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Friday, August 23, 2019

the unregulated and clandestine manufacture of the drug Oxytocin, which is reportedly misused in milch animals; and on the other hand, the continued supply of an essential life­saving drug, which is used as the first line drug for 33 prevention and treatment of post­partum haemorrhage at the time of childbirth.

the unregulated and clandestine manufacture of the drug Oxytocin, which is reportedly misused in milch animals; and on the other hand, the continued supply of an essential life­saving   drug,   which   is   used   as   the   first   line   drug   for 33 prevention and treatment of post­partum haemorrhage at the time of childbirth.                                                                                                                                      The   following   substantial   questions   of   law   arise   for consideration: (i) Whether a drug included in the National List of Essential Medicines   published   under   Schedule   1   of   the   Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 2013 notified under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 would be subject to the provisions of Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940?                                                  (ii) Whether   the   impugned   notification   has   resulted   in creating a monopoly in favour of public sector companies, to the complete exclusion of private sector companies, and if so, whether it would be protected by Article 19(6)(ii) read with Article 14 of the Constitution? (iii)Whether   the   classification   made   by   the   impugned notification   between   licensed   public   sector   and   private sector   companies,   in   the   manufacture   of   the   drug Oxytocin for domestic use, would achieve the object and purpose of preventing the unregulated and illegal use of the drug? 34 (iv)Whether   it   would   be   in   public   interest   to   restrict   the manufacture of a life­saving drug for domestic use, to a single   public   sector   undertaking,   to   the   complete exclusion of the private sector companies, particularly in view of the high maternal mortality rates in the country?                                                                      (v) Whether there was relevant and objective material before the Central Government to form the basis of satisfaction to exercise the power to prohibit the manufacture of the drug by the private sector companies for domestic use, under Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940?                                                                  (vi)Whether   the   object   of   curbing   the   clandestine manufacture and unregulated use of the drug Oxytocin, which   is   covered   by   Section   18   of   the   Drugs   and Cosmetics Act, 1940, can be achieved by taking recourse to Section 26A by imposing a ban on the manufacture of licensed drugs by private sector companies? (vii) Whether the exercise of power by the Central Government under Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is legislative or executive in nature? 35 13. We are of the considered view that this is a fit case to refer the matter to a larger Bench of three Judges to consider the aforesaid questions of law, and authoritatively pronounce upon the same. Accordingly, we direct the Registry to place the   present   group   of   appeals   before   the   Hon’ble   Chief Justice of India for necessary directions.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal Nos.6588­6591  of 2019
(Arising out of SLPs (Civil) Nos. 3296­3299 Of 2019)
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. ETC                APPELLANTS
Versus
BGP PRODUCTS OPERATIONS GMBH
AND HAGENE IMMERMATT WEG. & ANR. ETC.  RESPONDENTS 
J U D G M E N T
INDU MALHOTRA, J.
  Leave granted.
1. The issue which arises for consideration in the present appeals
is the validity of the Notification dated 27.04.2018 issued under
Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter
referred to as the “Act”) by the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare.
The   impugned   notification   restricts   the   manufacture   of
Oxytocin formulations for domestic use, only by public sector
1
undertakings or companies, to the complete exclusion of the
private sector companies. However, the manufacture of the drug
for export purposes is open to both public and private sector
companies.
It was notified that the notification would come into force on
01.07.18.
By a subsequent notification dated 29.06.2018, the date was
extended to 01.09.18.
2. Till the issuance of the impugned notification, Oxytocin was
being manufactured by private sector companies to meet the
entire need in the country.
After the issuance of the impugned notification, Karnataka
Antibiotics   &   Pharmaceuticals   Ltd.   (“KAPL”),   a   public   sector
company has commenced the manufacture of Oxytocin in May
2018.
3. The Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (“API”) or the bulk drug is
manufactured in India only by one private sector company in
India, viz. Hemmo Pharmaceuticals Pvt Ltd. (“Hemmo Pharma”).
4. The impugned Notification dated 27.04.2018 was challenged in
a group of Writ Petitions by various private sector companies
who are inter alia  manufacturing the drug Oxytocin in W.P.(C)
No. 6084/2018, W.P.(C) No. 8555/2018, W.P.(C) No. 8666/2018
and W.P.(C) No. 9601/2018 before the Delhi High Court on
various   grounds.   The   Delhi   High   Court   granted   stay   of   the
operation of the impugned notification vide Interim Order dated
31.08.2018.   The   order   of   stay   was   extended   by   subsequent
2
Orders, which remained in force till 15.12.2018. The Delhi High
Court  vide  a detailed Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2018
has quashed the impugned notification. As a consequence, the
impugned notification did not come into force at all.
5. The Appellant­Union of India has filed the present Special Leave
Petitions before this Court, to challenge the judgment passed by
the Delhi High Court.
6. The subject matter of the present appeals is the drug Oxytocin,
which   is   notified   as   an   essential   drug   by   the   World   Health
Organization   (WHO)   Model   List   of   Essential   Medicines   since
2002. The concept of “Essential Medicines” was first introduced
by the WHO in 1977, and has now been adopted by many
countries, NGOs and international non­profit supply agencies.
Oxytocin continues to be notified in the 21st edition of the WHO
Model List of Essential Medicines published in 2019. It is listed
under   the   head   “Medicines   For   Reproductive   Health   And
Perinatal   Care”   and   the   recommended   form   of   dosage   is
“Injection: 10 IU in 1­ mL”.
6.1. Oxytocin is an essential life­saving drug, which is included
in the National List of Essential Medicines, 2011 (“NLEM”).
It   continues   to   be   listed   at   S.No.   26.1.5   in   the   latest
notification   published   in   2015.   The   NLEM   is   published
under the 1st Schedule to the Drugs (Prices) Control Order,
2013   (“DPCO”)   under   Section   3   of   the   Essential
Commodities Act, 1955 (“EC Act”).
The   NLEM   specifies   the   recommended   dosage   and
strength of Oxytocin injection as 5IU per 1 ml and 10IU per
3
1 ml. Oxytocin injection in the form of “5 IU per ml in 1ml
ampoule pack” is included in the “Essential Drug List for
the year 2016­2018” at Serial No. 228 published by the
National Health Mission, Department of Health and Family
Welfare, Government of Himachal Pradesh.
6.2. The objective of the National List of Essential Medicines
(NLEM) is that the drugs included in it are adequate to
meet   the   contemporary   health   needs   of   the   general
population of the country.1
 It is one of the key instruments
in balanced healthcare delivery system of a country. The
first NLEM was prepared and released in 1996. This list
was subsequently revised in 2003, 2011 and 2015.
NLEM contains those essential medicines “that satisfy
the primary health needs of the country‘s population.” NLEM
medicines are required to be made available at all times in
adequate   quantities   in   the   appropriate   dosage   forms   to
serve the larger public interest. The primary purpose of the
NLEM is to promote rational use of medicines considering
three important aspects i.e cost, safety and efficacy. The
list   is   considered   to   include   the   most   cost­effective
medicines for a particular indication.
The   criteria   for   the   inclusion   of   a   medicine   in   the
NLEM  inter   alia  includes   that   the   medicine   should   be
approved/licensed   in   India;   the   medicine   should   have
1 Press Release on “Essential Drugs” dated 15.03.2013 by the Press Information Bureau,
Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
4
proven efficacy and safety profile based on valid scientific
evidence; the medicine should be cost effective etc.2
The NLEM is prepared by an Expert Core Committee
constituted   by   the   Director   General   of   Health   Services
(DGHS) out of the World Health Organization (WHO) Model
List   of   Essential   Medicines,   Essential   Drugs   Lists   of
various  States, and  medicines  used  in various  National
Health Programmes and Emergency Care Drugs.3
6.3. Oxytocin   is   recommended   as   the   first   line   drug   for
prevention   and   treatment   of   post­partum   haemorrhage
(excess bleeding immediately after child­birth).4
 Oxytocin is
the drug of choice used for pregnant women to induce or
augment labour at the time of delivery, to control postpartum bleeding and uterine hypo­tonicity and is placed
under   Schedule   H1   of   the   said   Act.5
  Oxytocin   is   also
included in the Indian Pharmacopoeia published in 2010,
2014, and 2018.
6.4. The misuse of Oxytocin has been the subject matter of
discussion   because   of   rampant   misuse   of   the   drug   on
milch animals. The issue was under deliberation by the
Drugs Technical Advisory Board (“DTAB”) and the Drugs
Consultative   Committee   (“DCC”),   which   are   statutory
bodies constituted under the said Act.
2 Executive Summary, Report of the Core Committee for Revision of the National List of
Essential Medicines published in 2015.
3 Paragraph 3.1(ii) of the National Pharmaceuticals  Pricing Policy, 2012 (NPPP­2012) dated
07.12.12 published by the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Government of India
4  World Health Organisation  Recommendations For The Prevention And Treatment Of
Postpartum Haemorrhage, 2012
5  Fifty­Ninth Report Of Parliamentary Standing Committee On Health And Family Welfare
On The Functioning Of Central Drugs Standard Control Organization
5
The   DTAB   is   a   statutory   body   established   under
Section 5 of the said Act. The DTAB consists of technical
experts   to   advise   the   Central   Government   and   State
Governments on technical issues arising under the said
Act.
The DCC has been constituted under Section 7 of the
said Act, which consists of representatives of the Central
Government, and one representative of each of the State
Governments to advise the Central and State Governments,
and the DTAB, on any matter relating to secure uniformity
in the administration of the Act.
6.5. The deliberations on the issue of rampant misuse of the
drug commenced from 1997 onwards.
It is necessary to advert to the deliberations of the
meetings   of   these   statutory   bodies   to   understand   the
background   in   which   the   impugned   notification   was
passed.
6.6. The misuse of Oxytocin came up for discussion first in the
31st  meeting   of   the   DCC   held   on   21.08.1997   and
22.08.1997. The DCC noted that it had received several
complaints on the misuse/abuse of Oxytocin in veterinary
practice.   Oxytocin   injections   were   being   misused   to
artificially   extract   milk   from   cows   and   buffaloes.   The
members of the Committee were requested to collect more
information on the issue.
6.7. At the 48th meeting of the DTAB held on 08.07.1999, the
DTAB discussed the misuse of Oxytocin in milch animals
6
and the deleterious effects due to consumption of such
milk on consumers. The DTAB considered the suggestion
of imposing a general ban on the manufacture of Oxytocin.
However,   11   members   opined   that   as   the   drug   is
“essential”   in   the   medical   field,   and   is   included   in   the
“Essential Drug list”, the same could not be prohibited.
The Joint Secretary, Ministry of Food Processing, an
invitee to the meeting mooted a suggestion that “perhaps
restricting   the   manufacture   of   Oxytocin   to   PSUs,   and
thereafter   keeping   a   track   on   its   distribution”   may   be
considered.
The   representative   of   the   Department   of   Consumer
Affairs agreed that the whole issue of use and misuse of
Oxytocin injection requires an in­depth examination and
suggested that a detailed paper be prepared based on the
outcome of such study.
6.8. At   the   36st  meeting   of   the   DCC   held   on   23.07.05   and
24.07.05, the DCC advised not to ban Oxytocin injection
since it formed a part of the NLEM. The DCC noted that the
sale   of   Oxytocin   had   been   regulated   by   amending   the
package   size   of   Oxytocin   to   “single   blister   packs”,   as
against the earlier prescribed larger packaging of 50­100
ampoules.
6.9. At the 40th Meeting of the DCC held on 29.06.2009, it was
observed that the misuse of Oxytocin injection had been
reported   in   many   parts   of   the   country,   and   a   strong
vigilance was required to stop the clandestine manufacture
7
of the drug. The DCC observed that the drug has a definite
place in medical treatment, and is used by gynaecologists
universally. The DCC urged the members/representatives
of each State to ensure that the clandestine manufacture of
the   drug   under   their   jurisdiction   is   curbed   through
extensive surveys and raids.
6.10. At the 43rd  meeting of the DCC held on 14.11.2011, the
DCC observed that there was an increasing misuse of the
drug by dairy owners, because of the clandestine supply of
the drug through illegal channels, and recommended that
its   misuse   can   only   be   curbed   through   increased
surveillance.
6.11. At the 44th meeting held on 20.07.2012, the DCC noted the
importance of continuous surveillance to stop the misuse
of   the   Oxytocin.   After   deliberations,   it   was   agreed   that
diversion  of  the  bulk  drug  to  illegal  channels  could   be
curtailed to a large extent, if it was ensured that the bulk
drug is sold to licensed manufacturers only.
6.12. On   12.11.2013,   the   DCC   convened   its   46th  meeting,
wherein the misuse of oxytocin injections to milch animals
came up for further discussion.
After  deliberations,  the  DCC  recommended that  the
manufacture   and   sale   of   Oxytocin   injections   should   be
banned for veterinary use under Section 26A of the Act
coupled with the condition that the manufacturers of the
bulk   drug   Oxytocin   should   supply   the   Active
8
Pharmaceutical   Ingredient   (“API”)   only   to   licensed
manufacturers of Oxytocin formulations for human use.
6.13. At the 65th meeting of the DTAB held on 25.11.2013, the
misuse of Oxytocin by dairy owners to extract milk from
milch   animals   and   its   harmful   effects   on   animals   and
human   consumption   was   deliberated   upon.   While
acknowledging that Oxytocin had proven medical use for
inducing labour, and to control post­partum bleeding and
uterine hypotonicity, the DTAB recognized the abundant
availability and use of the drug in a clandestine manner,
which was a matter of great concern for public health. In
spite of the action taken by the authorities to place the
drug under Schedule H of the Drugs & Cosmetics Rules,
1945, which requires the drug to be dispensed only on the
prescription   of   a   Registered   Medical   Practitioner,   the
manufacture and sale of the drug in a clandestine manner
in large quantities, and its misuse by the farmers or dairy
owners was rampant.
The opinion of the Department of Animal Husbandry,
Dairying and Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, was sought
with   respect   to   the   proposal   for   banning   Oxytocin   for
Animal use. It was opined that ban on the production and
use   of   Oxytocin   for   veterinary   purposes,   was   not
recommended, since the drug has therapeutic application
in case of expulsion of foetus, and retention of placenta
even in animals.
9
After deliberations, the DTAB noted that since the drug
has a definite use for therapeutic purposes, it need not be
prohibited. It was, however, opined that the manufacturer
of the bulk drug should supply the API only to licensed
manufacturers of the drug and veterinary hospitals. It was
further recommended that the State Drugs Controllers be
asked to curb the misuse of the drug through increased
surveillance and raids conducted on the possible hideouts
of clandestine manufacture and sale of the drug, and take
strict action against the offenders.
6.14. Pursuant to the recommendations made by the DTAB in
the 65th meeting, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
issued   a   Notification   G.S.R   29(E)   dated   17.01.2014
restricting the manufacture and sale of Oxytocin as under:
“Whereas the Central Government is satisfied that the drug Oxytocin has a
definite therapeutic use in certain medical conditions;
And whereas the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary and
expedient to regulate and restrict the manufacture, sale and distribution of
the said drug in the country to prevent its misuse in public interest.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 26A of the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), the Central Government
hereby directs that the drug oxytocin shall be manufactured for sale or for
distribution   or   sold   in   the   manner   specified   below,   in   addition   to   the
provisions contained in the said Act and Rules made thereunder, namely: ­
1.  The   manufacturers   of   bulk   oxytocin   drug   shall   supply   the   active
pharmaceutical drug only to the manufacturers licensed under the Drugs
and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 for manufacture of formulations of the said
drug.
2. The formulations meant for veterinary use shall be sold to the veterinary
hospitals only.” 
(emphasis supplied)
6.15. The validity of the aforesaid Notification dated 17.01.2014
was challenged before the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
Narang   Medical   Store   v.   Union   of   India  [W.P.(C)   No.
10
7135/2014],  inter alia  on the ground that it was not in
consonance with the provisions of Section 26A of the Act.
The High Court vide judgment and order dated 28.01.2016,
upheld the validity of the Notification, to avoid the misuse
of the bulk drug or Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient used
in Oxytocin injections.
6.16. At the 67th  meeting of the DTAB held on 01.04.14, the
DTAB once again recognized that the drug Oxytocin has a
definite   role   in   the   medical   field   for   both   humans   and
animals, and as such the legitimate manufacture and sale
of the drugs cannot be stopped by banning the drug. Even
if   the   domestic   manufacturers   are   prohibited   from
manufacturing   the   drug,   the   bulk   drug   is   liable   to   be
smuggled from the neighbouring countries for illegal use.
Misuse can only be contained by enhanced surveillance by
the regulatory authorities, followed by strict action against
the violators.
After deliberations, the DTAB recommended that at the
time of sale of oxytocin by retail chemists, the name and
address of the purchaser, the name of the patient, and the
quantity supplied shall be recorded. Such records shall be
maintained for three years, and shall be kept open  for
inspection. This would help in not only maintaining the
legitimate supply of the drug, but also to curb misuse of
the drug through the legitimate sale channels.
6.17. The recommendations of DTAB came to be given statutory
effect   by   an   amendment   to   Rule   65   of   the   Drugs   and
11
Cosmetics Rules,1945  vide  Notification dated 30th  August
2013   published   by   the   Ministry   of   Health   and   Family
Welfare.
6.18. On 05.11.2014, a meeting was convened by the Minister
for   Women   and   Child   Development   Ministry   (MWCD),
which   was   attended   by   Secretaries   from   various   other
Ministries. In this meeting, a suggestion was mooted that
on account of the rampant misuse of Oxytocin, which led
to cows and animals contracting diseases, and the illegal
use   for   increasing   milk   production,   could   be   effectively
controlled if a “Government of India owned company may
be allowed for production of this drug in the country and the
private companies may be prohibited for the same.”
6.19. At the 69th  DTAB meeting held on 22.04.15, the DTAB
reiterated its earlier recommendation that Oxytocin “need
not   be   prohibited   as   it   has   definite   use   for   therapeutic
purposes. Shri A. K. Tiwari of IVRI stated that the drug
oxytocin is an essential drug in the veterinary practice. He
added that the Department of animal husbandry had also
earlier given his opinion that the ban on production and use
of oxytocin for veterinary used is not recommended.” The
DTAB   observed   that   the   misuse   of   the   drug   can   be
controlled by stricter control over the manufacture and sale
of the drug, especially through clandestine channels. The
DTAB noted that “Constant surveillance by the State Drug
Regulatory Authorities and other regulatory authorities can
only curb the misuse of the drug.”
12
6.20. In its 70th meeting dated 18.08.15, the DTAB was informed
that dairy owners were getting the drug manufactured at
dubious premises from unscrupulous suppliers. The DTAB
noted that the raw material or the bulk drug was being
clandestinely smuggled into the country from the border
States,   which   was   then   being   crudely   manufactured
clandestinely and sold to dairy owners at a very cheap rate.
The DTAB reiterated its recommendation that “the drug
legitimately manufactured is required for medical purposes
and as such cannot be prohibited. The misuse of the drug in
a   crude   form,   can   only   be   curbed   through   constant
surveillance by the Regulatory Authorities.”
6.21. On 16.10.2015, the DCC in its 49th Meeting discussed the
rampant misuse of Oxytocin through clandestine channels.
It was inter alia recommended that officials from the State
Drug   Regulatory   Authority   must   conduct   periodic   raids
with the assistance of the Police at suspected outlets; and
that the manufacture and sale of oxytocin formulations by
the   licenced   manufacturers   in   the   State,   should   be
monitored regularly.
6.22. On 12.02.2018, the DTAB in its 78th  meeting considered
the proposal to restrict the supply of Oxytocin formulations
for human use only to registered hospitals and clinics in
public and private sector to prevent misuse of the drug.
The members deliberated upon the matter and “agreed on
a draft notification for regulating, restricting the Oxytocin
13
formulations for human use to be supplied only to registered
hospitals and clinics in public and private sector.”
The DTAB accepted in principle the proposal to amend
Rule 96 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 to ensure
that bar­coding system is adopted for the manufacture and
sale of Oxytocin formulations so as to ensure track and
traceability of the product, to avoid its misuse.
The DTAB had further agreed to prohibit the import of
Oxytocin formulations under Section 10A of the said Act
for human as well as animal use.
6.23. On 09.04.2018, the DCC at the 53rd meeting was informed
about the recommendations of the 78th DTAB meeting held
on   12.02.2018   to   address   the   misuse   of   Oxytocin.   The
DCC, in principle, agreed with the recommendations of the
DTAB.
6.24. On 18.04.2018, The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
issued   a   Notification,   containing   “Draft   Rules”  viz.  the
“Drugs and Cosmetics (Amendment) Rules, 2018, on which
objections and suggestions were invited to within 45 days.
The Draft Rules proposed to amend Rule 96 of the Drugs
and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 to ensure that a 3­tier barcoding   system   is   adopted   by   licensed   manufacturers   of
Oxytocin formulations to facilitate and trace their products.
The   relevant   extracts   of   Rule   1   and   2   are   extracted
hereinbelow for ready reference:
DRAFT RULES
“1. (1) These rules may be called the Drugs and Cosmetics ( Amendment) Rules,
2018.
14
(2) These rules shall come into effect after one hundred eighty days of the publication
of the final rules in the Gazette of India. 2. In the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945,
in rule 96, in sub-rule (1), after clause (xii) the following clause shall be inserted,
namely:-
"(xiii) (A) The manufacturers of drug formulations of oxytocin shall print the details
specified below to facilitate tracking and tracing of their products, namely:-
a. at primary level packaging of two dimensional barcode encoding unique and
universal global product identification code in the 14 digits Global Trade Item
Number format along with batch number, expiry date and a unique serial number of
the primary pack;
b. at secondary level packaging of one or two dimensional barcode encoding unique
and universal global product identification code in the 14 digits Global Trade Item
Number format along with batch number, expiry date and a unique serial number of
the secondary pack;
c. at tertiary level packaging of one dimensional barcode encoding unique and
universal global product identification code in the 14 digits Global Trade Item
Number format along with batch number, expiry date and a unique serial number of
the Tertiary pack.
(B) The manufacturer of drug formulation shall maintain the data in the parent —
child relationship for all three level of packaging and their movement in its supply
chain.
(C) The data referred to in sub-rule (2) shall be uploaded on the central portal of the
Central Government by the manufacturer or its designated agency before release of
the drugs for sale or distribution. (D) The responsibility of the correctness,
completeness and ensuring timely upload of data on the Central portal shall be that of
the manufacturer.”
The Central Government did not proceed with these
Draft Rules, since the Impugned Notification came to be
passed on 27.04.2018. As a consequence, the Draft Rules
lapsed.
6.25. On 24.04.18, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in
exercise of its powers under Section 10A of the Act issued a
Notification completely prohibiting the import of ‘Oxytocin
and its formulation in any name or manner’ into India.
6.26. On 27.04.18, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in
exercise of its powers under Section 26A of the Act issued
the   Impugned   Notification,   which   superseded   the
Notification dated 17.01.2014, and directed that the drug
Oxytocin   shall   be   manufactured   only   by   public   sector
undertakings or companies for domestic use. However, the
manufacture of Oxytocin formulations for export purposes
shall be open to both public and private sector companies.
15
The   impugned  Notification   date  27.04.2018   is   extracted
herein below for ready reference:
“G.S.R. 411(E).—Whereas the Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh,
Shimla, has, in its judgment dated 15.3.2016 in CWPIL No. 16 of 2014
titled ‘Court on its own motion’ versus State of Himachal Pradesh and
others, observed that there is large scale clandestine manufacture and
sale of the drug Oxytocin leading to its grave misuse, which is harmful to
animals and humans;
And   whereas,   the   said   Hon’ble   High   Court   also   observed   that   the
feasibility of restricting the manufacture of Oxytocin only in public sector
companies and also restricting and limiting the manufacture of Oxytocin
by companies to whom licenses have already been granted should be
considered;
And whereas, the Drugs Technical Advisory Board constituted under
section 5 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940) considered
the   said   issue   in   its   meeting   held   on   the   12th   February   2018   and
recommended that Oxytocin formulations for human use be regulated
and restricted to be supplied only to registered hospitals and clinics in
public and private sector to prevent misuse of the said drug;
And   whereas,   the   Central   Government,   on   the   basis   of   the
recommendations of the said Board and after examination of the matter,
is satisfied that unregulated and illegal use of the drug Oxytocin is likely
to involve risk to human beings or animals and that in the public interest
it is necessary and expedient to regulate and restrict the manufacture,
sale and distribution of the drug Oxytocin in the country to prevent its
misuse by unauthorised persons or otherwise;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 26A of the
said Act, and in supersession of the notification number G.S.R. 29(E)
dated 17th January, 2014, the Central Government hereby directs that
the drug Oxytocin shall be manufactured for sale or for distribution or
sold in the manner specified below, namely:­
(i) The manufacture of Oxytocin formulations for domestic use shall
be by public sector undertakings or companies only and the label of the
product shall bear barcodes.
(ii)   The manufacture of Oxytocin formulations for export purposes
shall be open to both public and private sector companies and the packs
of such manufacture for exports shall bear barcodes. 
(iii) The   manufacturers   of   active   pharmaceutical   ingredient   of
Oxytocin shall supply the active pharmaceutical ingredient only to the
public sector manufacturers licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics
Rules, 1945 for manufacture of formulations of the said drug for domestic
use.
(iv) The   manufacturers   of   active   pharmaceutical   ingredient   of
Oxytocin shall supply the said active pharmaceutical ingredient to the
manufacturers in public and private sector licensed under the Drugs and
Cosmetics Rules, 1945 for manufacture of formulations of the said drug
for export purpose.
(v) The   Oxytocin   formulations   manufactured   by   the   public   sector
companies   or   undertakings   licensed   under   the   Drugs   and   Cosmetics
Rules, 1945 for domestic use shall supply the formulations meant for
human and veterinary use only,­
16
(a) to the registered hospitals and clinics in public and private sector
directly; or (b) to the Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana
(PMBJP) and Affordable Medicines and Reliable Implants for Treatment
(AMRIT) outlets or any other Government entity which may be specified
by the Central Government for this purpose in the country which shall
further supply the drug to the registered hospitals and clinics in public
and private sector.
(vi) The Oxytocin in any form or name shall not be allowed to be sold
through retail Chemist.”   
    (emphasis supplied)
6.27. On 25.07.18, the DTAB in its 80th  meeting recommended
the amendment of the Impugned Notification by deleting
Clause (v) and Clauses (vi) of the impugned Notification
dated 27.04.18, so as to ensure availability of the drug for
human use.
6.28. The Impugned Notification was subsequently amended by
Notification   dated   21.08.18.   The   Notification   dated
21.08.18 substituted clauses (v) and (vi), with the following
amended clause (v),
“(v)   The   Oxytocin   formulations   manufactured   by   the   public   sector
companies or undertakings licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics
Rules,  1945   shall   be   distributed   or   sold   in   accordance   with   such
rules.”
As a consequence of this amendment, the effect of the
impugned   notification   was   diluted,   and   Oxytocin
formulations could be sold and distributed by the public
sector companies or undertakings in accordance with the
Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 as against the earlier
restriction  wherein  Oxytocin   formulations  could  only be
supplied to the registered hospitals and clinics in public
and private sector directly; or through the Pradhan Mantri
Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana (PMBJP) and Affordable
17
Medicines   and   Reliable   Implants   for   Treatment   (AMRIT)
outlets.
6.29. On 30.07.2018, the DCC convened the 54th meeting where
the Chairman of the DCC apprised the Committee of the
Notification dated 27.04.2018 (“Impugned Notification”) to
restrict the manufacture for sale, sale or distribution of
Oxytocin   to   only   to   public   sector   undertakings   or
companies for domestic use.
The Secretary, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare
requested   the   State   Drug   Controllers   to   ensure   the
availability of Oxytocin in their respective States by placing
purchase   orders   in   time   with   Karnataka   Antibiotics   &
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (“KAPL”).
6.30. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare issued another
Notification   on   the   same   date   i.e.   21.08.18,   wherein
Oxytocin,   which   was   included   under   Entry   No.   382   of
Schedule ‘H’ of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules,1945 was
now shifted to Schedule ‘H1’ at Entry No. 47. Schedule H1
refers to Rules 65 and 97 of the Drugs and Cosmetics
Rules,1945.
As per the said Rules, Schedule H1 prescription drugs
provide   for   stricter   control   and   additional   precautions
when compared with Schedule H drugs.
The relevant extracts of the Rules are set out herein
below for ready reference:
“65. Conditions of licences. ­ Licences in Forms 20, 20­A, 20­B, 20­F,
20­G, 21 and 21­B shall be subject to the conditions stated therein and
to the following general conditions18
….
(3)(1) The supply of any drug [other than those specified in Schedule X]
on a prescription of a registered medical practitioner shall be recorded
at the time of supply in a prescription  register specially maintained for
the purpose and the serial number of entry in this regard shall be
entered on the prescription. The following particulars shall be entered in
the register:­
(a) serial number of the entry,
(b) the date of supply,
(c) the name and address of the prescriber,
[(d) the name and address of the patient, or the name and address of
the owner of the animal if the drug supplied is for veterinary use,]
(e) the name of the drug or preparation and the quantity or in the case of
a medicine made up by the licensee, the ingredients and quantities
thereof,
(f) in the case of a drug specified in Schedule C or Schedule H and
Schedule H1, the name of manufacturer of the drug, its batch number
and the date of expiry of potency, if any,
(g)   the   signature   of   the   [registered   Pharmacist]   by   or   under   whose
supervision the medicine was made up or supplied
…..
    (h)  the   supply   of   a   drug   specified   in   Schedule   H1   shall   be
recorded in a separate register at the time of the supply giving
the name and address of the prescriber, the name of the patient,
the   name   of   the   drug   and   the   quantity   supplied   and   such
records   shall   be  maintained   for   three   years   and   be   open   for
inspection.
….
(6) The licensee shall produce for inspection by an Inspector appointed
under the Act on demand all registers and records maintained under
these Rules, and shall supply to the Inspector such information as he
may require for the purpose of ascertaining whether the provisions of
the Act and Rules thereunder have been observed.
(7) Except where otherwise provided in these Rules, all registers and
records maintained under these Rules shall be preserved for a period of
not less than two years from the date of the last entry therein.
(8)  Notwithstanding   anything  contained   in  this   Rule  it   shall  not   be
necessary to record particulars in a register specially maintained for the
purpose if the particulars are recorded in any other register specially
maintained under any other law for the time being in force.
9)      (a)  Substances   specified   in   Schedule  H  and   Schedule  H1  or
Schedule   X   shall   not   be   sold   by   retail   except   on   and   in
accordance   with   the   prescription   of   a   Registered   Medical
    Practitioner and in the case of substances specified in Schedule X, the
prescriptions shall be in duplicate, one copy of which shall be retained
by the licensee for a period of two years.
(b) The supply of drugs specified in Schedule H and Schedule H1
or   Schedule   X   to   Registered   Medical   Practitioners,   Hospitals,
Dispensaries and Nursing Homes shall be made only against the
signed order in writing which shall be preserved by the licensee
for a period of two years.
19
….
(11) The person dispensing a prescription containing a drug specified in
Schedule H and Schedule H1 and Schedule X shall comply with the
following requirements in addition to other requirement of these rules.
(a) the prescription must not be dispensed more than once unless the
prescriber has stated thereon that it may be dispensed more than once;
(b) if the prescription contains a direction that it may be dispensed a
stated number of times or at stated intervals it must not be dispensed
otherwise than in accordance with the directions;
(c) at the time of dispensing there must be noted on the prescription
above the signature of the prescriber the name and address of the seller
and the date on which the prescription is dispensed.
…..
(11­A)   No   person   dispensing   a   prescription   containing   substances
specified in Schedule H and Schedule H1 or X, may supply any other
preparation,  whether   containing  the   same  substance   or  not,   in  lieu
thereof.
97.  Labelling of medicines.— 1 [(1) The container of a medicine for
internal use shall—
(b) if it contains a substance specified in Schedule H, be labelled with
the symbol Rx and conspicuously displayed on the left top corner of the
label and shall also be labelled with the following words in legible black
coloured font size in completely red rectangular box:
‘Schedule H Prescription Drug­ Caution: Not to be sold by retail without
the prescription of a Registered Medical Practitioner’
(e) if it contains a drug substance specified in Schedule H1, be
labelled   with   the   symbol   Rx,   which   shall   be   in   red   and
conspicuously displayed on the left top corner of the label, and
shall also be labelled with the following words in legible black
coloured font size in completely red rectangular box:
“SCHEDULE H1 PRESCRIPTION DRUG – CAUTION. –
­ It   is   dangerous   to   take   this   preparation   except   in
accordance with the medical advice.
­ Not   to   be   sold   by   retail   without   the   prescription   of   a
Registered Medical Practitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
7. The Impugned Notification dated 27.04.18 was challenged by
the   Respondents   –   BGP   Products   Operations   GmBH,   Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., All India Drug Action Network, Neon
Laboratories Ltd. and Ciron Drugs And Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd
before the Delhi High Court in May 2018.
20
8. The   Delhi   High   Court  vide  the   Impugned   Judgment   dated
14.12.2018   quashed   the   impugned   Notification   as   being
arbitrary and unreasonable. It was held there was no scientific
basis, and insufficient data to support the conclusion that the
existing availability or manner of distribution of Oxytocin posed
a   risk   to   human   life   or   animals,   which   is   one   of   the   preconditions for exercise of power under Section 26A of the Act.
The High Court held that the trigger and catalyst to the passing
of the impugned Notification was the decision of the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla dated 15.03.2016 in Court On Its
Own   Motion   vs   State   of   Himachal   Pradesh6
,   which   did   not
consider   that   Oxytocin   was   an   essential   drug   which   was
included in the NLEM. It was further held that the Central
Government did not adequately weigh the danger to the lives of
the users of Oxytocin i.e pregnant women and young mothers,
nor did it consider the deleterious effect to the public generally
and women particularly, of the possible restricted supply of a
life­saving drug, if the manufacture is confined to one single
public   sector   enterprise,   namely   Karnataka   Antibiotic   and
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (“KAPL”), which admittedly has no prior
experience in manufacturing the drug. The High Court opined
that the risk of such a consequence can be drastic since the
scarcity of the drug, or even a restricted availability can lead to
increased maternal fatalities during childbirth, impairing lives of
thousands of innocent young mothers. It was held that there is
no provision in the Act, including Section 26A, which authorized
the Central Government to create a State monopoly in favour of
6 CWPIL No. 16 of 2014
21
one licensee, which did not fall within the protective ambit of
Article 19(1)(6)(ii).
9. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, and perused
the pleadings and written submissions filed by the parties.
10. Mr.   Tushar   Mehta,   Learned   Solicitor   General   and   Mr.
Vikramjeet   Banerjee,   Learned   Additional   Solicitor   General   of
India appeared on behalf of the Appellant­Union of India.
The   Senior   Counsel   for   the   Union   of   India   assailed   the
impugned Judgment on the ground that the High Court had
exceeded   its   jurisdiction   by   reviewing   the   sufficiency   of   the
material relied upon by the Central Government in exercise of
its legislative powers under Section 26A of the Act. The Counsel
for the Union of India­Appellants submitted as follows:
10.1. The exercise of power under Section 26A being
legislative in  nature, the grounds for judicial review are
limited. The  Court should exercise judicial restraint in
review of policy  matters and cannot sit in appeal over a
policy decision.  Since   the   impugned   notification
creates a general restriction  with respect to all licensed
manufacturers, it would not  amount   to   an   executive
action.
10.2. It   was   further   submitted   that   there   is   a
presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a
subordinate  legislation   and   the   burden   is   upon   the
Respondents to show  that   it   is   invalid.   Reliance   was
placed on Akadasi Pradhan  vs State of Orissa7
,  State of
7 1963 Supp (2) SCR 691 : AIR 1963 SC 1047
22
T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy8
, UOI v.  Cynamide   India   Pvt.
Ltd9
;  E   Merck   (India)   Limited   v.   UOI10;  Macleods
Pharmaceuticals Limited v. UOI11
, Drug Controller  General
of India vs West Bengal Small Scale Manufacturers12
,  UniSan Pharmaceuticals Ltd.& Anr. v UOI13
10.3. It   was   further   argued   that   the   Court   cannot
exercise judicial  review   over   a   legislative   act   on   the
basis of sufficiency or  insufficiency   of   material.   The
Court cannot weigh and sift  through evidence or material
relied upon by the Central Government in exercise of its
powers under Section 26A.  The Court cannot substitute its
wisdom in place of the  wisdom   of   the   Central
Government, particularly, in matters  of   public   health
and public interest. Reliance was placed on  Union   of
India vs Pfizer Ltd.14, Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v State  of
Karnataka15,   Shimnit   Utsch   India   (P)   Ltd.   v   West   Bengal
Transport   Infrastructure   Development   Ltd.   &   Ors.16
,
Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Ors.17
,
Academy   of   Nutrition   Improvement   v   Union   of   India18
,
Vincent  Panikurlangara   v   Union   of   India19
,  Systopic
Laboratories v  Dr. Prem Gupta20
.
8 (2006) 4 SCC 517
9 1987 (2) SCC 720
10 2001 (90) DLT 16
11 2012 SCC Online Mad 1735
12 AIR 2000 Cal 133
13 AIR 2002 Ker 72: (2001) 1 KLJ 822
14 (2018) 2 SCC 39
15 (1996) 10 SCC 304
16 (2010) 6 SCC 303.
17 (2007) 4 SCC 737
18 (2011) 8 SCC 274
19 (1987) 2 SCC 165
20 (1994) Suppl. 1 SCC 160
23
10.4. It was submitted that Section 26­A confers wide
powers   on   the   Central   Government   to   either   regulate,
restrict or prohibit the manufacture, sale or distribution of
a drug, if the   Central   Government   is   “satisfied”   that   the
conditions mentioned in Section 26­A exist.
Section 26­A of the Act reads as under:
26A. Powers of Central Government to prohibit manufacture, etc., of
drug and cosmetic in public interest.­­­Without prejudice to any other
provision contained in this Chapter, if the Central Government is
satisfied, that the use of any drug or cosmetic is likely to involve any
risk to human beings or animals or that any drug does not have the
therapeutic value claimed or purported to be claimed for it or contains
ingredients and in such quantity for which there is no therapeutic
justification   and   that   in   the   public   interest   it   is   necessary   or
expedient so to do, then, that Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, regulate, restrict or prohibit the manufacture, sale or
distribution of such drug or cosmetic.”
The   Central   Government   was   not   bound   by
recommendations of the DTAB or the DCC. The Central
Government could independently arrive at a satisfaction
with regard to the factum of misuse of the drug.
10.5. The  misuse   of   Oxytocin   was   consistently
deliberated by the DCC and DTAB since the past 21 years
from 1997 onwards, and formed the basis of the impugned
Notification. The minutes of the meetings of the DTAB and
DCC   reveal   the  factum   of   misuse  of   Oxytocin   and   its
harmful effects on  milch   animals   and   humans   through
consumption of such milk. The subjective “satisfaction” of
the Central Government was arrived at after considering
24
the factum of  misuse which was deliberated by the DTAB
and DCC. Reliance was placed on a Chart on Oxytocin Data
Compilation from April 2015 to August 2018, which showed
that licensed manufacturers were manufacturing far more
Oxytocin   than   the   legitimate   national   requirement,   and
there   was   a   considerable   amount   of   “leakage”   in   the
production. The licensed manufacturers were responsible
for this leakage as they were supplying the bulk drug or API
manufactured   by   Hemmo   Pharma   to   small   illegal   local
units   for   production   of   spurious   Oxytocin.   The   Central
Government in public interest decided to strike a balance
between   two   competing  interests  i.e  animal   and   human
health, and issued the impugned notification.
10.6.The   impugned   Notification   does   not   violate   or
extinguish the  right to carry on any trade or business or
occupation of the Respondent­Manufacturers under Article
19(1)(g). The  Impugned   Notification   does   not   create   a
State Monopoly in  favour of KAPL, since the Respondentmanufacturers still  have a right to export Oxytocin and sell
their products  overseas. They are restricted only insofar as
domestic  manufacture   and   distribution   of   Oxytocin   is
concerned. The Impugned Notification merely regulates the
manufacture of Oxytocin, and does not completely prohibit
it.
Even   otherwise,   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned
judgment has held in favour of the Appellants to the extent
that the power to restrict or prohibit under Section 26A
can be used to “partially ban the manufacture of a drug i.e
25
prohibit   its   production   by   private   manufacturers,   and
reserve it, so to speak for the public sector”.
Such a measure cannot be said to be ultra vires the
power under the statute.
10.7.The Impugned Notification is protected under Article
19(6) of the Constitution of India. It was contended that
Article 19(6)(ii) of the Constitution empowers the State to
enact laws with regard to any trade, business, industry or
service,  to the complete or partial exclusion of citizens
and private  entities.
In the alternative, even if the impugned notification
does   create   a   State   monopoly,   there   is   no   requirement
under Article 19(6) to enact legislation for the creation of
the same. Restrictions on trade can be created by way of
notification as well. Such a measure should be presumed
to be reasonable and constitutional. Reliance was placed
on  Akadasi   Pradhan   vs   State   of   Orissa21
,  Khoday
Distilleries Ltd. v State of Karnataka22, Daruka & Co v Union
of India & Ors.23, Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v.
Punjab Drugs Manufacturers Assn.24, Municipal Committee,
Amritsar v State of Punjab25
.
10.8. It   was   further   submitted   that   the   impugned
notification was  issued   in   furtherance   of   legitimate
public interest towards  protection   of   bovine   heath,
21 1963 Supp (2) SCR 691 : AIR 1963 SC 1047
22 (1995) 1 SCC 574
23 (1973) 2 SCC 617
24 (1999) 6 SCC 247
25 (1966) 1 SCC 475
26
maintenance of animal  husbandry   standards   and
protection of the environment. The impugned notification is
also aimed to prevent the ill  effects   of   Oxytocin,   which
may affect human life due to  prolonged   consumption   of
milk from milch animals injected  with   the   drug.   The
Appellants placed reliance on Articles 48,  48A   and
51A(g) of the Constitution, which form part of the Directive
Principles of State Policy.
11. Mr. Kapil Sibal, Mr. Colin Gonsalves and Mr. S. Ganesh, Senior
Advocates   appeared   on   behalf   of   the   Respondents.   Ms.
Meenakshi Arora, Senior Advocate appeared for the Federation
of   Obstetric   and   Gynaecological   Societies  of   India,   and  Mr.
Jayant   Mehta,   Advocate   appeared   on   behalf   of   the   Indian
Medical Association (Intervenors).
The Respondents submitted as follows:
11.1 The   Respondents   –   BGP   Products   Operations   GmBH,
Mylan  Pharmaceuticals  Pvt.  Ltd.,  and Ciron  Drugs And
Pharmaceuticals   Pvt.   Ltd   have   been   manufacturing
Oxytocin injections I.P. 5IU per 1 ml under a license issued
under Part VII of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 for
over three decades in India. They manufacture the drug
only   for   domestic   use.   It   was   submitted   that   the
Respondents have at least 50% of the market share in
terms of manufacturing the drug. It was submitted that the
Respondent­manufacturers do not sell the drug directly to
the end consumer and only sell by way of wholesale dealing
to licensed distributors and licensed retail chemists, and
use the very same chain of distribution that KAPL uses.
27
The license issued to the manufacturers under Part VII
of the Act also carries with it the license to sell by way of
wholesale dealing within the territory of India.
As a consequence of the Impugned Notification, the
license   issued   to   these   Respondents,   for   all   practical
purposes, stood cancelled and terminated.
The   impugned   Notification   impinges   and   violates
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution in as much as it has
completely   prohibited   the   Respondents   from
manufacturing Oxytocin as they do not have a license to
export the drug.
11.2 It was submitted that the Act provides for a level playing
field in relation to the manufacture, distribution and sale of
drugs by any person. Reliance was placed on Section 16
read with Schedule II of the Act, to contend that the Act is
concerned   with   “what”   is   manufactured,   distributed   or
sold;   and,   not   with   “who”   is   the   manufacturer   or
distributor or seller of the drug.
11.3 It was submitted that there was no relevant material or
evidence placed before the Central Government for it to
arrive   at   a   “satisfaction”   to   completely   prohibit   the
manufacture   and   sale   of   the   drug   by   the   RespondentManufacturers. It was submitted that neither the DCC nor
DTAB   had   recommended   or   approved   the   complete
prohibition   of   manufacture   of   Oxytocin   by   private
licensees.   It   was   further   submitted   that   the   statutory
bodies had never recommended that the manufacture of
28
Oxytocin for domestic use be exclusively reserved for the
public sector.
11.4 It   was   submitted   that   the   basis   of   the   impugned
Notification was the decision of the High Court of Himachal
Pradesh, Shimla dated 15.03.2016 in  Court On Its Own
Motion   vs   State   of   Himachal   Pradesh26,   which   was
completely   irrelevant   for   forming   a   “satisfaction”   while
issuing the Impugned Notification.
11.5 The Respondent­Manufacturers had never been prosecuted
or even issued a Show­Cause Notice under the Act for any
misuse or abuse of the drug, or violation of any provisions
of the Act. There was no material or evidence to show any
illegal   or   clandestine   manufacture   of   Oxytocin   by   the
Respondent­manufacturers who are licensed in accordance
with law. The Chart on Oxytocin Data Compilation from
April   2015   to   August   2018   relied   on   by   the   Central
Government to show unutilised quantity of the bulk drug
or the API is wholly irrelevant, and was only prepared in
August 2018, much after the impugned Notification was
passed.
11.6 It was submitted that at the 78th  meeting of the DTAB
dated 12.02.18, which forms the basis of the Impugned
Notification, the DTAB did not recommend to restrict the
manufacture of Oxytocin to public sector companies only,
nor did it determine that Oxytocin is likely to pose a risk to
animals or humans.
26 CWPIL No. 16 of 2014
29
Rather, the DTAB agreed on a draft notification for
regulating   and   restricting   the   supply   of   Oxytocin
formulations only through registered hospitals and clinics
in the ‘public and private sector’.
11.7 It was submitted that the Draft Rules published by the
Ministry   of   Health   and   Family   Welfare   on   18.04.2018
suggested and recommended a 3­tier system of barcoding of
all   Oxytocin   formulations   manufactured   by   licensed
manufacturers “so as to ensure track and traceability of the
product to avoid its misuse”. The Central Government after
10 days i.e., on 27.04.2018, took the drastic course of
prohibiting   the   manufacture   of   the   drug   by   all   private
sector   licensees,   and   arbitrarily   issued   the   impugned
notification.
It was submitted that there is no material on record to
show   on   what   basis   the   Central   Government   suddenly
changed   its   stand   between   18.04.2018   and   27.04.2018
from   a   3­tier   system   of   barcoding   to   that   of   complete
prohibition on the manufacture of the drug by licensed
private sector manufacturers.
11.8 It   was   submitted   that   the   impugned   notification   is
arbitrary,   unreasonable   and   issued   with   complete   nonapplication of mind. The power under S. 26A cannot be
used   in   respect   of   a   licensed   drug,   or   in   respect   of   a
spurious,   misbranded,   adulterated   and   illegally   or
clandestinely manufactured drug. The “use of any drug” as
used in Section 26A means its use only for the intended,
30
declared   and   avowed   purpose,   and   does   not   cover   its
misuse.   Therefore,   Section   26A   could   not   have   been
invoked   to   prohibit/regulate/restrict   the   misuse   of   an
essential and licensed drug.
11.9 Section 26A cannot be invoked where the manufacture,
sale or distribution of a drug is already “prohibited” under
Section 18 of the Act. The Act and the accompanying Rules
provide   for   a   robust   mechanism   for   countering   any
contravention   of   the   Act   by   licensed   manufacturers.
Therefore,   there   was   no   public   necessity   to   completely
prohibit   all   licensed   manufacturers   from   manufacturing
the drug.
11.10 The exercise of power under Section 26A cannot be said to
be   legislative   in   nature,   since   it   is   based   on   the
“satisfaction” of the Central Government alone. The Central
Government   in   exercise   of   its   executive/administrative
powers under Section 26A, cannot create a State monopoly
in the manufacture for domestic sale of a drug, and claim
the protection of Article 19(6) of the Constitution.  Reliance
was placed on  Rai Sahab Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors. v
State of Punjab27
.
11.11 It was further submitted that Memorandum of Delegated
Legislation   accompanying   the   Bill   No.65   of   1982
introducing insertion of Section 26A in the Act, makes no
reference to the exercise of powers under Section 26A as a
form of delegated legislation.
27 (1955) 2 SCR 225
31
11.12 It   was   submitted   that   the   Impugned   notification
discriminates   between   private   sector   licensed
manufacturers and public sector manufacturers as a State
monopoly has been created in favour of one public sector
company,  viz.  KAPL. It was submitted that the impugned
notification is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India
as   being   arbitrary,   unreasonable,   discriminatory   and
disproportionate.
11.13 By virtue of the Impugned Notification, only one public
sector   company  viz.  Karnataka   Antibiotic   and
Pharmaceuticals   Ltd.   (“KAPL”),   would   be   allowed   to
manufacture the drug for domestic purposes. This would
create a monopoly in favour of a public sector corporation,
which could have a disastrous effect on the supply and
availability of the drug to hospitals and patients in the
country. It was further submitted that KAPL is completely
inexperienced, since it obtained a license to manufacture
the drug as recently as in April 2018 i.e. a couple of weeks
before   the   impugned   notification   was   passed.   It   was
submitted that the manufacturing activity commenced in
May 2018, after the impugned notification was passed.
11.14 It   was   further   submitted   that   the   Drug   Control
Department,   Drug   Testing   Laboratory   Karnataka   had
found   that   several   drugs   manufactured   by   KAPL,   as
recently as in October 2018 were of Non­Standard Quality
(NSQ).
32
11.15 It was further submitted that on 01.11.2017, the Cabinet
Committee on Economic Affairs had given its in­principle
approval   for   the   strategic   disinvestment   of   the   Central
Government’s   100%   equity   stake   in   KAPL   though   an
auction sale.  Since the Central Government owns at least
51% equity stake in KAPL, this would mean that upon
such   disinvestment   KAPL   would   no   longer   be   a   public
sector company/undertaking.
11.16 It was contended that the Central Government could not
have invoked Section 26A of the Act, since Oxytocin is an
“essential drug” enlisted under the NLEM. The NLEM is
listed   in   the   1st  Schedule   to   the   DPCO   notified   by   the
Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section
3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It was submitted
that   power   under   Section   26A   cannot   be   exercised   in
respect of NLEM drugs. Section 6 of the EC Act gives the
DPCO   an   overriding   effect   over   other   statutes.   The
impugned notification issued under Section 26A is ultra
vires the said provision since it runs counter to the DPCO
and the Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
12. After having heard the Senior Counsel appearing for parties
on both sides, we are of the view that the present group of
appeals raise serious issues having far reaching implications.
The twin issues which arise for consideration are on the one
hand, the unregulated and clandestine manufacture of the
drug Oxytocin, which is reportedly misused in milch animals;
and on the other hand, the continued supply of an essential
life­saving   drug,   which   is   used   as   the   first   line   drug   for
33
prevention and treatment of post­partum haemorrhage at the
time of childbirth.
The   following   substantial   questions   of   law   arise   for
consideration:
(i) Whether a drug included in the National List of Essential
Medicines   published   under   Schedule   1   of   the   Drugs
(Prices Control) Order, 2013 notified under Section 3 of
the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 would be subject to
the provisions of Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics
Act, 1940?
(ii) Whether   the   impugned   notification   has   resulted   in
creating a monopoly in favour of public sector companies,
to the complete exclusion of private sector companies, and
if so, whether it would be protected by Article 19(6)(ii) read
with Article 14 of the Constitution?
(iii)Whether   the   classification   made   by   the   impugned
notification   between   licensed   public   sector   and   private
sector   companies,   in   the   manufacture   of   the   drug
Oxytocin for domestic use, would achieve the object and
purpose of preventing the unregulated and illegal use of
the drug?
34
(iv)Whether   it   would   be   in   public   interest   to   restrict   the
manufacture of a life­saving drug for domestic use, to a
single   public   sector   undertaking,   to   the   complete
exclusion of the private sector companies, particularly in
view of the high maternal mortality rates in the country?
(v) Whether there was relevant and objective material before
the Central Government to form the basis of satisfaction
to exercise the power to prohibit the manufacture of the
drug by the private sector companies for domestic use,
under Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940?
(vi)Whether   the   object   of   curbing   the   clandestine
manufacture and unregulated use of the drug Oxytocin,
which   is   covered   by   Section   18   of   the   Drugs   and
Cosmetics Act, 1940, can be achieved by taking recourse
to Section 26A by imposing a ban on the manufacture of
licensed drugs by private sector companies?
(vii) Whether the exercise of power by the Central Government
under Section 26A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
is legislative or executive in nature?
35
13. We are of the considered view that this is a fit case to refer
the matter to a larger Bench of three Judges to consider the
aforesaid questions of law, and authoritatively pronounce
upon the same. Accordingly, we direct the Registry to place
the   present   group   of   appeals   before   the   Hon’ble   Chief
Justice of India for necessary directions.
.......................................J.
(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
...…...............………………J.
(INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi;
August 22, 2019.
36
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL  APPEAL Nos.6588­6591 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.3296­3299 of 2019)
Union of India & Anr. Etc.Etc. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
BGP Products Operations GMBH
& Hagene Immermatt Weg. & Anr. 
Etc.Etc.              ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. I have had the advantage of going through an
elaborate drafted judgment proposed by my learned
sister Justice Indu Malhotra. I entirely agree with the
reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by her.
2. I need not set out the facts and submissions of
learned counsel for the parties as the same have been
succinctly set out by my learned sister in her draft
judgment.
1
3. Indeed, having heard very learned and persuasive
arguments   of   Mr.   Tushar   Mehta,   learned   Solicitor
General for the appellants and Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned
senior counsel for the respondents at length and on
perusal   of   the   record,   I   am   also   of   the   considered
opinion that having regard to the nature of controversy
and the myriad issues, which arise in the appeals,
they have far reaching consequences on the rights of
the citizens qua State and, in particular, the abstract
legal   issues   such   as   what   is  the   nature   of   powers
exercised by the Central Government under Section
26­A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, whether it is
legislative or executive, because we find that there is
no decision of this Court so far on this issue. (see
observations of this Court in  Union of India  &  Anr.
vs. Pfizer Ltd. & Ors., 2018 (2) SCC 39)
4. Secondly, what are the essential ingredients for
invoking the powers under Section 26­A of the Drugs
and   Cosmetics   Act   in   relation   to   any   Drug   and
2
whether such power is in conflict with the exercise of
powers   conferred   under   the   Essential   Commodities
Act.
5. Thirdly,   whether   issuance   of   impugned
notification   has   resulted   in   creating   monopoly
(whether partial or full) in favour of the State and, if
so, whether it has satisfied the rigor of Article 14 read
with Article 19 (6)(ii) of the Constitution of India.
6. Lastly,  depending upon the answer to the nature
of exercise of powers under Section 26­A of the Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, whether material relied on by the
Central   Government   can   be   held   as   sufficient   to
sustain the impugned action.
7. In   my  opinion,   if  the   exercise  of   power  under
Section 26­A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act  is held
as   being   legislative   in   nature,   the   parameters   to
examine   the   legality   of   the   impugned   notification
would be different whereas if it is held to be executive
in nature, the parameters to examine the legality of
3
impugned   notification   would   be   somewhat   different
than the former one.
8. In my considered opinion, the decision either way
on any of these questions will have its far reaching
effect on the rights and health of public at large and
especially on the rights and health of the teenage girls,
pregnant females and milching animals. It will also
decide   the   scope   of   the   powers   of   the   Central
Government   under   Section   26­A   of   the   Drugs   and
Cosmetics Act qua the rights of the persons, who are
engaged in business of manufacture and sale of Drugs
specified under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act read with
Essential Commodities Act.
9. In effect, in my opinion, it will not be a judgment
inter party but it will be in rem laying down the law on
the questions. 
10. It is for all these reasons, we have formulated the
questions   for   being   answered   on   their   respective
4
merits   in   paragraph   12   of   my   sister’s   drafted
judgment.
11. Let   the   matter,   therefore,   be   placed   before
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India under Rule VI (2) of
the Supreme Court Rules for being  dealt with by the
larger bench for their authoritative pronouncement on
the   questions   framed   and   for   the   disposal   of   the
appeals accordingly.
12. Since I have also formed an opinion to refer the
matter to be dealt with by the larger bench under VI
(2) of the Supreme Court Rules, I also do not consider
it   necessary   to   give   my   opinion   in   detail   on   the
questions formulated.
         ……...................................J
                                     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
 
                                 
New Delhi;
August 22, 2019
5

Thursday, August 22, 2019

Cheque bounce case - burden of proof - mere non mentioning in the complaint that towards credit of grossary the accused issued empty cheques - can not be burshed aside the evidence of the Pw1 - burden of proof lies on the accused .


18. In the present case, by examining himself as PW-1, the
complainant has discharged the initial burden cast upon him
that the cheques were issued for the rice bags purchased on
credit. With the examination of PW-1, the statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the Act arises that the
cheques were issued by the respondent-accused for the
discharge of any debt or other liability in whole or in part. The
courts below disbelieved the evidence of the complainant on
the ground that there are no averments in the complaint that
the commodities were sold for cash and that the rice bags were
sold on credit and the cheques were issued for the goods sold
on credit. Though the complaint contains no specific
averments that the cheques were issued for the purchase
made on credit, in his evidence, PW-1 clearly stated that the
cheques were issued for the commodities purchased on credit.
The courts below erred in brushing aside the evidence of PW-1
on the ground that there were no averments in the complaint as
to the purchases made by cash and purchase. The courts
below also erred in not raising the statutory presumption under
Section 139 of the Act that the complainant received the
cheques to discharge the debt or other liability in whole or in
part.
19. It is for the respondent-accused to adduce evidence to
prove that the cheques were not supported by consideration
and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him.
The receipts-Ex.-22/C (colly) relied upon by the respondentaccused do not create doubt about the purchases made on
credit and the existence of a legally enforceable debt for which
the cheques were issued. The courts below erred in saying
that by the receipts-Ex.22/C (colly), the respondent-accused
has rebutted the statutory presumption raised under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The oral and the
documentary evidence adduced by the complainant are
sufficient to prove that it was a legally enforceable debt and that
the cheques were issued to discharge the legally enforceable
17
debt. With the evidence adduced by the complainant, the
courts below ought to have raised the presumption under
Section 139 of the Act. The evidence adduced by the
respondent-accused is not sufficient to rebut the presumption
raised under Section 139 of the Act. The defence of the
respondent that though he made payment for the
commodities/rice bags, the blank cheques were not returned by
the appellant-complainant is quite unbelievable and
unacceptable. The impugned judgment of the High Court
cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. The
respondent-accused is convicted under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act in both the complaints; however,
considering that the cheque transaction was of the year 2003,
at this distant point of time, we do not deem it appropriate to
impose any sentence of imprisonment on the accused.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.61-62 OF 2011
M/S SHREE DANESHWARI TRADERS …..Appellant
VERSUS
SANJAY JAIN AND ANOTHER ….Respondents
J U D G M E N T
 R. BANUMATHI, J.
These appeals arise out of the judgment dated
28.07.2008 in Criminal Appeal Nos.53 and 54 of 2006 passed
by the High Court of Bombay in and by which the High Court
dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant-complainant
thereby upholding the acquittal of the respondent-accused
Sanjay Jain under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act.
2. Brief facts which led to filing of these appeals are as
under:-
1
The appellant-complainant had been supplying the
commodities and rice bags to the respondent-accused on his
request. In this regard, the respondent-accused issued various
cheques which when presented for collection were
dishonoured. The appellant had filed two complaints under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - complaint
No.339/OA/NI/2004/A and complaint No.499/OA/NI/2004/A
against the respondent-accused alleging that the cheques
issued by the respondent-accused in lieu of payment owed to
the appellant were dishonoured on presentation. It was
averred that despite issuance of legal notice, the respondent
did not make payments.
3. In case No.339/OA/NI/2004/A, the respondent-accused
issued three cheques drawn on UTI Bank details of which are
as under:-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Number Amount
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. 08.08.2003 002497 Rs.17,540.00
2. 18.08.2003 002463 Rs.17,871.00
3. 25.08.2003 002480 Rs.17,760.00
-------------------------------
 Total = Rs.53,171.00
2
4. In case No.499/OA/NI/2004/A, the respondent-accused
issued nine cheques, details of which are as under:-
Date Number Amount
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. 01.09.2003 002481 Rs.18,000.00
2. 15.09.2003 633427 Rs.20,000.00
3. 22.09.2003 633428 Rs.20,000.00
4. 29.09.2003 633429 Rs.20,000.00
5. 03.10.2003 531977 Rs.25,000.00
6. 06.10.2003 633430 Rs.20,979.00
7. 13.10.2003 531975 Rs.20,000.00
8. 27.10.2003 531976 Rs.25,000.00
9. 10.11.2003 531978 Rs.25,000.00
-------------------------------
 Total = Rs.1,93,979.00
5. When the above said cheques were presented to United
Western Bank, Margao Branch for encashment, cheques were
returned by the bank unpaid on 04.02.2004 and 20.02.2004
with the endorsement “not arranged for/funds insufficient” and
“funds insufficient”. The appellant thereafter issued legal
notices to the respondent-accused dated 05.02.2004 and
23.02.2004 respectively making a demand for the payment of
the cheque amount. The said notices were received by the
respondent-accused; though respondent acknowledged the
3
receipt of the notices, he did not make the payment nor
arranged that amount in satisfaction of the cheques issued by
him. Hence, the complainant filed two complaints under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as noted above.
6. Taking into account the receipts produced by the
respondent-accused, the trial court acquitted the respondentaccused in both the cases. The trial court rejected the case of
the appellant that the respondent sometimes used to purchase
rice bags on credit and sometimes used to purchase rice bags
on payment of cash and the same being inconsistent with the
documents produced by the appellant. The trial court held that
in the written complaint, the appellant-complainant has not
alleged anywhere that the respondent used to make credit as
well as cash purchases. The trial court held that the
respondent left blank cheques with the appellant as security
whenever he used to make credit purchases and therefore, the
presumption under Section 139 of the Act is not available to the
appellant.
7. In appeal, the High Court affirmed the acquittal of the
respondent-accused and held that the respondent had taken
4
the defence that the subject cheques were issued as security
towards the goods supplied for which payment was
subsequently made by cash. The High Court held that by
producing the relevant receipts, the respondent has rebutted
the presumption and that the respondent was able to prove that
the cheques were issued by way of security towards the goods
supplied to him for which he made the payment by cash. The
High Court further held that it was incumbent upon the
complainant to have explained in the complaint that the cash
payments made by the respondent were related to other
commodities and the cheques were made for payment of rice
bags. Holding that the case of the appellant was not consistent,
the High Court affirmed the order of acquittal and dismissed the
appeals filed by the complainant-appellant.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
transaction between the parties was a mercantile transaction
and during the course of the business, running accounts were
maintained when purchases were made at different times and
payments were made by both modes i.e. cash and cheques. It
was submitted that both the courts below overlooked the fact
5
that the transactions were mercantile transactions mixed up
with cash payments and also payments made by cheques. It
was submitted that the courts below erred in not keeping in
view the statutory presumption available under Section 139 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act to the appellant and that the
respondent-accused failed to rebut the presumption by leading
cogent and consistent evidence. The learned counsel urged
that the impugned judgment is contrary to the object of Section
138 and Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and is
liable to be set aside.
9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent
submitted that the respondent used to leave the cheques with
the complainant when he purchased the commodities – rice
bags and used to make cash payment towards those
commodities for which complainant issued receipts. It was
submitted that even though the complainant received the
money for the rice bags, he failed to return the cheques and
had misused those cheques and filed false complaints against
the respondent. It was submitted that the respondent has
rebutted the statutory presumption by producing twenty
6
receipts-Ex.-22/C (colly) ranging from 02.09.2003 to
17.11.2003 as also receipts-Ex.16/C (colly). The total amount
of the receipts issued by the complainant is Rs.1,94,000/- and
taking into consideration that the amount has been paid, the
courts below rightly held that the presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was rebutted by the
respondent-accused.
10. We have carefully considered the submissions and
perused the impugned judgment and other materials on record.
The point falling for consideration is whether the courts below
were right in acquitting the respondent-accused by holding that
the appellant-complainant has failed to prove that the
respondent owed him debt and that the cheques were issued
for the discharge of the said debt.
11. The appellant is a commission agent/merchant
conducting his business and he used to supply rice bags to the
respondent-accused on his request. Admittedly, the transaction
between the appellant-complainant and the respondentaccused was a mercantile transaction. During the course of
business, running accounts were maintained by the parties.
7
Case of the appellant is that the respondent used to purchase
rice bags sometimes on credit and sometimes on cash. In his
evidence, PW-1-complainant stated that the cheques were
issued for the credit transaction payable to the appellant by the
respondent. Per contra, case of the respondent is that Ex.-
16/C (colly) and Ex.-22/C (colly) were issued against the cash
payment made by the respondent-accused and though the
payments were made, the cheques issued by the respondentaccused were not returned to him. The respondent-accused
relies upon the various receipts-Ex.-22/C (colly) which are as
under:-
Sr.No. Receipt No. Date Amount
1. 1276 02.09.2003 Rs.16,000/-
2. 1291 04.09.2003 Rs.2,000/-
3. 1340 08.09.2003 Rs.16,000/-
4. 1489 27.09.2003 Rs.20,000/-
5. 1556 03.10.2003 Rs.20,000/-
6. 1615 06.10.2003 Rs.14,500/-
7. 1621 08.10.2003 Rs.5,000/-
8. 1682 13.10.2003 Rs.15,500/-
9. 1689 13.10.2003 Rs.3,300/-
10. 1746 20.10.2003 Rs.17,000/-
11. 1763 23.10.2003 Rs.1,500/-
12. 1760 23.10.2003 Rs.2,300/-
13. 1808 27.10.2003 Rs.16,000/-
14. 1828 01.11.2003 Rs.3,000/-
15. 1882 05.11.2003 Rs.20,000/-
16. 1942 11.11.2003 Rs.15,000/-
17. 1941 11.11.2003 Rs.3,000/-
18. 1953 15.11.2003 Rs.3,000/-
19. 1958 17.11.2003 Rs.12,000/-
20. 2001 17.11.2003 Rs.3,000/-
8
12. Case of the complainant is that whenever the respondent
used to make cash purchases, cash memos/receipts were
issued to the respondent and the above twenty receipts Ex.-
22/C (colly) pertain to cash sale. Complainant-PW-1 further
stated that the cheques issued by the respondent-accused are
subject matter of the complaints and pertain to the credit
purchases made by the respondent-accused and the
respondent has not made the payment or cleared the dues of
the purchases made by him on credit. On the other hand, case
of the respondent is that he always used to make credit
purchase and used to leave blank cheques with the
complainant-appellant and thereafter, he used to make
payment for which the complainant used to issue receipts to
the respondent; however, the appellant did not return the blank
cheques left by the respondent with the appellant though the
respondent made the payments and those cheques were
misused by the appellant-complainant.
13. As seen from the receipts-Ex.-16/C (colly) and Ex.-22/C
(colly), though the amount said to have been credited to the
account of the respondent, the receipts contain the expression
9
“cheques are subject to realisation”. The format of the receiptEx.-16 (colly) is as under:-
M (CST) 4265 dt 4.9.91 Tel: ………
M (ST) 6104 dt 4.9.91 Res: ……..
M/s SHREE DANESHWARI TRADERS
General Merchant & Commission Agent
Shop No.8, Masjid Building
Malbhar, MARGAO-GOA
No.1145 Date: 18.8.03
RECEIPT
Credited to the account of M/s Shantadurga Stores, Margao, the amount
of Rs. Fifteen Thousand only, by Cash/Cheque/Draft Rs.15,000/-.
For M/s. Shree Daneshwari Traders
 L/F ____________________________
Cheques are subject to realisation.
Case of the appellant is that the receipts-Ex.-22/C (colly) were
issued by the appellant to the respondent towards cash
payment made by the respondent during the course of
business. The courts below failed to consider that Ex.-22/C
(colly) were issued by the appellant to the respondent as
against the cash payment made by respondent. Whereas the
cheques were issued towards the credit purchases of
10
commodities from the complainant which is a legally
enforceable debt.
14. DW-2 is the father of respondent-accused. In his
evidence, DW-2 stated that the respondent used to leave blank
cheques with him in order to carry out the business transaction.
DW-2 has stated that they used to purchase rice bags from the
complainant and had left the cheques with the complainant.
Admittedly, the cheques are in the handwriting of DW-2. In his
evidence, DW-2 stated that though the amount pertaining to the
purchase of rice has already paid, the complainant did not
return the cheques in spite of having received the amount
pertaining to the purchase of rice. It is quite unbelievable that in
a business/mercantile transaction, the accused even after
making payment towards the purchase of rice bags, did not
insist for the return of the cheques. It is quite improbable that
the respondent-accused did not take any steps to get back the
cheques and continued with the business transaction even
though the complainant has not returned the cheques after
payment of the money.
11
15. The trial court in its judgment referred to the three
cheques and observed that the three cheques bearing
Nos.2463, dated 18.08.2003; 2480 dated 25.08.2003 and 2497
dated 08.08.2003 go to suggest that the later cheque bearing
No.2497 was given much more earlier to 18.08.2003 or
25.08.2003 which seems inconsistent and it would not have
been in the normal course of business. The trial court held that
the date of issuance of the three cheques suggests that the
cheques were already with the complainant and they were
utilised by the complainant thereafter. On this aspect, PW-1
was cross-examined as to why cheque bearing No.2497 was
issued on 08.08.2003 while it ought to have been issued after
25.08.2003 to which PW-1 stated that he does not know about
the same. After referring to the above three cheques, the trial
court held that in view of inconsistency, the presumption
available under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
is not available to the complainant which was affirmed by the
High Court. It was further held that the blank cheques left by
the accused were with the complainant and they have been
used to file the complaint. The courts below did not keep in
12
view that the appellant has no control over the manner of
issuance of cheques by the respondent and how it was issued.
Merely because, later cheque No.2497 was said to have been
issued by the respondent at an earlier date i.e. 08.08.2003, it
cannot be held that the complainant had used the blank
cheques issued by the respondent.
16. Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
once the cheque is issued by the drawer, a presumption under
Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in favour of the
holder would be attracted. Section 139 creates a statutory
presumption that a cheque received in the nature referred to
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is for the
discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability. The
initial burden lies upon the complainant to prove the
circumstances under which the cheque was issued in his
favour and that the same was issued in discharge of a legally
enforceable debt.
17. It is for the accused to adduce evidence of such facts and
circumstances to rebut the presumption that such debt does
not exist or that the cheques are not supported by
13
consideration. Considering the scope of the presumption to be
raised under Section 139 of the Act and the nature of evidence
to be adduced by the accused to rebut the presumption, in
Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513, the
Supreme Court in paras (14-15) and paras (18-20) held as
under:-
“14. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed,
unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque
received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
15. Presumptions are devices by use of which the courts are
enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding
that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the
Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one or the other
class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, (1) “may
presume” (rebuttable), (2) “shall presume” (rebuttable), and (3)
“conclusive presumptions” (irrebuttable). The term “presumption”
is used to designate an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of
the existence of a fact, conveniently called the “presumed fact”
drawn by a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning
from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or
established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal.
Presumption literally means “taking as true without examination
or proof”.
……..
18. Applying the definition of the word “proved” in Section 3 of
the Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of
the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138 of
the Act a presumption will have to be made that every negotiable
instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was
executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of
negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as
the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the
instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules
of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him
14
shift the burden on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist
and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by
the accused, that is, the cheque was not issued for consideration
and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in
itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for
whose benefit it exists.
19. The use of the phrase “until the contrary is proved” in Section
118 of the Act and use of the words “unless the contrary is
proved” in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of “may
presume” and “shall presume” as given in Section 4 of the
Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be
raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a
presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on
whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact
presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and
reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed,
the purpose of the presumption is over.
20. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two
options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not
exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the
non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a
prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt
existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not
expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is
expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may
adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was
not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or
liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not
insist in every case that the accused should disprove the nonexistence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence
because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible
nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of
the passing of the consideration and existence of debt,
apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused.
Something which is probable has to be brought on record for
getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To
disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record
such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the
court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not
exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man
would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea
15
that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to
prove that the note in question was not supported by
consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the
accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the
circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may
likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also
rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in
Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions
arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.” [underlining
added].
18. In the present case, by examining himself as PW-1, the
complainant has discharged the initial burden cast upon him
that the cheques were issued for the rice bags purchased on
credit. With the examination of PW-1, the statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the Act arises that the
cheques were issued by the respondent-accused for the
discharge of any debt or other liability in whole or in part. The
courts below disbelieved the evidence of the complainant on
the ground that there are no averments in the complaint that
the commodities were sold for cash and that the rice bags were
sold on credit and the cheques were issued for the goods sold
on credit. Though the complaint contains no specific
averments that the cheques were issued for the purchase
made on credit, in his evidence, PW-1 clearly stated that the
cheques were issued for the commodities purchased on credit.
16
The courts below erred in brushing aside the evidence of PW-1
on the ground that there were no averments in the complaint as
to the purchases made by cash and purchase. The courts
below also erred in not raising the statutory presumption under
Section 139 of the Act that the complainant received the
cheques to discharge the debt or other liability in whole or in
part.
19. It is for the respondent-accused to adduce evidence to
prove that the cheques were not supported by consideration
and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him.
The receipts-Ex.-22/C (colly) relied upon by the respondentaccused do not create doubt about the purchases made on
credit and the existence of a legally enforceable debt for which
the cheques were issued. The courts below erred in saying
that by the receipts-Ex.22/C (colly), the respondent-accused
has rebutted the statutory presumption raised under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The oral and the
documentary evidence adduced by the complainant are
sufficient to prove that it was a legally enforceable debt and that
the cheques were issued to discharge the legally enforceable
17
debt. With the evidence adduced by the complainant, the
courts below ought to have raised the presumption under
Section 139 of the Act. The evidence adduced by the
respondent-accused is not sufficient to rebut the presumption
raised under Section 139 of the Act. The defence of the
respondent that though he made payment for the
commodities/rice bags, the blank cheques were not returned by
the appellant-complainant is quite unbelievable and
unacceptable. The impugned judgment of the High Court
cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. The
respondent-accused is convicted under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act in both the complaints; however,
considering that the cheque transaction was of the year 2003,
at this distant point of time, we do not deem it appropriate to
impose any sentence of imprisonment on the accused.
20. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court in
Criminal Appeal Nos.53 and 54 of 2006 is set aside and these
appeals are allowed. The respondent-accused is convicted
under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and a fine of
Rs.2,97,150/- (Rs.53,171/- + Rs.1,93,979/- + compensation of
18
Rs.50,000/-) is imposed on the respondent in default of which,
the respondent shall undergo imprisonment for six months. The
fine amount of Rs.2,97,150/- is to be deposited before the trial
court within twelve weeks from today, failing which the
respondent shall be taken into custody to serve the default
sentence. On deposit of fine amount, the amount of
Rs.2,97,150/- shall be paid to the appellant-complainant.
 ………………………….J.
 [R. BANUMATHI]
………………………….J.
 [A.S. BOPANNA]
New Delhi;
August 21, 2019.
19

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act of 2013




1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.705 OF 2018
DR.P.S. MALIK ...PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF DELHI & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
The petitioner, A Judicial Officer in Delhi
Higher Judicial Services, against whom disciplinary
proceedings alleging sexual harassment is underway,
has filed this writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India praying for following reliefs:-
“a. issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of certiorari quashing the
resolution of Respondent No.1, the
Full Court of Delhi High Court dated
13.07.2016 inToto, cited in the report
dated 09.03.2018 (Annexure-P-12) and
also all subsequent resolutions passed
by Full Court of Delhi High Court
dated 19.07.2016, 16.11.2016,
23.02.2017, 06.07.2017 or on any other
date in relation to this enquiry,
cited in the report dated 09.03.2018
2
(Annexure-P- 12) as the same are
arbitrary, without any jurisdiction
and violative of the provisions of
Sexual Harassment of Women at
Workplace Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act of 2013, Art. 14 and
Art. 21 of the Constitution of India;
b. issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of certiorari quashing the
proceedings of ICC the Respondent
number 2 as held by it under the
Provisions of the Act of 2013.
c. issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of certiorari quashing the
Charge sheet dated 23.02.2017
(Annexure-P-7) issued by the
Respondent No.1 on the recommendation
of the Respondent No.2;
d. issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of certiorari quashing the
report dated 9.3.2018 (Annexure-P-12)
of the ICC, the 2nd Respondent herein
along with all the proceedings of the
Respondents leading thereto;
e. issue a writ, order or direction in
the nature of certiorari quashing the
letter of e Hon’ble Delhi High Court
dated 15.05.2018 (Annexure-P-11)
issued by Respondent No.1; and
f. pass any other writ, order or
direction as this Hon’ble Court deems
fit to grant in the interest of
justice.”
2. Brief facts necessary for deciding this writ
petition are:-
3
2.1 The petitioner has been working as Additional
District Judge at Dwarka, New Delhi. On
05.07.2016, a written complaint was submitted
against the petitioner by a lady, Junior
Judicial Assistant (hereinafter referred to
as “employee”) alleging sexual harassment at
work place. The complaint was addressed to
the Chief Justice of High Court of Delhi.
The Junior Judicial Assistant was working as
Ahlmad in the Court of the petitioner w.e.f.
18.05.2015. She continued to work in that
capacity till 18.05.2016. Another complaint
dated 11.07.2016 was submitted by the
employee to the Chief Justice. Complaint
submitted by the employee came for
consideration before the Full Court of the
High Court on 13.07.2016, which resolved as
under:-
i. The Judicial Officer be placed under
suspension with immediate effect
pending disciplinary proceeding
contemplated against him.
4
ii. The Registrar General will forward the
complaint dated 05.07.2016 to SHO of
the concerned Police Station for
appropriate action in accordance with
law under intimation to this Court.
iii. Registry to take steps in anticipation
of the confirmation of the Minutes.
2.2 The Full Court of the Delhi High Court by
further resolution dated 19.07.2016 resolved to
constitute an Internal Complaints Committee
consisting of five members to inquire into the
allegation of sexual harassment made against
the petitioner. The petitioner as well as the
employee appeared before the Internal
Complaints Committee (hereinafter referred to
as “Committee”). The petitioner was suspended
by order dated 13.07.2016 pending disciplinary
proceedings. The employee further submitted a
detailed statement dated 28.07.2016 before the
Committee. The petitioner submitted his reply
to the Committee on 02.09.2016. On 19.09.2016,
the Committee interacted with both the parties
separately. On 05.11.2016, the Committee
5
submitted a Preliminary Report to the Full
Court. By its Report dated 05.11.2016, the
Committee opined that a disciplinary inquiry be
held against the petitioner. Full Court of the
High Court in its meeting dated 16.11.2016
resolved that the disciplinary proceedings for
major penalty under Rule 8 of All India
Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 be
initiated against the petitioner.
2.3 The memo of charges dated 22/23.02.2017 was
given to the petitioner containing, article of
charges and statement of imputations. The
petitioner submitted written statement on
11.03.2017. The Full Court on 06.07.2017
considered the written statement of defence
dated 11.03.2017 of petitioner and resolved to
hold the inquiry. The Full Court resolved for
constituting a Committee in terms of Section 4
of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act,
2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”)
6
chaired by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Hima Kohli, who
was appointed as the Inquiring Authority.
2.4 The inquiry before the Inquiring Committee
proceeded and Report dated 09.03.2018 has been
submitted by the Internal Complaints Committee.
The Inquiry Report submitted by the Committee
was placed before the Full Court in its meeting
held on 25.04.2018 which resolved to forward
the Inquiry Report to the petitioner and to ask
him to submit his written submissions. Full
Court in its meeting dated 01.08.2018 also
resolved to supply certified copies of Full
Court Meeting Minutes dated 13.07.2016,
19.07.2016 and 16.11.2016 to the petitioner.
High Court also resolved that since the
Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 has
not been relied upon, the same be not supplied
to the petitioner. After receipt of the
Inquiry Report, the petitioner has filed this
writ petition on 08.06.2018.
7
3. We have heard Shri Varinder Kumar Sharma, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Shri P.S. Narsimha,
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that
the Full Court of the High Court on receiving the
complaint dated 05.07.2016 did not follow the
procedure given in Act, 2013. It is submitted that
Full Court ought to have handed over the complaint to
the Internal Complaints Committee for inquiry. Full
Court erred in issuing three punitive directions on
13.07.2016 against the petitioner. The order dated
13.07.2016 was premature being before an inquiry or
opportunity to the petitioner of being heard.
Further, they were passed by an authority, which had
no legal competence to pass those directions under
the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 and the
All India Services Rules. There has been blatant
violation of Act, 2013 in the petitioner’s case
vitiating the entire procedure. The Committee after
conducting the inquiry has submitted a Report dated
05.11.2016, which report was required to be given to
the petitioner as per Act, 2013 but was denied to the
8
petitioner. The Committee having not found proved
the allegation against the petitioner, Full Court
ought not to have proceeded to impose penalty against
the petitioner. The respondents have wrongly assumed
that they are the disciplinary authority of the
petitioner whereas under Rule 26A of the Delhi Higher
Judicial Service Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to
as “Rules, 1970”), the High Court has been debarred
from having any right over the members of the service
in matters relating to major penalties. The charge
memo dated 23.02.2017 was issued without even
information to the disciplinary authority, i.e., the
Governor.
5. Shri Narsimha, learned senior counsel appearing
for the respondents submits that High Court having
control over judicial officers under Article 235 of
the Constitution, it did not lack jurisdiction in
placing the petitioner under suspension and directing
for a regular disciplinary inquiry. Inquiry having
conducted by the Committee, which after holding fullfledged inquiry, giving full opportunity to the
petitioner has submitted a Report dated 09.03.2018.
9
The Inquiry Report dated 09.03.2018 was served on the
petitioner by letter dated 16.05.2018, where
petitioner was asked to submit his written
representation or statement within one month, which
has not yet been done. It is submitted that in view
of the fact that the petitioner has filed this
petition in this Court and matter being pending due
to deference to this Hon’ble Court, no further steps
have been taken in the inquiry. It is submitted that
the Report dated 05.11.2016 was a Preliminary Report
submitted by the Committee giving opinion that the
disciplinary inquiry be held, the said report being a
Preliminary Inquiry Report, it was not necessary to
serve such report to the petitioner. The Inquiry
Report conducted as per Section 11 of the Act, 2013
and as per Section 13, the copy of the report has
been duly served on the petitioner. Further, the
Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 was not
taken into consideration for framing charges against
the petitioner and hence the High Court did not give
a copy of the said report to the petitioner.
10
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and have perused the records.
7. At very outset, we indicated to the learned
counsel for the petitioner that the disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner being still
underway, having not yet taken any final shape, most
of the issues, which are sought to be raised by the
writ petitioner in this writ petition can very well
be canvassed and pressed before in the disciplinary
proceedings. We indicated that any expression of
opinion by this Court on issues, which are relevant
and material in the disciplinary inquiry may
prejudice the parties.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner specifically
submitted that this Court may consider those
submissions, which go to the very root of the matter
specially non-compliance of the provisions of Act,
2013. We have already extracted the reliefs claimed
in the writ petition. Claims in the writ petition
are very wide, which include quashing the proceedings
of Internal Complaints Committee as well as Charge
Sheet dated 23.02.2017 and the Report dated
11
09.03.2018. We are of the view that the petitioner
having still opportunity in the disciplinary
proceedings to challenge the proceedings of the
Internal Complaints Committee, the charge sheet as
well as the Inquiry Report dated 09.03.2018, we deem
it appropriate not to enter into above issues leaving
it open to the petitioner to raise all submissions
and pleas before the appropriate authority. In this
writ petition, we, however, proceed to examine only
few limited issues, which has been pressed by the
petitioner. The only issues, which we proceed to
consider are:-
(i) Whether the High Court is a disciplinary
authority of the petitioner, competent to
initiate the disciplinary proceedings
against the petitioner and suspend him as
per Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules,
1970 and All India Services (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1969?
(ii) Whether the decision of the Full Court on
13.07.2016 initiating enquiry against the
12
petitioner and placing him under suspension
was beyond jurisdiction?
(iii) Whether the Preliminary Inquiry Report
submitted by Internal Complaints Committee
dated 05.11.2016 ought to have been
supplied to the petitioner and non-supply
of such Preliminary Inquiry Report dated
05.11.2016 vitiated the entire proceedings?
Issue Nos. 1 and 2
9. Issue Nos.1 and 2 being connected are taken
together. Part VI of the Constitution of India deals
with “The States”. Chapter VI contains heading
“Subordinate Courts”. Articles 233 and 235 of the
Constitution of India refers to two distinct powers.
The first is power of appointment, posting and
promotion of District Judges and second is power of
control over Judicial Officers of the State. The
word “control” occurring in Article 235 means not
only the general superintendence of the working of
the Courts but includes the disciplinary control of
the judicial officers, i.e., the district judges and
13
judges subordinate to him. The word “control” used
in Article 235 has been held by this court to be
disciplinary control. A Constitution Bench of this
Court in State of West Bengal and Another Vs.
Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447 had occasion
to consider the nature of the control vested in the
High Court in Article 235 of the Constitution over
district judges. In paragraph No.13 following was
held:-
“15. We do not accept this construction.
The word “control” is not defined in the
Constitution at all. In Part XIV which
deals with Services under the Union and the
States the words “disciplinary control” or
“disciplinary jurisdiction” have not at all
been used. It is not to be thought that
disciplinary jurisdiction of services is
not contemplated. In the context the word
“control” must, in our judgment, include
disciplinary jurisdiction. Indeed, the word
may be said to be used as a term of art
because the Civil Services (Classification
Control and Appeal) Rules used the word
“control” and the only rules which can
legitimately come under the word “control”
are the Disciplinary Rules. Further, as we
have already shown, the history which lies
behind the enactment of these Articles
indicate that “control” was vested in the
High Court to effectuate a purpose, namely,
the securing of the independence of the
subordinate judiciary and unless it
included disciplinary control as well the
very object would be frustrated. This aid
to construction is admissible because to
find out the meaning of a law, recourse may
14
legitimately be had to the prior state of
the law, the evil sought to be removed and
the process by which the law was evolved.
The word “control”, as we have seen, was
used for the first time in the Constitution
and it is accompanied by the word “vest”
which is a strong word. It shows that the
High Court is made the sole custodian of
the control over the judiciary. Control,
therefore, is not merely the power to
arrange the day to day working of the court
but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction
over the presiding Judge……………………………”
10. The Constitution Bench further held that under
Article 235 of the Constitution, High Court can hold
enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or
removal. In paragraph No. 18, following has been
held:-
“18. There is, therefore, nothing in
Article 311 which compels the conclusion
that the High Court is ousted of the
jurisdiction to hold the enquiry if Article
235 vested such a power in it. In our
judgment, the control which is vested in
the High Court is a complete control
subject only to the power of the Governor
in the matter of appointment (including
dismissal and removal) and posting and
promotion of District Judges. Within the
exercise of the control vested in the High
Court, the High Court can hold enquiries,
impose punishments other than dismissal or
removal, subject however to the conditions
of service, and a right of appeal if
granted by the conditions of service, and
to the giving of an opportunity of showing
cause as required by clause (2) of Article
311 unless such opportunity is dispensed
with by the Governor acting under the
15
provisos (b) and (c) to that clause. The
High Court alone could have held the
enquiry in this case. To hold otherwise
will be to reverse the policy which has
moved determinedly in this direction.”
11. To the same effect is another Three Judge Bench
judgment of this Court is Baradakanta Mishra Vs. High
Court of Orissa and Another, (1976) 3 SCC 327 where
in paragraph No.20, following was laid down:-
“20. The scope of Article 235 has been
examined by this Court in several
decisions. The important decisions are
State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath
Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447; High Court of
Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Roy, AIR 1962 SC
1704; High Court of Punjab and Haryana v.
State of Haryana (In the matter of N.S.
Rao), (1975) 1 SCC 843. The effect of the
decisions is this. The word “control” as
used in Article 235 includes disciplinary
control over District Judges and judges
inferior to the post of District Judge.
This control is vested in the High Court to
effectuate the purpose of securing
independence of the subordinate judiciary
and unless it included disciplinary control
as well the very object would be
frustrated. The word “control” is
accompanied by the word “vest” which shows
that the High Court is made the sole
custodian of the control over the
judiciary. Control is not merely the power
to arrange the day-to-day working of the
court but contemplates disciplinary
jurisdiction on the presiding judge. The
word “control” includes something in
addition to the mere superintendence of
these courts. The control is over the
conduct and discipline of judges. The
inclusion of a right of appeal against the
16
orders of the High Court in the conditions
of service indicates an order passed in
disciplinary jurisdiction. The word “deal”
in Article 235 also indicates that the
control is over disciplinary and not mere
administrative jurisdiction. The control
which is vested in the High Court is
complete control subject only to the power
of the Governor in the manner of
appointment including initial posting and
promotion of District Judges and dismissal,
removal, reduction in rank of District
Judges. Within the exercise of the control
vested in the High Court, the High Court
can hold enquiries, impose punishments
other than dismissal or removal subject
however to the conditions of service to a
right of appeal if granted by the
conditions of service, and to the giving of
an opportunity of showing cause as required
by clause (2) of Article 311 unless such an
opportunity is dispensed with by the
Governor acting under the provisos (b) and
(c) to that clause. The High Court alone
could make enquiries into disciplinary
conduct.”
12. Another Constitution Bench in Registrar (Admn.),
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Vs. Sisir Kanta
Satapathy (Dead) by Lrs. and Another, (1999) 7 SCC
725 after reviewing all earlier judgments, laid down
following in paragraph No.16:-
“16. We are clearly of the view that while
the High Court retains the power of
disciplinary control over the subordinate
judiciary, including the power to initiate
disciplinary proceedings, suspend them
pending enquiries and impose punishment on
them but when it comes to the question of
dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or
17
termination of the services of the judicial
officer, on any count whatsoever, the High
Court becomes only the recommending
authority and cannot itself pass such an
order (vide Inder Prakash Anand case,
(1976) 2 SCC 977 and Rajiah case, (1988) 3
SCC 211).”
13. We may also refer to another judgment of this
Court in Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) through LRs. and
Others Vs. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and
Others, (2011) 10 SCC 1. This Court in the above case
had occasion to consider control of Article 235 over
the judicial officers of NCT of Delhi. This Court
after elaborating the control of the High Court with
reference to judicial officers of NCT Delhi had laid
down that High Court alone is the sole authority
competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against Subordinate Judicial Officers or to impose
various punishments. The contentions raised before
the Court based on Article 239AA(4) of the
Constitution that the Scheme in NCT Delhi is
different was rejected. Following was laid down in
paragraph No.136:-
“136. Reliance on Article 239-AA(4) is
entirely out of place so far as the High
Court is concerned, dealing with the
judicial officers. To give any other
interpretation to Article 239-AA(4) will be
18
to defeat the supreme object underlying
Article 235 of the Constitution, specially
intended for protection of the judicial
officers and necessarily independence of
the subordinate judiciary. It is absolutely
clear that the Governor cannot take the aid
and advice of his Council of Ministers in
the case of judicial officers and accept
its advice and act according to it. There
is no room for any outside body between the
Governor and the High Court. Therefore,
this Court does not find any substance in
this contention also and the same is
rejected.”
14. In the above case, it has been clearly and
categorically laid down that disciplinary authority
with regard to judicial officers is the High Court
and it is the High Court, which can initiate the
disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers.
Although, with regard to dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank or termination of services of
judicial officers, the High Court becomes the
recommending authority and it is the Governor, who is
to issue the orders.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance on a Constitution Bench judgment of this
Court in Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Others
Vs. L.V.A. Dixitulu and Others, (1979) 2 SCC 34. The
above case was a case of employees of a High Court.
19
This Court had occasion to interpret the scope of
Article 235. In paragraph 40 of the judgment, few
incidents of control vested in the High Court were
enumerated. Paragraph 40 is as follows:
“40. The interpretation and scope of
Article 235 has been the subject of several
decisions of this Court. The position
crystallised by these decisions is that the
control over the subordinate judiciary
vested in the High Court under Article 235
is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in
extent and effective in operation. It
comprehends a wide variety of matters.
Among others, it includes:
(a) (i) Disciplinary jurisdiction and
a complete control subject only to
the power of the Governor in the
matter of appointment, dismissal,
removal, reduction in rank of
District Judges, and initial posting
and promotion to the cadre of
District Judges. In the exercise of
this control, the High Court can hold
inquiries against a member of the
subordinate judiciary, impose
punishment other than dismissal or
removal, subject, however, to the
conditions of service, and a right of
appeal, if any, granted thereby and
to the giving of an opportunity of
showing cause as required by Article
311(2).
(ii) In Article 235, the word
'control' is accompanied by the word
"vest" which shows that the High
Court alone is made the sole
custodian of the control over the
judiciary. The control vested in the
20
High Court, being exclusive, and not
dual, an inquiry into the conduct of
a member of judiciary can be held by
the High Court alone and no other
authority. (State of West Bengal v.
Nripendra Nath Bagchi (supra);
Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab
(1974) 2 SCC 831; Punjab and Haryana
High Court v. State of Haryana (sub
nom Narendra Singh Rao,(1975) 1 SCC
831).
(iii) Suspension from service of a
member of the judiciary, with a view
to hold a disciplinary inquiry.
(b)Transfers, promotions and
confirmation of such promotions of
persons holding posts in the judicial
service, inferior to that of District
Judge. (State of Assam v. S.N. Sen,
(1971) 2 SCC 899, State of Assam v.
Kuneswar Saikia, (1969) 3 SCC 505).
(c) Transfers of District Judges
[State of Assam v. Ranga Muhammad
(supra); Chandra Mouleshwar v. Patna
High Court (supra)].
(d) Recall of District Judges posted
on ex-cadre posts or on deputation on
administrated posts. (State of Orissa
v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC
647).
(e) Award of Selection grade to the
members of the judicial service,
including District Judges it being
their further promotion after their
initial appointment to the cadre.
(State of Assam v. Kuseswar Saikia
(supra).
21
(f) Confirmation of District Judges,
after their initial appointment or
promotion by the Governor to the
cadre of District Judges under
Article 233, on probation or
officiating basis. [Punjab & Haryana
High Court v. State of Haryana
(supra)].
(g) Premature or compulsory
retirement of Judges of the District
Court and of Subordinate Courts
(State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati
Tripathi and Anr. (supra).”
16. In the above case also, this Court held that the
disciplinary jurisdiction vests in the High Court
which can hold inquiries against a member of the
subordinate judiciary, impose punishment other than
dismissal or removal. The High Court can also suspend
a member of the judiciary. Insofar as dismissal or
removal is concerned, the said orders are required to
be passed by the Governor on the recommendation of
the High Court. The fact that the orders of dismissal
or removal are issued by the approval of the Governor
in no manner denude the disciplinary control of the
High Court.
17. Another judgment relied on by the learned counsel
for the petitioner is State of Tamil Nadu Rep. by
22
Secretary to Govt.(Home) Vs. Promod Kumar IPS and
Another, AIR 2018 SC 4060. The above was a case of
the member of Indian Police Service. This Court had
occasion to consider the provisions of All India
Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 in the
context of member of Indian Police Service. Learned
counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on
paragraphs 18 and 19, which are to the following
effect:
“18. Rule 8(4) of the All India Service
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 also
mandates that the disciplinary authority
shall "draw up or cause to be drawn up" the
charge memo. We see no reason to take a
view different from the one taken by this
Court in B.V. Gopinath (AIR 2014 SC 88)
(supra). We also see no substance in the
submission made by the Senior Counsel for
the State that the said judgment needs
reconsideration. Assuming that Mr. Giri is
right in his submission that the initiation
of disciplinary proceedings and issuance of
charge memo are at the same stage, the
mandatory requirement of Rule 8 which
provides for the charge memo to be drawn by
the disciplinary authority cannot be
ignored. We reject the submission on behalf
of the Appellant that Gopinath's case can
be distinguished on facts. We are not in
agreement with the contention of the
Appellant that the business Rules and
standing orders of the State of Tamil Nadu
are quite different from the office orders
and circulars issued by Union of India
which formed the basis of the judgment in
23
Gopinath's case. A close reading of the
said judgment would disclose that reliance
on the office note was only in addition to
the interpretation of the Rule.
19. It is also settled law that if the Rule
requires something to be done in a
particular manner it should be done either
in the same manner or not at all- Taylor v.
Taylor (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426, 431. In view of
the mandatory requirement of Rule 8(4) and
the charge memo being drawn up or cause to
be drawn up by the disciplinary authority
is not complied with, we are of the
considered opinion that there is no reason
to interfere with the judgment of the High
Court on this issue. The only addition we
would like to make is to give liberty to
the disciplinary authority to issue a
charge memo afresh after taking approval
from the disciplinary authority.”
18. In the above case, charge memo was not drawn by
the disciplinary authority, hence, this Court
approved the decision of the High Court quashing
charge-sheet. The above case is not applicable in the
present case. The petitioner in the present case is a
member of Judicial Service for which disciplinary
authority is the High Court.
19. The submission, which has been pressed by the
petitioner is that in view of Act, 2013 there being
an Inquiry Report by Internal Complaints Committee as
envisaged by Sections 11 and 13, the High Court could
24
not have taken a decision to initiate the inquiry or
to suspend the petitioner. The Act, 2013 was to
provide protection against sexual harassment of women
at workplace and for the prevention and redressal of
complaints of sexual harassment and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto. Chapter
II of Act, 2013 deals with constitution of Internal
Complaints Committee. Chapter IV deals with
complaint. In Chapter IV, one of the sections is
Section 11, which deals with inquiry into complaint.
Section 11 of the Act is as follows:-
“11. Inquiry into complaint.-- (1) Subject
to the provisions of section 10, the
Internal Committee or the Local Committee,
as the case may be, shall, where the
respondent is an employee, proceed to make
inquiry into the complaint in accordance
with the provisions of the service rules
applicable to the respondent and where no
such rules exist, in such manner as may be
prescribed or in case of a domestic worker,
the Local Committee shall, if prima facie
case exist, forward the complaint to the
police, within a period of seven days for
registering the case under section 509 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and any
other relevant provisions of the said Code
where applicable:
Provided that where the aggrieved woman
informs the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, as the case may be, that any
25
term or condition of the settlement arrived
at under sub-section (2) of section 10 has
not been complied with by the respondent,
the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee shall proceed to make an inquiry
into the complaint or, as the case may be,
forward the complaint to the police:
Provided further that where both the
parties arc employees, the parties shall,
during the course of inquiry, be given an
opportunity of being heard and a copy of
the findings shall he made available to
both the parties enabling them to make
representation against the findings before
the Committee.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX”
20. Chapter V deals with inquiry into complaint and
Section 13 deals with inquiry report, which is to the
following effect:-
“13. Inquiry Report.--(1) On the
completion of an inquiry under this Act,
the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee, as the case may be, shall
provide a report of its findings to the
employer, or as the case may be, the
District Officer within a period of ten
days from the date of completion of the
inquiry and such report be made available
to the concerned parties.
(2) Where the Internal Committee or the
Local Committee, as the case may be,
arrives at the conclusion that the
allegation against the respondent has not
been proved, it shall recommend to the
employer and the District Officer that no
26
action is required to be taken in the
matter.
(3) Where the Internal Committee or the
Local Committee, as the case may be,
arrives at the conclusion that the
allegation against the respondent has been
proved, it shall recommend to the employer
or the District Officer, as the case may be

(i) to take action for sexual harassment
as a misconduct in accordance with
the provisions of the service rules
applicable to the respondent or where
no such service rules have been made,
in such manner as may be prescribed;
(ii) to deduct, notwithstanding anything
in the service rules applicable to
the respondent, from the salary or
wages of the respondent such sum as
it may consider appropriate to be
paid to the aggrieved woman or to her
legal heirs, as it may determine, in
accordance with the provisions of
section 15:
Provided that in case the employer is
unable to make such deduction from the
salary of the respondent due to his being
absent from duty or cessation of employment
it may direct to the respondent to pay such
sum to the aggrieved woman:
Provided further that in case the
respondent fails to pay the sum referred to
in clause (ii), the Internal Committee or
as the case may be, the Local Committee may
forward the order for recovery of the sum
as an arrear of land revenue to the
concerned District Officer.
27
(4) The employer or the District Officer
shall act upon the recommendation within
sixty days of its receipt by him.”
21. The Act, 2013 is a parliamentary legislation, the
preamble of which outlines the necessity of
legislation, which is to the following effect:-
“An Act to provide protection against
sexual harassment of women at workplace and
for the prevention and redressal of
complaints of sexual harassment and for
matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto.”
22. The provisions of the Act, complaint mechanism
and mechanism for constitution of the Internal
Complaints Committee, mechanism to inquire the
complaint are all for protection of dignity and
welfare of women at workplace. The provisions of
Sections 11 and 13 in no manner affect the control of
the High Court under Article 235, which it has with
respect to judicial officers as noted above. The
power to suspend the judicial officer vests in the
High Court. The Full Court of the High court is in
no manner precluded from initiating disciplinary
inquiry against the petitioner and placing the
petitioner under suspension on being satisfied that
28
sufficient material existed. The High Court in its
meeting dated 19.07.2016 has resolved to send the
complaint of the employee to the Internal Complaints
Committee and the Internal Complaints Committee
having opined that inquiry need to be held, further
steps were taken in accordance with Act, 2013. We,
thus, are of the view that there is no error in the
decision of the Full Court dated 13.07.2016 to
suspend the petitioner and initiate the inquiry
proceedings against the petitioner.
Issue No.3
23. The submission on which much emphasis has been
made by the petitioner is that the copy of the Report
dated 05.11.2016 referred to as a Preliminary Inquiry
Report by the High Court has not been supplied to the
petitioner by which he has been denied right to
appeal. With regard to Preliminary Inquiry Report
dated 05.11.2016, in paragraph Nos. 48 and 49, the
High Court has made following assertions:-
“48-49. The contents of para 48-49 are
wrong and denied. The Petitioner is under
the erroneous belief that the report dated
05.11.2016 which is only a Preliminary
Inquiry Report should have been made
available to him. That the inquiry has been
conducted strictly in compliance with the
procedure laid down in All India Services
29
(Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1965 and
Office Memorandum dated 16.07.2015 issued
by Department of Personnel & Training,
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances
and Pensions, Govt. of India. As per the
said Office Memorandum, the ICC firstly
conducted preliminary investigation/inquiry
and then submitted its Preliminary Inquiry
Report dated 05.11.2016 before the
Disciplinary Authority. There is no
provision to provide the copy of
Preliminary Inquiry Report to the
Delinquent. It is also pertinent to mention
here that the Petitioner had been provided
with a copy of the Inquiry Report dated
09.03.2018 submitted by the Inquiring
Authority after conducting regular inquiry
as per the procedure laid down in the All
India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules,
1969, with a direction to submit his
written representation or submissions, if
he so desires, against the findings of the
Inquiring Authority. However, instead of
submitting his written representation or
submissions, the Petitioner chose to file
the instant writ petition before this
Hon’ble Court. Thus, it is made clear here
that there was no discrepancy in the
Preliminary Inquiry/investigation by the
ICC. The Report dated 05.11.2016 was a
Preliminary Inquiry Report the purpose of
which is only to satisfy the Disciplinary
Authority as to whether any prima facie
case is made out against the Petitioner.
The Full Court, after considering the
Preliminary Inquiry Report dated
05.11.2016, resolved vide its decision
dated 16.11.2016 to initiate disciplinary
proceedings for major penalty under Rule 8
of the All India Services (Discipline &
Appeal) Rules, 1969 against the
Petitioner.”
30
24. In view of the above, it is clear that
Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 did not
contain any findings on allegations made against the
petitioner, Preliminary Inquiry Report only opined
that inquiry should be held. The Inquiry Report,
which has been referred to in Section 13 is an
Inquiry Report, which has been submitted by Internal
Complaints Committee after completion of the inquiry.
In the present case, the Inquiry Report by Internal
Complaints Committee is dated 09.03.2018, which has
been admittedly supplied to the petitioner, the right
of appeal given against the recommendation made under
sub-section(2) or sub-section(3) of Section 13 are
appealable under Section 18 of the Act. Section 18
of the Act is as follows:-
“18.Appeal.-- (1) Any person aggrieved from
the recommendations made under sub-section
(2) of section 13 or under clause (i) or
clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section
13 or subsection (1) or sub-section (2) of
section 14 or section 17 or nonimplementation of such recommendations may
prefer an appeal to the court or tribunal
in accordance with the provisions of the
service rules applicable to the said person
or where no such service rules exist then,
without prejudice to provisions contained
in any other law for the time being in
force, the person aggrieved may prefer an
appeal in such manner as may he prescribed.
31
(2) The appeal under sub-section (1) shall
be preferred within a period of ninety days
of the recommendations.”
25. Thus, the right of appeal is given to an
aggrieved person only when report is submitted under
Section 13 to the employer. Section 13(3)
contemplates the report of Internal Complaints
Committee when it “arrives at the conclusion that the
allegation against the respondent has been proved”.
It is not the case of any of the parties that the
report of the Committee dated 05.11.2016 is the
report where allegation against the petitioner has
been proved. Even under Section 11(1) in the second
proviso, the only contemplation is to make available
a copy of the findings. Thus, when the report in
which there are no findings, parties are not entitled
to have the copy. High Court in its counter
affidavit has pleaded that the Report dated
05.11.2016 was not a report containing any findings
against the petitioner rather only opinion was
expressed that disciplinary inquiry be initiated
against the petitioner. We, thus, are of the view
32
that no prejudice can be held to be caused to the
petitioner by non-supply of the Preliminary Inquiry
Report dated 05.11.2016. The copy of memo of charge
dated 23.02.2017 has been brought on the record,
which also clearly indicates that the charge memo
does not refer to Preliminary Inquiry Report dated
05.11.2016. Thus, no prejudice can be said to have
been caused to the petitioner by non-supply of Report
dated 05.11.2016. We, thus, do not accept the
submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that
due to non-supply of Preliminary Inquiry Report dated
05.11.2016, the proceedings have been vitiated.
26. Before we close, we once more make it clear that
with regard to charge memo dated 23.02.2017, inquiry
conducted by Internal Complaints Committee
culminating into Report dated 09.03.2018, it is open
for the petitioner to raise all pleas of facts and
law before the appropriate authority. This Court has
only considered limited issues as pressed by the
petitioner as indicated above. Apart from above, all
questions and issues are left open to both the
33
parties. Subject to observations and liberty as
above, the Writ Petition is dismissed.
......................J.
 ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
......................J.
 ( NAVIN SINHA )
New Delhi,
August 21, 2019.