In the case of Government servant
retiring in accordance with the provisions
of these rules before completing qualifying
service of thirty-three years, but after
completing qualifying service of ten years,
the amount of pension shall be
proportionate to the amount of pension
admissible under clause (a) and in no case
the amount of pension shall be less than
the minimum amount of pension admissible.
******** ******** ****
******** ******** ****
(5)(i) In the case of a Government servant
retiring in accordance with the provisions of
these rules before completing qualifying
service of ten years, the amount of service
gratuity shall be paid at a uniform rate on
half month’s emoluments for every completed
six monthly period of service.
56. Family Pension :
**** **** **** **** **** **** ****
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in Sub-rule (4) where a Government
servant dies-
**** **** **** **** **** **** *****
(c ) After retirement from service and was
on the date of death in receipt of pension,
or compassionate allowance, referred to in
Chapter IV other than the pension referred
to in rules 43 and 44 the family of the
deceased shall be entitled to family
pension, the amount of which shall be
Page 7 of 17
determined in accordance with the table
below.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .“
14. The respondent’s husband, late Sagar Naik was appointed
on 22.8.1989 under the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme as
his father late Suri Naik died in harness, while serving in
the M.K.C.G. Medical College and Hospital. The appointee
was however found to be suffering from mental incapacity and
accordingly, on the basis of the medical certificate issued
by the HoD of the Psychiatric Department of the S.C.B.
Medical College, Cuttack, the employee was retired from
service on 6.7.1996 on the ground of mental incapacity. The
case paper reveals that the service of the employee was
erratic, as he remained absent from 1.2.1995 to 23.7.1995
and was under suspension from 24.7.1995 to 6.7.1996. Thus
his net qualifying service for the benefits under the
Pension Rules was taken as 4 years 6 months and 29 days
only.
15. For government servants not completing ten years
qualifying service prescribed in Rule 47(5)(i) of the
Pension Rules, the service gratuity is to be paid at a
uniform rate of half month’s emolument for every completed
Page 8 of 17
six months period of service. Such gratuity benefit as also
the other terminal benefits like GPF, unutilized Earned
Leave, Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity (DCRG), etc. were
sanctioned and paid to the widow of the employee.
Moreover, respondent was also appointed as a sweeper under
the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme and she is in regular
government service, since 12.6.2006.
16. The gratuity and other benefits and the compassionate
appointment was accepted by the respondent without raising
any additional claim towards invalid pension for her
deceased husband, who retired on 6.7.1996.Long after his
death on 24.7.1996, the respondent approached the Tribunal
to belatedly pray for firstly, fixation of pay for her
husband in the revised scale with effect from 1.1.1996 till
his superannuation and also to sanction family pension
benefits for the applicant, following the death of the
government employee (on 24.7.1996) along with all
consequential and terminal benefits. The respondent never
however prayed for invalid pension before the Tribunal.
Yet, the Tribunal ordered for invalid pension for the
respondent’s husband, under Rule 39 of the Pension Rules.
Page 9 of 17
17. When the Tribunal’s decision was challenged in the High
Court, the State specifically contended that Rule 39 has to
be read together with Rule 47 of the Pension Rules and the
specified qualifying service must be satisfied even for
claiming invalid pension. But the High Court without
adverting to the specific contention raised by the
appellants, dismissed the writ petition with a cryptic order
observing that the Tribunal has passed a reasoned order and
that the husband of the respondent is entitled to invalid
pension under Rule 39 of the Pension Rules.
18. The requirement of completing the qualifying service of
ten years for receipt of pension is prescribed under Rule
47(2)(b) and for those government employees who retire
before completing the qualifying service, alternate relief
is envisaged under the Pension Rules itself. How the service
gratuity is to be computed, is also prescribed in Rule
47(5)(1) of the Pension Rules.
19. The respondent’s husband was retired on the ground of
mental infirmity and hence the service gratuity was paid and
the widow had received the same, without any demur. She
never raised any claim for invalid pension either at the
time of retirement on 6.7.1996 or even when she approached
Page 10 of 17
the Tribunal i.e. 14 years later in the year 2010.
Nevertheless, the Tribunal went beyond the prayers in the
O.A. No. 18(B)/2010 and ordered for invalid pension for late
Sagar Naik and then following his death, ordered for family
pension for the widow. In declaring such entitlement the
High Court and the Tribunal however ignored the qualifying
service of ten years as prescribed in the Pension Rules
although the State specifically argued that the qualifying
service criterion has to be satisfied not only for the
regular pension but also for the invalid pension since both
claims are to be considered under the very same Pension
Rules.
20. An employee becomes entitled to pension by stint of his
long service for the employer and, therefore, it should be
seen as a reward for toiling hard and long for the employer.
The Pension Rules provide for a qualifying service of 10
years for such entitlement. When the question arises as to
how certain provisions of the Pension Rules are to be
understood, it would be appropriate to read the provision in
its context which would mean reading the statute as a whole.
In other words, a particular provision of the statute should
be construed with reference to other provisions of the same
Page 11 of 17
statute so as to construe the enactment as a whole. It would
also be necessary to avoid an interpretation which will
involve conflict with two provisions of the same statute and
effort should be made for harmonious construction. In other
words, the provision of a Rule cannot be used to defeat
another Rule unless it is impossible to effect
reconciliation between them. Pension as already stated is
earned by stint of continuity and longevity of service and
minimum qualifying service should therefore be understood as
the requirement for invalid pension as well. The Pension
Rules can be harmoniously construed in this manner and in
that event, there shall be no clash between different
provisions in the said Rules.
21. The condition of qualifying service prescribed in the
Pension Rules must be satisfied to become eligible for
invalid pension and the arguments made to the contrary that
invalid pension can be claimed under Rule 39 without
satisfying the stipulated qualifying service mentioned in
the same Rules, do not appeal to us. The respondent’s
husband who had served for lesser years then the 10 years
qualifying service, was found entitled by his employers to
service gratuity only, because of his premature retirement
Page 12 of 17
on the ground of mental incapacitation and this is what is
prescribed by the Pension Rules. The dues toward service
gratuity was paid accordingly. The Pension Rules definitely
envisaged that there could be a situation where an employee
may not be eligible for pension benefits for not satisfying
the prescribed qualifying service of 10 years. For those
with less than 10 years’ service, the Pension Rules provide
for gratuity payment and therefore, it is difficult for us
to conclude that for invalid pension, qualifying years of
service, can be ignored.
22. The above view of ours is supported by the ratio in
Union of India and Another Vs. Bashirbhai R. Khiliji1, where
this Court was considering claim for invalid pension for an
armed constable in the CRPF who suffered from pyrogenic
meningitis and neurosensory deafness (bilateral). In that
case, the CRPF personnel was declared unfit for active duty,
and he was invalidated from service. He applied to
authorities for invalid pension but that was rejected on the
ground that he had not completed the qualifying service of
10 years. Instead, he was paid service gratuity. The High
Court in that case however, took the view that since the
CRPF Constable’s invalidity was 100 per cent, he was
1(2007) 6 SCC 16
Page 13 of 17
entitled to invalid pension and the stipulation of 10 years
of qualifying service could not be invoked to deny him the
invalid pension. However, Justice A.K. Mathur, speaking for
a two judge Bench of this Court while interpreting similar
provisions in the applicable Rules, negated the High Court’s
view and pronounced on the issue of qualifying service for
invalid pension, in the following manner:-
 “. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. We are presently concerned with two
provisions of the Rules i.e., Rule 38 and
49. Rule 38, as reproduced above,
contemplates the invalid pension. The
procedure has been mentioned therein i.e. in
case an incumbent retires from service on
account of bodily or mental infirmity which
permanently incapacitated him for the
service, then a medical certificate of
incapacity shall be given by the authorities
concerned and in particular Form 23 the same
may be applied before the competent
authority. It is true that the qualifying
service is not mentioned in Rule 38 but Rule
49 which deals with the amount of pension
stipulates that a government servant
retiring in accordance with the provisions
of these Rules before completing qualifying
service of ten years, the amount of service
gratuity shall be calculated at the rate of
half month’s emoluments for every completed
six-monthly period of qualifying service.
Therefore, the minimum qualifying service of
ten years is mentioned in Rule 49. The word
“qualifying service” has been defined in
Rule 3(1)(q) of the Rules which read as
under:
Page 14 of 17
“3. (1)(q) ‘qualifying service’ means
service rendered while on duty or otherwise
which shall be taken into account for the
purpose of pensions and gratuities
admissible under these Rules;”
10. Therefore, the minimum qualifying
service which is required for the pension as
mentioned in Rule 49, is ten years. The
qualifying service has been explained in
various memos issued by the Government of
India from time to time. But Rule 49 read
with Rule 38 makes it clear that qualifying
service of pension is ten years and
therefore, gratuity is determined after
completion of qualifying service of ten
years. Therefore, for grant of any kind of
pension one has to put in the minimum of ten
years of qualifying service. The respondent
in the present case, does not have the
minimum qualifying service. Therefore, the
authorities declined to grant him the
invalid pension. But the amount of gratuity
has been determined and the same was paid to
him.
. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .”
(Underlining added)
23. The above enunciation of the law on requirement of
qualifying service for invalid pension by the bench of two
judges is reiterated and approved by us.
24. In a case like this, the need for compassion and the
compliance of the norms has to be balanced. As earlier
noted, the allowable gratuity benefits were granted on
Page 15 of 17
account of the respondent’s husband and after he died, the
widow was appointed (on 12.6.2006) in a government job under
the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme. Thus, the needed
means of sustenance was provided to the deceased’s family.
25. The respondent’s husband had not served for ten years
and was therefore, he disentitled for regular pension. For
the same reason, he cannot also be held entitled to invalid
pension. The different provisions of the Pension Rules
cannot be read in isolation and must be construed
harmoniously and the requirement of qualifying service
cannot be said to be irrelevant for claiming different
service benefits under the same Rules. Here the employee did
not satisfy the requirement of qualifying service and
therefore the invalid pension could not have been ordered
for him, under Rule 39 of the Pension Rules.
26. In the above context, it will bear emphasis that the
respondent never prayed for invalid pension for her husband
in her O.A. and yet the Tribunal as well as the High Court
granted her the unclaimed relief. Such additional
munificence, in addition to the job provided to the first
respondent under the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme for
Page 16 of 17
the sustenance of the deceased’s family, in our view, was
unwarranted and the impugned order cannot be sustained.
27. In view of the foregoing, the impugned orders of
Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the Appeal
stands allowed. The parties to bear their own cost.
………………………………………………J.
 [R.BANUMATHI]
………………………………………………J.
 [A.S.BOPANNA]
 ………………………………………………J.
 [HRISHIKESH ROY]
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 04, 2019.
Page 17 of 17