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Friday, September 22, 2017

SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT

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SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
_______
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
________
PART I
PRELIMINARY
SECTIONS
1. Short title, extent and commencement.
2. Definitions.
3. Savings.
4. Specific relief to be granted only for enforcing individual civil rights and not for enforcing penal
laws.
PART II
SPECIFIC RELIEF
CHAPTER I
RECOVERING POSSESSION OF PROPERTY
5. Recovery of specific immovable property.
6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.
7. Recovery of specific movable property.
8. Liability of person in possession, not as owner, to deliver to persons entitled to immediate
possession.
CHAPTER II
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
9. Defences respecting suits for relief based on contract.
Contracts which can be specifically enforced
10. Cases in which specific performance of contract enforceable.
11. Cases in which specific performance of contracts connected with trusts enforceable.
12. Specific performance of part of contract.
13. Rights of purchaser or lessee against person with no title or imperfect title.
Contracts, which cannot be specifically enforced
14. Contracts not specifically enforceable.
Persons for or against whom contracts may be specifically enforced
15. Who may obtain specific performance.
16. Personal bars to relief.
17. Contract to sell or let property by one who has no title, not specifically enforceable.
18. Non-enforcement except with variation.
19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title.
Discretion and powers of court
20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.
21. Power to award compensation in certain cases.
22. Power to grant relief for possession, partition, refund of earnest money, etc.
23. Liquidation of damages not a bar to specific performance.
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SECTIONS
24. Bar of suit for compensation for breach after dismissal of suit for specific performance.
Enforcement of awards and directions to execute settlements
25. Application of preceding sections to certain awards and testamentary directions to execute
settlements.
CHAPTER III
RECTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS
26. When instrument may be rectified.
CHAPTER IV
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS
27. When rescission may be adjudged or refused.
28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the
specific performance of which has been decreed.
29. Alternative prayer for rescission in suit for specific performance.
30. Court may require parties rescinding to do equity.
CHAPTER V
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS
31. When cancellation may be ordered.
32. What instruments may be partially cancelled.
33. Power to require benefit to be restored or compensation to be made when instrument is cancelled
or is successfully resisted as being void or voidable.
CHAPTER VI
DECLARATORY DECREES
34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.
35. Effect of declaration.
PART III
PREVENTIVE RELIEF
CHAPTER VII
INJUNCTIONS GENERALLY
36. Preventive relief how granted.
37. Temporary and perpetual injunctions.
CHAPTER VIII
PERPETUAL INJUNCTIONS
38. Perpetual injunction when granted.
39. Mandatory injunctions.
40. Damages in lieu of, or in addition to, injunction.
41. Injunction when refused.
42. Injunction to perform negative agreement.
43. [Repealed.]
44. [Repealed.]
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THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963
ACT NO. 47 OF 1963
[13th December, 1963.]
An Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief.
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Fourteenth Year of the Republic of India as follow:—
PART I
PRELIMINARY
1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called the Specific Relief
Act, 1963.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) It shall come into force on such date1
as the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, appoint.
2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) “obligation” includes every duty enforceable by law;
(b) “settlement” means an instrument (other than a will or codicil as defined by the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), whereby the destination or devolution of successive interests in
movable or immovable property is disposed of or is agreed to be disposed of;
(c) “trust” has the same meaning as in section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882), and
includes an obligation in the nature of a trust within the meaning of Chapter IX of that Act;
(d) “trustee” includes every person holding property in trust;
(e) all other words and expressions used herein but not defined, and defined in the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act.
3. Savings.—Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Act shall be deemed—
(a) to deprive any person of any right to relief, other than specific performance, which he may
have under any contract; or
(b) to affect the operation of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), on documents.
4. Specific relief to be granted only for enforcing individual civil rights and not for enforcing
penal laws.—Specific relief can be granted only for the purpose of enforcing individual civil rights and
not for the mere purpose of enforcing a penal law.
PART II
SPECIFIC RELIEF
CHAPTER I
RECOVERING POSSESSION OF PROPERTY
5. Recovery of specific immovable property.—A person entitled to the possession of
specific immovable property may recover it in the manner provided by the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.—(1) If any person is dispossessed without
his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming
1. 1st March, 1964, vide notification No. S.O. 189, dated 13th January, 1964, see Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II,
sec. 3(ii).
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through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in
such suit.
(2) No suit under this section shall be brought—
(a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or
(b) against the Government.
(3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor
shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.
(4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to
recover possession thereof.
7. Recovery of specific movable property.—A person entitled to the possession of specific movable
property may recover it in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
Explanation 1.—A trustee may sue under this section for the possession of movable property to the
beneficial interest in which the person for whom he is trustee is entitled.
Explanation 2.—A special or temporary right to the present possession of movable property is
sufficient to support a suit under this section.
8. Liability of person in possession, not as owner, to deliver to persons entitled to immediate
possession.—Any person having the possession or control of a particular article of movable property, of
which he is not the owner, may be compelled specifically to deliver it to the person entitled to its
immediate possession, in any of the following cases:—
(a) when the thing claimed is held by the defendant as the agent or trustee of the plaintiff;
(b) when compensation in money would not afford the plaintiff adequate relief for the loss of the
thing claimed;
(c) when it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the actual damage caused by its loss;
(d) when the possession of the thing claimed has been wrongfully transferred from the plaintiff.
Explanation.—Unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall, in respect of any article of
movable property claimed under clause (b) or clause (c) of this section, presume—
(a) that compensation in money would not afford the plaintiff adequate relief for the loss of the
thing claimed, or, as the case may be;
(b) that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the actual damage caused by its loss.
CHAPTER II
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
9. Defences respecting suits for relief based on contract.—Except as otherwise provided herein
where any relief is claimed under this Chapter in respect of a contract, the person against whom the relief
is claimed may plead by way of defence any ground which is available to him under any law relating to
contracts.
Contracts which can be specifically enforced
10. Cases in which specific performance of contract enforceable.—Except as otherwise provided
in this Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may, in the discretion of the court, be enforced—
(a) when there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the
non-performance of the act agreed to be done; or
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(b) when the act agreed to be done in such that compensation in money for its non-performance
would not afford adequate relief.
Explanation.—Unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall presume—
(i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by
compensation in money; and
(ii) that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be so relieved except in the
following cases:—
(a) where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce, or is of special value or interest
to the plaintiff, or consists of goods which are not easily obtainable in the market;
(b) where the property is held by the defendant as the agent or trustee of the plaintiff.
11. Cases in which specific performance of contracts connected with trusts
enforceable.—(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, specific performance of a contract may, in
the discretion of the court, be enforced when the act agreed to be done is in the performance wholly or
partly of a trust.
(2) A contract made by a trustee in excess of his powers or in breach of trust cannot be specifically
enforced.
12. Specific performance of part of contract.—(1) Except as otherwise hereinafter provided in this
section, the court shall not direct the specific performance of a part of a contract.
(2) Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, but the part which must
be left unperformed be a only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in
money, the court may, at the suit of either party, direct the specific performance of so much of the
contract as can be performed, and award compensation in money for the deficiency.
(3) Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which
must be left unperformed either—
(a) forms a considerable part of the whole, though admitting of compensation in money; or
(b) does not admit of compensation in money;
he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance; but the court may, at the suit of the other
party, direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can
perform, if the other party—
(i) in a case falling under clause (a), pays or has paid the agreed consideration for the whole of
the contract reduced by the consideration for the part which must be left unperformed and in a case
falling under clause (b)
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[pays or has paid] the consideration for the whole of the contract without any
abatement; and
(ii) in either case, relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract
and all right to compensation, either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by him
through the default of the defendant.
(4) When a part of a contract which, taken by itself, can and ought to be specifically performed,
stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot or
ought not to be specifically performed the court may direct specific performance of the former part.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, a party to a contract shall be deemed to be unable to
perform the whole of his part of it if a portion of its subject-matter existing at the date of the contract has
ceased to exist at the time of its performance.
1. Ins. by Act 52 of 1964, s. 3 and the Second Schedule (w.e.f. 29-12-1964).
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13. Rights of purchaser or lessee against person with no title or imperfect title.—(1) Where a
person contracts to sell or let certain immovable property having no title or only an imperfect title, the
purchaser or lessee (subject to the other provisions of this Chapter), has the following rights, namely:—
(a) if the vendor or lessor has subsequently to the contract acquired any interest in the property,
the purchaser or lessee may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest;
(b) where the concurrence of other person is necessary for validating the title, and they are bound
to concur at the request of the vendor or lessor, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to procure
such concurrence, and when a conveyance by other persons is necessary to validate the title and they
are bound to convey at the request of the vendor or lessor, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to
procure such conveyance;
(c) where the vendor professes to sell unencumbered property, but the property is mortgaged for
an amount not exceeding the purchase money and the vendor has in fact only a right to redeem it, the
purchaser may compel him to redeem the mortgage and to obtain a valid discharge, and, where
necessary, also a conveyance from the mortgagee;
(d) where the vendor or lessor sues for specific performance of the contract and the suit is
dismissed on the ground of his want of title or imperfect title, the defendant has a right to a return of
his deposit, if any, with interest thereon, to his costs of the suit, and to a lien for such deposit, interest
and costs on the interest, if any, of the vendor or lesser in the property which is the subject-matter of
the contract.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also apply, as far as may be, to contracts for the sale or hire
of movable property.
Contracts, which cannot be specifically enforced
14. Contracts not specifically enforceable.—(1) The following contracts cannot be specifically
enforced, namely:—
(a) a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief;
(b) a contract which runs into such minute or numerous details or which is so dependent on the
personal qualification or volition of the parties, or otherwise from its nature is such, that the court
cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms;
(c) a contract which is in its nature determinable;
(d) a contract the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the
court cannot supervise.
(2) Save as provided by the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), no contract to refer present or future
differences to arbitration shall be specifically enforced; but if any person who has made such a contract
(other than an arbitration agreement to which the provisions of the said act apply) and has refused to
perform it, sues in respect of any subject which he has contracted to refer, the existence of such contract
shall bar the suit.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1), the
court may enforce specific performance in the following cases:—
(a) where the suit is for the enforcement of a contract,—
(i) to execute a mortgage or furnish any other security for securing the repayment of any loan
which the borrower is not willing to repay at once:
Provided that where only a part of the loan has been advanced the lender is willing to advance
the remaining part of the loan in terms of the contract; or
(ii) to take up and pay for any debentures of a company;
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(b) where the suit is for,—
(i) the execution of a formal deed of partnership, the parties having commenced to carry on
the business of the partnership; or
(ii) the purchase of a share of a partner in a firm;
(c) where the suit is for the enforcement of a contract for the construction of any building or the
execution of any other work on land:
Provided that the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:—
(i) the building or other work is described in the contract in terms sufficiently precise to
enable the court to determine the exact nature of the building or work;
(ii) the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the contract and the interest is
of such a nature that compensation in money for non-performance of the contract is not an
adequate relief; and
(iii) the defendant has, in pursuance of the contract, obtained possession of the whole or any
part of the land on which the building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed.
Persons for or against whom contracts may be specifically enforced
15. Who may obtain specific performance.—Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, the
specific performance of a contract may be obtained by—
(a) any party thereto;
(b) the representative in interest or the principal, of any party thereto:
Provided that where the learning, skill, solvency or any personal quality of such party is a
material ingredient in the contract, or where the contract provides that his interest shall not be
assigned, his representative in interest or his principal shall not be entitled to specific performance of
the contract, unless such party has already performed his part of the contract, or the performance
thereof by his representative in interest, or his principal, has been accepted by the other party;
(c) where the contract is a settlement on marriage, or a compromise of doubtful rights between
members of the same family, any person beneficially entitled thereunder;
(d) where the contract has been entered into by a tenant for life in due exercise of a power, the
remainder man;
(e) a reversioner in possession, where the agreement is a covenant entered into with his
predecessor in title and the reversioner is entitled to the benefit of such covenant;
(f) a reversioner in remainder, where the agreement is such a covenant, and the reversioner is
entitled to the benefit thereof and will sustain material injury by reason of its breach;
(g) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with
another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation;
(h) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract for
the purposes of the company, and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the
company:
Provided that the company has accepted the contract and has communicated such acceptance to
the other party to the contract.
16. Personal bars to relief.—Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a
person—
(a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or
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(b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that
on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with,
or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or
(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to
perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms of the
performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),—
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to
actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the
court;
(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the
contract according to its true construction.
17. Contract to sell or let property by one who has no title, not specifically enforceable.—(1) A
contract to sell or let any immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of a vendor or
lessor—
(a) who, knowing himself not to have any title to the property, has contracted to sell or let the
property;
(b) who, though he entered into the contract believing that he had a good title to the property,
cannot at the time fixed by the parties or by the court for the completion of the sale or letting, give the
purchaser or lessee a title free from reasonable doubt.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also apply, as far as may be, to contracts for the sale or hire
of movable property.
18. Non-enforcement except with variation.—Where a plaintiff seeks specific performance of a
contract in writing, to which the defendant sets up a variation, the plaintiff cannot obtain the performance
sought, except with the variation so set up, in the following cases, namely:—
(a) where by fraud, mistake of fact or mis-representation, the written contract of which
performance is sought is in its terms or effect different from what the parties agreed to, or does not
contain all the terms agreed to between the parties on the basis of which the defendant entered into
the contact;
(b) where the object of the parties was to produce a certain legal result which the contract as
framed is not calculated to produce;
(c) where the parties have, subsequently to the execution of the contract, varied its terms.
19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title.—Except as
otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against—
(a) either party thereto;
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a
transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract;
(c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the
plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant;
(d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with
another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation;
(e) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract for
the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the
company:
Provided that the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other
party to the contract.
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Discretion and powers of court
20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.—(1) The jurisdiction to decree specific
performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to
do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial
principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal.
(2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific
performance:—
(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the
contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the
contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which
he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or
(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering
the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.
Explanation 1.—Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the
defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the
meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b).
Explanation 2.—The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the
defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any
act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing
at the time of the contract.
(3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the
plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific
performance.
(4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground
that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party.
21. Power to award compensation in certain cases.—(1) In a suit for specific performance of a
contract, the plaintiff may also claim compensation for its breach, either in addition to, or in substitution
of, such performance.
(2) If, in any such suit, the court decides that specific performance ought not to be granted, but that
there is a contract between the parties which has been broken by the defendant, and that the plaintiff is
entitled to compensation for that breach, it shall award him such compensation accordingly.
(3) If, in any such suit, the court decides that specific performance ought to be granted, but that it is
not sufficient to satisfy the justice of the case, and that some compensation for breach of the contract
should also be made to the plaintiff, it shall award him such compensation accordingly.
(4) In determining the amount of any compensation awarded under this section, the court shall be
guided by the principles specified in section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(5) No compensation shall be awarded under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such
compensation in his plaint:
Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such compensation in the plaint, the court shall,
at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just, for including
a claim for such compensation.
Explanation.—The circumstances that the contract has become incapable of specific performance
does not preclude the court from exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this section.
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22. Power to grant relief for possession, partition, refund of earnest money, etc.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (5 of 1908), any
person suing for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property may, in an
appropriate case, ask for—
(a) possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property in addition to such
performance; or
(b) any other relief to which he may be entitled, including the refund of any earnest money or
deposit paid or 1
[made by] him, in case his claim for specific performance is refused.
(2) No relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it
has been specifically claimed:
Provident that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the court shall, at any
stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim
for such relief.
(3) The power of the court to grant relief under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be without prejudice
to its powers to award compensation under section 21.
23. Liquidation of damages not a bar to specific performance.—(1) A contract, otherwise proper
to be specifically enforced, may be so enforced, though a sum be named in it as the amount to be paid in
case of its breach and the party in default is willing to pay the same, if the court, having regard to the
terms of the contract and other attending circumstances, is satisfied that the sum was named only for the
purpose of securing performance of the contract and not for the purpose of giving to the party in default
an option of paying money in lieu of specific performance.
(2) When enforcing specific performance under this section, the court shall not also decree payment
of the sum so named in the contract.
24. Bar of suit for compensation for breach after dismissal of suit for specific
performance.—The dismissal of a suit for specific performance of a contract or part thereof shall bar the
plaintiff’s right to sue for compensation for the breach of such contract or part, as the case may be, but
shall not bar his right to sue for any other relief to which he may be entitled, by reason of such breach.
Enforcement of awards and directions to execute settlements
25. Application of preceding sections, to certain awards and testamentary directions to execute
settlements.—The provisions of this Chapter as to contracts shall apply to awards to which the
Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), does not apply and to directions in a will or codicil to execute a
particular settlement.
CHAPTER III
RECTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS
26. When instrument may be rectified.—(1) When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties
a contract or other instrument in writing [not being the articles of association of a company to which the
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), applies] does not express their real intention, then—
(a) either party or his representative in interest may institute a suit to have the instrument
rectified; or
(b) the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim
in his pleading that the instrument be rectified; or
(c) a defendant in any such suit as is referred to in clause (b), may, in addition to any other
defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument.
1. Subs. by Act 52 of 1964, s. 3 and the Second Schedule, for “made to” (w.e.f. 29-12-1964).
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(2) If, in any suit in which a contract or other instrument is sought to be rectified under
sub-section (1), the court finds that the instrument, through fraud or mistake, does not express the real
intention of the parties, the court may in its discretion, direct rectification of the instrument so as to
express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in
good faith and for value.
(3) A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so
prayed in his pleading and the court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced.
(4) No relief for the rectification of an instrument shall be granted to any party under this section
unless it has been specifically claimed:
Provided that where a party has not claimed any such relief in his pleading, the court shall, at any
stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the pleading on such terms as may be just for including such
claim.
CHAPTER IV
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS
27. When rescission may be adjudged or refused.—(1) Any person interested in a contract may sue
to have it rescinded, and such rescission may be adjudged by the court in any of the following cases,
namely:—
(a) where the contract is voidable or terminable by the plaintiff;
(b) where the contract is unlawful for causes not apparent on its face and the defendant is more to
blame than the plaintiff.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the court may refuse to rescind the
contract—
(a) where the plaintiff has expressly or impliedly ratified the contract; or
(b) where, owing to the change of circumstances which has taken place since the making of the
contract (not being due to any act of the defendant himself), the parties cannot be substantially
restored to the position in which they stood when the contract was made; or
(c) where third parties have, during the subsistence of the contract, acquired rights in good faith
without notice and for value; or
(d) where only a part of the contract is sought to be rescinded and such part is not severable from
the rest of the contract.
Explanation.—In this section “contract” in relation to the territories to which the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), does not extend, means a contract in writing.
28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property,
the specific performance of which has been decreed.—(1) Where in any suit a decree for specific
performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or
lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay
the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply
in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the
court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the
justice of the case may require.
(2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the court—
(a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the
contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor; and
(b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in
respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee
until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if the justice of the case so requires, the
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refund of any sum paid by the vendee or the lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the
contract.
(3) If the purchase or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under
the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in the same
suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate
cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely:—
(a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor;
(b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the
execution of such conveyance or lease.
(4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the
instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be.
(5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the court.
29. Alternative prayer for rescission in suit for specific performance.—A plaintiff instituting a
suit for the specific performance of a contract in writing may pray in the alternative that, if the contract
cannot be specifically enforced, it may be rescinded and delivered up to be cancelled; and the court, if it
refuses to enforce the contract specifically, may direct it to be rescinded and delivered up accordingly.
30. Court may require parties rescinding to do equity.—On adjudging the rescission of a contract,
the court may require the party to whom such relief is granted to restore, so far as may be, any benefit
which he may have received from the other party and to make any compensation to him which justice
may be require.
CHAPTER V
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS
31. When cancellation may be ordered.—(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void
or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him
serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so
adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the
court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so
registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its
cancellation.
32. What instruments may be partially cancelled.—Where an instrument is evidence of different
rights or different obligations, the court may, in a proper case, cancel it in part and allow it to stand for the
residue.
33. Power to require benefit to be restored or compensation to be made when instrument is
cancelled or is successfully resisted as being void or voidable.—(1) On adjudging the cancellation of
an instrument, the court may require the party to whom such relief is granted, to restore, so far as may be
any benefit which he may have received from the other party and to make any compensation to him which
justice may require.
(2) Where a defendant successfully resists any suit on the ground—
(a) that the instrument sought to be enforced against him in the suit is voidable, the court may if
the defendant has received any benefit under the instrument from the other party, require him to
restore, so far as may be, such benefit to that party or to make compensation for it;
(b) that the agreement sought to be enforced against him in the suit is void by reason of his not
having been competent to contract under section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), the
court may, if the defendant has received any benefit under the agreement from the other party, require
him to restore, so far as may be, such benefit to that party, to the extent to which he or his estate has
benefited thereby.
13
CHAPTER VI
DECLARATORY DECREES
34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.—Any person entitled to any legal
character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested
to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration
that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief:
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further
relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
Explanation.—A trustee of property is a “person interested to deny” a title adverse to the title of some
one who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.
35. Effect of declaration.—A declaration made under this Chapter is binding only on the parties to
the suit, persons claiming through them respectively, and, where any of the parties are trustees, on the
persons for whom, if in existence at the date of the declaration, such parties would be trustees.
PART III
PREVENTIVE RELIEF
CHAPTER VII
INJUNCTIONS GENERALLY
36. Preventive relief how granted.—Preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by
injunction, temporary or perpetual.
37. Temporary and perpetual injunctions.—(1) Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue
until a specific time, or until the further order of the court, and they may be granted at any stage of a suit,
and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
(2) A perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon the merits
of the suit; the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right, or from the
commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff.
CHAPTER VIII
PERPETUAL INJUNCTIONS
38. Perpetual injunction when granted.—(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or
referred to by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of
an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication.
(2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and
provisions contained in Chapter II.
(3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of,
property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely:—
(a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff;
(b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be
caused, by the invasion;
(c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief;
(d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.
39. Mandatory injunctions.—When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel
the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion
grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite
acts.
14
40. Damages in lieu of, or in addition to, injunction.—(1) The plaintiff in a suit for perpetual
injunction under section 38, or mandatory injunction under section 39, may claim damages either in
addition to, or in substitution for, such injunction and the court may, if it thinks fit, award such damages.
(2) No relief for damages shall be granted under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such
relief in his plaint:
Provided that where no such damages have been claimed in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of
the proceedings, allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including such
claim.
(3) The dismissal of a suit to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favour of the plaintiff
shall bar his right to sue for damages for such breach.
41. Injunction when refused.—An injunction cannot be granted—
(a) to restrain any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the
suit in which the injunction is sought, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of
proceedings;
(b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate
to that from which the injunction is sought;
(c) to restrain any person from applying to any legislative body;
(d) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter;
(e) to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically
enforced;
(f) to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a
nuisance;
(g) to prevent a continuing breach in which the plaintiff has acquiesced;
(h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of
proceeding except in case of breach of trust;
(i) when the conduct of the plaintiff or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to be the
assistance of the court;
(j) when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter.
42. Injunction to perform negative agreement.—Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (e)
of section 41, where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a certain act, coupled with a
negative agreement, express or implied, not to do a certain act, the circumstance that the court is unable to
compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement shall not preclude it from granting an
injunction to perform the negative agreement:
Provided that the plaintiff has not failed to perform the contract so far as it is binding on him.
1
* * * * *
1. Sections 43 and 44 rep. by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1974 (56 of 1974), s. 3 and the Second Schedule
(w.e.f. 20-12-1974).

National Green Tribunal- Tribunal was perturbed and anguished that some persons appointed to the State Pollution Control Boards (for short ‘SPCBs’) did not have, according to the NGT, the necessary expertise or qualifications to be members or chairpersons of such high powered and specialized statutory bodies and therefore did not deserve their appointment or nomination. While we fully commiserate with the NGT and share the pain and anguish, we are of the view that the Tribunal has, at law, exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the State Governments to reconsider the appointments and in laying down guidelines for appointment to the SPCBs, however well-meaning they might be. Therefore, we set aside the decision of the NGT, but note that a large number of disconcerting facts have been brought out in the judgment which need serious consideration by those in authority, particularly the State Governments that make appointments or nominations to the SPCBs. Such appointments should not be made casually or without due application of mind considering the duties, functions and responsibilities of the SPCBs.= We make it clear that it is left open to public spirited individuals to move the appropriate High Court for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto if any person who does not meet the statutory or constitutional requirements is appointed as a Chairperson or a member of any SPCB or is presently continuing as such.

C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 1 of 34
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1359 OF 2017
Techi Tagi Tara …Appellant
versus
Rajendra Singh Bhandari & Ors. …Respondents
WITH
C.A. No. 1360/2017, C.A. No. 2481/2017 , C.A. No. 526/2017,
C.A. No. 1561/2017 , C.A. No. 4917/2017, C.A. No. 4936/2017,
C.A. No. 5735/2017, C.A. Nos. 8377-8378/2017, C.A. No.
10471/2017, C.A. No. 9498/2017 and C.A. Nos. 10472-
10473/2017
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. This batch of appeals is directed against the judgment and order
dated 24th August, 2016 passed by the National Green Tribunal, Principal
Bench, New Delhi (for short ‘the NGT’) in Original Application No. 318
of 2013.1
On a reading of the judgment and order passed by the NGT, it
1
Rajendra Singh Bhandari v. State of Uttarakhand and others
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 2 of 34
is quite clear that the Tribunal was perturbed and anguished that some
persons appointed to the State Pollution Control Boards (for short
‘SPCBs’) did not have, according to the NGT, the necessary expertise or
qualifications to be members or chairpersons of such high powered and
specialized statutory bodies and therefore did not deserve their
appointment or nomination. While we fully commiserate with the NGT
and share the pain and anguish, we are of the view that the Tribunal has,
at law, exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the State Governments to
reconsider the appointments and in laying down guidelines for
appointment to the SPCBs, however well-meaning they might be.
Therefore, we set aside the decision of the NGT, but note that a large
number of disconcerting facts have been brought out in the judgment
which need serious consideration by those in authority, particularly the
State Governments that make appointments or nominations to the SPCBs.
Such appointments should not be made casually or without due
application of mind considering the duties, functions and responsibilities
of the SPCBs.
2. Why is it important to be more than careful in making such
appointments? There can be no doubt that the protection and preservation
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 3 of 34
of the environment is extremely vital for all of us and unless this
responsibility is taken very seriously, particularly by the State
Governments and the SPCBs, we are inviting trouble that will have
adverse consequences for future generations. Issues of sustainable
development, public trust and intergenerational equity are not mere catch
words, but are concepts of great importance in environmental
jurisprudence. Perhaps appreciating and anticipating this, Article 48A
was introduced in the Constitution and this Article reads as follows:
“Protection and improvement of environment and
safeguarding of forests and wild life - The State shall
endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to
safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.”
Similarly Article 51A (g) of the Constitution indicates the fundamental
duties of every citizen of the country, one of them being to protect and
improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild
life, and to have compassion for living creatures.2
It is quite clear that
apart from the natural law obligation to protect and preserve the
environment, there is also a constitutional obligation to do so.
Unfortunately, despite this, our society has been witnessing over the last
2
51A. Fundamental duties.—It shall be the duty of every citizen of India—
(a) to (f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and
to have compassion for living creatures;
(h) to (k) xxx xxx xxx
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 4 of 34
few decades, to repeated onslaughts against the environment, sometimes
in the name of development and sometimes because our society just does
not seem to care. In this context we may also mention Article 21 of the
Constitution which has been given a very wide amplitude by several
decisions of this Court, including on issues concerning the environment.
The judgment of the NGT draws attention to some of these aspects but
essentially points to the ‘who-cares’ attitude adopted by several State
Governments. It is this attitude that compelled a public spirited
environmentally conscious individual to challenge the composition of the
SPCB in the State of Uttarakhand and consequently the necessity of
being extra careful in making appointments to the SPCB.
3. One of the principal attributes of good governance is the
establishment of viable institutions comprising professionally competent
persons and the strengthening of such institutions so that the duties and
responsibilities conferred on them are performed with dedication and
sincerity in public interest. This is applicable not only to administrative
bodies but more so to statutory authorities – more so, because statutory
authorities are the creation of a law made by a competent legislature,
representing the will of the people.
4. State Pollution Control Boards (or SPCBs) constituted under the
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 5 of 34
provisions of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974
and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 19813
fall in this
category but many of them possess only a few or sometimes none of the
above attributes of good governance and again a few or none of them are
adequately empowered. This is a serious problem haunting the SPCBs
for at least two decades (if not more).
5. The composition of the SPCB is provided for in Section 4(2) of the
Water Act and this reads as follows (Section 5(2) of the Air Act is
similar):
“4(2) A State Board shall consist of the following members,
namely:-
(a) a chairman, being a person having special knowledge
or practical experience in respect of matters relating to
environmental protection or a person having
knowledge and experience in administering institutions
dealing with the matters aforesaid, to be nominated by
the State Government:
Provided that the chairman may be either wholetime
or part-time as the State Government may think
fit;
(b) such number of officials, not exceeding five, to be
nominated by the State Government to represent that
Government;
3
Henceforth the Water Act and the Air Act
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 6 of 34
(c) such number of persons, not exceeding five, to be
nominated by the State Government from amongst the
members of the local authorities functioning within the
State;
(d) such number of non-officials, not exceeding three, to
be nominated by the State Government to represent the
interests of agriculture, fishery or industry or trade or
any other interest which, in the opinion of the State
Government, ought to be represented;
(e) two persons to represent the companies or
corporations owned, controlled or managed by the
State Government, to be nominated by that
Government;
(f) A full-time member-secretary, possessing
qualifications, knowledge and experience of scientific,
engineering or management aspects of pollution
control, to be appointed by the State Government.”
6. One of the earliest communications on our record encouraging
professionalism in the SPCBs with a view to empowering them is a letter
of 26th September, 1997 addressed by the Secretary in the Ministry of
Environment and Forest (MoEF) of the Government of India to the Chief
Secretary of every State highlighting the importance of the SPCBs, the
fact that their activities are science and technology based and the necessity
of taking relevant factors into consideration while making appointments to
the SPCBs. The letter reads as follows:
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 7 of 34
“Secretary
Ministry of Environment & Forests
Government of India
September 26, 1997
D.O. No. PS/Secy (E&F)/CPCB/97
Dear
The State Pollution Control Boards/Pollution Control
Committees in Union Territories have been assigned an
important role for prevention and control of pollution from
different sources. In recent years, additional responsibilities have
been assigned to them for enforcement of various statutes.
Hence, these organizations need to be suitably strengthened so
that they can cope up with the tasks. In fact, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has also had occasion to observe on the
unsatisfactory performance of State Boards in discharging their
functions.
The activities of the Pollution Control Boards/Pollution Control
Committees are essentially science and technology based. The
Chairman and Member Secretaries are the key functionaries of
the Boards/Committees who are expected to have requisites
professional knowledge and experience for providing effective
leadership to their organizations. Under the Water (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (Prevention and
Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 the specific requirements for
appointment to these posts have been laid down.
However, in some State Boards/Committees, the appointments to
these posts are made without due consideration to such
requirements as envisaged under the Acts. Also, another major
problem being faced by these organizations is on account of
frequent changes of Chairmen and Member Secretaries. I request
you to kindly ensure that appropriate persons are appointed for
these key positions and they are not frequently changed. Where
the incumbents do not have the prescribed criteria they should be
replaced.
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 8 of 34
It is requested that this issue may kindly receive your personal
attention on a top priority basis.
With regards
Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
(Vishwanath Anand)”
7. More importantly and perhaps keeping the diverse nature of
activities of the SPCBs in mind, a conference was held in Coimbatore on
29th and 30th January, 2001 of the Ministers of Environment and Forests of
the State Governments. The conference recommended, inter alia, the
induction of academicians, professionals, experts and technologists for the
effective functioning of the SPCBs. As a follow-up to the
recommendations, a letter was addressed by the Secretary in the MoEF to
the Chief Secretary of every State on 3rd July, 2001. This letter reads as
follows:
“P.V. Jayakrishnan
Secretary
D.O. No. PS/Secy (E&F)/CPCB/2001
July 3, 2001
Dear
In the National Conference of Ministries of Environment
and Forests held at Coimbatore on January 29-30, 2001, several
important recommendations were made regarding effective
functioning of the State Pollution Control Boards/ Committees.
These include the following:
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 9 of 34
(i) Induction of academicians, legal professionals,
health experts and technologists as members of the
Boards/Committees.
(ii) Appointment of multi-disciplinary staff
(iii) Ban on recruitment shall be relaxed for the posts of
scientists and engineers in the Pollution Control
Boards/Committees.
(iv) Training of personnel, for which programme shall
be drawn up by the Central Pollution Control
Board.
(v) Streamlining of Consent/Authorization procedures.
(vi) Inventorization of polluting sources and pollution
load.
(vii) Formulation of Annual Action Plans.
(viii) Publication of annual State Environment Report.
(ix) Strengthening and upgrading of water and air
quality monitoring and laboratory facilities.
We had taken up the matter with the respective State Pollution
Control Boards/Committees. Since most of the action points
require intervention of the State Governments, I request you
kindly to take necessary action for implementation of the
recommendations.
I look forward to your response at the earliest.
With regards.
Yours Sincerely,
Sd/-
(P.V. Jayakrishnan)
To Chief Secretaries of all States/UTs”
8. These communications seem to have had little or no impact at least
in one instance as is evident from a reading of a decision of the
Jharkhand High Court dated 15th May, 2002 in Binay Kumar Sinha v.
State of Jharkhand4
concerning the Chairperson of the SPCB of that
4
(2002) 50 BLJR 2223
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 10 of 34
State. The High Court was compelled to make the following scathing and
unfortunate observations:
“4. On 4th April 2002, when the Chairman appeared before us
and we started talking to him in order to elicit his views and
opinion on the aforesaid questions, what we found has been aptly
and clearly recorded in our order of that day. The extracts read
thus:--"Shri Thakur Bal Mukund Nath Shahdeo, Chairman, State
Pollution Control Board has appeared before us today in person.
During the course of our conversation with him, we found (to our
total horror, surprise, dismay and amazement) that he does not
know anything at all about any aspect relating to pollution, or the
control of pollution. In course of our extensive conversation with
him, we found that the only academic qualification that he boasts
of is 'matriculation'. He has no other academic or technical
qualification whatsoever. When, by referring to Section 5(2)(a)
of the Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, we
asked him whether he has any special knowledge or any practical
experience in respect of any matter relating to the environmental
pollution, his answer was in the negative. We must record that
during the course of our conversation with Sri Shahdeo, we were
constantly helped and assisted by Mr. Poddar, learned Addl.
Advocate General. We actually impressed upon Mr. Poddar the
need of assisting Sri Shahdeo in answering our questions. Mr.
Poddar very kindly lent his helping hand to us. What emerged
was that Mr. Shahdeo has neither any general or special
knowledge, nor any academic qualification, nor any experience
whatsoever that may have anything to do with any matter or any
aspect relating to the pollution, air pollution, water pollution,
noise pollution, or any other pollution of any kind. What to speak
of his-having special knowledge or practical experience, he has
neither any knowledge, general or special, nor any experience,
practical or otherwise with respect to any matters relating to
environmental pollution. We repeatedly asked him to inform us
about one single such fact by which he could lay his claim to
hold this office. He failed to inform us of even a single fact
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 11 of 34
which could qualify him to hold this office. His only claim was
that he is a politico-social worker. We asked him also as to how
he came to be appointed on this post. He says that he made an
application to Mrs. Neelam Nath, Secretary, Forests, we asked
him whether such an application was invited from him. He says
that the application was invited from him. We asked him whether
invitation was extended to him personally by Mrs. Neelam Nath
or did it appear in any advertisement. He says that he, on his
own, gave such an application and that it was neither invited
personally from him nor through any advertisement. Prima facie,
it appears to us that a person who does not have the requisite
qualification, experience, or knowledge has been appointed on
the post of Chairman, Pollution Control Board. Before we
proceed any further, we would like Mr. Poddar, learned A.A.G.
to produce before us the original records of the Govt. relating to
the appointment of Mr. Shahdeo."
5. It was from this point onwards that a case arose within a case.
Both the issues started being dealt with simultaneously by us,
namely, the issue relating to Sundera Mineral & Chemical
Industry and the propriety, legality and validity of the
appointment of Mr. Shahdeo.”
A little later in the judgment it was held:
“41. Looked at from the aforesaid legal perspective and in view
of our clear findings that Shri Shahdeo did not possess the
qualifications required of the Chairman, State Pollution Control
Board, we have no hesitation, but to hold that it would be a
violation of the law to allow him to continue as the Chairman of
the State Board. We accordingly order and declare that the
appointment of Shri Shahdeo as Chairman, State Board, was not
legal and valid and hence improperly made and therefore, on
these grounds we order and direct that he cannot continue to
function as such. By issuance of a writ of quo-warranto,
therefore, the appointment of Shri Shahdeo as Chairman, State
Board, is quashed and set aside. Shri Shahdeo shall forthwith and
with immediate effect cease to hold the office of Chairman, State
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 12 of 34
Board. The post of Chairman, State Board is hereby declared to
be vacant, and with immediate effect.”
9. Notwithstanding the above decision, communications and orders,
the State Governments continued to display disinterest in the matter of
professional appointments to the SPCBs. This led to another
communication from the MoEF on 16th August, 2005 (which still did not
have the desired effect) and this communication reads as follows:
“Supreme Court Matter
Most Immediate
By Speed Post
No. 23-8/2004-HSMD (Vol.II)
Government of India
Ministry of Environment & Forests
(Supreme Court Monitoring Committee)
Room No, 927, Paryavaran Bhawan
C.G.O. Complex, Lodhi Road
New Delhi-110003 108
Dated 16th August, 2005
To,
The Chief Secretaries of all States/UTs
(As per the list enclosed)
Sub: Constitution of the State Pollution Control Board/Pollution
Control Committees (SPCBs PCCs) - regarding
Dear Sir,
The Supreme Court by its order dated 14-10-2003 in the Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 657/1995 set up a Monitoring Committee to
ensure time-bound implementation of various directions given in
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 13 of 34
the said order.5
The committee has been visiting several States to
monitor the status of implementation of these directions.
During its interaction with various pollution control officials, the
Supreme Court Monitoring Committee (SCMC) has noticed that
the State Pollution Control Board (SPCBs), Pollution Control
Committee (PCCs) of UTs were not constituted in accordance
with the provisions given in the Water Act, 1994 and the Air Act,
1981.
Chairperson of the Board :-
3. The statutory provisions require that Chairpersons appointed
shall be persons having “special knowledge or practical
experience in respect of matters relating to environmental
protection or a person having knowledge and experience in
administering institutions dealing with the matter aforesaid”
4. The SCMC has found that in the several cases, the Chief
Secretaries, Environment Secretaries, politicians, MLAs, literary
persons and non-technical persons have been appointed as
Chairperson of SPCBs/PCCs.
5. The MGK Menon Committee had recommended in its report
that “The Chairman of the Pollution Control Boards &
Committees should be individuals with a sense of vision and a
feeling for the future. They must have an understanding of the
complexity of modern science and technology since they will be
dealing with highly technical issue. They must have an
understanding of law. The chairperson would have to be fully
involved in the task of environment construction and planning
appointment of the Chairperson of the Board should be on full
time basis.
Member Secretary of the Board:-
6. Similarly, in respect of the post of Member Secretary the
statutory provisions (Water Act) require that he be full-time,
possessing qualifications, knowledge and experience of
scientific, engineering or management aspects of pollution
control.
5
Research Foundation for Science v. Union of India
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 14 of 34
7. In relation to appointment of Member Secretaries, the Menon
Committee has recommended that: “The incumbent should
possess a post-graduate degree in science, engineering or
technology, and have adequate experience of working in the area
of environment protection”.
8. The SCMC has found that in several States, persons from IFS
or from the PWD especially from the PHE departments, are
either being appointed or deputed to the post of Member
Secretary without the necessary statutory qualifications.
Members:-
9. No effort is being made to appoint persons with adequate
scientific, technical or legal background from the environmental
field as members of the Board. Board members are increasingly
being appointed for political purposes. This is leading to
ineffective and inefficient functioning of SPCBs/PCCs.
10. Though the Boards are to function as statutory bodies under
the Air Act, 1981, no specialists in air pollution (as required by
the Air Act, 1981) are being appointed as members. This is a
serious lacuna in constitution of the Boards.
11. During its visits to various States to monitor implementation
of the order dated 14.10.2003, the SCMC has observed that the
order of the Supreme Court being efficiently carried out in States
that have competent Chairperson or Member Secretaries. In other
States, due to lack of proper attention at the highest level,
implementation is found to be tardy and without much progress.
12. The SCMC discussed these issues at its meeting held on 28-
03-2005 came to the firm conclusion that only technically
qualified professionals should be appointed to the critical
positions of Chairperson, Member Secretary and Members of the
Pollution Control Boards so that their functioning can be
strengthened as required in terms of paragraph - 41.1 of the
Supreme Court’s order dated 14.10.2003.
13. The committee is also of the view that recommendations of
the MGK Menon Committee be fully respected and the
Chairperson should be appointed on full-time basis. Without the
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 15 of 34
officers it is not possible for any Board to function effectively in
view of the numerous laws and statutes that demand efficient and
effective actions from State Pollution Control Boards.
14. We draw your kind attention to several reports on
strengthening of State Pollution Control Boards. These include:
1) The Bhattacharia Committee, 1984
2) The Belliappa Committee, 1990
3) The ASCI Study, 1994
4) Study of the Sub Group, 1994
15. All these studies were considered during the Evaluation
Study on “Function of the Pollution Control Board” prepared by
the Programme Evaluation Organization of the Planning
Commission.
16. The Planning Commission report concluded: “Considering
the interesting technicalities involved in the functions to be
performed by these Boards, it is essential that technical persons
possessing scientific knowledge about matters relating to
pollution and pollution control hold the upper hand”.
17. The conference of Ministers of Environment that took place
in Coimbatore also reiterated at the highest political level, the
decision that the SPCBs should be headed and staffed by
technically competent professionals (and not by journalists or
politicians or administrative officers).
18. The composition of the Boards is therefore under the scrutiny
of the SCMC and no further appointment of Chairpersons or
Member Secretaries should be carried out which do not meet the
norms given in the statute and elucidated by the Menon
Committee.
19. In view of the above, you are requested to inform this
monitoring Committee regarding the qualifications of the
Chairperson, Member Secretary and Members of the Pollution
Control Board, Pollution Control Committee in your State/ Union
Territory. Based on the information, the committee will examine
whether the persons nominated to these positions meet the
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 16 of 34
statutory norms and the requirements as indicated in the MGK
Menon Committee Report and the Order of the Supreme Court
dated 14.10.2003 and further necessary action will be taken in
the matter.
20. This matter may kindly be given the highest consideration
and a reply in this regard may be provided to the undersigned
within 4 weeks so that the same will be considered in the next
SCMC meeting. It will be highly appreciated, if a copy of the
information may also be sent through email.
Yours faithfully
Sd/-
(Dr. G. Thyagarajan)
Chairman,
Supreme Court Monitoring Committee
Telefax: 011-24361410
Email: drgarajan @yahoo.co.in”
10. There are a few other communications on the same subject but it is
not necessary to detail their contents. All that need be said is that the
Central Government, time and again, requested the State Governments to
appoint persons who could add value and stature to the SPCBs by their
very presence and then utilize their expertise in preserving and protecting
the environment, including air and water.
11. As far as the State of Uttarakhand is concerned, it has come on
record that no rules (let alone recruitment rules) have been framed by the
State under the Water Act and the Air Act even though the State was
formed several years ago. Rules framed by the State of Uttar Pradesh
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 17 of 34
notified in 1984 have been adopted by Uttarakhand but there has
apparently been no fresh application of mind to these Rules or even
consideration of the possibly somewhat different conditions in
Uttarakhand. There seems to be a mechanical and bodily lifting of the
Uttar Pradesh Rules. Apart from the above, it has also come on record
that meetings of the SPCB are required to be held once in three months
but as far as the State of Uttarakhand is concerned, only 15 meetings
were held during the period from 2001 (when the Board was constituted)
over the next 12 years. There is therefore nonchalance shown by
Uttarakhand to the rule making power and the provisions of Section 8 of
the Water Act and Section 10 of the Air Act6
relating to holding meetings
of the SPCB.
12. To make matter worse, despite this Court passing an order on 8th
January, 2008 (in IA No.4/2007 in SLP (Civil) No.6023/2006) directing
6
Section 8 of the Water Act: 8. Meetings of Board.—A Board shall meet at least once in every three
months and shall observe such rules of procedure in regard to the transaction of business at its
meetings as may be prescribed:
Provided that if, in the opinion of the chairman, any business of an urgent nature is to be transacted,
he may convene a meeting of the Board at such time as he thinks fit for the aforesaid purpose.
Section 10 of the Air Act: 10. Meetings of Board.—(1) For the purposes of this Act, a Board shall meet
at least once in every three months and shall observe such rules of procedure in regard to the
transaction of business at its meetings as may be prescribed:
Provided that if, in the opinion of the Chairman, any business of an urgent nature is to be transacted,
he may convene a meeting of the Board at such time as he thinks fit for the aforesaid purpose.
(2) Copies of the minutes of the meetings under sub-section (1) shall be forwarded to the Central
Board and to the State Government concerned.
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 18 of 34
the State of Uttarakhand and the SPCB to consider the desirability of
making rules laying down essential qualifications and experience and
other relevant factors for appointment of members in the SPCB7
, we are
told that unfortunately, such rules have not been made and the impugned
order under appeal indicates that the matter has remained under
consideration of the State Government since 2006.
13. Keeping all these facts and the recalcitrance of the State
Governments in mind, the NGT examined the expertise and
qualifications of members of the SPCB of almost all States and prima
facie found that about ten States and one Union Territory had members in
the SPCB who lacked the qualifications suggested by the Central
Government.
14. At this stage, it must be mentioned that apart from the Central
Government, there are several authorities that have applied their mind to
the issue of appointment of members of the SPCBs. These include
Expert Committees such as the Bhattacharya Committee of 1984, the
7
“I.A. No. 4/2007 be treated as an original petition to be listed along with SLP (C) No. 6023/2006.
Learned counsel for the State of Uttaranchal and Uttarakhand Environment Protection and Pollution
Control Board shall find out the desirability of having Rules governing the essential qualifications and
experience and such relevant factors for the appointment of various officials in the Board. They shall
also indicate their stand as regards certain NOCs stated to have been issued to pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
Call after eight weeks.”
IA No.4/2007 was converted to W.P. (Civil) No.85/2008 which was listed along with SLP (Civil)
No.6023/2006
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 19 of 34
Belliappa Committee of 1990, the Administrative Staff College of India
Study of 1994 and a Committee chaired by Prof. M.G.K. Menon.
Notwithstanding this, the response of the State Governments in
appointing professionals and experts to the SPCBs has been remarkably
casual. It is this chalta hai attitude that led the NGT to direct the State
Governments to consider examining the appointment of the Chairperson
and members in the SPCBs and determining whether their appointment
deserves continuation or cancellation. Thereafter the NGT gave several
guidelines that ought to be followed in making appointments to the
SPCBs.
15. The objection of the appellants is to: (i) the exercise of jurisdiction
by the NGT in directing the State Governments to reconsider the
appointment of the Chairperson and members of the SPCBs; and (ii)
laying down guidelines for appointment of the Chairperson and members
of the SPCBs.
16. As regard the first grievance, it is contended that the appointment
or removal of members of the SPCBs does not lie within the statutory
jurisdiction of the NGT. Our attention has been drawn to some provisions
of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (for short ‘the Act’). The
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 20 of 34
jurisdiction of the NGT is circumscribed by Section 14 of the Act which
reads as follows:
“14. Tribunal to settle disputes.—(1) The Tribunal shall
have the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial
question relating to environment (including enforcement of
any legal right relating to environment), is involved and such
question arises out of the implementation of the enactments
specified in Schedule I.
(2) The Tribunal shall hear the disputes arising from the
questions referred to in sub-section (1) and settle such
disputes and pass order thereon.
(3) No application for adjudication of dispute under this
section shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made
within a period of six months from the date on which the
cause of action for such dispute first arose:
Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the
application within the said period, allow it to be filed within a
further period not exceeding sixty days.”
This provision cannot be read in isolation but must be read in conjunction
with Section 15 of the Act which relates to relief, compensation and
restitution as being broadly the directions that can be issued by the NGT.
Section 15 of the Act reads as follows:
“15. Relief, compensation and restitution.—
(1) The Tribunal may, by an order, provide,—
(a) relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage arising under the enactments
specified in the Schedule I (including accident occurring
while handling any hazardous substance);
(b) for restitution of property damaged;
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 21 of 34
(c) for restitution of the environment for such area or areas, as
the Tribunal may think fit.
(2) The relief and compensation and restitution of property
and environment referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of subsection
(1) shall be in addition to the relief paid or payable
under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991).
(3) No application for grant of any compensation or relief or
restitution of property or environment under this section shall
be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a
period of five years from the date on which the cause for such
compensation or relief first arose:
Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the
application within the said period, allow it to be filed within a
further period not exceeding sixty days.
(4) The Tribunal may, having regard to the damage to public
health, property and environment, divide the compensation or
relief payable under separate heads specified in Schedule II so
as to provide compensation or relief to the claimants and for
restitution of the damaged property or environment, as it may
think fit.
(5) Every claimant of the compensation or relief under this
Act shall intimate to the Tribunal about the application filed
to, or, as the case may be, compensation or relief received
from, any other court or authority.”
Finally, it is important to refer to Section 2(m) of the Act which reads:
“(m) “substantial question relating to environment” shall
include an instance where,—
(i) there is a direct violation of a specific statutory
environmental obligation by a person by which,—
(A) the community at large other than an individual
or group of individuals is affected or likely to be
affected by the environmental consequences; or
(B) the gravity of damage to the environment or
property is substantial; or
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 22 of 34
(C) the damage to public health is broadly
measurable;
(ii) the environmental consequences relate to a specific
activity or a point source of pollution;”
17. On a combined reading of all these provisions, it is clear to us that
there must be a substantial question relating to the environment and that
question must arise in a dispute – it should not be an academic question.
There must also be a claimant raising that dispute which dispute is
capable of settlement by the NGT by the grant of some relief which could
be in the nature of compensation or restitution of property damaged or
restitution of the environment and any other incidental or ancillary relief
connected therewith.
18. The appointment of the Chairperson and members of the SPCBs
cannot be classified in any circumstance as a substantial question relating
to the environment. At best it could be a substantial question relating to
their appointment. Moreover, their appointment is not a dispute as one
would normally understand it. In Prabhakar v. Joint Director,
Sericulture Department8
the following ‘definition’ of dispute was noted
in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Report:
8
(2015) 15 SCC 1
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 23 of 34
“34. To understand the meaning of the word “dispute”, it would
be appropriate to start with the grammatical or dictionary
meaning of the term:
“‘Dispute’.—to argue about, to contend for, to oppose by
argument, to call in question — to argue or debate (with, about or
over) — a contest with words; an argument; a debate; a quarrel;”
35. Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., p. 424 defines “dispute”
as under:
“Dispute.—A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or
rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met
by contrary claims or allegations on the other. The subject of
litigation; the matter for which a suit is brought and upon which
issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and
witnesses examined.”
19. As far as we are concerned, in the context of the Act, a dispute
would be the assertion of a right or an interest or a claim met by contrary
claims on the other side. In other words, the dispute must be one of
substance and not of form and it appears to us that the appointments that
we are concerned with are not ‘disputes’ as such or even disputes for the
purposes of the Act – they could be disputes for a constitutional court to
resolve through a writ of quo warranto, but certainly not for the NGT to
venture into. The failure of the State Government to appoint professional
and experienced persons to key positions in the SPCBs or the failure to
appoint any person at all might incidentally result in an ineffective
implementation of the Water Act and the Air Act, but this cannot be
classified as a primary dispute over which the NGT would have
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 24 of 34
jurisdiction. Such a failure might be of a statutory obligation over which,
in the present context and not universally, only a constitutional court
would have jurisdiction and not a statutory body like the NGT. While we
appreciate the anxiety of the NGT to preserve and protect the
environment as a part of its statutory functions, we cannot extend these
concepts to the extent of enabling the NGT to consider who should be
appointed as a Chairperson or a member of any SPCB or who should not
be so appointed.
20. Additionally, no relief as postulated by Section 15 of the Act could
be granted to a claimant, assuming that a substantial question relating to
the environment does arise and that a dispute does exist.
21. It appears to us that the NGT realized its limitations in this regard
and therefore issued a direction to the State Governments to reconsider
the appointments already been made, but the seminal issue is really
whether the NGT could at all have entertained a claim of the nature that
was raised. For reasons given above, the answer must be in the negative
and it would have been more appropriate for the NGT to have required
the claimant to approach a constitutional court for the relief prayed for in
the original application. To this extent therefore, the direction given by
the NGT must be set aside as being without jurisdiction. However, we
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 25 of 34
have been told that some States have implemented the order of the NGT
and removed some members while others have approached this Court and
obtained an interim stay order. Those officials who were removed
pursuant to the order of the NGT (including the appellant Techi Tagi
Tara) have an independent cause of action and we leave it open to them
to challenge their removal in appropriate and independent proceedings.
This is an issue between the removed official and the State Government -
the removal is not a public interest issue and we cannot reverse the
situation.
22. On the second grievance relating to the issue of guidelines by the
NGT, the meat of the matter concerns the appointment of officials who
are experts in their field and are otherwise professional. This is for each
State Government to consider and decide what is the right thing to do
under the circumstances – should an unqualified or inexperienced person
be appointed or should the SPCB be a representative but expert body?
The Water Act and the Air Act as well as the Constitution give ample
guidance in this regard. We have already adverted to the provisions of the
Constitution including Article 48A, Article 51A(g) and Article 21 of the
Constitution. So, the entire scheme of the various provisions of the
Constitution adverted to above, including the principles that have been
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 26 of 34
accepted and adopted internationally as well as by this Court such as the
principles of sustainable development, public trust and intergenerational
equity are a clear indication that in matters relating to the protection and
preservation of the environment (through the appointment of officials to
the SPCBs) the Central Government as well as the State Governments
have to walk the extra mile. Unfortunately, many of the State
Governments have not even taken the first step in that direction – hence
the present problem.
23. While it is beyond the jurisdiction of the NGT and also beyond our
jurisdiction to lay down specific rules and guidelines for recruitment of
the Chairperson and members of the SPCBs, we are of opinion that there
should be considerable deliberation before an appointment is made and
only the best should be appointed to the SPCB. It is necessary in this
regard for the Executive to consider and frame appropriate rules for the
appointment of such persons who would add lustre and value to the
SPCB. In this connection we refer to the State of Punjab v. Salil
Sabhlok9
in which it was observed with reference to appointments to the
Public Service Commission that besides express restrictions in a statute
or the Constitution, there can be implied restrictions in a statute or the
9
(2013) 5 SCC 1
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 27 of 34
Constitution and the statutory or constitutional authority cannot, in
breach of such implied restrictions, exercise its discretionary power. In
our opinion this would be equally applicable to an appointment to a
statutory body such as the SPCB - the State Government does not have
unlimited discretion or power to appoint anybody that it chooses to do.
24. It was also held in Salil Sabhlok (supra) that the deliberative
process and institutional requirements are of considerable importance in
respect of any appointment that is made. In this context, the imperative
of good governance was highlighted and with regard to framing rules or
issuing guidelines, it was held as follows:
“In the light of the various decisions of this Court adverted to
above, the administrative and constitutional imperative can be
met only if the Government frames guidelines or parameters for
the appointment of the Chairperson and Members of the Punjab
Public Service Commission. That it has failed to do so does not
preclude this Court or any superior court from giving a direction
to the State Government to conduct the necessary exercise within
a specified period. Only because it is left to the State Legislature
to consider the desirability or otherwise of specifying the
qualifications or experience for the appointment of a person to
the position of Chairperson or Member of the Punjab Public
Service Commission, does not imply that this Court cannot direct
the executive to frame guidelines and set the parameters. This
Court can certainly issue appropriate directions in this regard,
and in the light of the experience gained over the last several
decades coupled with the views expressed by the Law
Commission, the Second Administrative Reform Commission
and the views expressed by this Court from time to time, it is
imperative for good governance and better administration to
issue directions to the executive to frame appropriate guidelines
and parameters based on the indicators mentioned by this Court.
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 28 of 34
These guidelines can and should be binding on the State of
Punjab till the State Legislature exercises its power.”
25. In Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana10 this Court observed
that competent, honest, independent persons of outstanding ability and
high reputation who command the confidence of people and who would
not allow themselves to be deflected by any extraneous consideration
from discharging their duties should be appointed to Public Service
Commissions. Similarly, in In R/o Dr Ram Ashray Yadav11 it was held
that the credibility of an institution is founded upon the faith of the
common man in its proper functioning. The faith would be eroded and
confidence destroyed if it appears that the officials act subjectively and
not objectively or that their actions are suspect. In our opinion, these
conclusions of this Court would equally apply to professional and expert
statutory bodies such as the Central Pollution Control Board and the State
Pollution Control Boards.
26. Additionally, various committees have given sufficient guidelines
for the appointment of the Chairperson and members of the SPCBs. The
Bhattacharya Committee (1984) proposed that the structural
organization of SPCBs should consist of technical services, scientific
10 (1985) 4 SCC 417
11 (2000) 4 SCC 309
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 29 of 34
services, planning, legal services, administrative services, accounts,
training cell and research and development. The Committee, inter-alia,
called for (a) discouraging the flow of deputationists to the Boards, (b)
upgrading regional laboratories, (c) providing each Board with at least
one mobile laboratory, (d) creating a centralized training institute, (e)
providing, on priority, funds to establish air control activity, and (f)
bestowing the power to make posts at least up to the rank of
environmental engineers/scientists with the Boards.12
27. Similarly, the Belliappa Committee (1990) recommended (a)
introducing elaborate monitoring, reporting and organizational systems at
the national level along with four regional centres and one training cell in
each Board, (b) effecting suitable changes in the Boards recruitment
policy to enable them induct persons with suitable academic
qualifications, and (c) ensuring that the Chairman and Member-Secretary
are appointed for a minimum of three years.
28. The Administrative Staff College of India (1994) recommended,
inter alia, that (a) the SPCBs be reoriented for implementing the
instrument mix of legislation and regulation, fiscal incentives, voluntary
12 Final Report prepared by the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board in 2005 on Institutional Capacity
Building highlights the recommendations made by the Bhattacharya Committee, the Belliappa
Committee and the ASCI Study
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 30 of 34
agreements, information campaigns and educational programmes (b) an
Annual Environmental Quality Report be prepared by every SPCB for
the concerned State, (c) an inventory of discharges and effluents
disaggregated to the district level be prepared, (d) a research cell be
formed in each SPCB and a network be established with the proposed
clean technology centre and (f) model environmental impact assessments
be prepared for major categories of industries.
29. Finally, the Menon Committee13 made recommendations that are
a part of the communication of 16th August, 2005 referred to above. It
was also recommended that (a) in general, State Governments should not
interfere with recruitment policies of the SPCBs, especially where the
Boards are making efforts to equip their institutions with more and better
trained engineering and scientific staff, (b) the statutory independence
and functional autonomy given to the SPCBs should be protected and the
Boards should be kept free from political interference. The Boards should
be enabled to make independent decisions in this regard and (c) the
Chairperson of the SPCB should be a full-time appointee for a period of
five years and the Member-Secretary of the SPCB should also be
appointed for a period of five years.
13 Constituted pursuant to an order passed by this Court on 14th October, 2003 in Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 657/1995
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 31 of 34
30. All these suggestions and recommendations are more than enough
for making expert and professional appointments to the SPCBs being
geared towards establishing a professional body with multifarious tasks
intended to preserve and protect the environment and consisting of
experts. Any contrary view or compromise in the appointments would
render the exercise undertaken by all these committees completely
irrelevant and redundant. Surely, it cannot be said that the committees
were not constituted for the purpose of putting their recommendations in
the dustbin.
31. Unfortunately, notwithstanding all these suggestions,
recommendations and guidelines the SPCBs continue to be manned by
persons who do not necessarily have the necessary expertise or
professional experience to address the issues for which the SPCBs were
established by law. The Tata Institute of Social Sciences in a Report
published quite recently in 2013 titled “Environmental Regulatory
Authorities in India: An Assessment of State Pollution Control Boards”
had this to say about some of the appointments to the SPCBs:
“An analysis of data collected from State Pollution Control
Boards, however, gives a contrasting picture. It has been
observed that time and again across state governments have not
been able to choose a qualified, impartial, and politically neutral
person of high standing to this crucial regulatory post. The recent
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 32 of 34
appointments of chairpersons of various State Pollution Control
Boards like Karnataka (A a senior BJP leader), Himachal
Pradesh (B a Congress party leader and former MLA), Uttar
Pradesh (C appointed on the recommendation of SP leader X),
Arunachal Pradesh (D a sitting NCP party MLA), Manipur
Pollution Control Board (E a sitting MLA), Maharashtra
Pollution Control Board (F a former bureaucrat) are in blatant
violation of the apex court guidelines. The apex court has
recommended that the appointees should be qualified in the field
of environment or should have special knowledge of the subject.
It is unfortunate that in a democratic set up, key enterprises and
boards are headed by bureaucrats for over a decade. In this
connection, it is very important for State Governments to
understand that filling a key regulatory post with the primary
intention to reward an ex-official through his or her appointment
upon retirement, to a position for which he or she may not
possess the essential overall qualifications, does not do justice to
the people of their own states and also staffs working in the State
Pollution Control Boards. The primary lacuna with this kind of
appointment was that it did not evoke any trust in the people that
decisions taken by an ex-official of the State or a former political
leader, appointed to this regulatory post through what appeared
to be a totally non-transparent unilateral decision. Many senior
environmental scientists and other officers of various State
Pollution Control Boards have expressed their concern for
appointing bureaucrats and political leader as Chairpersons who
they feel not able to create a favourable atmosphere and an
effective work culture in the functioning of the board. It has also
been argued by various environmental groups that if the
government is unable to find a competent person, then it should
advertise the post, as has been done recently by states like
Odisha. However, State Governments have been defending their
decision to appoint bureaucrats to the post of Chairperson as they
believe that the vast experience of IAS officers in handling
responsibilities would be easy. Another major challenge has been
appointing people without having any knowledge in this field.
For example, the appointment of G with maximum qualification
of Class X as Chairperson of State Pollution Control Board of
Sikkim was clear violation of Water Pollution and Prevention
Act, 1974.”14
14 The names have been deliberately left out by us
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 33 of 34
32. The concern really is not one of a lack of professional expertise –
there is plenty of it available in the country – but the lack of dedication
and willingness to take advantage of the resources available and instead
benefit someone close to the powers that be. With this couldn’t-care-less
attitude, the environment and public trust are the immediate casualties. It
is unlikely that with such an attitude, any substantive effort can be made
to tackle the issues of environment degradation and issues of pollution.
Since the NGT was faced with this situation, we can appreciate its
frustration at the scant regard for the law by some State Governments,
but it is still necessary in such situations to exercise restraint as cautioned
in State of U.P. v. Jeet S. Bisht.
15
33. Keeping the above in mind, we are of the view that it would be
appropriate, while setting aside the judgment and order of the NGT, to direct
the Executive in all the States to frame appropriate guidelines or recruitment
rules within six months, considering the institutional requirements of the
SPCBs and the law laid down by statute, by this Court and as per the reports
of various committees and authorities and ensure that suitable professionals
and experts are appointed to the SPCBs. Any damage to the environment
could be permanent and irreversible or at least long-lasting. Unless
15 (2007) 6 SCC 586
C.A. Nos. 1359/2017 etc. etc. Page 34 of 34
corrective measures are taken at the earliest, the State Governments should
not be surprised if petitions are filed against the State for the issuance of a
writ of quo warranto in respect of the appointment of the Chairperson and
members of the SPCBs. We make it clear that it is left open to public
spirited individuals to move the appropriate High Court for the issuance of a
writ of quo warranto if any person who does not meet the statutory or
constitutional requirements is appointed as a Chairperson or a member of
any SPCB or is presently continuing as such.
34. The appeals are disposed of in light of the above discussion.
….……………………J
(Madan B. Lokur)
………………………..J
(Deepak Gupta)
New Delhi;
September 22, 2017