Family settlement operates as estopel = even without registration a written document of family settlement/family arrangement can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and conduct of the parties. In the present case, as observed hereinabove, even the plaintiff has also categorically admitted that the oral partition had taken place on 23.04.1971 and he also 30 admitted that 3 to 4 punchayat people were also present. However, according to him, the same was not reduced in writing. Therefore, even accepting the case of plaintiff that there was an oral partition on 23.04.1971, the document Exhibit D4 dated 23.04.1971, to which he is also the signatory and all other family members are signatory, can be said to be a list of properties partitioned. Everybody got right/share as per the oral partition/partition. Therefore, the same even can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and conduct of the parties.

REPORTABLE
        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 784 OF 2010
Thulasidhara & Another                 ..Appellants
             Versus
Narayanappa & Others                                      ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
Bengaluru dated 25.07.2007 passed in Regular Second Appeal
No.1033 of 2001, by which, in exercise of powers under Section
100 of the CPC, the High Court has allowed the said appeal
preferred   by   the   respondent   herein­original   plaintiff   and   has
quashed and set aside the Judgment and Decree passed by both
1
the Courts below dismissing the suit, and consequently decreeing
the suit, original defendants have preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are
as under :
That   the   respondent   herein­original   plaintiff
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘original plaintiff’) instituted the
suit in the Court of Munsiff and JMFC at Gubbi (learned Civil
Judge,  Junior  Division,   Gubbi)  being  Original   Suit   No.141  of
1984 praying for the Judgment and Decree in his favour to the
effect that he be declared as the owner of the suit schedule
property   and   also   for   permanent injunction   restraining   the
appellants herein­original defendants (hereinafter referred to as
the   ‘original   defendants’)   from   interfering   with   his   peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. It was
the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that he has become an
owner of the suit property having purchased the same under a
registered Sale Deed and therefore the defendants have no right
whatsoever   to   interfere   with   his   peaceful   possession   and
enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The suit was resisted by
the defendants by filing the written statement. It was the case on
2
behalf of the defendants that husband of defendant no.1 and
father of defendant nos. 2 and 3 i.e. A. N. Krishnappa (deceased),
purchased the suit property on 12.12.1948 under a registered
Sale Deed for a consideration of Rs.400/­. That the suit property
was   blended   into   the   joint   family   properties   by   him.   That
thereafter the partition between the sons of deceased Nanjappa
was recorded on 23.04.1971 and the suit property fell into the
share of the deceased A. N. Krishnappa. It was also the case on
behalf of the defendants that they are enjoying the possession of
the suit property. It was also the case on behalf of the defendants
that no Sale Deed has been executed by the defendants in favour
of the plaintiff and the alleged Sale Deed is fabricated by the
plaintiff.
2.1  That   the   learned   Trial   Court   framed   the   following
issues:
“(i) Does the plaintiff prove his title to the suit
schedule property?
(ii)   Whether   the   plaintiff   proves   his   lawful
possession of the suit schedule property on the
date of suit?
(iii) Does the plaintiff prove the interference by
the   defendants   to   his   possession   of   the   suit
property?”
3
2.2 That both the parties led evidence, both, oral as well as
documentary. That after considering the submissions made on
behalf   of   the   rival   parties   and   on   appreciation   of   evidence,
learned Trial Court held that there was a partition between family
on 23.4.1971 and for that the learned Trial Court observed and
held   that   Exhibit   D4(Partition   Deed   dated   23.04.1971)   is
admissible in evidence. The learned Trial Court also observed and
held that the suit property was available at the time of partition.
The learned Trial Court also observed and held that Exhibit P1
(the Sale Deed relied upon by the original plaintiff) was only a
nominal   Sale   Deed   and   not   an   out   and   out   sale   deed   since
Exhibit P1 was executed as security for loan and never intended
to sell the suit property. The learned Trial Court also observed
and   held   that   the   suit   property   was   purchased   by   late
Krishnappa for a sum of Rs.400/­ in 1948 and thereafter it is
stated to have been sold at Rs.200/­ after 16 years i.e. in 1964,
which is highly improbable. The learned Trial Court also gave a
specific finding that there was a concealment of material facts in
the suit, which shows  mala fide  intention of the plaintiff. The
learned Trial Court also held that plaintiff, in collusion with PW2,
has got executed a sham document in his favour. By holding so
4
and recording above findings, the learned Trial Court dismissed
the suit.
2.3 The   First   Appellate   Court   dismissed   the   appeal
preferred by the original plaintiff and confirmed the Judgment
and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the suit.
While dismissing the appeal, the learned First Appellate Court
observed that Exhibit D4 cannot be said to be a Partition Deed
and can be said to be only a list of properties partitioned and
does not create or extinguish any right in the immovable property
and   therefore   not   a   compulsorily   registrable   document   and
therefore Exhibit D4 is admissible in evidence. 
3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Judgment
and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court confirmed by the
First Appellate Court, the original plaintiff filed a Regular Second
Appeal No.1033 of 2001 before the High Court. The High Court
framed   only   one   substantial   question   of   law   which   reads   as
under :
“Whether   the   appellant   is   the   owner   and   in
possession of the suit land as he purchased it in
the year 1973, that is, subsequent to the date
23.4.1971   when   Ex.D1   –   Partition   deed   –
Palupatti is alleged to have come into existence?”
5
3.1 That by the impugned Judgment and Order, the High
Court has allowed the said appeal and has interfered with the
findings   of   facts   recorded   by   both   the   Courts   below   and
consequently has decreed the suit by holding that Exhibit D4
required registration and therefore the same was inadmissible in
evidence.   The High Court further observed and held that both
the Courts below are not justified in holding that document ­
Exhibit P1 was only a nominal sale deed and that the same was
not acted upon.
3.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
Judgment   and   Order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   original
defendants have preferred the present appeal.
4. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned Senior Advocate has appeared
on behalf of the appellants­original defendants and Ms. K. V.
Bharathi Upadhyaya, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of
the respondent­original plaintiff and wife and son of the original
plaintiff   (newly   added   respondents),   who   are   permitted   to   be
impleaded as respondents by this Court.
6
5. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the original defendants has vehemently submitted that
the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction under Section 100
of the CPC by interfering with the concurrent findings of facts
recorded by both the Courts below.
5.1 It   is   further   submitted   by   Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendants
that in fact substantial question of law framed by the High Court
as such cannot be said to be a substantial question of law at all
and the same can be said to be a question of fact. It is submitted
that therefore the High Court has committed a grave error and/or
has exceeded in its jurisdiction by entering into the question of
fact and thereby by interfering with the concurrent findings of
facts recorded by the Courts below.
5.2 It   is   further   submitted   by   Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendants
that High Court has committed a serious error in holding that
Exhibit D4 requires registration, whereas, both the courts below
clearly   recorded   that   Exhibit   D4   does   not   require   any
registration.
7
5.3 It   is   further   submitted   by   Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendants
that High Court has committed a grave error in observing and
holding that as Exhibit D4 was an unregistered document and
therefore the same was not admissible in evidence.
5.4 It is vehemently submitted by Ms. Kiran Suri, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendants
that assuming that Exhibit D4 requires registration and the same
was unregistered, in that case also, the same document can be
used and considered for collateral purpose. It is submitted that
even otherwise and as held by this Court in the case of Kale and
Others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others  (1976) 3
SCC   119   even   if  the   family  settlement  was   not   registered,  it
would operate as a complete estoppel against the original plaintiff
who was party to such family settlement.   It is submitted that
therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error of law in
not giving effect to the Doctrine of Estoppel.
5.5 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of
Subraya M.N. v. Vittala M.N. and Others (2016) 8 SCC 705, Ms.
Kiran Suri, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
8
original defendants has vehemently submitted that as held by
this   Court   in   the   aforesaid   decision,   when   family
arrangement/settlement   is   orally   made,   no   registration   is
required   and   that   would   be   admissible   in   evidence,   however,
when reduced in writing, registration is essential, without which
it was not admissible in evidence. It is submitted that however it
is   further   observed   and   held   by   this   Court   in   the   aforesaid
decision   that   even   without   registration,   written   document   of
family   arrangement/settlement   can   be   used   as   corroborative
evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and
conduct of the parties. It is submitted that it is further observed
and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision that unregistered
document of family arrangement can be used as corroborative
piece   of evidence for   explaining   the   nature   of
settlement/arrangement arrived at between the parties, conduct
of   plaintiff   members   in   receiving   money   from   the   defendant
members of the family in lieu of relinquishing their interest in
certain family properties. It is submitted that in the present case,
document D4 dated 23.04.1971 was in fact acted upon by all the
parties   including   the   plaintiff   and   therefore   assuming   that
9
document D4 required registration, in that case also, the same
can be used as corroborative evidence.
5.6 It   is   submitted   by   Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned   Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendants that as
such document D4 cannot be said to be a Partition Deed and it
can be said to be a document containing list of properties allotted
to   parties   and   therefore   the   same   was   not   required   to   be
registered. It is submitted that, therefore, the High Court has
committed a grave error in holding that as Exhibit D4 was an
unregistered document, the same was inadmissible in evidence.
In support of her above submissions, she has heavily relied upon
the decisions of this Court in the case of  Roshan  Singh  and
Others v. Zile Singh and Others (2018) 14 SCC 814.
5.7 It   is   further   submitted   by   Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendants
that the High Court has committed a serious error in holding that
the suit property was not available for partition in the year 1971
with the joint family in the year 1971.  It is submitted that by
holding so, the High Court has not at all considered the fact that
10
Exhibit   P1,   a   Sale   Deed   relied   upon   by   the   plaintiff,   was   a
nominal Sale Deed and everybody understood.
5.8 It   is   further   submitted   by   Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendants
that the High Court has committed a grave error in interfering
with the findings of the Courts below that Exhibit P1 exhibits
only as a security and is not a document for sale.
5.9 It   is   further   submitted   by   Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendants
that High Court has committed a grave error in interfering with
the   findings   of   facts   recorded   by  both   the   courts   below   that
Exhibit P1 was not acted upon. It is further submitted that both
the Courts below clearly recorded in their respective findings that
the   possession   remained   with   the   defendants   and   the
consideration   for   the   sale   Exhibit   P1   was   inadequate   and
therefore no title passed on.
5.10 It   is   submitted   by   Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned   Senior
Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants­original
defendants that as observed and held by this Court in the case of
Kaliaperumal v. Rajagopal and Another  (2009) 4 SCC 193 that
11
though on registration of Sale Deed under the Registration Act,
1908, title will normally pass to the purchaser from the date of
the execution of the Sale Deed, true test is the intention of the
parties. It is submitted that it is held by this Court that the
registration   is   prima   facie   proof   of   intention   of   transfer   of
property, but not a proof of operative transfer. It is submitted
that it is further observed and held by this Court that where
recitals   are   insufficient   or   ambiguous,   circumstances   and
conduct of parties can be looked into, subject to provisions of
Section 92 of the Evidence Act.
5.11 It   is   further   submitted   by   Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendants
that the High Court has committed a very serious error in setting
aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below that
Exhibit P1 was a nominal Sale Deed. It is vehemently submitted
by Ms. Kiran Suri that in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the High Court has committed a grave error in giving much
emphasis   on   Exhibit   P1   being   registered   Sale   Deed,   without
considering the surrounding circumstances and the intention of
12
the parties which are brought/borne out from the conduct of the
parties.
5.12 Now, so far as not praying to set aside the Sale Deed
(Exhibit   P1)   by   the   defendants   by   filing   a   suit   is   concerned,
relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Vidhyadhar
v. Manikrao and  Another  (1999) 3 SCC 573, it is vehemently
submitted that in a suit filed by the plaintiff for a declaration to
declare   him   an   owner   on   the   basis   of   the   Sale   Deed,   the
defendant who is a stranger to the Sale Deed can raise a plea
that the Sale Deed was void, fictitious, collusive or not intended
to be acted upon and/or not binding to him. It is submitted that
as held by this Court in the aforesaid decision, defendant can
raise any legitimate plea available to him under the law to defeat
the suit of the plaintiff. It is submitted that therefore non­filing of
the suit by the defendant to set aside the Sale Deed (Exhibit P1)
and/or not specifically praying to quash and set aside the Sale
Deed (Exhibit P1), would not defeat the case of the defendant and
the same cannot go against the defendant.
5.13 Making   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the
decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appeal
13
and quash and set aside the impugned Judgement and Order
passed   by   the   High   Court   and   restoring   the   Judgement   and
Decree passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the suit.
6. Present appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. K. V.
Bharathi Upadhyaya, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
the   newly   added   respondents   (wife   and   son   of   the   original
plaintiff).
6.1 It   is   vehemently   submitted   by   Ms.   K.   V.   Bharathi,
learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   contesting
respondents that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
High Court has rightly decreed the suit and has rightly held that
the original plaintiff is entitled to the declaration that he had
become the owner of the suit property under the registered Sale
Deed.
6.2 It   is   vehemently   submitted   by   Ms.   K.   V.   Bharathi,
learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   contesting
respondents that on appreciation of evidence and having found
that there was a registered Sale Deed in favour of the original
plaintiff, the High Court has rightly interfered with the findings
14
recorded by both the Courts below as the said findings were
perverse.
6.3 It is further submitted by learned Advocate appearing
on behalf of the contesting respondents that as such, the High
Court had framed the substantial question of law and thereafter
had   answered   the   substantial   question   of   law   framed   and
therefore the  High Court has not exceeded in  its jurisdiction
permissible under the law, and more particularly, has exercised
the Jurisdiction within the parameters of Section 100 of the CPC.
6.4 It is further submitted by Ms. K. V. Bharathi, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents that
as such, there was a registered Sale Deed in favour of the original
plaintiff, on payment of the sale consideration and in fact the
same   was   acted   upon   and   the   possession   was   handed   over
pursuant to and under the registered Sale Deed and, therefore,
the High Court has rightly held that the original plaintiff has
become the absolute owner pursuant to the registered Sale Deed
dated 22.06.1964 (Exhibit P1).
6.5 It is further submitted by Ms. K. V. Bharathi, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents that
15
in fact by registered Sale Deed dated 22.06.1964 (Exhibit P1),
which was also signed by the plaintiff along with two brothers
and their father Nanjappa, the suit property in question, was sold
in favour of Siddalingappa. Therefore, Siddalingappa became the
absolute owner and thereafter the plaintiff purchased the suit
property   from   the   above   Siddalingappa   under   registered   Sale
Deed dated 18.05.1973 (Exhibit P2). It is submitted therefore, the
plaintiff became the absolute owner of the suit property under
the registered Sale Deed dated 18.05.1973 (Exhibit P2).
6.6 It is further submitted by learned Advocate appearing
on behalf of the contesting respondents that the registered Sale
Deed   dated   22.06.1964   (Exhibit   P1)   cannot   be   said   to   be   a
nominal Sale Deed as held by the High Court.
6.7 It is further submitted by Ms. K. V. Bharathi, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents that
in any case, nobody challenged either the registered Sale Deed
dated 22.06.1964 (Exhibit P1) or the subsequent registered Sale
Deed dated 18.05.1973 (Exhibit P2). It is submitted that none of
the   defendants   challenged   the   aforesaid   two   registered   Sale
Deeds. It is submitted therefore, in absence of any challenge, in
16
respect of the aforesaid Sale Deeds, more particularly, the Sale
Deed dated 18.05.1973 (Exhibit P2) and considering Section 54
of the Transfer of Property Act, the original plaintiff has become
the absolute owner pursuant to the registered Sale Deed(s).
6.8 It is further submitted by Ms. K. V. Bharathi, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents that
the so­called Partition Deed dated 23.04.1971 (Exhibit D4) is
rightly held to be not admissible in evidence as the same was
unregistered. It is further submitted that Exhibit D4 cannot be
said to be a list of property partitioned. It is submitted that
Exhibit   D4   is   a   Partition   Deed   and   therefore   the   same   was
required to be registered. It is submitted that as the same was
unregistered, as rightly held by the High Court, the same was not
admissible in evidence. It is submitted, therefore, the High Court
has  rightly  not  considered  the   so­called  Partition  Deed  dated
23.04.1971 (Exhibit D4).
6.9 It is further submitted by learned Advocate appearing
on behalf of the contesting respondents that even otherwise and
in view of the earlier Sale Deed dated 22.06.1964 (Exhibit P1), by
which the suit property was sold by the plaintiff along with his
17
two brothers and his father Nanjappa in favour of Siddalingappa,
at   the   time   of   alleged   partition   dated   23.04.1971,   the   suit
property   was   not   available   for   partition.   It   is   submitted   that
therefore, even otherwise, at the time of so­called partition on
23.04.1971, as the property was already sold, the same could not
have been subjected to partition and therefore the Krishnappa
could   not   have   acquired   any   interest   in   the   suit   property
pursuant to the alleged Partition Deed dated 23.04.1971.
6.10 Making above submissions it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal.
7. Heard learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the
respective parties at length.
7.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that by the
impugned   Judgment   and   Order,   in   a   Second   Appeal   and   in
exercise of the powers under Section 100 of the CPC, the High
Court has set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the
Courts below. The learned Trial Court dismissed the suit and the
same came to be confirmed by the learned First Appellate Court.
While allowing the second appeal, the High Court framed only
one substantial question of law which reads as under :
18
“Whether   the   appellant   is   the   owner   and   in
possession of the suit land as he purchased it in
the year 1973, that is, subsequent to the date
23.4.1971   when   Ex.D1   –   Partition   deed   –
Palupatti is alleged to have come into existence?”
No other substantial question of law was framed. We
are afraid that the aforesaid can be said to be a substantial
question of law at all. It cannot be disputed and even as per the
law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   catena   of   decisions,   the
jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain Second Appeal under
Section 100 of the CPC after the 1976 amendment, is confined
only with the Second Appeal involving a substantial question of
law. The existence of ‘a substantial question of law’ is a sine qua
non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the
CPC.
7.2 As observed and held by this Court in the case of
Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC
722, in the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the
High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First
Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by
the lower Court were erroneous being :
19
(i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable
law;                             
OR
(ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court;
OR
(iii)  Based on in­admissible evidence or no evidence.
It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that if First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a
judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from
an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in
Second Appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could
have   decided   differently   is   not   a   question   of   law   justifying
interference in Second Appeal.
7.3 When a substantial question of law can be said to have
arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in the
case of Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434. In the
aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held :
 “Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment,
it  is  essential  for  the  High   Court  to   formulate  a
substantial question of law and it is not permissible
to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court
without doing so. There are two situations in which
interference with findings of fact is permissible. The
first one is when material or relevant evidence is not
considered which, if considered, would have led to
an   opposite   conclusion.   The   second   situation   in
20
which   interference   with   findings   of   fact   is
permissible is where a finding has been arrived at
by   the   appellate   court   by   placing   reliance   on
inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an
opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the
above situations, a substantial question of law can
arise.”
7.4 Considering the law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions and even considering Section 100 of the CPC,
the substantial question of law framed by the High Court in the
present   case,   as   such,   cannot   be   said   to   be   a   substantial
question of law at all.
8. Having gone through the findings recorded by the Trial
Court as well as the First Appellate Court, it appears that both,
the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court, gave cogent
reasons on appreciation of evidence on record, more particularly,
the Sale Deed dated 22.06.1964 (Exhibit P1), document dated
23.04.1971   (Exhibit   D4)   and   subsequent   Sale   Deed   dated
18.05.1973 (Exhibit P2) and thereafter held that the plaintiff is
not entitled to the declaration that he has become the owner.
While interfering with the Judgment and Decree passed by both
the   Courts   below,   it   appears   that   the   High   Court   has   again
21
reappreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of
powers under Section 100 of the CPC, is not permissible. Under
the   circumstances,   the   High   Court   has   committed   a
grave/manifest error in quashing and setting aside the findings
recorded by both the Courts below, which were on appreciation of
evidence   on   record.   The   High   Court   has   exceeded   in   its
jurisdiction while exercising the powers under Section 100 of the
CPC.
9. Even   otherwise,   on   merits   also,   the   impugned
Judgment   and  Order   passed   by   the   High   Court  allowing   the
appeal and consequently decreeing the suit, is not sustainable. It
was  the   case  on   behalf   of  the   original  plaintiff  that   the   suit
property   was   sold   by   registered   Sale   Deed   dated   22.06.1964
(Exhibit P1) by the plaintiff, along with his two brothers and their
father Nanjappa in favour of one Siddalingappa from whom the
plaintiff   subsequently   purchased   the   suit   property   under   the
registered Sale Deed dated 18.05.1973 (Exhibit P2). On the other
hand, it was specific case on behalf of the defendants that the
Sale Deed dated 22.06.1964 was a nominal Sale Deed and was
never acted upon and as such was not to be acted upon at all. It
22
was also the case on behalf of the defendants that thereafter in
the year 1971, the partition took place and the same was reduced
in writing by document dated 23.04.1971 (Exhibit D4) and under
the same document, it was recorded that the suit property had
gone in favour of Krishnappa. Plaintiff denied that any partition
was reduced in writing, more particularly, in the form of Exhibit
D4 dated 23.04.1971. The High Court has observed and held that
in view of the registered Sale Deed executed in favour of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff has become the actual owner. The High
Court has allowed the appeal and subsequently has decreed the
suits mainly on the ground that :
(i) That the registered Sale Deed dated 22.06.1964 (Exhibit P1)
was an out and out Sale Deed and the same was not a nominal
Sale Deed;
(ii) That the defendants have never challenged the registered Sale
Deed dated 22.06.1964 (Exhibit P1) and even the subsequent
registered Sale Deed dated 18.05.1973 (Exhibit P2).
(iii)   Exhibit   D4­Partition   Deed   dated   23.04.1971   purports   to
convey   interest   in   the   immovable   property   in   favour   of
Krishnappa   and   that   therefore   the   same   was   required   to   be
23
registered and as such it was an unregistered document and
therefore having regard to the provisions of the Registration Act,
the same is not admissible in evidence and therefore the same
cannot be looked into.
9.1 Now so far as the registered Sale Deed (Exhibit P1) is
concerned, it is an admitted position that Krishnappa is not a
signatory to the said Sale Deed. Therefore, as such, the said Sale
Deed does not bind Krishnappa. Even in the cross­examination,
the original plaintiff has admitted that Exhibit P1 was not signed
by Krishnappa.   He has also admitted that his other brothers
Rangappa and Govindaiah also did not sign. From the entire
evidence on record, it appears that the suit property was initially
purchased by Krishnappa in the year 1948 and thereafter, due to
some internal family problems with respect to said suit property,
it was the Krishnappa who thrown the same property into the
joint family property in the year 1952 and Krishnappa executed
the Sale Deed in favour of his father Nanjappa stating that it
belongs to joint family property. From the entire evidence on
record, it appears that even the Sale Deed (Exhibit P1) was not
acted   upon.   Between   1964   to   1971,   even   the   name   of
24
Siddalingappa was not mutated/recorded in the revenue record.
Both the Courts below considered in detail the aforesaid aspect
which has been upset by the High Court. It is required to be
noted that even in the cross­examination the original plaintiff
was   not   sure   about   the   sale   consideration   received   from
Siddalingappa as a remuneration in view of the registered Sale
Deed   dated   22.06.1964   (Exhibit   P1).   Even   otherwise,   even
according to the plaintiff and even considering the material on
record, as the suit land was a joint family property and/or was in
the name of Nanjappa, all the brothers had an equal share and
therefore   the   same   could   not   have   been   sold   by   Nanjappa,
plaintiff and other two brothers only and without consent of other
brothers   including   Krishnappa   unless   the   property   was
partitioned. In the cross­examination the original plaintiff has
specifically admitted that in the year 1965­66, when the father
sold away the said suit schedule property, there was no partition
between the brothers at that time. In the circumstances, the
registered Sale Deed dated 22.06.1964 (Exhibit P1), by which the
suit   property   was   sold   to   Siddalingappa,   cannot   bind
Krishnappa. It was a registered Sale Deed which was not acted
upon. Even the plaintiff and Siddalingappa tried to mutate the
25
name of Siddalingappa in the year 1973, which was the subject
matter of the Revenue Authority.
9.2 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff
that as the registered Sale Deed dated 22.06.1964 (Exhibit  P1)
was not challenged by the defendant by way of suit or even
counter claim and therefore thereafter it was not open for the
defendants to challenge the same is concerned, at the outset, it is
required to be noted and as observed hereinabove, Krishnappa
was   not   a   signatory   to   the   said   document/Sale   Deed   and
therefore it cannot bind him or his heirs. Even otherwise and as
held by this Court in the case of  Vidhyadhar  (supra), in a suit
filed   by   the   plaintiff   for   a   declaration   on   the   basis   of   the
registered Sale Deed, it is always open for the defendant, who is a
stranger to the Sale Deed, to raise a plea that the Sale Deed was
void, fictitious, collusive or not intended to be acted upon and or
not binding to him. In the aforesaid decision, it is observed and
held by this Court that a person, in his capacity as a defendant,
can raise any legitimate plea available to him under the law to
defeat the suit of the plaintiff. In paragraph 21 this Court has
observed and held as under :
26
“21. The above decisions appear to be based on
the principle that a person in his capacity as a
defendant can raise any legitimate plea available
to   him   under   law   to   defeat   the   suit   of   the
plaintiff. This would also include the plea that
the sale deed by which the title to the property
was intended to be conveyed to the plaintiff was
void or fictitious or, for that matter, collusive and
not intended to be acted upon. Thus, the whole
question would depend upon the pleadings of the
parties, the nature of the suit, the nature of the
deed, the evidence led by the parties in the suit
and other attending circumstances. For example,
in a landlord­tenant matter where the landlord is
possessed   of   many   properties   and   cannot
possibly seek eviction of his tenant for bona fide
need from one of the properties, the landlord may
ostensibly transfer that property to a person who
is not possessed of any other property so that
that   person,   namely,   the   transferee,   may
institute eviction proceedings on the ground of
his genuine need and thus evict the tenant who
could not have been otherwise evicted. In this
situation, the deed by which the property was
intended to be transferred, would be a collusive
deed representing a sham transaction which was
never intended to be acted upon. It would be
open to the tenant in his capacity as a defendant
to   assert,   plead   and   prove  that   the  deed   was
fictitious and collusive in nature. We, therefore,
cannot subscribe to the view expressed by the
Privy   Council   in   the   case   of   Lal   Achal   Ram
[(1905) 32 IA 113 : ILR 27 All 271] in the broad
terms in which it is expressed but do approve the
law laid down by the Calcutta, Patna and Orissa
High Courts as pointed out above.”
27
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of
the opinion that without even challenging the Sale Deed (Exhibit
P1) by way of behalf of independent proceedings, in a suit filed by
the plaintiff seeking a declaration that he has become the owner
pursuant to the registered Sale Deed, it is always open for the
defendant, who is stranger to the Sale Deed, to raise a plea that
either the Sale Deed is not binding to him or the same was
without consideration or it was a nominal Sale Deed or void or
fictitious, for that matter, collusive and not intended to be acted
upon.
9.3 Now so far as the finding recorded by the High Court
that as the Partition Deed dated 23.04.1971 (Exhibit D4) was
unregistered though required registration under the Provisions of
the Registration Act and therefore the same is not admissible in
evidence is concerned, it is required to be noted that as such
Exhibit D4 can be said to be a Palupatti as has been described as
Palupatti. Palupatti means list of properties partitioned. At the
most, it can be said to be a family arrangement. Therefore, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the same was not required
to be registered.
28
9.4 It   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the   deed   dated
23.04.1971, under which the suit property had gone /devolved in
favour   of   the   Krishnappa,   was   reduced   in   writing   before   the
Panchayat and Panchas, and the same was signed by the village
people/panchayat   people   and   all   the   members   of   the   family
including even the plaintiff.   Though the plaintiff disputed that
the partition was not reduced in writing in the form of document
Exhibit D4, on considering the entire evidence on record and
even   the   deposition   of   plaintiff   (cross­examination),   he   has
specifically admitted that the oral partition had taken place in the
year 1971. He has also admitted that he has got the share which
tellies   with   the   document   dated   23.04.1971   (Exhibit   D4).
Execution   of   the   document/   Partition   Deed/   Palupatta   dated
23.04.1971   has   been   established   and   proved   by   examining
different witnesses. The High Court has refused to look into the
said   document   and/or   consider   document   dated   23.04.1971
(Exhibit D4) solely on the ground that it requires registration and
therefore as it is unregistered, the same cannot be looked into.
However, as observed by this Court in the case of Kale  (Supra)
that   such   a   family   settlement,   though   not   registered,   would
operate as a complete estoppel against the parties to such a
29
family   settlement.   In   the   aforesaid   decision,   this   Court
considered its earlier decision in the case of S. Shanmugam Pillai
and Others v. K. Shanmugam Pillai and Others (1973) 2 SCC 312
in which it was observed as under:
“13.   Equitable,   principles   such   as   estoppel,
election,   family   settlement,   etc.   are   not   mere
technical   rules   of   evidence.   They   have   an
important purpose to serve in the administration
of   justice.   The   ultimate   aim   of   the   law   is   to
secure justice. In the recent times in order to
render justice between the parties, courts have
been   liberally   relying   on   those   principles.   We
would hesitate to narrow down their scope.
As   observed   by   this   Court   in   T.V.R.   Subbu
Chetty’s Family Charities case, that if a person
having full knowledge of his right as a possible
reversioner   enters   into   a   transaction   which
settles   his   claim   as   well   as   the   claim   of   the
opponents   at   the   relevant   time,   he   cannot   be
permitted to go back on that agreement when
reversion actually falls open.”
9.5 As held by this Court in the case of  Subraya M.N.
(Supra) even without registration a written document of family
settlement/family   arrangement   can   be   used   as   corroborative
evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and
conduct   of   the   parties.   In   the   present   case,   as   observed
hereinabove, even the plaintiff has also categorically admitted
that the oral partition had taken place on 23.04.1971 and he also
30
admitted   that   3   to   4   punchayat   people   were   also   present.
However, according to him, the same was not reduced in writing.
Therefore, even accepting the case of plaintiff that there was an
oral partition on 23.04.1971, the document Exhibit D4 dated
23.04.1971, to which he is also the signatory and all other family
members are signatory, can be said to be a list of properties
partitioned.   Everybody   got   right/share   as   per   the   oral
partition/partition.   Therefore,   the   same   even   can   be   used   as
corroborative   evidence   as   explaining   the   arrangement   made
thereunder and   conduct of the parties. Therefore, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed a
grave/manifest error in not looking into and/or not considering
the document Exhibit D4 dated 23.04.1971.
9.6 So far as the Sale Deed dated 18.05.1973 (Exhibit P2)
executed by Siddalingappa in favour of the plaintiff is concerned,
as there was a categorically finding by both the Courts below that
the same document was sham. It is required to be noted that in
the   cross­examination,   the   plaintiff   has   stated   that   he   paid
Rs. 3000 to 4000 to Siddalingappa and the said property was
purchased by him in the year 1973. However, in the document,
31
the   sale   consideration   is   stated   to   be   Rs.200/­.   Even   PW2
Siddalingappa has stated that he purchased the suit schedule
property for Rs.200/­ and he sold the suit schedule property to
the plaintiff for Rs.600/­ Therefore, it is a serious dispute with
respect to consideration paid by the plaintiff and received by the
Siddalingappa.
10. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case,
the High Court was not justified in interfering with the findings
recorded by both the Courts below. For the reasons stated above,
the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court
cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and
set   aside   and   is   accordingly   quashed   and   set   aside.   The
Judgment and Order passed by both the Courts below dismissing
the suit, are hereby restored and consequently the suit filed by
the original plaintiff is dismissed.  No costs.
……………………………….J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
NEW DELHI, ……………………………….J.
MAY 1, 2019.         [M.R. SHAH] 
32

suit by Donor - alternate prayer made for a decree of declaration that the School was the owner in possession of the land which had been gifted to it, and that the mutation of exchange was illegal, unlawful, and liable to be set aside. =The purported oral exchange dated 01.08.1988, followed by the Agreement dated 25.08.1988, between Balwant Singh, the then Principal of the Doaba Public School, with Mohinder Singh ­ the President of the School, was a wholly collusive and illegal transaction. The exchange was illegal and unauthorized, since there was no Resolution passed by the Doaba Education Society which was running the school in favour of the President to exchange the land owned and vested in the School pursuant to the Gift Deed.=The purported exchange dated 01.08.1988 and 25.08.1988 being wholly illegal, is liable to be quashed and set aside. The Jamabandis reflecting the purported exchange are quashed and set aside. The Jamabandis be restored by the revenue authorities in the name of the Doaba Public School, Garhshankar, Village Parowal, District Hoshiarpur, Punjab. The Appeals are allowed accordingly.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4629­4630 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.  4120­4121  of 2019)
Randhir Kaur (Deceased) through her Lrs. …Appellant(s)
Versus
Balwinder Kaur & Ors.                        …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
INDU MALHOTRA, J.
1. Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.
2. The   present   Appeals   have   been   filed   against   the   common
judgment and order dated 25.05.2018 passed by the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in RSA Nos. 2879 and 4771 of 2015.
Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the Appellants have
filed the present Appeals.
1
3. The background facts in which the present Appeals have been
filed, briefly narrated are as follows: ­
3.1 The   predecessor­in­title   of   the   suit   property   Smt.
Randhir Kaur w/o Harnandan Singh vide a registered
Gift   Deed   dated   27.05.1981   donated   a   property
admeasuring   4   Kanals   10   Marlas   of   land   bearing
Khata No. 15/18, Khasra No. 766/567 (4­10) situated
at   Parowal   Tehsil   Garhshankar   to   Doaba   Public
School,   Garhshankar   [hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
“suit property”]. The Gift was executed for the specific
purpose   of   advancing   the   cause   of   education   of
children   of   the   area,   for   which   the   property   was
transferred with all rights to the Doaba Public School,
run by the Doaba Education Society, Garhshankar.
The   Gift  Deed  was  executed   by  the   Donar  viz
Smt. Randhir Kaur through her husband as power of
attorney holder. The Gift Deed was witnessed by Mr.
Ujjagar   Singh,   Nambardar,   Parowal.     The   second
witness was Mr. Balwant Singh, the Principal of the
School.
2
3.2 The suit property was duly mutated in the name of the
Doaba   Public   School  vide  Mutation   Entry   dated
04.12.1981.
3.3 The   Respondents   contend   that   by   an   oral
memorandum of exchange on 1.8.1988, the Principal
of Doaba Public School ­ Mr. Balwant Singh, and Mr.
Mohinder Singh, ­ the President of Doaba Education
Society, purportedly exchanged the land of the School
admeasuring 24 Kanals in Tehsil Garhshankar, with
the   personal   land   owned   by   Mr.   Balwant   Singh   in
Village   Khanni,   Tehsil   Garhshnakar.   This   exchange
included the land admeasuring 4 Kanals 10 Marlas
which had been donated by Smt. Randhir Kaur, the
predecessor of the Appellants herein. Subsequently, an
agreement   dated   25.8.1988   was   executed   by   the
Principal of the Doaba Public School and the President
of the Doaba Education Society.
3.4 Mr. Balwant Sing, Principal had the lands of the school
mutated in his own name on 29.10.1988 vide mutation
3
of   exchange   no.1824,   based   on   the   aforesaid
agreement of exchange.
3.5 On the death of Balwant Singh in 1995, his widow
Balwinder Kaur/Respondent No.1 herein became the
owner of the suit property.
3.6 Smt. Randhir Kaur – the donar of the suit property
and therefore filed Civil Suit No. 66 of 2001, wherein
she prayed for the following two reliefs: ­
“It   is,   therefore,   prayed   that   decree   for
possession   of   land   measuring   4   kls   10   mrls
bearing Khewat no.94, Khatauni no. 124 Khasra
No.   756/567   (4­10),   as   entered   in   Jamabandi
1994­95 situated in the area of vill­persona, M.B.
No.   266.   The­Garhshankar,   Distt.­Hoshiarpur,
after removal of all types of Malba.
OR
In the alternative a decree for declaration to
the   effect   that   the   defdt.   No.2   is   owner   in
possession   of   land   measuring   4   kls   10   mrls
bearing Khewat No.94, Khatauni No.124, Khasra
No.756/567 (4­10), situated in the area of VillParowal, The­Garhshankar. Distt­Hoshiarpur and
that   the   mutation   No.1824   allegedly   regarding
exchange of above said land from the name of
defdt. No.2 in the name of husband of defdt. No.1
i.e.   Balwant   Singh   is   wrong,   incorrect,   illegal,
unlawful, null and void­ab­initio, ineffective and
inoperative, against the rights of defdt. No.2 and
is liable to be set aside and that the entries in the
column   of   ownership   of   Jamabandi   1994­95
showing the defdt. No.1 as owner of the said land
4
are wrong, incorrect, illegal, unlawful, null and
void, having no effect on the rights of defdt. No.2
and are liable to be corrected to show the defdt.
No.2 as owner in possession f the same with a
consequential   relief   of   Perpetual   Injunction
restraining   the   defdt.   No.1   from   execution   any
instrument of alienation in favour of some third
person by taking undue­advantage of the wrong
entries   in   her   favour   and   for   restraining   the
defendant from using the suit land for any other
purpose except for the purposes sub­servient to
the   educational   activities   of   defdt.   No.2   may
kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff and
against   the   defdts.   with   costs   which   is   in   the
interest of justice and equity.”
3.7 The Trial Court  vide  its detailed judgment and order
dated 29.07.2011 partly allowed the suit filed by the
appellant   herein.   The   first   prayer   for   decree   of
possession   could   not   be   granted   pursuant   to   the
registered Gift Deed, the land had vested in the School.
However, the Court granted the alternate relief prayed
for. The Court held that as the School failed to produce
any Resolution passed by the Doaba Education Society
empowering the Principal to enter into an exchange of
the property of the School. The Respondent No.2 had
sought   to   exchange   24   Kanals   of   un­arable,
unirrigated land situated in a remote village of Khanni
5
located   in   the   Shivalik   foothills   for   the   valuable
property of the School. By the exchange the PrincipalBalwant   Singh   claimed   ownership   over   the   suit
property. The Respondent No.1 had the mutation of
the   suit   property   changed   into   his   own   name.
Thereafter, he executed a lease­deed dated 27.05.2002
of the School property, showing the School to be the
lessee. As a consequence, the school now became the
lessee, and the Principal became the owner of the suit
property.
The Trial Court held that the exchange was clearly
illegal, in the absence of any resolution passed by the
Society. Since the exchange was held to be illegal, the
Appellants were granted the alternative relief prayed
for, i.e. a declaration that the Doaba Education Society
as   the   owner   in   possession   of   the   land.   The
Respondent No.1 had no right to use the suit property
for any other purpose, except the educational activities
of the Respondent No.2­School. The Respondent No.1
was permanently restrained from alienating the suit
property,   or   using   it   in   any   manner,   than   for   the
6
educational needs of the school. The Trial Court held
that   the   Respondent   No.2­School   was   the   duly
appointed trustee in possession of the land of 4 kanals
10 marlas donated by the plaintiffs. The Court ordered
that the mutation of exchange No.1824 be set aside,
being illegal, null and void.  The entries in the revenue
record be corrected in favour of the Respondent No.2
School as owner and in possession of the suit property.
3.8 Respondent No.1 filed an appeal before the Additional
District Judge. The Appellate Court held that it would
not be possible for the donor to contend that the gift is
not valid. The Appellate Court was of the view that the
Appellants have no locus standi to agitate the matter,
because she was left with no concern over the suit
property   after   the   execution   of   the   Gift   Deed.   The
cancellation of the Gift Deed could not be considered.
The Court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court,
and declared that the cancellation of the mutation in
favour of the Respondent herein was not correct.
3.9 Aggrieved by the said judgment, the Appellants filed a
Second Appeal before the High Court of Punjab and
7
Haryana.   The High Court  vide  impugned judgment
dated   25.5.2018   affirmed   the   order   of   the   First
Appellate Court.
3.10 The present Appeals have been filed by the Appellants
who are the legal representatives of Smt. Randhir Kaur
­ the donor of the suit property. The Appellants have
inter   alia  contended   that   the   donation   of   the   suit
property was  for the  benefit of  the students  of  the
School;   the   transfer/exchange   by   Balwant   Singhhusband of Respondent No.1 who was the Principal of
the School, was illegal and vitiated by ulterior motives.
The   property   which   had   been   donated   by   the
Appellants was of high value and quality, which was
sought to be exchanged with a property which was
inferior in quality, and was unirrigated land, situated
in a remote village Khanni; the exchange was without
any   legal   sanction   or   authority   from   the   society
running the School.
3.11 The learned Counsel for the Respondents  inter   alia
submitted that the Gift Deed dated 27.05.1981 did not
reserve any rights for the Donor. After the execution of
8
the Gift Deed the Appellants had no locus to file a suit
for possession of the suit property, as possession was
delivered   to   the   Respondent   No.2­School  vide  the
registered Gift Deed. It was further submitted that the
Gift   Deed   had   no   condition   wherein   it   could   be
cancelled by the Donor.
The   Appellants   divested   themselves   from   any
right of title in the suit property which was passed to
the Donee.   Once the registered Gift Deed had been
executed   without   reserving   any   right   in   the   suit
property, it could not be revoked.
The oral exchange of lands on 1.8.1988 between
the Principal of the School, and the President of the
Doaba Education Society, was later reduced in writing
by   virtue   of   an   agreement   dated   25.08.1988.     The
Respondents produced for the first time a copy of a
Resolution   dated   1.8.1988   in   favour   of   Mohinder
Singh, the President of the Society to sell or exchange
the   School’s   property.   This   document   was   never
produced before the Courts below. The authenticity of
this document has not been proved. We did not permit
9
the   Respondent   to   place   additional   documents   on
record at the fag end before this Court.
It was further argued that even though the land
was exchanged to set up a school in a remote area
which would give an opportunity to the children of
Village Khanni to get access to education, the school
continued to run from the suit property. During the
course   of   arguments,   the   learned   Counsel   also
suggested   that   the   Respondents   would   give   an
Undertaking that the School would be run from the
suit property in the future also.
4.We have heard the learned counsel appearing for both the
parties at length.
4.1 Having carefully perused the record filed before this
Court, and considering the oral submissions made by
the Counsel for the parties, we are of the considered
view that both the First Appellate Court and the High
Court. It has been erroneously held that the mutation
entries for exchange by Respondent No.1 was valid.
Even   though,   the   Appellants/plaintiffs   herein   had
10
prayed for a decree of possession of the land which
had been gifted to Respondent No. 2­School; there was
an alternate prayer made for a decree of declaration
that the School was the owner in possession of the
land which had been gifted to it, and that the mutation
of exchange was illegal, unlawful, and liable to be set
aside. The Trial Court had rightly decreed the suit on
the alternate prayer. The First Appellate Court and the
High Court confined their discussion only with respect
to the prayer for declaration for possession of the suit
property.   The   Appellant   Court   and   High   Court
completely vest right of the alternate prayer made by
the Appellant.
4.2 The   purported   oral   exchange   dated   01.08.1988,
followed by the Agreement dated 25.08.1988, between
Balwant Singh, the then Principal of the Doaba Public
School, with Mohinder Singh ­ the President of the
School, was a wholly collusive and illegal transaction.
The   exchange   was   illegal   and   unauthorized,   since
there   was   no   Resolution   passed   by   the   Doaba
11
Education Society which was running the school in
favour of the President to exchange the land owned
and vested in the School pursuant to the Gift Deed.
The   Principal   and   the   President   of   the   school   in
Garhshankar entered into this collusive transaction,
whereby Balwant Singh ­ the then Principal became
the owner of the suit property. The school could not
have   been   divested   of   the   ownership   of   the   suit
property by the so­called exchange mentioned above.
This was in complete breach of faith and trust by the
President of the Society and Principal of the School.
4.3 The ostensible reason given by the Respondents for the
exchange   was   that   this   was   for   the   benefit   of   the
students in Village Khanni, Garhshankar. 
This   reason   was   a   mere   camouflage   which   is
apparent from the fact that the School has not been
shifted to Village Khanni since the date of purported
exchange on 25.08.1988 i.e. since the past 31 years.
The School to date continues to be run from the suit
property and adjoining lands.
12
It is obvious that the so­called exchange was a
mere ruse to transfer the valuable land of the School
which had been gifted by the mother of the Appellants,
to   the   Principal,   in   exchange   for   some   unirrigated
inferior quality banjar land situated in a remote corner
in Village Khanni. 
Once the School was divested of ownership on the
basis   of   the   purported   exchange,   the   Respondents
executed a Lease Deed in favour of the School, wherein
the   School   was   now   shown   as   a   Lessee,   and   was
required to pay lease rent to the Principal and later his
legal heirs.
5. The purported exchange dated 01.08.1988 and 25.08.1988
being wholly illegal, is liable to be quashed and set aside. The
Jamabandis reflecting the purported exchange are quashed
and set aside. The Jamabandis be restored by the revenue
authorities   in   the   name   of   the   Doaba   Public   School,
Garhshankar, Village Parowal, District Hoshiarpur, Punjab.
The Appeals are allowed accordingly.
13
The Respondents are directed to pay costs of Rs. 1 lac
to the Appellants herein within a period of 12 weeks, and
report compliance to this Court.
…...........................J.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
…...……………………J.
(INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi,
May 6, 2019.
14

Service matter - we hold that the Judgment of the Division Bench is liable to be set aside since the contesting Respondents did not have a vested or fructified right of promotion to OAS Class II posts which had arisen during the recruitment year 2008. The names of the contesting Respondents were merely recommended for consideration. In the meanwhile, in 2009 the State had re­structured the cadre, and abolished the OAS Class II cadre. The re­constituted cadre viz. the Orissa Revenue Service Group ‘B’ cadre came in its place. Hence, the direction of the Division Bench to appoint the contesting Respondents in the vacancies which had occurred in the abolished cadre, in accordance with the repealed 1978 Rules, was contrary to law, and liable to be set aside.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4646 OF 2019
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4976 of 2019]
State of Orissa & Anr.                  …Appellants
Versus
Dhirendra Sundar Das & Ors.              …Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4647 OF 2019
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4977 of 2019]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4648 OF 2019
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4978 of 2019]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4649 OF 2019
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4979 of 2019]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4650 OF 2019
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4980 of 2019]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4651 OF 2019
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11861 of 2019]
(Diary No. 13938 of 2019)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4652 OF 2019
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11862 of 2019]
(Diary No. 13946 of 2019)
1
    J U D G M E N T
    INDU MALHOTRA, J.
Leave granted.
1. The present Civil Appeals arise out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 4976­
4980/2019 and S.L.P. (C) Diary Nos. 13938 and 13946/2019.
S.L.P. (C) Nos. 4976­4980/2019 arise out of the common
impugned Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2018 passed by a
Division   Bench   of   the   Orissa   High   Court   in   W.P.   (C)   Nos.
14831/2013,   18749/2012,   6720/2013,   25961/2017   and
9200/2016.
S.L.P. (C) Diary Nos. 13938 and 13946/2019 arise out of
the   impugned   Orders   dated   08.08.2018   and   10.08.2018
passed by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court whereby
W.P. (C) Nos. 7383 and 14665/2018 were disposed of in terms
of   the   common   impugned   Judgment   and   Order   dated
30.04.2018.
2. The factual matrix in which the present Civil Appeals arise for
consideration, briefly stated, are as under:
2
2.1. On 28.04.2008, a Letter was issued by the Appellant –
State of Orissa (“State”) to all Departments, Heads of
Departments, and Collectors inviting recommendations
for   appointment   by   way   of   promotion   to   the   Orissa
Administrative Service Class – II (“OAS Class – II”) cadre
having 150 vacancies. The recruitment process was to be
undertaken   in   accordance   with   the   Orissa
Administrative   Service,   Class   II   (Recruitment)   Rules,
1978   (“OAS   Class   II   Rules,   1978”)   and   the   Orissa
Administrative   Service,   Class   –   II   (Appointment   by
Promotion and Selection) Regulations, 1978 (“OAS Class
II Regulations, 1978”).
2.2. The concerned Departmental Authorities forwarded the
names   of   559   candidates,   including   the   contesting
Respondents, for consideration to be promoted/selected
to OAS Class – II posts.
2.3. The   State   issued   Office   Order   dated   07.06.2008,   for
implementation   of   the   Judgment   dated   11.04.2007
3
passed by the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack
Bench (“O.A.T.”).
The   O.A.T.   had   directed   the   State   to   separately
assess the vacancies for the years 2001 to 2005 year
wise, conduct the process of calling for names, hold a
D.P.C. in accordance with established procedure, and
make appointments within a period of six months.
2.4. In   this   background,   the   State   decided   to   keep   the
recruitment  process for OAS Class – II posts for the
recruitment   year   2008   on   hold,   till   the   process   of
recruitment by way of promotion/selection for the years
2001­2005 was completed.
2.5. Pursuant to the Judgment of the Tribunal, the State
vide Letter dated 19.06.2008 called for recommendations
for the years 2001 to 2005 from all Departments, Heads
of Departments, and Collectors for recruitment to OAS
Class – II posts under Rule 3(c) of the OAS Class II
Rules, 1978.
4
2.6. Aggrieved by the delay in completion of the recruitment
process   for   the   years   2007­2008,   various   O.A.s   were
filed by the contesting Respondents, and other similarly
situated   persons,   who   had   been   recommended   for
consideration   to   OAS   Class   –   II   posts   against   the
vacancies   for   2008   before   the   O.A.T.   The   Applicants
prayed  for  completion   of   the   recruitment   process   by
convening a D.P.C.; and declaration of the selection list
for the years 2007­2008 within a month, and issuance of
appointment letters.
2.7. The   State   undertook   restructuring   of   the   Orissa
Administrative Service in February 2009.
The   re­structured   Orissa   Administrative   Service
cadre would comprise of different Grades,  viz.  – OAS
Class – I (Junior Branch), OAS Class I (Senior Branch),
OAS (Supertime Scale), OAS (Senior Grade in Supertime
Scale), OAS (Superior Administrative Grade), and OAS
(Special Secretary).
2.8. By   Resolution   dated   25.05.2009,   the   Orissa   Revenue
Service Group ‘B’ cadre was constituted.
5
The   existing   cadre   of   OAS   Class   –   II   posts   was
abolished. The corresponding cadre of OAS Class – II
was the Orissa Revenue Service Group ‘B’ cadre.
2.9. The   State  vide  two   Notifications   dated   07.12.2010
appointed candidates on OAS Class – II posts by way of
selection and promotion for the recruitment years 2001
to 2005.
2.10. The   State   framed   the   Orissa   Administrative   Services
(Method   of   Recruitment   and   Conditions   of   Service)
Rules, 2011 (“OAS  Rules,  2011”) under Article 309 of
the Constitution of India. The Rules came into force on
25.06.2011.
Rule 17 of the OAS Rules, 2011 repealed the OAS
Class II Rules, 1978 under which the 2008 recruitment
process had been initiated.
Rule   4   of   the   OAS   Rules,   2011   provides   for
recruitment by promotion to Group ‘A’ (Junior Branch)
posts of the re­constituted Orissa Administrative Service
cadre from members of the Orissa Revenue Service.
6
Similarly, the Orissa Revenue Service (Recruitment)
Rules, 2011 (“ORS   Rules,   2011”) came into force on
June 27, 2011 to regulate the method of recruitment,
and conditions of service, of persons appointed to the
Orissa Revenue Service, including Group ‘B’ posts.
2.11. The O.A.T. vide Judgment dated 14.03.2012 decided the
O.A.s   filed   by   the   contesting   Respondents   and   other
similarly situated persons who were under consideration
for the vacancies for the recruitment year 2008. The
State was directed to take immediate steps to fill up
Class – II/Group ‘B’ posts in the Orissa Revenue Service
cadre. 50% of the vacancies were to be filled up by direct
recruitment, and 50% by promotion from amongst Class
– III/Group C employees as early as practicable, and
preferably within six months. The relief claimed by the
contesting   Respondents   and   other   similarly   situated
persons could not be granted unless 50% of the available
vacancies were first filled up by direct recruitment in
accordance with the Rules. The contesting Respondents
had   merely   been   recommended   by   their   respective
7
Departmental   Authorities   for   promotion/selection   to
OAS Class – II (Group B) posts. There was no Selection
Board/D.P.C. which was convened, nor was any Select
List/Merit   List   prepared.   The   contesting   Respondents
who were continuing against Class III posts, could be
considered for promotion only to Class – II (Group B)
posts, and not directly to Class – I (Group A) posts. No
right   had   accrued   in   favour   of   the   contesting
Respondents   to   seek   convening   of   a   Selection
Board/Department   Promotion   Committee   for
appointment on OAS Class – II posts. The contesting
Respondents would be eligible for consideration against
the   available   Class   –   II/Group   B   posts   in   the
promotional quota, after 50% of the vacancies were filled
up by direct recruitment.
2.12. Aggrieved by the common Judgment and Order dated
14.03.2012   passed   by   the   O.A.T.,   the   contesting
Respondents filed W.P.s before the Orissa High Court
seeking   quashing   of   the   Judgment   dated   14.03.2012
passed by the O.A.T.; issuance of directions to the State
8
to complete the recruitment process to OAS Class – II
posts   on   the   basis   of   the   recommendations   made   in
favour   of   the   contesting   Respondents;   and,   grant
promotion to the contesting Respondents to OAS Class –
II posts with all service and promotional benefits from
the date such benefits were due.
2.13. The Division Bench by the common impugned Judgment
and Order dated 30.04.2018 disposed of the W.P.s filed
by   the   contesting   Respondents,   and   set   aside   the
Judgment dated 14.03.2012 passed by the O.A.T. The
State Authorities were directed to call for a review D.P.C.
to consider the cases of the contesting Respondents, and
other   eligible   officers,   and   complete   the   recruitment
process for 150 vacant OAS Class – II posts as against
the recruitment year of 2008 within 3 months. The High
Court held that the 150 vacant OAS Class – II posts for
which recommendations were made in the year 2008,
prior to the abolition of the OAS Class – II posts, and reconstitution   of   the   Orissa   Revenue   Service   cadre,   be
filled up under the OAS Class II Rules, 1978.
9
3. Aggrieved   by   the   impugned   Judgment   and   Order   dated
30.04.2018 as well as the impugned Orders dated 08.08.2018
and 10.08.2018 passed by the Division Bench, the State has
filed the present Special Leave Petitions.
4. The issue which arises for our consideration in the present
Civil Appeals is whether the Division Bench of the Orissa High
Court was justified in directing the State to convene a review
D.P.C. for considering the case of the contesting Respondents
and other eligible officers, and directing it to complete the
recruitment process for recruitment year of 2008 to the 150
vacant posts.
5.     SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONERS
5.1. Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Advocate on behalf of the
State submitted that the Division Bench had committed
a   palpable   error   in   directing   the   State   to   convene   a
review D.P.C.
5.2. Placing reliance on a recent decision of this Court in
Union of India & Ors.  v. Krishna Kumar & Ors.1
, it was
submitted that no right had accrued in favour of the
1 2019 (1) SCALE 691.
10
contesting   Respondents   merely   on   account   of   their
names   being   recommended   by   the   respective
Departmental   Authorities   to   be   considered   for
selection/promotion   against   the   vacancies   in   the
recruitment year 2008. The list of persons recommended
cannot   be   considered   to   be   the   approved   list   of
candidates for selection/promotion, since no D.P.C. or
Selection Committee was convened for the same.
5.3. It   was   further   submitted   that   the   contesting
Respondents did not challenge the abolition of the OAS
Class – II cadre, and the consequent creation  of  the
Orissa Revenue Service Group ‘B’ cadre.
5.4. The contesting Respondents could not claim a lien over
the   OAS   Class   –   II   cadre,   which   had   since   been
abolished in 2009, and replaced by the Orissa Revenue
Service Group ‘B’ cadre.
5.5. Some   of   the   contesting   Respondents   had   submitted
themselves before the Selection Committee convened in
2013, and another in 2018, under the new ORS Rules,
11
2011   for   appointment   to   vacant   posts   in   the   Orissa
Revenue Service Group ‘B’ cadre.
It was, therefore, not open to claim appointments to
the OAS Class – II posts under the repealed Rules in an
abolished cadre.
5.6. The   claim   of   the   contesting   Respondents   cannot   be
considered at par with the candidates for the years 2001
to 2005 as their appointments were made prior to the
repeal of the OAS Class II Rules, 1978 and the OAS
Class II Regulations, 1978.
5.7. It was further submitted on behalf of the State that if the
directions of the Division Bench were to be carried out,
supernumerary posts would be required to be created to
accommodate the contesting Respondents which was not
possible. This would create a serious precedent, since
there were 559 candidates who were similarly situated
as   the   contesting   Respondents,   and   had   been
recommended by various Departments in 2008.
6.     SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENTS
12
6.1. Ms.   Meenakshi   Arora,   learned   Senior   Advocate,
submitted that 150 vacant OAS Class – II posts were
available   in   2008.   The   contesting   Respondents   were
eligible, and were duly recommended for appointment by
way   of   selection/promotion   under   the   OAS   Class   II
Rules, 1978 and the OAS Class II Regulations, 1978.
6.2. The State, being a model employer, cannot discriminate
in the matter of selection/promotion to OAS Class – II
posts on a ‘pick­and­choose’ basis.
6.3. Admittedly, the OAS Class II Rules, 1978 and the OAS
Class II Regulations, 1978 were in force at the time when
the State decided to fill up 150 OAS Class – II posts on
28.04.2008. The vacancies were required to be filled up
under the OAS Class II Rules, 1978.
6.4. Reliance   was   placed   by   Ms.   Arora,   learned   Senior
Advocate, on the decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah
& Ors.  v.  J. Sreenivasa Rao & Ors.2
. It was submitted
that vacancies which had occurred prior to the repeal of
the   OAS   Class   II   Rules,   1978   and   OAS   Class   II
2 (1983) 3 SCC 284.
13
Regulations, 1978; and the coming into force of the OAS
Rules,   2011   and   the   ORS   Rules,   2011,   would   be
governed by the old Rules, viz. OAS Class II Rules, 1978
and OAS Class II Regulations, 1978.
7.     DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
7.1. The contesting Respondents cannot claim an accrued or
vested right for selection or promotion to OAS Class – II
posts in the year 2008, merely on the basis of their
names being forwarded by the respective Departmental
Authorities.
7.2. When the recruitment process for 2008 was initiated
vide Letter dated April 28, 2008 by the State, the extant
rules and regulations occupying the field for selection
and promotion to OAS Class – II posts were the OAS
Class II Rules, 1978 and the OAS Class II Regulations,
1978.
7.3. Rule 6 of the OAS Class II Rules, 1978 provided for the
determination   of   vacancies   by   the   State   Government.
14
Rule   6   has   been   reproduced   hereinbelow   for   ready
reference:
“6. Filing of vacancies. –
The   State   Government  may  decide   the   number   of
vacancies in the service as may be required to be filled
up in any particular year:
Provided   that  no   recruitment   to   the   service
shall be made without  the prior consultation with the
Commission”
(emphasis supplied)
7.4. Rule 3 of the OAS Class II, Rules 1978 provided that
recruitment to OAS Class II posts was to be made by
three methods – first, direct recruitment by competitive
examination   [Rule   3(a)];  second,   promotion   from
amongst Gazetted Officers of a certain class [Rule 3(b)];
and third, selection of non­Gazetted Officers [Rule 3(c)].
The proportion of candidates to be recruited by the
methods specified above as per Rule 8 of the OAS Class
II Rules, 1978 was – 50% by direct recruitment, 30% by
promotion, and 20% by selection.
Further, Rule 8(5) also mandated that the State was
required   to   consult   the   Orissa   Public   Service
15
Commission before appointment by way of promotion
and selection.
7.5. As   per   Rule   5   of   the   OAS   Class   II   Rules,   1978,
recruitment to OAS Class II posts by way of selection or
promotion shall be in accordance with the Orissa Class
II   Regulations,   1978,   which   outline   the   recruitment
process.
7.6. In accordance with Regulation 6(i) of the OAS Class II
Regulations, 1978, any recruitment process by way of
selection or promotion was to be initiated by the State by
calling for recommendations from Collectors, Heads of
Departments   and   Departments   of   Governments,   who
were required to forward a list of candidates considered
suitable   to   the   Administrative   Department   (i.e.  the
Revenue Department).
On   receipt   of   the   recommendations,   the
Administrative   Department   (i.e.  the   Revenue
Department)   was   required   to   place   a   list   of
recommended   candidates   in   a   tabular   form   before   a
Selection Board constituted under Regulation 3.
16
7.7. Under Regulation 7, the Selection Board was required to
consider   the   recommendations   so   received   from   the
Administrative   Department,   scrutinise   the   records
relating to the candidates who had been recommended,
and prepare a list of candidates who in the opinion of
the Selection Board are suitable for appointment to OAS
Class – II posts.
7.8. Thereafter, as per Regulation 8, the list prepared by the
Selection Board under Regulation 7 was required to be
referred to the Orissa Public Service Commission by the
State Government, along with the service records of the
all candidates whose names feature in the list.
7.9. After considering the list prepared under Regulation 7
along with other documents and records received from
the   State   Government,   the   Orissa   Public   Service
Commission   was   required   to   recommend   a   list   of
candidates suitable for selection or promotion, as the
case may be, under Regulation 9.
7.10. The list of candidates recommended by the Orissa Public
Service Commission under Regulation 9 was required to
17
be placed before the State Government. The said list,
after any approval with modification, was to form the
final list from which appointments were to be made to
OAS Class – II posts by way of selection or promotion in
accordance with Regulation 10.
Thus, the recruitment process by way of selection or
promotion, as the case may be, initiated in accordance
with Regulation 6 would culminate on the making of a
final list as per Regulation 10. Appointments by way of
promotion or selection could be made only from amongst
the candidates whose names featured in the final list
prepared   by   the   Commission,   and   placed   before   the
State Government.
7.11. In Deepak Agarwal & Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors.3
 this Court had held that the right to be considered
for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of
eligible candidates.4
3 (2011) 6 SCC 725.
4 See also Union of India & Ors. v. Krishna Kumar & Ors., 2019 (1) SCALE 691 (para 11);
and, State of Tripura & Ors. v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty & Ors., (2017) 3 SCC 646 (paras 8
and 9).
18
The   relevant   extract   of   the   decision   is   extracted
hereinbelow for ready reference:
“26. It   is   by   now   a   settled   proposition   of   law   that   a
candidate has the right to be considered in the light of
the existing rules, which implies the “rule in force” on the
date the consideration took place. There is no rule of
universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be
filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the
vacancy   arises.   The   requirement   of   filling   up   old
vacancies   under   the   old   rules   is   interlinked   with   the
candidate having acquired a right to be considered for
promotion.   The   right   to   be   considered   for   promotion
accrues   on   the   date   of   consideration   of   the   eligible
candidates.  Unless,   of   course,   the   applicable   rule,   as
in Y.V. Rangaiah case [(1983) 3 SCC 284 : 1983 SCC
(L&S) 382] lays down any particular time­frame, within
which the selection process is to be completed. In the
present case, consideration for promotion took place after
the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be
accepted   that   any   accrued   or   vested   right   of   the
appellants has been taken away by the amendment.”
(emphasis supplied)
7.12. In   the   present   case,   the   names   of   559   candidates,
including   the   contesting   Respondents,   were   merely
recommended   by   their   respective   Departmental
Authorities under Regulation 6. The recruitment process
did   not   proceed   any   further   in   accordance   with
Regulations   7,   8,   9   and   10.   No   final   list   of   selected
candidates   was   placed   by   the   Orissa   Public   Service
19
Commission   before   the   State   Government   for   the
purposes   of   appointment   as   against   the   vacancies   of
2008.
As   such,   the   contesting   Respondents   who   had
merely   been   recommended   by   their   respective
Departmental Authorities could not be considered to be
‘eligible’   for   appointment   by   way   of   promotion   or
selection under the erstwhile OAS Class II Regulations,
1978,   since   the   steps   set   out   in   the   regulations
mentioned below had not been completed prior to the
repeal of the old OAS Class II Rules, 1978 and the OAS
Class II Regulations, 1978:
 Regulation   7   –   preparation   of   a   list   of   suitable
candidates by the Selection Board;
 Regulation 8 – consultation with the Orissa Public
Service Commission;
 Regulation   9   –   recommendation   of   the   Orissa
Public Service Commission; and,
20
 Regulation 10 – preparation and placement of final
list before the State Government for appointment.
Thus, the contesting Respondents had not acquired
an accrued or vested right of selection or promotion to
OAS Class – II posts in accordance with the OAS Class II
Rules, 1978 and the OAS Class II Regulations, 1978,
since   their   names   had   never   been   considered   for
selection or promotion beyond the stage contemplated
under Regulation 6.
7.13. Reliance placed by the Counsel for the Respondents on
Y.V. Rangaiah & Ors.  v.  J. Sreenivasa Rao & Ors.5
  in
order to submit that the vacancies which had arisen
under the old Rules would be governed by the old Rules,
is of no avail.
A similar submission was rejected by this Court in
Deepak Agarwal & Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors.6
. The relevant excerpt of the decision is reproduced
hereinbelow:
5 (1983) 3 SCC 284.
6 (2011) 6 SCC 725.
21
“24. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment
    in     Y.V. Rangaiah case[(1983) 3 SCC 284 : 1983 SCC
(L&S) 382] would not be applicable in the facts and
circumstances of this case. The aforesaid judgment was
rendered on the interpretation of Rule 4(a)(1)(i) of the
Andhra Pradesh Registration and Subordinate Service
Rules,   1976.   The   aforesaid   Rule   provided   for
preparation of a panel for the eligible candidates every
year in the  month  of September. This was a statutory
duty cast upon the State. The exercise was required to
be   conducted   each   year.   Thereafter,   only   promotion
orders were to be issued. However, no panel had been
prepared for the year 1976. Subsequently, the Rule was
amended,   which   rendered   the   petitioners   therein
ineligible   to   be   considered   for   promotion.   In   these
circumstances, it was observed by this Court that the
amendment would not be applicable to the vacancies
which   had   arisen   prior   to   the   amendment.   The
vacancies which occurred prior to the amended Rules
would   be   governed   by   the   old   Rules   and   not   the
amended Rules.
25. In the present case, there is no statutory duty cast
upon the respondents to either prepare a yearwise panel
of the eligible candidates or of the selected candidates
for promotion. In fact, the proviso to Rule 2 enables the
State to keep any post unfilled. Therefore, clearly there
is no statutory duty which the State could be mandated
to perform under the applicable Rules. The requirement
to identify the vacancies in a year or to take a decision
as to how many posts are to be filled under Rule 7
cannot be equated with not issuing promotion orders to
the   candidates   duly   selected   for   promotion.   In   our
opinion, the appellants had not acquired any right to be
considered   for   promotion.   Therefore,   it   is   difficult   to
accept the submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan that the
vacancies, which had arisen before 17­5­1999 had to be
filled under the unamended Rules.”
(emphasis supplied)
22
7.14. In   the   present   case   the   contesting   Respondents   had
merely   been   recommended   by   the   respective
Departmental   Authorities   under   Regulation   6.   The
recruitment   process   had   not   proceeded   any   further
thereafter.   There   was   no   time­frame   prescribed   for
completion   of   the   recruitment   process   under   the
erstwhile OAS Class – II Rules, 1978 or the OAS Class –
II Regulations, 1978.
7.15. In   the   meanwhile,   the   State   restructured   the   Orissa
Administrative Service cadre, and constituted the Orissa
Revenue Service vide Resolutions dated 28.02.2009 and
25.05.2009.
As   a   part   of   the   re­structuring   exercise,   the
erstwhile OAS Class – II posts were abolished, and a
corresponding new cadre of Group ‘B’ posts in the newly
constituted Orissa Revenue Service was created.
7.16. The contesting Respondents have not challenged either
the abolition of OAS Class – II posts, or the creation of
the   corresponding   Orissa   Revenue   Service   Group   ‘B’
posts.
23
7.17. To the contrary, some of them have participated in the
proceedings of the D.P.C. convened on 30.04.2013 for
recruitment to the newly created Orissa Revenue Service
Group ‘B’ cadre.
After   being   considered,   6   of   the   contesting
Respondents   were   selected,   while   1   was   kept   on   the
Waiting List.
The State appointed the said Respondents to the
Orissa Revenue Service Group ‘B’ posts. However, only
two out of the five contesting Respondents who were
appointed, joined the posts.
7.18. Subsequently,   during   the   pendency   of   the   W.P.s,
another D.P.C. was convened to consider the promotion
of employees working in the Orissa Revenue Services
Group ‘B’ posts to Orissa Administrative Service Group A
(Junior Branch) posts.
1 contesting Respondent was promoted to the OAS
Group A (Junior Branch) cadre.
24
7.19. The contesting Respondents cannot claim any lien over
the abolished OAS Class – II posts, which were governed
by the old OAS Class II Rules, 1978 and OAS Class II
Regulations, 1978.
7.20. In this context, reliance may be placed on two decisions
of this Court in Rajasthan Public Service Commission v.
Chanan   Ram7 and  Union   of   India   &   Ors.  v.  Krishna
Kumar & Ors.8
.
In  Rajasthan Public Service Commission  v.  Chanan
Ram9
this Court rejected a claim for filing up vacancies
in posts which no longer existed, after an amendment of
the extant Rules.
The relevant excerpt of the decision is reproduced
hereinbelow for ready reference:
“14.  …Once it is held that the old vacancies were in
posts which no longer existed after April 1995, there
remained   no   occasion   to   consider   whether   these   old
vacancies could be filled in by applying earlier rules of
recruitment to the very same posts…There were no such
posts after April 1995 in the cadres of the Rajasthan
Agricultural Marketing Service as seen earlier…
7 (1998) 4 SCC 202.
8 2019 (1) SCALE 691.
9 (1998) 4 SCC 202.
25
15. …On the contrary a three­Judge Bench judgment of
this   Court   in   the   case   of Jai   Singh   Dalal v. State   of
Haryana [1993 Supp (2) SCC 600 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 846
: (1993) 24 ATC 788] would squarely get attracted on
the facts of the present case. A.M. Ahmadi J., speaking
for   the   three­Judge   Bench   in   para   7   of   the   Report
relying on an earlier judgment of this Court in case
of State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha [(1974)
3 SCC 220 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 488] laid down that when
the   special   process   of   recruitment   had   not   been
finalised and culminated into select list the candidate
did   not   have   any   right   to   appointment.   In   this
connection it was observed that the recruitment process
could be stopped by the Government at any time before
a candidate has been appointed. A candidate has no
vested right to get the process completed and at the
most the Government could be required to justify its
action   on   the   touchstone   of   Article   14   of   the
Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
In Union of India & Ors. v. Krishna Kumar & Ors.10
this Court was dealing with a similar situation of cadre
restructuring.
The relevant extract of the decision is reproduced
hereinbelow for ready reference:
“14.  In   view of this  statement of the  law,  it  is   evident
that   once   the   structure of Assam   Rifles   underwent   a
change   following   the   creation of the   intermediate
post of Warrant   Officer,   persons   holding   the
post of Havildar would be considered for promotion to the
post of Warrant Officer. The intermediate post of Warrant
Officer   was   created   as   a   result of the   restructuring
10 2019 (1) SCALE 691.
26
exercise.  The High Court was, in our view, in error in
postulating   that   vacancies   which   arose   prior   to   the
    amendment     of the Recruitment Rules would necessarily
    be governed by the Rules which existed at the time     of the
    occurrence     of the vacancies. As the decided cases noted
    earlier   indicate,   there   is   no   such   rule of   absolute   or
universal   application.   The   entire   basis     of the
    decision     of the   High   Court   was   that   those   who   were
recruited   prior   to   the   restructuring   exercise   and   were
    holding   the   post     of Havildars   had   acquired   a   vested
    right     of     promotion to the post     of Naib Subedar. This does
not reflect the correct position in law. The right is to be
considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules as
they exist when the exercise is carried out for promotion.”
(emphasis supplied)
7.21. The submission of the contesting Respondents that their
case be considered at par with the candidates appointed
by   way   of   selection   and   promotion   as   against   the
vacancies for the years 2001 to 2005 is not tenable.
The   appointments   of   persons   as   against   the
vacancies for the years 2001 to 2005 were made vide two
Notifications   dated   December   7,   2010,   which   were
issued prior to the repeal of the old OAS Class II Rules,
1978 and the OAS Class II Regulations, 1978.
7.22. Finally, the High Court had relied upon the decision in
Mukti Ranjan Acharya & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors.11
11 2012 (II) OLR 61.
27
[W.P. (C) No. 19827/2009; Decided on 16.04.2012] to
hold that promotions could be given under the repealed
OAS   Class   II   Rules,   1978   and   the   OAS   Class   II
Regulations, 1978. The S.L.P. against this judgment had
been simply dismissed. The Counsel for the contesting
Respondents prayed for dismissal of the present Civil
Appeals by submitting that the said decision had been
affirmed by this Court vide Order dated 28.09.2012. 
It is a well­settled principle of law emerging from a
catena   of   decisions   of   this   Court,   including  Supreme
Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India &
Anr.12  and  State   of   Punjab  v.  Davinder   Pal   Singh
Bhullar13, that the dismissal of a S.L.P. in limine simply
implies   that   the   case   before   this   Court   was   not
considered worthy of examination for a reason, which
may be other than the merits of the case. Such in limine
dismissal at the threshold without giving any detailed
reasons, does not constitute any declaration of law or a
binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution.
12 (1989) 1 SCC 187 (paras 22 and 23).
13 (2011) 14 SCC 770 (paras 112 and 113).
28
8. On the aforesaid grounds, we hold that the Judgment of the
Division Bench is liable to be set aside since the contesting
Respondents   did   not   have   a   vested   or   fructified   right   of
promotion to OAS Class II posts which had arisen during the
recruitment   year   2008.   The   names   of   the   contesting
Respondents were merely recommended for consideration. In
the meanwhile, in 2009 the State had re­structured the cadre,
and abolished the OAS Class II cadre. The re­constituted cadre
viz.  the Orissa Revenue Service Group ‘B’ cadre came in its
place. Hence, the direction of the Division Bench to appoint
the   contesting   Respondents   in   the   vacancies   which   had
occurred   in   the   abolished   cadre,   in   accordance   with   the
repealed 1978 Rules, was contrary to law, and liable to be set
aside.
In   view   of   the   aforesaid   findings,   the   present   Civil
Appeals are allowed. The common impugned Judgment and
Order dated 30.04.2018 passed by the Orissa High Court in
W.P. (C) Nos. 14831 of 2013, 18749 of 2012, 6720 of 2013,
25961 of 2017 and 9200 of 2016 as well as the impugned
Orders dated 08.08.2018 and 10.08.2018 passed by the Orissa
29
High Court in W.P. (C) Nos. 7383 and 14665/2018 are set
aside.
Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, are disposed
of in terms of the Judgment.
Ordered accordingly.
…..……...........................J.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
..….……..........................J.
(INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi
May 6, 2019.
30