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Tuesday, July 10, 2018

“8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the appellate court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by 15 an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further, if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court.”

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1479 OF 2015
MOTIRAM PADU JOSHI AND OTHERS …Appellants
Versus
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 30.07.2015 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No.174
of 1994 in and by which the High Court reversed the judgment of the
acquittal of the appellants/accused Nos. 3, 5, 7 and 8 and convicted
them under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with 149 IPC and sentenced
them to undergo life imprisonment.
2. Briefly stated case of the prosecution is that PW-2-Anant Budhaji
Joshi is the brother of deceased Machindra Budhaji Joshi. Both Anant
and Machindra were doing the work of electric fitting. PW-3-
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Kesarinath Bhagat and PW-4-Vasudeo Gaikar were also doing the
same work. Appellant Motiram Padu Joshi (A3), Ratan Maruti Vaskar
(A5), Devidas Maruti Vaskar (A7), Ramnath @ Ram Padu Joshi (A8),
deceased-Machindra and prosecution witnesses are residents of
village Owa-peth, Taluka Panvel, District Raigad. Appellants/accused
were belonging to congress party and the deceased and the
prosecution witnesses were from Shiv-sena party. In the election of
Zilla Parishad in 1992, both parties became inimical to each other.
3. On 26.04.1992, deceased Machindra had gone to village
Nandgaon for electric fitting work along with PWs 3 and 4 and they
returned at about 08.30 pm to the house of deceased. All three of
them had their dinner and were sitting on the cot in the courtyard. PW2
was thereafter taking his dinner inside the house. At about 09.30
pm, appellants along with other accused being armed with deadly
weapons like swords, knife, sticks and motor-cycle chain came to the
courtyard of the house of deceased Machindra. Appellant Motiram
(A3) was carrying sword in his hand and assaulted the deceased on
his head. Appellant Ratan (A5) attacked the deceased with the sword
on the legs of the deceased. Appellant Ramnath (A8) also attacked
the deceased with the sword on his head. Appellant Devidas (A7)
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attacked the deceased with knife on his foot and legs. Other accused
against whom the appeal is abated assaulted the deceased with
motor-cycle chain and sticks. On seeing the accused armed with
deadly weapons, PWs 3 and 4 got frightened and went inside the
house and stood near the window of the house and witnessed the
occurrence. Due to the assault, the deceased fell down from the cot
having sustained grievous injuries and PW-2 took the deceased in the
truck of his brother PW-5-Eknath Joshi to Taloja police station.
Considering the serious conditions of the deceased, he was sent to the
Municipal Dispensary at Panvel along with police constable Mhatre.
PW-15-Atmaram, Head Constable recorded the statement of PW-2,
based on which, FIR in Crime No.44/92 was registered under Sections
147, 148, 149 and 307 IPC. On the same night at about 11.30 pm,
deceased Machindra succumbed to injuries and the FIR was altered
from Section 307 IPC to Section 302 IPC.
4. Sub-Inspector Mr. Laxman Shejal (PW-16) had taken up the
investigation and he visited the spot and prepared the rough sketch
(Ex.A42). From the spot, he collected blood-stained quilt (Article No.3)
and also blood-stained soil and sample mud. The body was sent to
autopsy and PW-14-Dr. Ramrao Kendre conducted the post-mortem
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and noticed as many as twenty-six injuries in the nature of incised
wounds, contusions on the head, legs, right arm and all over the body
of the deceased. Dr. Ramrao Kendre opined that the cause of death
was “shock secondary to celebral contusion due to blood trauma over
occipital area”.
5. The accused were arrested on 27.04.1991. Based on the
disclosure statement of appellant Motiram, one sword (Article No.8)
was recovered on 09.05.1992. Swords (Article No.9) also came to be
recovered at the instance of appellants Ratan and Ramnath on
11.05.1992 and 10.05.1992. The motor-cycle chain and sticks also
came to be recovered from the other accused. The Chemical Analysis
Report disclosed that ‘A’ group blood was found on Article No.8 (sword
recovered at the instance of appellant Motiram) and Article No.12
(Motor-cycle chain). On completion of investigation, charge sheet was
filed against all the nine accused under Sections 147, 148, 302 read
with 149 IPC.
6. To prove the charges against the accused, the prosecution has
examined as many as sixteen witnesses and also produced material
objects and exhibited documents. The accused were questioned
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. about the incriminating evidence and
4
circumstances and the accused denied all of them and stated that they
have been falsely implicated. Upon consideration of evidence, the trial
court pointed out that PW-2 has a criminal record and that his
evidence is improbable. The trial court also held that the presence of
PWs 3 and 4 was doubtful and their evidence is untrustworthy and
cannot be relied upon to convict the accused. The trial court further
held that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted all the accused.
7. On appeal by the State, the High Court held that the evidence of
PWs 2 to 4 as to the overt act of the accused is consistent and
corroborated by the medical evidence and recovery of weapons. The
High Court held that the trial court erred in disbelieving the evidence of
eye witnesses and the reasonings of the trial court suffers from
perversity. Observing that prompt registration of FIR lends credence
to the prosecution case which is also strengthened by medical
evidence and recovery of weapons, the High Court reversed the
judgment of the trial court and convicted the appellants as aforesaid in
para (1). The High Court maintained the acquittal of accused Baburao
(A2).
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8. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court,
accused Ragho Dharma Koli (A1), Rohidas Balram Joshi (A4),
Satyawan Balu Waskar (A6) and Dnyandeo Sakharam Joshi (A9) died
and the appeal against them stood abated.
9. We have heard Mr. Y.P. Adhyaru and Mr. Sidharth Luthra learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of appellants and the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of State of Maharashtra. We have
perused the impugned judgment and carefully considered the rival
contentions and the evidence and materials placed on record.
10. There are three eye witnesses namely Anant, brother of
deceased (PW-2), Kesarinath (PW-3) and Vasudeo (PW-4). PWs 2 to
4 have consistently stated that on the date of incident, after having
dinner, deceased was lying on the cot in the courtyard and PWs 3 and
4 were sitting near him. PW-2 went inside and was taking meal. At
about 09.30 pm, the appellants and other accused armed with
weapons came there shouting and running. On seeing the accused
armed with deadly weapons, PWs 3 and 4 got frightened and went
inside the house. Appellant Motiram attacked the deceased with
sword on his head, appellant Ratan attacked the deceased with sword
on his legs, appellant Ramnath attacked the deceased with sword on
6
his head and appellant Devidas attacked the deceased with knife on
his foot and legs. On hearing the alarm raised by deceased
Machindra, PW-2 came out and raised shouts and on seeing the
neighbours, the accused ran away from the spot. PWs 2 to 4 have
consistently spoken about the overt act of the appellants as mentioned
above.
11. Evidence of PW-2 and his credibility is attacked by the
appellants contending that:- (i) PW-2 though present in the house did
not go to the rescue of his brother Machindra and remained mute
spectator; and (ii) PW-2 has a criminal record. Just prior to the
incident, PW-2 went inside the house and was taking meals. On
hearing the alarm raised by his brother Machindra, PW-2 came
outside. As the accused were many in numbers and armed with
deadly weapons like swords, knife, motor-cycle chain and sticks etc.,
PW-2 being unarmed would have naturally become frightened and
may not have dared to interfere. Evidence of a witness is not to be
disbelieved simply because he has not reacted in a particular manner.
12. Likewise, the relationship of PW-2 with the deceased cannot be
the reason for doubting the testimony of PW-2. It is fairly well-settled
that relationship is not a ground affecting the credibility of a witness. In
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Mohabbat v. State of M.P., (2009) 13 SCC 630, this Court held as
under:-
“11. Learned counsel for the respondent State on the other hand
supported the judgment of the High Court.
“12. Merely because the eyewitnesses are family members their
evidence cannot per se be discarded. When there is allegation of
interestedness, the same has to be established. Mere statement
that being relatives of the deceased they are likely to falsely
implicate the accused cannot be a ground to discard the evidence
which is otherwise cogent and credible. We shall also deal with the
contention regarding interestedness of the witnesses for furthering
the prosecution version.
13. ‘5. … Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a
witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal
actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person.
Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In
such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse
evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible.
………
To the same effect are the decisions in State of Punjab v. Jagir
Singh (1974) 3 SCC 277, Lehna v. State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC
76 (SCC pp. 81-82, paras 5-9) and Gangadhar Behera v. State of
Orissa (2002) 8 SCC 381.”
The above position was also highlighted in Babulal Bhagwan
Khandare v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 10 SCC 404, Salim
Sahab v. State of M.P. (2007) 1 SCC 699 and Sonelal v. State of
M.P. (2008) 14 SCC 692 (SCC pp. 695-97, paras 12-13).”
As held in various decisions, judicial approach has to be cautious in
dealing with such evidence. It is unreasonable to contend that
evidence given by related witness should be discarded only on the
ground that such witness is related.
13. Evidence of PWs 3 and 4 is sought to be assailed on the ground
that their names were not mentioned in the First Information Report
8
(FIR) and that they are interested witnesses. Of course, names of
PWs 3 and 4 were not mentioned in the FIR. Deceased Machindra
was critically injured and when he was taken to the police station, on
seeing his serious condition, deceased was sent to the hospital along
with police constable Mhatre. PW-2 remained in the police station to
lodge the complaint and his statement was recorded. His brother
having been critically injured, PW-2 must have been in a disturbed
mind and must have been in a hurry to rush to the hospital to save his
brother. Non-mention of the names of eye witnesses (PWs 3 and 4) in
the FIR should be examined in the situation in which PW-2 was
placed.
14. Furthermore, as pointed out by the High Court, FIR is not an
encyclopedia which should contain all the details of the incident. FIR
is not an encyclopedia which is expected to contain all the details of
the prosecution case. It may be sufficient if the broad facts of the
prosecution case about the occurrence appear. Omission as to the
names of the assailants or the witnesses may not all the times be fatal
to the prosecution, if the FIR is lodged without delay. Unless there are
indications of fabrication, the court cannot reject the prosecution case
as given in the FIR merely because of omission. In the present case,
9
FIR was registered without delay and prompt registration of FIR itself
lends assurance to the prosecution case. The object of the FIR is to
set the law in motion. Omission to give the names of assailants or the
names of witnesses in the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution case.
The High Court was right in observing that non-mention of the names
of eye witnesses in the FIR can hardly be fatal to the prosecution case.
15. Evidence of PWs 3 and 4 is assailed on the ground that PWs 3
and 4 have not gone to the rescue of the deceased and it is quite
unbelievable that on seeing the accused who were armed with
weapons, both of them went inside the house. It is further submitted
that the trial court righty held that their evidence is not trustworthy and
the High Court was not right in intervening such finding and basing the
conviction on the evidence of PWs 3 and 4. In their evidence, PWs 3
and 4 have stated that on seeing number of accused armed with
deadly weapons got frightened and went inside the house and stood
near the window and saw the occurrence. Their evidence cannot be
doubted on the ground that they did not intervene in the attack nor
made attempts to save the deceased. On witnessing a crime, each
person reacts in his own way and their evidence cannot be doubted on
the ground that the witness has not acted in a particular manner. The
10
evidence of PWs 3 and 4 cannot be doubted merely because they
have not acted in a particular manner.
16. We may usefully refer to the case in Rana Partap v. State of
Haryana, (1983) 3 SCC 327 as under:-
“6. Yet another reason given by the learned Sessions Judge to
doubt the presence of the witnesses was that their conduct in not
going to the rescue of the deceased when he was in the clutches of
the assailants was unnatural. We must say that the comment is
most unreal. Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his
own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted
to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start
shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far
removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of
the victim, even going to the extent of counter-attacking the
assailants. Every one reacts in his own special way. There is no set
rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the
ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to
appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way.”
17. While appreciating the evidence of witness, approach must be
whether the evidence of witness read as a whole appears to have a
ring of truth and consistent with the prosecution case or to find out
whether it is against the general tenor of the case. Their evidence
cannot be doubted merely because they belong to opposite faction. All
that is required is that their evidence is to be scrutinized with care and
caution. On testing the evidence of PWs 2 to 4, the High Court found
that their evidence is consistent and credit worthy. We find no reason
to take a different view.
11
18. The evidence of PWs 2 to 4 is corroborated by medical
evidence. Further, PW-14 opined that nineteen to fourteen injuries
could have been caused by swords (Articles 8 and 9). Oral evidence
of PWs 2 to 4 is thus corroborated by the medical evidence. PW-14-
Dr. Ramrao who conducted the post-mortem has noticed that “half of
the stomach with rice is not digested”. PW-14 opined that the
deceased died within two hours of his last meal which again is
consistent with the evidence of PWs 2 to 4. Medical evidence of PW14
lends assurance to the evidence of PWs 2 to 4.
19. Prosecution case is further corroborated by recovery of weapons
from the accused. Based on the disclosure statement of appellant
Motiram, one sword (Article No.8) was recovered and another sword at
the instance of appellant Ratan (Article No.9) was recovered and
another sword was also recovered on the disclosure statement of
appellant Ramnath. Chemical Analysis Report (Ex. A32) showed that
the blood-stained found on the quilt seized from the scene of
occurrence was that of ‘A’ group. ‘A’ group blood was also detected on
swords which were recovered, based on the disclosure statement of
appellants Motiram (Article No.8) and Ratan (Article No.9). The
presence of ‘A’ group blood (Blood Group of deceased) on the
12
weapons recovered is yet another piece of evidence corroborating the
evidence of PWs 2 to 4 and strengthening the prosecution case.
20. PW-14-Dr. Ramrao noticed that the thighs and legs of the
deceased was smeared with mud. Learned senior counsel for the
appellants submitted that in view of the presence of mud on the body
of the deceased, serious doubts arise as to the time and place of
occurrence and that there is no possibility of the occurrence having
taken place in the courtyard of the house of deceased Machindra.
This submission does not merit acceptance for more than one reason.
Firstly, as pointed out earlier, PW-16-Laxman Shejal, Investigating
Officer had recovered blood-stained quilt (Article No.3) from the scene
of occurrence i.e. courtyard of house of the deceased and also bloodstained
mud and sample mud. Chemical Analysis Report (Ex. A32)
showed presence of ‘A’ group blood in the quilt. While narrating the
occurrence, eye witnesses have stated that after the attack, the
deceased had fallen down from the cot; in that course, thighs and legs
of the deceased might have been smeared with mud. The presence of
mud on the thighs and legs therefore does not raise doubts about the
prosecution case. This aspect of submission advanced by the
appellants has been elaborately considered by the High Court in para
13
(42) of its judgment. As rightly observed by the High Court, this is too
insignificant a fact to give importance so as to disbelieve and discard
the entire prosecution case as such.
21. Learned senior counsel for the appellants then contended that
only when there are compelling and substantial reasons, the High
Court can interfere with the order of acquittal and in the present case,
there were no such compelling circumstances or glaring mistakes in
the judgment of the trial court to reverse the order of acquittal.
22. It is fairly well-settled that in an appeal against the order of
acquittal, the appellate court would be slow to disturb the findings of
the trial court which had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the
witnesses. In an appeal against the order of acquittal, there is no
embargo for reappreciating the evidence and to take a different view;
but there must be strong circumstances to reverse the order of
acquittal. In the appeal against order of acquittal, the paramount
consideration of the appellate court should be to avoid miscarriage of
justice.
23. While considering the scope of power of the appellate court in an
appeal against the order of acquittal, after referring to various
14
judgments, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415,
this Court summarised the principle as under:-
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court
while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both
on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are
not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an
appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature
of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case
of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of
the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
24. In Kallu alias Masih and others v. State of M.P., (2006) 10
SCC 313, this Court held as under:-
“8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the
appellate court is no less than the power exercised while hearing
appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power
exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant
difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by
15
an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on
evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not
reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view
is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused
is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further, if it decides to
interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of
the trial court.”
25. In the present case, as held by the High Court, the trial court has
not properly appreciated the evidence and its findings are perverse.
When the approach of the trial court is perverse, in an appeal against
the order of acquittal, a duty is cast upon the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence. The deceased had sustained as many as
twenty-six injuries. PWs 1 to 3 have consistently spoken about the
incident and that the appellants were armed with deadly weapons and
the overt acts of the appellants which is corroborated by the medical
evidence and also by recovery of weapons from the
appellants/accused. As observed by the High Court, the trial court
gave importance to insignificant aspects like “smearing of the thighs
and legs of the body with mud” and the conduct of the witnesses as to
why they have not reacted in a particular manner and while doing so,
the trial court failed to appreciate the substratum of the prosecution
case. The High Court on being satisfied that the conclusion reached
by the trial court was erroneous reversed the order of acquittal
16
recorded by the trial court. We do not find any good ground to
interfere with the judgment of the High Court.
26. In the result, the conviction of the appellants under Section 302
IPC read with Section 149 IPC is confirmed and the sentence of life
imprisonment imposed upon each of them is confirmed and this appeal
is dismissed.
.…….…………...………J.
 [RANJAN GOGOI]
…………….……………
J.
 [R. BANUMATHI]
New Delhi;
July 10, 2018
17

rape and murder of a 23 years' age lady ­Nirbhaya (changed name).= When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” ; Involvement of the bus No. DL 1 PC 0149 (Ext. P/1) was also held to be substantiated by matching of DNA profile of the material objects lifted from the bus No. DL 1 PC 0149 (Ext. P/1) which were found consistent with that of the victim and the complainant. - Matching of DNA profile developed from the articles seized from the bus like ‘hair’ recovered from the third left row of the bus and the blood­stained seat cover of the bus and the bunch of hair recovered from the floor of the bus with the DNA profile of the victim was held to be unimpeachable evidence establishing the involvement of the bus in the commission of the offence.; various submissions regarding reliability of the three dying declarations:­ (i) failure to disclose the names of any of the accused in the first dying declaration (Ext.PW­49/A) and therefore, the second and third dying declarations are tutored; (ii) the three dying declarations cannot be relied upon due to variations and improvements; and (iii) sudden appearance of the name of ‘Vipin’ (in the third dying declaration) makes it doubtful and no explanation is offered.= The victim made three dying declarations:­ (i) statement recorded by PW­49 Dr. Rashmi Ahuja immediately after the victim was admitted to the hospital; (ii) Dying declaration (Ex.PW­27/A) recorded by PW­27 SDM Usha Chaturvedi on 21.12.2012; and (iii) dying declaration (Ex.PW­30/D) recorded by PW­30 Pawan Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate on 25.12.2012 at 1:00 p.m. by multiple choice questions and recording answers by gestures and writing. In the first dying declaration (Ex.PW­49/A), the prosecutrix has stated that more than two men committed 27 rape on her, bit her on lips, cheeks and breast and also subjected her to unnatural sex. In the second dying declaration (Ex.PW­27/A) recorded by PW­27, the victim has narrated the entire incident in great detail, specifying the role of each accused, rape committed by number of persons, insertion of iron rod in her private parts, description of the bus, robbery committed and throwing of both the victims out of the moving bus in naked condition. On 25.12.2012 at 1:00 p.m., PW­30 Pawan Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate recorded the statement by putting multiple choice questions to the victim and by getting answers through gestures and writing. While making the third declaration, the victim also tried to reveal the names of the accused by writing in her own handwriting viz. “Ram Singh, Mukesh, Vinay, Akshay, Vipin, Raju”.= this Court held that all the three dying declarations are true, voluntary and consistent.- held that the dying declaration made through signs, gestures or by nods are admissible as evidence and that proper care was taken by PW­30 Pawan Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate and the third dying declaration recorded by in response to the multiplechoice questions by signs, gestures made by the victim are admissible as evidence. In the third dying declaration, the victim also wrote the names of the accused persons “Ram Singh, Mukesh, Vinay, Akshay, Vipin, Raju”. So far as the name of accused Vipin written by the prosecutrix in the third dying declaration has been elaborately considered by this Court in paras (150) and (188) of the judgment.; Plea of alibi raised by accused Vinay Sharma =The plea of alibi put forth by accused Vinay Sharma that he was present in the musical programme organised by the SCC Unit of the Church in the DDA Park in his locality has been elaborately considered in paras (258) to (269). In para (267) of the judgment, this Court referred to the evidence of PW­83 Shri Angad Singh, 31 Deputy Director (Horticulture), DDA who has deposed that no permission was granted by any authority to organise any function in the evening of 16.12.2012 in the DDA District Park, Hauz Khas, New Delhi. This Court has also referred to the evidence of PW­84 Father George Manimala of St. Thomas Church and PW­85 Brother R.P. Samuel, Secretary, Ebenezer Assembly Church who have deposed that their church(es) never organised any musical programme/event in the DDA District Park, Hauz Khas in the evening of Sunday i.e. on 16.12.2012.- the evidence of PW­46 and the expert report (Ext. PW46/D), this Court held that the evidence clearly establishes the presence of accused Vinay Sharma in the bus. There is no merit in the contention that the plea of alibi was not considered by this Court.; Now, coming to the submission regarding juvenility of petitioner, Vinay Sharma. = petitioner is not a juvenile has rightly rejected the application for ossification test submitted by petitioner No.1.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURICTION
REVIEW PETITION (CRL.) NOS.671­673 OF 2017
IN
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.608 & 609­610 OF 2017
VINAY SHARMA & ANR. ... PETITIONERS
VERSUS
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. ... RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
These   review   petitions   have   been   filed   by   two
applicants   Vinay   Sharma­accused   No.1   and   Pawan   Kumar
Gupta­accused No.2 to review the judgment of this Court
dated   05.05.2017   by   which   judgment   this   Court   had
dismissed the criminal appeals filed by the petitioners
challenging   the   order   of   the   High   Court   confirming   the
death reference and dismissing the criminal appeals filed
2
by   the   petitioners   against   the   order   of   conviction   and
award of death sentence.
2. Both the petitioners were tried for rape and murder
of   a   23   years'   age   lady   ­Nirbhaya   (changed   name).   The
trial   court   convicted   the   petitioners   along   with   three
others   and   awarded   death   sentence   to   all   the   four
accused.   Death   reference   No.6   of   2013   Was   sent   by   the
trial court to the High Court. Separate criminal appeals
were   also   filed   by   the   petitioners   challenging   the
judgment  of the trial  court.  Delhi  High Court  vide  its
judgment dated 13.03.2014 confirmed the death penalty to
all   the   four   convicts   including   petitioners,   Vinay
Sharma,   appellant   No.1   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.   609   of
2017,   Pawan   Kumar   Gupta,   appellant   No.1   in   Criminal
Appeal Nos.608 of 2017. The appeals were dismissed by the
judgment of this Court dated 05.05.2017. The petitioners
aggrieved by the said judgment dated 05.05.2017 by which
all   the   appeals   were   dismissed   have   filed   these   review
petitions   praying   for   reviewing   the   judgment   dated
05.05.2017.
3
3. We have heard the learned counsel, Shri A.P. Singh
appearing for the petitioners and Shri Sidharth Luthra,
learned senior counsel for the State.
4. Shri A.P. Singh learned counsel for the peititoners
in   support   of   the   review   petitions   has   urged   several
grounds. Shri Singh submits that death penalty in India
needs to be abolished. He submits that there are several
reasons   for   opposing   death   penalty   which   broadly
speaking,   they   fall   under   two   categories,   moral   and
practical. This also goes against the principle of nonviolence
  that   India   has   advocated   for   decades.   In   the
year 1966, the Bill introducing death penalty abolition
was   passed   by   the   House   of   Parliament   in   England.   He
further   submitted   that   in   a   large   number   of   countries
death   penalty   has   been   abolished.   In   his   submission   he
has   referred   the   names   of   several   Latin   American
countries and  several  Australian States.
5. Apart from above, several other contentions have been
advanced by Shri A.P. Singh which we proceed to note in
seriatim. Shri Singh submits that investigation and trial
4
has been carried out with the sole purpose of survival of
the prosecuting agency. The investigation is engaged in
maladroit effort to book the vulnerable and the innocent
so as to disguise and cover there inefficiency to catch
the   real   culprits.   The   political   class   is   using
investigating   agencies   as   tools   for   partisan   political
objective.
6. PW.1,   during   his   cross­examination   was   confronted
with   his   statement   Ex.PW­1/A   qua   the   factum   of   not
disclosing the use of iron rod, the description of Bus,
the name of assailants either in MLC Ex.PW­51/A or in his
complaint   Ex.PW­1/A.   The   Bus,   Ex.P­1   has   been   falsely
implicated   in   the   present   case.   CCTV   footage   was   not
properly examined to check all possible Buses plying on
the   said   route.     The   Bus   was   taken   to   Tyagraj   Stadium
instead of the Police Station to avoid the media and to
facilitate the planting of evidence.
7. That the three dying declarations have been contrived
and   deserved   to   be   kept   out   of   consideration   and   the
dying   declarations   do   not   inspire   confidence   for
5
variations in them relating to the number of assailants,
the description of Bus, the identity of accused etc. If
at all any dying declaration is to be relied on, it is
first dying declaration made on 16.12.2012 and recorded
by PW­49, Dr. Rashmi Ahuja, which dying declaration only
states that there were 4 to 5 persons in the Bus.
8. In   the   statement   recorded   in   MLC   Ex.PW­49/A
prosecutrix   has   neither   named   any   of   the   accused   nor
mentioned   the   factum   of   iron   rod   being   used   by   the
accused   persons.   The   prosecutrix   could   not   have   given
such a lengthy dying declaration on 21.12.2012 when she
was   continuously   on   morphine.   Third   dying   declaration
recorded   by   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate,   PW­30,   on
25.12.2012, through gesture and writings is controverted
by allegations of false medical fitness certificate and
absence   of   videography.     The   use   of   iron   rod   was   not
mentioned   by   PW­1   in   his   statement.   Had   the   iron   rod
been   really   inserted   through   the   vagina,   it   would   have
first   destroyed   the   uterus   before   the   intestines   were
pulled   out.   There   were   no   rod   related   injuries   in   her
6
uterus   and   medical   science   too   does   not   assist   the
prosecution in their claim.
9. The DNA test can not be treated as accurate, since
there was blood transfusion as the prosecutrix required
blood   and   when   there   is   mixing   of   blood,   the
DNA profile is likely to differ. 
10. The   High   Court   has   failed   to   appreciate   that
petitioner No.1, Vinay Sharma on the date of incident and
time was in a musical programme arranged by S.C.C. unit
of Church in his locality and he was there from 8.15 p.m.
to 11/12 p.m. on 16.12.2012. The presence of petitioner
No.1   in   musical   show   has   been   witnessed   by   defence
witnesses who had deposed before the Court. Ram Babu,DW10
had also videographed the show from the mobile phone
of   petitioner   No.1   which   was   produced   before   the   trial
court.
11. The   application   for   ossification   test   submitted   by
petitioner   No.1   was   wrongly   turned   down   by   the   trial
court. The petitioner was actually born on 01.03.1995 but
his   date   of   birth   given   by   his   father   was   01.03.1994
7
which was only for the purpose of getting him admitted in
the MCD School. The petitioner was only 17 years 8 months
and 15 days old at the time of incident.
12. The   real   date   of   birth   of   petitioner   No.2   is
08.10.1996 and he was also minor on the date of incident.
The   petitioners   were   not   habitual   offenders.   Number   of
dacoits have surrendered for the last several decades and
have reformed themselves.
13. Shri   Sidharth   Luthra,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing for the State refuting the submissions of the
petitioners submitted that the petitioners already in a
long hearing of the appeals before this Court have made
all   possible   submissions   which   have   been   considered   by
this Court while deciding the appeals on 05.05.2017, the
review   petition   is   nothing   but   an   effort   by   the
petitioners   to   re­argue   the   appeals   on   merits   which   is
not permissible under the law. No grounds have been made
out to consider the review petitions. In so far as the
submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioners
that the death penalty be abolished in India, Shri Luthra
8
submits that the said submission need not to be gone into
in   these   review   petitions.   It   is   submitted   that   death
penalty   has   already   been   upheld   by   this   Court   by   the
Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in  Bachan   Singh   vs.
State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684. He submits that death
penalty being still in the statute book it is not open
for the petitioners to  argue  that  the  death penalty be
abolished   in   this   country.   The   abolition   of   the   death
penalty   is   a   legislative   function   and   unless   the
Parliament   passes   an   amending   Act   it   is   not   for   the
Courts to consider the said submission.
14. With   regard   to   the   submissions   of   the   petitioners
that   investigation   was   faulty   and   prosecuting   agencies
had   roped   in   the   petitioners,   it   is   submitted   that
prosecution   was   scientifically   carried   out   in   efficient
manner which has also been noted by this Court and any
person against the prosecution are unjustified and have
to be ignored.
15. The evidence of PW­1 and all infirmities which are
sought to be pointed out in these review petitions have
9
already   been   considered   and   gone   into   by   this   Court.
Learned counsel has referred  to in  paragraphs  65  to 97
and   425   to   434   of   the   judgment   where   this   Court   has
thoroughly considered all submissions regarding evidence
of PW­1 and this Court has rejected the inconsistencies,
shortcomings   and   omissions   as   being   pointed   by   the
petitioners. Coming to the submission that the Bus, P­1
has   been     falsely   implicated,   Shri   Luthra   submits   that
apart   from   CCTV   footage   where   Bus   was   noticed   twice
passing   in   front   of   the   hotel,   there   were   other
evidences, namely finger prints, wound stains and other
objects obtained from the Bus which proved that the Bus
was involved in the incident. Shri Luthra has referred to
paragraphs 104 and 105 where this argument has been noted
and rejected by this Court.
16. On the submissions raised by the learned counsel for
the petitioners regarding dying declarations, Shri Luthra
submits   that   all   arguments   pertaining   to   dying
declarations have  been considered and dealt with by this
Court   in   paragraphs   148   to   192   of   the   judgment   dated
10
05.05.2017 and petitioners cannot be allowed to reagitate
the same which have already been considered and rejected
by   this   Court.   With   regard   to   first   dying   declaration
which was the case history recorded by Dr. Rashmi Ahuja,
this   Court   has   considered   all   aspects   and   had   already
held that there was no infirmity in noticing the facts as
could be disclosed by the prosecutrix at that time when
she   had   undergone   traumatic   experience   immediately
before.
17. The non­mention of use of iron rod in the MLC or PW1's
statement has also been considered by this Court and
this Court had held and found use of iron rod from the
evidence. The statement of PW­1 pertaining to use of iron
rod   to   injure   the   prosecutrix   has   also   been   considered
and   noticed   by   this   Court.   The   DNA   reports   have   been
examined   in   detail   by   this   Court   including   blood
transfusion which has also been considered in paragraphs
233­234. With regard to alibi of Vinay Sharma that he, at
the relevant time, was in a musical programme, this Court
in   its   judgment   dated   05.05.2017   has   considered   and
11
rejected the plea of alibi after consideration of Defence
evidence.   The   same   argument   cannot   be   allowed   to   be
raised in the review petition.  In so far as the argument
that petitioner No.1, Vinay  Sharma was a juvenile at the
time   of   the   commission   of   the   offence,   Shri   Luthra
mentioned   order   of   the   trial   court   dated   10.01.2013
which mentioned that age verification report of Vinay and
Pawan have been received and they do not dispute the age
verification report filed by the IO. The prosecuiton has
placed   the   certified   copy   of   the   admission   register   of
the first attended school along with the certified copy
of the admission form of the first class of accused­Vinay
Sharma   and   trial   court   after   considering   all   evidences
had held that Vinay Sharma was more than 18 years of age
at the time of commission of offence. On the claim that
Pawan was a juvenile, Shri Luthra referred to the order
dated 10.01.2013 where age verification report of Pawan
has   been   received   and   also   certified   copies   had   been
filed on record. The report had referred to the written
statement of the parents of both these accused where they
have   confirmed   the   age   of   their   wards.     There   was   no
12
infirmity   in   the   trial   court   taking   decision   that   both
were   major   and   the   trial   court   proceeded   accordingly.
There   is   no   substance   in   the   submission   raised   by   the
learned counsel for the petitioners.
18. We have considered the submissions of the parties and
perused the records.
19. Before we enter into the submissions raised in these
review petitions, it is useful to recapitulate the scope
and   grounds   available   for   exercise   of   jurisdiction   by
this Court under Article 137. Order XLVII Rule 1 of the
Supreme   Court   Rules,   2013   dealing   with   review   is   as
follows:
“i.   The   Court   may   review   its   judgment   or
order,   but   no   application   for   review   will   be
entertained   in   a   civil   proceeding   except   on
the ground mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1 of
the Code, and in a criminal proceeding except
on the ground of an error apparent on the face
of the record.”
20. An   application   to   review   a   judgment   is   not   to   be
lightly   entertained   and   this   Court   could   exercise   its
review jurisdiction only when those grounds are made out
13
as provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court
Rules, 2013 framed under Article 145 of the Constitution
of India.  This Court in Sow Chandra Kante and another v.
Sheikh Habib, (1975) 1 SCC 674  speaking through Justice
V.R. Krishna Iyer on review has stated the following in
para 10:
“10. A review of a judgment is a serious step
and   reluctant   resort   to   it   is   proper   only
where a glaring omission or patent mistake or
like   grave   error   has   crept   in   earlier   by
judicial   fallibility.   A   mere   repetition,
through   different   counsel,   of   old   and
overruled   arguments,   a   second   trip   over
ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes
of   inconsequential   import   are   obviously
insufficient.”
21. As   per   rule,   review   in   a   criminal   proceeding   is
permissible only on the ground of error apparent on the
face of the record. This Court in  P.N. Eswara Iyer and
others v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (1980) 4
SCC 680  while examining the review jurisdiction of this
Court  vis a vis  criminal and civil proceedings had made
the following observations in paras 34 and 35: 
“34.   The   rule,   on   its   face,   affords   a   wider
set of grounds for review for orders in  civil
proceedings,   but   limits   the   ground   vis­a­vis
14
criminal   proceedings  to   “errors   apparent  on
the   face  of   the   record”.   If   at   all,   the
concern   of   the   law   to   avoid   judicial   error
should   be   heightened   when   life   or   liberty   is
in peril since civil penalties are often less
traumatic. So, it is reasonable to assume that
the   framers   of   the   rules   could   not   have
intended   a   restrictive   review   over   criminal
orders   or   judgments.   It   is   likely   to   be   the
other   way   about.   Supposing   an   accused   is
sentenced   to   death   by   the   Supreme   Court   and
the “deceased” shows up in court and the court
discovers the tragic treachery of the recorded
testimony. Is the court helpless to review and
set   aside   the   sentence   of   hanging?   We   think
not. The power to review is in Article 137 and
it   is   equally   wide   in   all   proceedings.   The
rule   merely   canalises   the   flow   from   the
reservoir   of   power.   The   stream   cannot   stifle
the   source.   Moreover,   the   dynamics   of
interpretation   depend   on   the   demand   of   the
context   and   the   lexical   limits   of   the   test.
Here   “record”   means   any   material   which   is
already on record or may, with the permission
of the court, be brought on record. If justice
summons  the  Judges   to   allow  a   vital  material
in,   it   becomes   part   of   the   record;   and   if
apparent   error   is   there,   correction   becomes
necessitous.
35.   The   purpose   is   plain,   the   language   is
elastic   and   interpretation   of   a   necessary
power   must   naturally   be   expansive.   The
substantive power is derived from Article 137
and   is   as   wide   for   criminal   as   for   civil
proceedings.   Even   the   difference   in
phraseology   in   the   rule   (Order   40   Rule   2)
must, therefore, be read to encompass the same
area   and   not   to   engraft   an   artificial
divergence   productive   of   anomaly.   If   the
expression   “record”   is   read   to   mean,   in   its
15
semantic   sweep,   any   material   even   later
brought   on   record,   with   the   leave   of   the
court, it will embrace subsequent events, new
light and other grounds which we find in Order
47   Rule   1,   CPC.   We   see   no   insuperable
difficulty   in   equating   the   area  in   civil   and
criminal   proceedings   when   review   power   is
invoked from the same source.”
22. The scope of review jurisdiction has been considered
by   this   Court   in   a   number   of   cases   where   well   settled
principles   have   been   reiterated   time   and   again.   It   is
sufficient to refer to judgment of this Court in Kamlesh
Verma   vs.   Mayawati   and   others   (2013)   8   SCC   320,   where
this   Court   has   elaborately   considered   the   scope   of
review. In paras 17, 18, 20.1 and 20.2 following has been
laid down:
“17.  In a review petition, it is not open to
the   Court   to   reappreciate   the   evidence   and
reach a different conclusion, even if that is
possible.   Conclusion   arrived   at   on
appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in
a   review   petition   unless   it   is   shown   that
there is an error apparent on the face of the
record   or   for   some   reason   akin   thereto.  This
Court in  Kerala SEB  v.  Hitech Electrothermics
& Hydropower Ltd.  held as under: (SCC p. 656,
para 10)
“10. … In a review petition it is not open to
this Court to reappreciate the evidence and
16
reach a different conclusion, even if that is
possible. The learned counsel for the Board
at   best   sought   to   impress   us   that   the
correspondence exchanged between the parties
did   not   support   the   conclusion   reached   by
this Court. We are afraid such a submission
cannot   be   permitted   to   be   advanced   in   a
review petition. The appreciation of evidence
on record is fully within the domain of the
appellate   court.   If   on   appreciation   of   the
evidence   produced,   the   court   records   a
finding   of   fact   and   reaches   a   conclusion,
that   conclusion   cannot   be   assailed   in   a
review petition unless it is shown that there
is   an   error   apparent   on   the   face   of   the
record   or   for   some   reason   akin   thereto.   It
has not been contended before us that there
is   any   error   apparent   on   the   face   of   the
record.   To   permit   the   review   petitioner   to
argue   on   a   question   of   appreciation   of
evidence would amount to converting a review
petition into an appeal in disguise.”
18.  Review   is   not   rehearing   of   an   original
matter. The power of review cannot be confused
with appellate power which enables a superior
court   to   correct   all   errors   committed   by   a
subordinate   court.   A   repetition   of   old   and
overruled   argument   is   not   enough   to   reopen
concluded   adjudications.   This   Court   in  Jain
Studios   Ltd.  v.  Shin   Satellite   Public   Co.
Ltd.,   held   as   under:   (SCC   pp.   504­505,   paras
11­12)
“11. So far as the grievance of the applicant
on merits is concerned, the learned counsel
for the opponent is right in submitting that
virtually the applicant seeks the same relief
which had been sought at the time of arguing
the main matter and had been negatived. Once
17
such   a   prayer   had   been   refused,   no   review
petition   would   lie   which   would   convert
rehearing   of   the   original   matter.   It   is
settled law that the power of review cannot
be   confused   with   appellate   power   which
enables   a   superior   court   to   correct   all
errors committed by a subordinate court. It
is   not   rehearing   of   an   original   matter.   A
repetition of old and overruled argument is
not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
The   power   of   review   can   be   exercised   with
extreme care, caution and circumspection and
only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by
the   applicant   herein   had   been   made   at   the
time when the arbitration petition was heard
and was rejected, the same relief cannot be
sought   by   an   indirect   method   by   filing   a
review   petition.   Such   petition,   in   my
opinion, is in the nature of ‘second innings’
which   is   impermissible   and   unwarranted   and
cannot be granted.””
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or
evidence   which,   after   the   exercise   of   due
diligence,   was   not   within   knowledge   of   the
petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of
the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The   words   “any   other   sufficient   reason”   have
been   interpreted   in  Chhajju   Ram  v.  Neki  and
approved by this Court in  Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius
to   mean   “a   reason   sufficient   on   grounds   at
18
least   analogous   to   those   specified   in   the
rule”.   The   same   principles   have   been
reiterated   in  Union   of   India  v.  Sandur
Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.
20.2.  When   the   review   will   not   be
maintainable:
(i)   A   repetition   of   old   and   overruled
argument   is   not   enough   to   reopen   concluded
adjudications.
(ii)   Minor   mistakes   of   inconsequential
import.
(iii)   Review   proceedings   cannot   be   equated
with the original hearing of the case.
(iv)   Review   is   not   maintainable   unless   the
material error, manifest on the face of the
order, undermines its soundness or results in
miscarriage of justice.
(v)   A   review   is   by   no   means   an   appeal   in
disguise   whereby   an   erroneous   decision   is
reheard   and   corrected   but   lies   only   for
patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the
subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the
record should not be an error which has to be
fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record
is fully within the domain of the appellate
court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced
in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same
relief sought at the time of arguing the main
matter had been negatived.”
19
23. This very Bench speaking through one of us (Justice
Ashok   Bhushan)   had   occasion   to   consider   the   ambit   and
scope of the review Jurisdiction in a criminal proceeding
in  Vikram Singh alias Vicky Walia and another vs. State
of Punjab and another (2017) 8 SCC 518.   In para 23 of
the judgement following has been stated:
“23.   In   view   of   the   above,   it   is   clear   that
scope,   ambit   and   parameters   of   review
jurisdiction   are   well   defined.   Normally   in   a
criminal   proceeding,   review   applications
cannot be entertained except on the ground of
error   apparent   on   the   face   of   the   record.
Further,   the   power   given   to  this   Court   under
Article   137   is   wider   and   in   an   appropriate
case   can   be  exercised   to   mitigate   a  manifest
injustice. By review application an applicant
cannot be allowed to reargue the appeal on the
grounds   which   were   urged   at   the   time   of   the
hearing   of   the   criminal   appeal.   Even   if   the
applicant succeeds in establishing that there
may be another view possible on the conviction
or   sentence   of   the   accused   that   is   not   a
sufficient ground for review. This Court shall
exercise its jurisdiction to review only when
a glaring omission or patent mistake has crept
in   the   earlier   decision   due   to   judicial
fallibility. There has to be an error apparent
on   the   face   of   the   record   leading   to
miscarriage of justice to exercise the review
jurisdiction under Article 137 read with Order
40   Rule   1.   There   has   to   be   a   material   error
manifest   on   the   face   of   the   record   with
results in the miscarriage of justice.”
20
24. We first take up the submission of Shri A.P. Singh
regarding the abolition of death penalty in this counrty.
The   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in  Bachan   Singh
(supra)  examined   the   constitutional   validity   of   death
penalty   as   provided   under   Section   302   of   IPC.   After
elaborately considering the existence of death penalty in
the Penal Code, constitutional provisions of Articles 19
and 21, and international covenant on civil and criminal
rights, this court held that death penalty as contained
in Penal Code is constitutionally valid. In paragraph 132
following was held:
“132. To sum up, the question whether or not
death   penalty   serves   any   penological   purpose
is a difficult, complex and intractable issue.
It has evoked strong, divergent views. For the
purpose   of   testing   the   constitutionality   of
the   impugned   provision   as   to   death   penalty
in Section   302, Penal   Code on   the   ground   of
reasonableness in the light Of Articles 19 and
21   of   the   Constitution,   it   is   not   necessary
for us to express any categorical opinion, one
way   or   the   other,   as   to   which   of   these   two
antithetical views, held by the Abolitionists
and   Retentionists,   is   correct.   It   is
sufficient   to   say   that   the   very   fact   that
persons   of   reason,   learning   and   light   are
rationally and deeply divided in their opinion
on this issue, is a ground among others, for
rejecting   the   petitioner's   argument   that
retention   of   death   penalty   in   the   impugned
21
provision,   is   totally   devoid   of   reason   and
purpose.   If,   notwithstanding   the   view   of   the
Abolitionists   to   the   contrary,   a   very   large
segment   of   people,   the   world   over,   including
sociologists, legislators, jurists, judges and
administrators   still   firmly   believe   in   the
worth and necessity of capital punishment for
the   protection   of   society,   if   in   the
perspective of prevailing crime conditions in
India, contemporary public opinion channelized
through   the   people's   representatives   in
Parliament,   has   repeatedly   in   the   last   three
decades, rejected all attempts, including the
one made recently, to abolish or specifically
restrict the area of death penalty, if death
penalty   is   still   a   recognised   legal   sanction
for murder or some types of murder in most of
the civilised countries in the world, if the!
framers of the Indian Constitution were fully
aware as we shall presently show they were of
the   existence   of   death   penalty   as   punishment
for   murder,   under the   Indian   Penal   Code,   if
the 35th Report and subsequent Reports of the
Law   Commission   suggesting   retention   of   death
penalty,   and   recommending   revision of   the
Criminal   Procedure   Code and   the   insertion   of
the   new Sections   235(2) and 354(3) in   that
Code   providing   for   pre­sentence   hearing   and
sentencing procedure on conviction for murder
and   other   capital   offences   were   before   the
Parliament   and   presumably   considered   by   it
when in 1972­1973 it took up revision of the
Code of   1898   and   replaced   it   by   the CrPC,
1973,   it   is   not   possible   to   hold   that   the
provision   of   death   penalty   as   an   alternative
punishment   for   murder,   in Section   302, Penal
Code is   unreasonable   and   not   in   the   public
interest.   We   would,   therefore,   conclude   that
the   impugned   provision   in Section   302,
violates   neither   the   letter   or   the   ethos
of Article 19.”
22
25. The submission of Mr. Singh that death penalty has
been abolished by the Parliament of U.K. in the year 1966
and   several   Latin   American   countries   and   Australian
States have also abolished death penalty is no ground to
efface   the   death   penalty   from   the   statute   book   of   our
country.  So far the death  penalty  remains  in  the  Penal
Code the Courts cannot be held to commit any illegality
in awarding death penalty in appropriate cases.
26. In view of the above, no ground to review judgment is
made out on the strength of the above submissions.
27. Now,   coming   to   the   submissions   made   by   Shri   Singh
attacking   the   investigation   and   prosecution   agencies,
suffice   it   to   say   that   submissions   and   arguments   are
general in nature and not based on any substantial ground
so as to point out any such error in the trial so as to
furnish any ground to review any judgment.
28. The   submission   made   by   Shri   Singh   attacking   the
evidence of PW­1 sole eye­witness, who was also injured
23
in the incident need not to be considered in these review
petitions.   All   submissions   impeaching   evidence   of   PW­1
were   made   when   the   appeals   were   heard   on   merit.     This
Court   had   considered   all   submissions   attacking   the
evidence of PW­1 in paragraphs 65­97 and 425 to 434. This
Court after examining the relevant evidences had relied
on evidence of PW­1. In the review petitions, petitioners
cannot   ask   the   Court   to   re­hear   the   appeals   on   merits
which submissions had already been noted, considered and
rejected.
29. The   submission   of   Shri   Singh   that   Bus   Ex.P­1,   has
been   falsely   implicated   is   also   stated   to   be   rejected.
All these submissions were considered by this Court while
delivering the judgment in paragraphs 98­107. This   Court
has   rejected   the   submission   of   the   petitioners   that   it
was a case of plantation of Bus, the Bus was found to be
involved in the incident from the evidence on record.
30. Contention of Mr. V.K. Singh is that the bus No. DL 1
PC  0149 (Ext.  P/1)  has  been falsely implicated  and  the
24
CCTV Footage cannot be relied upon and this aspect is not
properly considered by this Court.  The exact points now
raised by Mr. Singh in para (M) of the review petition
were considered by this Court in paras (98) to (113) and
paras   (435)   to   (439).     In   para   (101),   this   Court   has
referred   to   the   evidence   of   PW­76   Gautam   Roy,   HoD,
Computer   Cell,   Forensic   Division   who   has   examined   the
CCTV Footage received by him in a Pen Drive in two sealed
parcels.  In paras (98) to (113), this Court has referred
to   the   evidence   regarding   retrieval   of   CCTV   Footage   in
the   presence   of   PW­67   Pramod   Kumar   Jha,   owner   of   the
hotel at Delhi Airport and the photographs taken thereon
to   prove   the   involvement   of   the   bus   No.   DL   1   PC   0149
(Ext. P/1).
31. To show the involvement of the bus No. DL 1 PC 0149
(Ext. P/1), in paras (108) to (113), this Court has also
elaborately   considered   the   evidence   of   PW­81,   Dinesh
Yadav,   owner   of   the   bus   and   PW­16   Rajeev   Jakhmola,
Manager   (Admn.)   of   Birla   Vidya   Niketan   School,   Pushp
Vihar who have stated that the bus No. DL 1 PC 0149 (Ext.
25
P/1) was routinely driven by Ram Singh (deceased accused)
and he was the driver of the bus.
32. Involvement of the bus No. DL 1 PC 0149 (Ext. P/1)
was   also   held   to   be   substantiated   by   matching   of   DNA
profile of the material objects lifted from the bus No.
DL 1 PC 0149 (Ext. P/1) which were found consistent with
that of the victim and the complainant.   In paras (431)
and (438), the same has been well­considered.   Matching
of   DNA   profile   developed   from   the   articles   seized   from
the bus like ‘hair’ recovered from the third left row of
the bus and the blood­stained seat cover of the bus and
the   bunch   of   hair   recovered   from   the   floor   of   the   bus
with   the   DNA   profile   of   the   victim   was   held   to   be
unimpeachable   evidence   establishing   the   involvement   of
the bus in the commission of the offence.   The oral and
scientific   evidence   has   been   elaborately   considered   by
this Court in upholding the findings of the High Court as
to   the   involvement   of   the   bus.     The   petitioner/accused
cannot reagitate the same point again.
26
33. Mr.   Singh   has  inter   alia  made   various   submissions
regarding   reliability   of   the   three   dying   declarations:­
(i) failure to disclose the names of any of the accused
in   the   first   dying   declaration   (Ext.PW­49/A)   and
therefore,   the   second   and   third   dying   declarations   are
tutored;   (ii)   the   three   dying   declarations   cannot   be
relied upon due to variations and improvements; and (iii)
sudden  appearance  of  the  name  of  ‘Vipin’  (in  the  third
dying declaration) makes it doubtful and no explanation
is offered.
34. The   victim   made   three   dying   declarations:­   (i)
statement recorded by PW­49 Dr. Rashmi Ahuja immediately
after   the   victim   was   admitted   to   the   hospital;     (ii)
Dying declaration (Ex.PW­27/A) recorded by PW­27 SDM Usha
Chaturvedi   on   21.12.2012;   and   (iii)   dying   declaration
(Ex.PW­30/D) recorded by PW­30 Pawan Kumar, Metropolitan
Magistrate on 25.12.2012 at 1:00 p.m. by multiple choice
questions and recording answers by gestures and writing.
In   the   first   dying   declaration   (Ex.PW­49/A),   the
prosecutrix has stated that more than two men committed
27
rape on her, bit her on lips, cheeks and breast and also
subjected   her   to   unnatural   sex.   In   the   second   dying
declaration   (Ex.PW­27/A)   recorded   by   PW­27,   the   victim
has   narrated   the   entire   incident   in   great   detail,
specifying   the   role   of   each   accused,   rape   committed   by
number of persons, insertion of iron rod in her private
parts,   description   of   the   bus,   robbery   committed   and
throwing   of   both   the   victims   out   of   the   moving   bus   in
naked condition.  On 25.12.2012 at 1:00 p.m., PW­30 Pawan
Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate recorded the statement by
putting   multiple   choice   questions   to   the   victim   and   by
getting   answers   through   gestures   and   writing.       While
making   the   third   declaration,   the   victim   also   tried   to
reveal   the   names   of   the   accused   by   writing   in   her   own
handwriting   viz.   “Ram   Singh,   Mukesh,   Vinay,   Akshay,
Vipin, Raju”.
35. All the contentions raised regarding the three dying
declarations   have   been   considered   in   detail   in   paras
(148) to (192) and paras (395) to (417). Considering all
the   three   dying   declarations,   in   the   light   of   well­
28
settled   principles,   this   Court   held   that   all   the   three
dying   declarations   are   true,   voluntary   and   consistent.
Insofar as third dying declaration, this Court, in paras
(408)   to   (412)   held   that   the   dying   declaration   made
through   signs,   gestures   or   by   nods   are   admissible   as
evidence  and  that  proper  care  was  taken by  PW­30  Pawan
Kumar,   Metropolitan   Magistrate   and   the   third   dying
declaration   recorded   by   in   response   to   the   multiplechoice
  questions   by   signs,   gestures   made   by   the   victim
are   admissible   as   evidence.     In   the   third   dying
declaration,   the   victim   also   wrote   the   names   of   the
accused persons “Ram Singh, Mukesh, Vinay, Akshay, Vipin,
Raju”.   So far as the name of accused Vipin written by
the prosecutrix in the third dying declaration has been
elaborately considered by this Court in paras (150) and
(188) of the judgment.
36. Non­mention of use of iron rod in MLC, Ex.PW­49/A has
also been noticed by this Court in its judgment and this
Court has given reasons for not finding any fault in the
MLC,   Ex.PW­49/A.   The   submissions   of   Shri   Singh   that   on
29
21.12.2012   the   prosecutrix   was   not   fit   to   record   her
dying declaration has also been rejected. With regard to
the   morphine   injection   which   was   given   to   prosecutrix,
the statement  of  Doctor,  the  time  of  injection  and  the
effect of morphine was categorically noted and considered
and no fault was found with the second dying declaration.
The   submission   having   been   noted,   considered   and   dealt
with   by   this   Court   in   the   judgment,   the   petitioners
cannot be allowed to reagitate the same issue again and
again. Non­mention of use of iron rod in the statement of
PW­1 has also been noted in detail by this Court. That in
second   dying   declaration   on   21.12.2012   the   prosecutrix
has   mentioned   the   use   of   iron   rod   by   which   she   was
injured   which   is   also   noted   by   the   Court.   This   Court
noted the injuries and medical evidence and has concluded
that accused had used iron rod. Those submissions having
been   raised,   dealt   with   by   this   Court   in   the   main
judgment, the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the
same again.
37. With   regard   to   reports   regarding   DNA,   this   Court
elaborately   considered   the   whole   concept   of   DNA   and
30
reports   received.   The   attack   of   the   petitioners   on   the
ground of blood transfusion and other submissions on DNA
report having been considered and has rightly been relied
on by this Court, the submissions pertaining to DNA are
nothing   but   repitition   of   submissions   which   have   been
noted and rejected by this Court in the main judgment.
38. Contention of Mr. V.K. Singh is that accused Vinay
Sharma raised the plea of  alibi  that he had attended a
musical programme arranged by SCC Unit of the Church in
his   locality   and   he   was   there   from   08:15   pm   to
11.00/12.00   pm   on   16.12.2012   and   he   has   produced   the
video   clipping   to   prove   his   presence   there   in   the
programme  and  the  same  has  not  been considered  by  this
Court.
39. The plea of  alibi  put forth by accused Vinay Sharma
that he was present in the musical programme organised by
the   SCC   Unit   of   the   Church   in   the   DDA   Park   in   his
locality has been elaborately considered in paras (258)
to   (269).     In   para   (267)   of   the   judgment,   this   Court
referred   to   the   evidence   of   PW­83   Shri   Angad   Singh,
31
Deputy Director (Horticulture), DDA who has deposed that
no   permission   was   granted   by   any   authority   to   organise
any   function   in   the   evening   of   16.12.2012   in   the   DDA
District Park, Hauz Khas, New Delhi.  This Court has also
referred to the evidence of PW­84 Father George Manimala
of   St.   Thomas   Church   and   PW­85   Brother   R.P.   Samuel,
Secretary, Ebenezer Assembly Church who have deposed that
their   church(es)   never   organised   any   musical
programme/event   in   the   DDA   District   Park,   Hauz   Khas   in
the   evening   of   Sunday   i.e.   on   16.12.2012.     While
considering the plea of  alibi  raised by Vinay Sharma in
paras  (258) to  (269)  referring  to  the  evidence  of  DW­5
Smt. Chamba Devi, mother of accused Vinay Sharma,   DW­7
Kishore Kumar Bhat and DW­9 Manu Sharma, this Court held
that the plea of alibi raised by accused Vinay Sharma was
not   acceptable.     Petitioner/accused   Vinay   Sharma   now
cannot reagitate the same point.
40. Plea of alibi raised by accused Vinay Sharma was also
considered in the light of the footprints lifted from the
bus   (Ext.P/1).     PW­46   A.D.   Shah,   Senior   Scientific
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Officer   (Fingerprints),   CFSL,   CBI   examined   the   chance
prints lifted from the bus marked as “Q.1” and “Q.4” was
found identical with the left palmprint and right thumb
impression of accused Vinay Sharma.   After referring to
the   evidence   of   PW­46   and   the   expert   report   (Ext.   PW46/D),
  this   Court   held   that   the   evidence   clearly
establishes the presence of accused Vinay Sharma in the
bus.   There is no merit in the contention that the plea
of alibi was not considered by this Court.
41. Likewise,   video   clippings   relied   upon   by   accused
Vinay Sharma (Ext.DW­10/1) was considered in para (263)
of   the   judgment   wherein   this   Court   held   that   accused
Vinay Sharma and accused Pawan Gupta were not in the DDA
District Park at 08:16 pm on 16.12.2012.
42. Now, coming to the submission regarding juvenility of
petitioner,   Vinay   Sharma.   The   issue   of   juvenile   was
considered   by   the   trial   court   and   trial   court   on   the
basis   of   the   materials   on   record   held   that   petitioner
No.1   was   not   a   juvenile.   Learned   counsel   for   the
respondent has referred to the order of the trial court
33
dated 10.01.2013 which fully supports his submission. The
trial court on being fully satisfied that petitioner is
not a juvenile has rightly rejected the application for
ossification test submitted by petitioner No.1. There is
no substance in this submission and no ground is made out
to review the judgment.
43. Now, coming to the submission of the learned counsel
for petitioner No.2 that he was juvenile at the time of
occurrence.   The   said   issue   was   also   considered   by   the
trial court and rejected. The trial court on the basis of
the material placed before it had rightly concluded that
petitioner No.2 was not a juvenile. Learned counsel for
the respondent has rightly referred to the proceedings of
trial   court   dated   10.09.2013.   In   this   respect   this
submission also does not furnish any ground for review of
the judgment.
44. Before   closing   we   need   to   reiterate   that   criminal
appeals   filed   by   the   appellants   (petitioners   herein)
against the judgment of the High Court were heard by this
Court   giving   them   sufficient   time   for   raising   all
possible   submissions.   The   hearing   in   criminal   appeals
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continued   about   38   days.   The   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants/petitioners   had   made   elaborate   submissions
which   were   all   duly   considered   by   us   in   our   main
judgment.   In   these   review   petitions   no   ground   has   been
made   out   which   may   furnish   any   ground   to   review   the
judgment.   We,   thus,   find   no   merit   in   these   review
petitions   and   consequently,   the   review   petitions   are
dismissed.
........................CJI.
( DIPAK MISRA )
..........................J.
     ( R. BANUMATHI )
..........................J.
     ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
JULY 09, 2018.