HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT GWALIOR- Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted to protect women and children =the applicant is entitled for monthly maintenance amount of Rs.5,000/- per month= This being the position in law, it is the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife. He cannot be permitted to plead that he is unable to maintain the wife due to financial constraints as long as he is capable of earning.-Thus, it is clear that not only the wife is entitled to enjoy the same status which she could have otherwise enjoyed in her matrimonial house but if the husband is a able-bodied person, then he cannot refuse to pay adequate maintenance amount to his wife merely on the ground that his monthly income is less.

1 CRR 815/2008 & 107/2009
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT GWALIOR
*****************
SB:- Hon'ble Shri Justice G. S. Ahluwalia
CRR 815/2008
Smt. Megha Patil
vs.
Upendra Patil
AND
CRR 107/2009
Upendra Patil
vs.
Smt. Megha Patil
===========================================
None for the parties
============================================
ORDER
(05/10/2017)
None for the parties. The case was called on 07/09/2017 and
none had appeared. Today also, none appears for the parties even
in the second round. Therefore, this Court is left with no other
option but to decide both the criminal revisions after going through
the record. This Court has passed the following common order and
this order shall also dispose of Criminal Revision No.107/2009
filed by Upendra Patil.
(2) Being dissatisfied with the quantum of maintenance awarded
by the trial Court, applicant- Smt. Megha Patil has filed Criminal
Revision No.815/2008 against the order dated 17/11/2008 passed
by Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Gwalior in Case
No.160/2007, by which the application filed by applicant- Megha
Patil under Section 125 of CrPC was allowed and it was directed
that respondent Upendra Pail shall pay Rs.2,500/- per month to
applicant by way of maintenance whereas the respondent Upendra
Patil has filed Criminal Revision No.107/2009 challenging the
2 CRR 815/2008 & 107/2009
aforesaid order 17/11/2008, passed by Additional Principal Judge,
Family Court, Gwalior in Case No.160/2007 and prayed that either
the order passed under Section 125 of CrPC may be reversed or the
maintenance amount may be reduced.
(3) The necessary facts for the disposal of both the revisions in
short are that applicant Megha Patil was married to respondentUpendra
Patil on 13/12/2006 at Pune, as the respondent and his
family members had insisted that the marriage shall be performed
at Pune itself. The entire family of the applicant went to Pune
where the marriage was performed. When she reached her
matrimonial house, then the elder sister of the respondent had
objected with regard to various arrangements including food etc.
and she also alleged that the arrangements were not made as per
their social status. After two- three days of her marriage, the
respondent and his family members demanded Rs.2 lacs, however,
the applicant did not inform anybody about the said demand.
Three-four days after the marriage, the respondent left her in the
house of her elder sister who is residing at Pune and then, the
applicant informed about the demand of Rs.2 lacs to her sister and
brother-in-law. When her sister tried to consult with the respondent
then the respondent alleged that he would keep the applicant with
him only when an amount of Rs. 2 lacs is given, otherwise he
would not take her back. After great persuasion, the respondent
took her back on 27/12/2006. Food was not given and she was
harassed by her mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law and the
respondent. The house in which the respondent is residing in threestored
building and on the upper floor, her sister-in-law is residing
along with her family. On 28/01/2007, the applicant was slapped
by the respondent in the presence of her elder sister and brother-inlaw
and the respondent also refused to talk to the elder sister of the
applicant and insisted that the father and brother of the applicant
should be called. On 4th February, 2007, her brother came to her
3 CRR 815/2008 & 107/2009
matrimonial house and tried to persuade in-laws of the applicant
but they did not agree as a result of which her brother brought her
back to Gwalior and from then, she is residing in her parents’
house. On 23rd February, 2007, her brother had talked to her
father-in-law and requested the respondent to come to Gwalior and
to take the applicant back. On 25/02/2007, the respondent came to
Gwalior and stated that until and unless an amount of Rs.2 lacs is
given, he would not take her back to her matrimonial house.
Thereafter, the applicant lodged a report at Mahila Police Station
Padav, District Gwalior and when no action was taken then she
filed a complaint.
(4) The applicant was cross-examined by the respondent. In her
cross-examination, the applicant has stated that the demand for the
first time was made on 20/12/2006. She had also made a complaint
to Police Station Hadapsar, District Pune and admitted that the
allegation of demand of Rs.2 lacs was not mentioned and she has
given an explanation as she was interested for reconciliation,
therefore, the allegations were not made. The reconciliation
proceedings had also taken place on 28/01/2017 at Pune and the
applicant has also admitted that letter Ex.D2 was written by sister
of the applicant to the sister of the respondent mentioning therein
that because of intellectual differences, the marriage/relation is not
possible. However, this letter was written on 08/05/2006 i.e. prior
to the marriage. Thus, it is clear that the family of the applicant
was already apprehending that there are intellectual differences
between the parties and the marriage may not be possible but the
respondent has not explained that when this letter Ex.D/2 was
already written by the sister of the applicant to the sister of the
respondent, then who persuaded the applicant or her family
members to agree for the marriage. When the bride’s family had
already expressed his inability to go ahead with the marriage
proposal on the ground of intellectual differences, then it was for
4 CRR 815/2008 & 107/2009
the respondent to explain as to how the marriage was finalized.
The applicant has also stated that after the marriage, she had stayed
with her matrimonial house for about 20-25 days only and the
marriage could not be consummated because the respondent had
stayed away from her because of non-fulfillment of demand of
dowry. The applicant has further stated that apart from two four
wheelers i.e. Maruti 800 and Tata DI 207, the respondent is also
having one Scorpio. She has further stated that if the respondent
agrees to keep her properly, then she is still ready and willing to go
along with the respondent.
(5) Respondent Upendra Prabhakar Patil (DW1) admitted that
on 28/01/2007, a meeting was held in the house of his friend for
reconciliation. He further stated that his father is a retired Central
Government Employee but was not in a position to state the post
from which his father has retired. He further stated that as a private
complaint was filed by the applicant under Section 498-A of IPC,
therefore, on 09/06/2007 he went to Police Station Padav, District
Gwalior but the applicant did not join his company and, therefore,
he did not take any other step for restitution of conjugal rights.
(6) From the evidence of both the parties, it is clear that there
were certain difference between the parties even prior to the
settlement of marriage. The sister of the applicant had already
expressed that the marriage may not be possible because of
intellectual differences. When the letter dated 08/05/2006 written
by the sister of the applicant has been filed by the respondent
himself, then it was for the respondent to clarify that under what
circumstance the marriage was ultimately solemnized and who
persuaded the other party to go ahead with the marriage but that
has not been done by the respondent. Therefore, this Court is of the
considered opinion that in spite of intellectual differences between
the parties, the marriage ceremony was performed. The applicant
has alleged that she was harassed and, therefore, she had lodged
5 CRR 815/2008 & 107/2009
the FIR and has filed a private complaint under Section 498-A of
IPC whereas the respondent did not take any legal steps for
restitution of conjugal rights. Thus, it is clear that the trial Court
did not commit any mistake in holding that the applicant is
residing separately because of reasonable reason as she was
harassed by the respondent and his family members due to nonfulfillment
of their demand of Rs.2 lacs. Accordingly, it is held that
the applicant is entitled for maintenance.
(7) The next question for determination is about the quantum of
maintenance.
(8) The respondent- Upendra Prabhakar Patil in his crossexamination
has admitted that he is a labour civil contractor and
stated that his monthly income is Rs.8-10 thousand. It was further
stated by him that about Rs.5,000/- is required for meeting his
domestic expenses whereas Rs.2-3 thousand is spent for his
medical treatment. At present, he is making payment of Rs.6,500/-
to the applicant by way of maintenance out of which, Rs.5,000/- is
being paid in compliance of the order passed under Section 24 of
the Hindu Marriage Act. The respondent also admitted in his crossexamination
that he is the owner of two four wheelers i.e. Maruti
800 car and Tata DI 207 which is used for transportation of
labourers.
(9) So far as the question of maintenance is concerned, it is well
established principle of law that the lady is entitled to enjoy the
same social and financial status which she would have otherwise
enjoyed in her matrimonial house. In the present case, the
respondent is a Contractor by profession and is having two four
wheelers. An amount of Rs.5,000/- was also granted to the
applicant under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. However,
there is nothing on record as to what transpired to the proceedings
initiated under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act by the
respondent. The order dated 22/05/2008 passed under Section 24
6 CRR 815/2008 & 107/2009
of the Hindu Marriage Act has been placed on record by the
respondent by Ex.D20. It is clear that the respondent had filed an
application for grant of divorce against the applicant.
(10) It is also well established principle of law that while
awarding the maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC, the Court
has to take into consideration the maintenance amount awarded to
the lady under different statutory provisions. The order of interim
maintenance under Section 24 of Hindu Marriage Act was passed
in the year 2008 and nine long years have passed. Therefore, it can
be presumed that the said proceedings must have come to an end.
Be that as it may, the factual aspect is that the respondent is a
Contractor and, therefore, the applicant is entitled to enjoy same
financial status which she could have otherwise enjoyed.
(11) So far as the income tax returns Ex.D4 to D10 are
concerned, the same can be an indicative the gross total income of
the respondent. The purpose of filing income tax returns is for
payment of taxes and it is a matter between the assessee and the
revenue authority. Therefore, the income tax returns can be taken
as guiding factor for assessing the financial status of the parties.
From the income tax returns of assessment year 2008-2009
(Ex.D9), it is clear that the gross income of the respondent was
Rs.2,20,117/- which means that at least his monthly income is
about Rs.20,000/-. The respondent in his cross-examination has
also admitted that he had come to Gwalior from Pune on four
wheeler but he denied that the vehicle belongs to him and alleged
that the vehicle belongs to his friend and expenses of diesel has
also been borne by his friend but he has not named the person who
is the owner of the Scorpio four wheeler on which the respondent
had come to Gwalior and he has also not named the person who
had made payment of his expenses of diesel. Thus, it is clear that
the respondent has suppressed his actual income and if a person
can come to Gwalior from Pune on four wheeler by road,
7 CRR 815/2008 & 107/2009
specifically when the trains are available between two stations, that
clearly indicates the financial status of the respondent. Under these
circumstances, this Court is of the view that the amount of
Rs.2,500/- awarded by the trial Court is on the lower side.
(12) The Supreme Court in the case of Shamima Farooqui v.
Shahid Khan, (2015) 5 SCC 705 has held as under:-
''15. While determining the quantum of maintenance,
this Court in Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge,
Dehradun (1997) 7 SCC 7 has held as follows: (SCC
p. 12, para 8)
“8. … The court has to consider the status of
the parties, their respective needs, the capacity
of the husband to pay having regard to his
reasonable expenses for his own maintenance
and of those he is obliged under the law and
statutory but involuntary payments or
deductions. The amount of maintenance fixed
for the wife should be such as she can live in
reasonable comfort considering her status and
the mode of life she was used to when she lived
with her husband and also that she does not feel
handicapped in the prosecution of her case. At
the same time, the amount so fixed cannot be
excessive or extortionate.”
16. Grant of maintenance to wife has been
perceived as a measure of social justice by this Court.
In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai (2008) 2 SCC 316, it has
been ruled that: (SCC p. 320, para 6)
“6. … Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social
justice and is specially enacted to protect
women and children and as noted by this Court
in Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena
Kaushal (1978) 4 SCC 70 falls within the
constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced
by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is
meant to achieve a social purpose. The object
is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It
provides a speedy remedy for the supply of
food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife.
It gives effect to fundamental rights and natural
duties of a man to maintain his wife, children
and parents when they are unable to maintain
themselves. The aforesaid position was
highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v.
State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636 .”
8 CRR 815/2008 & 107/2009
17. This being the position in law, it is the obligation
of the husband to maintain his wife. He cannot be
permitted to plead that he is unable to maintain the
wife due to financial constraints as long as he is
capable of earning.
18. In this context, we may profitably quote a passage
from the judgment rendered by the High Court of
Delhi in Chander Parkash Bodh Raj v. Shila Rani
Chander Prakash 1968 SCC Online Del 52 wherein it
has been opined thus: (SCC On Line Del para 7)
7. … an able-bodied young man has to be
presumed to be capable of earning sufficient
money so as to be able reasonably to maintain
his wife and child and he cannot be heard to say
that he is not in a position to earn enough to be
able to maintain them according to the family
standard. It is for such able-bodied person to
show to the Court cogent grounds for holding
that he is unable, for reasons beyond his
control, to earn enough to discharge his legal
obligation of maintaining his wife and child.
When the husband does not disclose to the
Court the exact amount of his income, the
presumption will be easily permissible against
him.
19. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is limpid
that the obligation of the husband is on a higher
pedestal when the question of maintenance of wife and
children arises. When the woman leaves the
matrimonial home, the situation is quite different. She
is deprived of many a comfort. Sometimes her faith in
life reduces. Sometimes, she feels she has lost the
tenderest friend. There may be a feeling that her
fearless courage has brought her the misfortune. At this
stage, the only comfort that the law can impose is that
the husband is bound to give monetary comfort. That is
the only soothing legal balm, for she cannot be allowed
to resign to destiny. Therefore, the lawful imposition
for grant of maintenance allowance.''
(13) Thus, it is clear that not only the wife is entitled to enjoy the
same status which she could have otherwise enjoyed in her
matrimonial house but if the husband is a able-bodied person, then
he cannot refuse to pay adequate maintenance amount to his wife
merely on the ground that his monthly income is less.
9 CRR 815/2008 & 107/2009
(14) Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of
the case, this Court is of the view that the applicant is entitled for
monthly maintenance amount of Rs.5,000/- per month. The order
dated 17/11/2008 passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family
Court, Gwalior in Case No.160/2017, is modified and it is directed
that applicant- Smt. Megha Patil shall be entitled to get the
monthly maintenance amount of Rs.5,000/- per month in place of
Rs.2,500/- per month as directed by the Court below.
(15) With the aforesaid observation, the criminal revision filed
by applicant- Smt. Megha Patil i.e. Criminal Revision
No.815/2008 succeeds and is partly allowed whereas the criminal
revision filed by respondent - Upendra Patil i.e. Criminal
Revision No.107/2009 fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
MKB

PATNA HIGH COURT= Limitation for filing DV Act - the maximum punishment provided under the D.V. Act is for a term which may extend to one year. Hence, the Court would be debarred from taking cognizance after one year. Evidently, the complaint has been filed in the present case after the expiry of the period of limitation. In this regard, the petitioner has rightly placed reliance on the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra) wherein it has been held that the complaint under the D.V. Act could be filed only within a period of one year from the date of incident in view of the provisions of Sections 28 and 32 of the D.V. Act.; the complaint under the D.V. Act by the ex-wife after divorce was not maintainable in law.=the application filed by the petitioner under Section 13(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of the marriage between him and the opposite party no.2 held on 14.02.2013 was allowed by the learned Senior Civil Judge at Sangareddy, Andhra Pradesh on 27.02.2015 whereas the complaint under the D.V. Act was filed after more than four months of passing of the decree of divorce on 10.07.2015.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Criminal Miscellaneous No.41318 of 2016
Arising Out of PS.Case No. -110 Year- 2015 Thana -DOMESTIC VIOLENACE District- PATNA
===========================================================
Santosh Kumar, son of Sri Siyaram Mandal, resident of House No.241/2/5
Govindpur Housing Colony Chota Govindpur (Jamshedpur), P.S.-Chota
Goovindpur, District-East Singhbhum (Jharkhand) at present residing at BHEL RC
Puram Lingampally Hyderabad, P.S.-Lingampally, District-Hyderabad, State of
Telangana (at present).
.... .... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Bihar
2. Neha Kumari, Daughter of Sri Rameshwar Prasad, resident of Purnendu Nagar,
Plot No. E/3/3, Near Shiv Mandir, Adjacent house of Baby Niwas,
P.S.-Phulwarisharif, District-Patna.
.... .... Opposite Parties
===========================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Dinu Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Swapnil Kumar, Advocate
For the Opposite Party no.2 : Mr. Baijnath Thakur, Advocate
===========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
Date: 06-10-2017
This application under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (for short „Cr.P.C.‟) has been filed by the
petitioner for quashing the entire proceeding of Domestic Violence
Case No. 110 of 2015 including the order dated 22.07.2016 passed
by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Patna by which ad interim relief
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
2
has been granted to the opposite party no.2 whereby the petitioner
has been directed to pay Rs.15,000/- per month to the opposite party
no.2 for her day-to-day maintenance and to continue her studies.
2. Three important issues, which arise for
determination in this case are:-
(i) Whether an ex-wife can file a complaint under
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 (for short the „D.V. Act‟) when the
relationship has come to an end with a decree of
divorce?
(ii) Whether an application under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. would be maintainable for quashing a
proceeding under the provisions of the D.V. Act?
(iii) Whether the provisions of Section 468 of the
Cr.P.C. would be applicable in case of a proceeding
under the D.V. Act?
3. Before, I proceed ahead to discuss and decide the
aforesaid questions, it would be essential to briefly narrate the
factual issues.
4. A complaint under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 27 of
the D.V. Act was filed by the opposite party no.2 against the
petitioner and three others in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
3
Patna alleging therein that she was married to the petitioner on
14.02.2013 at Barauni, Begusarai. Her parents had spent Rs.18
Lakhs over her marriage. After the marriage, she was taken to her
sasural at Jamshedpur. In sasural, she was subjected to harassment
by her husband and in-laws for demand of Rs. 10 lakhs. They used
to utter that the petitioner being a class-II officer in B.H.E.L., whose
monthly salary is Rs.1.25 lakhs, was being offered Rs.25 lakhs as
dowry by several persons. They asked her to demand Rs.10 Lakhs
from her parents failing which she was threatened to be driven out of
her matrimonial house. She has alleged that after sometimes, she
was taken to Lingampally, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) where her
husband was posted. Even there, she was being subjected to cruelty
by her husband and in-laws for non-fulfilment of demand of Rs.10
lakhs and a luxury car. She has alleged that her husband and in-laws
also attempted to kill her, but somehow she could save her life and,
ultimately, on 23.04.2013, she was ousted from the house by her
husband and in-laws at Hyderabad. An information, in this regard,
was given to the Hyderabad Police, but no action was taken on her
complaint. Thereafter, she came back to Patna at her parents‟ house.
Even in Patna, she was threatened to bring dowry as demanded.
5. On the basis of these allegations, the complainant
prayed for the following reliefs from the court under the D.V. Act
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
4
from the husband:-
(i) Rs. 10 lakhs as compensation for physical and
mental sufferings;
(ii) Rs. 15 lakhs for loss of education;
(iii) Rs. 25 thousand per month for maintenance;
(iv) Rs. 20 thousand per month for residential
accommodation or a direction to allow the petitioner
to reside in the flat of her husband at Hyderabad; and
(v) Rs. 25 lakhs for cumulative suffering and loss.
6. Mr. Dinu Kumar, learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that as the case was transferred to the court of
learned Judicial Magistrate and notice was served to the petitioner
and another accused persons, he appeared and filed show cause on
31.05.2016 denying the allegations levelled by the opposite party
no.2. A specific stand was taken before the learned Magistrate that
the D.V. case is malicious and has been filed with oblique motive
and is not maintainable. It was also pleaded that the provisions of
Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Act, 2005 are not made out. It was
also pleaded that the opposite party no.2 had hardly stayed for 5-6
days at Jamshedpur after marriage and she stayed for about two
months at Hyderabad. The marriage was performed without any
dowry and the allegation of demand of dowry and torture as
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
5
mentioned in the complaint is concocted and false. As a matter of
fact, due to cruelty meted out by the opposite party no.2, the
petitioner had gone in depression and, for that, he underwent
treatment in hospital. Since the steps taken for settlement of the
issue could not deliver any fruitful result, a divorce case being
H.M.O.P. No.54 of 2014 under Section 13(i)(a) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 was filed for dissolution of the marriage
between the petitioner and the opposite party no.2 in the court of
Senior Civil Judge at Sangareddy, Andhra Pradesh. The opposite
party no.2 knowingly did not appear in the divorce case filed by the
petitioner even, after valid service of notice. A decree of divorce
dated 27.02.2015 was passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge,
Sangareddy. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted
that once the domestic relationship came to an end after the decree
of divorce, the complaint under the D.V. Act could not have been
filed. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on a
judgment passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the
matter of Amit Agarwal and Ors. Vs. Sanjay Aggarwal [III
(2016) DMC 97 (P & H). He submitted that the complaint under the
D.V. Act is also barred by law of limitation in view of the provisions
of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C.. In this regard, he has placed reliance
on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Inderjit Singh
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
6
Grewal vs. State of Punjab & Anr. [(2011) 12 SCC 588].
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the opposite party
no.2 submitted that the instant application under Section 482 of the
Cr. P.C. is not maintainable, as the impugned order of maintenance
passed under Section 20 of the D.V. Act is appelable under Section
29 thereof. He contended that when there is statutory remedy
available, the inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
cannot be exercised. He contended that the decree of divorce dated
27.02.2015 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Andhra Pradesh is an
ex parte decree for which the opposite party no.2 came to know only
after she appeared in Cr. Misc. No.36243 of 2015 filed by the
petitioner before this court against the order of cognizance passed in
Complaint Case No.56 C of 2015 instituted under Section 498A of
the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner and others. After
coming to know about the said decree of divorce, the opposite party
no.2 filed a petition in H.M.O.P. No.54 of 2014 on 30.09.2015 under
Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Cr.P.C. for setting
aside the decree. He contended that the said petition is still pending
before the court of Senior Civil Judge, Sangareddy. He contended
that even otherwise the complainant-opposite party no.2 is entitled
to receive maintenance under Section 20(1)(d) of the D.V. Act, as
the allegation of domestic violence in Domestic Violence Case
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
7
No.110 of 2015 relate back to the date prior to the institution of the
said divorce case.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
carefully perused the record.
9. The first question whether an ex-wife can file a
complaint under the D.V. Act when the relationship has come to an
end with a decree of divorce fell for consideration before the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Amit Agarwal (supra). In that case, a
challenge was made by the husband to the complaint filed by the
brother of his ex-wife in 2009, after a year of decree of divorce was
passed. The facts of the said case were that the petitioner was
married in 2003, but in 2006 his wife left the matrimonial house. In
the meantime, a complaint under the D.V. Act was also filed by her
against her husband and his family members. The husband filed a
divorce case. Against which, he got an ex parte order in 2008. The
complaint filed by the wife in 2006 was withdrawn in March, 2009,
but a month later, her brother again filed a complaint. The Punjab
and Haryana High Court held that as per provisions of the Act, the
brother of the aggrieved was duly competent to file a complaint, but
in a case where the decree of divorce had already been passed, it was
not maintainable. The court while exercising power under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. quashed the complaint and observed that “the
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
8
provisions under the D.V. Act can be invoked only when the
domestic relationship is in existence”.
10. Referring to Section 2(a) of the D.V. Act, the
Court observed: “the use of the word is any woman „who is‟ or „has
been‟. Both the expressions are in the present tense. The legislature
has not used the word „who was‟ or „had been‟. This means the
domestic relationship has to be in the present and not in the past.
The definition requires that on the date Act come into force, the
woman should be in domestic relationship”.
11. Referring to Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act, which
defines the domestic relationship, the Court observed: “the
definition clearly speaks of a domestic relationship between two
persons who live or have at any point of time lived together in a
shared household and are related by marriage or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage. This definition also speaks
about the existence of a relationship by marriage or a relationship
in the nature of marriage at the time. The expression used is „are
related‟ by marriage. The expression by the legislature is not „were
related‟. From the bare reading of these two provisions it is
apparent that the intention of the legislature is to protect those
women who are living in a domestic relationship”.
12. While deciding the said question, the Court
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
9
referring to decision of Delhi High Court in Harbans Lal Malik vs.
Payal Malik [(2010) DLT 67], held: “the definition of „wife‟ as
available in Section 125 Cr.PC cannot be merged into Domestic
Violence Act”.
13. While examining the second question in Amit
Agarwal (supra) whether an application under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. would be maintainable for quashing a proceeding under the
provisions of the D.V. Act, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
held: “The Apex Court in Ashish Dixit and others Vs. State of U.P.
and another MANU/SC0156/2013 had quashed the proceedings
under the Domestic Violence Act in a petition filed under Section
482 Cr.P.C. This High Court in Jasvir Kaur and another Vs.
Manpreet Kaur in CRM No. M-29792 of 2011 allowed the petition
filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the complaint
filed under the Domestic Violence Act. The Karnataka High Court in
Smt. Nagarathnamma Vs. M.S. Vanithashree in Cr.P.No.5246 of
2010 had allowed the petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Thus,
a complaint can be quashed in the petition filed under Section 482
Cr.P.C. if it is found that the complaint was an abuse of the process
of the Court or has filed only with a view to harass the others”.
14. On both the above said questions, I fully concur
with the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amit
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
10
Agarwal (supra).
15. So far as the third question whether the
provisions of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. would be applicable in case
of a proceeding under the Act is concerned, the same is no more res
integra.
16. In Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra), the Supreme
Court has answered the said question in the following words:
“Submissions made by Shri Ranjit Kumar on the issue of limitation,
in view of the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., that the complaint
could be filed only within a period of one year from the date of the
incident seem to be preponderous in view of the provisions of
Sections 28 and 32 of the Act 2005 read with Rule 15(6) of The
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 which
make the provisions of Cr.P.C. applicable and stand fortified by the
judgments of this court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar
Mohanty, AIR 2007 SC 2762; and Noida Entrepreneurs
Association v. Noida & Ors., (2011) 6 SCC 508”.
17. The law declared by the Supreme Court has got
binding force and, in that view of the matter, it can safely be said
that the provisions of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. would clearly be
applicable in cases instituted under the provisions of the D.V. Act.
18. Coming back to the facts of the present case, the
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
11
complainant-opposite party no.2 was admittedly married to the
petitioner on 12.04.2013 at Barauni, Begusarai. Subsequently, she
was taken to Lingampally, Hyderabad where the petitioner was
serving as a Class-II officer in B.H.E.L. She was ousted from her
husband‟s house in Lingampally, Hyderabad on 23.04.2013. An
allegation has also been made in the complaint that on 04.05.2014 at
about 7:00 P.M., the complainant went together with her mother to
the house of the petitioner, but the petitioner refused to return her
ornaments and other utensils.
19. In Section 31 of the D.V. Act penalty has been
provided for breach of protection order. The penalty provided for
such breach is for a term which may extend to one year or extend to
twenty thousand rupees or both. Apparently, the D.V. Act is not
considered as a criminal law as it is more concerned with providing
relief to the victim. However, if the offender does not comply with a
final or temporary protection order, he can be (i) sent to jail; (ii)
ordered to pay fine upto Rs.20,000/-; or (iii) sent to jail and ordered
to pay fine.
20. Section 28 of the D.V. Act clearly stipulates
that save as otherwise expressly provided, all proceedings under
Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 23 and offences under Section 31
shall be governed by the provisions of Cr.P.C.
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
12
21. Section 32 of the D.V. Act provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.P.C., the offence under
Section 31 shall be cognizable and non-bailable.
22. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. deals with
limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences. Section 468 of
the Cr.P.C., which bars taking cognizance of the offence after lapse
of one year, reads as under:-
“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of
the period of limitation.-
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in
this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an
offence of the category specified in sub- section
(2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be-
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with
fine only
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for term exceeding one year but
not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period
of limitation in relation to offences which may
be tried together, shall be determined with
reference to the offence which is punishable
with the more severe punishment or, as the case
may be, the most severe punishment.”
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
13
23. A perusal of Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. would
make it evident that the Court would be debarred from taking
cognizance of the offence after expiry of one year if the offence is
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding one year.
24. As seen above, the maximum punishment
provided under the D.V. Act is for a term which may extend to one
year. Hence, the Court would be debarred from taking cognizance
after one year. Evidently, the complaint has been filed in the present
case after the expiry of the period of limitation. In this regard, the
petitioner has rightly placed reliance on the ratio laid down by the
Apex Court in Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra) wherein it has been
held that the complaint under the D.V. Act could be filed only
within a period of one year from the date of incident in view of the
provisions of Sections 28 and 32 of the D.V. Act.
25. Further, the application filed by the petitioner
under Section 13(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for
dissolution of the marriage between him and the opposite party no.2
held on 14.02.2013 was allowed by the learned Senior Civil Judge at
Sangareddy, Andhra Pradesh on 27.02.2015 whereas the complaint
under the D.V. Act was filed after more than four months of passing
of the decree of divorce on 10.07.2015.
26. In view of the discussions made above, as I have
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.41318 of 2016 dt.-06-10-2017
14
already concurred with the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Amit Agarwal (supra), the complaint under the D.V.
Act by the ex-wife after divorce was not maintainable in law.
27. Thus, I am of the opinion that the entire
proceeding of the D.V. Case No. 110 of 2015 is an abuse of the
process of the Court. Accordingly, the complaint and the entire
proceeding of the aforesaid case including the impugned order dated
22.07.2016 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Patna are
hereby quashed.
28. The application stands allowed.
Sanjeet/-
(Ashwani Kumar Singh, J.)
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE 08.09.2017
Uploading Date 10.10.2017
Transmission
Date
10.10.2017

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR = Hindu Marriage Act- Divorce - Paramour is not a necessary party = Mr. Sumit Jain, was necessary party and in support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of this Court reported in Jaideep vs. Rashmi Shah [2011 (2) MPLJ 680. We are not in agreement with the arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellant. This Court in the aforesaid judgment has specifically held that the allegations of illegal relationship is made, then the aforesaid person is not necessary party. However, he may be a proper party. There is no necessity to make a person as a party in matrimonial proceedings in accordance with Indian Law against whom an allegation of illicit relationship has been made. Hence, the arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellant is hereby rejected.

1
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH PRINCIPAL SEAT AT
JABALPUR
DIVISION BENCH: Hon'ble Shri Justice S.K. Gangele &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Anurag Shrivastava
First Appeal No.611 of 2017
Smt. Tripti Gohite
Versus.
Santosh Gohite
Shri Alok Wagrecha and Shri Pushpendra Dubey, counsel for the
appellant
Shri S.K. Kashyap, counsel for the respondent.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
J U D G M E N T
(Pronounced on 09.10.2017)
As per S.K. Gangele, J:
1. Appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment and
decree dated 02.08.2017 passed in regular Civil Suit No.84-A/2016
by the Family Court, Betul. The trial Court awarded decree of divorce
under Section 13 (1) (i A) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
2. The respondent/husband filed a suit for divorce under Section
13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. He pleaded that the marriage of
respondent and appellant was solemnized on 27.04.2015 at Sadar,
Betul in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. The appellant lived
with the respondent from 28.04.2015 to 03.05.2015, for one week.
On 03.05.2015, the respondent/husband noticed some messages
2
which were obscene on her mobile no.9926746701. The number
from which the messages were came, was saved in the name of
'Dipali', then he enquired from the wife about it, she told him that
messages were send by Mr. Sumeet Jain, with whom she had love
relationship. Thereafter, the respondent made a call on mobile
no.7089894632 and the person told his name 'Sumit Jain' and also
told him that he is in love with the appellant and he wants to marry
with her.
3. On 03.05.2015, the respondent/husband informed his father
and mother about the aforesaid incident and relationship of the
appellant with Mr. Sumit Jain and after inspection of the bag of the
appellant he found one pen drive. When he opened the pendrive, he
found number of photographs of appellant and Mr. Sumit Jain.
Thereafter, on 07.06.2015 a meeting of Betul Samaj was held. In the
aforesaid meeting, the father and mother of the appellant were also
present. Members of the committee apprised about the conduct of
the appellant and due to aforesaid conduct of the appellant, the
prestige of the respondent/husband was lowered in the Society. The
appellant left the matrimonial home. Thereafter, number of notices
were sent to her. She did not reply. The appellant also lodged a
report against the family members of the respondent.
3
4. Appellant/wife denied the pleadings of the respondent. She
further denied that she had any relationship with Mr. Sumit Jain, as
alleged by the respondent. She also pleaded that her father had
given sufficient dowry at the time of marriage. She pleaded that she
was subjected to cruelty by the appellant. She pleaded that
respondent had beaten her. On 05.05.2015, the respondent
promised that he would not repeat such type of behaviour and
thereafter, the meeting of the Samaj was held on 14.06.2015. The
Members present in the meeting were warned the respondent not to
repeat such behaviour. The appellant also filed a case under Section
9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. The
trial Court framed two issues (i) whether the appellant had caused
practiced with the respondent and (ii) whether on this ground, the
respondent is eligible to get decree of divorce. The Court answered
both the questions in favour of the respondent/husband and granted
decree of divorce.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial
Court has committed error of jurisdiction in granting decree of
divorce. The Court has further committed error in admitting the
photographs contrary to Section 65-B of Evidence Act. In the event
of allegation that the appellant/wife had illegal relationship with Mr.
Sumit Jain, it is necessary to make Mr. Sumit Jain as party. He has
4
further contended that decree of divorce on the basis of cruelty on
the basis of past conduct could not be awarded. In support of his
contentions, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following
judgments :
[1] Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer and others, (2014) 10 SCC 473.
[2] Jaideep vs. Rashmi Shah [2011 (2) MPLJ 680.
[3] Smt. Parvati vs. Shiv Ram another AIR 1989 HP 29
6. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the trial
Court has considered all the aspects and from the conduct of the
appellant and the evidence on record it has been established that
the respondent had illegal relationship with Mr. Sumit Jain due to
which, the respondent suffered mental shock, humiliation and his
prestige was affected in the Society hence, the trial Court has rightly
granted decree of divorce.
7. Main question for consideration before this Court is that
whether the appellant had any illegal relationship with Mr. Sumit Jain
and whether she concealed the aforesaid fact. The
respondent/husband specifically pleaded in the plaint that on
28.04.2015 and 15.05.2015, the appellant had long conversations on
her mobile. On 3.5.2015 he had noticed various obscene messages
on her mobile and what’s app messages were sent from the mobile
no. 7089894632. It was in the name of 'Mr. Sumit Jain'. He had also
contacted Mr. Jain on the aforesaid mobile number and he admitted
5
that he is in love with the appellant and he wants to marry with her.
He narrated all the facts to his parents and thereafter, on 7.6.2016, a
meeting of Betul Samaj was held. The same facts have been
deposed by the respondent in his statement recorded before the trial
Court.
8. On behalf of the respondent, [PW-3] Mr. Rajendra S/o Sukhram
Kodale, who was present in the meeting of Samaj, deposed that he
had seen the appellant and Mr. Sumit Jain at many occasions, they
were also travelling in a train and also on motorbike. On 7.6.2015, a
meeting of the Samaj was held at the instance of Santosh/appellant.
In the meeting family members of the appellant were present. The
appellant told the members of the Sanjaj that the respondent had
relationship with Mr. Sumit Jain and shown the photographs. The
respondent had admitted love relationship with Mr. Sumit Jain. In the
meeting, the members made a request to the respondent that if she
gives an undertaking to the effect that she would not repeat the
same, however, the respondent refused the same. Mother of the
respondent also deposed the same facts as stated by the appellant.
9. On behalf of respondent another person Mr. Radheshyam S/o
Gajanand Charpe was examined. He deposed that he is in the
business of Photography, Videography and Printing. On 8.5.2015,
Santosh Gohite had come to his shop and he had given the
6
pendrive . He had developed the photographs from the pendrive
which was given by the respondent and received remuneration
Rs.1500/-. The photographs were taken out from the personal
computer. No change was made in the aforesaid photographs.
10. On behalf of the appellant, she examined herself and her
mother. She deposed that at the time of marriage her father had
given sufficient dowry. The respondent/husband had beaten and
abused her. She narrated the facts to her father and mother when
they came on 05.05.2016. They had taken back her from the house
of the respondent. A meeting of Samaj was held on 14.06.2015 to
consider the behaviour of the respondent. She denied the fact that
she had any relationship with Mr. Jain and she had received
messages on her mobile. In her cross-examination, she admitted the
fact that on 7.6.2015 a meeting of member of Samaj was held at the
instance of respondent. It was held at Pawar Samaj Sangathan,
Betul. In the aforesaid meeting, family members of the appellant and
respondent were present. She denied the photographs Ex.P.-1 to
Ex.P-73. However, she admitted the fact that her husband had a
mobile number. She specifically denied that she had ill-will or she is
not happy with her marriage. She deposed that she wants to
continue with the marriage. She further denied that she has any
illegal relationship with Mr. Sumit Jain. She admitted the fact that she
7
had lodged the report against the family members of the respondent
and criminal case has been registered against them.
11. Mother of the appellant deposed that during marriage, they
had given Rs. 1,50,000/- as dowry along with other articles to the
respondent/husband. She further deposed that respondent and his
family members had been beating the respondent and they forced
her to leave the house. Thereafter, we had taken the appellant on
05.05.2015 because the respondent was not willing to keep the
appellant with him. She further admitted the fact that a meeting of
Samaj was held on 07.06.2015, it was called at the instance of
respondent and family members were present in the meeting. She
deposed that she did not remember what had happened in the
meeting. She denied the fact that appellant had any illegal
relationship with Mr. Sumit Jain as alleged by the respondent.
12. Independent witness [PW-3] was present in the meeting of the
Samaj which was convened on 7.6.2015. He verified the fact that
respondent had told the members of Samaj that appellant had illicit
love relationship with 'Sumit Jain' and she used to talk with Sumit
Jain. From the possession of appellant pendrive was recovered and
some photographs were taken out from the pendrive. His evidence is
natural and trustworthy. Appellant and her mother i.e. sole witness
examined on behalf of the appellant admitted the fact that a meeting
8
of Samaj was held on 7.6.2015, it was convened at the initiation of
family members of respondent. The evidence established the fact
that there was a serious dispute between appellant and respondent.
A meeting of the Samaj was convened on the instance of family
members of respondent. The independent witness [PW-3] proved
the fact that in the aforesaid meeting the respondent narrated the
conduct and activities of the appellant. The pendrive has been
produced before the trial Court and the photographs i.e. near about
73 have been produced before the trial Court as Exhibits. In the
aforesaid photographs, the respondent has seen in intimate positions
with Mr. Sumit Jain.
13. [PW-2] deposed that he is running a studio in the name of
“Megha Digital Studio”. He had taken out 110 photographs from the
pendrive and CD and those photographs were handed over to the
respondent, he has given certificate required under Section 65-B of
the Evidence Act.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that
photographs are not admissible in evidence because there is no
compliance of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. In support of his
contention, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the apex Court
reported in Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer and others, (2014) 10
SCC 473.
9
15. The facts of present case are distinguishable. In the present
case, pendrive was recovered from the possession of the appellant.
It was not possible for the respondent to produce original
equipments from which photographs were taken out in the pendrive
because those photographs were taken out by the appellant herself.
The appellant has denied the same. It is not possible for the person
to forge 110 of photographs of the appellant with Mr. Sumit Jain.
Hence, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the appellant.
From the evidence produced by the respondent this fact has been
proved that appellant had illicit relationship with Mr. Sumit Jain
before marriage.
16. The apex Court in the case of Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh
reported in (2007) 4 SCC 511 in regard to mental cruelty and has
held as under:-
40. The term "mental cruelty" has been defined in the Black's
Law Dictionary [8th Edition, 2004] as under:
"Mental Cruelty - As a ground for divorce, one spouse's course
of conduct (not involving actual violence) that creates such
anguish that it endangers the life, physical health, or mental
health of the other spouse."
41. The concept of cruelty has been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of
England [Vol.13, 4th Edition Para 1269] as under:
"The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire
matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule
10
is of special value when the cruelty consists not of violent
acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or
taunts. In cases where no violence is averred, it is
undesirable to consider judicial pronouncements with a
view to creating certain categories of acts or conduct as
having or lacking the nature or quality which renders them
capable or incapable in all circumstances of amounting to
cruelty; for it is the effect of the conduct rather than its
nature which is of paramount importance in assessing a
complaint of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been guilty of
cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact and
previously decided cases have little, if any, value. The court
should bear in mind the physical and mental condition of
the parties as well as their social status, and should consider
the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on
the mind of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels
between the spouses from that point of view; further, the
conduct alleged must be examined in the light of the
complainant's capacity for endurance and the extent to
which that capacity is known to the other spouse.
Malevolent intention is not essential to cruelty but it is an
important element where it exits."
42. In 24 American Jurisprudence 2d, the term "mental cruelty" has been
defined as under:
"Mental Cruelty as a course of unprovoked conduct toward
one's spouse which causes embarrassment, humiliation, and
anguish so as to render the spouse's life miserable and
unendurable. The plaintiff must show a course of conduct on
the part of the defendant which so endangers the physical or
mental health of the plaintiff as to render continued
11
cohabitation unsafe or improper, although the plaintiff need
not establish actual instances of physical abuse."
43. In the instant case, our main endeavour would be to
define broad parameters of the concept of 'mental cruelty'.
Thereafter, we would strive to determine whether the
instances of mental cruelty enumerated in this case by the
appellant would cumulatively be adequate to grant a decree
of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty according to the
settled legal position as crystallized by a number of cases of
this Court and other Courts.
44. This Court has had an occasion to examine in detail the
position of mental cruelty in N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane
reported in (1975) 2 SCC 326 at page 337, para 30 observed
as under :-
"The enquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct charges
as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the
petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or
injurious for him to live with the respondent."
45. In the case of Sirajmohmedkhan Janmohamadkhan
v. Haizunnisa Yasinkhan & Anr. reported in (1981) 4 SCC
250, this Court stated that the concept of legal cruelty
changes according to the changes and advancement of social
concept and standards of living. With the advancement of
our social conceptions, this feature has obtained legislative
recognition, that a second marriage is a sufficient ground for
separate residence and maintenance. Moreover, to establish
legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should
be used. Continuous ill-treatment, cessation of marital
intercourse, studied neglect, indifference on the part of the
husband, and an assertion on the part of the husband that the
12
wife is unchaste are all factors which lead to mental or legal
cruelty.
46. In the case of Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi
reported in (1988) 1 SCC 105, this Court had an occasion to
examine the concept of cruelty. The word 'cruelty' has not
been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. It has been used in
Section 13(1)(i)(a) of the Act in the context of human
conduct or behaviour in relation to or in respect of
matrimonial duties or obligations. It is a course of conduct of
one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may
be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is
physical, it is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental,
the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment
and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of
the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that
it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other,
ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into
account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the
complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where
the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se
unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on
the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In
such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct
itself is proved or admitted. The absence of intention should
not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in
human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be
regarded as cruelty. Intention is not a necessary element in
cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the
ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful illtreatment.
13
47. In Rajani v. Subramonian AIR 1990 Ker. 1 the Court aptly
observed that the concept of cruelty depends upon the type of
life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social
conditions, their culture and human values to which they
attach importance, judged by standard of modern civilization
in the background of the cultural heritage and traditions of our
society.
48. Again, this Court had an occasion to examine in great
detail the concept of mental cruelty. In the case of V. Bhagat v.
D. Bhagat (Mrs.) reported in (1994) 1 SCC 337, the Court
observed, in para 16 at page 347, as under:
"16. Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(i-a) can broadly be defined
as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental
pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to
live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of
such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to
live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party
cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and
continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove
that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of
the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be
had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the
society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties
ever living together in case they are already living apart and all
other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither
possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in
one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a
matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts
and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and
allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they
were made."
14
49. This Court aptly observed in Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi
reported in (2001) 4 SCC 250, para 14 at pp.258-259, as under:
"Matrimonial matters are matters of delicate human and
emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard,
respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable
adjustments with the spouse. The relationship has to conform
to the social norms as well. The matrimonial conduct has now
come to be governed by statute framed, keeping in view such
norms and changed social order. It is sought to be controlled
in the interest of the individuals as well as in broader
perspective, for regulating matrimonial norms for making of a
well-knit, healthy and not a disturbed and porous society. The
institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to
play in the society, in general. Therefore, it would not be
appropriate to apply any submission of "irretrievably broken
marriage" as a straitjacket formula for grant of relief of
divorce. This aspect has to be considered in the background of
the other facts and circumstances of the case."
50. In Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey reported in
(2002) 2 SCC 73, the Court stated as under: "Mental cruelty is
the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or
fear to the matrimonial life of the other. "Cruelty", therefore,
postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to
cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it
would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the
other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the
ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on
the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be
adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in
general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other."
15
51. This Court in the case of Gananath Pattnaik v. State of
Orissa reported in (2002) 2 SCC 619 observed as under:
"The concept of cruelty and its effect varies from individual to
individual, also depending upon the social and economic status
to which such person belongs. "Cruelty" for the purposes of
constituting the offence under the aforesaid section need not be
physical. Even mental torture or abnormal behaviour may
amount to cruelty and harassment in a given case."
52. The mental cruelty has also been examined by this Court in
Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta reported in (2002) 5 SCC 706 at
pp.716-17 [para 21] which reads as under:
"Cruelty for the purpose of Section 13(1)(i-a) is to be taken
as a behaviour by one spouse towards the other, which
causes reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter that
it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial
relationship with the other. Mental cruelty is a state of mind
and feeling with one of the spouses due to the behaviour or
behavioural pattern by the other. Unlike the case of physical
cruelty, mental cruelty is difficult to establish by direct
evidence. It is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn
from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of
anguish, disappointment and frustration in one spouse
caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated
on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which
the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. The
inference has to be drawn from the attending facts and
circumstances taken cumulatively. In case of mental cruelty
it will not be a correct approach to take an instance of
misbehaviour in isolation and then pose the question
whether such behaviour is sufficient by itself to cause
16
mental cruelty. The approach should be to take the
cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging
from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference
whether the petitioner in the divorce petition has been
subjected to mental cruelty due to conduct of the other."
53. In this case the Court also stated that so many years have
elapsed since the spouses parted company. In these circumstances
it can be reasonably inferred that the marriage between the parties
has broken down irretrievably.
54. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur reported in (2005) 2 SCC
22, the Court observed as under:
"10. The expression "cruelty" has not been defined in the
Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a
ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as
wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to
cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or
as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a
danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be
considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the
particular society to which the parties belong, their social
values, status, environment in which they live. Cruelty, as
noted above, includes mental cruelty, which falls within
the purview of a matrimonial wrong. Cruelty need not be
physical. If from the conduct of the spouse, same is
established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn
that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an
apprehension in the mind of the other spouse, about his or
her mental welfare then this conduct amounts to cruelty.
In a delicate human relationship like matrimony, one has
to see the probabilities of the case. The concept proof
17
beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal
trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters
of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband
and wife. Therefore, one has to see what are the
probabilities in a case and legal cruelty has to be found
out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the
mind of the complainant spouse because of the acts or
omissions of the other. Cruelty may be physical or
corporeal or may be mental. In physical cruelty, there can
be tangible and direct evidence, but in the case of mental
cruelty there may not at the same time be direct evidence.
In cases where there is no direct evidence, Courts are
required to probe into the mental process and mental
effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in
this view that one has to consider the evidence in
matrimonial disputes.
12. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of
should be "grave and weighty" so as to come to the
conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be
reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must
be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear
of married life". The conduct taking into consideration
the circumstances and background has to be examined to
reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of
amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to
be considered, as noted above, in the background of
several factors such as social status of parties, their
education, physical and mental conditions, customs and
traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or
to give exhaustive description of the circumstances,
which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as
18
to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship
between the parties had deteriorated to such extent due to
the conduct of the other spouse that it would be
impossible for them to live together without mental
agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining
spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not
absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent
course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony
and torture may well constitute cruelty within the
meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may
consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and
abusive language leading to constant disturbance of
mental peace of the other party.
13. The Court dealing with the petition for divorce on
the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the
problems before it are those of human beings and the
psychological changes in a spouse's conduct have to be
borne in mind before disposing of the petition for
divorce. However, insignificant or trifling, such conduct
may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the
conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain
pitch of severity. It is for the Court to weigh the gravity. It
has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no
reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be
considered whether the complainant should be called
upon to endure as a part of normal human life. Every
matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the
other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations,
quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day
married life, may also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in
matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can
19
be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere
silence, violent or non-violent."
55. This Court in Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit reported in
(2006) 3 SCC 778 aptly observed as under:
"37. As to what constitutes the required mental cruelty for the
purposes of the said provision, will not depend upon the
numerical count of such incidents or only on the continuous
course of such conduct but really go by the intensity, gravity and
stigmatic impact of it when meted out even once and the
deleterious effect of it on the mental attitude, necessary for
maintaining a conducive matrimonial home.
38. If the taunts, complaints and reproaches are of ordinary nature
only, the court perhaps need consider the further question as to
whether their continuance or persistence over a period of time
render, what normally would, otherwise, not be so serious an act
to be so injurious and painful as to make the spouse charged with
them genuinely and reasonably conclude that the maintenance of
matrimonial home is not possible any longer."
56. In Shobha Rani's case (supra) at pp.108-09, para 5, the Court
observed as under:
"5. Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of
human beings who are no generally similar. Among the
human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which
may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in
any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or
incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is
the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty."
57. In this case, the Court cautioned the lawyers and judges not
to import their own notions of life in dealing with matrimonial
problems. The judges should not evaluate the case from their own
20
standards. There may be a generation gap between the judges and
the parties. It is always prudent if the judges keep aside their
customs and manners in deciding matrimonial cases in particular.
58. In a recent decision of this Court in the case of Rishikesh
Sharma v. Saroj Sharma reported in 2006 (12) Scale 282, this
Court observed that the respondent wife was living separately
from the year 1981 and the marriage has broken down
irretrievably with no possibility of the parties living together
again. The Court further observed that it will not be possible for
the parties to live together and therefore there was no purpose in
compelling both the parties to live together. Therefore the best
course was to dissolve the marriage by passing a decree of divorce
so that the parties who were litigating since 1981 and had lost
valuable part of life could live peacefully in remaining part of
their life. The Court further observed that her desire to live with
her husband at that stage and at that distance of time was not
genuine.
59. This Court observed that under such circumstances, the High
Court was not justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction in
favour of the appellant who sought divorce from the Court.
60. "Mental cruelty" is a problem of human behaviour. This
human problem unfortunately exists all over the world. Existence
of similar problem and its adjudication by different courts of other
countries would be of great relevance, therefore, we deem it
appropriate to examine similar cases decided by the Courts of
other jurisdictions. We must try to derive benefit of wisdom and
light received from any quarter."
17. The apex Court has held that in considering the cases of
cruelty, entire matrimonial relationship has to be considered and if
21
the act of a party causes apprehension in the mind of another party
that it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial
relationship with other, then decree of divorce has to be granted.
18. In the present case, within seven days of marriage, the
respondent received information in regard to illegal relationship with
Mr. Sumit Jain. She used to talk with Mr. Jain even after marriage
also. The appellant denied the aforesaid fact and concealed her act.
Hence, in our opinion, the trial Court has rightly held that the
respondent is eligible to get decree of divorce on the ground of
“cruelty”.
19. Learned counsel for the appellant also raised an arguments
that Mr. Sumit Jain, was necessary party and in support of his
contention, he relied on the judgment of this Court reported in
Jaideep vs. Rashmi Shah [2011 (2) MPLJ 680. We are not in
agreement with the arguments advanced by the counsel for the
appellant. This Court in the aforesaid judgment has specifically held
that the allegations of illegal relationship is made, then the aforesaid
person is not necessary party. However, he may be a proper party.
There is no necessity to make a person as a party in matrimonial
proceedings in accordance with Indian Law against whom an
allegation of illicit relationship has been made. Hence, the arguments
advanced by the counsel for the appellant is hereby rejected.
22
20. In this view of the matter and taking into consideration the
principle of law laid down by the apex Court in the case of Samar
Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh [supra] in our opinion, the trial Court has
considered the evidence properly and passed the proper judgment
and decree. Consequently, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It
is hereby dismissed. No order as to the costs.
(S.K. Gangele) (Anurag Shrivastava)
Judge Judge
Pb
23

High Court of Madhya Pradesh At Jabalpur = quash the proceeding of Criminal Case No. 2054/2016 pending before J.M.F.C, Harda for offence under Sections 498- A, 294, 506 of I.P.C read with Section 3 /4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. = It is also to be seen that the Adhar Card, Ration Card submitted by the petitioners indicate that they are residents of different places. It is not uncommon in the Indian context that the family members are roped in the domestic disputes. Therefore, following the law laid down in Neelu Chopra & Another Vs. Bharti, AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2950, wherein “the Supreme Court has expressed its concern with regard to false implication of husband and his relatives in the cases under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code by disgruntled wives. It has also been held that the tendency of falsely implicating even those relatives of husband, who lived separately and in different cities is also growing. It has been held that if there are no specific and credible allegations against, with necessary particulars against the relatives of the husband, they should not be made to suffer the ignominy of a criminal trial,” this petition is partly allowed. So far as the petitioner Nos. 4- Mangal, petitioner No. 5- Chhaya Bai, petitioner No. 6- Lakhanlal Chouhan and petitioner No. 7- Maya are concerned. the crime lodged against petitioner Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 is quashed. So far as petitioner No. 1-Brajesh Verma, petitioner No. 2- Laxmi Verma and the petitioner No. 3- Usha Verma are concerned, this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C is dismissed.

High Court of Madhya Pradesh At Jabalpur
M.Cr.C. No. 20769/2016
Brajesh Verma & Others
Vs.
The State of M.P & Others.
****
Shri Amit Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioners.
Shri Ramji Pandey, learned P.L for the respondent No. 1/State.
Shri Basant Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2.
Present: Hon'ble Shri Justice Sushil Kumar Palo
____________________________________________________
(Order)
10/10/2017
This petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C has been filed to
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court and to
quash the proceeding of Criminal Case No. 2054/2016
pending before J.M.F.C, Harda for offence under Sections
498- A, 294, 506 of I.P.C read with Section 3 /4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act.
2. The facts requisite for disposal of this petition are that
respondent No. 2/ complainant is married to petitioner No. 1-
Brajesh Verma on 25.02.2011. Petitioner No. 2 is the motherin-law,
petitioner No. 3 is the sister-in-law, petitioner No. 5 is
the sister-in-law and petitioner No. 4 is the husband of
petitioner No. 5. Petitioner No. 7 is the sister-in-law and
petitioner No. 6 is the husband of petitioner No. 7.
3. The respondent No. 2/complainant lodged a report at
police station Timrani, District Harda alleging that at the
time of her marriage, her parents had given articles including
clothes, jewelery, home appliances and cash sufficiently.
Despite that her husband/petitioner No. 1, mother-inlaw/petitioner
No. 2, sister-in-laws/petitioner No. 3 sister-inlaw
(Jethani), petitioner No. 5 and petitioner No. 7
complained that inadequate dowry has been given. They
demanded a motorcycle due to which the brother of the
complainant- Deepak had given Rs.55,000/- to Brajesh for
purchase of motorcycle. After some time, the in-laws
demanded Rs.2,00,000/- for opening a shop for Brajesh, her
husband. She informed her brother and father about the
demand. Her two sisters-in-law, petitioner Nos. 5 and 7
whenever come to their maternal home, (house of the in-laws
of the complainant), they instigated petitioner No. 1, Brajesh
about the demand of dowry. Her husband, her sister-in-law
(Jethani) and mother-in-law to demand gold chain, washing
machine and Rs.5,00,000/- from the complainant. When this
demand was not met, her husband tried to strangulate her.
The matter was referred to Parivar Paramarsh Kendra,
Hoshangabad on her complaint. The conciliators advised her
to take recourse to law but she preferred not to take any
action for she did not want to lose her family life.
4. Her brother-in-law (Jeth) is serving outside. Her sister-inlaw/petitioner
No. 3 is residing in the first floor. Her husband
used to visit the first floor by some pretext or the other. One
day when her sister-in-law/petitioner No. 3 fell from the
staircase, she lodged a false report against the complainant,
on the advice of her uncle who is an Advocate. The
complainant was falsely implicated. Her husband used to live
in the first floor up to 12:00-1:00' O'clock in the night. When
she complained about this, he threatened to divorce her.
Somehow the complainant lived there. Her two daughters
were born at Timarni and Harda. But all the expenses were
born by her parents. She visited her in-laws' place off and on
but she was being taunted that she is giving birth to only girl
child. Therefore, it is necessary for the petitioner No.1 to
bring a second wife. Then she was thrown out from the
matrimonial home along with her child. She left for her
parental house. After her in-laws were called and persuaded
them, took her but she was ill-treated, abused and subjected
to cruelty.
5. Her brother was informed by phone to come and take her
otherwise some day she will be killed by them. Her brother
came to Hoshangabad and took her to her parental home.
The petitioners told them if Rs.5,00,000/- is not arranged, she
will not be taken to her in-laws house.' Because the demand
could not be met, she is living at her parental house for 8-9
months.
6. On 17.06.2016 at about 10.00 am, when she was preparing
food at the matrimonial home, her husband, mother-in-law,
sister-in-law (Jethani) came there and stated that if she does
not bring Rs.5,00,000/-, she should sign the divorce paper.
Her husband caught her by her hair and took to the gas stove
with intention to kill her. She tried to escape. The petitioner
No. 2/mother-in-law, petitioner No. 3/sister-in-law (Jethani)
were instigating petitioner No. 1-Brajesh to kill her. When
she shouted, her brother Deepak and one Jagdish Nayar and
passers by Nirbhaydas Patil and Rajesh Yogi came there and
saved her, otherwise she could be done to death. After this,
accused persons threatened her stating that she somehow
escaped but in future, they will complete the job. During Deo
Soni Gyaras, her husband and mother-in-law had come to her
father's house and said that by lodging report what they have
achieved?
7. On this report, crime was registered at police station
Timarni for offence under Sections 498 A, 294, 506 of I.P.C
and Section 3 / 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
8. On behalf of the petitioners, arguments has been
vehemently advanced stating that the complainant
caused injury to petitioner No. 2/her mother-in-law,
therefore, earlier report was lodged on 01.06.2014.
Subsequently, there was repetition of the incident and,
hence, on 26.06.2015 another report was lodged. On
16.07.2015, petitioner No. 3/sister-in-law (Jethani) was
pushed by the complainant due to which she fell down
and sustained injuries. On her report, criminal case was
registered under Sections 323, 294 of I.P.C. In this case,
petitioner Nos. 5 and 7 were shown as witnesses. On
27th July, 2015, the complainant left the matrimonial
home. After one year, the report has been lodged.
9. The petitioner No. 1 filed an application under Section
9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of
conjugal right. They also tried to bring her to the
matrimonial home but nothing came out and the
petitioners have been falsely implicated as a counter
blast.
10. Counsel for the
petitioners placed
reliance on Preeti
Gupta And Another
Vs. State of
Jharkhand And
Another, (2010) 7
SCC 667, wherein the
Apex Court has held
that:-
“Quashing of
complaint
under S. 498-A
I.P.C against
appellants
(unmarried
brother and
married sister
of
complainant's
husband) who
were neither
residing with
complainant in
her
matrimonial
home nor
visited herDemand
of
luxury car,
passing of
sarcastic
remarks
(without
stating actual
wordings), and
physical
assault alleged
against
parents-in-law,
husband and
appellants- No
specific
allegation
made against
appellants in
complaint, and
none of the
witnesses
attributing any
role to themHeld,
their
implication
was only
meant to
harass and
humiliate
husband's
relativesPermitting
complainant to
pursue
complaint
would be
abuse of
process of lawHence,
complaint
against
appellants
quashedCourts
cautioned to
scrutinize such
vexatious and
frivolous
complaints
with great
care and
circumspectio
n.”
11. Learned counsel
for the petitioners
suggesting that the
family members have
been falsely
implicated, relied
upon the case of
Pashaura Singh Vs.
State of Punjab &
Another, (2010) 11
SCC 749, wherein it
has been held that:-
“Subjecting
woman to
cruelty by
husband and
his relativesAbsence
of
proof of
demand of
dowry or
harassment by
accused- High
Court found
that only
allegation
made in FIR
was that
appellantaccused
and
his family
members
started
harassing
appellant's
wife for not
bringing more
dowry- But
there was no
demand for
dowry, nor was
there any
specific
entrustment of
dowry articles
to accused as
alleged in FIRHeld,
offence
under Section
498 A not
made out.”
12. Learned counsel
for the petitioners has
submitted that no
allegation of demand
of dowry was made.
The allegation was
made for the first time
in the complaint.
Earlier there was no
complaint about any
demand of dowry and
harassment.
Therefore, the
complaint's
allegations are
developments. In this
regard reference has
been made to
Bhaskar Lal Sharma
& Another Vs.
Monica, (2009) 10
SCC 604, wherein it
has been held that:-
“Penal Code,
1860- Ss. 498-
A, 406 and 34 -
Complaint
petition underEmails
between
couple and
parents
forming part
of- Evidentiary
value and
importance of -
Nonconsideration
of, by High
Court- EffectWhether
correspondenc
e showed any
allegation of
dowry demand
or
misappropriati
on of
respondent's
wife's stridhanHeld,
complaint
petition must
also be read
with several
other
documents
which form
part of the
complaint
petition- In
none of them
had any
allegation with
regard to
cruelty or
breach of trust
been madeAllegations
made for first
time in
complaint
petition and
application for
grant of
maintenanceCorrespondenc
e exchanged
between the
spouses and
between the
husband and
his in-laws did
not disclose
any allegation
which would
amount to
criminal
misconduct on
part of
appellants- It
was evident
that the couple
had developed
incompatibility
- Evidence Act,
1872- S. 3- Email
correspondenc
e- Evidentiary
value of â€
Criminal
Procedure
Code, 1973,
Ss. 154 to 157
and 482.”
13. Learned counsel
for the petitioners
have also placed
reliance on Swapnil
And Others Vs.
State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2014) 13
SCC 567, wherein it
has been held that:-
“Quashment
of proceedings
underAccusations
unfounded so
charges
quashedAdmittedly
wife living
separately
since April
2011, due to
strained
relationship
with appellant
husband- held,
on facts, there
is no question
of any beating
by appellants
as respondent
wife not living
together â€
Even
application for
restitution of
conjugal rights
withdrawn by
husband as
wife was not
interested to
live togetherHence,
it is
difficult to
believe that
there was still
a demand for
dowry coupled
with criminal
intimidationAllegations
are
vague and
bereft of
details as to
place and time
of incidentImpugned
prosecution
wholly
unfoundedCharges
against
appellantaccused
deserve to be
quashedCriminal
Procedure
Code, 1973- S.
482- Crimes
Against
Women and
ChildrenDowry
Prohibition
Act, 1961,”
S.4.”
14. Learned P.L for the respondent/State opposing the
contentions submits that the documents filed by the
respondent with regard to the report against the
complainant etc are not the part of the record and the
same cannot be considered at this stage. It is also stated
that right from the beginning there have been a constant
maltreatment and ill-treatment by the petitioners. Hence,
earlier settlement was done before Parivar Paramarsh
Kendra. However, the petitioners have been constantly
harassing her. The documents, which are not on record,
cannot be considered at this stage. Otherwise also it
need to be ascertained at the trial. Hence, the order
impugned is called for no interference.
15. Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 has also
vehemently opposed the contentions advanced by the
counsel for the petitioners and submits that the
complainant was beaten brutally and was taken to the
gas stove to burn her by her husband/petitioner No. 1 on
the instigation of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3. After this
incident the petitioner lodged the report. Earlier she did
not report thinking that she wanted to live with her inlaws.
16. Considered the submissions made by the rival parties.
17. Perused the record.
18. The Annexures submitted only indicate that there has
been estrange relationship between the parties but it is also
seen that the complainant had earlier lodged complaint
before Parivar Paramarsh Kendra as mentioned in the F.I.R.
Therefore, it would not be correct to say that the complainant
has lodged the report as a counter blast.
19. The statement of the witnesses goes to show that there
has been a quarrel. The petitioner No.3/sister-in-law (Jethani)
is residing in the first floor of the same house. Petitioner Nos.
4, 5, 6 and 7 are living at Khalwa, District Khandwa and
Jayshree Nagar, District Dewas along with their families.
They are not residing at Rasuliya, District Hoshangabad. the
marital house of the complainant.
20. It is also to be seen that the Adhar Card, Ration Card submitted
by the petitioners indicate that they are residents of different places.
It is not uncommon in the Indian context that the family members are
roped in the domestic disputes. Therefore, following the law laid
down in Neelu Chopra & Another Vs. Bharti, AIR 2009 SC
(Supp) 2950, wherein “the Supreme Court has expressed its
concern with regard to false implication of husband and his relatives
in the cases under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code by
disgruntled wives. It has also been held that the tendency of falsely
implicating even those relatives of husband, who lived separately and
in different cities is also growing. It has been held that if there are no
specific and credible allegations against, with necessary particulars
against the relatives of the husband, they should not be made to
suffer the ignominy of a criminal trial,” this petition is partly
allowed. So far as the petitioner Nos. 4- Mangal, petitioner No. 5-
Chhaya Bai, petitioner No. 6- Lakhanlal Chouhan and petitioner No. 7-
Maya are concerned. the crime lodged against petitioner Nos. 4, 5, 6,
7 is quashed. So far as petitioner No. 1-Brajesh Verma, petitioner No.
2- Laxmi Verma and the petitioner No. 3- Usha Verma are concerned,
this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C is dismissed.
awinash/
(SUSHIL KUMAR PALO)
JUDGE
awinash

BOMBAY HIGH COURT - Sec.24 of Hindu Marriage Act - An order for maintenance pendente lite or for costs of the proceedings is conditional on the circumstance that the wife or husband who makes a claim for the same has no independent income sufficient for her or his support or to meet the necessary expenses of the proceeding. It is no answer to a claim of maintenance that the wife is educated and could support herself. Likewise, the financial position of the wife’s parents is also immaterial. The Court must take into consideration the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay maintenance and whether the applicant has any independent income sufficient for her or his support. Maintenance is always dependent upon factual situation; the Court should, therefore, mould the claim for maintenance determining the quantum based on various factors brought before the Court.” if one has regard to the rich experience the Petitioner is having in his job, his potentiality, his present status as Member of John Maxwell Team, then it follows that at present also he must be earning substantial sum. Whereas Respondent is not having any source of income and now she also cannot support herself when the job is left long back for the purpose of household duties. Hence, merely because at one time in her life, about 20 years back, she was doing some job of Stenographer, she cannot be denied her lawful claim for interim maintenance. Having regard, therefore, to the status of the parties, the capacity of the husband and his approximate earning, the amount of interim maintenance awarded by the trial Court to the tune of Rs.30,000/- per month, in this case, can hardly be called as exorbitant or unreasonable, so as to warrant interference therein. The impugned order therefore passed by the trial Court being just, legal and correct; it is confirmed. Writ Petition being devoid of merits, stands dismissed.

   Sec.24 of Hindu Marriage Act -  An order for maintenance pendente lite or for costs of the proceedings is conditional on the circumstance that the wife or husband who makes a claim for the same has no independent income sufficient for her or his support or to meet the  necessary expenses of the proceeding. It is no answer to a claim of maintenance that the wife is educated and could support herself. Likewise, the financial position of the wife’s parents is also immaterial. The Court must take into consideration the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay maintenance and whether the applicant has any independent income sufficient for her or his support. Maintenance is always dependent upon factual situation; the Court should, therefore, mould the claim for maintenance determining the quantum based on various factors brought before the Court.”  if one has regard to the rich experience the Petitioner is having in his job, his potentiality, his present status as Member of John Maxwell Team, then it follows that at present also he must be earning substantial sum. Whereas Respondent is not having any source of income and now she also cannot support herself when the job is left long back for the purpose of household duties. Hence, merely because at one time in her life, about 20 years back, she was doing some job of Stenographer, she cannot be denied her lawful claim for interim maintenance.  Having regard, therefore, to the status of the parties, the capacity of the husband and his approximate earning, the amount of interim maintenance awarded by the trial Court to the tune of Rs.30,000/- per month, in this case, can hardly be called as exorbitant or unreasonable, so as to warrant interference therein. The impugned order therefore passed by the trial Court being just, legal and correct; it is confirmed. Writ Petition being devoid of merits, stands dismissed.