No Confidence Motion - Right of MP to Vote as Ex Offico member - Whether the Member of the House of Parliament (for short “MP”) representing the Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, who is also an ex­officio member of the Panchayat Samiti, for reckoning the quorum of a special meeting regarding motion of no confidence against the Pramukh of the Little Andaman Panchayat Samiti (for short the “said Samiti”) and also whether he/she can exercise his/her vote on the ‘No Confidence Motion’ within the meaning of the provisions of Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Panchayats) Regulation, 1994 (for short “Regulation”) and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Panchayats Administration Rules) 1997 (for short “the Rules”).? - Apex court held yes- A ‘No Confidence Motion’ dated 19th December, 2007 was moved by respondent No.6 against the appellant (Pramukh of the said Samiti). The said Samiti consisted of six members i.e. five directly elected members from territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area and one MP representing the Union Territory. A meeting for discussion of the ‘No Confidence Motion’ was scheduled on 2nd January, 2017 at 3.00 PM in the Conference Hall of the Panchayat Samiti. That notice was duly served to all the members. But only 3 elected members remained present at the scheduled time (3.00 PM) and place of the meeting. As the quorum was not complete, the members waited upto one hour i.e. upto 4.00 PM. Eventually, the meeting came to be dissolved by the Executive Officer for want of quorum of four members, in view of Section 107 of the 3 Regulation. - we conclude that the Division Bench committed manifest error in setting aside the decision of the Executive Officer dated 2nd January, 2017 declaring that the meeting stood dissolved for want of quorum. Instead, we uphold the said decision of the Executive Officer having held that the quorum of the special meeting ought to be of not less 40 than two­thirds of the “total number of membership of the Panchayat Samiti” which includes all the members of the Panchayat Samiti ­ be it directly elected or ex­officio members, as the case may be. So understood, the quorum of the special meeting has been justly recorded as four members. However, as only three members had remained present at the scheduled time and place, the Executive Officer had no option except to dissolve the meeting convened on 2nd January, 2017. For the same reason, the motion of no confidence against the appellant, in law, could not have proceeded further. 34. Resultantly, the follow up action taken against the appellant, asking him to step down, therefore, also would be non est in law. This Court, vide order dated 15th January, 2018, had made it clear that the consequential election to fill in the vacancy arisen due to removal of the appellant, would be subject to the outcome of this petition. Accordingly, we hold that all steps taken after the order of the Executive Officer dated 2nd January, 2017 be treated as non est in terms of this order.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL  APPEAL NO.                OF  2019
(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No.36952 of 2017)
Seema Sarkar      …..Appellant(s)
:Versus:
Executive Officer and Ors.     ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The conundrum in this appeal is about the inclusion or
exclusion of the Member of the House of Parliament (for short
“MP”)   representing   the   Union   Territory   of   Andaman   and
Nicobar   Islands,   who   is   also   an   ex­officio   member   of   the
Panchayat   Samiti,   for   reckoning   the   quorum   of   a   special
meeting   regarding   motion   of   no   confidence   against   the
Pramukh of the Little Andaman Panchayat Samiti (for short
the   “said   Samiti”)   and   also   whether   he/she   can   exercise
2
his/her vote on the ‘No Confidence Motion’ within the meaning
of   the   provisions   of   Andaman   and   Nicobar   Islands
(Panchayats) Regulation, 1994 (for short “Regulation”) and the
Andaman   and   Nicobar   Islands   (Panchayats   Administration
Rules) 1997 (for short “the Rules”).
3. A ‘No Confidence Motion’ dated 19th December, 2007 was
moved by respondent No.6 against the appellant (Pramukh of
the said Samiti).  The said Samiti consisted of six members i.e.
five directly elected members from territorial constituencies in
the   Panchayat   area   and   one   MP   representing   the   Union
Territory.   A   meeting   for   discussion   of   the   ‘No   Confidence
Motion’   was scheduled on 2nd January, 2017 at 3.00 PM in
the Conference Hall of the Panchayat Samiti.  That notice was
duly served to all the members. But only 3 elected members
remained present at the scheduled time (3.00 PM) and place of
the meeting. As the quorum was not complete, the members
waited   upto   one   hour   i.e.   upto   4.00   PM.   Eventually,   the
meeting came to be dissolved by the Executive Officer for want
of quorum of four members, in view of Section 107 of the
3
Regulation.   The Executive Officer issued communication in
that behalf on 2nd July, 2017 which reads thus:
“No.3­131/PS/HB/2016­17/535
OFFICE OF THE PANCHAYAT SAMITY
HUT BAY, LITTLE ANDAMAN
**************
Hut Bay dated the 2nd Jan. 2017
To,
The Deputy Commissioner,
South Andaman, Port Blair.
Sub: Report on No Confidence Motion against Smt. Sima Sarkar,
Pramukh, Panchayat Samiti, Little Andaman­Reg.
Sir,
The re­scheduled special meeting on No Confidence
Motion   was   held   on   02/01/2017   at   3:00   pm   in   the
Conference hall of Panchayat Samiti. The notice was served
to   5   elected   members   and   a   Member   of   Parliament,
Andaman and Nicobar Administration. After serving notice
to Member of Parliament as per Panchayat Regulation 1994
under   chapter   X   at   serial   no.107   the   members   of   the
Panchayat Samiti, Hut Bay become six and 2/3rd majority is
4.
The meeting was fixed at 3:00 pm and waited upto 1
hour i.e., upto 4:00 pm but only 3 members were attended
but to fulfill Quorum 4 member is must hence for want of
Quorum meeting dissolved.
The extract of proceeding of the meeting is enclosed
herewith for your kind reference.
Encl: A/A
Yours   Faithfully
Executive Officer
Panchayat Samiti
Little Andaman”
4
4. The respondent No.6 assailed the said decision by way of
Writ Petition No.14 of 2017 before the High Court at Calcutta,
Civil   Appellate   Jurisdiction,   Circuit   Bench   at   Port   Blair.
Respondent   No.6   asserted   that   the   MP   had   no   right   to
participate in the special meeting regarding a ‘No Confidence
Motion’ nor was he entitled to vote thereat. Respondent No.6
prayed for the following reliefs in the said writ petition:
“In the fact and circumstance mentioned herein above, your
petitioner respectfully prays that YOUR LORDSHIP may be
graciously pleased to issue:­
A. A   writ   in   the   nature   of   certiorari   quashing   the
proceedings dated 02.01.2017 wherein the Executive
Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Little Andaman dated held
that quorum required is four members and as such no
confidence motion not be proceeded.
B. A writ in the Mandamus directing the respondent no.1
to   call   for   a   meeting   of   moving   the   no   confidence
against the private respondent no.1 and further direct
the Up­Pramukh i.e. the respondent no.4 to preside
over   the   meeting   to   complete   the   process   without
casting to vote in the said meeting.
C. A writ  in the nature of the Certiorari directing the
respondent authorities to transmit the case records
before this Hon’ble Court so that after pursuing the
same   conscionable   justice   may   be   rendered   your
petitioner   and   directing   the   respondent   no.1   to
consider the case of the letter of the petitioner dated
19.12.2016 and 02.01.2017.
D. Rule NISI in terms of prayer A&B above.
E. Cost of the incidents to this writ application.
F. Any other order/orders of further order/orders as your
Lordship may deem fit and proper.”
5
5. The writ petition was heard by the learned Single Judge
of the High Court who negatived the stand of respondent No.6
and thus dismissed the writ petition. The learned Single Judge
held that the quorum for a special meeting to consider the
motion   of   no   confidence   against   the   Pramukh,   being   twothirds of the “total membership”, minimum four members of
the   Panchayat   Samiti   ought   to   have   remained   present.
Presence of only three members at the meeting, therefore, did
not constitute quorum. Further, the MP being the member of
the   said   Samiti   was   entitled   to   participate   in   the   special
meeting to consider a no confidence motion and also vote on
that motion.  As a result, the writ petition came to be rejected.
6. Respondent No.6 carried the matter before the Division
Bench by way of writ appeal, being M.A. No.26 of 2017. The
Division Bench reversed both the conclusions reached by the
learned   Single   Judge   and   instead,   opined   that   the   MP
representing the Union Territory was not eligible to participate
in the special meeting and vote on a  ‘No Confidence Motion’
for removal of the Pramukh or Up­Pramukh of the Panchayat
6
Samiti. For arriving at that conclusion, the Division Bench
adverted   to   Sections   107(3),   112(1),   115   and   117   of   the
Regulation and Rules 9(3) and 21 of the Rules. Additionally,
the   Division   Bench   placed   reliance   on   the   decisions   in
Ramesh  Mehta Vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi and Ors.1
  and
State of  Karnataka  and  Ors.  Vs.  Lakshmappa  Kallappa
Balaganur  and  Ors.2
   The Division Bench also adverted to
Articles 243(d), 243B and 243C, especially clauses (3), (4) and
(5) of Article 243C of the Constitution of India and opined as
follows: 
“….Panchayats have been included in the Constitution of
the India by the Constitution (73rd amendment) Act, 1992.
The purpose of amendment appears to be that it was felt
that in every State there should be a panchayats at the
village,   intermediate   and   district   levels   as  a   part   of   self
governance.   Article   243   (d)   of   the   Constitution   defines
Panchayat to mean an institution by whatever name called
of self government constituted under Article 243 B for the
rural   areas.   Article   243   C   deals   with   composition   of
Panchayat. 243 C (3) permits the legislation of the State by
law   to   provides   for   representation.   Article   243   (C)   (4)
provides that the Chairperson of the Panchayat and other
members of the Panchayat whether or not chosen by direct
election   from   territorial   constituencies   in   the   Panchayat
area shall have the right to vote in the meetings of the
panchayats.   The   Chairperson   of   a   Panchayat   at   the
intermediate level or district level under Article 243 (C) (5)
1
  (2004) 5 SCC 409
2
  (2001) 3 KLJ  498
7
(b)   shall   be   elected   by   and   from   amongst   the   elected
members thereof. Article 243 (C) (4) is similar to Regulation
107 (3) (b) which provides that the member of the House of
Parliament representing the Union Territory shall also be
represented in the Panchayat Samiti with a right to vote in
the meetings of the Panchayat Samiti. It has to be seen from
the Regulations whether or not the Regulations intend to
treat   the   Member   of   Parliament   at   par   with   the   elected
members of the Panchayat to participate in the proceedings
initiated for removal of the Pramukh of the Panchayat.
Although   the   Regulations   and   the   Rules   do   not
appear to have made any distinction between “person” and
“member”   which   appear   to   have   been   used   at   places
interchangeably but regard must be had to the very object
for   which   a   member   of   Parliament   is   included   in   the
Panchayat Samiti with a right to vote. The presence of the
Member of Parliament is not required for the purpose of
electing the Pramukh and Up­Pramukh as the Regulations
clearly   use   the   phrase   “by   and   from   amongst   elected
members   of   the   Panchayat   Samiti”   and   the   Member   of
Parliament is not treated at par with the elected members
for the purpose of election of such office bearers.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions
on interpretation on similar rules and/or regulations, we
are of the opinion that the Member of Parliament cannot be
treated at par with an elected member of the Panchayat
Samity for the purpose of removal of Pramukh and Uppramukh. In the relevant Rules and Regulations in relation
to a motion of no confidence wherever the word ‘member’ is
used,   it   would   only   mean   elected   members   and   not
nominated members even though such nominated member
may have a right to vote in other proceedings. All members
who have selected Pramukh and Up­pramukh are all elected
members of the Samiti unlike the nominated members and
in matters concerning motion of no confidence in our view it
is only those members who have been directly elected shall
have the right to remove Pramukh and Up­Pramukh as the
said office bearers have been elected by and from amongst
the elected members of Panchayat Samiti. There is a clear
distinction between the two classes of members and they
8
cannot be treated at par in matters relating to no confidence
motion to remove Pramukh or Up­Pramukh.”
7. Having thus held, the Division Bench proceeded to allow
the appeal filed by respondent No.6 and consequently granted
relief as prayed for in the writ petition ­ of setting aside the
decision of the Executive Officer dated 2nd January, 2017. The
High   Court   also   directed   the   Executive   Officer,   Panchayat
Samiti, Little Andaman to proceed in accordance with law in
light of the observations made in the said judgment.
8. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal by
special   leave.   The   appellant   moved   the   Court   for   urgent
consideration of the matter on 22nd December, 2017 before the
Vacation Bench of this Court when notice came to be issued.
However,   during   the   pendency   of   this   appeal,   the   Deputy
Commissioner,   acting   upon   the   directions   issued   by   the
Division Bench of the High Court not only proceeded to remove
the appellant from the post of Pramukh of the Little Andaman
Panchayat Samiti on 26th December, 2017 but also intended to
proceed to fill up the vacancy arising from the removal of the
9
appellant,   by   scheduling   a   fresh   election   on   19th  January,
2018. The appellant, therefore, urgently moved this Court for
appropriate orders on 15th January, 2018, when the following
order came to be passed:
“Learned counsel who have entered appearance on behalf of
the respondents, pray for a week’s time to file the counter
affidavit.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner does not intend
to file the rejoinder affidavit.
As a pure question of law emerges, let the matter be listed on
29th January, 2018. Any election held in the meantime,
shall   be   subject   to   the   result   of   this   special   leave
petition.”
      (emphasis supplied)
9. Resultantly,   the   meeting   scheduled   on   19th  January,
2018, proceeded to elect respondent No.6 as Pramukh of Little
Andaman   Panchayat   Samiti.   As   the   matter   also   involved
applicability of Articles 243C and 243R of the Constitution of
India, this Court on 31st January, 2018, requested the learned
Attorney General for India to assist the Court. Pursuant to the
said request, the learned Attorney General for India appeared
in the proceedings and is now represented by Mr. Aman Lekhi,
Additional Solicitor General of India.
10
10. We have heard Mr. Purushaindra Kaurav, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Aman Lekhi, learned
Additional Solicitor General of India, Ms. G. Indira, learned
counsel   appearing   for   respondent   No.1   and   Mr.   R.
Chandrachud, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.6.
11. By the Constitution 73rd  Amendment Act, 1992, which
came   into   force   from   24th  April,   1993,   Part­IX   of   the
Constitution   of   India   came   to  be   amended.   It   envisaged   a
detailed mechanism for democratic decentralization of the selfGovernment on the principle of grass­root democracy. It may
be useful to advert to the Statement of Objects and Reasons
necessitating such amendment, which reads thus:
“THE CONSTITUTION (SEVENTY­THIRD AMENDMENT)
ACT, 1992
Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   appended   to   the
Constitution (Seventy­second Amendment) Bill, 1991 which
was enacted as the Constitution (Seventy­third Amendment)
Act, 1992
Though the Panchayati Raj institutions have been in
existence for a long time, it has been observed that these
institutions have not been able to acquire the status and
dignity of viable and responsive people’s bodies due to a
number of reasons including absence of regular elections,
prolonged   supersessions,   insufficient   representation   of
weaker sections like Scheduled Casts, Scheduled Tribes and
women,   inadequate   devolution   of   powers   and   lack   of
financial resources.
11
2. Article 40 of the Constitution which enshrines one
of the directive principles of State Policy lays down that the
State shall take steps to organize Village Panchayats and
endow them with such powers and authority as may be
necessary   to   enable   them   to   function   as   units   of   selfgovernment. In the light of the experience in the last forty
years and in view of the shortcomings which have been
observed, it is considered that there is an imperative need to
enshrine   in   the   Constitution   certain   basic   and   essential
features of Panchayati Raj institutions to impart certainty,
continuity and strength to them.”
By virtue of this amendment, Panchayat has been defined to
mean   an   institution   (by   whatever   name   called)   of   selfGovernment   constituted   under   Article   243B   for   the   rural
areas. Article 243B reads thus:
“243B.   Constitution   of   Panchayats.­(1)   There   shall   be
constituted   in   every   State,   Panchayats   at   the   village,
intermediate   and   district   levels   in   accordance   with   the
provisions of this Part.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (1), Panchayats at the
intermediate level may not be constituted in a State having a
population not exceeding twenty lakhs.”
It may be apposite to reproduce Article 243C which deals with
composition of Panchayats. The same reads thus:   
“243C.   Composition   of   Panchayats.­(1)   Subject   to   the
provisions of this Part, the Legislature of a State may, by
law,   make   provisions   with   respect   to   the   composition   of
Panchayats:
Provided that the ratio between the population of the
territorial area of a Panchayat at any level and the number of
seats in such Panchayat to be filled by election shall, so far
as practicable, be the same throughout the State.
12
(2)   All   the   seats   in   a   Panchayat   shall   be   filled   by
persons   chosen   by   direct   election   from   territorial
constituencies in the Panchayat area and, for this purpose,
each   Panchayat   area   shall   be   divided   into   territorial
constituencies in such manner that the ratio between the
population of each constituency and the number of seats
allotted   to   it   shall,   so   far   as   practicable,   be   the   same
throughout the Panchayat area.
(3) The Legislature of a State may, by law, provide for
the representation­
(a) of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at the
village   level,   in   the   Panchayats   at   the
intermediate level or, in the case of a State not
having Panchayats at the intermediate level, in
the Panchayats at the district level;
(b) of the Chairpersons of the Panchayats at the
intermediate   level,   in   the   Panchayats   at   the
district level;
(c) of the members of the House of the People
and the members of the Legislative Assembly of
the   State   representing   constituencies   which
comprise wholly or partly a Panchayat area at a
level   other   than   the   village   level,   in   such
Panchayat;
(d) of the members of the Council of States and
the members of the Legislative Council of the
State,   where   they   are   registered   as   electors
within­
(i) a Panchayat area at the intermediate level, in
Panchayat at the intermediate level;
(ii)   A   Panchayat   area   at   the   district   level,   in
Panchayat at the district level.
(4)   The   Chairperson   of   a   Panchayat   and   other
members of a Panchayat whether or not chosen by direct
election from territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area
13
shall   have   the   right   to   vote   in   the   meetings   of   the
Panchayats.
(5) The Chairperson of­
(a) a Panchayat at the village level shall be elected in
such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by
law, provide; and
(b) a Panchayat at the intermediate level or district
level   shall   be   elected   by,   and   from   amongst,   the
elected members thereof.”
12. In   the   present   case,   we   are   concerned   with   an
intermediate   level   Panchayat.   The   composition   of   such
Panchayat can be culled out from Article 243C. Clause (1)
makes it amply clear that the legislature of a State is free to
make   a   law   with   respect   to   the   composition   of   Panchayat
subject to the provisions of Part­IX of the Constitution.  In the
present   case,   we   are   not   so   much   concerned   about   the
composition of Panchayat, except to notice that clause (2) of
the   said   Article   makes   it   clear   that   all   the   seats   in   the
Panchayat   shall   be   filled   up   by   persons   chosen   by   direct
election from the territorial constituencies in the Panchayat
area. Clause (3) of the Article is an enabling clause permitting
the legislature of a State to make a law to provide for the
representation of other persons who are not directly elected
14
from   the   territorial   constituencies   in   the   Panchayat   area.
Clause (4) deals with the right to vote in the meetings of the
chairperson   of   a   Panchayat   or   other   members   of   the
Panchayat whether or not chosen by direct election from the
territorial   constituencies   in  the   Panchayat   area.   Clause   (5)
deals   with   the   manner   in   which   the   chairperson   of   a
Panchayat is elected at the village level, intermediate level or
district level, as the case may be.
13. The chairperson of a Panchayat at intermediate level is
required   to   be   elected   by,   and   from   amongst,   the   elected
members   thereof.   On   a   conjoint   reading   of   the   provisions
referred   to   above,   it   is   crystal   clear   that   there   is   marked
distinction between the member of the Panchayat chosen by
direct   election   from   the   territorial   constituencies   in   the
Panchayat area referred to in clause (2) vis­a­vis other persons
referred to in sub­clauses (a) to (d) of clause (3) of Article
243C, who may also represent as per the law made by the
State Legislature. Thus understood, there is little doubt that
the election of chairperson is by the former category of the
15
members of the Panchayat, namely, directly elected from the
territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area and one from
amongst them is then elected as a chairperson. Notably, there
is no express provision in the Constitution dealing with the
removal of a chairperson of the Panchayat Samiti.
14. Taking cue from the absence of such a provision in the
Constitution, it was argued by the learned ASG that it being a
case of constitutional silence by interpretative process, the
Court must hold that the MP, not being  directly elected from
the territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area and only a
representative in the Panchayat Samiti by virtue of law made
in terms of Article 243C(3), is neither entitled to participate in
a special meeting concerning a ‘No Confidence Motion’ nor
eligible to vote thereat. For, only the body of members directly
elected from the territorial constituencies in the Panchayat
area   which   had   elected   the   Chairperson/Pramukh,   would
alone be competent to vote on a ‘No Confidence Motion’. The
concomitant is that the Member of Parliament (MP), though a
member   of   the   Panchayat   Samiti,   is   not   competent   to
16
participate in the special meeting and vote on a ‘No Confidence
Motion’.
15. This argument is not wholly accurate. In our opinion,
that approach may become necessary only if the legislature of
the State also had chosen to remain silent by not enacting any
law on the subject of removal of the Pramukh or Up­Pramukh
of the Panchayat Samiti. Indisputably, however, a law on the
said subject is already in place in the form of the Regulation
as also the Rules concerning Panchayat administration. The
Constitution itself enables the State Legislature to make a law
on   the   subject   of   composition   of   Panchayats,   including
regarding election of the Pramukh, subject to the provisions
contained in Part­IX of the Constitution. The law, as made in
the   form   of   the   Regulation,   is   not   the   subject   matter   of
challenge before us either on the ground of being in excess of
legislative competence or transcending the sphere of matters
referred to in Part­IX of the Constitution.
16. Concededly,   the   Regulation   as   well   as   the   Rules
specifically provided for the subject of motion of no confidence,
17
how such motion should be moved and the manner in which it
is required to be carried forward. Section 106 of the Regulation
speaks about the constitution of the Panchayat Samiti. The
composition of the Panchayat Samiti has been predicated in
Section 107. This provision is in four parts. The first clause
[(clause   (1)]   is   a   general   provision   envisaging   that   every
Panchayat Samiti shall consist of such number of seats as the
administrator   may   by   notification   determine.   Clause   (2)
postulates   that   the   seats   in   the   Panchayat   Samiti   as
determined  shall  be  filled  up  by  persons  chosen  by  direct
election   from   the   territorial   constituencies   in   the   manner
prescribed. Clause (3) refers to the persons who shall also be
represented in the Panchayat Samiti other than the persons
chosen by direct election referred to in clause (2). This clause
(3)   is   again   split   in   two   parts:   the   first   referring   to   the
proportion of the representation given to the representatives of
the Gram Panchayat in the Panchayat Samiti; and the second
referring   to   the   member   of   the   House   of   Parliament
representing the Union Territory. As regards the latter, it has
18
been explicitly provided that such member shall have the right
to vote in the meeting of the Panchayat Samiti. The fourth
clause is not significant for dealing with the issue on hand.
Section 107 of the Regulation reads thus:
“107.  (1)   Every   Panchayat   Samiti   shall   consist   of   such
number of seats as the Administrator may by notification
determine.
(2) The seats in the Panchayat Samiti shall be filled by
person   chosen   by   direct   election   from   the   Territorial
Constituencies in such manner that the ratio between the
population of each constituency and the number of seats
allotted   to   it   shall   so   far   as   practicable   be   the   same
throughout the Panchayat Samiti area.
(3) The following persons shall also be represented in the
Panchayat Samiti, namely:­
(a) a proportion of the Pradhans of the Gram
Panchayat   in   the   Panchayat   Samiti   to   be
determined by order of the Administrator and
by   rotation   for   such   period   as   may   be
prescribed: Provided that while nominating the
Pradhans   by  rotation  the  Administrator  shall
ensure that as far as possible all the Pradhans
are given the opportunity or being represented
in the Panchayat Samiti atleast once during its
duration: and
(b)  the  member  of  the  House  of  Parliament
representing the Union Territory.
Who   shall   have   the   right   to   vote   in   the
meeting of the Panchayat Samiti.
(4) The provisions of sub­sections (5),(6),(7) and (8) of section
11 shall so far as may be apply to the Panchayat Samiti as
19
they apply to a Gram Panchayat subject to the modification
that for the words ‘Gram Panchayat’ wherever they occur,
the words ‘Panchayat Samiti’ had been substituted.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. The other relevant provision in the Regulation is Section
112, which deals with election of Pramukh and Up­Pramukh.
The same reads thus:
“112. (1) On the constitution of a Panchayat Samiti for the
first time under this Regulation or on the expiry of the term
of a Panchayat Samiti or on its reconstitution, a meeting
shall   be   called   on   the   date   fixed   by   the   Deputy
Commissioner for the election of the Pramukh and the UpPramukh by and from amongst the elected members of the
Panchayat Samiti.
(2) The Deputy Commissioner shall preside at such meeting
but not have the right to vote.
(3) No business other than the election of the Pramukh and
Up­Pramukh shall be transacted at such meeting.
(4) In case of equality of votes, the result of the election shall
be decided by lots drawn in the presence of the Deputy
Commissioner in such manner as he may determine.
(5)   Subject   to   any   general   or   special   order   of   the
Administrator, the Deputy Commissioner shall reserve.
(a) the number of offices of Pramukhs in the Panchayat
Samitis for the Scheduled Tribes which shall bear as
nearly  as may  be,  the  same  proportion  to  the total
number of such offices in the Panchayat Simitis as the
population of the Scheduled Tribes in the area of the
Union Territory to which this Regulation applies bears
to the total population of such area;
(b) not less than one­third of the total number of offices
of Pramukh in the Panchayat Samitis for women;
Provided   that   the   offices   reserved   under   this   subsection  shall  be  allotted   by  the  Election  Commission  by
20
rotation different Panchayat Samitis in such manner as may
be prescribed.”
18. Even this provision seems to be in conformity with the
letter and spirit of Article 243C. On a plain reading of this
provision, it is noticed that the election of the Pramukh and
Up­Pramukh is “by” the elected members of the Panchayat
Samiti and the one who is elected as such, is “from amongst
them”.   Even   the   expression   used   in   Article   243C(5)(b)   is
“elected by, and from amongst, the elected members thereof”.
This   dispensation   is  in   consonance   with   the  constitutional
scheme of democratic decentralization and self­Government on
the principle of grass­root democracy. In that sense, the other
members of the Panchayat Samiti (other than those chosen by
direct   election   from   the   territorial   constituencies   in   the
Panchayat area)  referred to in Article 243C(3) have no say in
the matter of electing the Pramukh or Up­Pramukh of the
Panchayat Samiti, though they may generally have the right to
vote in the meeting of the Panchayat Samiti on other matters.
19. Sections 107 and 112 are a facsimile of Article 243C and
also   within   the   framework   provided   therein.   Although   the
21
other member(s) who have been given representation in the
Panchayat Samiti have no say in the election of the Pramukh
or Up­Pramukh of the Panchayat Samiti, it does not follow
that they are not eligible to remain present and vote in the
special meeting regarding the motion of no confidence against
the   Pramukh   or  Up­Pramukh   of   the   Panchayat   Samiti.  As
aforementioned, the Constitution is completely silent on the
subject of removal of the Pramukh or the Up­Pramukh of the
Panchayat Samiti, including regarding the manner in which a
‘Motion of No Confidence’  against them could be moved and
carried forward. That subject has been articulated in the form
of Section 117 of the Regulation, which reads thus:
“117  (1) A motion of no confidence may be moved by any
member of a Panchayat Samiti against the Pramukh or the
Upa­Pramukh   after   such   notice   thereof   as   may   be
prescribed.
(2) If the motion is carried by a majority of not less than
two   thirds   of   the   total   number   of   members   of   the
Panchayat  Samiti,  the Pramukh or Upa­pramukh, as the
case may be shall cease to hold office after a period of three
days from the date on which the motion is carried unless he
has resigned earlier.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Regulation,
the   Pramukh   or   Upa­Pramukh   shall   not   preside   over   a
meeting   in   which   a   motion   of   no   confidence   is   discuss
22
against   him   but   he   shall   have   the   right   to   speak   or
otherwise take part in the proceedings of such meeting.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. Thus, an unambiguous provision has been made in the
Regulation regarding the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the
Pramukh   or   Up­Pramukh   of   the   Panchayat   Samiti.     The
validity of the said provision is not the subject matter of this
appeal. As a result, we do not wish to dilate on the argument
which may indirectly, if not directly, question the validity of
the provision.   Suffice is to observe that we are not dealing
with a case where the Regulation made by the State legislature
is also silent on the subject of motion of no confidence or
removal of Pramukh or Up­Pramukh of the Panchayat Samiti.
The provision is explicit as to who can move the motion and
the   manner   in   which   the   same   is   required   to   be   carried
forward to its logical end. As per this provision, the other
members having representation on the Panchayat Samiti, who
are not directly elected from the territorial constituencies in
the Panchayat area have no right to vote during the election of
the Pramukh or Up­Pramukh  of the Panchayat Samiti, it does
23
not follow that they are not or cease to be members of the
Panchayat Samiti. Whereas, in terms of Section 107 which
specifies the composition of the Panchayat Samiti, they are
plainly recognized as members of the Panchayat Samiti during
the relevant period. Those persons may not be directly elected
from the territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area but
nevertheless,   are   people’s   representatives,   being   elected   as
Pradhans of the concerned Gram Panchayat within the area of
the   Panchayat   Samiti,   or   as   the   Member   of   the   House   of
Parliament representing the Union Territory. It would have
been a different matter if Section 117 had constricted the right
to vote on a motion of no confidence only to the members
directly elected from the territorial constituencies in the Gram
Panchayat area, referred to in Section 107(2) of the Regulation.
To put it differently, merely because the law permits only the
directly   elected   members   to   vote   during   the   election   of
Pramukh,   that  ipso   facto  would   not   follow   that   the   other
members (other than the elected members) of the Panchayat
Samiti are ineligible to vote on  a ‘No Confidence Motion’.
24
21. Besides the explicit provisions in the Regulation, even the
statutory Rules make it unstintingly intelligible that the other
(ex­officio) member(s)  of the Panchayat Samiti can also remain
present and participate in the special meeting to consider a
motion   of   no   confidence   against   the   Pramukh.   The   stated
Rules are framed in exercise of the power to make rules in
terms of Section 202. Clause (ak) of Section 202 (2) enables
the Administrator to frame rules in respect of the notice for
moving a motion  of no confidence against the Pramukh or UpPramukh as per Section 117(1) of the Regulation. Further,
clause (al) permits framing of rules regarding the time and
place of meetings of the Panchayat Samitis and the procedure
for such meetings under sub­section (1) of Section 121; and
clause (am) deals with the manner in which a member of
Panchayat Samiti may move resolution(s) and put question(s)
to the Pramukh and Up­Pramukh under sub­section (2) of
Section 121. The statutory rules framed under Section 202
expressly   provide   for   the   quorum   of   the   meetings   of   the
25
Panchayat Samiti. Rule 9 as applicable to Panchayat Samiti
reads thus:
“9. Quorum.­  The following shall be the quorum required
for meetings of Gram Sabha, Gram Panchayat, Panchayat
Samiti, Zilla Parishad for the kinds of meetings in each
Panchayat:
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
(3)  Panchayat   Samiti.­  (a)  Two­thirds   of   the   total
membership   of   a   Panchayat   Samiti  shall   be   sufficient
quorum for an ordinary meeting of a Panchayat Samiti­,
(b)  Not less than two­thirds of  the  total membership is
necessary   for   a  special   meeting  called   for   the   purpose
under sub­section (1) of section 117 of the Regulation to
move a motion of no confidence against the Pramukh and
Up­Pramukh.   However,   to   carry   the   motion   under   subsection (2) of section 117, a majority of not less than twothirds of the membership of the Panchayat Samiti present
and voting is necessary.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx”
(emphasis supplied)
It will be useful to advert to Rule 10, which reads thus:
“10. Adjournment of meeting for want of quorum. ­(1) If,
within   one   hour   from   the   time   appointed   for   holding   a
meeting of a Panchayat quorum is not present, the meeting
may be adjourned and may be held on another date to be
fixed  by  the  Chairperson  or  the  Vice­Chairperson of  the
Presiding member as the case may be. The members shall
be informed of the date, place and time of the adjourned
meeting by a fresh three day's notice in Form­2. No quorum
shall be necessary for such adjourned meeting. No business
other   than   that   included   in   the   list   of   business   for
transaction at the original meeting shall be brought before
an adjourned meeting.
26
(2). In determining the quorum, fraction of one half and
above be counted one, and less than half shall be ignored.”
22. Rule   21   specifically   deals   with   the   motion   of   no
confidence against the Pramukh or Up­Pramukh. The same
reads thus:
“21.   Pramukh   and   Up­Pramukh:   (1)   A   motion   of   no
confidence against the Pramukh or the Up­Pramukh may be
moved by any member of a Panchayat Samiti, after giving 7
days notice. The notice shall be in Form 4. The notice shall
be addressed to the Pramukh and shall be delivered to him
and in his absence to the Up­Pramukh or in the absence of
both,   to   the   Executive   Officer.   The   Pramukh   or   in   his
absence the Up­Pramukh or in the absence of both, the
Executive   Officer   shall   call   a   special   meeting   of   the
Panchayat Samiti within 15 days from the date of moving
the   notice   of   no   confidence   by   serving   notice   to   the
Pramukh,   Up­Pramukh   and   all   the   members   of   the
Panchayat Samiti, in Form 1­A enclosing therewith a copy
of the no confidence motion moved by the member.
(2) The Pramukh or the Up­Pramukh shall not preside over
the meeting but shall have a right to speak or otherwise
take part in the proceedings of the meeting. The meeting
shall be presided over by the Pramukh if the motion is
against the Up­Pramukh and if the motion is against the
Pramukh   the   meeting   will   be   presided   over   by   the   UpPramukh. In the absence of both the Pramukh and UpPramukh,   the   members   assembled   shall   elect   one   from
among themselves to preside over the meeting. A quorum of
not less than two­thirds of the total membership of the
Panchayat  Samiti   is  necessary   for  the  meeting.  Within
one hour from the appointed time, if there is no quorum,
the no confidence motion shall deemed to have not been
carried and the meeting shall be dissolved. The Executive
Officer   shall   send   the   report   of   the   dissolution   of   the
meeting   for   want   of   quorum   to   the   concerned   Assistant
Commissioner,   the   Deputy   Commissioner   (Director   of
27
Panchayat Elections), the Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla
Parishad   and   also   the   Secretary   (Panchayat)   of   the
Administration.
(3) If the motion is carried by a majority of not less than
two­thirds   of   the   total  membership   of   the   Panchayat
Samiti   present   and   voting,  the   Pramukh   or   the   UpPramukh or both, as the case may be, shall cease to hold
office after a period of three days from the date on which the
motion is carried unless the Pramukh or the Up­Pramukh
or both, as the case may be, have resigned earlier.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. To put it differently, the provisions in the Regulation and
the Rules distinctly deal with the manner in which a motion of
‘No Confidence’ should be moved and carried forward to its
logical   end.   In   that   sense,   the   central   issue   is   about   the
purport of the mechanism provided in the Regulation and the
Rules   on   the   subject   of   ‘No   Confidence   Motion’.   From   the
legislative scheme it is noticed that as and when the special
meeting   to   consider   the   ‘No   Confidence   Motion’   proceeds,
Section 117(2) mandates that the motion may be treated as
carried out only if a majority of not less than two­thirds of the
“total number” of members of the Panchayat Samiti vote in
favour of removal of the Pramukh or Up­Pramukh, as the case
may be. A similar position is restated in Rule 21 of the Rules.
28
24. Indeed, the provisions in the Regulation do not provide
for   the   quorum   of   the   special   meeting.   That   is,   however,
prescribed in the form of Rule 9. Rule 9(3)(b) stipulates that
two­thirds of the “total membership” of a Panchayat Samiti
shall   be   a   sufficient   quorum   for   a   special   meeting   of   the
Panchayat   Samiti   in   reference   to   Section   117(1)   of   the
Regulation  to move a motion  of  no confidence against  the
Pramukh or Up­Pramukh. Thus, the quorum specified is not
less than two­thirds of the “total membership”. The emphasis
is on the expression “total membership”, which includes the
other (ex­officio) member(s) referred to in Section 107(3) of the
Regulation   having representation on the Panchayat Samiti
and not limited to members chosen by direct election from
territorial constituencies in the Panchayat area as referred to
in   Section   107(2)   of   the   Regulation.   Thus   understood,   all
members   of   the   Panchayat   Samiti   are   expected   to   remain
present and participate in the special meeting and the quorum
of   the   meeting   is   to   be   determined   on   the   basis   of   “total
number” of members in the Panchayat Samiti.
29
25. The question as to whether the other member(s) (other
than   directly   elected)   who   can   participate   in   the   special
meeting, have the right to vote on the ‘No Confidence Motion’.
That   would   depend   on   the   legislative   scheme   and   intent
manifest from the express provisions permitting them to do so.
The usefulness of their presence at such a special meeting, to
consider the motion of no confidence, cannot and need not be
speculated. The governing provisions predicate that the special
meeting must be attended by not less than two­thirds of the
“total   membership”   of   the   Panchayat   Samiti   and   the   ‘No
Confidence Motion’ must be carried out by not less than twothirds of the “total number” of members of the Panchayat
Samiti present and voting. This is the twin requirement. If so,
the ‘No Confidence Motion’ is required to be considered in the
special meeting of the Panchayat Samiti as a whole and not
limited   to   members   directly   elected   from   the   territorial
constituencies in the Panchayat area. Thus understood, the
total membership of the Little Andaman Samiti being six, twothirds thereof would be four. If the members present at the
30
scheduled   place   and   time   of   the   meeting   were   only   three,
obviously the Executive Officer was justified in dissolving the
meeting for want of quorum.
26. That takes us to the question as to who can vote on the
‘No Confidence Motion’. Indubitably, the language of Section
117 of the Regulation envisages that the motion is required to
be carried by a majority of not less two­thirds of the “total
number” of members of the Panchayat Samiti present and
voting. A similar mandate flows from Rule 9 read with Rule 21
of the Rules. The question is whether the law as enacted in the
form of Section 117 of the Regulation, in any way, deviates
from the scheme of Part­IX of the Constitution. Our answer is
an emphatic “NO”. The fact that Article 243C(5)(b) postulates
that   the   chairperson   of   the   Panchayat   Samiti   at   the
intermediate level shall be elected by, and from amongst, the
elected members thereof, it does not follow that the process of
removal of such chairperson should be limited to voting by the
elected members. The law on the removal of the Pramukh or
Up­Pramukh by means of ‘No Confidence Motion’ has been
31
enacted   by   the   State   Legislature.   That   permits   “all”   the
members   of   the   Panchayat   Samiti   to   participate   in   the
discussion   and   vote   on   the   motion   of   no   confidence.     On
conjoint reading of Section 117, Rule 9(3)(b) and also Rule 21
of the Rules, in our opinion, they, in no way, exclude any
member   of   the   Panchayat   Samiti   muchless   the   members
referred to in Section 107(3) of the Regulation.   Not even by
necessary implication. Taking any other view would result in
re­writing of  the provisions to read as ­ the  motion of no
confidence must be carried out by a majority of not less than
two­thirds of the total number of “directly elected” members of
the Panchayat Samiti mentioned in Section 107(2), present
and voting.  We must presume that the State Legislature was
conscious of the marked distinction between the category of
members   constituting   the   Panchayat   Samiti.   As   is   evident
from Section 107(2), it refers to a category of persons chosen
by   direct   election   from   the   territorial   constituencies,   in
contradistinction to the other category of persons mentioned
in Section 107(3), the constituent of the Panchayat Samiti. If
32
the legislature had intended to exclude the latter category from
the process of ‘No Confidence Motion’, it would have expressly
limited   it   to   only   the   elected   members   [former   category
ascribable to Section 107(2)] of the Panchayat Samiti, as is
done at the stage of election of the chairperson. Whereas, the
provision makes it incumbent that not less than two­thirds of
the “total number” of members of the Panchayat Samiti must
participate and vote. This is the legislative intent which cannot
be whittled down by some overstretched interpretative process
including by relying on the common law principle that only the
body   of   persons,   who   had   elected   the   Pramukh   or   UpPramukh, alone can initiate such a process.
27. The Division Bench of the High Court relied upon the
decision in  Ramesh  Mehta  (supra). In that case, this Court
was called upon to answer whether, in counting the “whole
number of members” on the Municipal Board in terms of Rule
3(9) of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Motion of No­confidence
against   the   Chairman   or   Vice­Chairman)   Rules,   1974,
“nominated members”   have to be taken into consideration.
33
For answering that question, the Court adverted to Article
243R, which deals with the composition of municipalities. The
dispensation prescribed with regard to Panchayats in Article
243C is somewhat different from the one specified in Article
243R for Municipalities. As regards the Panchayats, in terms
of Article 243C(3), only persons referred to in sub­clauses (a)
to (d) thereof, can represent in the Panchayat Samiti as per the
law made by the State Legislature in that behalf. The category
of persons referred to in the said sub­clauses are all directly
elected at different levels ­ be it Panchayat or the House of the
People and the members of the legislative assembly of the
State   or   the   Council   of   States   and   the   members   of   the
legislative council of the State. Whereas, in the composition of
Municipalities,   persons   having   special   knowledge   or
experience   in   municipal   administration   can   also   be
nominated,   who   obviously   may   not   be   elected   people’s
representatives.   The   latter,   therefore,   has   been   expressly
denuded   of   a   right   to   vote   in   the   meetings   of   the
Municipalities, as per the proviso to Article 243R(2). Similar
34
exclusion is not made in respect of the other categories of
members of the Municipality referred to in sub­clauses (ii) to
(iv) of Article 243R(2)(a). In short, the question considered in
the said case was very specific as to whether the voting rights
of the “nominated members” in a Municipal Board can be
reckoned for computing a majority required for a motion of no
confidence   against   the   Chairman   or   Vice­Chairman   of   the
Board.   The   Court   considered   the   statutory   provisions   as
applicable   to   that   case   i.e.,   Section   9   of   the   Rajasthan
Municipalities Act, 1959, as amended. It then concluded that
there was no indication therein that a right to vote is created
in   the   “nominated   members”.   In   other   words,   they   cannot
exercise voting rights.
28. In   the   present   case,   neither   Article   243C   nor   the
Regulation made by the State Legislature or the Rules framed
thereunder   expressly   exclude   the   other   members   of   the
Panchayat   Samiti   referred   to   in   Section   107(3)   of   the
Regulation   from   exercising   their   vote   on   a   ‘Motion   of   No
Confidence’. It is a well established position that the right to
35
elect, and including the right to be elected and continue on the
elected   post,   is   a   statutory   right.   Further,   the   mode   and
manner of election to any post could be different from the
scheme for removal of a person from that post, as restated in
paragraph 10 of the same reported decision. It reads thus:
“10. There   is  no  dispute  with   the  proposition   that  the
right to elect and the right to be elected is a statutory
right and that the mode and manner of election to any
post could be different from the scheme of removal of a
person from that post. xxx xxx xxx”
(emphasis supplied)
29. The High Court had  also adverted to the decision of the
Karnataka   High   Court   in  State   of   Karnataka   and   Ors.
(supra). Even this decision will be of no avail. For, the High
Court   considered   the   specific   provisions   contained   in   the
Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 and construed them to
mean that they expressly exclude the right to participate in the
proceedings and vote on a ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the
Adhyaksha or Up­Adhyaksha.   The observations in the said
decision,   therefore,   are   contextual   and   in   reference   to   the
express provision in the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act in the
36
form   of   Sections   120(2),   140(3),   159(2)   and   179(3).   As
aforesaid,   the   provisions   in   the   Regulation   under
consideration in no way exclude the MP, muchless expressly,
from participating in the special meeting and vote on the ‘No
Confidence Motion’. As a matter of fact, the provision in the
Regulation   under   consideration   is   an   inclusive   one   and
explicitly   permits   all   (total)   members   to   participate   in   the
special meeting and vote on the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against
the Pramukh or Up­Pramukh, as the case may be. 
30. A   priori,   the   argument   of   Mr.   Lekhi   that   the
interpretation will offend the principle of  ut res magis valeat
quam pereat  and make   Article 243C(5)(b) unworkable, does
not   commend   us.   As   aforesaid,   Article   243C   makes   no
mention   about   the   manner   and   mode   by   which   the
Chairperson of the Panchayat Samiti can be removed by way
of a ‘No Confidence Motion’.   Whereas, the State Legislature
has been empowered to make a law on that subject. As is
noticed from the stated Regulation, the same explicitly deals
with   the   mechanism   for   moving   a   ‘No   Confidence   Motion’
37
against the Pramukh or Up­Pramukh, as the case may be; and
more  particularly,  as  per  the  rules  framed under  the  said
Regulation.  The validity of the said provisions has not been
put  in   issue.  In  such  a  situation,  the  argument  regarding
constitutional silence or its efficacy need not detain us. For the
same reason, we do not wish to dilate on the exposition in
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. Vs. Union of India and
Ors.3
,  Bhanumati   and   Ors.   Vs.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh
through   its  Principal  Secretary  and  Ors.4
,   Usha  Bharti
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.5 and Delhi Transport
Corporation Vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors.6
 
31. Learned   ASG   has   invited   our   attention   also   to   the
decision   in  Vipulbhai   M.   Chaudhary   Vs.   Gujarat
Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and Ors.7
,
dealing with the question of permissibility of removal of the
Chairperson/elected office bearers by motion of no confidence.
The exposition in the said decision, that if a person has been
3
  (2017) 10 SCC 1 (page 516­519)
4
  (2010) 12 SCC 1 (para 51)
5
  (2014) 7 SCC 663 (para 34)
6
  (1991) Supp.(1) SCC 600 (para 255)
7
  (2015) 8 SCC 1 (para 20)
38
elected to an office through democratic process and when such
person  loses the confidence of the representatives who elected
him,   then   those   representatives   should   necessarily   have   a
democratic right to remove such an office bearer in whom they
do not have confidence,  will not take the matter any further
in the wake of express provisions contained in the Regulation
of 1994 and the Rules of 1997, to which we have elaborately
adverted hitherto.
32. For   the   same   reason,   even   the   decision   in  Pratap
Chandra Mehta Vs. State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh
and Ors.8
,  will be of no avail for interpreting or applying the
provisions   in   the   Regulation   and   the   Rules   under
consideration. Our attention was also invited to the decision in
Mohan Lal Tripathi Vs. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly
and   Ors.9
  Emphasis   was   placed   on   the   observations   in
paragraph 4 of this decision. As a matter of fact, the dictum in
this decision would reinforce the view that we have taken, as it
is   observed   in   the   said   paragraph   that   a   provision   in   the
8
  (2011) 9 SCC 573 (para 22, 26, 46)
9
  (1992) 4 SCC 80 (para 4)
39
statute for recall of an elected representative has to be tested
not on general or vague notions but on practical possibility
and electoral feasibility of entrusting the power of recall to a
body which is representative in character and is capable to
projecting the views of the electorate. We have already noted
that the category of persons referred to in Section 107(3) of the
Regulation   are   also,   in   one   sense,   elected   representatives
(though not by direct election from territorial constituencies in
the   Panchayat  area)  and,  therefore,  their  participation  and
voting   on   the   ‘No   Confidence   Motion’   has   been   expressly
permitted by the Regulation and the Rules. That cannot be
undermined  on the basis of the common law principle, so long
as the governing statutory provisions are in the field.
33. For the above reasons, we conclude that the Division
Bench committed manifest error in setting aside the decision
of the Executive Officer dated 2nd January, 2017 declaring that
the meeting stood dissolved for want of quorum.  Instead, we
uphold the said decision of the Executive Officer having held
that the quorum of the special meeting ought to be of not less
40
than two­thirds of the “total number of membership of the
Panchayat   Samiti”   which   includes   all   the   members   of   the
Panchayat Samiti ­ be it directly elected or ex­officio members,
as the case may be. So understood, the quorum of the special
meeting has been justly recorded as four members. However,
as only three members had remained present at the scheduled
time and place, the Executive Officer had no option except to
dissolve the meeting convened on 2nd January, 2017.  For the
same   reason,   the   motion   of   no   confidence   against   the
appellant, in law, could not have proceeded further.  
34. Resultantly,   the   follow   up   action   taken   against   the
appellant, asking him to step down, therefore, also would be
non est  in law. This Court, vide order dated 15th  January,
2018, had made it clear that the consequential election to fill
in the vacancy arisen due to removal of the appellant, would
be subject to the outcome of this petition. Accordingly, we hold
that all steps taken after the order of the Executive Officer
dated 2nd January, 2017 be treated as non est  in terms of this
order. 
41
35. As a result, we allow this  appeal, set aside the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court in M.A. No.26 of
2017,   and   instead,   we   dismiss   the   writ   petition   filed   by
respondent   No.6,   and   to   do   complete   justice,   we   direct
restitution of the appellant to the post of Pramukh of the Little
Andaman Panchayat  Samiti as his  tenure would otherwise
have expired in September, 2020. The District Administration
shall take follow up steps forthwith and ensure compliance of
the directions not later than one week from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order and submit compliance report in the
Registry of this Court. 
36. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No order as to
costs. All pending applications stand disposed of.
…………………………..….J.
        (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
       (Ajay Rastogi)
New Delhi;
May 01, 2019.

Doctrine of blending of properties in joint family properties = Even the reasons given by the High Court that as the loans were taken on the suit properties for borewell, crop loan, electric motor pump set loan, jewel loan by all the three joint family members, namely Sengoda Gounder, Ramasamy and Subramanian and, therefore, there was a blending of the suit properties into join family properties also, cannot be accepted. As all the three were residing together and some loans might have been taken by the family members residing together, by that itself, it cannot be said that there was a blending of the suit properties into joint family properties. The law on the aspect of blending is well settled that property separate or self­acquired of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein; but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be established. Clear intention to abandon the separate rights in the property must be proved. Even abandonment cannot be inferred from mere allowing other family members also to use the property or utilisation of income of the separate property out of generosity to support the family members. At this stage, it is required to be noted that there was a serious dispute regarding who repaid the loan. It was the plaintiff who claimed that he only discharged that loan, however, the defendant Subramanian contended that the loan was discharged by Sengoda Gounder from out of the income derived by him from the suit properties itself. In any case, when on appreciation of evidence on record including the documentary evidence which came to be reappreciated by the High Court, both the Courts below came to the conclusion that there was no blending of the suit properties into joint family properties, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the CPC, is not justified in reversing those findings which were on appreciation of evidence on record.

    Reportable
        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4536­4537  OF 2019
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) NOS.31125­26 of 2013)
S.Subramanian                                    ..Appellant
             Versus
S. Ramasamy Etc. Etc.                                        ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.
2. As common question of law and facts arise in both
these appeals and as such arise out of the impugned common
Judgment   and   Order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   both   these
appeals   are   being   decided   and   disposed   of   together   by   this
common Judgment and Order.
1
3.  Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
common   Judgment   and   Order   passed   by   the   High   Court   of
Judicature at Madras in Second Appeal Nos.4 and 5 of 2009 by
which the High Court while exercising powers under Section 100
of the CPC has allowed the said Second Appeals and has quashed
and set aside the Judgement and Decree passed by the Trial
court as well as the First Appellate Court dismissing the suits
and   consequently   has   decreed   the   suits   preferred   by   the
respondent herein­original plaintiff, the original defendant has
preferred the present appeals.
4. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as
under :
That   the   original   plaintiff   (Respondent   No.1   herein)­S.
Ramasamy initially filed a suit being OS No.10 of 2006 in respect
of the immovable properties described in the schedule of plaint to
restrain original defendant No.2 (appellant herein) from alienating
or encumbering or creating any kind of document in respect of
plaintiff’s common one­third share of the suit properties, till final
partition takes place between the plaintiff and original defendant
No.2 by metes and bounds by a decree of permanent injunction.
2
That the said suit was filed by the original plaintiff against his
father Sengoda Gounder (died) as well as his younger brother
Subramanian. That during the pendency of the said suit, the
same plaintiff­Ramasamy filed a suit being OS No.19 of 2005
against   his   younger   brother   Subramanian   and   his   father
Sengoda Gounder for partition of the suit properties. It was the
case on behalf of the original plaintiff that the plaintiff and his
father and his younger brother constituted a Hindu Joint Family
which owned ancestral properties. It was further the case on
behalf of the plaintiff that the father of the plaintiff, namely,
Sengoda Gounder, by way of settlement, got the suit properties,
vide Ex­A1 dated 07.04.1956­the Settlement Deed  executed by
one Kumarasamy Gounder in favour of Sengoda Gounder. It was
the case on behalf of the plaintiff that since that time, the suit
properties along with the ancestral properties were treated as
joint   family   properties   and   all   the   three   coparceners were
enjoying them together. It was alleged that since the father and
the younger brother of the plaintiff, in collusion with each other
were   attempting   to   alienate   the   suit   properties,   the   first
injunction suit (OS No.19 of 2005) was filed.
3
4.1 The   suit   was   resisted   by   the   original   defendant­younger
brother of the plaintiff Ramasamy. It was the case on behalf of
the original defendant that no joint family at all ever existed
amongst Sengoda Gounder and his two sons, namely Ramasamy
and  Subramanian. That  the suit properties were obtained by
Sengoda Gounder as per Ex­A1­the Settlement Deed during the
year   1956   as   his   self­acquired   properties.   That   Sengoda
Gounder’s   sons,   namely   Ramasamy   and   Subramanian   had
nothing to   do   with   the   suit   properties   and   they   had   no
proprietary   right   or   share   in   that   and   that   they   were   never
treated as joint family properties. It was the specific case on
behalf   of   the   defendant   that,   in   fact,   the   Sengoda   Gounder,
during his lifetime, executed two settlement deeds Ex­ A13 and
A14   in   favour   of   Subramanian   and   subsequently   he   also
executed   Ex­B24,   a   will   dated   08.11.2004   in   favour   of
Subramanian. It was the case on behalf of the defendant that as
such, Subramanian­the defendant became absolute owner of the
suit properties. It was also contended on behalf of the defendant
that the second suit is also barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. It
was   the case on behalf of the defendant that before filing the
injunction   suit   (first   suit)   the   plaintiff   issued   notice   seeking
4
partition and despite the same he initially filed the injunction
suit   only   and   thereafter,   without   any   rhyme   or   reason   and
without obtaining any permission from the Court at the time of
filing the injunction suit to file a partition suit subsequently, he
simply filed the second suit, which was barred by Order 2 Rule 2
of CPC.
4.2 That the Trial Court framed the issues. Both the suits were
tried jointly. The plaintiff­Ramasamy examined himself as PW1
along with PWs 2 to 4 and Exs. A1 to A46 were brought on
record. Subramanian­the defendant examined himself as DW1
along with DWs 2 to 4 and he brought on record Exs. B1 to B31.
That thereafter, on appreciation of evidence, the learned Trial
Court dismissed both the suits. The appeals by the unsuccessful
plaintiff  came  to  be  dismissed  by  the  learned  First  Appellate
Court.
4.3 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   common
Judgment   and   Order   passed   by   the   First   Appellate   Court
dismissing the appeals and confirming the Judgment and Decree
passed   by   the   learned   Trial   Court   dismissing   the   suits,   the
original plaintiff filed two second appeals before the High Court.
5
The High Court formulated and framed the following questions of
law as substantial questions of law :
“(1)   Whether   both   the   Courts   below   were
justified in holding that the generosity shown by
Sengoda Gounder should not be treated as an
act   of   blending   of   the   sit   properties   with   the
ancestral   properties   and   whether   the   Courts
below  were  justified  in  ignoring  the  factum  of
describing   the   properties   found   in   Ex.A1   as
“Pidhirajyam”   (Ancestral   property)   and   also
Exs.A19, 24, 45 and 46 and in deciding the lis by
holding   as   though   there   was   no   blending   or
treating   the   suit   properties   as   joint   family
properties?
(2) Whether the courts below were justified in
upholding Exs.A13 and A14­the settlement deeds
and Ex.B24­the Will as valid, even though those
documents   according   to   the   plaintiff   were   not
allegedly   proved   by   the   propounder   of   those
documents as per law?
(3) Whether the Courts below were justified in
rendering judgment, without referring to Order 2
Rule 2 of CPC despite a plea taken in that regard
in the written statement?
(4) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in
the judgments of both the fora below?”
That thereafter, by the impugned Judgment and Order and
after   re­appreciating   the   entire   evidence   on   record,   the   High
Court has answered the aforesaid questions of law/substantial
questions of law as under :
6
“Substantial Question of Law (1) is decided to the
effect   that   both   the   Courts   below   were   not
justified in holding that the generosity shown by
Sengoda Gounder should not be treated as an
act of blending of the suit properties with the
ancestral properties and the Courts below were
not justified in ignoring the factum of describing
the properties found in Ex.A1 as “Pidhirajyam”
(Ancestral property) and also Exs. A19, 24, 45
and 46 in deciding the lis by holding as though
there   was   no   blending   or   treating   the   suit
property as a joint family property.
Substantial Question of Law No.(2) is decided to
the effect that the courts below were justified in
upholding the execution of Exs.A13 and A14­ the
settlement deeds and Ex.A24 the Will, however,
in view of my discussion supra Sengoda Gounder
had   no   competence   to   execute   the   settlement
deeds treating the suit property as self­acquired
property in entirely, but his 1/3rd  share could
only be considered as the one relinquished by
him in favour of the remaining two coparceners
namely, his sons. Wherefore, the suit property
shall be divided into two shares. The plaintiff and
the defendant shall be entitled to half share each
in the suit property.
Substantial Question of Law No.(3) is decided to
the effect that the Courts below were justified in
rendering judgment, without referring to Order 2
Rule 2 of CPC, in view of my finding supra that
the   cause   of   action   for   seeking   partition   is   a
continuing one.”
Consequently, the High Court has allowed both the appeals
and set aside common Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court as
well as the First Appellate Court and has directed to draw the
7
preliminary decree for partition allotting half share each in favour
of the plaintiff and the defendant.
4.4 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
Judgment and Order passed by the High Court by which, while
exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court
has re­appreciated the entire evidence on record and has set
aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below, the
original defendant has preferred the present appeals.
5. Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate has appeared on
behalf of the appellant­original defendant and Shri V Prabhakar,
learned   Advocate   has   appeared   on   behalf   of   the   Respondent
No.1­original plaintiff.
6. Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
the original defendant has vehemently submitted that in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the High Court has manifestly
committed a grave error in allowing the appeals and interfering
with the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below.
6.1 It is vehemently submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that by
passing the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has
8
exceeded in its jurisdiction while exercising powers under Section
100 of the CPC.
6.2 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that as
held by this Court in catena of decisions and even as per Section
100 of the CPC, while exercising powers under Section 100 of the
CPC, the High Court is not required to re­appreciate the entire
evidence on record as if the High Court is deciding the first
appeal.
6.3 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that the
substantial questions of law framed by the High Court cannot be
said to be the substantial questions of law at all. It is submitted
that Section 100 of the CPC provides for a second appeal only on
the substantial questions of law. It is submitted that even second
appeal is not required to be entertained on question of law only.
It is submitted that the question of law must be a substantial
question of law and not mere a question of law. It is submitted
that the substantial questions of law formulated and framed by
the High Court, while deciding the second appeals, cannot be
9
said to be substantial questions of law at all. It is submitted that
on the face of it, even the substantial questions of law formulated
and framed by the High Court, are the questions of fact. It is
submitted, therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error
in allowing the Second Appeals.
6.4 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that even
otherwise, the  impugned Judgment and Order passed by the
High Court cannot be sustained in as much as while exercising
powers under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court has reappreciated   the   entire   evidence   on   record,   which   is   wholly
impermissible. It is submitted that so far as the question of fact
is concerned, the First Appellate Court is the final Court on facts.
It is submitted that unless and until the findings recorded are
found to be perverse and/or contrary to the evidence on record,
the High Court would not be justified in upsetting such findings
recorded   by   the   Courts   below,   more   particularly,   the   First
Appellate Court. It is submitted that in the present case, if we see
the entire Judgment and Order passed by the High Court, the
High Court has re­appreciated the entire evidence on record and
10
has given its own conclusion and findings and thereafter has
interfered with the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts
below, which were on appreciation of evidence, which is wholly
impermissible. In support of his above submissions and on the
scope   and   ambit   of   the   jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   while
deciding   the   second   appeal   under   Section   100   of   the   CPC,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has heavily
relied   upon   the   decisions   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Panchugopal  Barua  v.  Umesh  Chandra  Goswami,  (1997)  4
SCC   713;  Kondiba   Dagadu   Kadam  v.  Savitribai   Sopan
Gujar,  (1999)  3  SCC  722;  Ishwar  Dass  Jain  v.  Sohan  Lal,
(2000) 1 SCC 434.
6.5 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that even
otherwise the grounds on which the High Court has held that
there   was   blending   of   the   suit   properties   with   the   ancestral
properties, are not sustainable.
6.6 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   original   defendant   that
admittedly   and     even   as   per   the   High   Court   also,   the   suit
11
properties   were   self­acquired   properties   of   Sengoda   Gounder
(father) because those properties were obtained by him not from
his direct male ancestors but from his mother’s sister’s husband.
It   is   submitted   that   therefore,   merely   because   as   Sengoda
Gounder and his two sons were residing together and some loan
on land might have been taken by all of them, it cannot be said
that there was a blending of the suit properties with the ancestral
properties by Sengoda Gounder. It is submitted that it was the
specific   case   on   behalf   of   the   defendant   that   the   loan   was
repaid/discharged by Sengoda Gounder from out of the income
derived by him from the suit property itself.
6.7 It is further submitted by Shri Siddharth Naidu, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that the
fact   that   the   father­Sengoda   Gounder,   during   his   lifetime,
executed   two   settlement   deeds   Exhibits   A13   &   A14   and
subsequently   he   also   executed   Exhibit   B24,   a   will   dated
08.11.2004, the same is suggestive of the fact that there was no
intention   of   the   father­Sengoda   Gounder   to   blend   the   suit
properties with the joint family properties. It is submitted that as
such the High Court has specifically observed and held that the
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Courts   below   were   justified   in   upholding   the   execution   of
Exhibits A13 & A14 ­ the Settlement Deeds and Exhibit B24 ­the
Will. It is submitted that however, thereafter the High Court has
erred in holding that the Sengoda Gounder had no competence to
execute the Settlement Deeds treating the suit property as selfacquired  property in entirely, but his one­third share could only
be considered as the one relinquished by him in favour of the
remaining two coparceners namely his sons.
6.8 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above
decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appeals
and quash and set aside the impugned Judgement and Order
passed   by   the   High   Court   and   consequently   restore   the
Judgement and Decree passed by the Courts below dismissing
the suits.
7. Shri V. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the   original   plaintiff   while   opposing   the   present   appeals   has
vehemently submitted that as such the High Court was cautious
of   its   limitations   while   deciding   the   Second   Appeals   under
Section 100 of the CPC. It is submitted that however, as the High
Court   found   that   both   the   Court   below   have   not   properly
13
appreciated the relevant material and evidence on record, more
particularly,   Exhibit   A1   and   also   Exhibits   A19,24,45,   &   46,
thereafter   the   High   Court   has   rightly   held   that   there   was   a
blending   of   the   suit   properties   with   the   joint   family
properties/ancestral properties by Sengoda Gounder.
7.1 It   is   submitted   by   Shri   V.   Prabhakar,   learned   counsel
appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff that cogent reasons
have   been   given   by   the   High   Court   while   holding   that   the
generosity shown by Sengoda Gounder should be treated as an
act   of   blending   of   the   suit   properties   with   the   ancestral
properties/joint family properties.
7.2 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   V.   Prabhakar,   learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff that after
considering the  Sale  Deed  dated 05.02.1975­Exhibit  A10 and
Sale Deed dated 25.03.1977­Exhibit A2, by which some of the
properties   specified   in   Exhibit   A1­Settlement   Deed   dated
07.04.1956, were sold treating the same as ancestral properties,
the   High   Court   has   rightly   held   that   thereafter   there   was   a
blending   of   suit   properties   with   the   ancestral   properties   by
Sengoda Gounder and all the properties specified in Exhibit A1­
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Settlement Deed dated 07.04.1956 were treated as joint family
properties. It is submitted that thereafter and having found so,
the High Court has rightly held that once there was blending of
the   suit   properties   with   the   ancestral   properties   by   Sengoda
Gounder, thereafter it was not open for him and/or Sengoda
Gounder had no competence to execute the settlement deeds
and/or will treating the suit properties as self­acquired properties
in entirely.
7.3 Now, so far as the submissions made by the learned counsel
appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellants   that  while   passing  the
impugned   Judgment   and   Order,   the   High   Court   has   reappreciated   the   entire   evidence   on   record   is   concerned,   it   is
submitted by Shri V. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing on
behalf   of   the   original   plaintiff   that   while   discussing   and/or
deciding   the   substantial   questions   of   law,   the   High   Court   is
bound to consider and/or appreciate the evidence on record and
to reach to a conclusion that the findings recorded by the Courts
below are perverse or contrary to the evidence on record. It is
submitted therefore that appreciation of evidence by the High
15
Court while deciding the second appeals in exercise of its powers
under section 100 of the CPC, is permissible.
7.4 Making the above submissions it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeals. 
8. Heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective
parties at length.
8.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such, both,
the   learned   Trial   Court   as   well   as   the   First   Appellate   Court
dismissed the suits, more particularly, the suit for partition filed
by the original plaintiff by holding that the suit properties were
not   ancestral   properties   of   Sengoda   Gounder   but   were   selfacquired properties of Sengoda Gounder. That on appreciation of
evidence,   both   the   Courts   below   specifically   came   to   the
conclusion   that,   as   such,   there   was   no   blending   of   the   suit
properties with the ancestral properties by Sengoda Gounder.
However, the said findings recorded by both the Courts below
have been upset and set aside by the High Court, while deciding
the second appeals in exercise of its powers under Section 100 of
the CPC. We have gone through and considered the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate
16
Court.   On   appreciation   of   entire   evidence   on   record,   more
particularly,   the   documentary   evidence   which   came   to   be
considered by the High Court as Exhibit A1 and Exhibits A 19,
24, 45 and 46, thereafter both the Courts below came to the
conclusion that there was no blending or treating of the suit
property as a joint family property. Despite the above, the High
Court while passing the impugned common Judgment and Order,
has re­appreciated the entire evidence on record including the
documentary evidence which as such were considered by both
the Courts below and has upset the findings of facts recorded by
both the Courts below on the blending of suit property as a joint
family property and has given its own findings, which in exercise
of   its   powers   under   Section   100   of   the   CPC   is   wholly
impermissible. As per catena of decisions of this Court, while
deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the
High Court is not required to re­appreciate the entire evidence on
record and to come to its own conclusion and the High Court
cannot set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts
below when the findings recorded by both the Courts below were
on appreciation of evidence. That is exactly what is done by the
17
High   Court   in   the   present   case   while   deciding   the   second
appeals, which is not permissible under the law.
8.2 Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per catena
of decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100
of the CPC, the Second Appeal would be maintainable only on
substantial question of law.  The Second Appeal does not lie on
question   of   facts   or   of   law.   The   existence   of   ‘a   substantial
question   of   law’   is   a  sine   qua   non  for   the   exercise   of   the
jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held
by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a
second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court
cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate
Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower
Court were erroneous being:
(i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable
law;                             
OR
(ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court;
OR
(iii)  Based on in­admissible evidence or no evidence.
It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision
that if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a
18
judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from
an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in
Second Appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could
have   decided   differently   is   not   a   question   of   law   justifying
interference in Second Appeal.
8.3 When a substantial question of law can be said to have
arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in the
case of Ishwar Dass Jain (Supra). In the aforesaid decision, this
Court has specifically observed and held :
 “Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment,
it  is essential  for  the  High  Court  to  formulate  a
substantial question of law and it is not permissible
to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court
without doing so. There are two situations in which
interference with findings of fact is permissible. The
first one is when material or relevant evidence is not
considered which, if considered, would have led to
an   opposite   conclusion.   The   second   situation   in
which   interference   with   findings   of   fact   is
permissible is where a finding has been arrived at
by   the   appellate   court   by   placing   reliance   on
inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an
opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the
above situations, a substantial question of law can
arise.”
8.4 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions   and   the   substantial   questions   of   law
19
formulated/framed and answered by the High Court, reproduced
hereinabove, it cannot be said that the said questions of law can
be said to be substantial questions of law. All can be said to be
questions of law or questions of fact and cannot be said to be
Substantial Questions of law.
8.5 As   observed   hereinabove,   while   passing   the   impugned
Judgment and Order, the High Court has re­appreciated the
entire evidence on record as if the High Court was deciding the
first   appeal.   By   the   impugned   Judgment   and   Order,   while
exercising the powers under Section 100 of the CPC and on reappreciation of entire evidence on record, the High Court has set
aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below on
blending of the suit properties with the joint family properties.
The   same   is   wholly   impermissible.   So   far   as   the   facts   are
concerned, the First Appellate Court is the final court and unless
and until the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below are
found to be manifestly perverse and/or contrary to the evidence
on record, the High Court would not be justified in setting aside
the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below which were on
appreciation of evidence on record. It is not permissible for the
20
High Court to  re­appreciate the entire evidence on record and
come   to   its   own   finding   when   the   findings   recorded   by   the
Courts below, more particularly, the First Appellate Court are on
appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the procedure adopted by
the High Court while deciding the Second Appeals, is beyond the
scope and ambit of exercise of its powers under Section 100 of
the CPC.
9. Even otherwise, on merits also, the High Court has erred in
holding that there was blending of the suit properties with the
joint family properties by Sengoda Gounder. It is an admitted
position that and even as observed and held by the High Court,
the   suit   properties   were   self­acquired   properties   of   Sengoda
Gounder   pursuant   to   the   Settlement   Deed   Exhibit   A1   dated
07.04.1956 as the properties were obtained by Sengoda Gounder
not from his direct male ancestors but from his mother’s sister’s
husband. High Court also held that when some of the properties
were sold, some of these properties specified in Exhibit A1 dated
07.04.1956­Settlement Deed were sold, in the recitals it was
mentioned that the properties sold for urgent necessity of family
expenses and farm expenses and it was mentioned  that the
21
same properties were belonging to them jointly through their
ancestors However, considering the documentary evidence, more
particularly, the settlement deeds Exhibits A13 and A14 and
Exhibit B24, Will, executed by the Sengoda Gounder himself, by
which the same properties were given to the original defendanthis   son   Subramanian,   the   intention   of   the   father­Sengoda
Gounder was very clear and the suit properties were treated as
the self­acquired properties and not the joint family properties.
9.1 Even the reasons given by the High Court that as the loans
were taken on the suit properties for borewell, crop loan, electric
motor pump set loan, jewel loan by all the three joint family
members,   namely   Sengoda   Gounder,   Ramasamy   and
Subramanian and, therefore, there was a blending of the suit
properties into join family properties also, cannot be accepted.
As all the three were residing together and some loans might
have been taken by the family members residing together, by
that itself, it cannot be said that there was a blending of the suit
properties into joint family properties.   The law on the aspect of
blending is well settled that property separate or self­acquired of
a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the
22
character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by
the   owner   into   the   common   stock   with   the   intention   of
abandoning his separate claim therein; but to establish such
abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be
established.  Clear intention to abandon the separate rights in
the property must be proved.   Even abandonment cannot be
inferred from mere allowing other family members also to use
the property or utilisation of income of the separate property out
of generosity to support the family members. At this stage, it is
required to be noted that there was a serious dispute regarding
who repaid the loan. It was the plaintiff who claimed that he only
discharged   that   loan,   however,   the   defendant   Subramanian
contended that the loan was discharged by Sengoda Gounder
from out of the income derived by him from the suit properties
itself. In any case, when on appreciation of evidence on record
including   the   documentary   evidence   which   came   to   be   reappreciated by the High Court, both the Courts below came to
the conclusion that there was no blending of the suit properties
into joint family properties, the High Court in exercise of its
powers   under   Section   100   of   the   CPC,   is   not   justified   in
23
reversing those findings which were on appreciation of evidence
on record. 
10 In view of the above and as per the reasons stated above,
both   the   present   appeals   are   allowed.   Impugned   common
Judgment and Order passed by the High Court in S.A. Nos. 4
and 5 of 2009 is quashed and set aside and common Judgment
and Decree passed by the Trial Court dismissing the suits are
hereby restored. However, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, there shall be no order as to costs.
……………………………….J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
New Delhi; ……………………………….J.
May 01, 2019.                 [M.R. SHAH] 
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