Sec.319 Cr.P.C. = whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Trial Court was justified in summoning the appellants herein to face the trial in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the CrPC? = As observed hereinabove, the appellants herein were also named in the FIR. However, they were not shown as accused in the challan/charge­sheet. As observed hereinabove, nothing is on record whether at any point of time the complainant was given an opportunity to submit the protest application against non­filing of the charge­sheet against the appellants. In the deposition before the Court, P.W.1 and P.W.2 have specifically stated against the appellants herein and the specific role is attributed to the accused­appellants herein. Thus, the statement of P.W.1 and P.W.2 before the Court can be said to be “evidence” during the trial and, therefore, on the basis 31 of the same and as held by this Court in the case of Hardeep Singh (supra), the persons against whom no charge­sheet is filed can be summoned to face the trial. Therefore, we are of the opinion that no error has been committed by the Courts below to summon the appellants herein to face the trial in exercise of power under Section 319 of the CrPC.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 813  OF 2019
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1189 of 2019]
Rajesh & Ors. .. Appellants
Versus
State of Haryana .. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 19.12.2018 passed by the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Revision – CRR
No. 521 of 2018 by which the High Court has dismissed the said
revision   petition   preferred   by   the   appellants   herein   and   has
confirmed the order dated 28.10.2017 passed by the learned Trial
Court, by which the appellants herein were summoned to face
the trial for the offences under Sections 148, 149, 323, 324, 325,
2
302, 307 and 506 of the IPC, the appellants herein have preferred
the present appeal.
3. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as
under:
That one Hukum Singh lodged one FIR No. 180 on 12.06.2016 at
Police Station Sadar, Panipat against ten accused, including the
appellants herein for the offences under Sections 148, 149, 323,
324, 325, 302, 307 and 506 of the IPC.   It was alleged that on
12.06.2016 at about 1.30 pm, he along with his son Bhajji and
Hari   son   of   Parkash   were   going   from   Panipat   to   his   village
Chhajpur   Khurd   on   his   tractor.     His   son   had   parked   his
motorcycle in front of the shop of Nande at bus stand.  Therefore,
his son Bhajji and Hari son of Parkash alighted from the tractor
to   pick   up   the   motorcycle.     When   his   son   picked   up   the
motorcycle,   in   the   meantime,   Sunil   son   of   Jagpal   came   on
Splendor motorcycle.   Ravit son of Ramesh and Vicky son of
Jaswant   were   sitting   on   pillion   behind   him   on   motorcycle.
Sheela son of Paras was on his motorcycle Pulsar and Sumit son
of Jagdish, Rinku son of Rai Singh were sitting behind him on his
motorcycle.  Sunder son of Om Singh was on motorcycle Bullet
and Rajesh son of Prem and Sanjay son of Bishni were sitting
3
behind him on the said motorcycle.  Ankush son of Rajinder was
on his motorcycle make Splendor and Jagdish son of Devi Singh
and Tejpal son of Nar Singh were sitting behind him.  Joni son of
Sahab Singh was on his motorcycle Bullet and Sachin son of
Khilla was sitting behind him.   They were armed with swards,
pistols, hockeys, iron bars and gandasi etc.    They attacked his
son Bhajji and Hari son of Parkash.  Ravit son of Ramesh was
armed with a hockey, Vicky son of Jaswant was armed with
wooden baton, Sheela son of Paras was armed with gandasi.
Sumit son of Jagdish was armed with pistol, Rinky son of Rai
Singh was armed with iron bar, Sunder son of Om Singh was
armed with wooden baton, Rajesh son of Prem was armed with
sword, Jagdish son of Devi Singh was armed with lathi, Tejpal
son of Nar Singh was armed with iron bar, Joni son of Sahab
Singh was armed with wooden handle of spade, Sachin son of
Ruhla Ram was armed with sword and Joginder son of Sahi Ram
was having gandasi with him.  Rajesh son of Prem exhorted to
kill   both   of   them   because   they   were   pressing   hard   for   their
ejectment   from   panchayat   land.     Pursuant   to   exhortation,
accused inflicted injuries to his son and Hari son of Parkash with
their respective weapons.  When he raised alarm, accused sped
4
away on their motorcycles threatening to kill them in case any
action   is   taken   against   them.     In  the   meantime,   his  brother
Mahender came there and they removed both the injured to Prem
Hospital where Hari son of Parkash succumbed to his injuries on
14.06.2016 during treatment.
3.1 That all the accused named in the FIR were arrested.  The
Investigating Officer conducted the investigation and found ten
persons involved in the said incident.  However, the Investigating
Officer found that the appellants herein (six in numbers) were not
present at the site of incident.     That the Investigating Officer
submitted his report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC against
four   accused   only.     That,   thereafter   the   Investigating   Agency
conducted   further   investigation   by   Jagdeep   Singh   HPS,   DSP,
Panipat.   It appears that a report under Section 173(8) of the
CrPC was also submitted.  According to the Investigating Officer,
on   the   date   of   the   commission   of   the   offence   the   appellants
herein were not present at the place of occurrence, rather they
were found on different places which have been found by the
Investigating   Agency   also.     It   appears   that   thereafter,   as   the
appellants herein were in custody, the SHO, Police Station Sadar
filed the applications before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
5
Panipat   on   01.09.2016   and   28.10.2016   submitting   that   after
investigation no challan is filed against the appellants herein and
no evidence is found against them and, therefore, they may be
discharged/released.    That   the  learned  Magistrate   directed  to
release   the   appellants.       That,   thereafter   the   trial   proceeded
further   against   the   remaining   accused   against   whom   the
challan/charge­sheet was filed.   The prosecution examined two
witnesses – P.W.1, the original informant and P.W.2, Bhajji, the
injured eye witness.   Both of them corroborated the case of the
prosecution and categorically stated that the appellants herein
were also present at the time of incident.   Both of them were
cross­examined   by   the   defence.     That,   thereafter   the   original
informant P.W.1 submitted the application before the learned
Magistrate   under   Section   319   of   the   CrPC   to   summon   the
appellants herein to face the trial for the offences under Sections
148, 149, 323, 324, 325, 302, 307 and 506 of the IPC.  It was the
case on behalf of the original informant that P.W.1 and P.W.2
who   were   examined   during   the   course   of   the   trial,   in   their
depositions   both   of   them   have   corroborated   the   case   of   the
prosecution and the statements which they had made before the
police have also been found corroborated and their statements
6
before the Court are part of the application filed and, therefore
the   appellants   herein   who  were  named  in   the  FIR  are  to  be
summoned to face the trial.   That, by a detailed judgment and
order, the learned Magistrate in exercise of powers under Section
319 of the CrPC has directed to issue summons against the
appellants herein to face the trial along with the other co­accused
for the offences under Sections 148, 149, 323, 324, 325, 302,
307 and 506 of the IPC
3.2 The   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate   has   been
confirmed   in   revision   by   the   High   Court   by   the   impugned
judgment and order.  Hence the present appeal by the appellants
herein who are issued the summons to face the trial in exercise of
powers under Section 319 of the CrPC.
4. Shri R. Basant, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on
behalf of the appellants herein.
4.1 Shri Basant, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of
the appellants has vehemently submitted that, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the learned Magistrate has erred in
summoning the appellants herein to face the trial in exercise of
powers under Section 319 of the CrPC. 
7
4.2 It is vehemently submitted by Shri Basant, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants that both, the
High Court as well as the learned Trial Court have not properly
appreciated the scope and ambit of the powers to be exercised
under Section 319 of the CrPC.     Relying upon the decision of
this Court in the case of  Hardeep  Singh   v.  State  of  Punjab
(2014) 3 SCC 92, it is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that, as observed and held
by this Court, the power under Section 319 of the CrPC is a
discretionary and an extraordinary power and it is to be exercised
sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the
case so warrant. 
4.3 It is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf   of   the   appellants   that   the   learned   Magistrate   has
mechanically passed the order despite the fact that there was no
strong and cogent evidence on record even at the time of the trial.
4.4 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that, in the present case, as
such, the investigating agency thoroughly investigated the case
when all the appellants were in judicial custody and after taking
into account all the facts and evidence, came to the conclusion
8
that all the appellants were innocent as they were not present at
the place of incident and thereafter submitted the report under
Section 173(2) of the CrPC and filed the challan only against four
accused   persons   and   did   not   file   the   challan   against   the
appellants   herein.     It   is   submitted   that   not   only   that,   even
thereafter also, further investigation was carried out by the DCP
who submitted the report under Section 173(8) of the CrPC and
in that report also all the appellants were found innocent.  It is
submitted   that,   therefore,   the   SHO,   Police   Station   Sadar
submitted   the   applications   praying   for   discharge   of   the
appellants specifically stating that the appellants are innocent
and   the   learned   Magistrate   allowed   the   said   discharge
applications,   though   opposed   by   the   complainant.     It   is
submitted that, therefore, once the learned Magistrate discharged
the appellants on the applications submitted by the SHO, Police
Station, Sadar, thereafter solely on the basis of depositions of
P.W.1 and P.W.2 which was nothing but reiteration of what they
stated   in   their   statements   before   the   police,   the   learned
Magistrate was not justified in summoning the appellants herein
to face the trial in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the
CrPC. 
9
4.5 Relying   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Bijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2017) 7 SCC 706, it is
vehemently submitted by Shri Basant, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that, as observed by this
Court, merely on the basis of the deposition of the complainant
and some other persons, with no other material to support their
so­called verbal/ocular version, no person can be arrayed as an
accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the CrPC.    It
is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellants that, as observed by this Court in the aforesaid
decision, such an “evidence” recorded during the trial is nothing
more than the statements which was already there under Section
161 of the CrPC recorded at the time of investigation of the case.
Relying upon the aforesaid decision, it is vehemently submitted
by   the   learned   Senior   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
appellants that, in any case, the learned Magistrate was bound to
look into the evidence collected by the investigating officer during
investigation which suggested that the accused were not present
at the time of commission of the offence.  It is submitted that, in
the   present   case,   the   learned   Magistrate   on   the   applications
submitted by the SHO in fact discharged the accused­appellants
10
herein and allowed the applications submitted by the SHO in
which it was categorically stated that the appellants are innocent
and that they were not present at the time of the incident.  It is
submitted that therefore the High Court has erred in dismissing
the   revision  petition  and  confirming  the  order  passed  by the
learned Magistrate in summoning the accused­appellants herein
to face the trial for the offences under Sections 148, 149, 323,
324, 325, 302, 307 and 506 of the IPC, which was passed in
exercise of powers under Section 319 of the CrPC.
5. Learned   counsel   appearing  on   behalf   of   the   respondentState of Haryana has supported the order passed by the learned
Magistrate as well as the impugned judgment and order passed
by   the   High   Court.     He   has   also   relied   upon   some   of   the
observations made by this Court in the case of Hardeep Singh
(supra) and even some of the observations made by this Court in
the case of Bijendra Singh (supra).
5.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the State that it is not correct to state that the
appellants herein were discharged by the learned Magistrate on
the applications filed by the SHO,    It is submitted that the SHO
11
submitted the applications to discharge the appellants from the
custody   and   to   release   them   as   they   were   in   jail   and   those
applications came to be allowed.   It is submitted that therefore
the orders dated 01.09.2016 and 28.10.2016 cannot be said to
be   the   orders   of   discharge   in  stricto   sensu,   as   sought   to   be
contended on behalf of the appellants.
5.2 It is submitted that, in the present case, even at the initial
stage when the investigating officer submitted the report under
Section 173(2) of the CrPC and the challan was filed only against
four accused persons, out of ten accused persons named in the
FIR   and   the   remaining   six   accused   (appellants   herein)   were
dropped,   nothing   is   on   record   that   the   learned   Magistrate
accepted the report/closure report against the appellants and,
that   too,   by   following   the   procedure   as   required   as   per   the
decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Bhagwant   Singh   v.
Commissioner  of  Police  (1985) 2 SCC 537.     It is submitted
that, as per settled law, before even accepting the closure report,
an opportunity is required to be given to the informant to submit
the objections/protest and only thereafter the closure report can
be accepted.  It is submitted that, in the present case, no such
12
procedure was followed.  It is submitted that thereafter when in
the   examination­in­chief/cross­examination,   P.W.1   and   P.W.2,
who are the informant and the injured eye witness respectively,
categorically deposed that the appellants were also present at the
time of the incident and they actively participated in commission
of offence and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the
case,   the   learned   Magistrate   was   justified   in   issuing   the
summons against the appellants to face the trial along with the
other co­accused.       It is submitted that, therefore, the order
passed by the learned Trial Court is rightly confirmed by the High
Court by the impugned judgment and order.
5.3  Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal. 
6. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective
parties at length.     We have also perused and considered the
orders passed by the High Court as well as the learned Trial
Court in depth.
6.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that, in the present
case, what is under challenge is the impugned order passed by
the   High   Court   dismissing   the   revision   application   and
confirming   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Trial   Court
13
summoning the accused in exercise of powers under Section 319
of the CrPC and to face the trial for the offences under Sections
148, 149, 323, 324, 325, 302, 307 and 506 of the IPC.     It is
required   to   be   noted   that,   in   the   present   case,   the   original
complainant­first informant specifically named ten persons as
accused, including the appellants herein.   However, thereafter
after the investigation, the investigating officer filed the chargesheet/challan   against   four   accused   persons   only   and   no
challan/charge­sheet   was   filed   against   the   appellants   herein.
Nothing is on record whether at that time any specific closure
report was submitted by the investigating officer or not.  Nothing
is on record whether at that stage an opportunity was given to
the   complainant/original   informant   to   submit   any   protest
application   or   not.     Assuming   that   non­filing   of   the   chargesheet/challan against the remaining accused named in the FIR
can be said to be a closure report, in that case also, as per the
settled proposition of law and more particularly, the decision of
this   Court   in   the   case   of  Bhagwant   Singh  (supra),   before
accepting the closure report, the Magistrate is bound to issue
notice   to   the   complainant/original   informant   and   the
complainant/original   informant   is   required   to   be   given   an
14
opportunity to submit the protest  application and, thereafter,
after   giving   an   opportunity   to   the   complainant/original
informant, the Magistrate may either accept the closure report or
may not accept the closure report and direct to proceed further
against   those   persons   for   whom   the   closure   report   was
submitted.    In the present case, nothing is on record that such
a   procedure   was   followed   by   the   learned   Magistrate.     That,
thereafter the trial proceeded against the four accused persons
against whom the charge­sheet/challan was filed.   During the
trial, the depositions of P.W.1 and P.W.2 were recorded.  Both of
them were even cross­examined.   In the deposition, P.W.1 and
P.W.2 specifically stated the overacts by the appellants herein
and the role played by them and categorically stated that at the
time of the incident/commission of the offence, the appellants
herein were also present and they participated in the commission
of the offence. That, thereafter, on the application submitted by
the  original  complainant  submitted  under  Section  319 of  the
CrPC, the learned Magistrate found a prima facie case against the
appellants herein and summoned the appellants herein to face
the trial along with other co­accused.  The said order has been
confirmed   by   the   High   Court.     Therefore,   the   short   question
15
posed for the consideration of this Court is whether, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the Trial Court was justified in
summoning the appellants herein to face the trial in exercise of
powers under Section 319 of the CrPC?   
7. While   considering   the   aforesaid   question/issue,   few
decisions   of   this   Court   are   required   to   be   referred   to   and
considered.
7.1 The first decision which is required to be considered is a
decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
Hardeep Singh (supra) which has been consistently followed by
this Court in subsequent decisions. 
7.2 In the case of Hardeep Singh (supra), this Court had the
occasion to consider in detail the scope and ambit of the powers
of the Magistrate under Section 319 of the CrPC; the object and
purpose of Section 319 of the CrPC etc.   In the said case, the
following five questions fell for consideration before this Court:
“(i) What is the stage at which power under Section
319 CrPC can be exercised?
(ii) Whether the word “evidence” used in Section
319(1)   CrPC   could   only   mean   evidence   tested   by
cross­examination   or   the   court   can   exercise   the
power under the said provision even on the basis of
the statement made in the examination­in­chief of
the witness concerned?
16
(iii) Whether the word “evidence” used in Section
319(1) CrPC has been used in a comprehensive sense
and   includes   the   evidence   collected   during
investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the
evidence recorded during trial?
(iv) What is the nature of the satisfaction required
to   invoke   the   power   under   Section   319   CrPC   to
arraign   an   accused?   Whether   the   power   under
Section   319(1)   CrPC   can   be   exercised   only   if   the
court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in
all likelihood be convicted?
(v) Does the power under Section 319 CrPC extend
to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR
but not charged or who have been discharged?”
7.3 While   considering   the   aforesaid   questions,   this   Court
observed and held as under:
“12. Section   319   CrPC   springs   out   of   the
doctrine judex   damnatur   cum   nocens
absolvitur (Judge   is   condemned   when   guilty   is
acquitted)   and   this   doctrine   must   be   used   as   a
beacon light while explaining the ambit and the spirit
underlying the enactment of Section 319 CrPC.
13. It is the duty of the court to do justice by
punishing the real culprit. Where the investigating
agency for any reason does not array one of the real
culprits as an accused, the court is not powerless in
calling the said accused to face trial. The question
remains   under   what   circumstances   and   at   what
stage   should   the   court   exercise   its   power   as
contemplated in Section 319 CrPC?
14. The submissions that were raised before us
covered a very wide canvas and the learned counsel
have taken us through various provisions of CrPC
and the judgments that have been relied on for the
said   purpose.   The   controversy  centres   around   the
stage at which such powers can be invoked by the
17
court and the material on the basis whereof such
powers can be exercised.
17. Section 319 CrPC allows the court to proceed
against any person who is not an accused in a case
before it. Thus, the person against whom summons
are   issued   in   exercise   of   such   powers,   has   to
necessarily not be an accused already facing trial. He
can either be a person named in Column 2 of the
charge­sheet   filed   under   Section   173   CrPC   or   a
person   whose   name   has   been   disclosed   in   any
material before the court that is to be considered for
the   purpose   of   trying   the   offence,   but   not
investigated. He has to be a person whose complicity
may be indicated and connected with the commission
of the offence.
18. The legislature cannot be presumed to have
imagined all the circumstances and, therefore, it is
the duty of the court to give full effect to the words
used   by   the   legislature   so   as   to   encompass   any
situation which the court may have to tackle while
proceeding to try an offence and not allow a person
who deserves to be tried to go scot­free by being not
arraigned in the trial in spite of the possibility of his
complicity   which   can   be   gathered   from   the
documents presented by the prosecution.
19. The court is the sole repository of justice and
a duty is cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and,
therefore,   it   will   be   inappropriate   to   deny   the
existence   of   such   powers   with   the   courts   in   our
criminal justice system where it is not uncommon
that   the   real   accused,   at   times,   get   away   by
manipulating   the   investigating   and/or   the
prosecuting agency. The desire to avoid trial is so
strong that an accused makes efforts at times to get
himself absolved even at the stage of investigation or
inquiry even though he may be connected with the
commission of the offence.
22. In   our   opinion,   Section   319   CrPC   is   an
enabling   provision   empowering   the   court   to   take
appropriate steps for proceeding against any person
18
not being an accused for also having committed the
offence under trial.  .....
47. Since after the filing of the charge­sheet, the
court reaches the stage of inquiry and as soon as the
court frames the charges, the trial commences, and
therefore, the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can
be exercised at any time after the charge­sheet is
filed   and   before   the   pronouncement   of   judgment,
except during the stage of Sections 207/208 CrPC,
committal,   etc.   which   is   only   a   pre­trial   stage,
intended to put the process into motion. This stage
cannot be said to be a judicial step in the true sense
for it only requires an application of mind rather than
a judicial application of mind. At this pre­trial stage,
the   Magistrate   is   required   to   perform   acts   in   the
nature of   administrative  work  rather than  judicial
such as ensuring compliance with Sections 207 and
208   CrPC,   and   committing   the   matter   if   it   is
exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. Therefore,
it would be legitimate for us to conclude that the
Magistrate at the stage of Sections 207 to 209 CrPC
is   forbidden,   by   express   provision   of   Section   319
CrPC, to apply his mind to the merits of the case and
determine as to whether any accused needs to be
added or subtracted to face trial before the Court of
Session.
53. It is thus aptly clear that until and unless
the case reaches the stage of inquiry or trial by the
court, the power under Section 319 CrPC cannot be
exercised. ............
54. In our opinion, the stage of inquiry does not
contemplate any evidence in its strict legal sense, nor
could   the   legislature   have   contemplated   this
inasmuch   as   the   stage   for   evidence   has   not   yet
arrived. The only material that the court has before it
is the material collected by the prosecution and the
court at this stage prima facie can apply its mind to
find  out   as  to  whether  a  person,  who   can  be an
accused, has been erroneously omitted from being
arraigned or has been deliberately excluded by the
19
prosecuting agencies. This is all the more necessary
in   order   to   ensure   that   the   investigating   and   the
prosecuting   agencies   have   acted   fairly   in   bringing
before the court those persons who deserve to be
tried   and   to   prevent   any   person   from   being
deliberately shielded when they ought to have been
tried. This is necessary to usher faith in the judicial
system whereby the court should be empowered to
exercise such powers even at the stage of inquiry and
it   is   for   this   reason   that   the   legislature   has
consciously used separate terms, namely, inquiry or
trial in Section 319 CrPC.
55. Accordingly,   we   hold   that   the   court   can
exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC only after
the trial proceeds and commences with the recording
of the evidence and also in exceptional circumstances
as explained hereinabove.
56. ........ What is essential for the purpose of the
section is that there should appear some evidence
against a person not proceeded against and the stage
of   the   proceedings   is   irrelevant.   Where   the
complainant   is   circumspect   in   proceeding   against
several persons, but the court is of the opinion that
there appears to be some evidence pointing to the
complicity of some other persons as well, Section 319
CrPC acts as an empowering provision enabling the
court/Magistrate to initiate proceedings against such
other persons. The purpose of Section 319 CrPC is to
do complete justice and to ensure that persons who
ought   to   have   been   tried   as   well   are   also   tried.
Therefore, there does not appear to be any difficulty
in invoking powers of Section 319 CrPC at the stage
of trial in a complaint case when the evidence of the
complainant   as   well   as   his   witnesses   are   being
recorded.”
7.4 While answering question No. (iii), namely whether the word
“evidence” used in Section 319(1) of the CrPC has been used in a
20
comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during
investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence
recorded during trial, this Court, in the aforesaid decision has
observed and held as under:
“58. To answer the questions and to resolve the
impediment that is being faced by the trial courts in
exercising of powers under Section 319 CrPC, the
issue   has   to   be   investigated   by   examining   the
circumstances which give rise to a situation for the
court to invoke such powers. The circumstances that
lead to such inference being drawn up by the court
for summoning a person arise out of the availability
of the facts and material that come up before the
court and are made the basis for summoning such a
person as an accomplice to the offence alleged to
have been committed. The material should disclose
the complicity of the person in the commission of the
offence which has to be the material that appears
from the evidence during the course of any inquiry
into or trial of offence. The words as used in Section
319 CrPC indicate that the material has to be “where
… it appears from the evidence” before the court.
59. Before we answer this issue, let us examine
the   meaning   of   the   word   “evidence”.   According   to
Section 3 of the Evidence Act, “evidence” means and
includes:
“(1) all statements which the court permits or
requires to be made before it by witnesses, in
relation to matters of fact under inquiry;
such statements are called oral evidence;
(2) all documents including electronic records
produced for the inspection of the court;
such   documents   are   called   documentary
evidence.”
21
78. It is, therefore, clear that the word “evidence”
in Section 319 CrPC means only such evidence as is
made before the court, in relation to statements, and
as   produced   before   the   court,   in   relation   to
documents.   It   is   only   such   evidence   that   can   be
taken into account by the Magistrate or the court to
decide whether the power under Section 319 CrPC is
to   be   exercised   and   not   on   the   basis   of   material
collected during the investigation.
82. This   pre­trial   stage   is   a   stage   where   no
adjudication on the evidence of the offences involved
takes place and therefore, after the material along
with the charge­sheet has been brought before the
court,   the   same   can   be   inquired   into   in   order   to
effectively proceed with framing of charges. After the
charges are framed, the prosecution is asked to lead
evidence and till that is done, there is no evidence
available in the strict legal sense of Section 3 of the
Evidence   Act.   The   actual   trial   of   the   offence   by
bringing the accused before the court has still not
begun. What  is available is the material that  has
been   submitted   before   the   court   along   with   the
charge­sheet. In such situation, the court only has
the preparatory material that has been placed before
the court for its consideration in order to proceed
with the trial by framing of charges.
83. It is, therefore, not any material that can be
utilised, rather it is that material after cognizance is
taken by a court, that is available to it while making
an inquiry into or trying an offence, that the court
can utilise or take into consideration for supporting
reasons   to   summon   any   person   on   the   basis   of
evidence adduced before the court, who may be on
the   basis   of   such   material,   treated   to   be   an
accomplice   in   the   commission   of   the   offence.   The
inference that can be drawn is that material which is
not exactly evidence recorded before the court, but is
a material collected by the court, can be utilised to
corroborate   evidence   already   recorded   for   the
22
purpose of summoning any other person, other than
the accused. ........
84. The   word   “evidence”   therefore   has   to   be
understood in its wider sense both at the stage of
trial and, as discussed earlier, even at the stage of
inquiry, as used under Section 319 CrPC. The court,
therefore, should be understood to have the power to
proceed against any person after summoning him on
the   basis   of   any   such   material   as   brought   forth
before   it.   The   duty   and   obligation   of   the   court
becomes   more   onerous   to   invoke   such   powers
cautiously on such material after evidence has been
led during trial.
85. In   view   of   the   discussion   made   and   the
conclusion   drawn   hereinabove,   the   answer   to   the
aforesaid question posed is that apart from evidence
recorded   during   trial,   any   material   that   has   been
received by the court after cognizance is taken and
before the trial commences, can be utilised only for
corroboration and to support the evidence recorded
by the court to invoke the power under Section 319
CrPC. The “evidence” is thus, limited to the evidence
recorded during trial.”
7.5 While answering question No. (ii), namely whether the word
“evidence” used in Section 319(1) of the CrPC means as arising in
examination­in­chief or also together with cross­examination, in
the   aforesaid   decision,   this   Court   has   observed   and   held   as
under:
“86. The second question referred to herein is in
relation to the word “evidence” as used under Section
319 CrPC, which leaves no room for doubt that the
evidence   as   understood   under   Section   3   of   the
Evidence Act is the statement of the witnesses that
23
are   recorded   during   trial   and   the   documentary
evidence in accordance with the Evidence Act, which
also includes the document and material evidence in
the   Evidence   Act.   Such   evidence   begins   with   the
statement of the prosecution witnesses, therefore, is
evidence   which   includes   the   statement   during
examination­in­chief. In Rakesh [(2001) 6 SCC 248 :
2001 SCC (Cri) 1090 : AIR 2001 SC 2521] , it was
held that: (SCC p. 252, para 10)
“10. … It is true that finally at the time of
trial the accused is to be given an opportunity to
cross­examine   the   witness   to   test   its
truthfulness.   But   that   stage   would   not   arise
while exercising the court's power under Section
319 CrPC. Once the deposition is recorded, no
doubt there being no cross­examination, it would
be a prima facie material which would enable the
Sessions Court to decide whether powers under
Section 319 should be exercised or not.”
87. In Ranjit   Singh [Ranjit   Singh v. State   of
Punjab, (1998) 7 SCC 149 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1554 :
AIR 1998 SC 3148] , this Court held that: (SCC p.
156, para 20)
“20. … it is not necessary for the court to
wait   until   the   entire   evidence   is   collected   for
exercising the said powers.”
88. In Mohd.   Shafi [Mohd.   Shafi v. Mohd.   Rafiq,
(2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : AIR
2007 SC 1899] , it was held that the prerequisite for
exercise   of   power   under   Section   319   CrPC   is   the
satisfaction of the court to proceed against a person
who is not an accused but against whom evidence
occurs,   for   which   the   court   can   even wait   till   the
cross­examination is over and that there would be no
illegality in doing so. A similar view has been taken
by a two­Judge Bench in Harbhajan Singh v. State of
Punjab [(2009) 13 SCC 608 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1135]
.   This   Court   in Hardeep   Singh [Hardeep
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 16 SCC 785 : (2010)
2 SCC (Cri) 355] seems to have misread the judgment
24
in Mohd. Shafi[Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq, (2007) 14
SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 : AIR 2007 SC
1899] , as it construed that the said judgment laid
down that for the exercise of power under Section
319 CrPC, the court has to necessarily wait till the
witness   is   cross­examined   and   on   complete
appreciation   of   evidence,   come   to   the   conclusion
whether there is a need to proceed under Section 319
CrPC.
89. We have given our thoughtful consideration
to the diverse views expressed in the aforementioned
cases. Once examination­in­chief is conducted, the
statement becomes part of the record. It is evidence
as per law and in the true sense, for at best, it may
be   rebuttable.   An   evidence   being   rebutted   or
controverted   becomes   a   matter   of   consideration,
relevance and belief, which is the stage of judgment
by the court. Yet it is evidence and it is material on
the basis whereof the court can come to a prima facie
opinion as to complicity of some other person who
may be connected with the offence.
90. As held in Mohd. Shafi [Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd.
Rafiq, (2007) 14 SCC 544 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 889 :
AIR 2007 SC 1899] and Harbhajan Singh [(2009) 13
SCC 608 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1135] , all that  is
required for the exercise of the power under Section
319 CrPC is that, it must appear to the court that
some other person also who is not facing the trial,
may   also   have   been   involved   in   the   offence.   The
prerequisite for the exercise of this power is similar to
the prima facie view which the Magistrate must come
to   in   order   to   take   cognizance   of   the   offence.
Therefore, no straitjacket formula can and should be
laid with respect to conditions precedent for arriving
at such an opinion and, if the Magistrate/court is
convinced even on the basis of evidence appearing in
examination­in­chief, it can exercise the power under
Section   319   CrPC   and   can   proceed   against   such
other person(s). It is essential to note that the section
also   uses   the   words   “such   person could be   tried”
25
instead of should be tried. Hence, what is required is
not   to   have   a   mini­trial   at   this   stage   by   having
examination   and   cross­examination   and   thereafter
rendering a decision on the overt act of such person
sought to be added. In fact, it is this mini­trial that
would affect the right of the person sought to be
arraigned as an accused rather than not having any
cross­examination at all, for in light of sub­section (4)
of Section 319 CrPC, the person would be entitled to
a   fresh   trial   where   he   would   have   all   the   rights
including   the   right   to   cross­examine   prosecution
witnesses   and   examine   defence   witnesses   and
advance his arguments upon the same. Therefore,
even on the basis of examination­in­chief, the court
or the Magistrate can proceed against a person as
long   as   the court   is   satisfied that   the   evidence
appearing against such person is such that it prima
facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial.
In   fact,   examination­in­chief   untested   by   crossexamination, undoubtedly in itself, is an evidence.
91. Further, in our opinion, there does not seem
to   be   any   logic   behind   waiting   till   the   crossexamination of the witness is over. It is to be kept in
mind that at the time of exercise of power under
Section 319 CrPC, the person sought to be arraigned
as an accused, is in no way participating in the trial.
Even   if   the  cross­examination   is  to   be  taken   into
consideration, the person sought to be arraigned as
an   accused   cannot   cross­examine   the   witness(es)
prior to passing of an order under Section 319 CrPC,
as such a procedure is not contemplated by CrPC.
Secondly, invariably the State would not oppose or
object to naming of more persons as an accused as it
would only help the prosecution in completing the
chain   of   evidence,   unless   the   witness(es)   is
obliterating the role of persons already facing trial.
More   so,   Section   299   CrPC   enables   the   court   to
record   evidence   in   absence   of   the   accused   in   the
circumstances mentioned therein.
26
92. Thus,   in   view   of   the   above,   we   hold   that
power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised at
the stage of completion of examination­in­chief and
the court does not need to wait till the said evidence
is   tested   on   cross­examination   for   it   is   the
satisfaction of the court which can be gathered from
the   reasons   recorded   by   the   court,   in   respect   of
complicity  of  some  other  person(s),  not  facing   the
trial in the offence.”
7.6 While answering question No. (iv), namely what is the degree
of satisfaction required for invoking the power under Section 319
of the CrPC, this Court after considering various earlier decisions
on the point, has observed and held as under:
105. Power   under   Section   319   CrPC   is   a
discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be
exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the
circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be
exercised   because   the   Magistrate   or   the   Sessions
Judge is of the opinion that some other person may
also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where
strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person
from   the   evidence   led   before   the   court   that   such
power should be exercised and not in a casual and
cavalier manner.
106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima
facie case is to be established from the evidence led
before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of
cross­examination,   it   requires   much   stronger
evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The
test that has to be applied is one which is more than
prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of
charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the
evidence,   if   goes   unrebutted,   would   lead   to
conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the
27
court   should   refrain   from   exercising   power   under
Section 319 CrPC. In Section 319 CrPC the purpose
of providing if “it appears from the evidence that any
person   not   being  the   accused   has   committed  any
offence”   is   clear   from   the   words   “for   which   such
person could be tried together with the accused”. The
words used are not “for which such person could be
convicted”. There is, therefore, no scope for the court
acting under Section 319 CrPC to form any opinion
as to the guilt of the accused.”
7.7 While answering question No. (v), namely in what situations
can   the   power   under   Section   319   of   the   CrPC   be   exercised:
named   in   the   FIR,   but   not   charge­sheeted   or   has   been
discharged, this Court has observed and held as under:
“112. However, there is a great difference with
regard   to   a   person   who   has   been   discharged.   A
person   who   has   been   discharged   stands   on   a
different   footing   than   a   person   who   was   never
subjected to investigation or if subjected to, but not
charge­sheeted. Such a person has stood the stage of
inquiry   before   the   court   and   upon   judicial
examination   of   the   material   collected   during
investigation, the court had come to the conclusion
that there is not even a prima facie case to proceed
against such person. Generally, the stage of evidence
in trial is merely proving the material collected during
investigation and therefore, there is not much change
as regards the material existing against the person so
discharged. Therefore, there must exist compelling
circumstances   to   exercise   such   power.   The   court
should keep in mind that the witness when giving
evidence   against   the   person   so   discharged,  is   not
doing so merely to seek revenge or is naming him at
the behest of someone or for such other extraneous
considerations. The court has to be circumspect in
28
treating such evidence and try to separate the chaff
from the grain. If after such careful examination of
the evidence, the court is of the opinion that there
does exist evidence to proceed against the person so
discharged, it may take steps but only in accordance
with   Section   398   CrPC   without   resorting   to   the
provision of Section 319 CrPC directly.
116. Thus, it is evident that power under Section
319   CrPC   can   be   exercised   against   a   person   not
subjected   to   investigation,   or   a   person   placed   in
Column   2   of   the   charge­sheet   and   against   whom
cognizance had not been taken, or a person who has
been discharged. However, concerning a person who
has   been   discharged,   no   proceedings   can   be
commenced against him directly under Section 319
CrPC without taking recourse to provisions of Section
300(5) read with Section 398 CrPC.”
7.8 Considering the law laid down by this Court in the case of
Hardeep   Singh  (supra)   and   the   observations   and   findings
referred to and reproduced hereinabove, it emerges that (i) the
Court can exercise the power under Section 319 of the CrPC even
on the basis of the statement made in the examination­in­chief of
the witness concerned and the Court need not wait till the crossexamination of such a witness and the Court need not wait for
the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be
tested by cross­examination; and (ii) a person not named in the
FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been
charge­sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be
29
summoned under Section 319 of the CrPC, provided from the
evidence (may be on the basis of the evidence collected in the
form   of   statement   made   in   the   examination­in­chief   of   the
witness concerned), it appears that such person can be tried
along with the accused already facing trial.
7.9 In   the   case   of  S.   Mohammed   Ispahani   v.   Yogendra
Chandak (2017) 16 SCC 226 in para 35, this Court has observed
and held as under:
“35. It needs to be highlighted that when a person
is named in the FIR by the complainant, but police,
after investigation, finds no role of that particular
person and files the charge­sheet without implicating
him, the Court is not powerless, and at the stage of
summoning, if the trial court finds that a particular
person   should   be   summoned   as   accused,   even
though not named in the charge­sheet, it can do so.
At that stage, chance is given to the complainant also
to file a protest petition urging upon the trial court to
summon other persons as well who were named in
the FIR but not implicated in the charge­sheet. Once
that stage has gone, the Court is still not powerless
by virtue of Section 319 CrPC. However, this section
gets triggered when during the trial some evidence
surfaces against the proposed accused.”
7.10 Thus,   even   in   a   case   where   the   stage   of   giving
opportunity to the complainant to file a protest petition urging
upon the trial Court to summon other persons as well who were
named in the FIR but not implicated in the charge­sheet has
30
gone, in that case also, the Court is still not powerless by virtue
of Section 319 of the CrPC and even those persons named in the
FIR but not implicated in the charge­sheet can be summoned to
face the trial provided during the trial some evidence surfaces
against the proposed accused.
8. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion
that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, neither the
learned Trial Court nor the High Court have committed any error
in summoning the appellants herein to face the trial along with
other   co­accused.     As   observed   hereinabove,   the   appellants
herein were also named in the FIR.   However, they were not
shown as accused in the challan/charge­sheet.   As observed
hereinabove, nothing is on record whether at any point of time
the complainant was given an opportunity to submit the protest
application against non­filing of the charge­sheet against the
appellants.  In the deposition before the Court, P.W.1 and P.W.2
have specifically stated against the appellants herein and the
specific   role   is   attributed   to   the   accused­appellants   herein.
Thus, the statement of P.W.1 and P.W.2 before the Court can be
said to be “evidence” during the trial and, therefore, on the basis
31
of the same and as held by this Court in the case of Hardeep
Singh  (supra), the persons against whom no charge­sheet is
filed can be summoned to face the trial.  Therefore, we are of the
opinion that no error has been committed by the Courts below to
summon the appellants herein to face the trial in exercise of
power under Section 319 of the CrPC.
9. Now,  so far as the submissions made on  behalf  of the
appellants herein relying upon the orders passed by the learned
Magistrate   dated   01.09.2016   and   28.10.2016   that   once   the
appellants herein were discharged by the learned Magistrate on
an application submitted by the Investigating Officer/SHO and,
therefore, thereafter it was not open to the learned Magistrate to
summon the accused to face the trial in exercise of power under
Section 319 of the CrPC is concerned, it appears that there is
some mis­conception on the part of the appellants.     At the
outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the   orders   dated
01.09.2016 and 28.10.2016 cannot be said to be the orders
discharging the accused.   If the applications submitted by the
Investigating Officer/SHO and the orders passed thereon are
considered, those were the applications to discharge/release the
32
appellants herein from custody as at that stage the appellants
were   in   judicial   custody.     Therefore,   as   such,   those   orders
cannot be said to be the orders of discharge in  stricto sensu.
Those are the orders discharging the appellants from custody.
Under   the   circumstances,   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the
accused that as they were discharged by the learned Magistrate
and   therefore   it   was   not   open   to   the   learned   Magistrate   to
exercise   the   power   under   Section   319   of   the   CrPC   and   to
summon the appellants to face the trial, cannot be accepted. 
10.  In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we
see no reason  to  interfere with the  impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court confirming the order passed by
the   learned   Magistrate   summoning   the   accused­appellants
herein to face the trial in exercise of the power under Section
319 of the CrPC.  We are in complete agreement with the view
taken by the High Court.   No interference is called for by this
Court.   In the facts and circumstance of the case and for the
reasons   stated   hereinabove,   the   present   appeal   fails   and
deserves to be dismissed and is according dismissed.
33
............................................J.
      [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
NEW DELHI;      ............................................J.
MAY 1, 2019.                 [M.R. SHAH]

Service matter - whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court is justified in 16 dismissing the writ petition and confirming the order passed by the learned Tribunal quashing and setting aside the amended rules by notification – G.O. No. 6 of 2015 dated 08.03.2015 equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of the post of JCIF? = when a conscious decision was taken by the UPSC and the Government while amending rules and equating the two posts after considering the pros and cons of the matter and considering the relevant factors referred to and reproduced hereinabove, being a policy decision, the Tribunal was not 23 justified in quashing and setting aside the statutory rules. Therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error in dismissing the writ petition and confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal quashing and setting aside the amended rules by notification – G.O. No. 6 of 2015 equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale). - In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court dismissing the writ petitions and confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal quashing and setting aside the amended rules by notification – G.O. No. 6 of 2015 equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with the post of JCIF. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal deserve to be quashed and set aside.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITON
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5969­5970 OF 2009
Union of India & Ors. etc. etc. .. Appellants
Versus
S. Maadasamy and Anr. etc. etc. .. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. As both these appeals arise out of the impugned common
judgment and order passed by the High Court and are between
the same parties, the same are being disposed of by this common
judgment.
2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
common judgment and order dated 29.10.2007 passed by the
High Court of Madras in Writ Petition Nos. 44921 and 44922 of
2
2006,   by   which   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   the   said   writ
petitions preferred by the appellants­Union of India and others
and confirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned
Central Administrative Tribunal dated 04.07.2006 in O.A. No.
218 of 2005 and O.A. No. 814 of 2005, the Union of India and
others­original   writ   petitioners   before   the   High   Court   have
preferred the present appeals.
3. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as
under:
That respondent no. 1 herein­original applicant initially joined
the   services   in   the   Government   of   Puducherry   as   a   Craft
Instructor in the Labour Department on 03.11.1975 and was
appointed   as   the   Group   Instructor   on   regular   basis.     That,
thereafter   he   was   promoted   as   Inspector   of   Factories   on
27.09.1982 and as Principal, Group ‘A’ (Junior Scale) on regular
basis w.e.f. 25.08.1989.  That, thereafter on 26.07.2001, he was
promoted as the Joint Chief Inspector of Factories (hereinafter
referred to as the “JCIF”) on regular basis.   The promotion of
respondent No. 1­original applicant was challenged by one Sri
P.S. Krishnamurthy, who was promoted as Principal, Group ‘A’
3
(Junior Scale) subsequent to the promotion of respondent No. 1­
original applicant.  On the representation made by the said Sri
P.S. Krishnamurthy, the Government initiated steps to convene a
review DPC, but the same was rejected by the UPSC.  Thereafter,
respondent no. 1­original applicant joined duty in the said post
on 26.07.2001. The said promotion was challenged by Sri P.S.
Krishnamurthy by way of O.A. No. 795 of 2001, but the same
was dismissed by the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short
‘Tribunal’)   on   29.07.2001.     According   to   the   appellants,   the
Government  of  Puducherry also  sent  a  proposal  to  UPSC for
amendment   of   the   recruitment   rules   equating   the   post   of
Principal, ITI held by Sri P.S. Krishnamurthy with that of JCIF.
It appears that pursuant to the draft recruitment rules equating
the posts, respondent No. 1­original applicant was transferred
from JCIF and posted as Principal, Group ‘A’ (Senior Scale) on
30.09.2003.  It appears that, in the meantime, in the year 1998
the  Government  of  Puducherry  decided to  create  one  post of
Principal   (Senior   Scale)   (Rs.3000­4500/­   later   revised   to
Rs.10,000­15200/­)   in   the   Government   ITI   at   Karaikal.
According to the Department, the same was pursuant to the
order of the Tribunal, based on the number of students at ITI,
4
Karaikal   being   more   than   400.       The   same   was   done   in
anticipation   of   the   approval   of   the   Government   of   India,   by
keeping one post of Principal (Junior Scale) in abeyance.   That
the Government of India, by order dated 19.10.2000 sanctioned
the   proposal   for   creation   of   the   post   of   Principal,   Group   ‘A’
(Senior Scale) subject to the condition that one post of Principal
(Junior Scale) which was kept in abeyance, should be abolished.
That, thereafter respondent No. 1 working as Principal (Junior
Scale) in ITI, Puducherry was promoted to the post of JCIF vide
order   dated   26.07.2001.     That,   thereafter   on   17.09.2001,
pursuant to the approval received from the Government of India
for the creation of one post of Principal (Senior Scale), one post of
Principal (Junior Scale) was abolished.  It appears that pursuant
to the draft recruitment rules equating the posts of Principal, ITI
and the JCIF, respondent No.1­original applicant was transferred
from JCIF and posted as Principal, Group ‘A’ (Senior Scale) on
30.09.2003.  That the said order was challenged by respondent
No. 1 herein­original applicant before the learned Tribunal by
way of O.A. No. 869 of 2003.   That the said O.A. came to be
allowed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 06.01.2004.     The
writ petition challenging the judgment and order passed by the
5
learned Tribunal came to be dismissed by the High Court on
16.02.2005.  At this stage, it is required to be noted that while
quashing   and   setting   aside   the   order   dated   30.09.2003
transferring respondent No. 1 from JCIF to Principal, Group ‘A”
(Senior Scale), the learned Tribunal held that reliance placed on
draft   recruitment   rules   to   support   the   transfer,   cannot   be
sustained, as the mere approval of the Lt. Governor is not enough
and the consultation with and approval of the UPSC is required
and thereafter, it has to be notified.   The Tribunal also held the
transfer as  mala fide  and passed with ulterior motive.     The
Tribunal also observed and held that after the rules are approved
by UPSC and notified, the Government would be at liberty to
make the transfer of the original applicant. 
3.1 It appears that, thereafter the notification being G.O. No. 6
dated 08.03.2005 to amend the recruitment rules relating to the
post   of   JCIF/Chief   Principal,   Group   ‘A’   (Senior   Scale)   was
published on 15.03.2005.   Simultaneously, on the same date,
respondent No. 1 herein­original applicant came to be transferred
and   posted   as   Principal,   Group   ‘A’   (Senior   Scale)   to   the
Government ITI, Karaikal from the post of JCIF, Puducherry.
6
The said order of transfer came to be challenged by respondent
No. 1­original applicant before the learned Tribunal by way of
O.A. No. 218 of 2005.   That, by way of O.A. No. 814 of 2005,
respondent   No.   1­original   applicant   challenged   the   revised
recruitment rules introduced by G.O. No. 6 dated 08.03.2005,
equating the two posts, namely the post of JCIF and the post of
Principal Group ‘A” (Senior Scale) and also to set aside the said
amended recruitment rules.
3.2 That the learned Tribunal quashed and set aside the order
of transfer dated 15.03.2005 stating that the same was mala fide
and passed with an ulterior motive.   The learned Tribunal also
allowed O.A. No. 814 of 2005 and held that the amended rules
are   arbitrary   and   violative   of   Articles   14   and   16   of   the
Constitution of India.   According to the learned Tribunal, the
purpose for bringing the amended rules was not germane, but
was directed only to achieve a different purpose. 
3.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by
the   learned   Tribunal   in   O.A.   No.   218   of   2005   quashing   and
setting  aside  the  order of   transfer  dated 15.03.2005  and  the
judgment and order passed in O.A. No. 814 of 2005 quashing
7
and setting aside the amended recruitment rules equating the
post of Principal Group ‘A” (Senior Scale) with that of the post of
JCIF, the appellants herein­Union of India and others preferred
writ petitions before the High Court.   That, by the impugned
common judgment and order, the High Court has dismissed both
the writ petitions and confirmed the judgment and order passed
by the learned Tribunal quashing and setting aside the order of
transfer dated 15.03.2005 and setting aside the amended rules
equating the post of Principal Group ‘A” (Senior Scale) with that
of the post of JCIF.   That, by the impugned judgment and order,
the High Court has dismissed both the writ petitions.  Hence, the
present   appeals   challenging   the   impugned   common   judgment
and order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 44921
and 44922 of 2006 confirming the judgment and order passed by
the learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 218 of 2015 and O.A. No. 814 of
2005 dated 04.07.2006. 
3.4 Now,   so   far   as   the   challenge   to   the   impugned   common
judgment and order passed by the High Court dismissing the writ
petition and confirming the judgment and order passed by the
learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 218 of 2005, by which the learned
8
Tribunal   set   aside   the   order   of   transfer   dated   15.03.2005   is
concerned,   it   is   the   admitted   position   that   in   view   of   the
subsequent development and respondent No. 1 herein­original
applicant has retired on attaining the age of superannuation, as
such,   the   challenge   to   the   order   passed   by   the   High   Court
confirming the order passed by the learned Tribunal quashing
and setting aside the order of transfer dated 15.03.2005 has
become   infructuous/academic.     Even   otherwise,   there   are
concurrent findings given by both, the learned Tribunal as well
as the High Court holding that the order of transfer was  mala
fide  and   with   the   oblique   motive.   Therefore,   the   appeal
challenging the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High   Court   dismissing   the   writ   petition   and   confirming   the
judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A. No.
218 of 2005 stands disposed of as infructuous/academic.   
3.5 However, the question still remains how the period from the
order of transfer dated 15.03.2005 till respondent No. 1­original
applicant   attained   the   age   of   superannuation   is   to   be
treated/considered.  It appears that at the time when respondent
No. 1­original applicant attained the age of superannuation, he
9
has   been   paid   the   retirement   benefits   and   the
pension/pensionary benefits vide order dated 18.08.2016 and the
period from 15.03.2005 till he attained the age of superannuation
is   treated   as  dies­non  and   he   has   been   paid   the
pension/pensionary benefits accordingly.   Therefore, it will be
open for respondent  No. 1­original applicant  to challenge the
order dated 18.08.2016 treating the period between 15.03.2005
till he attained the age of superannuation as dies­non, before the
appropriate Court/Forum and as and when such proceedings are
initiated, the same may be considered in accordance with law
and on its own merits.
4.  In  view  of  the  above,  now   the  challenge  to  the   impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court confirming the
order passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 814 of 2005 by
which the amended recruitment rules vide notification ­ G.O. No.
6 dated  08.03.2005  equating  the  post  of  Principal,  Grade  ‘A’
(Senior Scale) with that of JCIF survives.
4.1 Shri   A.   Mariarputham,   learned   Senior   Advocate   has
appeared on behalf of the appellants.  Learned counsel appearing
10
on behalf of the appellants has vehemently submitted that, as
such, the challenge to the amended rules by respondent No. 1­
original   applicant   before   the   learned   Tribunal   was   limited   to
equating the two posts and not the entirety of the rules.   It is
further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the   appellants   that,   even   otherwise,   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case, both, the learned Tribunal as well as
the  High  Court  have  committed  grave  error  in  quashing and
setting aside the amended rules equating the post of Principal,
Group ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of the post of JCIF.   It is
submitted   that   the   educational   and   other   qualifications
prescribed   for   the   two   posts   in   question,   namely   JCIF   and
Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) are identical; that the feeder
cadre/posts   for   both   the   posts  are   also   identical   and  having
common rules for the two posts.  It is submitted that, therefore,
in that view of the matter, the equations of two posts cannot be
said to be bad­in­law.   It is further submitted by the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that even in the
lower cadres, the pattern of having the same rules for a group of
posts, where the feeder cadres are the same, was in existence.
In support of his above submission, he has relied upon the 1982
11
Rules, governing the post of Inspector of Factories, Principal and
Technical   officers.     It   is   submitted   that   a   person   posted   as
Inspector of Factories is transferable as Principal and vise­versa
etc. 
4.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants that both, the learned Tribunal as well as
the High Court have materially erred in quashing and setting
aside the amended rules equating the aforesaid two posts, on the
ground that the duties and responsibilities with respect to the
two posts are not similar/identical.  It is submitted that there is
no requirement in law that all the posts clubbed together should
be   identical   in   respect   of   duties   and   responsibilities   and
functions.   It is submitted that by the very nature of things, it
will not be identical.  It is submitted that what is to be seen is
whether   the   person   is   capable/competent   to   discharge   the
functions of both the posts.  It is submitted that having regard to
the identical, educational and other qualifications prescribed and
coming   from     the feeder   cadres   common   to   both, they   are
competent to man both the posts and capable of discharging the
functions of both the posts.  It is submitted that, in the present
12
case and in the case of respondent No. 1 himself, in fact, his
initial appointed was as a craft instructor; later he became the
Inspector of Factories and thereafter he got promoted as Principal
(Junior Scale) and thereafter got promoted as JCIF. 
4.3 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   senior   counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants that, even otherwise, the
principles   laid   down   by   this   Court   for   an   administrative
determination as to whether two posts are equivalent in nature
for different purposes such as absorption, counting the length of
service   for   seniority,   cannot   be   invoked   to   strike   down   a
legislative exercise of rule making under the proviso to Article
309   of   the   Constitution   of   India   which   has   been   held   to   be
statutory and legislative in character. 
4.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants that, therefore, on facts the decision of
this Court in the case of  Union of  India v.  P.K.  Roy  (1968) 2
SCR 186 as well as the decision in the case of  Sub­Inspector
Roop Lal v. Lt. Governor (2000) 1 SCC 644, relied upon by the
High Court shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on
13
hand, more particularly, when the amended rules equating the
posts were statutory and legislative in character. 
4.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants that, even otherwise, on facts, both, the
learned Tribunal and the High Court have committed a grave
error in quashing and setting aside the amended rules equating
the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of the post
of JCIF, inasmuch as the amended rules were approved by the
UPSC and the rules were amended in consultation with the UPSC
and   after   elaborate   discussions   thereafter   the   UPSC   gave   its
concurrence/approval   and   thereafter   the   rules   were   amended
equating the two posts.
4.6 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of P.U.
Joshi v. Accountant General, Ahmedabad (2003) 2 SCC 632, it
is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants that, as such, it is ultimately for the
Government to take an appropriate decision on equation of posts.
It   is   submitted   that   questions   relating   to   the   constitution,
pattern,   nomenclature   of   posts,   cadres,   categories   and   other
conditions of service including avenues of promotions and criteria
14
to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of Policy
and within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the State.
It is submitted that, therefore, the learned Tribunal and the High
Court have committed a grave error in interfering with such a
policy decision/decision of the Government to equate two posts,
which were after due deliberations and in consultation with the
UPSC.   
4.7 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the
present appeals and quash and set aside the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court and the learned Tribunal
insofar as quashing and setting aside the notification – G.O. No.
6 dated 18.03.2005 by which the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’
(Senior Scale) was equated with the post of JCIF. 
5. Shri Pramod Swarup, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf   of   respondent   No.   1   has   supported   the   impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court.   It is submitted
that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court
upholding   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   learned
Tribunal quashing and setting aside the amended rules equating
15
the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of the post
of   JCIF   is   absolutely   just   and   proper   and   considering   the
decisions   of   this   Court   in  P.   K.   Roy  (supra)   and  Roop   Lal
(supra).  It is submitted that as it was found that the nature of
duties; responsibilities and powers exercised by holding the two
posts are not similar and identical and, therefore, the High Court
was justified in confirming the judgment and order passed by the
learned Tribunal quashing and setting aside the amended rules.
Therefore, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals.
6. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective
parties at length. 
6.1 As observed hereinabove, now in the present appeals, the
challenge to the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High   Court   dismissing   the   writ   petition   and   confirming   the
judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A. No.
814   of   2005   quashing   and   setting   aside   the   amended   rules
equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that
of JCIF survives.   Therefore, the only question which is now
required to be considered by this Court is whether, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the High Court is justified in
16
dismissing the writ petition and confirming the order passed by
the learned Tribunal quashing and setting aside the amended
rules  by notification  –  G.O.  No.  6  of  2015  dated  08.03.2015
equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that
of the post of JCIF?
6.2 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court, it appears that the High Court has dismissed the writ
petition,   confirming   the   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
learned Tribunal quashing and setting aside the amended rules
equating the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with the
post of JCIF mainly on the ground that the nature of duties of
both   the   posts,   responsibilities   and   powers   exercised   by   the
officers   holding   the   posts   are   not   similar   and/or   identical.
Considering the decisions of this Court in the case of P.K. Roy
(supra) and Roop Lal (supra), the High Court has observed and
held that the equation of posts has to be determined by taking
into account the following factors:
(i) nature and duties of post;
(ii) responsibilities and powers exercised by officer holding a
post;   extent   of   territorial   or   other   charge   held   or
responsibilities discharged;
(iii)   minimum   qualifications,   if   any,   prescribed   for
recruitment to the post; and
17
(iv) salary of the post.
6.3 Relying upon the aforesaid two decisions of this Court, the
High Court has dismissed the writ petitions preferred by the
appellants herein­Union of India and has confirmed the judgment
and order passed by the learned Tribunal quashing and setting
the amended rules vide notification – G.O. No. 6 of 2015 equating
the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of the post
of JCIF.   However, neither the learned Tribunal nor the High
Court has considered the relevant factors which were considered
while amending the rules and equating the two posts.  The High
Court has also not considered the fact that the UPSC gave its
concurrence to the emended rules and only thereafter the rules
were amended and the posts were equated.
6.4 From the affidavit­in­reply filed on behalf of the UPSC before
the learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 814 of 2005, it appears that the
rules were amended after the concurrence of the UPSC and after
the draft rules were approved by the UPSC.  From the affidavitin­reply filed by the UPSC, it appears that the UPSC gave its
concurrence after due deliberation with the Government from
time to time.   Relevant paragraphs of the affidavit­in­reply which
18
are   necessary   for   determination   of   the   issue   involved   are   as
under:
“5.      That the proposal for framing of common
Recruitment   Rules   for   the   post   of   Joint   Chief
Inspector of Factories and Principal, Group ‘A’ (Senior
Scale) in the scale of pay of Rs. 10000­15200 under
the   Labour   Department   of   the   Government   of
Pondicherry in lieu of the existing Recruitment Rules
for the post of Joint Chief Inspector of Factories, was
received on 18th March 2003 (ANNEXURE R­I).  The
proposal   was   examined   and   the   Government   of
Pondicherry   was   requested   to   certify   whether   the
duties   of   both   the   posts   (Joint   Chief   Inspector   of
Factories   and   Principal,   Group   ‘A’   (Senior   Scale)
match   to   merit   framing   of   common   Recruitment
Rules and whether the persons holding the post of
Principal will be able to discharge the duties of the
post of Joint Chief Inspector of Factories effectively
and   vice   versa.   In   this   connection   Commission’s
letter, dated 21.05.2003 (ANNEXURE R­II) may be
referred to.  It is most respectfully submitted that in
response to Commission’s letter referred to above, the
Government   of  Pondicherry  furnished  clarifications
vide their letter, dated 01.08.2003 (ANNEXURE R­III).
Subsequently, the Government of Pondicherry was
also   requested   to   furnish   the   duties   and
responsibilities attached to the post of Joint Chief
Inspector   of   Factories,   vide   Commission’s   letter,
dated 23.10.2003 (ANNEXURE R­IV).  The duties and
responsibilities were furnished by the Government of
Pondicherry   vide   their   letter,   dated   29.10.2003
(ANNEXURE R­IV­A).  It was found that the duties of
both   the   posts   did   not   match.     Accordingly,   the
Government of Pondicherry was advised vide letter
dated 27.11.2003 (ANNEXURE R­IV­B) to explore the
possibility of filling the post by deputation.  In reply,
the Government of Pondicherry informed vide their
letter, dated 09.02.2004 (ANNEXURE R­V) that the
suggestion to explore the possibility of filling up the
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post   of   Joint   Chief   Inspector   of   Factories   by
deputation, will not help them in ensuring the safety
and health of industrial workers.
6. It   is   most   respectfully   submitted   that   the
Government   of   Pondicherry,   in   their   letter,   dated
09.02.2004 referred to above, insisted upon having
common Recruitment  Rules for the  posts of  Joint
Chief Inspector of Factories and Principal, Group ‘A’
(Senior Scale), while expressing that their intention
that these two posts are interchangeable, and both
the incumbents holding feeder posts of Inspector of
Factories and Principal, Group ‘A’ (Junior Scale) are
capable   of   discharging   their   duties   of   the   post   of
Joint   Chief  Inspector of   Factories  effectively.    The
Pondicherry Government also stated that feeder post
for the promotional post of Principal (Junior Scale),
Inspector of Factories and Inspector of Boilers are
also   interchangeable   and   that   the   Joint   Chief
Inspector of Factories and Principal, Group ‘A’ (Senior
Scale)   are   the   only   higher   posts   available   for   the
lower cadre as promotional avenues.  Therefore, the
post of Joint Chief Inspector of Factories cannot be
set a part for deputationists, as suggested by UPSC.
7. It is also most respectfully submitted that the
Government of Pondicherry, in their communication
referred to above, clearly stated that the intention is
for creating  avenues of  promotion  to  the  cadre of
Inspector   of   Factories   and   Principal,   Group   ‘A’
(Junior Scale), Technical Officer and  Training Officer
and the Government has also brought all these four
posts   under   one   umbrella.     The   Government   of
Pondicherry had stated that since these four posts
were brought under one umbrella, there will be no
difficulty in operating a common Recruitment Rules
for the posts of Joint Chief Inspector of Factories and
Principal, Group ‘A’ (Senior Scale) by keeping these
four   posts   as   a   feeder   post.     The   Government   of
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Pondicherry had also stated that having a common
Recruitment Rules will facilitate not only the rotation
of   officers   at   frequent   intervals   for   better
administration,   but   also   will   create   promotional
avenues to the officers holding the feeder posts.  The
Government of Pondicherry further emphasised that
such an action will also meet guidelines of the Chief
Vigilance   Commission   of   India,   New   Delhi.
Subsequently, the case was also discussed by Joint
Secretary   (Labour)   with   the   concerned   officers   of
UPSC   in   the   Commission   on   24.05.2004   and   the
representative of  the Pondicherry Government was
requested to submit detailed comment with regard to
the  requirement  of  having a  common Recruitment
Rules again.   The record of the discussion held on
24.05.2004 is annexed as (ANNEXURE R­VI).  Having
examined the proposal it was felt necessary to have a
clear view, particularly the details to corroborate the
assertion of the Pondicherry Government that there
is   stagnation   in   the   feeder   grade.     As   such,   the
Government of Pondicherry was requested to forward
a statement indicating the name of the incumbents
holding the posts of Inspector of Boilers, Inspector of
Factories, Technical Officer and Training Officer and
Principal,   I.T.I.   and   also   their   date   of   regular
appointments in the respective grade.  Commission’s
letter, dated 19.11.2004 (ANNEXURE R­VII) may be
referred   to.     Finally,   having   examined   the   entire
proposal   along   with   the   details   furnished   by   the
Government of Pondicherry, the Recruitment Rules
were concurred by the Commission upon insistence
of   the   Government   of   Pondicherry   to   have   the
common Recruitment Rules in view of the following:
(i) That   the   feeder   post   of   Principal   (Junior
Grade) and Inspector of Factories are also
interchangeable.
(ii) That the feeder grade posts of Inspector of
Boilers,   Inspector   of   Factories,   Principal,
Group   ‘B’,   I.T.I.,   Technical   Officer   and
Training   Officer   could   be   provided   better
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promotional   avenues   as   some   of   the
incumbents   holding   these   posts   are
stagnating in their respective grade.
(iii) That   it   is   necessary   to   have   a   common
Recruitment Rules, because the post of Joint
Chief   Inspector   of   Factories   is   a   sensitive
post and there is a need to rotate the officers
at   frequent   intervals   so   as   to   meet   the
guidelines   of   the   Central   Vigilance
Commission.     The   Government   of
Pondicherry   had   certified   that   there   is   no
impediment to have a common Recruitment
Rules   for   both   the   posts   of   Joint   Chief
Inspector of Factories and Principal, Group
‘A’ (Senior Scale).”
6.5 From   the   aforesaid,   it   appears   that   the   UPSC   gave   its
concurrence after having due deliberations and considering the
relevant   factors   and   only   thereafter   the   rules   came   to   be
amended and the two posts in question came to be equated.  In
the case of P.U. Joshi  (supra) in paragraph 10, this Court has
observed and held as under:
“10. We   have   carefully   considered   the
submissions   made   on   behalf   of   both   parties.
Questions   relating   to   the   constitution,   pattern,
nomenclature   of   posts,   cadres,   categories,   their
creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and
other   conditions   of   service   including   avenues   of
promotions   and   criteria   to   be   fulfilled   for   such
promotions pertain to the field of policy is within the
exclusive   discretion   and   jurisdiction   of   the   State,
subject, of course, to the limitations or restrictions
envisaged in the Constitution of India and it is not for
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the   statutory   tribunals,   at   any   rate,   to   direct   the
Government   to   have   a   particular   method   of
recruitment   or   eligibility   criteria   or   avenues   of
promotion or impose itself by substituting its views
for that of the State. Similarly, it is well open and
within the competency of the State to change the
rules relating to a service and alter or amend and
vary   by   addition/substraction   the   qualifications,
eligibility   criteria   and   other   conditions   of   service
including avenues of promotion, from time to time, as
the   administrative   exigencies   may   need   or
necessitate. Likewise, the State by appropriate rules
is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate
departments   into   more   and   constitute   different
categories of posts or cadres by undertaking further
classification, bifurcation or amalgamation as well as
reconstitute   and   restructure   the   pattern   and
cadres/categories of service, as may be required from
time to time by abolishing the existing cadres/posts
and creating new cadres/posts. There is no right in
any   employee   of   the   State   to   claim   that   rules
governing conditions of his service should be forever
the same as the one when he entered service for all
purposes   and   except   for   ensuring   or   safeguarding
rights or benefits already earned, acquired or accrued
at a particular point of time, a government servant
has no right to challenge the authority of the State to
amend, alter and bring into force new rules relating
to even an existing service.”
6.6 Thus, when a conscious decision was taken by the UPSC
and the Government while amending rules and equating the two
posts after considering the  pros  and  cons  of the  matter  and
considering   the   relevant   factors   referred   to   and   reproduced
hereinabove,   being   a   policy   decision,   the   Tribunal   was   not
23
justified   in   quashing   and   setting   aside   the   statutory   rules.
Therefore,   the   High   Court   has   committed   a   grave   error   in
dismissing the writ petition and confirming the judgment and
order passed by the learned Tribunal quashing and setting aside
the amended rules by notification – G.O. No. 6 of 2015 equating
the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale).  Now, so far as the
reliance placed upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of
P.K.   Roy  (supra)   and  Roop   Lal (supra)   is   concerned,   on
considering the decisions, we are of the opinion that, in the facts
and   circumstances   of   the   case,   those   decisions   shall   not   be
applicable to the facts of the case on hand.  The decision in the
case of P.K. Roy (supra) related to administrative determination
of equivalence between different posts in the context of State reorganization and absorption of individuals in equivalent posts.
The decision in the case of Roop Lal (supra) related to absorption
of a Sub­Inspector belonging to BSF in the Delhi Police when he
was serving on deputation, and period to be counted for seniority.
Therefore, on facts, the said decision shall not be applicable to
the   facts   of   the   case   on   hand.   
Even otherwise, on considering the nature and duties of both the
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decisions, namely JCIF and Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale), we
are of the opinion that the duties to be performed by JCIF and
Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) can be said to be identical
and/or similar in nature.
7 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we
are   unable   to   agree   with   the   view   taken   by   the   High   Court
dismissing the writ petitions and confirming the judgment and
order passed by the learned Tribunal quashing and setting aside
the amended rules by notification – G.O. No. 6 of 2015 equating
the post of Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with the post of
JCIF.   The impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court as well as the judgment and order passed by the learned
Tribunal deserve to be quashed and set aside.
7.1 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in Writ
Petition No. 44922 of 2006 arising out of the judgment and order
dated 04.07.2006 passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 814
of 2005 quashing and setting aside the recruitment rules issued
vide   notification   –   G.O.   No.   6   of   2015   equating   the   post   of
25
Principal, Grade ‘A’ (Senior Scale) with that of JCIF, is hereby
quashed and set aside.  The appeal arising out of Writ Petition
No. 44922 of 2006 is hereby allowed accordingly.   No costs.
7.2 Now, so far as the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court in Writ Petition No. 44921 of 2006 arising out of
the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal dated
04.07.2006 in O.A. No. 218 of 2005 by which the Tribunal set
aside   the   order   of   transfer   is   concerned,   the   same   stands
disposed of, as observed hereinabove.   However, the liberty is
reserved   in   favour   of   respondent   No.   1–original   applicant   to
challenge the order dated 18.08.2016 treating the period between
15.03.2005 till he attained the age of superannuation as  diesnon, before an appropriate court/forum and as and when such
proceedings   are   initiated,   the   same   may   be   considered   in
accordance with law and on merits.
........................................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
........................................J.
[M. R. SHAH]
New Delhi,
May 1, 2019.