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Sunday, September 2, 2018

“45. Death­cum­Retirement Gratuity.­(1)(a)A Government servant, who has completed five years’ qualifying service and has become eligible for service gratuity or pension under rule 43, shall, on his retirement be granted death­cum­retirement gratuity as in the table below for each completed six monthly period of qualifying service, subject to a maximum of fifteen times, the emoluments:­” - The judgment of the High Court dated 01.04.2015 is set aside and the Civil Appeals filed by the appellants are allowed. (2) The respondents are directed to sanction superannuation pension to appellants K. Anbazhagan and P.G. Rajagopal in accordance with 1978 Rules. (3) The respondents are directed to sanction compensation pension to the appellants, namely, Selvi G. Savithri, R. Radha and A.S. Hassina. (4) All the appellants are entitled for payment of gratuity in accordance with 1978 Rules. (5) The respondents are also directed to permit encashment of earned leave to the credit of the appellants subject to a maximum of 240 days. 52 (6) All above retiral benefits be computed and paid to the appellants within a period of two months from today. In the event payments are made after two months, the appellants shall be entitled for such payments alongwith the simple interest @ 7% per annum. (7) The parties shall bear their own costs

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REPORTABLE
  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8216­8217 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 24328­24329/2015)
K. ANBAZHAGAN & ANR.                     … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS & ANR.              … RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8218­8221 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 26929­26932/2015)
R. RADHA & ANR.                     … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.               … RESPONDENT(S)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8222 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5467/2016)
P.G. RAJAGOPAL                            … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL
HIGH COURT AT MADRAS & ANR.              … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. These   three   appeals   have   been   filed   against   the   common
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judgment   of   Madras   High   Court   dated   01.04.2015   by   which
judgment,   writ   petitions   filed   by   the   appellants   have   been
dismissed.     The   questions   of   facts   and   law   raised   in   the
appeals being similar all the appeals have been heard together
and are being decided by this common judgment.
3. There   are   five   appellants   in   these   three   appeals,   who
were appointed as Fast Track Judges from the Bar in the State
of   Tamil   Nadu,   consequent   to   creation   of   Fast   Track   Courts
under the Eleventh Finance Commission Report of the Government
of India.   This Court vide its judgment dated 06.05.2002 in
Brij Mohan Lal Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2002) 5 SCC 1 had
issued various directions with regard to appointment and other
matters pertaining to Fast Track Courts under Eleventh Finance
Commission for setting up of 1734 Fast Track Courts in various
States of the country.
4. After   creation   of   Fast   Track   Courts   under   Eleventh
Finance Commission, the Madras High Court vide its order dated
21.11.2001 issued an order pertaining terms and conditions for
the Additional District Judges for the Fast Track Courts and
the   instructions   thereon.     The   High   Court   vide   its
Notification   dated   19.12.2001   invited   applications   from   the
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practicing   Advocates   for   the   post   of   Additional   District
Judges (Fast Track Court) on ad hoc basis for a period of five
years.  The terms of the notification provided that applicants
should   have   completed   45   years   of   age   and   shall   not   have
reached 55 years as on 01.01.2002.                                         
5. The High Court vide its order dated 14.02.2002 appointed
the appellants, who all were advocates as Additional District
and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Courts) on Ad hoc Basis.  The
initial ad hoc appointment of all the appellants was for five
years,   which   was   extended.     All   the   appellants   were
subsequently   relieved   from   their   assignments.     In   the   year
2011/2012, appellants also filed different writ petitions for
their absorption as Additional District and Sessions Judge in
the regular cadre, which writ petitions were dismissed by the
High   Court.     After   the   orders   rejecting   the   claim   of   the
appellants   for   absorption   in   regular   cadre   of   Additional
District Judges, the appellants filed representations praying
for grant of pension and other retiral benefits, which were
rejected by the High Court.   Second round of litigation was
initiated   by   the   appellants   claiming   retiral   benefits
including  pension, gratuity, and leave encashment, which has
been dismissed by the High Court by its common judgment dated
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01.04.2015.     Apart     from   above   common   facts   regarding   the
appellants, few individual facts pertaining to their period of
working and some other facts need to be separately noted in
each appeal, which are as follows:­
Civil   Appeal   Nos.   ___________   of   2018       
(arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 24328­24329 of 2015)
6. There   are   two   appellants   namely,   (i)   K.   Anbazhagan   and
(ii) G. Savithri in this appeal.   Both were appointed as  Ad
hoc  Fast   Track   Judges   by   the   High   Court   order   dated
14.02.2002.     The   appellant   No.1   joined   on   23.02.2002 and
appellant   No.2   joined   on   24.02.2002.   The   appellant   No.1,
before joining as Fast Track Judge, was working as Additional
Public Prosecutor since 1996. The appellant No.1 resigned from
his post of Additional Public Prosecutor for joining as Fast
Track Judge.   The appointment of appellant No.1 was extended
upto 31.05.2011, on which date he was attaining 60 years of
age.     The   appellant   No.1   was   relieved   from   his   assignment
w.e.f. 31.05.2011 after putting in total period of 9 years, 5
months   and   5   days   to   his   credit.   The   appellant   No.2   was
relieved from services by the Registrar General of the High
Court by order dated 25.04.2012.  Appellant No.2 thus had put
in service of more than 10 years as Additional District Judge
(Fast   Track   Court).     The   appellant   No.1   having   submitted
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representation   for   grant   of   pension   and   other   retiral
benefits,   an   order   dated   11.10.2012   was   issued   by   the
Registrar General of High Court of Madras by which the claim
of   appellant   No.1   for   grant   of   pension   and   other   retiral
benefits has been rejected.  The appellant No.2 had also made
a   representation   for   grant   of   pension   and   other   retiral
benefits, which too was rejected.  Writ Petition No. 5187 of
2014   was   filed   by   appellant   No.2   whereas   Writ   Petition   No.
23532 of 2014 was filed by the appellant No.2, which  has been
dismissed by the common judgment dated 01.04.2015.
Civil   Appeal   Nos.   ___________   of   2018
(arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 26929­26932 of 2015)
7. This appeal has been filed by two appellants namely R.
Radha and A.S. Hassina.  Both the appellants were appointed by
the   same   appointment   order   dated   14.02.2002.   Both   the
appellants   joined   on   23.02.2002.     Both   the   appellants   were
relieved by order dated 25.04.2012 of the Registrar General.
After   unsuccessfully   challenging   the   relieving   order   dated
25.04.2012   in   the   High   Court,   they   also   submitted
representation   dated   14.08.2014   claiming   pension   and   other
retiral benefits.  The representations of the appellants were
rejected on 06.11.2014. The appellant No.1 filed Writ Petition
No. 2756 of 2015 whereas appellant No.2 filed a Writ Petition
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No. 2755 of 2015.  Both the writ petitions have been dismissed
on 01.04.2015.
Civil   Appeal   No.   ___________   of   2018             
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 5467 of 2016)
8. The appellant was also appointed by the same order dated
14.02.2002, in pursuance of which, he joined on 24.02.2002.
On 28.10.2010, the appellant was relieved of his position as
Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) w.e.f. 31.10.2010
on   which   date   he   was   attaining   60   years   of   age.     The
petitioner's claim for pension was rejected on 13.07.2011 by
the High Court. Writ Petition No. 4276 of 2013 was filed by
the appellant praying for quashing the order dated 13.07.2011
and   praying   for   direction   to   pay   pension   and   other   retiral
benefits, which petition has also been rejected on 01.04.2015.
9. We   have   heard   Shri   A.   Mariarputham,   learned   senior
counsel for the appellants and learned counsel appearing for
the High Court as well as the State of Tamil Nadu.
10. Learned senior counsel for the appellants contends that
High   Court   committed   error   in   rejecting   the   claim   of   the
appellants for pension, gratuity and leave encashment on wrong
premise that appellants were contract appointees and they are
not   borne   on   pensionable   establishment.     He   submits   that
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appointment of appellants by direct recruitment from Bar was
on adhoc basis, which is clear from the advertisement inviting
applications for filling the post.  He submits that appellants
are   not   contract   employees   and   on   that   ground   denial   of
retiral benefits is unsustainable.   He further submits that
Fast Track Court Judges were in the same establishment as the
regular   Additional   District   Judges.     They   being   not   in   a
separate or independent establishment, they were clearly borne
on pensionable establishment.   It is further submitted that
ad hoc appointments of Fast Tract Courts were made by both the
sources   i.e.   by   promotion   of   judges   from   lower   division   as
well as from the bar.  There cannot be any dispute that cadre
of   Additional   District   Judges   is   borne   on   pensionable
establishment, hence there cannot be any differentiation with
regard to establishment in which both  ad hoc  appointees were
borne.   All the appellants have completed qualifying service
of   ten   years   under   the   Tamil   Nadu   Pension   Rules,   1978
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “1978   Rules”)   and   were   clearly
entitled for pension and gratuity.   It is further submitted
that before High Court both the claim of gratuity and leave
encashment   were   also   raised   by   the   appellants   but   the   High
Court   did   not   advert   to   the   claim   of   gratuity   or   leave
encashment.     The   appellant   K.   Anbazhagan   was   relieved   on
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31.05.2011 after attaining the age of sixty years, hence he
was   clearly   entitled   for   superannuation   benefits   under   the
1978 Rules.  Learned senior counsel for the appellants further
submits   that   all   the   Fast   Track   Court   Judges,   who   were
appointed from bar were entitled to add additional period to
their service as per Rule 27 as well as in accordance with
judgment of this Court in Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors. Vs.
All India Young Lawyers Association (Regd.) and Ors., (2009)
14 SCC 49.  It is contended that entitlement for  gratuity is
completion of five years of service and none of the appellants
could have been denied the gratuity.  It is further submitted
that   there   was   GPF   deduction   from   the   salary   of   all   the
appellants,   which   also   proves   that   they   were   part   of   the
pensionable establishment and entitled for payment of pension.
11. With   regard   to   appellant   K.   Anbazhagan,   it   is   further
submitted   that   he   has   earlier   worked   as   Additional   Public
Prosecutor, which was not a pensionable post. Rule 11(3) of
1978 Rules, provides that 50% of service in a non­pensionable
post would be added in his service.  Thus, all the appellants
have completed ten years of qualifying service.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the High Court supporting
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the judgment and the order contends that the appellants were
appointed on Fast Track Courts on contract basis.  Fast Track
Courts   cannot   be   said   to   have   been   created   in   pensionable
establishment hence the writ petition of the appellants have
rightly   been   dismissed.   It   is   further   submitted   that
appellant's   claim   for   regularisation   on   post   of   Additional
District Judge had been rejected, which was upheld by the High
Court   vide   its   judgment   dated   20.07.2012.     The   appellants
functioned purely on adhoc basis and were not appointed under
the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitment)
Rules,   1995  nor   were   absorbed   in   any   regular   vacancy   hence
they   are   not   eligible   for   any   retiral   benefits,   which   are
available   to   those   who   were   appointed   by   due   recruitment
process under the above 1995 Rules.  Tenure of the Fast Track
Courts was initially for only five years under the Eleventh
Finance Commission and subsequently extended for another five
years.     Government   of   Tamil   Nadu   had   further   extended   the
tenure  of  courts  for  a period  of  one  year  upto  31.03.2012.
Thereafter vide Government Order dated 26.08.2011, Government
of Tamil Nadu had sanctioned retention of 49 Fast Track Courts
in  the  cadre  of District  Judge  functioning  in  the  State of
Tamil   Nadu.     The   appellants   having   accepted   the   purely
temporary   nature   of   the   post   to   which   they   were   appointed,
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they now cannot contend claiming all the benefits available to
those,   who   have   been   appointed   to   a   substantive   post   by   a
recruitment process.
13. Learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State   of   Tamil   Nadu
while adopting the submissions of the learned counsel for the
High Court has submitted that appellants did not fulfill the
conditions   for   grant   of   pension   and   other   retiral   benefits
under the 1978 Rules, hence their claim was rightly rejected.
14.     We   have   considered   the   submissions   of   the   learned
counsel for the parties and have perused the records.
15. Before we proceed to examine the respective contentions
of   the   parties,   it   is   necessary   to   notice   the   relevant
background   facts   for   creation   of   Fast   Track   Courts   in   the
country   and   manner   and   nature   of   appointments   made.
16. The Eleventh Finance Commission allocated funds for the
purpose of setting up of 1734 Courts in various States to deal
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with   the   long   pending   cases   particularly   sessions   cases.
Consequent to allocation of funds by the Finance Commission,
the State Governments were required to take necessary steps to
establish such courts.  Finance Commission had suggested that
States   may   consider   re­employment   of   retired   judges   for
limited period for the disposal of pending cases.  Fast Track
Courts   scheme   was   challenged   in   different   High   Courts
primarily   on   the   ground   that   there   was   no   constitutional
sanction   for   employment   of   retired   judges   and   effective
guidelines have not been issued.   This Court considered the
controversy after transferring various writ petitions pending
in   the   different   High   Courts   under   Article   139A   of   the
Constitution of India.   The issues pertaining to Fast Track
Courts were decided by this Court in Brij Mohan Lal Vs. Union
of India and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 1.  After noticing the funds
allocated   under   the   Eleventh   Finance   Commission   and   other
respective contentions, this Court issued various directions
in Para 10.  With regard to recruitment on Fast Track Courts,
directions   1   to   4   were   given   in   Para   10,   which   are   as
follows:­
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“10. Keeping in view the laudable objectives with
which   the   Fast   Tract   Courts   Scheme   has   been
conceived   and   introduced,   we   feel   the   following
directions,   for   the   present,   would   be   sufficient
to   take   care   of   initial   teething   problems
highlighted by the parties:
Directions by the Court:                                     
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1. The first preference for appointment of judges
of the Fast Track Courts is to be given by ad­hoc
promotions   from   amongst   eligible   judicial
officers.   While   giving   such   promotion,   the   High
Court shall follow the procedures in force in the
matter   of   promotion   to   such   posts   in
Superior/Higher   Judicial   Services.
2. The second preference in appointments to Fast
Track Courts shall be given to retired judges who
have good service records with no adverse comments
in   their   ACRs,   so   far   as   judicial   acumen,
reputation   regarding   honesty,   integrity   and
character are concerned. Those who were not given
the benefit of two years extension of the age of
superannuation,   shall   not   be   considered   for
appointment.   It   should   be   ensured   that   they
satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 233(2)
and   309   of   the   Constitution.   The   High   Court
concerned shall take a decision with regard to the
minimum­maximum age of eligibility to ensure that
they are physically fit for the work in Fast Track
Courts.
3.   No   Judicial   Officer   who   was   dismissed   or
removed   or   compulsorily   retired   or   made   to   seek
retirement   shall   be   considered   for   appointment
under   the   Scheme.   Judicial   Officers   who   have
sought   voluntary   retirement   after   initiation   of
Departmental   proceedings/inquiry   shall   not   be
considered   for   appointment.
4. The third preference shall be given to members
of the Bar for direct appointment in these Courts.
They   should   be   preferably   in   the   age   group   of
35­45 years, so that they could aspire to continue
against the regular posts if the Fast Track Courts
cease   to   function.   The   question   of   their
continuance   in   service   shall   be   reviewed
periodically   by   the   High   Court   based   on   their
performance.   They   may   be   absorbed   in   regular
vacancies,   if   subsequent   recruitment   takes   place
and their performance in the Fast Track Courts is
found satisfactory. For the initial selection, the
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High Court shall adopt such methods of selection
as are normally followed for selection of members
of   the   Bar   as   direct   recruits   to   the
Superior/Higher Judicial Services.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx”
17. One more direction, which needs to be noticed is Direction
No. 16 where this Court directed that persons appointed under
the Scheme will be governed for service benefits by the rules
and regulations, which are applicable to the members of the
judicial   services   of   the   State   of   equivalent   status.
Direction No. 16 is as follows:­
“16. Persons appointed under the Scheme shall be
governed, for the purpose of leave, reimbursement
of medical expenses. TA/DA and conduct rules and
such   other   service   benefits,   by   the   rules   and
regulations which are applicable to the members of
the Judicial Services of the State of equivalent
status.”
18. In Para 12, States were directed to ensure compliance in
following words:­
“12.   Copies   of   the   judgment   be   sent   by   the
Registry of this Court to each High Court and the
State Government concerned for ensuring compliance
with our directions.”
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19. Even   before   the   aforesaid   directions   were   issued   on
06.05.2002, different High Courts in the country in pursuance
of   Eleventh   Finance   Commission   allocation   proceeded   to   take
steps   for   setting   up   of   the   Fast   Track   Courts.     On   the
recommendations received from the High Court of Madras, the
Government   of   Tamil   Nadu   granted   sanctions   of   post   by   two
Government   orders,   for   30   posts   (dated   03.08.2001)   and   19
posts   (dated   18.12.2001)   respectively.     In   the   present
appeals, we are concerned with appointment of the appellants,
which   were   made   on   19   sanctioned   posts,   hence   we   need   to
notice the Government Order dated 18.12.2001, by which 19 more
Fast Track Courts were sanctioned.   Para 3 of the Government
Order dated 18.12.2011 provides for sanction of posts which is
as follows:­
“3. The   proposals   of   the   High   Court   has   been
examined by the Government and they have decided
to accept them.  The Government accordingly direct
that as proposed by the High Court, 19 Fast Track
Courts be constituted in the places mentioned in
the Annexure to this order.   The Government also
accord sanction for the creation of the following
posts   temporarily   for   a   period   of   one   year   from
the date of appointment.
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Sl. No. Designation of the post Scale of pay
1. District Judge (Addl
District Judge cadre)
15000­18600
2. Translator 5500­9000
3. Assistant 4000­6000
4. Steno Typist 4000­6000
5. Typist 3200­4900
6. Office Assistants 2550­3200
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The   Presiding   Officers   of   these   courts   would   be
the pay drawing officers.” 
20. After   creation   of   the   posts,   High   Court   issued   a
Notification dated 19.12.2001 inviting applications from the
practicing   advocates   for   being   considered   for   the   post   of
Additional   District   Judge   for   Fast   Track   Courts   on  ad   hoc
basis.   Notification   dated   19.12.2001   reads   as   under:­
"Notification No. 159/2001
Applications   are   invited   from   the   practicing
Advocates possessing  the following qualifications
for   being   considered   for   the   post   Additional
District Judge (Fast Track Court) on Ad hoc basis
for a period of 5 years. The post carries a Scale
of Pay of Rs.15000­400­18600.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx”
21. The   appellants   who   were   all   practicing   advocates   and
fulfilling   the   eligibility   as   required   in   the   notification
submitted the applications.  The High Court after calling the
appellants   to   appear   in   interview   sent   a   proposal   to   the
Government recommending 15 names for appointment as Additional
District   Judge.     The   State   Government  by  order   dated
14.02.2002 appointed all the appellants.   Paragraphs 4 and 5
of the order of the State Government dated 14.02.2002 is as
follows:­
18
"4. The Government in consultation with the High
Court   Madras,   hereby   appoint   the   following   15
(Fifteen)   Advocates   as   Additional   District   and
Sessions   Judges   (Fast   Track   Courts)   on  Ad   hoc
Basis subject to the terms and conditions fixed by
the High Court, Madras:­
Thiru/Tmt/Selvi
1. K. Anbazhagan
2. G.K. Bharathi
3. Bhagirathi R Angarajan
4. V.B. Chinnappan
5. R. Duraisamy
6. A. Devaki
7. A.S. Hassina
8. V. Meganathan 
9. S. Mani
10. P. Pandurangan
11. K. Pandurangan
12. R. Radha
13. P.G. Rajagopal
14. M. Sekar &
15. G. Savithri
5. The   above   Additional   District   and   Sessions
Judges will draw a pay of Rs.15,000/­ in the scale
of   Rs.15000­400­18600­   and   other   usual
allowances.”
22. We may first notice the reasons given by the High Court
for rejecting the claim of pension of the appellants. The High
19
Court   has   mainly   given   following   reasons   for   rejecting   the
claim:
1) The Fast Track Courts created under Eleventh Finance
Commission   cannot   be   said   to   have   been   created   in   a
'pensionable establishment'.
2) Rule 11 of 1978 Rules, which provides for commencement
of   qualifying   service   does   not   cover   appointment   on
contractual   basis.   The   appointments   of   appellants   were
appointments   on   contract   basis,   hence   they   are   not
covered by Rule 11 of 1978 Rules.
3)   Division   Bench   of   High   court   in   its   judgment   dated
20.07.2012   rendered   in   Writ   Petition   No.13703­13705   of
2012 treated the appointment of appellants as contractual
appointment.
23. The   first   issue   to   be   answered   is   as   to   whether   the
appointments   of   appellants   were   appointment   on   'pensionable
establishment'   or   not.   The   expression   'pensionable
establishment' is not defined under the 1978 Rules. Rule 2 of
1978   Rules   which   provides   for   application   of   Rules   is   as
follows:­
"2.   Application:­  Save   as   otherwise   provided   in
these   rules,   these   Rules   shall   apply   to   all
Government Servants appointed to Services and posts
20
in connection with the affairs of the State which
are   borne   on   pensionable   establishments,   whether
temporary or permanent, but shall not apply toa)
  Persons   in   causal   and   daily   rated
employment;
b) Persons paid from contingencies;
c)   Persons   employed   on   contract   except   when
the contract provids otherwise;
d) Members of the All­India Services;
e)   Persons   who   are   entitled   to   the   benefits
under   the   Factories   Act,   1948   and   the
Employees   Provident   Fund   Act,   1952   excluding
those who are governed by Statutory Services
Rules and belong to pensionable service."
24. The expression 'pensionable establishment' has been used
in   Rule   2.   Rule   11   sub­Rule   (3)   also   uses   the   expression
'non­pensionable establishment'. An indication in chapter 12
of the Rules i.e. Rule 84 is given that service paid for from
a Local Fund does not qualify for pension which indicates that
services   paid   for   from   a   Local   Fund   are   services   in
'non­pensionable   establishment'.   For   the   purposes   of   this
case, we have to only consider as to whether the establishment
where appellants were appointed and working was a 'pensionable
establishment' or 'non­pensionable establishment'.
25. We   have   noticed   above   the   Government   Order   dated
18.12.2001 by which the State Government created nineteen Fast
21
Track Courts of District Judges(Additional District Judges) in
the   pay   scale   of   Rs.15000­18600.   The   appellants   in   their
appointment Order dated 14.02.2002 were also referred to as
having   been   appointed   as   Additional   District   and   Sessions
Judges (Fast Track Courts) on ad­hoc basis. The appointment
order   further   provided   that   the   appellants   as   Additional
District and Sessions Judges will draw a pay in the scale of
Rs.15000­400­18600 and other usual allowances. The appellants
were appointed in the Judicial establishment of the district
and were part of the Subordinate Courts under the control of
the   High   Court.   Clause   9   of   the   Government   Order   dated
18.12.2001 read as follows:
"9. The expenditure involved in the proposal shall
be   debited   to   2014.00   Administration   of   Justice
­800­other Expenditure­II State Plan – JA Eleventh
Finance Commission– Upgradation and Special Problem
Grant setting up of additional courts for disposal
of long pending cases 0.9 Grants in Adl.03. Other
grants for Specific Scheme (D.P.C.No.2014.00 800 JA
0934)”
26. The payment of salary to the appellants were made from
same   sources   by   which   other   Additional   District   Judges   and
other Judicial Officers of the State were being paid. There is
no indication from any of the material produced before us that
the appellants were appointed on any different establishment
22
than the Judicial establishment of the District.
27. We have noticed above that this Court in  Brij Mohan Lal
Vs. Union of India and others in paragraph 10 of the judgment
has   directed   that   persons   appointed   under   the   Scheme(Fast
Track Courts Scheme) shall be governed, for the purposes of
leave,   reimbursement   of   medical   expenses,   TA/DA   and   conduct
rules   and   such   other   service   benefits,   by   the   rules   and
regulations   which   are   applicable   to   the   members   of   the
judicial services of the State of equivalent status.
28. By   direction   10(16),   this   Court   had   directed   the   State
Governments   to   ensure   compliance,   hence,   the   terms   and
conditions of service of appellants were same as those other
judicial  officers  of  the  State  as  per  Order of  this Court.
High Court in its judgment although observed that Fast Track
Courts   cannot   be   said   to   have   been   created   in   'pensionable
establishment'   but   said   conclusion   has   been   arrived   without
considering relevant materials and without giving any cogent
reasons.   We   thus   are   of   the   view   that   appointment   of
appellants was in 'pensionable establishment'.
23
29. Now, we come to the second reason given by the High Court
that   the   appointments   of   the   appellants   were   contractual
appointments. We have already noticed that the appointments of
the appellants were made against nineteen sanctioned posts of
Additional   District   Judges   by   Government   Order   dated
18.12.2001.   The   notification   which   was   issued   by   the   High
Court   inviting   applications   from   practising   Advocates
mentioned   that   applications   are   invited   from   practising
Advocates   for   being   considered   for   the   post   of   Additional
District Judge (Fast Track Court) on ad­hoc basis for a period
of five years. It further mentioned that the post carries a
Scale   of   Pay   of   Rs.15000­400­18600.   Thus,   the   notification
inviting applications never mentioned that it is a contractual
appointment.   Further,   the   appointment   order   issued   to   the
appellants dated 14.02.2002, in paragraph 3 stated as follows:
"3. Accordingly, the High Court, Madras, has called
for   applications   from   eligible   Advocates   for
filling   up   of   15   posts   of   Additional   District
Judges (Fast Track Courts), conducted interview and
sent proposals to Government recommending 15 names
of Advocates for appointment as Additional District
and   Sessions   Judges(Fast   Track   Courts)   on   ad   hoc
basis.”
The   appointment   order   thus   clearly   mentioned   that   the
appointment is on ad­hoc basis.
24
30. In   service   jurisprudence,   the   appointments   are   made   by
employer   with   different   nomenclature/characteristics.
Appointments   are   made   both   on   permanent   or   temporary   basis
against permanent post or temporary post. The appointment can
also be made on ad­hoc basis on permanent or temporary post.
There   is   one   common   feature   of   appointments   of   permanent,
temporary   or   ad­hoc   appointment   i.e.   those   appointments   are
made against the post whether permanent or temporary. On the
contrary, for contractual appointment, there is no requirement
of   existence   of   any   post.   A   contractual   appointment   is   not
normally   made   against   a   post.   Further,   contractual
appointments are also not normally on Pay Scale. On the mere
fact   that   the   advertisement   as   well   as   the   appointment   was
made   initially   for   a   period   of   five   years,   the   nature   of
appointment of the appellants cannot be termed as contractual
appointment. When a Government servant is contemplated to hold
a certain post for a limited period it is a Tenure Post.
31. The   Fundamental   Rules   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Government
defines   Tenure   Post.   Fundamental   Rule   9(30­A)   defines   the
Tenure post in following manner:
"30­A. Tenure Post means a permanent post which an
25
individual   Government   servant   may   not   hold   for
more than a limited period.”
32. The fact that the advertisement limited the appointment
for   a   period   of   five   years   only   becausse     the   posts   were
contemplated   for   five   years   only,   the   appointment   of   the
appellants   at   best   can   be   said   as   “Tenure   appointment”.
Although   temporary,   ad­hoc   and   contractual   appointments   are
used in contradiction to a regular and permanent appointment
but   between   ad­hoc   appointment   and   contract   appointment,
distinction   is   there   in   service   jurisprudence   and   both   the
expressions   cannot   be   interchangeably   used.   When   the
advertisement against which the appellants were appointed and
the   appointment   order   mentions   the   appointment   as   ad­hoc
appointment, we cannot approve the view of the High Court that
the nature  of  the  appointment  of  the  appellants was only  a
contractual appointment.
33. Now, we come to the third reason given by the High Court.
The Division Bench of the High Court vide its judgment dated
20.07.2012   in   W.P.No.13703­13705/2012   held   that   the
appointment of the petitioners was on contract basis, hence,
the   appointment   has   to   be   treated   as   appointment   on
contractual basis. The judgment of Division Bench of Madras
26
High court in above writ petition has been brought on record
as   Annexure   P­11.   Three   Writ   Petitioners   namely   R.Radha,
A.S.Hassina   and   G.Savithri   had   filed   three   writ   petitions
challenging   the   Order   dated   25.04.2012   by   which   they   were
relieved from the post of Additional District Judge(Fast Track
Courts).   The   writ   petition   was   filed   by   those   writ
petitioners,   questioning   the   Order   dated   25.04.2012   and
further seeking direction to consider the writ petitioners for
absorption and regularization of their services as Additional
District Judges. The Court in the aforesaid writ petitions was
thus   concerned   with   the   challenge   to   Order   relieving   the
appellants on 25.04.2012 and the question as to whether the
appellants were entitled to be absorbed as Additional District
Judges. The Division Bench upheld that the discontinuation by
the High  court  on  the  ground  that  Fast  Track  Courts itself
came to an end, the appellants could not have been allowed to
continue. Further, the High Court did not accept the claim of
the writ petitioners that they are entitled for regularization
and absorption. In the above context, the High Court observed
in paragraph 16 that the discontinuation and relieving of the
services   of   the   writ   petitioners   are   not   coming   within   the
meaning of dismissal, removal or termination. The High Court
observed that the ad­hoc appointments given to the petitioners
27
on   contract   basis   were   discontinued   and   they   were   relieved
without any stigma. The High court in the above writ petitions
was not concerned with the claim of the appellants with the
nature of the appointment of the appellants for the purposes
of   grant   of   pension.   As   noted   above   Rule   2   of   1978   Rules
excludes certain categories from application of rules. One of
such category is "persons employed on contract except when the
contract   provides   otherwise".   Whether   the   case   of   the
appellants   was   covered   by   the   excluded   category   under   Rule
2(C) is a question which has arisen in these proceedings and
was not subject matter of earlier writ petitions decided on
20.07.2012.
34. Thus,   any   observation   made   by   the   High   Court   while
dismissing the writ petitions on 20.07.2012 challenging their
relieving orders and claim of absorption as regular District
Judges   has   to   be   read   in   context   of   the   aforesaid   writ
petitions and cannot be accepted as any expression regarding
entitlement or dis­entitlement of the appellants with regard
to claim of pension. We, thus, are of the view that High Court
instead of referring to Rule 78 and especially Rule 2 did not
advert to the nature of appointment in the above reference and
28
followed the judgment dated 20.07.2012 which was rendered in
different context. In above view of the matter, all the three
reasons   given   by   the   High   Court   for   dismissing   the   writ
petitions are unsustainable. But the question still remains as
to whether appellants are entitled for pension, gratuity and
leave encashment as claimed by them in their writ petitions.
35. We   thus   now   proceed   to   examine   the   above   claim   in
accordance with 1978 Rules, which governs the grant of pension
and   other   relevant   aspects.                               
36. Now, we revert to 1978 Rules to find out as to whether
the appellants were entitled for grant of pension.   We have
already noticed Rule 2, which provides for application of the
rules   to   all   Government   servants   appointed   to  Services   and
posts  in  connection with  the   affairs   of   the   State   which   are
borne on  pensionable establishments.   We  having already held
that   appellants   were   borne   on   pensionable   establishment   and
they  were  not  employed  on  contract  basis,  Rule  2  is clearly
applicable on them. There is another category which is excepted
from   application   of   the   rule   ­   Rule   2(e),   i.e.   “persons
entitled to the benefit of a Contributory Provident Fund”.  In
29
the   present   case,   the   appellants   were   not   covered   by   any
Contributory   Provident   Fund   Scheme   rather   covered   by   General
Provident Fund Scheme.   The fact that appellants were covered
by General Provident Fund Scheme is apparent from the materials
brought on record.  In Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (c) No.
24328­29   of   2015­   Annexure   P10   is   a   letter   of   Assistant
Registrar, High Court of Madras dated 17.10.2012 addressed to
the   Principal   District   and   Sessions   Judge,   Tiruvallur,   which
was on the subject “GPF­Final Closure applications of Selvi G.
Savithri,   the   then   Additional   District   and   Sessions   Judge,
Tiruvallur, (FTC III, Tiruvallur)­ Discontinued from service on
25.04.2012­Particulars called for­Regarding.”  It is useful to
extract the aforesaid letter, which is as follows:­
30
"From
Tmt. P. Sandhiya, M.A. B.Ed.,B.L.,                     
Assistant Registrar (Per. Admn.)                       
High Court, Madras
To
The   Principal   District   and   Sessions   Judge,
Tiruvallur (w.e)                             
Sir,
Sub:   GPF­Final   Closure   applications   of   Selvi   G.
Savithri,   the   then   I   Additional   District   and
Sessions Judge, Tiruvallur, (FTC III, Tiruvallur)­
Discontinued from service on 25.04.2012­Particulars
called for­Regarding.”
Ref:   Your   letter   D.No.4308/A/2012,   dated
01.10.2012.
I am herewith enclosing a copy of the combined
application and to request you to obtain the same
in   Triplicate   from   Selvi   G.   Savithri,   then   I
Additional District and Sessions Judge Tiruvallur,
now   discontinued   from   service   on   25.04.2012,   for
sanction   of   General   Provident   Fund,   and   the   same
may kindly be forwarded to the High Court, early,
for taking further action in the matter.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/­
Asst. Registrar (Per.Admn.)”
31
37. The General Provident Fund (Tamil Nadu) Rules relates to
all   Government   Servants,   whether   permanent,   temporary   of
officiating other then re­employed servants, who shall join the
Fund.   Learned counsel for the appellants has also brought on
record alongwith additional written submissions, details of pay
drawn by Selvi G. Savithri for the period April, 2011 to April,
2012, which indicate that General Provident Fund subscription
was Rs. 33,000/­ in each month. Rule 3(o) defines 'qualifying
service' to the following effect:­
“3(o)   'qualifying   service'   means   permanent   or
officiating   service   (including   temporary   service
under   emergency   provisions)   rendered   in   a   post
included in a pensionable establishment.”
38. Rule 11(1) provides for commencement of qualifying service
in following manner
“11.   Commencement   of   qualifying   services.   —  (1)
Subject to the provisions of these rules, qualifying
service of a Government servant shall commence from
the date he takes charge of the post to which he is
first   appointed   either   substantively   or   in   an
officiating or temporary capacity. In the case of a
Government   servant   retiring  on   or  after  the  first
October   1969,   temporary   or   officiating   service   in
the pensionable  post whether rendered in a regular
capacity or not shall count in full as qualifying
services even if it is not followed by confirmation.
32
NOTE.­ In the case of the employees of the former
Pudukkottai State and persons transferred from the
former   Travancore­Cochin   State  consequent   on   the
reorganisation of States, temporary or officiating
service   rendered   in   a   regular   capacity   under   the
former   Pudukkottai   State   or   the   former
Travancore­Cochin   State   shall   count   in   full   for
purposes of pension.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
11(2) Half of the service paid from contingencies
shall   be   allowed   to   count  towards   qualifying
service   for   pension   along   with   regular   service
subject to the following conditions:­
(i) Service   paid   from   contingencies   shall   be   
in   a   job   involving  whole   time   employment   
and     not     part­time     for     a   portion   of   the
day.
(ii) Service   paid   from   contingencies   shall   be
in  a type of work or job for which   regular 
posts could have been sanctioned, for  example
Chowkidar.
(iii)Service   shall   be   for   which   the   payment   is 
made out on monthly or daily rates  computed 
and paid on a monthly basis and  which, 
though not analogous to the  regular   scale   of 
pay, shall bear some  relation in the matter 
of pay to those  being     paid   for   similar
jobs  being  performed   by   staff   in   regular 
establishments.
(iv) Service   paid   from   contingencies   shall   be 
continuous   and  followed   by   absorption   in 
regular employment without a break.
(v) Subject   to   the   above   conditions   being 
fulfilled,   the   weightage  for   past   service 
paid from contingencies shall be limited  to 
the period after the 1st January 1961  for  which
authentic records of service may  be available.
(vi) Pension or revised pension admissible as  the
case shall be paid from, the 23rd June,  1988.]
33
11(3) Half of the service rendered by a Government
servant under non­pensionable establishment shall be
counted  for  retirement   benefits  along  with  regular
service under pensionable establishment subject to
the following conditions:­
(i) Service under non­pensionable establishment shall be
in a job involving whole time employment.
(ii) Service under non­pensionable establishment shall be
on time scale of pay and
(iii) Service under non­pensionable establishment shall
be   continuous   and   followed   by   absorption   in
pensionable establishment without a break.
Provided that in respect of those who retired
prior   to   the   14th  February,   1996,   the   retirement
benefit or revised retirement benefit, as the case
may be, admissible to  them shall be paid from the
14th February, 1996 and there shall' be no claim for
arrears  in any case, for the period up to the 13th
February, 1996.]”
34
39.   As   per   Rule   11(1)   qualifying  service   of   a   Government
servant shall commence from the date he takes charge of the post
to   which   he   is   first   appointed   either   substantively   or   in   an
officiating   or   temporary   capacity.     The   appellants,   who   were
appointed on ad hoc basis shall be clearly covered by nature of
appointment as contemplated in Rule 11(1). Rules 11(2) and 11(3)
also clearly provided that even half of the service paid from
contingencies  are  allowed  to  count  towards  qualifying  service
and a half of the service rendered by a Government servant under
non­pensionable establishment is counted for retirement benefits
along with regular service with certain conditions.  The Scheme
delineated by Rule 11 indicate a liberal scheme of recognition
of service as pensionable and to accept the submission  of the
respondent  that  ad  hoc  appointment  of the appellants  are not
covered by Rule 11 is to strain the meaning and extent of the
Rule   11.     Rule   21   provides   for   forfeiture   of   service   on
dismissal or removal.
35
40. Chapter V of the Rules deals with “Classes of Pension and
conditions   governing   their   grant”.     Rule   32   deals   with
“Superannuation Pension”. A Superannuation pension is granted to
a Government servant entitled or compelled, by rule, to retire
at a particular age.  Rule 33 deals with Retiring pension, which
provides   that   a   retiring   pension   shall   be   granted   to   a
Government servant who retires, or is retired, in advance of the
age of compulsory retirement, in accordance with the provisions
of Rule 42.  Rule 38(1) deals with Compensation pension.  Rule
38(1) is as follows:­
“38. Compensation   pension:­  (1)   If   a   Government
servant   is   selected   for  discharge   owing   to   the
abolition of his permanent post, he shall, unless
he is  appointed to another post, the conditions of
which   are   deemed   by   the   authority  competent   to
discharge him to be at least equal to those of his
own, have the option ­
(a) of taking compensation pension to which he may he
entitled for the service he had rendered, or
(b) of accepting another appointment on such pay as may
be  offered   and   continuing   to   count   his   previous
service for pension.”
36
41. Rule   39   deals   with   Compulsory   retirement   pension.
Sub­rule(1)   of   Rule   39   provides   that   a   Government   servant
compulsorily retired from service as a penalty may be granted by
the   authority   competent   to   impose   such   penalty,   pension   or
gratuity, or both at a rate not less than two­thirds and not
more   than   full   compensation   pension   or   gratuity   or   both
admissible   to   him   on   the   date   of   his   compulsory   retirement.
Rule 40 contemplates that a Government servant who is dismissed
or removed from service although shall forfeit his pension and
gratuity but the authority competent to dismiss or remove him
from   service   may,   if   the   case   is   deserving   of   special
consideration, sanction a compassionate allowance not exceeding
two­thirds of pension or gratuity or both which would have been
admissible to him if he had retired on medical certificate. The
scheme as delineated by Chapter V of the Rules indicate that
rules framing authorities have adopted a liberal and flexible
approach   in   sanctioning   the   pension.     Even   the   Government
servant, who is dismissed or removed, is also given a window to
get compassionate allowance, if the case is deserving a special
consideration.  A Government servant, who retires voluntarily or
is compulsorily retired, is entitled to a retiring pension by
virtue of Rule 42(1), which is as follows:­
37
“42(1).     A   Government   servant,   who,   under
Fundamental   Rule   56(d),   retires   voluntarily   or   is
required  by  the  appointing  authority  to  retire   in
the public interest shall be entitled to a retiring
pension.”
42. Rule 43(1) deals with amount of pension, which is to the
following effect:­
"43(1) In the case of a Government servant retiring
in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   these   rules
before completing qualifying service of ten years,
the amount of service gratuity shall be calculated
at the uniform rate of half­month's emoluments for
every completed six monthly period of service.”
43.     Rule   43(2)   provides   that   in   the   case   of   a   Government
servant,   retiring   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   these
rules after completing qualifying service of not less than ten
years,   the   amount   of   pension   shall   be   as   set   out   in   the
sub­rule(2).   Thus, the  qualifying service  not less than  ten
years  is a condition for grant of pension.   At this juncture,
let us revert back to the facts of the present case to find out
as to whether all the appellants have completed ten years of
qualifying service?  From the record before us, following is the
service rendered by the appellants as Additional District Judge
(Fast Track Court):­
38
Sl.
No.
Name  Date of
Joining
Date of
Relieving
Total Period
1. K. AnbazhaganAppellant
No.1
13.02.2002 31.05.2011 09 Years 05
Months and 05
Days
2. Selvi G.
SavithriAppellant
No.2
24.02.2002 25.04.2012 10 Years 02
Months and 02
Days
3. R. Radha ­
Appellant No.3
23.02.2002 25.04.2012 10 Years 02
Months and 03
Days
4. A.S. Hassina –
Appellant No.4
23.02.2002 25.04.2012 10 Years 02
Months and 03
Days
5. P.G. Rajagopal
Appellant No.5
24.02.2002 31.10.2010 08 Years 08
Months and 08
Days
From the above, it is clear that apart form K. Anbazhagan
and P.G. Rajagopal, other three appellants have completed ten
years of qualifying service.
39
44. Now, we have to find out as to whether as per Rules, K.
Anbazhagan and P.G. Rajagopal are entitled to add any service
for the purpose of completing qualifying service. Rule 27 of the
Rules   is   a   clear   answer   to   the   aforesaid   issue.     Both   K.
Anbazhagan and P.G. Rajagopal were relieved on A/N of 31.05.2011
and   31.10.2010   respectively,   on   attaining   the   age   of   sixty
years.     Rule   27   provides   for   addition   in   their   service
qualifying   for   Superannuation   pension,   the   actual   period   not
exceeding one­fourth of the length of service or actual period
by which his age at the time of recruitment exceeds thirty years
or a period of five years, whichever is less.  Rule 27(1) which
is relevant for the present case is as follows:­
“27(1)   Any  person appointed to a service or post
and   who   retires   from   service   on   or   after   the   1'
July   1960   may   add   to   his   service   qualifying   for
superannuation pension (but not for any other class
of   pension)   the   actual   period   not   exceeding   one
fourth of the length of  his service or the actual
period by which his age at the time of recruitment
exceeds   thirty   years   or   a   period   of   five   years,
whichever is less, if the service or post is one­
(a)     for   which   post­graduate   research   or
specialist qualification  or experience in
scientific, technological or professional
fields   is   prescribed   not   merely   as
desirable but as obligatory  qualification;
and
(b)     for   which   the   age   of   recruitment
prescribed in the service rules applicable
to the service or post concerned is above
thirty years.
40
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx”
45. Rule 27(1) proviso specifically mentions that the age limit
prescribed   in   sub­rule(!)   above   viz.   thirty   years   shall   be
lowered to twenty seven years in so far as Judicial Officers who
are   directly   recruited   as   Magistrates,   District   Munsifs   and
District   Judges.     The   appellants   are   clearly   covered   by   the
proviso to sub­rule(1) of Rule 27. As per Rule 27(1), out of
three periods mentioned therein, whichever is lesser, has to be
accepted. To the actual service,   the period of one­fourth of
the length of the service of the above appellants is a lessor
period, which needs to be added in their service.  By addition
of one­fourth period of the actual service of  K.Anbazhagan and
P.G. Rajagopal, their qualifying service become more than ten
years.   The above appellants also thus have qualifying service
of more than ten years, we thus conclude that all the appellants
before   us   have   qualifying   service   of   more   than   ten   years.
Another relevant rule, which needs to be looked into is Rule 78.
Rule   78   provides   for   the   date   from   which   pension   becomes
payable.  Rule 78(1) is as follows:­
41
"78(1) Except in the case of a Government servant to
whom the provision of rule 34 apply and subject to
the provisions of rule 9, 60 and 69 a pension other
than  family  pension  shall  become  payable   from  the
date   on   which   a   Government   servant   ceases   to   be
borne on the establishment.” 
42
46. The crucial words in Rule 78 are “shall become payable from
the date on which a Government servant ceases to be borne on the
establishment.”  In the present cases, dates on which appellants
were relieved is the date from which they cease to be borne on
the   establishment.     Two   appellants   K.Anbazhagan   and   P.G.
Rajagopal  were  relieved on  account  of  attaining age of  sixty
years   hence   they   were   clearly   entitled   for   superannuation
pension.  Other three appellants were relieved by the High Court
due to the reasons that Fast Track Courts came to an end by
converting   the   Fast   Track   Courts   into   Permanent   Courts   of
Additional District Judge by Government order dated 26.08.2011.
49 Fast Track Courts, which were created under Eleventh Finance
Commission   were   retained   on   permanent   basis   as   the   post   of
District Judge/Additional District Judge.   The central funding
for Fast Track Courts was ceased on 31.03.2011 but the State of
Tamil Nadu has allowed to continue the said Courts for one more
year   w.e.f.   01.04.2011,   i.e.   upto   31.03.2012.     The   State
Government   has   continued   the   post   till   01.04.2012.     49   Fast
Track Courts become the Permanent Courts of Additional District
Judges.   The relieving of other three appellants on 25.04.2012
was   on   the   ground   that   since   Fast   Track   Courts   have   been
discontinued, A.S. Hassina, R. Radha and Selvi G. Savithri are
relieved   from   their   services.     Rule   38   provides   for   a
43
compensation pension. The discontinuance of the posts held by
the above three appellants, w.e.f. 01.04.2012 and consequently
relieving of the aforesaid appellants,  we are of the view that
above   three   appellants   are   also   entitled   for   compensation
pension.     We,   thus,   conclude   that   K.   Anbazhagan   and   P.G.
Rajagopal   are   entitled   for   superannuation   pension   and   other
three   appellants   namely   A.S.   Hassina,   R.   Radha   and   Selvi   G.
Savithri are entitled for compensation pension.  High Court fell
in error in rejecting their claim of pension.
47. With   regard   to   compensation   pension   as   contemplated   by
Rule   38   there   can   be   one   aspect   which   also   needs   to   be
considered. Rule 38 sub­rule (1) contemplates discharge owing
to the abolition of his permanent post. It may be contended
that Fast Track Courts as per order dated 18.12.2001 were not
the permanent posts and initially Fast Track Court Scheme was
only for five years which subsequently got extended to another
five   years   and   one   year.   The   discontinuance   of   Fast   Track
Court cannot be treated as permanent abolition of post. The
present case  is a  case  where  the  appellants had allowed to
work   for   10   years   and   the   post   of     Fast   Track   Court
(Additional   District   Court)   held   by   the   appellants   was
discontinued with effect from 01.04.2012.   It cannot be said
that   relieving   of   the   appellants   was   due   to   abolition   of
44
permanent post but the basis for allowing compensation pension
in the circumstances as mentioned in sub­rule (1) of Rule 38
can be said to be very much present in the present case. The
appellants who worked for 10 years and were discontinued due
to   discontinuation   of   posts   which   were   held   by   them,   the
equity   and   justice   demands   that   they   should   also   be   given
compensation   pension.   Thus,   in   the   present   case   even   if
technically abolition of permanent post may not be involved
but   for   doing   complete   justice,   direction   for   giving
compensation pension to the appellants is just and proper.
48. Learned senior counsel for the appellants has also placed
reliance   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in  Mahesh   Chandra
Verma   Vs.   The   State   of   Jharkhand   and   ors.,   2018   (7)   Scale
343.  The   question   which   arose   in   the   aforesaid   appeals   for
consideration   has   been   noted   in   the   paragraph   1   of   the
judgment which is to the following effect:
“1. The   sole   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   in   these   appeals   is   whether   the
services   rendered   by   the   appellants/Judicial
Officers as Fast Track Court Judges is liable to
be   counted   for   their   pensionary   and   other
benefits, the appellants having joined the regular
judicial service thereafter.”
49. The   appellants   in   the   aforesaid   case   were   directly
45
recruited from the Bar as Fast Track Court Judges. This Court
in paragraphs 15, 17 and 18 has held the following:
“15. The appellants were not appointed to the Fast
Track   courts   just   at   the   whim   and   fancy   of   any
person, but were the next in line on the merit list
of a judicial recruitment process. They were either
part of the select list, who could not find a place
given the cadre strength, or those next in line in
the   select   list.   Had   there   been   adequate   cadre
strength,   the   recruitment   process   would   have
resulted in their appointment. We do believe that
these Judges have rendered services over a period
of   nine   years   and   have   performed   their   role   as
Judges   to   the   satisfaction,   otherwise   there   would
have been no occasion for their appointment to the
regular   cadre   strength.   Not   only   that,   they   also
went through a second process for such recruitment.
We believe that it is a matter of great regret that
these   appellants   who   have   performed   the   functions
of   a   Judge   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   competent
authorities should be deprived of their pension and
retiral   benefits   for   this   period   of   service.   The
appellants were not pressing before us any case of
seniority   over   any   person   who   may   have   been
recruited subsequently, nor for any other benefit.
In   fact,   we   had   made   it   clear   to   the   appellants
that we are only examining the issue of giving the
benefits of their service in the capacity of Fast
Track   court   Judges   to   be   counted   towards   their
length   of   service   for   pensionary   and   retiral
benefits.   To   deny   the   same   would   be   unjust   and
unfair to the appellants. In any case, keeping in
mind   the   spirit   of   the   directions   made   Under
Article   142   of   the   Constitution   of   India   in   Brij
Mohan   Lal­[II]   and   in   Mahesh   Chandra   Verma,   the
necessary   corollary   must   also   follow,   of   giving
benefit   of   the   period   of   service   in   Fast   Track
courts for their pension and retiral benefits. The
methodology   of   non­creation   of   adequate   regular
cadre   posts   and   the   consequent   establishment   of
Fast Track courts manned by the appellants cannot
be   used   as   a   ruse   to   deny   the   dues   of   the
appellants.
46
17. The position in respect of the appellants is
really no different on the principle enunciated, as
there was need for a regular cadre strength keeping
in mind the inflow and pendency of cases. The Fast
Track Court Scheme was brought in to deal with the
exigency and the appellants were appointed to the
Fast Track courts and continued to work for almost
a   decade.   They   were   part   of   the   initial   select
list/merit   list   for   recruitment   to   the   regular
cadre   strength   but   were   not   high   enough   to   be
recruited   in   the   existing   strength.   Even   at   the
stage of absorption in the regular cadre strength,
they   had   to   go   through   a   defined   process   in
pursuance of the judgment of this Court and have
continued to work thereafter.
18. We are, thus, unhesitatingly and unequivocally
of the view that all the appellants and Judicial
Officers identically situated are entitled to the
benefit of the period of service rendered as Fast
Track court Judges to be counted for their length
of service in determination of their pension and
retiral benefits.”
50. Although in the above case of Mahesh Chandra, Fast Track
Court   Judges   were   ultimately   absorbed   in   the   regular   cadre
strength but the fact that period of services as Fast Track
Court   Judges   had   been   directed   to   be   added   for   their
pensionary benefits, does support the claim of the appellants
in the present case.
51. Another   judgment   on   which   reliance   was   placed   by   the
appellants is a judgment of this Court in    Government of NCT
of Delhi and others Vs. All India Young Lawyers Association
(Registered)   and   another,   (2009)   14   SCC   49.  Learned   counsel
47
submits   that   this   Court   in   the   above   case   had   directed   for
addition   of   10   years   or   actual   period   of   judicial   service,
whichever   is   less,   as   qualifying   service   to   the   direct
recruits to Delhi Higher Judicial Service. In the above case
direct   recruits   to   the   Delhi   Higher   Judicial   Service   were
under   25%   quota.   The   appellants   were   regularly   recruited   in
Delhi Higher Judicial Service in accordance with Delhi Higher
Judicial Service Rules, 1970. Direct recruits had filed writ
petition before the High Court of Delhi seeking a mandamus to
the appellants that the actual period of practice at the Bar
subject to a maximum of fifteen years, should be added to the
total   pensionable   service   while   computing   the   pension.   The
High Court allowed the writ petition while giving weightage of
15 years of practice or such other number of years of practice
at the Bar, whichever is less. The Government of NCT of Delhi
filed   an   appeal.   It   has   been   noted   by   this   Court   in   the
aforesaid judgment that the High Court after taking decision
on the Administrative side wrote to the Delhi Government and
it   was   only   on   02.02.2006   by   a   letter,   the   Government   has
indicated   that   it   was   agreeable   to   give   weightage   of   seven
years of practice. The above fact is noted in paragraphs 6 and
7 which is to the following effect:
“6.  The   High   Court,   on   the   administrative   side,
brought this fact to the notice of the Government
48
by   writing   a   letter   in   the   year   1987.   Though
repeated reminders were sent to the Government, no
decision was taken by the Government till the end
of   2005   and   only   on   2­2­2006   by   a   letter,   the
Government has indicated that it was agreeable to
give weightage of seven years of practice at the
Bar while computing the pension and other retiral
benefits for direct recruits.
7.  Learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State
contended that the reason why the Government has
agreed to give weightage of seven years’ practice
at the Bar is that because in the case of direct
recruitments to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service,
a member should have seven years’ practice at the
Bar and that is why the Government thought it fit
to give weightage of seven years.”
52. This Court while allowing the appeal partly, directed the
Government of NCT to give weightage of ten years of practice
at   the   Bar   or   such   number   of   years   of   actual   service,
whichever is less. The above case is distinguishable due to
two   reasons.   Firstly,   the   direct   recruits   were   Advocates
appointed   in   accordance   with   Delhi   Higher   Judicial   Service
Rules,   1970.   Secondly,   the   Government   of   NCT   of   Delhi   has
agreed for giving weightage of seven years in their service
period. It was the concession given by the Government of NCT
of   Delhi   which   was   relied   by   this   Court   while   issuing
direction. Thus, benefit of the above case is not available to
the appellants in the present case.
53. Now   we   come   to   the   entitlement   of   gratuity   by   the
49
appellants. The definition of pension as given under Rule 3(m)
provides as follows:
“3(m) ‘pension’ includes gratuity except when the
term   pension   is   used   in   contradistinction   to
gratuity but does not include dearness allowance.”
54. When   the   appellants   are   entitled   for   grant   of   pension,
they are obviously entitled for grant of gratuity. Rule 45 of
the   1978   Rules   provided   that   a   Government   servant,   who   has
completed   five   years’   qualifying   service   and   has   become
eligible for service gratuity or pension under Rule 43, shall
be granted gratuity. Rule 45 sub­rule (1)(a) is as follows:
“45.   Death­cum­Retirement   Gratuity.­(1)(a)A
Government servant, who has completed five years’
qualifying   service   and   has   become   eligible   for
service gratuity or pension under rule 43, shall,
on his retirement be granted death­ cum ­retirement
gratuity as in the table below for each completed
six monthly period of qualifying service, subject
to a maximum of fifteen times, the emoluments:­”
55. We,   thus,   are   of   the   view   that   appellants   are   also
entitled for gratuity which may be computed in accordance with
1978 Rules.
56. Now remains the issue of leave encashment. The Tamil Nadu
Leave   Rules,   1933   govern   all   aspects   of   the   leave.   Rule   7
deals with leave at the credit of a Government servant. Rule 7
50
also   provides   in   respect   of   the   benefit   of   encashment   of
earned leave at the credit of a Government servant. Rule 7(i)
and (ii) are as follows:
“7.(i) Leave   at   the   credit   of   a   Government
servant   in   his   leave   account,   other   than   earned
leave and leave on private affairs shall lapse on
the   date   of   retirement   or   on   the   date   of
termination   of   the   extension   of   service,   as   the
case   may   be.     The   competent   authority   (leave
sanctioning   authority)   shall  suo   motu  draw   and
disburse the cash benefits of encashment of earned
leave and leave on private affairs at the credit
of  the Government servants in Groups  B, C and D
without   formal   sanction   orders   on   the   date   of
retirement   or   on   the   date   of   termination   of
extension of  service, as  the case may be, or on
the   next   working   day,   following   the   date   of
retirement or the date of termination of extension
of service, if the date of retirement or the date
of termination of extension of service happens to
be a holiday. In respect of Group A Officers, the
Accountant General or Pay and Accounts Officer, as
the   case   may   be,   shall,  suo   motu  issue   the   pay
slips for encashment of earned leave and leave on
private   affairs,   as   aforesaid,   at   the   credit   of
the   Government   servants   without   formal   sanction
orders, on the date of retirement or on the date
of   termination   of   extension   of   service,   as   the
case may be, or on the next working day, following
the date of retirement or the date of termination
of extension of service if the date of retirement
or the date of termination of extension of service
happens to be a holiday.
(ii) The benefit of encashment of earned leave at
the credit of a Government servant on the date of
retirement   or   on   the   date   of   termination   of
extension of service, as the case may be, shall be
subject   to   a   maximum   of   240   days   and   shall   be
eligible for cash equivalent of full leave salary
which shall be based on Pay, Dearness Allowance,
House   Rent   Allowance   and   City   Compensatory
Allowance   for   the   entire   period   of   leave   at
51
credit.”
57. The   appellants   claimed   earned   leave   to   their   credit   on
the   date   when   they   retired/relieved.   The   appellants   were
clearly entitled for encashment of leave subject to a maximum
of 240 days.
58. In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussions,   we   allow   these
appeals in the following manner:
(1) The judgment of the High Court dated 01.04.2015 is set
aside   and   the   Civil   Appeals   filed   by   the   appellants   are
allowed.
(2) The   respondents   are   directed   to   sanction   superannuation
pension   to   appellants   K.   Anbazhagan   and   P.G.   Rajagopal   in
accordance with 1978 Rules.  
(3) The   respondents   are   directed   to   sanction   compensation
pension to the appellants, namely, Selvi G. Savithri, R. Radha
and A.S. Hassina.
(4) All the appellants are entitled for payment of gratuity
in accordance with 1978 Rules.
(5) The respondents are also directed to permit encashment of
earned   leave   to   the   credit   of   the   appellants   subject   to   a
maximum of 240 days.
52
(6) All above retiral benefits be computed and paid to the
appellants within a period of two months from today. In the
event payments are made after two months, the appellants shall
be entitled for such payments alongwith the simple interest @
7% per annum.
(7) The parties shall bear their own costs.
..........................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
..........................J.
     ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
AUGUST 13,2018.

The order granting anticipatory bail/bail to the millers was challenged by the State/Corporation in matters which came up before this Court on 28.02.2017. While declining to cancel such orders granting anticipatory bails/bail, this Court deemed it proper to impose certain additional conditions. The first condition was that, in all FIRs the concerned accused would ensure that bank guarantee was furnished and kept alive, failing which, the benefit of anticipatory bails/bail would stand cancelled. The reference to “Bank Guarantee” in said condition No.1 was to the obligation arising from the agreement entered into with each of the accused. In the circumstances we direct:- a) The expression “Bank Guarantee” used in condition No.1 as stipulated in order dated 28.02.2017 passed by this Court pertains to bank guarantee which the concerned miller was obliged, in terms of the agreement in question to furnish. The obligation to furnish the bank guarantee and to keep it alive is referable to the terms of the agreement and not to the “defalcated sum” as was submitted by the Corporation. b) If on account of failure to submit and to keep it alive in respect of the “defalcated sum”, any benefit of bail/anticipatory bail was withdrawn and orders of non-bailable warrants were issued, such orders stand cancelled and recalled. However the concerned millers ought to have furnished and kept alive bank guarantees as contemplated in terms of the agreement. If there be any failure on this count the cancellation of bail/anticipatory bail was perfectly justified. c) The order dated 28.02.2017 passed by this Court would apply to every single case, irrespective whether the concerned miller was a party to the proceedings before this Court or not. d) If any miller, in terms of the order dated 28.02.2017, had not furnished bank guarantee or had not kept it alive in terms of his obligations under the agreement, the facility of bail/anticipatory bail would not be 20 available to him. The orders cancelling such facility stand confirmed and the challenge in that behalf is negated. All such millers shall be immediately taken in custody by the concerned Police. e) We permit the Corporation to secure its interest either by invoking the bank guarantees wherever furnished and or by putting to auction the unencumbered immovable property pledged by the millers with it, after due process of law.

1
 NON -REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 998 OF 2018 @
(SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.9196 OF 2017)
Arvind Tiwary ……Appellant
Versus
State of Bihar and Another ..….Respondents
With
Criminal Appeal No.996 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9029 of 2017)
Criminal Appeal No.997 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9043 of 2017)
Criminal Appeal No.999 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9246 of 2017)
Criminal Appeal No.1026 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9334 of 2017)
Criminal Appeal No.1019 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9312 of 2017)
Criminal Appeal No.1020 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 9409 of 2017)
Criminal Appeal No.1021 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9405 of 2017)
Criminal Appeal No.1022 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9406 of 2017)
2
Criminal Appeal No.1000 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9904 of 2017)
Criminal Appeal No.1001 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9664 of 2017)
Criminal Appeal No.1002 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1283 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1003 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1238 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1004 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1192 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1023 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1252 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1024 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1286 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1025 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1239 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1005 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1327 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1006 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1568 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1007 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2966 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1008 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3107 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1009 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3087 of 2018)
3
Criminal Appeal No.1010 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3064 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1011 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3041 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1012 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3238 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1013 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3814 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1014 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.4116 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1015 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5128 of 2018)
Criminal Appeal No. 1017 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.)No.6707 of 2018 (D.No.25551/2018)
Criminal Appeal No.1016 of 2018 @
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5870 of 2018)
JUDGMENT
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Leave granted in all the matters.
2. Since similar questions arise in all these matters, they are being
disposed of by this common Judgment. The matters can be broadly classified
in three categories. We have taken Criminal Appeal arising from Special
Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9196 of 2017, Criminal Appeal arising from Special
4
Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9029 of 2017 and Criminal Appeal arising from
Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9409 of 2017 to be the lead matters
representing each of those three categories. The facts leading to the filing of
said appeals are set out in detail hereunder:-
A. Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl) No.9196 of 2017
3. Under an agreement dated 29.03.2014 entered into between the
appellant and Bihar State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation”) the appellant undertook to mill
paddy procured from District Office of the Corporation as per terms and
conditions mentioned in the agreement. Clause 2 of the agreement was as
under:
“That the Second Party with a monthly milling capacity
of 400 MT of paddy shall furnish a bank guarantee equivalent
to the value of paddy issued to him by the First Party for
milling in the current procurement season and in case, he is
issued an additional quantity of paddy for milling he shall to
furnish an additional bank guarantee equivalent to the value of
the amount of the additional paddy issued to him by the First
Party. In case he is not capable of furnishing the above
mentioned bank guarantee(s), he shall pledge unencumbered
immovable property belonging to him in the name of District
Manager, Kaimur of the same amount or more, as certified by
the competent authority Circle Officer/Sub-Divisional Officer.
In the prescribed manner, for the entire value of paddy as per
his milling capacity. However it will be mandatory for the
5
Second Party to provide a minimum bank guarantee as per the
milling capacity enumerated in the table below:
Sl.No. Milling Capacity Minimum
Manadtory Bank
Guarantee
1 UP to 2 MT per hour Rs.5 lakh
2 More than 2 MT and upto 5 MT
per hour
Rs.10 lakh
3 More than 5 MT per hour
The said bank guarantee of Rs. Five Lakh Rupees
(amount in words) issued in favour of the District Manager,
Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., Kaimur
vide Serial No. at BG No.2696IG-002214 issued by P.N.B.
Bank Akerhi Branch Mohania, Kaimur District has been
submitted by the Second Party.”
4. The appellant had thus undertaken to furnish bank guarantee
equivalent to the value of paddy issued to him. As per the concerned clause,
in case the appellant was unable to furnish such bank guarantee, he could
pledge unencumbered immovable property belonging to him in favour of the
Corporation for the equivalent sum. In addition it was mandatory for the
appellant to provide a minimum bank guarantee as per the milling capacity.
Accordingly a bank guarantee on that count in the sum of Rupees Five
Lakhs was furnished.
5. The procurement season in terms of the aforesaid agreement was
2013-14. However, it is the case of the Corporation that though the
6
appellant was supplied 6000 quintals of paddy, he failed to return 3212.70
quintals of rice amounting to Rs.79.62 lakhs and thus the appellant
misappropriated the aforementioned sum. A first information report was
registered on 02.04.2015 vide Bhabhua P.S. Case No.151 of 2015 under
Sections 409 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant thereafter
approached the High Court of Judicature at Patna seeking anticipatory bail
which was granted to him vide order dated 30.07.2015.
B. Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl) No.9029 of 2017
6. Under an agreement dated 06.03.2013 entered into between the
appellant and the Corporation, the appellant undertook to mill paddy lying at
Kaimur Centre of the Corporation in terms of the agreement. Clauses 2 and
3 of the agreement were as under:
“2. The Second Party has monthly milling capacity of 1 ton
of paddy but he has to furnish bank guarantee equivalent to the
value of paddy taken by him for milling in concerned
procurement season and in case, he requires further quantity for
paddy for milling, he has to furnish further bank guarantee
equivalent to value of paddy desired by him to be taken for
milling. However, he has to deliver C.M.R. in time before next
lot of paddy is taken from him. The said bank guarantee of Rs.
…….. issued in favour of District Manager, Bihar Food & Civil
Supplies Corporation Ltd. vide series No…….. dated ……….
has been submitted by the second party as per State
Government Instruction from time to time.
7
3. The second party is at liberty to take paddy for milling as
the quantity, he desired during the said procurement season in
accordance with his monthly milling capacity but, he has no
further bank guarantee for the value of the paddy, which, he
takes for milling in case, he is not capable of furnishing bank
guarantee, he had to pledge immovable property in the form of
mortgage bond for amount or he can pledge immovable
property for the entire value paddy which he takes for milling.
The property details so mortgaged must be certified to be in his
own name by the competent authority either by circle officer of
the block or SDO of the concerned sub division so that in case
of default of second party or any deviation of paddy may be
recovered.”
According to the appellant since he had pledged his land valued at
Rs.1.3 cores he was not required to furnish any bank guarantee. The
procurement season for the aforesaid agreement was 2012-13.
7. On a written report that though the appellant had lifted entire quantity
of paddy by 31.12.2013 he had not delivered any rice in terms of the
agreement and that he had misappropriated 2401.48 quintals of rice
amounting to Rs.51.99 lakhs, Kudra P.S. Case No.119 of 2015 was
registered against the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 409
and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. On an application moved by the appellant,
the High Court of Judicature at Patna vide judgment and order dated
24.07.2015 granted anticipatory bail to the appellant subject to his
depositing 20% of the due amount within six weeks. According to the
8
appellant, in compliance of such order the appellant deposited an amount of
Rs.10.42 lakhs vide DD dated 22.01.2016.
C. Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl) No.9409 of 2017
8. Under an agreement entered into between the appellant and the
Corporation on 11.2.2012 for the procurement season 2011-12, the appellant
had undertaken to mill paddy lying at Bhabhua Centre of the Corporation on
delivery of rice in terms of the agreement Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of the
agreement were as under:-
“2. After delivery of rice to the Corporation proportionate
paddy will be issued to the miller by Bihar State Food & Civil
Supplies Corporation Ltd.
3. Rice will be accepted in the same Gunny bags in which
the paddy is delivered by the Corporation. For the first
consignment/lot, rice will be delivered by the miller in new
SBT gunnies. The excess gunny bags will be returned by the
miller and if retrained by the Miller of excess gunny bags (in
which paddy supplier miller) will be deducted by the
Corporation @ 60% of net wages price from the bills submitted
by the miller.
4. The miller has already deposited Rs.50,000/- as security
money through DD No.710733 dated 11.02.2012 of Rs. Fifty
thousand in favour of District Manager, Bihar State Food &
Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.”
9
9. Since the rice was to be supplied at the time paddy would be given,
unlike previous two illustrations, no bank guarantee or pledge was
contemplated but deposit in terms of Clause 4 as security was given. On an
allegation that the appellant was supplied 2306 quintals of paddy for the
procurement year 2011-12 and the appellant had not returned 1545.02
quintals of rice amounting to Rs.28.9 lakhs, Kudra P.S. Case No.131 of
2015 was registered on 19.4.2015 for offences under Sections 409 and 420
IPC. The appellant was granted anticipatory bail by the High Court of
Judicature at Patna on 16.07.2015.
10. Similar orders were passed granting anticipatory bail to number of
persons against whom cases were filed by the Corporation. Those orders
were questioned by filing special leave petitions by State of Bihar or the
Corporation. These petitions came up before this Court on 28.02.2017 when
following order was passed by this Court:
“Heard.
 Permission granted.
Delay condoned.
These petitions have been preferred by the State of
Bihar/Bihar State Food Civil Supplies Corporation against
orders granting anticipatory bail/bail, in connection with cases,
the facts of which are identical.
10
It has been stated by Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned senior
counsel appearing for the State/Corporation, that a sum of
Rupees fifteen hundred crores in all has been allegedly
misappropriated by the accused for which 600 FIRs have been
filed. According to the case of the State, agreements for milling
of paddy were entered into with different rice mills in
pursuance of which paddy was handed over for milling but the
rice from the milled paddy was not returned or was returned
partly. Thus, there is misappropriation to a huge extent. In such
circumstances, grant of anticipatory bail/bail will seriously
hamper the investigation/trial resulting in huge loss to the State.
Our attention has been drawn to the Deed of Agreement.
Clause 3 thereof provides for furnishing of bank guarantee for
26 the value of paddy, which is taken for milling, or for
pledging of the immovable property of the value of the paddy.
There is also provision in clause 12 that in case of default of
terms of agreement the bank guarantee can be forfeited and
legal action initiated for recovery of the amount from the
mortgaged immovable property.
The High Court has passed an order for deposit of 10 to
20 % of the amount, alleged to be involved in different cases
for grant of bail/anticipatory bail.
Since the anticipatory bail/bail was granted more than
one year back and financial interest of the State is or can be
secured, we are not inclined to cancel the anticipatory bail/bail
but modify the order of granting of anticipatory bail/bail
conditional adding conditions as follows:
(1) The accused in all the FIR(s), will ensure that bank
guarantee, if not furnished, is furnished and if lapsed, is
renewed within a period of one month from today failing which
the anticipatory bail/bail granted will stand cancelled.
(2) The accused will cooperate with investigation/trial and their
failure to appear, when required, will be a ground for
cancellation of anticipatory bail/bail. An order of cancellation
11
will be passed by the trial court on being satisfied about such
failure.
 (3) The investigation will be completed within a period of three
months.
(4) All the accused will be tried only at five places viz. Patna,
Gaya, Chhapra, Darbhanga and Purnia by officers of the 27
appropriate rank determined by the High Court within one week
from today. The High Court may specify the area of jurisdiction
of the said five courts by a public order. If required by the High
Court, the State Government may sanction extra strength of
officers with requisite infrastructure so that normal work of
courts is not disturbed on account of the special arrangement
for these cases.
(5) The officers posted will deal with these cases exclusively. If
free from their work, any other work may be assigned to the
said officers.
(6) The concerned authorities will be at liberty to encash the
bank guarantee(s) after holding that there is a breach of terms
of the agreement which decision will be subject to appropriate
remedies of the parties.
(7) If not otherwise encashed, the bank guarantee will be kept
alive till the trial is over. However, deposits/furnishing of bank
guarantees will be abide by further orders of the trial court,
interim or final.
(8) If any amount is deposited by the accused, the said amount
will be adjusted in the amount of the bank guarantee, which is
to be furnished by the accused.
 (9) The accused will surrender their passports to the respective
courts within a period of four weeks from today and will not
leave the country without prior permission from the concerned
court.
12
On compliance of the above order, if any accused is in
custody, he will be granted bail in accordance with law.
Any other proceedings between the parties will remain
unaffected by this order and the same can proceed in
accordance with law.
The trial court/High Court will be at liberty to pass any
further order which it considers appropriate, having regard to
the individual fact situation or modify the above directions in
exigencies of the situation.
The special leave petitions are disposed of accordingly.
Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed
of.”
11. In Criminal Appeal arising from S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 9196 of 2017, the
Corporation vide its letter dated 18.03.2017 directed the appellant to furnish
bank guarantee equivalent to the “defalcated sum” of Rs.79.62 lakhs.
The appellant having failed, non-bailable warrant for arrest was issued on
29.05.2017. In the second matter i.e. in Criminal Appeal arising from S.L.P.
(Crl.) No.9029 of 2017, the Corporation vide its letter dated 18.03.2017
directed the appellant to deposit bank guarantee for the “defalcated amount”
of Rs.51.99 lakhs. On his failure, a non-bailable warrant of arrest was issued
against the appellant on 22.07.2017. Similar such direction was issued by the
Corporation in the third matter on 18.03.2017 for furnishing bank guarantee
for the “defalcated sum” of Rs.29.40 lakhs. After the failure to comply, nonbailable
warrant of arrest was issued on 30.05.2017.
13
12. Aggrieved, the appellants in all three cases and similarly situated
persons approached the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The High Court
by its common judgment and order dated 09.10.2017 in Crl. Misc. No.
29168 of 2017 and other connected cases, rejected the challenge. Paras 42,
43 and 45 of the judgment were as under:
“42. Thus, I see no merit in the submission of the learned
counsel for the petitioners that the aforesaid order would not
bind the petitioners, who were not parties before the Supreme
Court.
43. So far as the point of pledging of property for the value
of paddy in lieu of bank guarantee, and non-requirement of
bank guarantee in such cases are concerned, they were already
raised before the Supreme Court by the rice millers, which is
evident from the plain reading of the order of the Supreme
Court, but the Supreme Court did not accept their contention
and passed order for deposit of bank guarantee.
45. So far as the liberty granted to this Court to modify the
directions issued by the Supreme Court is concerned, as the
order of the Supreme Court has already taken effect and the
pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioners already stood cancelled,
it is not permissible for this Court to modify the directions
issued by the Supreme Court. May be that in appropriate case,
having regard to the individual fact situation, in view of the
liberty granted by the Supreme Court, this Court could have
modified any condition if the petitioner(s) would have
approached this Court in time. However, such a recourse would
be impermissible once the order of the Supreme Court has
taken its effect. I am also of the opinion that if the persons are
aggrieved by the order of the Supreme Court regarding deposit
of bank guarantee, the only course left to them is to approach
the Supreme Court and till the time the order of the
14
Supreme Court stands, the petitioners, whether they were party
before the Supreme Court or not have to abide by its orders.”
13. The appellants in all three cases have approached this Court
challenging the correctness of the view taken by the High Court. Similar
such petitions have also been filed by other persons. Leading the
submissions on behalf of said persons including the appellant, Mr. Kapil
Sibal, learned Senior Advocate submitted:
(a) The order passed by this Court on 28.02.2017 did not
contemplate furnishing of bank guarantee or keeping the bank guarantee
alive in the sum equivalent to the alleged “defalcated sum”
(b) The bank guarantee was in terms of the stipulations
contemplated by the agreement. Only such bank guarantee was to be
furnished and kept alive.
(c) In cases where concerned millers had pledged their properties,
the interest of the corporation was well secured and there could not be any
insistence on furnishing of bank guarantee by way of additional security.
14. Appearing for the respondent-State, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior
Advocate submitted:
15
(a) About 1500 crores of public money was involved in all the
matters. The rice in issue was part of public distribution system and
all the millers were guilty of swindling public funds.
(b) In cases where bank guarantees were required to be given and
kept alive in terms of the agreements and yet the millers had not
furnished and kept alive such bank guarantees, the benefit of
anticipatory bail/bail was rightly cancelled.
(c) In order to sub-serve public interest, the corporation be allowed
to put to auction all the pledged properties and recover the defalcated
sums.
15. The aforesaid three criminal appeals, the facts whereof are discussed
in detail in preceding paragraphs show that there were three categories of
matters. In the first, the miller was to give bank guarantee equivalent to the
value of paddy. However in case of his inability to furnish such bank
guarantee, the facility of pledging unencumbered immovable property was
afforded to him. The miller was however required to provide minimum
bank guarantee. In the second matter, the bank guarantee had to be given in
respect of value of paddy. Here also an option was given to pledge
immovable property in lieu of the requirement of furnishing of bank
16
guarantee. Though there appears to be slight distinction in phraseology
employed in the concerned clauses, the intent appears to be identical. It is
also a matter of record that the appellant in the second matter had pledged
his land valued at Rs.1.3 crores and was not required to furnish any bank
guarantee. In the third matter, there was no requirement of furnishing any
bank guarantee at all and all that the agreement insisted upon was furnishing
of security.
The requirement of furnishing bank guarantee was thus not mandatory
and an option was given to the miller to pledge his unencumbered
immovable property.
16. The matters therefore lie in a short compass. The order granting
anticipatory bail/bail to the millers was challenged by the State/Corporation
in matters which came up before this Court on 28.02.2017. While declining
to cancel such orders granting anticipatory bails/bail, this Court deemed it
proper to impose certain additional conditions. The first condition was that,
in all FIRs the concerned accused would ensure that bank guarantee was
furnished and kept alive, failing which, the benefit of anticipatory bails/bail
would stand cancelled. The reference to “Bank Guarantee” in said condition
No.1 was to the obligation arising from the agreement entered into with each
of the accused.
17
17. It may be noted here that prior to the passing of the order dated
28.02.2017, none of the orders passed by the High Court or this Court
required furnishing of bank guarantee or keeping it alive in respect of the
“defalcated sum”. The order passed by this Court on 28.02.2017 is quite
clear. The reference to “Bank Guarantee” and the condition modulated in
that behalf was one which the accused was obliged to and had undertaken to
furnish in terms of the agreement. If according to the terms of the agreement
and the benefit enjoyed by the concerned accused, he had already pledged
unencumbered immovable property in the equivalent sum, there was no
requirement to furnish and to keep alive additional bank guarantee.
Therefore the Corporation was not justified in demanding that the millers
must furnish bank guarantee in respect of “defalcated sum”. The trial court
was also not justified in cancelling the facility of bail/anticipatory bail
already enjoyed by the miller and in issuing non-bailable warrants.
18. However there are certain categories of persons, who were enjoined to
furnish bank guarantee, in terms of their agreement, to keep such bank
guarantee alive, had completely failed in that behalf. Such failure on their
part was in complete derogation and violation of the order dated 28.02.2017
passed by this Court. In such cases the trial court was certainly justified in
18
cancelling the facility of bail/anticipatory bail extended to such millers and
to issue non-bailable warrants of arrest. There is one more category of cases
where the millers in question were not parties to the proceedings in this
Court which were disposed of by order dated 28.02.2017. The submission in
that behalf made by such millers that the condition imposed by this Court
would not apply to them was rightly rejected by the trial court and we affirm
the view so taken.
19. We now come to the last submission made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar,
learned Senior Advocate. The idea behind requirement of furnishing bank
guarantee and or pledge of unencumbered property was to ensure sufficient
security in the hands of the Corporation. Going by the terms of the
agreement, in case there be any failure on part of the concerned miller to
discharge his obligations, the Corporation would certainly be entitled and
justified to take appropriate steps to secure its interest either by encashing
the bank guarantee and or by disposing the pledged properties in accordance
with law. We therefore accept the submission and hold that the Corporation,
in such cases, would be well within its rights to take appropriate steps in the
concerned matters.
19
20. In the circumstances we direct:-
a) The expression “Bank Guarantee” used in condition No.1 as
stipulated in order dated 28.02.2017 passed by this Court pertains to bank
guarantee which the concerned miller was obliged, in terms of the agreement
in question to furnish. The obligation to furnish the bank guarantee and to
keep it alive is referable to the terms of the agreement and not to the
“defalcated sum” as was submitted by the Corporation.
b) If on account of failure to submit and to keep it alive in respect
of the “defalcated sum”, any benefit of bail/anticipatory bail was withdrawn
and orders of non-bailable warrants were issued, such orders stand cancelled
and recalled. However the concerned millers ought to have furnished and
kept alive bank guarantees as contemplated in terms of the agreement. If
there be any failure on this count the cancellation of bail/anticipatory bail
was perfectly justified.
c) The order dated 28.02.2017 passed by this Court would apply
to every single case, irrespective whether the concerned miller was a party to
the proceedings before this Court or not.
d) If any miller, in terms of the order dated 28.02.2017, had not
furnished bank guarantee or had not kept it alive in terms of his obligations
under the agreement, the facility of bail/anticipatory bail would not be
20
available to him. The orders cancelling such facility stand confirmed and
the challenge in that behalf is negated. All such millers shall be immediately
taken in custody by the concerned Police.
e) We permit the Corporation to secure its interest either by
invoking the bank guarantees wherever furnished and or by putting to
auction the unencumbered immovable property pledged by the millers with
it, after due process of law.
21. All the appeals stand disposed of in aforesaid terms, without any order
as to costs.
…....….………………J.
 (Abhay Manohar Sapre)
……………………….J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi
August 13, 2018

Friday, August 31, 2018

Coming back to factual aspects of this case, on the basis of the above confession of Chanchal Bhaskar [A-3], the only recovery which was made was one Rope, which was used in committing the offence, which the counsel rightly pointed, is a common material or thing which is available anywhere in the market or at every household. Further, we may note that, there is no investigation to link the rope recovered with the crime as no report concerning the forensic aspects of the fiber or any recovered strands are part of the record. Therefore, the major condition for application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not fulfilled. Accordingly, we cannot append any value to the confession of Chanchal Bhaskar [A-3].

1
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1691-1692 OF 2010
KUSAL TOPPO AND ANOTHER …APPELLANTS
 VERSUS
STATE OF JHARKHAND …RESPONDENT
 O R D E R
1. These appeals by special leave are directed against the
judgment and order dated 12.1.2009 passed by the High Court
of Judicature of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Criminal Appeal No.
240 of 2002 with Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2002.
2. These appeals have been filed by Accused No.1 and Accused
No.4 questioning the conviction and sentence passed by the
trial Court on 17 and 18th May, 2002 wherein the accused were
convicted for the offence under Section 392 and were
sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of
Rs.1000/- each and in default of payment, to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year each and also convicted for the
2
offence under Section 302 and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.5000/- each and in
default of payment to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
term of 2 years each.
3. The judgment passed by the trial Court was subsequently
challenged before the High Court. The High Court also
confirmed the sentence and conviction passed by the trial
Court.
4. In the present case there were as many as five accused. A-5
was acquitted by the trial Court itself. The other two accused
A-2 and A-3 had filed Special leave Petition (Criminal) No(s).
2572-2573 of 2009 against the judgment and order of the High
Court, which were dismissed by this Court at the time of
admission itself. In criminal cases, it is well settled that a
dismissal of a SLP in limine, would neither mean that the lower
court judgment stands affirmed nor the principle res judicata
would be applicable [refer Kunhayammed and Anr. v. State
of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587; State of Punjab v. Devinder
Pal Singh Bhullar, AIR 2012 SC 364]. Therefore, the
dismissal of the SLP of the co-accused will not have any effect
accordingly.
3
5. In the instant special leave petitions filed by the accused A-1
and A-4, leave was granted by this Court on 30.8.2010.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. The prosecution story in brief is that on 3.12.1999, Truck No.
BR-24-M-8171 had gone to Balrampur having loaded the lac
of one Adit Sah of Latehar. The truck was returning from
Balrampur after unloading the lac in question on 4.12.1999
and reached Ranchi at 4 P.M. The aforesaid truck had picked
up its owner Sita Devi from Seva Sadan, Ranchi and proceeded
for Latehar. When the truck did not reach Latehar till the
morning of 5/12/1999, PW-2, Binod Agrawal (the joint owner
of the truck and brother-in-law of Sita Devi, and the informant
in this case) tried to search for the truck; in the course of his
search he went to the Line Hotel, owned by PW-1, Bindeshwar
Sah, situated at Ranchi Road, Kuru where the truck usually
used to stop for refreshment for its staff. The informant learnt
from the aforesaid hotel owner that his truck had stopped at
the hotel on 4.12.1999 at about 6.45 p.m. The driver, Suresh
Singh @ Bulet Singh, and the Khalasi (i.e., cleaner of the
truck), Jitendra Thakur, had taken four cups of special tea,
one for their employer Sita Devi, two for themselves and one
4
for a third person in the truck, but the third person did not
take tea and the same was returned. The driver was heard to
say that A-2, Mahendra, the third person inside the truck,
would not take tea. Thereafter, the truck proceeded for its
destination, having taken the owner Sita Devi, the Khalasi
Jitendra Thakur, and the third person, Mahendra (apart from
the driver himself). The informant also came to know from the
hotel owner that an unknown person aged about 25 years had
also come to the hotel at 5.00 p.m. on 4.12.1999, who had
enquired from the hotel owner whether Suresh Singh @ Bulet
Singh, the driver, had come to the hotel with the truck. The
hotel owner had replied to the unknown person that the truck
had not reached yet. Subsequently, the informant gathered
information from others at Kuru that the truck had crossed
Kuru Chowk for its destination (i.e. Latehar), but it was
hijacked by some criminals near Kuru P.S. and taken away
towards the forest. He further came to know that the truck
was lying abandoned in Aamjharia Valley with two dead bodies
lying near the truck and one dead body of a woman lying inside
the cabin of the truck. On such information, he went to
Aamjharia Valley and found the truck, where he found the
dead body of Sita Devi inside the truck, with her hands tied
5
and neck slit, and the bodies of the driver and Khalasi thrown
outside. The informant then went to Kuru P.S. to lodge an FIR,
but the police of Kuru P.S. did not entertain his information.
He then went to Lohardaga to approach the S.P., who was not
available, but the reader of the S.P. told him that the FIR had
to be lodged in the Police Station in the jurisdiction of which
the dead bodies had been recovered. Therefore, the informant
lodged the FIR at Chandwa Police Station on 7.12.1999 at 10
A.M., which is the basis of the case.
8. Mr. Annam D.N. Rao, learned Amicus Curiae appearing on
behalf of the accused mainly contended that the trial Court as
well as the High Court had convicted the accused by relying
upon the extra-judicial confessions made by Mahendra Prasad
and Chanchal Bhaskar (A-2 and A-3). Mr. Rao contended that
the accused could not be convicted merely on the basis of
extra-judicial confessions, relying upon the settled proposition
of law that an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of
evidence, and an accused cannot be convicted on such basis
in the absence of other reliable evidence establishing guilt. He
placed reliance on the decisions of this Court to this effect in
6
Gopal Sah v. State of Bihar1 and Pancho v. State of
Haryana.
2
9. Learned counsel, while arguing, has taken us through the
depositions of various witnesses. PW-1 is Bindeshwar Sah, the
hotel owner, who according to PW-2, Binod Agrawal, first
revealed the information to him that the truck party had come
to his hotel on the date of the incident, and left the place after
taking some tea. Based on the said information, PW-2 further
inquired about the matter. PW-2 also deposed that PW-1 had
told him that A-2 Mahendra was inside the truck, and that A2
had confessed to him (i.e. PW-1) that the accused had
committed the murder of the three persons and further
committed theft of a gold bangle and chain belonging to Sita
Devi, an amount of Rs. 2 Lac and a demand draft for Rs.
32,000/-. PW-2 admitted so in his cross-examination as well
as stated so before the police. At the time of trial, however, PW1,
the owner of the Line Hotel, turned hostile. He denied saying
anything to PW-2 as alleged.
10. Thus, according to PW-2, A-2 made a confession to PW-1. In
addition, the confessions of A-2 and A-3 were also recorded by

1(2008) 17 SCC 128.
2(2011) 10 SCC 165.
7
the police. As per the testimony of PW-6, the investigating
officer in the case, on the basis of the confession of A-3, a rope
was recovered from the place of occurrence.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that rope is a
common material or thing which is available anywhere in the
market and in every household.
12. Apart from this, learned counsel for the State is unable to show
any other material indicating the guilt of the appellants.
13. Learned Counsel for the State argued in support of the
impugned judgment.
14. The evidence relating to the extra-judicial confession made by
the accused Mahendra is found in two places in the evidence
of PW-2, i.e., in paragraphs 8 and 27. If we read both the
paragraphs, it is clear that PW-2 got the information from PW1
(the owner of the Line Hotel, Bindeshwar Sah) about the
factum of confession made by the accused Mahendra before
PW-1. In other words, PW-2 has not deposed in so many words
and clearly that the accused Mahendra made a confession
before him. On the other hand, it is the specific deposition of
PW-2 that the accused Mahendra confessed before PW-1, and
in turn PW-1 told about the same fact to PW-2. This means
8
that the information received by PW-2 from PW-1 about the
extra-judicial confession is hearsay, inasmuch as there is no
confession made by the accused Mahendra before PW-2
directly. Hence, such hearsay evidence of PW-2 relating to the
so-called confession cannot be relied upon. Even otherwise,
PW-1, who had allegedly informed PW-2 about the confession
allegedly made before him by the accused Mahendra, has
turned hostile. Thus, there is no supporting material to
corroborate the evidence of PW-2 regarding the extra-judicial
confession.
15. However, the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court,
probably relying upon the version of PW-2 in paragraphs 29 to
30 of his deposition, concluded that the accused Mahendra did
confess before PW-2 directly. Even if we take it that the
accused Mahendra did confess before PW-2 directly, the same
may not further or better the case of the prosecution,
inasmuch as this is the solitary piece of material against the
accused Mahendra, and that too in the form of an extrajudicial
confession.
16. As argued by the learned amicus curiae appearing for the
accused, an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of
9
evidence, and an accused cannot be convicted on its basis in
the absence of other reliable evidence establishing the guilt of
the accused. It will be pertinent to advert to the decisions relied
upon by the learned amicus curiae at this juncture, i.e., Gopal
Sah (supra) and Pancho (supra).
17. In Gopal Sah (supra), the Court held that an extra-judicial
confession is, on the face of it, a weak piece of evidence and
should not be relied upon to record a conviction, in the absence
of a chain of cogent circumstances. In Pancho (supra) as well,
the Court refused to convict the accused on the basis of an
extra-judicial confession, in the absence of other evidence of
sterling quality on record, establishing his involvement. In
the Pancho (supra), the Court discussed the evidentiary value
of an extra-judicial confession, as laid down by a
Constitutional Bench of this Court in Haricharan
Kurmi v. State of Bihar.
3In this case, referring to S. 3 and S.
30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court came to the
conclusion that an extra-judicial confession cannot be treated
as a substantive piece of evidence against the co-accused,
holding that the proper judicial approach is to use it only to

3AIR 1964 SC 1184.
10
strengthen the opinion formed by the Court after perusing
other evidence placed on record. It is pertinent to refer to the
observations of in Pancho (supra) in this regard-
“26. In Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar [AIR
1964 SC 1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] the
Constitution Bench of this Court was again
considering the same question. The
Constitution Bench referred to Section 3 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 and observed that
confession of a co-accused is not evidence
within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence
Act. It is neither oral statement which the court
permits or requires to be made before it as per
Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act nor does it fall
in the category of evidence referred to in Section
3(2) of the Evidence Act which covers all
documents produced for the inspection of the
court. This Court observed that even then
Section 30 provides that a confession may be
taken into consideration not only against its
maker, but also against a co-accused. Thus,
though such a confession may not be evidence
as strictly defined by Section 3 of the Evidence
Act, “it is an element which may be taken into
consideration by the criminal court and in that
sense, it may be described as evidence in a nontechnical
way”. (Haricharan case [AIR 1964 SC
1184])
27. This Court in Haricharan case [AIR 1964 SC
1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] further observed that
Section 30 merely enables the court to take the
confession into account. It is not obligatory on
the court to take the confession into account.
This Court reiterated that a confession cannot
be treated as substantive evidence against a coaccused.
Where the prosecution relies upon the
confession of one accused against another, the
proper approach is to consider the other
evidence against such an accused and if the
11
said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the
court is inclined to hold that the said evidence
may sustain the charge framed against the said
accused, the court turns to the confession with
a view to assuring itself that the conclusion
which it is inclined to draw from the other
evidence is right.
28. This Court in Haricharan case [AIR 1964 SC
1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] clarified that though
confession may be regarded as evidence in
generic sense because of the provisions of
Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the fact remains
that it is not evidence as defined in Section 3 of
the Evidence Act. Therefore, in dealing with a
case against an accused, the court cannot start
with the confession of a co-accused; it must
begin with other evidence adduced by the
prosecution and after it has formed its opinion
with regard to the quality and effect of the said
evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the
confession in order to receive assurance to the
conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is
about to reach on the said other evidence.”
18. Furthermore, in Sahadevan v. State of T.N.,
4 this Court
culled out certain principles regarding the reliability of an extra
judicial confession, which have also been relied upon in
Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab,
5 Tejinder Singh v. State
of Punjab,
6 and Vijay Shankar v. State of Haryana.
7 The

4(2012) 6 SCC 403.
5(2012) 11 SCC 768.
6(2013) 12 SCC 503.
7(2015) 12 SCC 644.
12
principles as stated in Sahadevan (supra) are reproduced
below:
“16. Upon a proper analysis of the abovereferred
judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to
state the principles which would make an extrajudicial
confession an admissible piece of
evidence capable of forming the basis of
conviction of an accused. These precepts would
guide the judicial mind while dealing with the
veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily
relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged
to have been made by the accused:
(i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak
evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the
court with greater care and caution.
(ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be
truthful.
(iii) It should inspire confidence.
(iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater
credibility and evidentiary value if it is
supported by a chain of cogent circumstances
and is further corroborated by other prosecution
evidence.
(v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the
basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any
material discrepancies and inherent
improbabilities.
(vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved
like any other fact and in accordance with law.”
The proposition that extra judicial confessions are a weak type
of evidence and should not be relied upon in the absence of
corroborative evidence has also been affirmed by this Court in
13
several other decisions, such as Pakkiriswamy v. State of
Tamil Nadu,
8 Makhan Sigh v. State of Punjab,
9 Baldev
Singh v. State of Punjab,
10 and even recently in Satish v.
State of Haryana.
11
19. Taking into consideration all the facts and position of law,
discussed supra, we are of the opinion that the appellants
herein cannot be convicted on the basis of only two extrajudicial
confessional statements of the co-accused which were
not corroborated by any cogent or reliable evidence. Needless
to say, that the confessions of A-2 and A-3 made before the
police are inadmissible. Now coming to the limited aspect
concerning appending weightage to their recovery of rope in
furtherance of the statement of A-3, before the Police under
Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act.
20. The law under, Section 27, Indian Evidence Act is well settled
now, wherein this court in Geejaganda Somaiah v. State of
Karnataka, (2007) 9 SCC 315, has observed as under:
“As the section is alleged to be frequently
misused by the police, the courts are required
to be vigilant about its application. The court
must ensure the credibility of evidence by police

8(1997) 8 SCC 158.
9(1988) Supp SCC 526.
10(2009) 6 SCC 564.
11(2018) 11 SCC 300.
14
because this provision is vulnerable to abuse. It
does not, however, mean that any statement
made in terms of the aforesaid section should be
seen with suspicion and it cannot be discarded
only on the ground that it was made to a police
officer during investigation. The court has to be
cautious that no effort is made by the
prosecution to make out a statement of the
accused with a simple case of recovery as a case
of discovery of fact in order to attract the
provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act”
21. The basic premise of Section 27 is to only partially lift the ban
against admissibility of inculpatory statements made before
police, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the
information received from the accused. Such condition would
afford some guarantee. We may additionally note that, the
courts need to be vigilant while considering such evidences.
This Court in multiple cases has reiterated the aforesaid
principles under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act and only
utilized Section 27 for limited aspect concerning recovery [refer
Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, 76 I.A. 65; Jaffar
Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC
1934]. As an additional safeguard we may note that reliance
on certain observations made in certain precedents of this
court without understanding the background of the case may
not be sustainable. There is no gainsaying that it is only the
15
ratio which has the precedential value and the same may not
be extended to an obiter. As this Court being the final forum
for appeal, we need to be cognizant of the fact that this Court
generally considers only legal aspects relevant to the facts and
circumstances of that case, without elaborately discussing the
minute hyper-technicalities and factual intricacies involved in
the trial.
22. Coming back to factual aspects of this case, on the basis of the
above confession of Chanchal Bhaskar [A-3], the only recovery
which was made was one Rope, which was used in committing
the offence, which the counsel rightly pointed, is a common
material or thing which is available anywhere in the market or
at every household. Further, we may note that, there is no
investigation to link the rope recovered with the crime as no
report concerning the forensic aspects of the fiber or any
recovered strands are part of the record. Therefore, the major
condition for application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is
not fulfilled. Accordingly, we cannot append any value to the
confession of Chanchal Bhaskar [A-3].
23. In light of the discussion above, we set aside the orders passed
by the trial Court as well as by the High Court and acquit the 
16
accused from all charges and the appeals are, accordingly,
allowed.
24. We appreciate the assistance given by Mr. Annam D.N. Rao,
learned Amicus Curiae in disposing of these appeals.


........................J.
 (N.V. RAMANA)

 ........................J.
 (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
New Delhi,
August 07, 2018