Cheque bounce case = the cheques were issued under and in pursuance of the agreement to sell is valid and is to be considered as legally enroceable debt or other liability = Admittedly, the cheques were issued under and in pursuance of the agreement to sell. Though it is well settled that an agreement to sell does not create any interest in immoveable property, it nonetheless constitutes a legally encforceable contract between the parties to it. A payment which is made in pursuance of such an agreement is hence a payment made in pursuance of a duly enforceable debt or liablity for the purposes of Section 138. = whether there was a dispute as contemplated in clause 4 of the Agreement to Sell which obviated the obligation of the purchaser to honor the cheque which was furnished in pursuance of the agreement to sell to the vendor, cannot be the subject matter of a proceeding under Section 482 and is a matter to be determined on the basis of the evidence which may be adduced at the trial.

                                                             1

                                                                                    REPORTABLE

                                              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                                             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                            CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 483 OF 2019
                                       (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 4608 of 2016)

                      RIPUDAMAN SINGH                                             Petitioner(s)

                                                            VERSUS

                      BALKRISHNA                                                  Respondent(s)


                                           CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 484 OF 2019
                                       (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 4610 of 2016)


                                                        JUDGMENT

                      Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.


                              Leave granted.

                              These appeals arise from a judgment of a learned Single

                      Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at its Bench at

                      Indore    dated    31    March   2016.     The    learned   Single   Judge    has

                      allowed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

                      Procedure, 19731 and quashed the complaints instituted by the

                      appellants under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,

                      1881.

                              The appellants are spouses.               Claiming to be owners of

                      certain agricultural land they entered into an agreement to

                      sell     dated    28     May   2013    with      the   Respondent.   The     sale
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
MANISH SETHI
Date: 2019.05.10
                      consideration was Rs. 1.75 crores. The agreement records that
12:22:38 IST
Reason:

                      an amount of Rs. 1.25 crores was paid in cash and as for the


     1 �CrPC�
                                       2

balance, two post dated cheques were issued, each in the amount

of Rs 25 lakhs.

       The cheques were issued by the respondent in favour of

the two appellants in the present appeals.                  The details of the

cheques are as follows:

       (i)    Cheque No. 297251 dated 03.06.2013 drawn on

       Indusind     Bank,     Indore       for    an   amount    of    Rs.

       25,00,000/-      (Rupees        twenty-five        lacs        only)

       favouring Ripudaman Singh;


       (ii)    Cheque No. 297252 dated 02.07.2013 drawn on

       Indusind     Bank,     Indore       for    an   amount    of    Rs.

       25,00,000/-      (Rupees        twenty-five        lacs        only)

       favouring Smt. Usha.


       Together with the agreement, the appellants executed a

General Power of Attorney in favour of the respondent. The

first of the two cheques was deposited for payment.                      On 18 June

2013   it    was   returned    unpaid      with    the   remarks      �Insufficient

funds�.      The second cheque dated 2 July 2013 was                  returned with

the same remark by the banker, upon deposit.

       After issuing legal notices dated 21 June 2013 and 13

August 2013, the appellants instituted complaints under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Process was issued

by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class.

       The respondent filed two separate applications seeking

discharge in the respective complaint cases. Those applications

were dismissed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore
                                          3

on 3 September 2014.             On 8 October 2014, charges were framed

under Section 138.

        The respondent then filed a petition under Section 482

CrPC before the High Court in which the impugned order has been

passed.     While      allowing     the        petition,      the    High     Court    has

adverted to Clause 4 of the agreement between the parties which

is in the following terms:

    �That on the above property of the seller there is
    no family dispute of any type nor is any case
    pending in the court. If due to any reason any
    dispute arises then all its responsibility would
    remain of the selling party and the payment of
    cheques would be after the resolution of the said
    disputes.�


        The High Court held that a suit in respect of the land,

Civil    Suit    No.    4-A    of    2012       is    pending       before    the     XIVth

Additional Sessions Judge, Indore since 2 September 2011 in

which the complainants are arraigned as parties.

        On this basis, the High Court held that under the terms

of clause 4 of the agreement, the cheques could not have been

presented    for      payment.      The       cheques,      according    to    the    High

Court, have not been issued for creating any liablity or debt

but for the payment of balance consideration.                        Holding that the

respondent      did    not    owe   any       money    to    the    complainants,      the

complaint under Section 138 have been quashed.

        Assailing      the    judgment         of    the    High    Court,    Mr.     Shyam

Divan, learned senior counsel submits that as a matter of fact,

acting on the strength of the General Power of Attorney which

was issued by the appellants in both the cases, the respondent
                                    4

entered into a sale transaction in respect of the same property

on 3 August 2013 for a total consideration of Rs. 3.79 crores.

Hence, it has been submitted that the order passed by the High

Court is manifestly misconceived.

        On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the respondent submitted that clause 4 of the agreement to sell

postulated that there was no dispute in respect of the land

which was the subject of the agreement to sell nor was there

any case pending before the Court.              Moreover, it was stated

that if a dispute was to arise, it was the duty of the vendor

to get it resolved and the payment of cheques would be after

the resolution of the dispute.

        We find ourselves unable to accept the finding of the

learned Single Judge of the High Court that the cheques were

not issued for creating any liability or debt, but �only� for

the payment of balance consideration and that in consequence,

there    was   no   legally    enforceable   debt   or   other   liability.

Admittedly, the cheques were issued under and in pursuance of

the agreement to sell.            Though it is well settled that an

agreement to sell does not create any interest in immoveable

property,      it   nonetheless   constitutes   a   legally   encforceable

contract between the parties to it. A payment which is made in

pursuance of such an agreement is hence a payment made in

pursuance      of   a   duly   enforceable   debt   or   liablity   for   the

purposes of Section 138.

        Moreover, acting on the General Power of Attorney, the

respondent entered into a subsequent transaction on 3 August
                                          5

2013.    Evidently that transaction was after the legal notice

dated 21 June 2013 and hence could not have been adverted to in

the legal notice. Recourse to the jurisdiction of the High

Court under Section 482 was a clear abuse of process.

        The   question     as     to   whether           there   was   a     dispute   as

contemplated       in    clause    4   of      the       Agreement     to    Sell   which

obviated the obligation of the purchaser to honor the cheque

which was furnished in pursuance of the agreement to sell to

the vendor, cannot be the subject matter of a proceeding under

Section 482 and is a matter to be determined on the basis of

the evidence which may be adduced at the trial.

        For these reasons, we are of the view that the order

passed by the High Court in the petition under Section 482 CrPC

was   unsustainable.       We     allow       the   appeals      and   set    aside    the

impugned judgment and order of the High Court.

        However,    we    clarify      that         we    have   not   expressed       any

opinion on the merits of the issues which may arise during the

course of the trial.

        The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of.

        Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.




                                               .............................J.
                                              (DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD)



                                               .............................J.
                                              (HEMANT GUPTA)

 NEW DELHI
 MARCH 13, 2019
                                    6

ITEM NO.1                  COURT NO.11                 SECTION II-A

                S U P R E M E C O U R T O F        I N D I A
                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)       No(s).    4608/2016

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 31-03-2016
in MCRC No. 356/2015 passed by the High Court Of M.p At Indore)

RIPUDAMAN SINGH                                         Petitioner(s)

                                   VERSUS

BALKRISHNA                                              Respondent(s)


WITH
SLP(Crl) No. 4610/2016 (II-A)


Date : 13-03-2019 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
          HONBLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
          HONBLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA


For Petitioner(s)
                     Mr.   Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv.
                     Mr.   Santosh Kumar, Adv.
                     Mr.   Visushant Gupta, Adv.
                     Mr.   Mushtaq Ahmad, AOR
For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. Akshat Shrivastava, AOR
                     Ms. Pooja Shrivastava, Adv.

            UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                               O R D E R

    Leave granted.

    The appeals are disposed of in terms of the signed reportable

judgment.

    Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.


(MANISH SETHI)                                  (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  BRANCH OFFICER
          (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
 

Cheque bounce case = When the cheque was not retruned with an endorsement that the date is corrected and signature is differs - non issue of reply notice - confirms the liablity of accused under Cheque =Insofar as the contention that the date of the cheque was erased and corrected from 30.12.1998 as 30.12.2002 as observed by the High Court that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement exceeds arrangement and the cheque was not dishonoured on the ground that there was correction in the date of the cheque or that the signature of the appellant-accused differs. That apart as held by the High Court even though, the appellant- accused received the notice on 12.02.2003, the appellant-accused neither complied with the notice nor gave any reply. The appellant has not explained as to why he has not sent reply to the notice - Exhibit No. 27 pointing out that the claim of the respondent is false and unacceptable to the appellant.

1
        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 28 OF 2019
        (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.)NO.8100 OF 2017)
RAJESH S/O MADHUKARRAOJI TOTE ...APPELLANT(S)
                                VERSUS
KAMAL S/O CHATURBHUJJI MANDHANIA ...RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   arises   out   of   the   judgment   dated   12.07.2017   in
Criminal   Appeal   No.   491   of   2008   reversing   the   acquittal   and
convicting the appellant-accused under Section 138 of N.I. Act and
imposing the compensation amount of Rs. 4,90,000/- along with fine
of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid to the respondent-complainant.
3. The respondent-complainant runs a shop-M/s Kisan Bandhu having
a business in the agricultural industry.   The appellant-accused is
the   owner   of   M/s   Rajesh   Agro   Trader   and   involved   in   agricultural
industry.   The   appellant   and   the   respondent   used   to   transact
business   amongst   themselves   in   cash   and   also   in   credit.     The
appellant   on   30.12.2002   issued   a   cheque   bearing   No.   2282696   drawn
on Bank of India, Kangaon Branch for an amount of Rs. 2,45,553/-/.
On   29.01.2003,   the   said   cheque   was   dishonoured   with   endorsement
�exceeds   arrangement�.   On   05.02.2003,   notice   was   issued   to   the

2
appellant-accused   demanding   payment   of   the   cheque   amount.   The
appellant-accused in spite of receipt of notice, had not chosen to
reply.
4. The   trial   court   dismissed   the   complaint   filed   by   the
respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and
acquitted   the   appellant-accused   on   the   ground   that   respondent-
complainant   had   failed   to   establish   by   cogent   evidence   that   the
appellant-accused   had   given   the   cheque   (   Exh.   23)   in   order   to
discharge a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court further held
that   since   it   was   not   proved   that   the   disputed   contents   on   the
cheque,   viz.   erasing  1998  and   correcting   it   as   2002,   the
amount   in   words   and   in   figures   whether   were   written   by   the
appellant   or   with   his   consent,   the   appellant   could   not   be   held   to
have committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act,
1881.
5. In   appeal   by   the   complainant,   the   High   court   reversed
the   judgment   of   acquittal   and   convicted   the   appellant   u/s   138   of
N.I.   Act   and   thereby   affirming   the   judgment   of   the   Trial   Court
affirming the conviction.
6. Since respondent has not entered appearance, Mr. S. Mahendran,
Advocate   was   appointed   through   Supreme   Court   Legal   Services
Committee.
7. We   have   heard   Mr.   Hrishikesh   Chitaley,   learned   counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. S. Mahendran,  learned
counsel   for   the   respondent   and   also   perused   the   impugned   judgment
and materials on record.

3
8. Insofar   as   the   contention   that   the   date   of   the   cheque   was
erased   and  corrected   from  30.12.1998   as  30.12.2002   as  observed
by   the   High   Court   that   the   cheque   was   dishonoured   with   an
endorsement   exceeds   arrangement    and   the   cheque   was   not
dishonoured on the ground that there was correction in the date of
the cheque or that the signature of the appellant-accused differs.
That   apart   as   held   by   the   High   Court   even   though,   the   appellant-
accused   received   the   notice   on   12.02.2003,   the   appellant-accused
neither complied with the notice nor gave any reply. The appellant
has  not  explained  as  to  why  he  has  not  sent  reply  to  the  notice  -
Exhibit   No.   27   pointing   out   that   the   claim   of   the   respondent   is
false and unacceptable to the appellant.
9. Considering   the   findings   of   the   High   Court   and   the
materials   on   record,   we   do   not   find   any   ground   warranting
interference   with   the   conviction   of   the   appellant-accused   under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
10. However,   considering   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the
case,   the   fine   amount   of   Rs.4,90,000/-   (Rupees   four   lakhs   ninety
thousand)     and   the   fine   amount   of   Rs.   50,000/-   (Rupees   fifty
thousand) imposed upon the appellant are reduced to Rs. 2,50,000/-
(Rupees   two   lakhs   fifty   thousand).   In   compliance   of   the   interim
order   of   this   Court   dated   10.09.2018,   the   appellant   has   already
deposited the said amount before the Trial Court.
11. The  appeal  is  partly  allowed  by  reducing  the  fine  amount
to Rs.2,50,000/-.
12. The   Trial   Court   shall   disburse   the   amount   to   the

4
respondent   either   an   application   filed   by   the   respondent   or   by
issuing notic e to the respondent.
����������������������...J.
[R. BANUMATHI]
NEW DELHI �����������������������.J.
8TH JANUARY, 2019 [INDIRA BANERJEE]

5
ITEM NO.11               COURT NO.8               SECTION II-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)  No(s).  8100/2017
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  12-07-2017
in CRLA No. 491/2008 passed by the High Court Of Judicature At
Bombay At Nagpur)
RAJESH S/O MADHUKARRAOJI TOTE                     Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
KAMAL S/O CHATURBHUJJI MANDHANIA                Respondent(s)
(Appln. For exemption from filing certified copy) 

Date : 08-01-2019 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI
         HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Hrishikesh Chitaley,Adv.
Mr. Vikay Kari Singh,Adv.
Mr. Chandra Prakash, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. S. Mahendran,Adv.
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The   appeal   is   partly   allowed   in   terms   of   the   signed
order.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
(MADHU BALA)                              (PARVEEN KUMARI PASRICHA)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

Cheque bounce case - Misreading of pleadings and coming to wrong conclusion liable to be set aside = The High Court mainly referred to the assertion in the complaint that the security cheques were demanded in response to which the accused had issued three signed blank cheques and stated if the amount is not returned within two years then by presenting the cheques the same may be encashed . This assertion was assumed by the High Court to mean that the cheques were given only by way of security. Having said that, the High Court proceeded to hold that the �security� offered was not for the discharge of any debt or any liability.= In our opinion, the High Court has muddled the entire issue. The averment in the complaint does indicate that the signed cheques were handed over by the accused to the complainant. The cheques were given by way of security, is a matter of defence. Further, it was not for the discharge of any debt or any liability is also a matter of defence. The relevant facts to countenance the defence will have to be proved - that such security could not be treated as debt or other liability of the accused. That would be a triable issue. We say so because, handing over of the cheques by way of security per se would not extricate the accused from the discharge of liability arising from such cheques.Suffice it to observe, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny . The same is, therefore, set aside.

1
REPORTABLE   
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1382-1383  OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos. 1365-1366/2019 )
M/S WOMB LABORATORIES PVT LTD  ...APPELLANT(S)
   VERSUS
VIJAY AHUJA & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. These   appeals   take   exception   to   the
Judgment   and   Order   dated   23 rd
  July,   2018   passed   by
the   High   Court   of   Delhi   at   New   Delhi   in   Crl.M.C.
Nos. 3084/2015 and 3086/2015 whereby the proceedings
initiated   against   respondent   No.1   for   the   offence
punishable   under   Section   138   of   the   Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 came to be quashed.
3.  The   High   Court   mainly   referred   to   the
assertion   in   the   complaint   that   the   security
cheques   were   demanded   in   response   to   which   the
accused   had   issued   three   signed   blank   cheques   and
stated   if   the   amount   is   not   returned   within   two
years   then   by   presenting   the   cheques   the   same   may

2
be encashed . This assertion was assumed by the High
Court   to   mean   that   the   cheques   were   given   only   by
way   of   security.   Having   said   that,   the   High   Court
proceeded   to   hold   that   the   �security�   offered   was
not for the discharge of any debt or any liability.
Resultantly,   it   came   to   hold   that   the   action   under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
cannot proceed against the accused any further.
4. We have heard counsel for the parties.
5. In our opinion, the High Court has muddled
the entire issue. The averment in the complaint does
indicate that the signed cheques were handed over by
the   accused   to   the   complainant.   The   cheques   were
given   by   way   of   security,   is   a   matter   of   defence.
Further, it was not for the discharge of any debt or
any   liability   is   also   a   matter   of   defence.   The
relevant facts to countenance the defence will have
to   be   proved   -   that   such   security   could   not   be
treated   as   debt   or   other   liability   of   the   accused.
That   would   be   a   triable   issue.   We   say   so   because,
handing   over   of   the   cheques   by   way   of   security   per
se   would   not   extricate   the   accused   from   the
discharge of liability arising from such cheques.

3
6. Suffice   it   to   observe,   the   impugned
judgment of the High Court cannot stand the   test   of
judicial   scrutiny .   The   same   is,   therefore,   set
aside.
7.  As   respondent   No.1   has   raised   other
contention(s)   in   the   quashing   petition,   we   deem   it
appropriate to relegate the parties before the High
Court for examining those grounds on its own merits
in accordance with law.
8. Counsel for the appellant pointed out that
in view of the changed legal position, the complaint
must now proceed before the Court at Ahmedabad. Even
this contention may be pursued before the High Court
in the remanded proceedings, which may be dealt with
appropriately.
9. The   appeals   are   disposed   of   in   the   above
terms.
..................,J.
       (A.M. KHANWILKAR)
..................,J.
   (DINESH MAHESHWARI)
   NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 11, 2019

4
ITEM NO.31               COURT NO.7               SECTION II-C
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).1365-1366/2019
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  23-07-2018
in CRLMC No. 3084/2015 and CRLMC No. 3086/2015 passed by the High
Court Of Delhi At New Delhi)
M/S WOMB LABORATORIES PVT LTD                      Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
VIJAY AHUJA & ANR.                                 Respondent(s)
IA No. 6355/2019 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT)

Date : 11-09-2019 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Siddharth Batra, AOR
Mr. Ravinder Kumar, Adv.
Ms. Garima Sehgal, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Sanjeev Agarwal, AOR
Mr. Ekansh Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Chirag M. Shroff, AOR
Ms. Mahima C. Shroff, Adv.
Ms. Yashika Verma, Adv
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                              O R D E R
Leave granted.
The   appeals   are   disposed   of   in   terms   of   the
signed order.
In view of the above, pending application(s)
shall stand disposed of.
(NEETU KHAJURIA)
COURT MASTER (VIDYA NEGI)
COURT MASTER
(Signed order is placed on the file.) 

Cheque bounce case - Section 141 postulate that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company = In the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was therefore not maintainable. The appellant had signed the cheque as a Director of the company and for and on its behalf. Moreover, in the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused. We, accordingly, are of the view that the High Court was in erorr in rejecting the petition under Section 482 of the CrPC.

1
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1465 OF 2009
HIMANSHU                                           Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
B. SHIVAMURTHY & ANR.                             Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.
A   complaint   under   Section   138   of   the   Negotiable
Instruments   Act,   1881   was   instituted   by   the   respondent   against
the appellant.  According to the complainant, the appellant had
borrowed a sum of Rs. 4,15,000/- �for his business development�
and   on   the   same   day,   the   appellant   issued   a   cheque   drawn   on
Karnataka   Bank,   Hosadurga   for   an   equivalent   amount.     When   the
cheque was presented on 26 December 2003 for encashment to the
State   Bank   of   Mysore,   Beligere   Branch,     the   bank   returned   the
cheque   with   an   endorsement   on   29   December   2003   stating   that
funds were insufficient. The complainant issued a notice to the
appellant   on   19   January   2004   which   was   served   on   28   January
2004.
Upon   the   failure   of   the   appellant   to   pay   the   amount   due
under the cheque, a complaint was instituted. 
The   Civil   Judge,   Junior   Division,   Tiptur   took   cognizance

2
on 6 July 2004 and issued summons to the appellant. 
The   appellant   instituted   a   petition   under   Section   482   of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (�CrPC�)   before the High
Court   of   Karnataka.   Paragraph   6   of   the   petition   states   the
ground on which the jurisdiction of the High Court was invoked.
�6.       The   cheque   was   issued   by   one   of   the
directors of M/s Lakshmi Cement and
 Industries Ltd., i.e., on behalf of said company.
The said company was public limited company and in
order   to   demonstrate   the   said   fact,   the   accused
herewith   produces   copies   of   the   memorandum   and
articles   of   association   of   the   company   alongwith
the   certification   of   incorporation   of   the   company
and   which   are   marked   as   ANNEXURE   C1,   C2   AND   C3
respectively.�
In paragraph 7, the appellant averred thus:-
�7. �
The   complainant   approached   the   learned   Magistrate
with   a   request   to   take   cognizance   against   the
accused   stating   that   the   accused   on   23.12.2003   had
issued   a   cheque   in   his   favour   and   the   said   cheque
was   bounced   on   26.12.2003   on   meticulously   going
through   the   cheque   dated   23.12.2005   it   discloses
that the cheque was issued by one of the directors
of the company and that was not a cheque issued by
any person in his individual capacity.   If that is
accepted the complaint should have been against the
company   and   its   Directors   and   not   against   the
Accused.�
The   appellant   submitted   that   the   cheque   was   issued   by   a
Director   of   Lakshmi   Cement   and   Ceramics   Industries   Ltd .,   a
public   limited   company.   In   other   words,   the   cheque   was   not
issued   by   the   signatory   in   his   personal   capacity.     Hence,   it
was   urged   that   the   complaint   ought   to   have   been   instituted
against   the   company   and   its   Directors   and   not   against   the
appell ant.

3
The   High   Court   by   its   order   dated   24   January   2006
dismissed the petition. The High Court rejected the submissions
urged   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   on   the   ground   that   the
complainant   had   pleaded   ignorance   about   the   existence   of   the
company. Moreover, in the view of the High Court, it would not
be   difficult   for   the   complainant   to   take   steps   to   proceed
against   the   company   as   well   as   against   other   persons   who   are
responsible for the affairs of the company.   
The judgment of the High Court has been questioned on two
grounds.    Learned counsel  appearing on  behalf of  the appellant
submits   that   firstly,   the   appellant   could   not   be   prosecuted
without   the   company   being   named   as   an   accused.   The   cheque   was
issued   by   the   company   and   was   signed   by   the   appellant   as   its
Director.   Secondly,   it   was   urged   that   the   observation   of   the
High Court that the company can now be proceeded against in the
complaint   is   misconceived.   Learned   counsel   submitted   that   the
offence under Section 138 is complete only upon the issuance of
a   notice   of   demand   and   the   failure   of   payment   within   the
prescribed   period.   In   absence   of   compliance   with   the
requirements   of   Section   138,   it   is   asserted,   the   direction   of
the High Court that the company could be impleaded/arraigned at
this stage is erroneous.
The   first   submission   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   is   no
longer   res integra.   A   decision of a three Judge Bench of this
Court   in   Aneeta   Hada   vs.   Godfather   Travels   and   Tours   Private
Limited 1
  governs   the   area   of   dispute.       The   issue   which   fell
1   (2012) 5 SCC 661

4
for   consideration   was   whether   an   authorized   signatory   of   a
company   would   be   liable   for   prosecution   under   Section   138   of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 without the company being
arraigned as an accused.  The three Judge Bench held thus:-
�58.   Applying   the   doctrine   of   strict
construction, we are of the considered opinion
that   commission   of   offence   by   the   company   is
an   express   condition   precedent   to   attract   the
vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words
�as   well   as   the   company�   appearing   in   the
section   make   it   absolutely   unmistakably   clear
that   when   the   company   can   be   prosecuted,   then
only   the   persons   mentioned   in   the   other
categories could be vicariously liable for the
offence   subject   to   the   averments   in   the
petition   and   proof   thereof.   One   cannot   be
oblivious   of   the   fact   that   the   company   is   a
juristic   person   and   it   has   its   own
respectability.   If   a   finding   is   recorded
against it, it would create a concavity in its
reputation.   There   can   be   situations   when   the
corporate   reputation   is   affected   when   a
director is indicted.�
In similar terms, the Court further held:
�59.   In   view   of   our   aforesaid   analysis,   we
arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for
maintaining   the   prosecution   under   Section   141
of   the   Act,   arraigning   of   a   company   as   an
accused is imperative. The other categories of
offenders   can   only   be   brought   in   the   drag-net
on   the   touchstone   of   vicarious   liability   as
the   same   has   been   stipulated   in   the   provision
itself�. �
The   judgment   of   the   three   Judge   Bench   has   since   been
followed   by   a   two   Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Charanjit   Pal
Jindal   vs.   L.N.   Metalics 2
.     T here   is   merit   in   the   second
submission   which   has   been   urged   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   as
2   (2015) 15 SCC 768

5
well.     The   proviso   to   Section   138   contains   the   pre-conditions
which   must   be   fulfilled   before   an   offence   under   the   provision
is   made   out.   These   conditions   are;   (i)   presentation   of   the
cheque to the bank within six months from the date on which it
is   drawn   or   within   the   period   of   its   validity,   whichever   is
earlier;   (ii)   a   demand   being   made   in   writing   by   the   payee   or
holder in due course by the issuance of a notice in writing to
the   drawer   of   the   cheque   within   thirty   days   of   the   receipt   of
information   from   the   bank   of   the   return   of   the   cheques;   and
(iii)   the   failure   of   the   drawer   to   make   payment   of   the   amount
of   money   to   the   payee   or   the   holder   in   due   course   within
fifteen days of the receipt of the notice.
In   MSR   Leathers   vs.   S.   Palaniappan 3
,   this   Court   held
thus  :-
�12.  The proviso to Section 138, however, is all
important   and   stipulates   three   distinct
conditions   precedent,   which   must   be   satisfied
before   the   dishonour   of   a   cheque   can   constitute
an   offence   and   become   punishable.     The   first
condition   is   that   the   cheque   ought   to   have   been
presented   to   the   bank   within   a   period   of   six
months   from   the   date   on   which   it   is   drawn   or
within   the   period   of   its   validity,   whichever   is
earlier.   The   second condition   is that the payee
or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the
case   may   be,   ought   to   make   a   demand   for   the
payment   of   the   said   amount   of   money   by   giving   a
notice   in   writing,   to   the   drawer   of   the   cheque,
within thirty days of the receipt of information
by him from the bank regarding the return of the
cheque   as   unpaid.     The   third   condition   is   that
the drawer of such a cheque should have failed to
make   payment   of   the   said   amount   of   money   to   the
payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due
course   of   the   cheque   within   fifteen   days   of   the
receipt of the said notice.    It is only upon the
satisfaction   of   all   the   three   conditions
3   (2013) 1 SCC 177

6
mentioned above and enumerated under the proviso
to   Section   138   as   clauses   (a),   (b)   and   (c)
thereof that an offence under Section 138 can be
said   to   have   been   committed   by   the   person
issuing the cheque.�
The   importance   of   fulfilling   these   conditions   has   been
adverted   to   in   a   recent   judgment   of   a   two   Judge   Bench   of   this
Court in N. Harihara Krishnan vs. J. Thomas 4
. 
Adverting to the ingredients of Section 138, the Court  observed
as follows:
�26. �.Obviously   such   complaints   must
contain   the   factual   allegations   constituting
each   of   the   ingredients   of   the   offence   under
Section 138.   Those ingredients are: (1) that a
person drew a cheque on an account maintained by
him with the banker; (2) that such a cheque when
presented   to   the   bank   is   returned   by   the   bank
unpaid; (3) that such a cheque was presented to
the bank within a period of six months from the
date   it   was   drawn   or   within   the   period   of   its
validity   whichever   is   earlier;   (4)   that   the
payee demanded in writing from the drawer of the
cheque   the   payment   of   the   amount   of   money   due
under the cheque to payee; and (5) such a notice
of   payment   is   made   within   a   period   of   30   days
from the date of the receipt of the information
by the payee from the bank regarding the return
of the cheque as unpaid...�
In   the   present   case,   the   record   before   the   Court
indicates   that   the   cheque   was   drawn   by   the   appellant   for
Lakshmi   Cement   and   Ceramics   Industries   Ltd.,   as   its   Director.
A   notice   of   demand   was   served   only   on   the   appellant.   The
complaint   was   lodged   only   against   the   appellant   without
arraigning the company as an accused. 
The   provisions   of   Section   141   postulate   that   if   the
person   committing   an   offence   under   Section   138   is   a   company,
4   (2018) 13 SC 663

7
every   person,   who   at   the   time   when   the   offence   was   committed
was   in   charge   of   or   was   responsible   to   the   company   for   the
conduct of the business of the company as well as the company,
shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable
to be proceeded against and punished.
In   the   absence   of   the   company   being   arraigned   as   an
accused,   a   complaint   against   the   appellant   was   therefore   not
maintainable. The appellant had signed the cheque as a Director
of   the   company   and   for   and   on   its   behalf.     Moreover,   in   the
absence   of   a   notice   of   demand   being   served   on   the   company   and
without   compliance   with   the   proviso   to   Section   138,   the   High
Court   was   in   error   in   holding   that   the   company   could   now   be
arraigned as an accused.
We, accordingly, are of the view that the High Court was
in   erorr   in   rejecting   the   petition   under   Section   482   of   the
CrPC.
We   hence   allow   the   appeal   and   set   aside   the   judgment   of
the High Court.  In consequence, the complaint, being C.R.P No.
27/2004 shall stand quashed.
During   the   pendency   of   these   proceedings,   this   Court   on
28   November   2008   recorded   the   statement   of   the   appellant   that
he   was   willing   to   deposit   the   entire   cheque,   and   hence   issued
the following directions:
�Learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   petitioner
submits that petitioner is willing to deposit the
entire   cheque   amount   which   was   dishonoured   in
this Court.
Let the  amount be  deposited in  this Court  within
four   weeks   from   today   and   on   deposit   of   the

8
amount   within   the   aforesaid   period,   Registry   to
issue   fresh   notice   to   the   respondent   as
respondent   is   not   represented   till   date.     The
amount,   so   deposited,   shall   be   invested   in   a
fixed   deposit   in   a   nationalised   bank   initially
for   a   period   of   six   months   and   may   be   kept
renewed from time to time until further orders.�
In   pursuance   of   the   aforesaid   directions,   the   appellant
deposited   an   amount   of   Rs.   4,15,000/-   on   23   February   2009.
The amount has been invested in a fixed deposit which has been
renewed periodically.
In   our   view,   having   regard   to   the   intent   of   the   order
which was passed by this Court on 28 November 2008, it would be
appropriate   and   proper   if   the   amount   deposited   in   this   Court,
together with accrued interest, is paid over to the respondent-
complainant.
The Registry shall, accordingly, issue a communication to
the   respondent   intimating   a   copy   of   the   present   order   (since
the respondent has not appeared despite service of notice.  The
amount   shall   be   disbursed   to   the   respondent   against   proof   of
identity. 
The criminal appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
  ...�...�.......������........J.
                                    (DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD)
�...�........������.�........J.
                        (HEMANT GUPTA)
 NEW DELHI,
 January 17, 2019

9
ITEM NO.103               COURT NO.11               SECTION II-C
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal  No(s).  1465/2009
HIMANSHU                                           Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
B. SHIVAMURTHY & ANR.                              Respondent(s)

Date : 17-01-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA
For Appellant(s)
Mr. Rohan Thawani, Adv.
                    Mr. Prashant Kumar, AOR
Mr. Dhawesh Pahuja, Adv.
Mr. Joseph Pookkatt, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s)
                    Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
Mr. Parikshit P. Angadi, Adv.
Md. Apzal Ansari, Adv.
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The   criminal   appeal   is   disposed   of   in   terms   of   the   signed
reportable judgment.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(MANISH SETHI)                                  (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file) 

Cheque bounce case = Under Section 142(1), a complaint has to be instituted within one month of the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138.The proviso however stipulates that cognizance of the complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.= the appellant issued a legal notice on 31 December 2015. This was within a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. Consequently, the requirement stipulated in proviso (b) to Section 138 was fulfilled. Proviso (c) spells out a requirement that the drawer of the cheque has failed to make payment to the holder in due course or payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. The second respondent does not as a matter of fact, admit that the legal notice dated 31 December 2015 was served on him. The appellant has in the complaint specifically narrated the circumstance that despite repeated requests to the postal department, no acknowledgment of the noticedated 26 February 2016. Cognizant as we are of the requirement specified in proviso (b) to Section 138, that the notice must be issued within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour, we have proceeded on the basis that it is the first notice dated 31 December 2015 which constitutes the cause of action for the complaint under Section 138.weare of the view that sufficient cause was shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in instituting the complaint taking the basis of the complaint as the issuance of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015.

1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 000868 OF 2019
(@SLP(Crl) No(s). 10811 of 2018)
Birendra Prasad Sah                                �Appellant(s)
                                 VERSUS
The State of Bihar & Anr.                          �Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 Leave granted.
3 This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna  dated 10 May  2018 by which  an order taking cognizance of an
offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1888 1
 has been quashed.
1  �Act�

2
4 The facts, briefly stated, are thus:
5 The   dispute   arises   over   two   cheques   drawn   on   the   State   Bank   of   India   in   the
amount of Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000 which were returned unpaid under a memo
issued by the UCO Bank, Begusarai on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the
memo on 4 December 2015. Following this, a legal notice was issued on 31 December
2015   intimating   the   dishonour   of   the   cheque.  According   to   the   appellant,   between   14
February 2016 and 23 February 2016, he made queries with the postal department but
no   proof   of   service   was   provided.    Accordingly,   on   26   February   2016,   a   second   legal
notice   was   issued.   This   was   replied   to   by   the   second   respondent   on   2   March   2016.
Eventually, a complaint under Section 138 was instituted on 11 May 2016.
6 The   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate,   Begusarai   by   an   order   dated   14   July   2016,
condoned   the   delay   in   filing   the   complaint.   While   taking   cognizance,   the   CJM   issued
summons   to   the   second   respondent.   The   second   respondent   instituted   revisional
proceedings   before   the   Sessions   Judge   which   were   rejected   on   8   March   2017.   In   a
further recourse  to  the  High  Court under Section  482  CrPC,  the  learned  Single  Judge
held   that   the   complaint   under   Section   138   was   not   filed   within   the   statutory   period   of
thirty   days   prescribed   under   Section   138   as   a   result   of   which   the   proceedings   were
quashed.
7 Assailing   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court,   Mr   Nagendra   Rai,   learned   Senior
Counsel submitted that in  MSR Leathers  v.  S Palaniappan 2
 a three judge Bench of this
Court has taken the  view that the issuance of successive notices  is permissible  under
the provisions of Section 138 having regard to the object of the legislation.     Moreover,
2  (2013) 1 SCC 177

3
the  learned  Senior Counsel  submitted  that  the  delay  in  the  institution  of the  complaint
was condoned by the CJM under Section 142. Hence, there was an error on the part of
the High Court in quashing the proceedings.
8 On the other hand, Mr Jay Savla, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the second respondent submitted that:
(i)  The  second  legal notice  dated  26 February  2016  was   sent beyond a  period  of
thirty   days   of   the   receipt   of   the   memo   of   dishonour   on   4   December   2015   and
hence cannot be the basis of a valid institution of a criminal complaint;
(ii)   If at all, the  complaint could  have only been instituted  on  the basis  of the first
legal notice dated 31 December 2015 which was within thirty days of the receipt
of the memo of dishonour;
(iii)  The   complaint   which   was   lodged   on   11   May   2016   was   beyond   the   stipulated
period from the date of issuance of the first notice;
(iv)   The   CJM   had   condoned   the   delay   which   had   occurred   in   the   institution   of   the
complaint only for the period after 6 April 2016 after the issuance of the second
notice; and
(v)  In the decision of the three judge Bench in   MSR Leathers   (supra) , there was a
re-presentation of the cheque as a result of which, a fresh notice was held to be
within the ambit of the law.
9 Section 138 provides thus:
�138.  Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds
in the account. �
Where   any   cheque   drawn   by   a   person   on   an   account
maintained by him with a banker  for payment of  any  amount
of   money   to   another   person   from   out   of   that   account   for   the

4
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is
returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of  that account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to
be   paid   from   that   account   by   an   agreement   made   with   that
bank,   such   person   shall   be   deemed   to   have   committed   an
offence  and shall,  without  prejudice to  any  other  provision of
this   Act,   be   punished   with   imprisonment   for 3
  [a   term   which
may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend
to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided   that   nothing   contained   in   this   section   shall   apply
unless�
(a)   the   cheque   has   been   presented   to   the   bank   within   a
period   of   six   months 4
  from   the   date   on   which   it   is   drawn   or
within   the   period   of   its   validity,   whichever   is   earlier;
(b)   the   payee   or   the   holder   in   due   course   of   the   cheque,   as
the   case   may   be,   makes   a   demand   for   the   payment   of   the
said   amount   of   money   by   giving   a   notice   in   writing,   to   the
drawer   of   the   cheque, 5
  [within   thirty   days]   of   the   receipt   of
information   by   him  from  the  bank   regarding  the  return  of  the
cheque as unpaid; and
(c)   the   drawer   of   such   cheque   fails   to   make   the   payment   of
the said amount  of  money  to  the  payee or,  as  the case may
be,   to   the   holder   in   due   course   of   the   cheque,   within   fifteen
days of the receipt of the said notice.�
10 In the present case, the facts narrated above indicate that the appellant issued a
legal notice on 31 December 2015. This was within a period of thirty days of the receipt
of   the   memo   of   dishonour   on   4   December   2015.   Consequently,   the   requirement
stipulated in proviso (b) to Section 138 was fulfilled. Proviso (c) spells out a requirement
that the drawer of the cheque has failed to make payment to the holder in due course or
payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. The second respondent does not
as a matter of fact, admit that the legal notice dated 31 December 2015 was served on
him.   The   appellant   has   in   the   complaint   specifically   narrated   the   circumstance   that
despite  repeated requests  to  the  postal department, no  acknowledgment of the  notice
3  Sub. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 7, for a �term which may be extended to one year� (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
4  The period has been reduced from six months to three months  vide  R.B.I Notification No. RBI/2011-12/251, DBOD.AML
BC. No. 47/14.01.001/2011-2012, dated 4 th
 November, 2011 (w.e.f. 1-4-2012).
5  Subs. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 7, for �within fifteen days� (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).

5
was furnished. It was in these circumstances that the appellant issued a second notice
dated  26   February  2016.  Cognizant as  we   are  of the   requirement specified  in  proviso
(b) to Section 138, that the notice must be issued within thirty days of the receipt of the
memo of dishonour, we have proceeded on the basis that it is the first notice dated 31
December 2015 which constitutes  the cause of action  for the complaint under Section
138.
11 The   complaint   was   instituted   on   11   May   2016.       Under   Section   142(1),   a
complaint has to be instituted within one month of the date on which the cause of action
has   arisen   under   clause   (c)   of   the   proviso   to   Section   138 6
.     The   proviso   however
stipulates   that   cognizance   of   the   complaint   may   be   taken   by   the   court   after   the
prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for
not   making   a   complaint   within   such   period.     Both   in   paragraphs   7   and   8   of   the
complaint, the appellant indicated adequate and sufficient reasons for not being able to
institute the complaint within the stipulated period. These have been adverted to above.
The CJM condoned the delay on the cause which was shown by the appellant for the
period commencing from 6 April 2018. However, if paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint
are   read   together,   it   is   evident   that   the   appellant   had   indicated   sufficient   cause   for
seeking condonation of the delay in the institution of the complaint. The High Court has
merely adverted to the presumption that the first notice would be deemed to have been
served if it was dispatched in the ordinary course.  Even if that presumption applies, we
6 142   (1)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (2   of   1974),�
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made
by   the   payee   or,   as   the   case   may   be,   the   holder   in   due   course   of   the   cheque;
(b)   such   complaint   is   made   within   one   month   of   the   date   on   which   the   cause   of   action   arises   under   clause   (c)   of   the
proviso to section 138:
[Provided   that  the  cognizance  of   a  complaint  may  be  taken  by   the  Court  after  the  prescribed   period,  if  the  complainant
satisfies   the   Court   that   he   had   sufficient   cause   for   not   making   a   complaint   within   such   period];
(c)   no   court   inferior   to   that   of   a   Metropolitan   Magistrate   or   a   Judicial   Magistrate   of   the   first   class   shall   try   any   offence
punishable under section 138..

6
are of the view that sufficient cause was shown by the appellant for condoning the delay
in instituting the complaint taking the basis of the complaint as the issuance of the first
legal notice dated 31 December 2015.   
12 In   the   view   which   we   have   taken,   we   have   come   to   the   conclusion   that   the
impugned   judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   unsustainable.   The   appeal   is   accordingly
allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The complaint
shall accordingly stand restored to the file of the trial court.
13 We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions which
will be adjudicated upon during the trial.
...........��������.....................J.
                           [Dr  Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
��������................................J.
                 [Hemant Gupta]
 NEW DELHI;
 May 8, 2019.

7
ITEM NO.43               COURT NO.11               SECTION II-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)  No(s).  10811/2018
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  10-05-2018
in   CRLM   No.   27495/2017   passed   by   the   High   Court   Of   Judicature   at
Patna)
BIRENDRA PRASAD SAH                                Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANR.                          Respondent(s)

Date : 08-05-2019 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Nagendra Rai, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Prerna Singh, Adv.
                    Mr. Shantanu Sagar, AOR
Mr. Aakash, Adv.
Ms. Priya Ranjan, Adv.                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Keshav Mohan, Adv.
Mr. Rishi K. Awasthi, Adv.
                    Mr. Santosh Kumar - I, AOR
Mr. Jay Saula, Sr. Adv.
                    Mr. Arvind Gupta, AOR
Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Verma, Adv.                 
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
  Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
The   appeal   is   allowed   in   terms   of   the   signed   reportable
judgment.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(MANISH SETHI)                                  (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  BRANCH OFFICER
   (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)