LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Sunday, October 15, 2017

MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT - Section 16(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act =the plaintiffs have miserably failed to establish that there has been a valid marriage between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai and that the plaintiffs have been born out of the said wedlock or even born to him through Rajammal illegally, it is found that the plaintiffs as such are not entitled to claim any share in the suit properties even on the footing that they are the illegitimate children of Rathinam Pillai and accordingly, it is found that the plaintiffs are not entitled to invoke Section 16(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act for claiming the limited reliefs as prayed for in the plaint.= I hold that Rajammal is not the legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai, I further hold that the plaintiffs are not the children of the deceased Rathinam Pillai. Consequently, I hold that the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any partition and separate possession of their respective shares in the suit properties as prayed for. I further hold that Rajeswari is the legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and the defendants are the children of the deceased Rathinam Pillai. Accordingly, Point Nos.I to IV are answered against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants.



BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 17.08.2017
Date of Reserving the Judgment
Date of Pronouncing the Judgment
02.08.2017
17.08.2017

CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE T.RAVINDRAN
A.S.No.276 of 2004
and
M.P.(MD) Nos.1 of 2011 & 1 of 2013
and
C.M.P.(MD) No.6506 of 2017

1.Rajaselvi
2.Maheswari ... Appellants
-vs-

1.Meenatchi
2.Ponnu Velammal
3.Karthigairani ... Respondents
PRAYER: Appeal is filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
set aside the Judgment and Decree, dated 27.09.2002 made in O.S.No.66 of
1985, on the file of the Sub Court, Periyakulam.
!For Appellants : Mr.M.Thirunavukkarasu

^For Respondents : No appearance for R1
Mr.R.Vijayakumar for R2 & R3
:JUDGMENT
Impugning the Judgment and Decree, dated 27.09.2002, passed in O.S.No.66 of
1985, on the file of the Sub Court, Periyakulam, the first appeal has been
preferred by the plaintiffs.
2. The suit in O.S.No.66 of 1985 has been laid by the plaintiffs for
partition and separate possession of the suit properties.

3. The averments contained in the plaint are briefly stated as follows:
3.1. The suit properties originally belonged to Murugapillai alias Rathinam
Pillai and he died intestate on 24.11.1976 and when he was alive, he had
taken Rajammal as his wife and through her, the plaintiffs were born and all
along Rajammal was living with Rathinam Pillai and Rathinam Pillai had two
elder sisters, namely, Palaniammal and Sakunthala and at the instance of his
sisters, Rathinam Pillai had married Rajeswari, who is the daughter of
Sakunthala, as his second wife and through Rajeswari, the defendants 1 to 3
were born to Rathinam Pillai. Rathinam Pillai had shown equal affection to
all his daughters and he spent for their eduction and after his death, the
second wife Rajeswari had developed contact with one Viputhi Veeramuthuswamy
and thereby, she eloped with him and also took away the first defendant along
with her and subsequently, the plaintiffs learnt that Rajeswari married
Viputhi Veeramuthuswamy
and the two other daughters of the deceased Rathinam
Pillai, namely, defendants 2 and 3, were under the care and custody of their
aunt Palaniammal. Hence, Rajeswari as such is not entitled to any share in
her husband's properties on account of her above said conduct
and as
misunderstandings had arisen between the parties and the plaintiffs finding
that it is no longer possible to be in the joint possession of the suit
properties and thereby demanded partition and separate possession and
inasmuch as the defendants did not come forward to effect amicable partition
of the same, according to the plaintiffs, they had been necessitated to lay
the suit for partition claiming their 2/5th share in the same. Further,
according to the plaintiffs, if the Court for any reason comes to the
conclusion that the marriage of Rathinam Pillai with Rajammal is not proved,
still she being kept as the exclusive mistress of the deceased Rathinam
Pillai, the plaintiffs should be treated as his illegitimate children and
thus, would be entitled to 1/4th share in the suit properties.

4. The averments contained in the written statement filed by the defendants 2
and 3 in brief are as follows:
4.1. The suit properties originally belonged to Murugapillai alias Rathinam
Pillai and it is correct to state that Rathinam Pillai died intestate on
24.11.1976. It is false to state that he had taken Rajammal as his wife when
he was alive and the plaintiffs were born through Rajammal out of the above
said alleged marriage between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai and it is false to
state that Rajammal was all along living with Rathinam Pillai. The date of
marriage has not been given in the plaint for the reasons best known to the
plaintiffs. It is true that Rathinam Pillai had two sisters, namely,
Palaniammal and Sakunthala. It is false to state that Rathinam Pillai had
married Rajeswari, who is the daughter of Sakunthala, as his second wife, on
the other hand, Rajeswari was the only wife of Rathinam Pillai and out of the
said wedlock, the defendants were born to Rathinam Pillai and Rajeswari. The
plaintiffs are not the daughters of Rathinam Pillai and he expired on
24.11.1976. It is false to state that after his death, Rajeswari developed
contact with one Vibuthi Veeramuthuswamy and eloped with him and took the
first defendant along with her. It is true that she married Vibuthi
Veeramuthuswamy and leading a married life with him. It is false to state
that Rajeswari is not entitled to claim any share in suit properties. The
plaintiffs not being the legal heirs of the deceased Rathinam Pillai, they
cannot be deemed to be in joint possession of the suit properties and it is
false to state that the plaintiffs demanded partition of the suit properties
and the defendants failed to effect amicable partition. Rathinam Pillai
never married Rajammal and the same had also been described by Rathinam
Pillai in the settlement deed effected by him in favour of Rajammal and the
plaintiffs are, thus, not entitled to claim share in the suit properties as
the legal heirs of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and the Court fee paid is
incorrect and hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed.
5. On the basis of the pleadings set out by the respective parties, the
following issues were framed by the Trial Court:
i. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to obtain the decree as prayed for
in the plaint?
ii. Whether the plaintiffs are the legal representatives of the deceased
Rathinam Pillai?
iii. Whether the suit is maintainable?
iv. Whether the Court fee paid by the plaintiffs is correct? and
v. To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled to?
6. In support of the plaintiffs' case, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.P1
to P17 were marked and on the side of the defendants' D.Ws.1 and 2 were
examined and Exs.D1 to D13 were marked.
7. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
respective parties, the Court below was pleased to dismiss the suit.
Challenging the same, the present appeal has been preferred.
8. Pending first appeal, the appellants have filed M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2011,
under Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C., for reception of certain documents as
additional evidence in support of their case.

9. The averments contained in the affidavit appended to the said
miscellaneous petition are briefly stated as follows:
9.1. The appellants have preferred the appeal impugning the Judgment and
Decree of the Court below rendered in their suit for partition and separate
possession and according to them, they were unaware of the legal issues
involved in the suit and the school transfer certificate of the first
appellant got misplaced and thereby, she preferred a complaint to the S.I. of
Police, Uthamapalayam Police Station, who issued a non-traceable certificate
to her on 31.07.2011 and they are now able to get the four documents detailed
in the petition being marriage invitation card of the second appellant, birth
certificate of a female child born to Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai on
20.12.1970, school transfer certificate issued to the first appellant by
Mohamed Fathima Girls High School, Uthamapalayam and the certificate issued
by S.I.of Police, Uthamapalayam Police Station, which would clinchingly
establish the appellants / plaintiffs case that they are the legal heirs of
the deceased Rathinam Pillai and hence, according to them, the said documents
should be received as additional documents in this appeal and hence, the
miscellaneous petition.
10. The averments contained in the counter affidavit of the respondents 2 and
3 / defendants 2 and 3 to the said miscellaneous petition are briefly stated
as follows:
10.1. The said miscellaneous petition is not maintainable either in law or on
facts. The documents sought to be produced as additional documents cannot be
received in evidence as such. The alleged birth certificate of the second
appellant / second plaintiff shows that she was born in Madurai. However,
there is no pleading in the plaint that at any point of time, Rajammal and
the deceased Rathinam Pillai were residing in Madurai and further the said
document being obtained during the pendency of the appeal cannot be received
in evidence and it is not admissible in evidence. The marriage invitation
card of the second appellant / second plaintiff is inadmissible as in the
settlement deed marked as Ex.D1, it has been clearly averred by the deceased
Rathinam Pillai that the second plaintiff is the daughter of Rajammal and not
his daughter and hence, the said document is also inadmissible. Further, the
school transfer certificate of the first appellant / first plaintiff shows
the date of birth as 17.03.1962, whereas the school transfer certificate
already produced and marked as Ex.D11 shows her date of birth as 04.05.1962
and the name of her parents as Shanmugavel and Rajammal and further in Column
No.19, it is shown as the first appellant has studied 6th to 8th Standards
during the academic year 1973 ? 1974, which is unbelievable and hence, the
said document is also not genuine and inadmissible in evidence. Further, the
certificate issued by S.I.of Police, Uthamapalayam Police Station, is not
genuine and would not in any manner advance the case of the appellants /
plaintiffs and further inasmuch as the ingredients of Order XLI Rule 27
C.P.C., have not been complied with and the documents sought to be produced
are found to be in contravention of the pleadings and the evidence already
adduced, the above said miscellaneous petition is liable to be dismissed.
11. In addition to the above said miscellaneous petition, the appellants /
plaintiffs have also filed C.M.P.(MD) No.6506 of 2017 under the same
provision of law for reception of the marriage registration certificate of
the first appellant / first plaintiff as an additional document in support of
their case.


12. The averments contained in the affidavit appended to the said
miscellaneous petition are briefly stated as follows:
12.1. The petitioners / appellants have laid the first appeal impugning the
Judgment and Decree rendered by the Court below in the suit laid by them for
partition and separate possession. It is stated that the marriage of the
first appellant / first plaintiff was solemnized with P.W.4 at Arulmigu
Meenakshi Sundareswarar Temple, Madurai, on 21.01.1977 and the same was
registered, wherein her father's name was mentioned as M.R.P.Rathinam Pillai
and the name of the village was mentioned as Uthamapalayam and further, the
deceased Rathinam Pillai had put his signature in the marriage register and
the marriage registration certificate had come to the knowledge of the first
appellant / first plaintiff only recently and obtained the certificate of the
same from the Officer concerned and hence, the said document should be
received in evidence as additional document to substantiate her case and
hence, the petition.

13. The averments contained in the counter affidavit of the respondents 2 and
3 / defendants and 3 to the said miscellaneous petition are briefly stated as
follows:
13.1. The miscellaneous petition is not maintainable either in law or on
facts and as per the oral evidence tendered on the side of the plaintiffs,
the marriage of the first appellant / first plaintiff took place at
Thiruparankundram Temple, however, the present additional document sought to
be marked states that her marriage had taken place at Arulmigu Meenakshi
Sundareswarar Temple, Madurai, which goes to show the contradictions in the
case of the plaintiffs and further, the deceased Rathinam Pillai, who is
alleged to have signed in the marriage register for the marriage of the first
appellant / first plaintiff at Meenakshi Amman Temple, Madurai, which took
place on 21.01.1977, but the fact remains that Rathinam Pillai died on
24.11.1976 as averred in Paragraph No.4 of the plaint and hence, the
projected additional document is false and it is a forged document and not
admissible in evidence and further, the ingredients of Order XLI Rule 27 have
not been complied with and hence, the petition is liable to be rejected.
14. The following points arise for consideration in this first appeal:
i. Whether Rajammal is the legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam
Pillai?

ii. Whether the appellants / plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the deceased
Rathinam Pillai born to him out of the lawful wedlock with Rajammal?
iii. Whether the appellants / plaintiffs are entitled to claim partition and
separate possession of their respective shares in the suit properties as
claimed in the plaint?

iv. Whether Rajeswari is the legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam
Pillai and whether the respondents / defendants are the children of the
deceased Rathinam Pillai?

v. To what relief the appellants / plaintiffs are entitled to? and
vi. Whether the miscellaneous petitions in M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2011 and
C.M.P.(MD) No.6506 of 2017, under Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C., are entitled for
acceptance?

POINT NOS.I TO IV:
15. The plaintiffs have laid the suit claiming partition and separate
possession in the suit properties on the footing that Rathinam Pillai married
their mother Rajammal and out of the said wedlock, they were born and thus,
they are the legal heirs of the deceased Rathinam Pillai, who died on
24.11.1976 and further, it is the case of the plaintiffs that Rathinam Pillai
had married one Rajeswari, who is none other than the daughter of his elder
sister, namely, Sakunthala, as his second wife and out of the said wedlock,
the defendants were born and thus, according to the plaintiffs, they and the
defendants are the children of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and thus, it is
the case of the plaintiffs that they are entitled to their respective shares
in the suit properties as the legal heirs of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and
hence, the suit for the above mentioned reliefs. The plaintiffs have also
taken a plea in the plaint itself that in case the Court holds that Rajammal
is not married to Rathinam Pillai and that she had been kept as the exclusive
mistress of the deceased Rathinam Pillai, the status of the plaintiffs shall
be treated as the illegitimate children of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and
thus, they are entitled to get their respective shares in the suit properties
and accordingly, the relief should be moulded in their favour.

16. The defendants have taken a specific defence that Rajammal is not the
legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai as projected by the
plaintiffs and at no point of time, Rajammal lived with Rathinam Pillai as
his wife and it is the further case of the defendants that the plaintiffs are
not the children born to Rathinam Pillai through Rajammal and the plaintiffs
are not the legal heirs of the deceased Rathinam Pillai. It is the further
case of the defendants that the deceased Rathinam Pillai married only
Rajeswari during his lifetime and out of the said wedlock, the defendants
were born to him and Rajeswari and thus, it is contended that it is only the
defendants, who are the legal heirs of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and
therefore, the plaintiffs cannot lay any claim or share in the suit
properties.
17. It is not in dispute that the suit properties belonged to the deceased
Rathinam Pillai. Originally, when the suit had come to be laid, the second
plaintiff, being a minor, it is found that Rajammal was shown as the mother
and guardian of the minor second plaintiff. It is therefore found that on
the date of laying of the suit, Rajammal was alive. Therefore, the immediate
question that arises for consideration is, if according to the plaintiffs
Rajammal is the legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai, then she
would also be entitled to claim her due share in the suit properties left
behind by the deceased Rathinam Pillai. However, it is found that only the
plaintiffs have chosen to lay the suit for partition and separate possession
leaving their mother away. This itself raises a suspicion as to whether
Rajammal is the legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai.
18. Be that as it may, though the plaintiffs in the plaint would claim that
the deceased Rathinam Pillai had married Rajammal, as put forth by the
defendants, it is strange that the plaintiffs have not whispered anything in
the plaint averments as to when the marriage between Rathinam Pillai and
Rajammal had taken place, the venue of the marriage and the persons, who had
attended the marriage etc. All that has been stated in the plaint is that
Rajammal was taken as the wife of Rathinam Pillai and through Rajammal, the
plaintiffs were born. As adverted above, the defendants have taken a
specific plea in the written statement that Rajammal is not the legally
wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and that no marriage took place
between Rathinam Pillai and Rajammal as per law and further, they have also
taken a specific plea that the plaintiffs were not born to the deceased
Rathinam Pillai and Rajammal and hence, the plaintiffs are not the legal
heirs of the deceased Rathinam Pillai. Such being the defence projected by
the defendants, it could be seen, as rightly argued by the learned counsel
for the defendants 2 and 3, that the best person, who could throw light on
the factum of the marriage between Rathinam Pillai and Rajammal, would be
only Rajammal. If according to the plaintiffs Rajammal was the legally
wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and if she is his first wife as
pleaded in the plaint, the defendants having repudiated the same in black and
white, it is for the plaintiffs to examine their mother Rajammal to establish
their case, but peculiarly, they have not chosen to examine Rajammal to
substantiate their case. This would only go to show as rightly determined by
the Court below that inasmuch as the plaintiffs' case that Rajammal married
Rathinam Pillai is not true and the plaintiffs were not born to Rathinam
Pillai through Rajammal, it is found that the plaintiffs though were in
possession of the best evidence, did not evince any interest to project the
same for the reasons best known to them. This further raises a strong
suspicion in the case projected by the plaintiffs.
19. The plaintiffs, in order to establish the factum of marriage between
Rajammal and the deceased Rathinam Pillai, have adduced oral evidence through
P.Ws.1 to 4. P.W.1 is the first plaintiff and as seen from the evidence
tendered by her during both chief as well as the cross-examination, as
rightly found the Court below, admittedly her evidence regarding the factum
of the marriage of Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai being only a hearsay evidence
and when further according to P.W.1, she had derived the knowledge of the
same only through her mother Rajammal, it is rightly held by the Court below,
the evidence of P.W.1 would not in any manner serve the case of the
plaintiffs. Therefore, it is found that the evidence of P.W.1 cannot be
taken into consideration for upholding the plaintiffs' case.
20. The next witness P.W.2 ? Rajangam would claim to have attended the
wedding reception of the marriage between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai at
Uthamapalayam. It is, therefore, found that he had not attended the alleged
marriage between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai. According to P.W.2, as seen
from his evidence that the marriage between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai took
place during 1959 or 1960. However, based upon the above said oral evidence
of P.W.2, as rightly held by the Court below, we cannot safely conclude that
a valid marriage had taken place between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai as
deposed by P.W.2 when the fact remains that he has not witnessed the
marriage. That apart, it is also found that P.W.2 was under the employment
of P.W.4 ? Manikandan, who is none other than the husband of P.W.1.
Therefore, it could be seen that the evidence of P.W.2 has to be accepted
only with the pinch of salt and cannot be relied upon straightaway to accept
the case of the plaintiffs.

21. P.W.3 ? Munusamy has also admitted that he has only heard about the
marriage, which took place between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai. However,
according to him, he had attended the wedding reception, which took place at
the Karnam house at Uthamapalayam and on the basis of the above piece of
evidence, the plaintiffs have endeavoured to establish the factum of marriage
between Rajammal and the deceased Rathinam Pillai. However, as rightly found
by the Court below, his evidence cannot also be accepted as the same being in
the nature of the hearsay evidence. Further, P.W.3 has also admitted that he
is cultivating the lands of P.W.4 ? Manikandan on othi basis. Therefore, it
is found that P.W.3 is also an interested evidence and his evidence, without
any basis or material, cannot be relied upon to accept the plaintiffs' case.
22. From the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3, it is found that the plaintiffs' case
is that the wedding reception of Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai took place at
the Karnam house, Uthamapalayam. As seen earlier, according to them, the
marriage took place during 1959 or 1960. In this connection, Manikandan, who
is the husband of P.W.1 and examined as P.W.4, has deposed that the marriage
between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai took place at Srivilliputtur Krishnan
Temple in 1959 and further he has clearly admitted that Rathinam Pillai
married Rajarajeswari on 08.02.1962 and the marriage invitation card
pertaining to the said marriage is Ex.D6 and further, he has also admitted
that on the previous day i.e., on 07.02.1962, reception was held and the
above said function was conducted in Karnam house at Uthamapalayam. A
perusal of Ex.D6 coupled with the admission of P.W.4 would go to show that on
08.02.1962, the marriage between Rathinam Pillai and Rajarajeswari took place
in the newly constructed house of Rathinam Pillai at Uthamapalayam and it is
also found that on the same date, the housewarming ceremony of the newly
constructed house was also celebrated and in such view of the matter, when
the housewarming ceremony of the newly constructed house i.e., Karnam's house
at Uthamapalayam was celebrated only on 08.02.1962 along with the marriage of
Rathinam Pillai and Rajarajeswari, the case of the plaintiffs as spoken to
through P.Ws.2 and 3 that the wedding reception of Rathinam Pillai and
Rajammal took place in Karnam house at Uthamapalayam cannot be believed as
the Karnam house had been completely constructed only on 08.02.1962.
Therefore, the above aspect of the matter also throws a serious doubt in the
case projected by the plaintiffs that Rajammal had been taken as the wife of
Rathinam Pillai through a lawful wedlock. It is not out of place to mention
here that P.W.4 is none other than the brother of Rajarajeswari and
therefore, as rightly found by the Court below, P.W.4 is competent to depose
about the marriage of his sister Rajarajeswari with Rathinam Pillai and
therefore, it is found that through the evidence of P.W.4 and the document
marked as Ex.D6 i.e., wedding invitation card, the lawful marriage between
Rajarajeswari and Rathinam Pillai had been duly established. As regards the
evidence of P.W.4 with reference to the alleged marriage between Rajammal and
the deceased Rathinam Pillai, it could be seen that he is also not in the
know of things directly and in such view of the matter, his evidence cannot
also be relied upon to hold that there has been a valid marriage between
Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai.

23. In the light of the above said discussions, it is found that the case of
the plaintiffs that Rathinam Pillai had taken Rajammal as his first wife and
only thereafter, he married Rajeswari as the second wife is not true. On the
other hand, the oral evidence tendered by the plaintiffs to establish the
alleged marriage between Rajammal and the deceased Rathinam Pillai being of
the above nature, which could not be safely relied upon for the reasons
afore-stated and when there is no convincing material to hold that there has
been a valid lawful marriage between Rajammal and the deceased Rathinam
Pillai, it is found that the case of the plaintiffs as regards the above fact
cannot be upheld, particularly, solely based on the oral evidence of P.Ws.1
to 4.


24. The defendants have examined Rathinam Pillai's sister, namely,
Palaniammal as D.W.1. As rightly found by the Trial Court, D.W.1 being the
eldest person in the family, would be in the know of things about the marital
status of Rathinam Pillai, he being her brother, it is found that the
evidence of D.W.1 requires consideration in this matter. As seen from the
evidence of D.W.1, it is found that Rajammal and her husband, namely,
Shanmugavel were in the employment at the house of Rathinam Pillai and in
such circumstances, according to D.W.1, there has been an illegitimate
relationship between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai and as the said issue had
cropped up at one point of time, according to D.W.1, Rajammal was taken by
her husband to her native place at Rajapalayam and therefore, it is found
from the evidence of D.W.1 that there has been some illegitimate connection
or relationship between Rajammal and Rathinam Pillai at that point of time
and the same had not developed into any valid marriage as such between them
and it is further found that Rajammal even at that point of time was married
to one Shanmugavel. Therefore, it is found that Rajammal being the legally
wedded wife of Shanmugavel and when it is further found that the plaintiffs
have miserably failed to establish the factum of marriage between Rajammal
and Rathinam Pillai as projected by them and when it is found that Rathinam
Pillai was having only illicit relationship with Rajammal, it is seen that
Rajammal at no point of time has been taken or treated as the wife of
Rathinam Pillai either by Rathinam Pillai or by the Society at large.

25. In this lis, the letters said to have been sent by Rajammal to Rathinam
Pillai have been marked as Exs.D8 to D10 and that the said letters are
written only by Rajammal has been admitted and her signatures in the said
letters had come to be marked as Exs.D3 to D5. Therefore, the Court below
has taken into consideration the contents of the above said letters to assess
the merits of the case at hand. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that
the above said letters have not been written by Rajammal. Further, to
controvert that the above said letters have not been written by Rajammal, the
plaintiffs have not chosen to examine their mother Rajammal with reference to
the same. Therefore, no fault could be attributed on the part of the Court
for relying upon the contents of the above said letters for determining the
issues involved in the matter. It is found from Ex.D8 that there is a clear
reference by Rajammal herself that her husband is only Shanmugavel and such
being the position, the case of the plaintiffs that Rajammal had married
Rathinam Pillai as such cannot be accepted in any manner. Further, as seen
from the contents of Ex.D10, it is found that only the illicit relationship
of Rajammal with Rathinam Pillai was adverted to and the said letter, dated
03.04.1963, would only probablize the case as spoken to by D.W.1 that during
the stay of Rajammal at Rathinam Pillai's house, when she was in employment,
there has been some illicit relationship between them and therefore, it is
found that the same had been adverted to by Rajammal in Ex.D10. Therefore,
the contents of Ex.D10 would also only improbablize the case of the
plaintiffs that she is the legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam
Pillai. That apart, the contents of Ex.D9 would go to show that following
the estrangement between the couples i.e., Rajammal and Shanmugavel, it is
found that Shanmugavel and his family members demanded the custody of the
first plaintiff from Rajammal and she had refused to accede to the request
stating that she cannot handover the custody of the first plaintiff, she
being the girl baby. From the contents of Ex.D9, it is found that the demand
for the custody of the first plaintiff was made by Shanmugavel and his family
members on the footing that the first plaintiff was born to Shanmugavel
through Rajammal. This piece of evidence would only go to show that inasmuch
as Rajammal was the wife of Shanmugavel and the first plaintiff was born to
them through the said wedlock, it is found that Shanmugavel as a matter of
right demanded the custody of the first plaintiff following the difference of
opinion between them. Therefore, the contents found in Exs.D8 to D10, which
had not been repudiated by Rajammal or by the plaintiffs as the case may be,
only go to establish the falsity of the plaintiffs' case that Rathinam Pillai
had married Rajammal and taken her as his wife and that the plaintiffs are
the children born to Rathinam Pillai through Rajammal.

26. In addition to that it is found that Rathinam Pillai had executed a
settlement deed in favour of Rajammal, which has come to be marked as Ex.D1
and on a perusal of the same, would only go to show that therein Rathinam
Pillai has only described Rajammal as his ?mgpkhd!;jphp? and not his wife as
such and further, he has described the plaintiffs in the said settlement deed
as only the daughters of Rajammal and not as his daughters.
This also would
only strengthen the defence version put forth by the defendants that Rathinam
Pillai had never taken Rajammal as his wife at any point of time and further,
inasmuch as the plaintiffs were not born to Rathinam Pillai through Rajammal,
he has described the plaintiffs as the daughters of Rajammal and not as his
daughters. The above said averments contained in Ex.D1 cannot be repudiated
by the plaintiffs inasmuch as the plaintiffs thereafter along with their
mother had alienated the subject property under Ex.D2 and therefore, it is
found that through Ex.D1, the defendants have exposed the falsity of the
plaintiffs' case. That apart, on the same date of Ex.D1, Rathinam Pillai had
executed settlement deeds marked as Exs.D12 and D13 in favour of
Rajarajeswari and her children, namely, defendants, wherein he has clearly
described Rajarajeswari as his wife and the defendants as his children and
therefore, Rathinam Pillai being fully aware about the status of
Rajarajeswari and the defendants born to him through her has clearly spelt
out the said relationship in the above said documents and accordingly, he
also being aware of the status of Rajammal has clearly described her as his
?mgpkhd!;jphp? in Ex.D1. Therefore, the above documents marked as Exs.D1,
D12 and D13 cumulatively would only go to establish that Rajammal is not the
legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and that the plaintiffs
were not born to the deceased Rathinam Pillai through Rajammal.
27. The marriage between Rajammal and Shanmugavel having come to be
established or in other words, Rajammal being the wife of Shanmugavel, which
fact having been admitted by Rajammal herself in Ex.D8 and when the said
marriage has not been annulled in the manner known to law, it is found that
as rightly determined by the Court below and also invoking Section 112 of the
Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as it is only Rajammal and Shanmugavel, who had
been having access to each other during the continuance of their marriage, it
is found that even the second plaintiff born to Rajammal is only an offspring
through Shanmugavel and therefore, it cannot be held that the second
plaintiff was born to Rajammal through Rathinam Pillai without any basis or
material.
28. However, the plaintiffs have projected the transfer certificate of the
second plaintiff as Ex.P2 to show that Rathinam Pillai was the father of the
second plaintiff. However, a perusal of Ex.P2 would only go to show that the
second plaintiff therein has been described as Maheswari.R, thereby alone it
cannot be construed that the initial ?R? stands for Rathinam Pillai without
any material or hold. As rightly found by the Court below, ?R? may also
denote her mother Rajammal and therefore, by Ex.P2 alone it cannot be
construed that there bas been a valid marriage between Rajammal and Rathinam
Pillai as put forth by the plaintiffs and that the second plaintiff Maheswari
was born to Rathinam Pillai through Rajammal. Therefore, Ex.P2 would not in
any manner support of the plaintiffs' case. The marriage invitation card of
the first plaintiff with P.W.4 has been marked as Ex.P3 and this document is
relied upon by the plaintiffs on the footing that in the same, the deceased
Rathinam Pillai has been shown as the father of the first plaintiff. As
rightly found by the Court below, the said invitation card has come be
printed after the death of Rathinam Pillai and it has not been established as
to who had been instrumental in bringing the above said printing card.
Therefore, the mere reference of Rathinam Pillai as the father of the first
plaintiff in the invitation card marked as Ex.P3 after his death alone would
not in any manner lead to the conclusion that Rajammal had been taken as the
lawful wedded wife by the Rathinam Pillai and that the first plaintiff was
born out of the said wedlock. On the other hand, when it is found that
Shanmugavel is the husband of Rajammal and when it is not clear on what basis
the above said description had come to be incorporated in the invitation
card, it is found that the same cannot be the deciding factor for upholding
the plaintiffs' case.
29. The other document on which the plaintiffs have placed reliance is Ex.P8,
which is the proposal given to the Insurance Corporation by Rathinam Pillai
in respect of the first plaintiff. Merely on the basis of the same, when it
has not been established that the contents found in the same are mooted by
Rathinam Pillai and further when any further action has been initiated
thereupon, as rightly determined by the Court below, the same having not been
established to have emanated from deceased Rathinam Pillai, in my opinion,
the said document cannot be considered as a valid piece of evidence to accept
the plaintiffs' case.
30. On the other hand, it is seen from Ex.D11, the birth certificate of the
first plaintiff, which document is not in dispute, it is found that the first
plaintiff is stated to have been born on 03.05.1962 at Uthamapalayam South
Street and the name of the parents of the first plaintiff has been clearly
stated as Shanmugavel and Rajammal. Therefore, when it is found from Ex.D11
that the first plaintiff is shown to have been born only to Shanmugavel and
Rajammal, the whole case of the plaintiffs get belied on the above said
document also and therefore, the reference about Rathinam Pillai as the
father of the first plaintiff in Exs.P3 and P8 could not in any manner be
believed and equally, the reference of the second plaintiff as R.Maheswari in
Ex.P2 also would not serve any purpose to establish the plaintiffs' case.
Coupled with the facts that as discussed above, when Rajammal herself has
admitted that she is only the wife of Shanmugavel as seen from Ex.P8 and also
refused to handover the custody of the first plaintiff to Shanmugavel as
being the female daughter and when Rathinam Pillai himself has described
Rajammal only as his ?mgpkhd!;jphp? and the plaintiffs as the daughters of
Rajammal in Ex.D1, all these facts cumulatively would only go to establish
that there has been no marriage at all muchless a valid marriage between
Rajammal and the deceased Rathinam Pillai and consequently, it is found that
the plaintiffs are not the children born to Rathinam Pillai through Rajammal
out of the said wedlock.
31. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs
placed reliance upon the decisions reported in 2004-TLNJ-383 [V.V.Kannan and
another vs. K.Sridhar], 2008 (3) LW 471 [Chandrammal and others vs. S.Sankar
(died) and others], 2009 (3) CTC 760 [Balamani and another vs.
S.Balasundaram], 2009 (4) CTC 440 [K.V.Ramasamy vs. K.V.Raghavan and others],
2009 (9) SCC 52 [R.Mahalakshmi vs. A.V.Anantharaman and others] and 2010 (2)
CTC 622 [Kuppan vs. Muniammal and another]. Similarly, the learned counsel
for the defendants 2 and 3 placed reliance upon the decisions reported in
2008(1) MLJ 1253 (SC) [K.R.Mohan Reddy vs. Net Work INC.], 2017 (1) MWN(C)
225 [S.K.P.Subramaniam and another vs. S.K.Chinnarsaj (Deceased) and others],
2015 (4) LW 509 [Baby @ Rohini (Deceased) and others vs. Kamalam Kumerasan
and others], 1995 (1) LW 487 [K.Munuswami Gounder and another vs.
M.Govindaraju and others] and 1989 (2) LW 197 (DB) [Mohan and another vs.
Santha Bai Ammal and others]. The principles of the law outlined in the
above said decisions are taken into consideration and followed as applicable
to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.
32. Considering the fact that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to
establish that there has been a valid marriage between Rajammal and Rathinam
Pillai and that the plaintiffs have been born out of the said wedlock or even
born to him through Rajammal illegally, it is found that the plaintiffs as
such are not entitled to claim any share in the suit properties even on the
footing that they are the illegitimate children of Rathinam Pillai and
accordingly, it is found that the plaintiffs are not entitled to invoke
Section 16(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act for claiming the limited reliefs as
prayed for in the plaint.

33. In the light of the above discussions, I hold that Rajammal is not the
legally wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai, I further hold that the
plaintiffs are not the children of the deceased Rathinam Pillai.
Consequently, I hold that the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any
partition and separate possession of their respective shares in the suit
properties as prayed for. I further hold that Rajeswari is the legally
wedded wife of the deceased Rathinam Pillai and the defendants are the
children of the deceased Rathinam Pillai. Accordingly, Point Nos.I to IV are
answered against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants.

POINT NO.VI:
34. During the appeal proceedings, the plaintiffs have chosen to file two
miscellaneous petitions for the reception of additional evidence, under Order
XLI Rule 27 C.P.C., in order to substantiate their case. Under M.P.(MD) No.1
of 2011, they seek to produce four documents as additional evidence. As
regards the first document, namely, marriage invitation of the second
plaintiff dated 15.12.1985, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the
defendants 2 and 3, the said document / invitation card has come into
existence after the death of Rathinam Pillai and therefore, it could be seen
that Rathinam Pillai cannot be construed as the author of the said document.
That apart when Rathinam Pillai has described the plaintiffs as the daughters
of Rajammal in Ex.D1, it is found that the above said document would not in
any manner advance the case of the plaintiffs and that apart no valid reason
has been adduced by the plaintiffs as to why they have not chosen to mark the
said document before the Court below.
35. The second document, namely, birth certificate, dated 28.07.2011, which
according to the plaintiffs would show that Rathinam Pillai was the father of
the female child mentioned therein through Rajammal, has come to be issued by
Madurai Corporation and when there is no plea in the plaint that at that
point of time, Rajammal was living as the wedded wife of Rathinam Pillai at
Madurai and on the other hand, when the evidence disclose as pointed out
earlier that Rajammal was the wife of Shanmugavel, it is found that the above
said document / birth certificate would also not in any manner be helpful to
sustain the case of the plaintiffs.
36. The third document, namely, the school transfer certificate projected by
the plaintiffs would only go to show that the date of birth of the first
plaintiff is 17.03.1962, whereas her birth certificate had also been marked
as Ex.D11, wherein her date of birth is shown as 04.05.1962 and her parents
are described as Shanmugavel and Rajammal. On the other hand, the projected
document shows that her date of birth is 17.03.1962 and described her father
as P.Rathinam and further it is also mentioned that during one academic year,
the first plaintiff had studied Standards VI to VIII. This also is found to
be against the pleadings already set out in the plaint and evidence of the
parties and hence, the same cannot be countenanced and no explanation
whatsoever is placed as to why the said document has not been marked in the
Court below.
37. The fourth document, namely, the certificate issued by the Police
Department regarding loss of transfer certificate. However, as rightly
argued by the learned counsel for the defendants 2 and 3, the said document
not shown to be established by the due authority as per law, by producing the
other connected documents, it is found that the said document also cannot be
accepted as additional document in support of the plaintiffs' case.
38. Through C.M.P.No.6506 of 2017, the plaintiffs are endeavouring to mark
the marriage certificate of the first plaintiff and P.W.4, which would only
go to that the marriage had taken place at Meenakshi Amman Temple, Madurai.
But, in the evidence deposed in the matter, the marriage is said to have been
taken place at Thirupparankundram Temple and therefore, on the face of it,
the said projected document is found to be unacceptable. That apart, when it
has been admitted in black and white in the plaint that Rathinam Pillai had
died on 24.11.1976, the case of the plaintiffs that Rathinam Pillai had
signed in the marriage register of the first plaintiff, which took place on
21.01.1977 also would expose the falsity of the document and therefore, as
rightly put forth by the learned counsel for the defendants 2 and 3, the said
document also does not merit acceptance for reception of the same as
additional evidence.
39. The above documents sought to be produced as additional evidence during
the course of this appeal are not marked during the original suit
proceedings. It has not been explained by the plaintiff properly as to why
the said documents had not been marked before the Court below. The case of
the plaintiffs that they had come to know about the said documents only
recently as such cannot be straightaway accepted. When the case of the
plaintiffs has been stoutly resisted by the defendants in all aspects, the
plaintiffs knowing about their status even at that point of time should have
endeavoured to mark all the documents in support of their case before the
Court below. On the other hand, failing to do and subsequently when their
case has been thrown out by the Trial Court and the plaintiffs now coming
forward with the plea that only recently they had come to know of the above
said documents and therefore, the same should be received as additional
evidence, cannot be accepted without any material to substantiate their case.
That apart, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the defendants 2 and
3, when the above said documents are not referred to in the plaint and
further also not disclosed during the course of evidence tendered by the
plaintiffs one way or the other and on the other hand, when the documents
projected are found to be inconsistent with the pleadings set out in the
plaint and also the evidence adduced in the matter and further, when it is
found that the above said petitions for the reception of the additional
evidence also do not comply with the ingredients of Order XLI Rule 27 C.P.C.,
as rightly put forth by the learned counsel for the defendants 2 and 3, the
above said petitions preferred for the reception of the additional evidence
cannot be accepted and hence, they are dismissed. Accordingly, Point No.VI
is answered.
POINT NO.V:
40. In conclusion,
i. The Judgment and Decree, dated 27.09.2002, passed in O.S.No.66 of 1985,
on the file of the Sub Court, Periyakulam, are confirmed and resultantly, the
first appeal is dismissed with costs;
ii. M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2011 and C.M.P.(MD) No.6506 of 2017 are also
dismissed; and
iii. Consequently, the other connected M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2013 is closed.

To:
The Sub Judge,
Periyakulam.


.

Apex court - A preliminary decree once passed could not be set aside unless and until the appeal was filed. Mere allowing an impleading petition, and that too during the final decree proceedings, would not entitle respondent No.4 to plead that the preliminary decree has to be reopened.; Unless in a case of subsequent event or change of law , Preliminary Decree can not be reopened = In our opinion, the High Court has erred in law while directing that further preliminary decrees can be passed. It was not a case of subsequent event or change of law. The only remedy available to Nima Kaur was to file a separate suit. Accordingly, we restore the order passed by the Civil Judge and set aside the order passed by the High Court in the revision petition. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. It is made clear that we have not adjudicated on the rights of Nima Kaur while deciding this matter and we have prima facie made the observations to decide whether any share she could claim in the final decree proceedings. Therefore, fresh suit, if any, to be filed by her, be decided unfettered by any observations made by us in the order or in the final decree.


1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).319-320 OF 2009
SARDAR SURJEET SINGH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
JUGUNA BAI (SINCE DEAD) & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. These appeals have been preferred against the judgment
and order dated 30.11.2007 passed by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh in Civil Revision Petition Nos.3914 and 3144 of
2007, whereby the High Court allowed the impleadment of
respondent No.3 in the final decree proceedings on the basis
of deed of settlement dated 30.12.1978.

3. The facts indicate that defendant Nos.2 and 3 are
sisters. Late Sardar Santh Singh, with the consent of his
wives, adopted the appellant herein-Sardar Surjeet Singh,
when he was three years old. After the adoption, Smt. Juguna
Bai gave birth to one daughter-Sathnam Kaur, defendant No.3.
Later on, one adoption deed was executed on 7.7.1978.
4. A suit for partition was filed in which the Trial
Court passed a preliminary decree on 11.10.1990 giving 1/3rd
share to the appellant, 1/3rd share to be shared between two
wives-Rama Bai and Juguna Bai, with 1/6th share each and
2
remaining 1/3rd to Sathnam Kaur-daughter.

5. The appeal against the final decree was ultimately
withdrawn by the plaintiff after the death of Rama Bai,
during the pendency of the appeal. Thereafter, an application
was filed in the year 1993 for passing of the final decree.
Nima Kaur, the foster daughter of Sardar Santh Singh, filed
I.A. No.1491 of 1993 under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleading
her as defendant No.4, claiming herself to be foster daughter
of Sardar Santh Singh and, in view of the settlement deed
dated 30.12.1978, she claimed 1/3rd share.

6. The appellant resisted the application. It was
contended that she was not having any right as the
preliminary decree, which had been passed in civil suit, had
attained finality. The existence of the settlement deed dated
30.12.1978 was denied. On 12.7.1996, the Civil Judge
dismissed the application filed by Nima Kaur. She preferred
a revision in the High Court in C.R.P.No.3124 of 1996, to be
impleaded as defendant No.4 in the Suit being O.S. No.54/81,
which was allowed vide order dated 28.7.1997.
7. The Trial Judge, by a docket order dated 26.11.2002,
directed the plaintiff to carry out the amendment and ordered
that the final decree proceedings be closed. Against the
said order, C.R.P.No.6088/2002 in O.S.No.54/81 and C.R.P.
No.620/2003 in I.A.No.697/93 in O.S.No.54/81 were filed
before the High Court.
8. The High Court allowed both the CRPs and directed the
3
Trial Court to proceed with the final decree proceedings only
and dispose of the same in accordance with law. The High
Court opined that it was evident that admittedly no challenge
was made as against the preliminary decree by respondent
No.4, the preliminary decree passed on 11.10.1990 had become
final and even the appeal filed by the plaintiff had been
dismissed on 6.4.1993 confirming the said decree. A
preliminary decree once passed could not be set aside unless
and until the appeal was filed. Mere allowing an impleading
petition, and that too during the final decree proceedings,
would not entitle respondent No.4 to plead that the
preliminary decree has to be reopened
. Vide order dated
8.12.2003, the High Court opined that if at all respondent
No.4 has any say, within legal parameter, the same is open to
her to be agitated.
9. Nima Kaur thereafter, filed an application being
I.A.No.1258 of 2004 in I.A.No.697/93 in O.S.No.54/81 to
receive a document dated 12.8.1979 purported to be a
relinquishment deed but the said application was rejected by
the Civil Judge vide order dated 8.12.2004. Aggrieved
thereby, C.R.P. No.86/05 was preferred by Nima Kaur, which
was dismissed by the High Court. The High Court observed that
these rights have to be considered by the executing court, if
any, during final decree proceedings.
10. On 5.2.2007, the Civil Judge passed the final decree
allotting half share to the appellant, 1/6th share to Juguna
4
Bai and 1/3rd share to Satnam Kaur. It was also held by the
said Court that Nima Kaur was not entitled for any share in
the suit property and her remedy was to file a separate suit.
It would not be possible for the Court to determine her
share in the final decree proceedings on the basis of the
deed dated 30.12.1978. Aggrieved thereby, Juguna Bai and
Satnam Kaur filed C.R.P.No.3914/07 and Nima Kaur filed C.R.P.
No.3114/07. The High Court vide impugned order dated
30.11.2007 directed the Trial Court to examine the claim of
Nima Kaur independently so that she would be able to
establish her claim over the property left by Sant Singh.
preliminary decree shall be modified to the extent needed and
shall also decide as to who succeeded to the estate of the
deceased and re-determine the shares accordingly. The said
order has been questioned before us in this appeal.
11. It was submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that once a preliminary decree has
been passed, determining the shares, during the final decree
proceedings, the shares could not have been altered as has
been ordered by the High Court. Preliminary decree had
attained finality. It was not an intervening event which has
taken place after passing of the preliminary decree and
before passing the final decree which can only be taken into
consideration for redeterrmining of shares. The only remedy
available to workout any right, if at all available to Nima
Kaur, was to file an independent suit to establish her
5
right, title or interest on the basis of deed dated
13.10.1978 or relinquishment deed of 1979 and not by way of
filing application in a final decree proceedings to get rid
of the preliminary decree, which has attained finality.
12. Learned counsel further submitted that Nima Kaur
otherwise would not have any right, title or other interest
in the property left by the deceased. Document itself was
doubtful. Thus, the High Court has erred in violating its
own earlier order laying down that preliminary decree would
not be reopened. The High Court has ordered reopening of
the preliminary decree which was not permissible.
13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent
has strenuously urged that during the final decree
proceedings, the extent of the share to be allotted to each
of the respondent parties can be worked out. Once the gift
deed has been executed, in the form of settlement deed in
favour of respondent No.3 - Nima Kaur, she was entitled to
press her claim for settlement of the said property during
the final decree proceedings. To that extent, the shares of
other members were rightly required to be reduced. Learned
counsel has relied upon various decisions of this Court to be
referred later.
14. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we
are of the opinion that the question whether preliminary
decree can be reopened, has been considered by this Court
in T. Ravi V. B Chinna Narasimha [2017(3) SCALE 740], in
6
which reliance has been placed on Venkata Reddy & Ors. v.
Pethi Reddy {AIR 1963 SC 992] and in view of section 97 of
CPC it has been laid down that once the matter has been
considered in preliminary decree, it cannot be reagitated in
the appeal against the final decree. Preliminary decree is
final with respect to the shares. In T. Ravi V. B Chinna
Narasimha this Court held as under:
“37. In the instant case preliminary decree was
passed in the year 1970 and the shares were
declared to the aforesaid extent of the
respective parties therein who were the heirs of
Late Nawab Jung. Hamid Ali Khan, defendant No.1,
had only 14/104th share in the disputed property.
Preliminary decree dated 24.11.1970 has attained
finality which was questioned in appeal on
limited extent in the High Court which has
attained finality by dismissal of LPA on
12.10.1977. Thus the determination of shares as
per preliminary decree has attained finality,
shares of the parties had been crystalised in
each and every property. Purchaser pendente lite
is bound by the preliminary decree with respect
to the shares so determined and it cannot be
re-opened and whatever equity could have bee
claimed in the final decree proceedings to the
extent of vendor's share has already been
extended to the purchasers.
38. In Venkata Reddy & Ors. v. Pethi Reddy AIR
1963 SC 992, it has been laid down that the
preliminary decree for partition is final. It
also embodies the final decision of the Court.
The question of finality has been discussed thus
:
“6. The new provision makes it clear that
the law is and has always been that upon the
father's insolvency his disposing power over
the interest of his undivided sons in the
joint family property vests in the Official
Receiver and that consequently the latter
7
has a right to sell that interest. The
provision is thus declaratory of the law and
was intended to apply to all cases except
those covered by the two provisos. We are
concerned here only with the first proviso.
This proviso excepts from the operation of
the Act a transaction such as a sale by an
Official Receiver which has been the subject
of a final decision by a competent Court.
The short question, therefore, is whether
the preliminary decree for partition passed
in this case which was affirmed finally in
second appeal by the High Court of Madras
can be regarded as a final decision. The
competence of the Court is not in question
here. What is, however, contended is that
in a partition suit the only decision which
ca be said to be a final decision is the
final decree passed in the case and that
since final decree proceedings were still
going on when the Amending Act came into
force the first proviso was not available to
the appellants. It is contended on behalf
of the appellants that since the rights of
the parties are adjudicated upon by the
Court before a preliminary decree is passed
that decree must, in so far as rights
adjudicated upon are concerned, be deemed to
be a final decision. The word 'decision'
even in its popular sense means a concluded
opinion (see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary –
3
rd ed. Vol. I, p. 743). Where, therefore,
the decision is embodied in the judgment
which is followed by a decree finality must
naturally attach itself to it in the sense
that it is o longer open to question by
either party except in an appeal, review or
revision petition as provided for by law.
The High Court has, however, observed :
“The mere declaration of the
rights of the plaintiff by the
preliminary decree, would, in our
opinion not amount to a final
decision for it is well known that
even if a preliminary decree is
passed either in a mortgage suit or
in a partition suit, there are
certain contingencies in which such
a preliminary decree can be modified
or amended and therefore would not
8
become final.”
It is not clear from the judgment what the
contingencies referred to by the High Court are
in which a preliminary decree can be modified or
amended unless what the learned Judges meant was
modified or amended in appeal or in review or in
revision or in exceptional circumstances by
resorting to the powers conferred by Sections 151
and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If that
is what the High Court meant then every decree
passed by a Court including decrees passed in
cases which do not contemplate making of a
preliminary decree are liable to be modified and
amended. Therefore, if the reason given by the
High Court is accepted it would mean that no
finality attaches to decree at all. That is not
the law. A decision is said to be final when, so
far as the Court rendering it is concerned, it is
unalterable except by resort to such provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its
reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly,
a final decision would mean a decision which
would operate as res judicata between the parties
if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by
preferring an appeal or a revision or a review
application as is permitted by the Code. A
preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a
mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a
tentative decree but must, in so far as the
matters dealt with by it are concerned, be
regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which
contemplate the making of two decrees – a
preliminary decree and a final decree – the
decree which would be executable would be the
final decree. But the finality of a decree or a
decision does not necessarily depend upon its
being executable. The legislature in its wisdom
has thought that suits of certain types should be
decided in stages and though the suit in such
cases can be regarded as fully and completely
decided only after a final decree is made the
decision of the Court arrived at the earlier
stage also has a finality attached to it. It
would be relevant to refer to S.97 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which provides that where a party
aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal
from it, he is precluded from disputing its
correctness in any appeal which may be preferred
from the final decree. This provision thus
clearly indicates that as to the matters covered
9
by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as
embodying the final decision of the Court passing
that decree.”
15. In the case of Phoolchand and Anr. vs. Gopal Lal, AIR
1967 SC 1470, this Court has laid down that there can be
variation in shares in the preliminary decree. Variation itself
is a Decree. In a case for partition, if any event transpires
after preliminary decree, which necessitates the change in
shares, same can be considered. This Court laid down thus :
“6. The next contention is that there
cannot be two preliminary decrees and
therefore when the trial court varied the
shares as indicated in the preliminary
decree of August 1, 1942 there was no fresh
preliminary decree passed by the trial
court. It is not disputed that in a
partition suit the court has jurisdiction
to amend the shares suitably even if the
preliminary decree has been passed if some
member of the family to whom an allotment
was made in the preliminary decree dies
thereafter : (Parshuram v. Hirabai "AIR
1957 Bom 59'). So the trial court was
justified in amending the shares on the
deaths of Sohan Lal and Smt. Gulab Bai. The
only question then is whether this
amendment amounted to a fresh decree. The
Allahabad High Court in Bharat Indo v.
Yakub Hassan (1913 ILR 35 All 159) the Oudh
Chief Court in Kedemath v. Pattu Lal (ILR
20 Luck 557 (AIR 1945 Oudh 312), and the
Punjab High Court in Joti Parshad v.
Ganeshi Lal (AIR 1961 Punj 120) seem to
take the view that there can be only one
preliminary decree and one final decree
thereafter. The Madras, Bombay and Calcutta
High Courts seem to take the view that
there can be more than one preliminary
decree : (Kasi v. V. Ramanathan
Chettiar(1947-2 Mad LJ 523) Raja Peary
Mohan v. Manohar (27 Cal WN 989 (AIR 1924
Cal 160), and Parshuram v. Hirabai. AIR
10
1957 Bom 59.
7. We are of opinion that there is nothing in
the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits
the passing of more than one preliminary
decree if circumstances justify the same and
that it may be necessary to do so particularly
in partition suits when after the preliminary
decree some parties die and shares of other
parties are thereby augmented. We have already
said that it is not disputed that in partition
suits the court can do so even after the
preliminary decree is passed. It would in our
opinion be convenient to the court and
advantageous to the parties, specially in
partition suits, to have disputed rights
finally settled and specification of shares in
the preliminary decree varied before a final
decree is prepared. If this is done, there is
a clear determination of the rights of parties
to the suit on the question in dispute and we
see no difficulty in holding that in such
cases there is a decree deciding these
disputed rights; if so, there is no reason why
a second preliminary decree correcting the
shares in a partition suit cannot be passed by
the court. So far therefore as partition suits
are concerned we have no doubt that if an
event transpires after the preliminary decree
which necessitates a change in shares, the
court can and should (1) A.I.R. 1957 Bom. 59.
(3) (1945) I.L.R. 29 Luck, 557. (5) [1947] II
Mad. L.J. 523. (2) (1913) I.L.R. 35 All. 159.
(4) A.I.R. 1961 Puni. 120. (6) [1923] 27 Cal.
W.N. 989. do so; and if there is a dispute in
that behalf, the order of the court deciding
that dispute and making variation in shares
specified in the preliminary decree already
passed is a decree in itself which would be
liable to appeal. We should however like to
point out that what we are saying must be
confined to partition suits, for we are not
concerned in the present appeal with other
kinds of suits in which also preliminary and
final decrees are passed. There is no
prohibition in the Code of Civil Procedure
against passing a second preliminary decree in
such circumstances and we do not see why we
should rule out a second preliminary decree in
such circumstances only on the ground that the
Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate
11
such a possibility. In any case if two views
are possible-and obviously this is so because
the High Courts have differed on the
question-we would prefer the view taken by the
High Courts which hold that a second
preliminary decree can be passed, particularly
in partition suits where parties have died
after the preliminary decree and shares
specified in the preliminary decree have to be
adjusted. We see no reason why in such a case
if there is dispute, it should not be decided
by the court which passed the preliminary
decree, for it must not be forgotten that the
suit is not over till the final decree is
passed and the court has jurisdiction to
decide all disputes that may arise after the
preliminary decree, particularly in a
partition suit due to deaths of some of the
parties. Whether there can be more than one
final decree does not arise in the present
appeal and on that we express no opinion. We
therefore hold that in the circumstances of
this case it was open to the court to draw up
a fresh preliminary decree as two of the
parties had died after the preliminary decree
and before the final decree was passed.
Further as there was dispute between the
surviving parties as to devolution of the
shares of the parties who were dead and that
dispute was decided by the trial court in the
present case and thereafter the preliminary
decree al- ready passed was amended, the
decision amounted to a decree and was liable
to appeal. We therefore agree with the view
taken by the High Court that in such
circumstances a second preliminary decree can
be passed in partition suits by which the
shares allotted in the preliminary decree
already passed can be amended and if there is
dispute between surviving parties in that
behalf and that dispute is decided the
decision amounts to a decree. We should
however like to make it clear that this can
only be done so long as the final decree has
not been passed. We therefore reject this
contention of the appellant.“
The decision is distinguishable and cannot be said to
be applicable in view of the factual matrix of the instant
12
case where the right has been asserted, which came into
existence before the preliminary decree was passed and Nima
Kaur was not a party to suit. It also appears that it was
not the plea that was taken by any of the parties during the
course of preliminary decree that she was having right, title
or interest on the basis of settlement/gift deed dated
30.12.1978.
16. Learned counsel has also relied upon the decision of
this Court in SS Reddy vs. Narayan Reddy, (1991) 3 SCC 647,
in which there was change of law after passing of the
preliminary decree. In that context, this Court has laid down
that since Hindu daughter's rights in coparcenary property
were not recognized earlier, it should be taken on the basis
of the law which prevails on the date of final decree
proceedings. In the meanwhile, after passing of preliminary
decree the amendment that has been taken place by way of
Amending Act was taken into consideration and the final
decree was modified, accordingly. It was also a case of
subsequent event after passing of the preliminary decree
which necessitated re-determination of the shares, otherwise
preliminary decree was final. Factual matrix is not the same
in the instant case. In S. Sai Reddy vs. S. Narayana Reddy &
Ors. (supra), this Court laid down thus:
“7. The question that falls for our
consideration is whether the preliminary
decree has the effect of depriving
respondents 2 to 5 of the benefits of the
13
amendment. The learned counsel placed
reliance on clause (iv) of Section 29-A to
support his contention that it does. Clause
(ii) of the section provides that a daughter
shall be allotted share like a son in the
same manner treating her to be a son at the
partition of the joint family property.
However, the legislature was conscious that
prior to the enforcement of the amending
Act, partitions will already have taken
place in some families and arrangements with
regard to the disposition of the properties
would have been made and marriage expenses
would have been incurred etc. The
legislature, therefore, did not want to
unsettle the settled positions. Hence, it
enacted clause (iv) providing that clause
(ii) would not apply to a daughter married
prior to the partition or to a partition
which had already been effected before the
commencement of the amending Act. Thus if
prior to the partition of family property a
daughter had been married, she was
disentitled to any share in the property.
Similarly, if the partition had been
effected before September 5, 1985 the date
on which the amending Act came into force,
the daughter even though unmarried was not
given a share in the family property. The
crucial question, however, is as to when a
partition can be said to have been effected
for the purposes of the amended provision. A
partition of the joint Hindu family can be
effected by various modes, viz., by a family
settlement, by a registered instrument of
partition, by oral arrangement by the
parties, or by a decree of the court. When a
suit for partition is filed in a court, a
preliminary decree is passed determining
shares of the members of the family. The
final decree follows, thereafter, allotting
specific properties and directing the
partition of the immovable properties by
metes and bounds. Unless and until the final
decree is passed and the allottees of the
shares are put in possession of the
respective property, the partition is not
complete. The preliminary decree which
determines shares does not bring about the
final partition. For, pending the final
decree the shares themselves are liable to
14
be varied on account of the intervening
events. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that only a preliminary decree had
been passed and before the final decree
could be passed the amending Act came into
force as a result of which clause (ii) of
Section 29-A of the Act became applicable.
This intervening event which gave shares to
respondents 2 to 5 had the effect of varying
shares of the parties like any supervening
development. Since the legislation is
beneficial and placed on the statute book
with the avowed object of benefiting women
which is a vulnerable section of the society
in all its stratas, it is necessary to give
a liberal effect to it. For this reason
also, we cannot equate the concept of
partition that the legislature has in mind
in the present case with a mere severance of
the status of the joint family which can be
effected by an expression of a mere desire
by a family member to do so. The partition
that the legislature has in mind in the
present case is undoubtedly a partition
completed in all respects and which has
brought about an irreversible situation. A
preliminary decree which merely declares
shares which are themselves liable to change
does not bring about any irreversible
situation. Hence, we are of the view that
unless a partition of the property is
effected by metes and bounds, the daughters
cannot be deprived of the benefits conferred
by the Act. Any other view is likely to
deprive a vast section of the fair sex of
the benefits conferred by the amendment.
Spurious family settlements, instruments of
partitions not to speak of oral partitions
will spring up and nullify the beneficial
effect of the legislation depriving a vast
section of women of its benefits.
8. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court has
rightly held that since the final decree had
not been passed and the property had not
been divided by metes and bounds, clause
(iv) to Section 29-A was not attracted in
the present case and the
respondent-daughters were entitled to their
share in the family property.”
15
18. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this
Court in S. Satnam Singh and Ors vs. Surender Kaur and Anr.
[(2009) 2 SCC 562] in which this Court laid down thus:
“18. In certain situations, for the purpose of
complete adjudication of the disputes between the
parties an appellate Court may also take into
consideration subsequent events after passing of
the preliminary decree.
In Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar & Ors. V.
Ct. A. Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar [(1960) 2 SCR 209],
it was held :
"20 It would thus be seen that the
respondent's share in the family
properties was not in dispute nor was his
share in the properties in Burma seriously
challenged. The only plea raised in
respect of the latter claim was that the
court had no jurisdiction to deal with it.
This state of the pleadings in a sense
truly reflected the nature of the dispute
between the parties. It is common ground
that the family is a trading family and
there could be no doubt that the assets of
the family were partible between the
members of the family. It was on these
pleadings that the trial judge framed
fifteen issues and set down the case for
hearing."
19. While dealing with the application under
Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 where
one of the questions was as to whether an
immoveable property situated in Burma could be a
subject matter of reference, in Phoolchand & Anr.
v. Gopal Lal [(1967) 3 SCR 153], it was held :
"7. We are of opinion that there is
nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure
which prohibits the passing of more than
one preliminary decree if circumstances
justify the same and that it may be
necessary to do so particularly in
partition suits when after the
preliminary decree some parties die and
16
shares of other parties are thereby
augmented. We have already said that it
is not disputed that in partition suits
the court can do so even after the
preliminary decree is passed. It would in
our opinion be convenient to the court
and advantageous to the parties,
specially in partition suits, to have
disputed rights finally settled and
specification of shares in the
preliminary decree varied before a final
decree is prepared. If this is done,
there is a clear determination of the
rights of parties to the suit on the
question in dispute and we see no
difficulty in holding that in such cases
there is a decree deciding these disputed
rights; if so, there is no reason why a
second preliminary decree correcting the
shares in a partition suit cannot be
passed by the court. So far therefore as
partition suits are concerned we have no
doubt that if an event transpires after
the preliminary decree which necessitates
a change in shares, the court can and
should do so; and if there is a dispute
in that behalf, the order of the court
deciding that dispute and making
variation in shares specified in the
preliminary decree already passed is a
decree in itself which would be liable to
appeal. We should however like to point
out that what we are saying must be
confined to partition suits, for we are
not concerned in the present appeal with
other kinds of suits in which also
preliminary and final decrees are passed.
There is no prohibition in the Code of
Civil Procedure against passing a second
preliminary decree in such circumstances
and we do not see why we should rule out
a second preliminary decree in such
circumstances only on the ground that the
Code of Civil Procedure does not
contemplate such a possibility."
Thus, subsequent event can be taken consideration while
working out the preliminary decree into the shape of final
17
decree. It was also a case of subsequent event. As such, it
is quite distinguishable. In the instant case, the
preliminary decree has attained finality. The High Court has
earlier rightly observed that preliminary decree would not be
reopened due to impleadment which had been ordered.
19. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in law while
directing that further preliminary decrees can be passed. It
was not a case of subsequent event or change of law. The
only remedy available to Nima Kaur was to file a separate
suit. Accordingly, we restore the order passed by the Civil
Judge and set aside the order passed by the High Court in the
revision petition. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid
extent. It is made clear that we have not adjudicated on the
rights of Nima Kaur while deciding this matter and we have
prima facie made the observations to decide whether any share
she could claim in the final decree proceedings. Therefore,
fresh suit, if any, to be filed by her, be decided unfettered
by any observations made by us in the order or in the final
decree.

.......................J.
(ARUN MISHRA)
.......................J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 2, 2017.
18
ITEM NO.115 COURT NO.11 SECTION XII-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s).319-320/2009
SARDAR SURJEET SINGH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
JUGUNA BAI (SINCE DEAD) & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 02-08-2017 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR
For Appellant(s) Mr. K. Maruthi Rao, Adv.
Ms. K. Radha, Adv.
Ms. Anjani Aiyagari, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jeetendra Mohan Sharma, Sr. Adv.
Mr. P. Venkat Reddy, Adv.
Mr. Prashant Tyagi, Adv.
Mr. Anil Kumar Tandale, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed
order.
(B.PARVATHI) (TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABORTY)
COURT MASTER (SH) BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file)

MADRAS HIGH COURT - Under valuation of suit - Powers of court - To ascertain the correct market value of the property, the court has power under Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC to appoint a Commissioner in this regard.



IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 21.08.2017
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE V.M.VELUMANI
C.R.P. PD No.3686 of 2016
and C.M.P.No.18699 of 2016

Judgment reserved on
18.07.2017
Judgment pronounced on
21.08.2017

S.N.Balapattabi ... Petitioner
Vs
Mrs.Balanagalakshmi ... Respondent

Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the fair order and decreetal order dated 26.09.2016 in I.A.No.250 of 2015 in O.S.No.2 of 2007 on the file of the III Additional District & Sessions Judge at Gobichettipalayam.
For Petitioner : Mr.V.Raghavachari for
M/s.M.Narayanasamy
For Respondent : Mr.S.Parthasarathy,
Senior Counsel for
M/s.Kumar & Baskar
O R D E R
This Civil Revision Petition is filed against the fair order and decreetal order dated 26.09.2016 in I.A.No.250 of 2015 in O.S.No.2 of 2007 on the file of the III Additional District & Sessions Judge at Gobichettipalayam.
2. The petitioner is the defendant and the respondent is the plaintiff in O.S.No.2 of 2007 before the Fast Track Court No.2, Gobichettipalayam. The respondent filed suit in O.S.No.2 of 2007 for partition into two shares and allot one share to the respondent and for mense profits. The petitioner filed I.A.No.250 of 2015 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint. According to the petitioner, the title of the respondent is denied and she ought to have filed suit for declaration. The suit is barred by limitation as respondent is not in possession of the suit property, plaint does not discloses any cause of action, the respondent suppressed the material facts and has not impleaded necessary parties as the two daughters of the petitioner are also co-parceners, non-production of documents based on the cause of action and the respondent has not properly valued Item Nos.8 & 9 of the suit property and has not paid proper court fee.

3. According to the petitioner, the respondent is claiming partition of ancestral properties, joint family properties as well as separate properties. In view of these facts, three separate nature of properties, the respondent has to value the properties at the market value and pay the court fee on the said value as per Section 37 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act and not as per Section 37 (2) of the Act. The respondent is not in joint possession of all the properties and therefore she has to pay the court fee at Ad valorem on the market value of the suit properties.
4. The respondent filed counter affidavit, additional counter affidavit and denied various allegations made by the petitioner. According to the respondent, the suit was initially filed in Sub Court, Gobichettipalayam and was taken on file as O.S.No.9 of 2004 and pending suit, the petitioner filed I.A.No.125 of 2005 on the ground that Sub Court, Gobichettipalayam has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and pass orders on the suit. After enquiry, it was held that Sub Court, Gobichettipalayam has no pecuniary jurisdiction and after valuing the properties, the suit was represented before District Court, Erode and numbered as O.S.No.177 of 2006. The said suit was transferred to the III Additional District Court No.3, Gobichettipalayam and re-numbered as O.S.No.2 of 2007.
5. According to the respondent, she is claiming partition as per the provision of Hindu Succession Act as amended and she is liable to pay court fee only under Section 37 (2) of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and Section 37 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act is not applicable to the facts of the case. She also further stated that the suit is not undervalued, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (b) CPC. If court comes to the conclusion that the suit is undervalued, the respondent must be given time to pay the court fee and only when she fails to pay the deficit court fee, plaint can be rejected. Already Sub Court, Gobichettipalayam has enquired into the value of the property and returned the plaint on the ground that the property is undervalued. The respondent, after return of the said plaint, valued the properties at the market rate and has represented the plaint before the District Court, Erode and it has been numbered as O.S.No.177 of 2006 and subsequently it was transferred to Fast Track Court, Gobichettipalayam and re-numbered as O.S.No.2 of 2007. In view of the said fact, the petitioner has no right to raise the said issue once again.
6. Before the learned Judge, the petitioner examined himself as PW1 and marked eight documents as Exs.P1 to P8. The respondent did not let in any oral or documentary evidence. The learned Judge, considering all the materials on record and documents filed by the petitioner, dismissed the application holding that the reasons given by the petitioner for rejection of plaint are not valid and also held that the properties mentioned as Item No.9 in the plaint is owned by the respondent and petitioner's wife and at this stage, it is not necessary to decide how much share the petitioner's wife is entitled to and the same can be decided only at the time of trial of the suit.
7. Against the said order of dismissal dated 26.09.2016 in I.A.No.250 of 2015 in O.S.No.2 of 2007, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the respondent has been ousted from the suit properties for more than statutory period, the respondent was not in possession of the suit properties from 1990 and suit is filed after 12 years and the same is barred by limitation. She is not in joint possession with the petitioner. In view of the ouster, it cannot be said that she is deemed to be in joint possession of the suit properties with the petitioner. The suit filed by the respondent is not only for ancestral and joint family properties but also for separate properties and also properties alleged to have been inherited by her. The respondent has to pay the court fee under different heads as provided under Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. The value of the properties in Item Nos.8 to 10 are not valued even as per the guideline value. The value of the properties are more than Rs.10 lakhs and Rs.12 lakhs whereas the respondent has valued the suit properties only at Rs.60,000/- and Rs.80,000/- respectively.
9. The learned Judge erred in dismissing the application holding that the petitioner has not filed documents now filed, before Sub Court, at the time of enquiry in I.A.No.125 of 2004 in O.S.No.9 of 2004. The learned Judge erred in dismissing the application on the ground that the petitioner is challenging the value in respect of Item Nos.8 to 10 only and not all the properties. The learned Judge, having held that the properties in Item No.9 is in the names of the petitioner's wife and respondent, ought to have ordered enquiry with regard to market value of the property and directed the respondent to pay court fee under Section 37 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. The learned Judge erred in holding that the share of the petitioner's wife can be determined only at the time of trial. The learned Judge failed to see that Item Nos.8 to 10 are separate properties and respondent has to pay the court fee only under Section 37 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, at the market value as she is not in joint possession of the suit properties or deemed to be in joint possession with the petitioner. The learned Judge has committed irregularity in dismissing the application on the ground that the suit is eight years old. The learned Judge failed to see that as per Section 12 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, the Court has power to decide the value of the suit before evidence is recorded.
10. In the present case, trial has not commenced. No evidence is recorded. The petitioner has raised the issue of undervaluation of properties before recording of evidence and the learned Judge ought to have decided the issue on merits as per Section 12 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. The Court has power under Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and under Order XXVI Rule 9 of CPC to appoint a Commissioner to ascertain the market value of the properties. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments -
(i) AIR 2003 MADRAS 290 [George Thomas v. Smt.Srividya]
26. However, the disentitlement of the defendant to raise the plea of under valuation will not absolve the liability of the plaintiff to pay proper Court fee. In the event, on facts, this Court comes to the conclusion that the suit is undervalued, even in the absence of any plea, it can direct the plaintiff to pay the deficit court fee.
(ii) 2010 (5) L.W. 334 [Regila Prem v. Chellappan & others]
19. As per the said judgment, when an application is filed disputing the valuation of the property, the court has to consider the same and the same shall be considered as per the section 12(2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act and the learned Judge has held the provision of section 12(2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act is a substantial law, which will prevail over Order 14, Rule 2 CPC, which is a procedural law. Nevertheless, having regard to the facts of that case, the learned Judge dismissed the revision petition filed by the tenant for deciding the matter as a preliminary issue.
24. Therefore, in the light of the observation of the Honourable Supreme Court and the law laid down by this Court in the judgment reported 2002(2) CTC 513, in the case of V.R.Gopalakrishnan vs. Andiammal, referred to above, I am of the opinion that when a question of jurisdiction is raised by filing an application under section 12(2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act by stating that the property was not properly valued and if properly valued, the court will have no jurisdiction, the same must be tried as a preliminary issue and court has to direct the parties to lead in evidence in that aspect, otherwise there is no purpose in enacting section 12(2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act.
(iii) 2016 (4) MLJ 765 [N.Ganesan v. Vadivel]
8. It is also quite well settled in law that the payment of Court Fee cannot be made according to the whims and fancies of the Plaintiff and Section 149 of C.P.C cannot be taken as a license to justify the inordinate delay on the part of the Plaintiff.
(iv) 1992 (1) SCC 731 [Sujir Keshav Nayak v. Sujir Ganesh Nayak]
3. ............................................................. Competency refers to jurisdiction territorial or pecuniary, of limited or unlimited limits. In courts of limited pecuniary jurisdiction valuation assumes great importance. A plaintiff may over or under-value the suit for purposes of avoiding a court of a particular grade. In the former the plaint may be returned under 0.7 Rule 10 for presentation in proper court but in latter it is liable to be rejected. Since under-valuation goes to the root of maintainability of the suit a defendant is entitled to raise the objection irrespective of the nature of the suit. That is why this Court in Abdul Hamid Shamsi v. Abdul Majid And Ors. while upholding the right of the plaintiff to value the suit for accounting according to his own estimate held that he "has not been given the absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever in such relief." But that was a case of limited pecuniary jurisdiction in which the defendant could object as arbitrary under-valuation could result in rejection of the plaint. ................................................................................................................................... But in suits of such nature filed before courts of unlimited jurisdiction the valuation disclosed by the plaintiff may be accepted as correct. This, however, does not mean that the courts power to examine the correctness of valuation is taken away. If on perusal of plaint the court is prima facie satisfied that the plaintiff has not been fair and valued the suit or relief arbitrarily it is not precluded from directing the plaintiff to value it properly and pay court fee on it.
(v) 1987 (4) SCC 71 [E.Achuthan Nair v. P.Narayanan Nair & Anr.]

4. ...................................................It is only in cases where it appears to the Court on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case that the valuation is arbitrary, unreasonable and the plaint has been demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine the valuation and can revise the same. The plaintiff has valued the lease hold interest on the basis of the rent. Such a valuation, as has been rightly held by the Courts below, is reasonable and the same is not demonstratively arbitrary nor there has been any deliberate underestimation of the reliefs.

11. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that plaint can be rejected only when any one of the ingredients of Order VII Rule 11 (a) to (d) of CPC is satisfied. In the present case, objection raised by the petitioner are not as per Order VII Rule 11 (b) of CPC. Even if the Court comes to the conclusion that the suit is not properly valued, the plaint cannot be straightaway rejected. The Court has to direct the plaintiff to pay the deficit court fee within the time granted. If the plaintiff pays the court fee as directed by the Court, then the suit must be proceeded with. Only if the plaintiff fails to pay the deficit court fee as directed by the Court, the plaint can be rejected. In the present case, already Sub Court, Gobichettipalayam has decided the question of valuation and it was found that the plaint was not properly valued and the same was returned to be represented before the proper court.
12. The respondent valued the suit and presented the same before District Court on payment of proper court fee and the same was taken on file accepting the valuation given by the respondent as correct. It is not open to the petitioner now to raise the same issue once again. The respondent has stated in the plaint that she is in joint possession of the suit property including the properties inherited from her mother. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the petitioner has also admitted the joint possession. In the application for rejection of plaint, only the averments in the plaint and documents filed alongwith the plaint can be considered. The averments in the written statement or documents relied on by the petitioner or averments filed in support of the rejection of plaint cannot be taken into consideration. The plaint discloses cause of action and also as to how the suit is not barred by limitation. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the respondent is in joint possession of the suit property and therefore the court fee paid under Section 37 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act is correct. The learned Judge has considered all the facts and law and has dismissed the application.
13. In support of this contention, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent relied upon the following judgments -
(i) 2006 (4) L.W. 896 [Ramesh B. Desai & ors. v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and ors.]
14. The principle underlying Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 is no different. We will refer here to a recent decision of this Court rendered in Popat and Kotecha Property vs. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510 where it was held as under in para 10 of the report: -
"10. Clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 7 speaks of suit, as appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Disputed questions cannot be decided at the time of considering an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 applies in those cases only where the statement made by the plaintiff in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by any law in force."
It was emphasized in para 25 of the reports that the statement in the plaint without addition or subtraction must show that it is barred by any law to attract application of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The principle is, therefore, well settled that in order to examine whether the plaint is barred by any law, as contemplated by sub-rule (d) of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the averments made in the plaint alone have to be seen and they have to be assumed to be correct. It is not permissible to look into the pleas raised in the written statement or to any piece of evidence. Applying the said principle, the plea raised by the contesting respondents that the Company Petition was barred by limitation has to be examined by looking into the averments made in the Company Petition alone and any affidavit filed in reply to the Company Petition or the contents of the affidavit filed in support of Company Application No. 113 of 1995 filed by the respondents seeking dismissal of the Company Petition cannot at all be looked into.
(ii) 2015 (3) CTC 671 [M.K. Mala v. M.K.Ravi]
7.2. In order to appreciate this answer, it is necessary to look into the basis of claim made for partition. It is the case of the plaintiff that in the partition between the mother and the legal heirs, namely, the plaintiff and the defendants, suit property was allotted to the share of the mother, K.Saroja Bai in the partition that took place on 02.12.1994; that Saroja Bai died on 02.06.1999; that after the death of Saroja Bai, the plaintiff and the defendants became entitled to the property as legal representative and each of them are entitled to 1/4th share. The sum and substance of the pleadings would go to show that after the death of the mother, the plaintiff and the defendants are deemed to be in joint possession of the property. When it is stated in the evidence that nobody is in possession of the property and when the pleadings indicate presumptive joint possession, the evidence must be interupted as the plaintiff having meant the actual physical residence as possession. In other words, the plaintiff has understood that actual physical entry into the property alone would mean possession, which is the understanding of a common man. But the Court should not be carried away by the language used by the common man and the Court is duty bound to interpret the same legally. Therefore, the evidence adduced would show that the plaintiff and the defendants must be deemed to be in joint possession of the property.
(iii) 99 L.W. 711 [P.Ramaswamy Gounder v. Ambujan & Ors.]
4. The three cardinal principles that should be borne in mind while disposing of a question relating to court-fee are : (1) The Court shall accept the plaint averments as correct and apply the appropriate provision in the Act, (b) the court shall not be carried away by the form in which the plaint is dressed but shall peep into the substance to ascertain the base for reliefs claimed and the reliefs really asked for in the action, and (c) the Court is not concerned with the legality or maintainability of the claim as that relates to the merits and falls outside the purview of the Act.
7. According to the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, a reading of the plaint as a whole will disclose that the plaintiff is not even in constructive possession of both movable properties in respect of which she had claimed partition and therefore the court-fee has to be paid under Section 37(1) of the Act. In this context great reliance is made on the allegations in the plaint that the plaintiff had claimed accounting in respect of these properties as well. According to the learned Advocate General, that will imply that there was an ouster and therefore, the appropriate provision is Section 37(1) but not Section 37(2). I am unable to agree. The plaint has categorically stated that she is one of the heirs to her father and that all the properties were the separate and absolute properties of her father and that she claims a share as a heir to her father. 'The law presumes that the possession and enjoyment of one co-owner is on behalf of others as well. It may be open to one of the co-owners to plead ouster and if she were to succeed, it is a different matter. But when considering the question of court-fee, as already pointed out by me, the relevant data to be noticed is the averments in the plaint. I have already referred to the fact that the plaintiff has claimed a share as heir to her father and that she stated that because she was denied the share in the income, she was constrained to ask for accounting in respect of her share in the income. That by itself will not necessarily imply that she is out of legal possession of the properties in respect of which the relief for partition is claimed. It is true that "the plaintiff is deemed to be in joint possession of the properties" is written in ink later in the body of the original plaint. I am at a loss to understand as to how such as insertion will in any way alter the position of law. It is always open to the plaintiff to amend the plaint in any manner he or she likes, before it is presented. Therefore, when the matter is taken up for consideration by court, it has to take the averments as a whole as found in the plaint albeit there, was correction or addition before it was presented. I am to reiterate that there is enough indication in the plaint that the possession of others is on behalf of all the sharers entitled to the property and therefore, as rightly pointed out by the plaintiff, she shall be deemed to be in joint possession of the property. If so, the claim for partition as valued under Section 37(2) is quite correct.
(iv) AIR 1978 SC 1607 [Lakshmi Ammal v. K.M.Madhavakrishnan and ors.]
3. In this particular case there is hardly any difficulty in holding that the plaintiff in paragraph 14 of the plaint has clearly alleged that sh., is in joint possession and is seeking partition and separate possession of her half share in the suit properties as heir of deceased, Paramayee. Obviously, the court fee that is payable is as she has claimed, namely under sec. 37(2) which corresponds to Art. 17(b) of the Central Act, which is the predecessor legislation on the subject. We allow the appeal and send the case back to the trial court and direct that court to proceed with the suit expeditiously. We make it clear that our decision on the question of court fee does not have any implications on the merits including the validity or otherwise of the Will. No costs.
(v) 1980 (2) SCC 247 [Neelavathi & Ors. v. N.Natarajan & Ors.]
8. .............................................................. The general principle of law is that in the case of co-owners, the possession of one is in law possession of all, unless ouster or exclusion is proved. To continue to be in joint possession in law, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should be in actual possession of the whole or part of the property. Equally it is not necessary that. he should be getting a share or some income from the property. So long as his right to a share and the nature of the property as joint is not disputed the law presumes that he is in joint possession unless he is excluded from such possession. Before the plaintiffs could be called upon to pay court fee under S. 37(1) of the Act on the ground that they had been excluded from possession, it is necessary that on a reading of the plaint, there should be a clear and specific averment in the plaint that they had been "excluded" from joint possession to which they are entitled in law. The averments in the plant that the plaintiff could not remain in joint possession as he was not given any income from the joint family property would not amount to his exclusion from possession.
14. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, perused the materials available on record and also the judgments relied on by the parties.
15. The petitioner, in Interlocutory Application for rejection of plaint raised various grounds. In the Civil Revision Petition, the petitioner has restricted his contention for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(b) CPC. According to the petitioner, the respondent is seeking partition on three different heads, i.e. ancestral properties, succession and separate properties. The respondent was never in possession of the suit property even during the life time of their grandfather and parents. In such circumstances, the respondent cannot claim deemed possession in respect of her claim by succession and in respect of separate properties. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the respondent is in joint possession alongwith the petitioner as the petitioner is enjoying the property on behalf of the respondent and on his behalf. The said contention is untenable as the respondent is claiming share in some of the properties by succession and on separate possession. To decide the issue whether the court can ascertain the market value of the properties and direct the plaintiff to pay the deficit court fee, if any, the relevant provisions are Section 12 (2) and 19 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and Order VII Rule 11 (b) of CPC. These provisions are extracted hereunder for appreciation of the issue in question.
Section 12 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act.
12. Decision as to proper fee in other courts. -
(2) Any defendant may, by his written statement filed before the first hearing of the suit or before evidence is recorded on the merits of the claim but, subject to the next succeeding sub-section, not later, plead that the subject-matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient. All questions arising on such pleas shall be heard and decided before evidence is recorded affecting such defendant, on the merits of the claim. If the Court decides that the subject-matter of the suit has not been properly valued or that the fee paid is not sufficient, the Court shall fix a date before which the plaint shall be amended in accordance with the Court's decision and the deficit fee shall be paid. If the plaint be not amended or if the deficit fee be not paid within the time allowed, the plaint shall be rejected and the Court shall pass such order as it deems just regarding costs of the suit.
Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act.

19. Inquiry and commission. -
For the purpose of deciding whether the subject-matter of a suit or other proceeding has been properly valued or whether the fee paid is sufficient, the Court may hold such inquiry as it considers proper and may, if it thinks fit, issue a commission to any proper person directing him to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary and to report thereon to the Court.
Order VII Rule 11 (b) of CPC
11. Rejection of plaint - The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases :-
(b) Where the relief claimed is under-valued, and the plaintiff, on being required bythe Court to so correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

16. From the materials available on record, I hold that it cannot be said that the respondent is in joint possession i.e. deemed possession alongwith the petitioner. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent is that the petitioner himself has admitted in Para 7 of the affidavit that the respondent is in joint possession. A reading of the said paragraph shows that the petitioner did not admit joint possession by the respondent. On the other hand, he has stated that the plaint speaks about joint possession. Once as per law, it cannot be said that the respondent is in deemed possession, she has to pay the ad-valorem court fee on the market value as per Section 37 (1) of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard has considerable force. The learned Judge has held that the property mentioned in Item No.9 belongs only to the respondent and petitioner's wife. The petitioner has no share in the said property. Having held so, the learned Judge erred in holding that the share of the petitioner's wife can be decided only during the trial. The learned Judge failed to see that the respondent is claiming = share in the said property also. In view of the finding that item No.9 belongs to the respondent and petitioner's wife, the respondent cannot contend that she is deemed to be in joint possession alongwith the petitioner.
17. Having held that in Item No.9, the petitioner's wife has a share, the learned Judge ought to have passed orders for ascertaining the market value of the property. Similarly, the learned Judge having held that value of the properties in Item Nos.8 to 10 is more than what is stated in the plaint even as per the document and having held that respondent must be given an opportunity to pay the additional court fee, if any, ought to have passed order for ascertaining the market value of those properties and directed the respondent to pay additional court fee, if any. The learned Judge failed to consider Section 12 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act wherein it has been clearly stated that before recording evidence, if defendant raises the plea on undervaluation of the suit, the Court has to decide such plea after hearing the parties. If Court comes to the conclusion that the property is undervalued, the Court has to fix the date before which the plaint has to be amended in accordance with law with court's decision and deficit court fee has to be paid. If the plaintiff fails to amend and pay the deficit court fee, the plaint has to be rejected. To ascertain the correct market value of the property, the court has power under Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC to appoint a Commissioner in this regard. The learned Judge failed to consider these provisions and failed to exercise his powers conferred on him. The learned Judge committed an irregularity in dismissing the application on the ground that the suit is eight years old and petitioner has not made any case for rejection of plaint.
18. In view of the above, the order of the learned Judge dated 26.09.2016 made in I.A.No.250 of 2015 in O.S.No.2 of 2007 is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. All the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent had decided about the consideration for rejection of plaint, ascertaining the market value of the property and payment of additional court fee, if any. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said circumstances, the learned Judge is directed to appoint an Advocate Commissioner as per Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC to ascertain the correct market value of the properties mentioned in Item Nos.8 to 10 and if the market value is more than what is mentioned in the plaint and the respondent has not paid proper court fee, the respondent may be directed to pay the deficit court fee within the time limit fixed by the Court and pass consequential order as per Section 12 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act and Order VII Rule 11 (b) CPC.
19. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
21.08.2017
Index : Yes/No
rgr
To
The III Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Gobichettipalayam.

V.M.VELUMANI, J.
rgr




Order in
C.R.P. PD No.3686 of 2016





21.08.2017