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Showing posts with label SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT. Show all posts

Friday, September 22, 2017

SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT

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SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
_______
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
________
PART I
PRELIMINARY
SECTIONS
1. Short title, extent and commencement.
2. Definitions.
3. Savings.
4. Specific relief to be granted only for enforcing individual civil rights and not for enforcing penal
laws.
PART II
SPECIFIC RELIEF
CHAPTER I
RECOVERING POSSESSION OF PROPERTY
5. Recovery of specific immovable property.
6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.
7. Recovery of specific movable property.
8. Liability of person in possession, not as owner, to deliver to persons entitled to immediate
possession.
CHAPTER II
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
9. Defences respecting suits for relief based on contract.
Contracts which can be specifically enforced
10. Cases in which specific performance of contract enforceable.
11. Cases in which specific performance of contracts connected with trusts enforceable.
12. Specific performance of part of contract.
13. Rights of purchaser or lessee against person with no title or imperfect title.
Contracts, which cannot be specifically enforced
14. Contracts not specifically enforceable.
Persons for or against whom contracts may be specifically enforced
15. Who may obtain specific performance.
16. Personal bars to relief.
17. Contract to sell or let property by one who has no title, not specifically enforceable.
18. Non-enforcement except with variation.
19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title.
Discretion and powers of court
20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.
21. Power to award compensation in certain cases.
22. Power to grant relief for possession, partition, refund of earnest money, etc.
23. Liquidation of damages not a bar to specific performance.
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SECTIONS
24. Bar of suit for compensation for breach after dismissal of suit for specific performance.
Enforcement of awards and directions to execute settlements
25. Application of preceding sections to certain awards and testamentary directions to execute
settlements.
CHAPTER III
RECTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS
26. When instrument may be rectified.
CHAPTER IV
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS
27. When rescission may be adjudged or refused.
28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the
specific performance of which has been decreed.
29. Alternative prayer for rescission in suit for specific performance.
30. Court may require parties rescinding to do equity.
CHAPTER V
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS
31. When cancellation may be ordered.
32. What instruments may be partially cancelled.
33. Power to require benefit to be restored or compensation to be made when instrument is cancelled
or is successfully resisted as being void or voidable.
CHAPTER VI
DECLARATORY DECREES
34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.
35. Effect of declaration.
PART III
PREVENTIVE RELIEF
CHAPTER VII
INJUNCTIONS GENERALLY
36. Preventive relief how granted.
37. Temporary and perpetual injunctions.
CHAPTER VIII
PERPETUAL INJUNCTIONS
38. Perpetual injunction when granted.
39. Mandatory injunctions.
40. Damages in lieu of, or in addition to, injunction.
41. Injunction when refused.
42. Injunction to perform negative agreement.
43. [Repealed.]
44. [Repealed.]
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THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963
ACT NO. 47 OF 1963
[13th December, 1963.]
An Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief.
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Fourteenth Year of the Republic of India as follow:—
PART I
PRELIMINARY
1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called the Specific Relief
Act, 1963.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) It shall come into force on such date1
as the Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, appoint.
2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) “obligation” includes every duty enforceable by law;
(b) “settlement” means an instrument (other than a will or codicil as defined by the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), whereby the destination or devolution of successive interests in
movable or immovable property is disposed of or is agreed to be disposed of;
(c) “trust” has the same meaning as in section 3 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882), and
includes an obligation in the nature of a trust within the meaning of Chapter IX of that Act;
(d) “trustee” includes every person holding property in trust;
(e) all other words and expressions used herein but not defined, and defined in the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act.
3. Savings.—Except as otherwise provided herein, nothing in this Act shall be deemed—
(a) to deprive any person of any right to relief, other than specific performance, which he may
have under any contract; or
(b) to affect the operation of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), on documents.
4. Specific relief to be granted only for enforcing individual civil rights and not for enforcing
penal laws.—Specific relief can be granted only for the purpose of enforcing individual civil rights and
not for the mere purpose of enforcing a penal law.
PART II
SPECIFIC RELIEF
CHAPTER I
RECOVERING POSSESSION OF PROPERTY
5. Recovery of specific immovable property.—A person entitled to the possession of
specific immovable property may recover it in the manner provided by the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.—(1) If any person is dispossessed without
his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming
1. 1st March, 1964, vide notification No. S.O. 189, dated 13th January, 1964, see Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II,
sec. 3(ii).
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through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in
such suit.
(2) No suit under this section shall be brought—
(a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or
(b) against the Government.
(3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor
shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.
(4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to
recover possession thereof.
7. Recovery of specific movable property.—A person entitled to the possession of specific movable
property may recover it in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
Explanation 1.—A trustee may sue under this section for the possession of movable property to the
beneficial interest in which the person for whom he is trustee is entitled.
Explanation 2.—A special or temporary right to the present possession of movable property is
sufficient to support a suit under this section.
8. Liability of person in possession, not as owner, to deliver to persons entitled to immediate
possession.—Any person having the possession or control of a particular article of movable property, of
which he is not the owner, may be compelled specifically to deliver it to the person entitled to its
immediate possession, in any of the following cases:—
(a) when the thing claimed is held by the defendant as the agent or trustee of the plaintiff;
(b) when compensation in money would not afford the plaintiff adequate relief for the loss of the
thing claimed;
(c) when it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the actual damage caused by its loss;
(d) when the possession of the thing claimed has been wrongfully transferred from the plaintiff.
Explanation.—Unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall, in respect of any article of
movable property claimed under clause (b) or clause (c) of this section, presume—
(a) that compensation in money would not afford the plaintiff adequate relief for the loss of the
thing claimed, or, as the case may be;
(b) that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the actual damage caused by its loss.
CHAPTER II
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
9. Defences respecting suits for relief based on contract.—Except as otherwise provided herein
where any relief is claimed under this Chapter in respect of a contract, the person against whom the relief
is claimed may plead by way of defence any ground which is available to him under any law relating to
contracts.
Contracts which can be specifically enforced
10. Cases in which specific performance of contract enforceable.—Except as otherwise provided
in this Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may, in the discretion of the court, be enforced—
(a) when there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the
non-performance of the act agreed to be done; or
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(b) when the act agreed to be done in such that compensation in money for its non-performance
would not afford adequate relief.
Explanation.—Unless and until the contrary is proved, the court shall presume—
(i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by
compensation in money; and
(ii) that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be so relieved except in the
following cases:—
(a) where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce, or is of special value or interest
to the plaintiff, or consists of goods which are not easily obtainable in the market;
(b) where the property is held by the defendant as the agent or trustee of the plaintiff.
11. Cases in which specific performance of contracts connected with trusts
enforceable.—(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, specific performance of a contract may, in
the discretion of the court, be enforced when the act agreed to be done is in the performance wholly or
partly of a trust.
(2) A contract made by a trustee in excess of his powers or in breach of trust cannot be specifically
enforced.
12. Specific performance of part of contract.—(1) Except as otherwise hereinafter provided in this
section, the court shall not direct the specific performance of a part of a contract.
(2) Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, but the part which must
be left unperformed be a only a small proportion to the whole in value and admits of compensation in
money, the court may, at the suit of either party, direct the specific performance of so much of the
contract as can be performed, and award compensation in money for the deficiency.
(3) Where a party to a contract is unable to perform the whole of his part of it, and the part which
must be left unperformed either—
(a) forms a considerable part of the whole, though admitting of compensation in money; or
(b) does not admit of compensation in money;
he is not entitled to obtain a decree for specific performance; but the court may, at the suit of the other
party, direct the party in default to perform specifically so much of his part of the contract as he can
perform, if the other party—
(i) in a case falling under clause (a), pays or has paid the agreed consideration for the whole of
the contract reduced by the consideration for the part which must be left unperformed and in a case
falling under clause (b)
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[pays or has paid] the consideration for the whole of the contract without any
abatement; and
(ii) in either case, relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part of the contract
and all right to compensation, either for the deficiency or for the loss or damage sustained by him
through the default of the defendant.
(4) When a part of a contract which, taken by itself, can and ought to be specifically performed,
stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot or
ought not to be specifically performed the court may direct specific performance of the former part.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, a party to a contract shall be deemed to be unable to
perform the whole of his part of it if a portion of its subject-matter existing at the date of the contract has
ceased to exist at the time of its performance.
1. Ins. by Act 52 of 1964, s. 3 and the Second Schedule (w.e.f. 29-12-1964).
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13. Rights of purchaser or lessee against person with no title or imperfect title.—(1) Where a
person contracts to sell or let certain immovable property having no title or only an imperfect title, the
purchaser or lessee (subject to the other provisions of this Chapter), has the following rights, namely:—
(a) if the vendor or lessor has subsequently to the contract acquired any interest in the property,
the purchaser or lessee may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest;
(b) where the concurrence of other person is necessary for validating the title, and they are bound
to concur at the request of the vendor or lessor, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to procure
such concurrence, and when a conveyance by other persons is necessary to validate the title and they
are bound to convey at the request of the vendor or lessor, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to
procure such conveyance;
(c) where the vendor professes to sell unencumbered property, but the property is mortgaged for
an amount not exceeding the purchase money and the vendor has in fact only a right to redeem it, the
purchaser may compel him to redeem the mortgage and to obtain a valid discharge, and, where
necessary, also a conveyance from the mortgagee;
(d) where the vendor or lessor sues for specific performance of the contract and the suit is
dismissed on the ground of his want of title or imperfect title, the defendant has a right to a return of
his deposit, if any, with interest thereon, to his costs of the suit, and to a lien for such deposit, interest
and costs on the interest, if any, of the vendor or lesser in the property which is the subject-matter of
the contract.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also apply, as far as may be, to contracts for the sale or hire
of movable property.
Contracts, which cannot be specifically enforced
14. Contracts not specifically enforceable.—(1) The following contracts cannot be specifically
enforced, namely:—
(a) a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief;
(b) a contract which runs into such minute or numerous details or which is so dependent on the
personal qualification or volition of the parties, or otherwise from its nature is such, that the court
cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms;
(c) a contract which is in its nature determinable;
(d) a contract the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the
court cannot supervise.
(2) Save as provided by the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), no contract to refer present or future
differences to arbitration shall be specifically enforced; but if any person who has made such a contract
(other than an arbitration agreement to which the provisions of the said act apply) and has refused to
perform it, sues in respect of any subject which he has contracted to refer, the existence of such contract
shall bar the suit.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1), the
court may enforce specific performance in the following cases:—
(a) where the suit is for the enforcement of a contract,—
(i) to execute a mortgage or furnish any other security for securing the repayment of any loan
which the borrower is not willing to repay at once:
Provided that where only a part of the loan has been advanced the lender is willing to advance
the remaining part of the loan in terms of the contract; or
(ii) to take up and pay for any debentures of a company;
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(b) where the suit is for,—
(i) the execution of a formal deed of partnership, the parties having commenced to carry on
the business of the partnership; or
(ii) the purchase of a share of a partner in a firm;
(c) where the suit is for the enforcement of a contract for the construction of any building or the
execution of any other work on land:
Provided that the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:—
(i) the building or other work is described in the contract in terms sufficiently precise to
enable the court to determine the exact nature of the building or work;
(ii) the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the contract and the interest is
of such a nature that compensation in money for non-performance of the contract is not an
adequate relief; and
(iii) the defendant has, in pursuance of the contract, obtained possession of the whole or any
part of the land on which the building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed.
Persons for or against whom contracts may be specifically enforced
15. Who may obtain specific performance.—Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, the
specific performance of a contract may be obtained by—
(a) any party thereto;
(b) the representative in interest or the principal, of any party thereto:
Provided that where the learning, skill, solvency or any personal quality of such party is a
material ingredient in the contract, or where the contract provides that his interest shall not be
assigned, his representative in interest or his principal shall not be entitled to specific performance of
the contract, unless such party has already performed his part of the contract, or the performance
thereof by his representative in interest, or his principal, has been accepted by the other party;
(c) where the contract is a settlement on marriage, or a compromise of doubtful rights between
members of the same family, any person beneficially entitled thereunder;
(d) where the contract has been entered into by a tenant for life in due exercise of a power, the
remainder man;
(e) a reversioner in possession, where the agreement is a covenant entered into with his
predecessor in title and the reversioner is entitled to the benefit of such covenant;
(f) a reversioner in remainder, where the agreement is such a covenant, and the reversioner is
entitled to the benefit thereof and will sustain material injury by reason of its breach;
(g) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with
another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation;
(h) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract for
the purposes of the company, and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the
company:
Provided that the company has accepted the contract and has communicated such acceptance to
the other party to the contract.
16. Personal bars to relief.—Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a
person—
(a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or
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(b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that
on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with,
or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or
(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to
perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms of the
performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),—
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to
actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the
court;
(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the
contract according to its true construction.
17. Contract to sell or let property by one who has no title, not specifically enforceable.—(1) A
contract to sell or let any immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of a vendor or
lessor—
(a) who, knowing himself not to have any title to the property, has contracted to sell or let the
property;
(b) who, though he entered into the contract believing that he had a good title to the property,
cannot at the time fixed by the parties or by the court for the completion of the sale or letting, give the
purchaser or lessee a title free from reasonable doubt.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also apply, as far as may be, to contracts for the sale or hire
of movable property.
18. Non-enforcement except with variation.—Where a plaintiff seeks specific performance of a
contract in writing, to which the defendant sets up a variation, the plaintiff cannot obtain the performance
sought, except with the variation so set up, in the following cases, namely:—
(a) where by fraud, mistake of fact or mis-representation, the written contract of which
performance is sought is in its terms or effect different from what the parties agreed to, or does not
contain all the terms agreed to between the parties on the basis of which the defendant entered into
the contact;
(b) where the object of the parties was to produce a certain legal result which the contract as
framed is not calculated to produce;
(c) where the parties have, subsequently to the execution of the contract, varied its terms.
19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title.—Except as
otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against—
(a) either party thereto;
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a
transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract;
(c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the
plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant;
(d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with
another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation;
(e) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract for
the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the
company:
Provided that the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other
party to the contract.
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Discretion and powers of court
20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.—(1) The jurisdiction to decree specific
performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to
do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial
principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal.
(2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific
performance:—
(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the
contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the
contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which
he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or
(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering
the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.
Explanation 1.—Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the
defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the
meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b).
Explanation 2.—The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the
defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any
act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing
at the time of the contract.
(3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the
plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific
performance.
(4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground
that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party.
21. Power to award compensation in certain cases.—(1) In a suit for specific performance of a
contract, the plaintiff may also claim compensation for its breach, either in addition to, or in substitution
of, such performance.
(2) If, in any such suit, the court decides that specific performance ought not to be granted, but that
there is a contract between the parties which has been broken by the defendant, and that the plaintiff is
entitled to compensation for that breach, it shall award him such compensation accordingly.
(3) If, in any such suit, the court decides that specific performance ought to be granted, but that it is
not sufficient to satisfy the justice of the case, and that some compensation for breach of the contract
should also be made to the plaintiff, it shall award him such compensation accordingly.
(4) In determining the amount of any compensation awarded under this section, the court shall be
guided by the principles specified in section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
(5) No compensation shall be awarded under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such
compensation in his plaint:
Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such compensation in the plaint, the court shall,
at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just, for including
a claim for such compensation.
Explanation.—The circumstances that the contract has become incapable of specific performance
does not preclude the court from exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this section.
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22. Power to grant relief for possession, partition, refund of earnest money, etc.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (5 of 1908), any
person suing for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property may, in an
appropriate case, ask for—
(a) possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property in addition to such
performance; or
(b) any other relief to which he may be entitled, including the refund of any earnest money or
deposit paid or 1
[made by] him, in case his claim for specific performance is refused.
(2) No relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it
has been specifically claimed:
Provident that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the court shall, at any
stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim
for such relief.
(3) The power of the court to grant relief under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be without prejudice
to its powers to award compensation under section 21.
23. Liquidation of damages not a bar to specific performance.—(1) A contract, otherwise proper
to be specifically enforced, may be so enforced, though a sum be named in it as the amount to be paid in
case of its breach and the party in default is willing to pay the same, if the court, having regard to the
terms of the contract and other attending circumstances, is satisfied that the sum was named only for the
purpose of securing performance of the contract and not for the purpose of giving to the party in default
an option of paying money in lieu of specific performance.
(2) When enforcing specific performance under this section, the court shall not also decree payment
of the sum so named in the contract.
24. Bar of suit for compensation for breach after dismissal of suit for specific
performance.—The dismissal of a suit for specific performance of a contract or part thereof shall bar the
plaintiff’s right to sue for compensation for the breach of such contract or part, as the case may be, but
shall not bar his right to sue for any other relief to which he may be entitled, by reason of such breach.
Enforcement of awards and directions to execute settlements
25. Application of preceding sections, to certain awards and testamentary directions to execute
settlements.—The provisions of this Chapter as to contracts shall apply to awards to which the
Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), does not apply and to directions in a will or codicil to execute a
particular settlement.
CHAPTER III
RECTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS
26. When instrument may be rectified.—(1) When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties
a contract or other instrument in writing [not being the articles of association of a company to which the
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), applies] does not express their real intention, then—
(a) either party or his representative in interest may institute a suit to have the instrument
rectified; or
(b) the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim
in his pleading that the instrument be rectified; or
(c) a defendant in any such suit as is referred to in clause (b), may, in addition to any other
defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument.
1. Subs. by Act 52 of 1964, s. 3 and the Second Schedule, for “made to” (w.e.f. 29-12-1964).
11
(2) If, in any suit in which a contract or other instrument is sought to be rectified under
sub-section (1), the court finds that the instrument, through fraud or mistake, does not express the real
intention of the parties, the court may in its discretion, direct rectification of the instrument so as to
express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in
good faith and for value.
(3) A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so
prayed in his pleading and the court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced.
(4) No relief for the rectification of an instrument shall be granted to any party under this section
unless it has been specifically claimed:
Provided that where a party has not claimed any such relief in his pleading, the court shall, at any
stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the pleading on such terms as may be just for including such
claim.
CHAPTER IV
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS
27. When rescission may be adjudged or refused.—(1) Any person interested in a contract may sue
to have it rescinded, and such rescission may be adjudged by the court in any of the following cases,
namely:—
(a) where the contract is voidable or terminable by the plaintiff;
(b) where the contract is unlawful for causes not apparent on its face and the defendant is more to
blame than the plaintiff.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the court may refuse to rescind the
contract—
(a) where the plaintiff has expressly or impliedly ratified the contract; or
(b) where, owing to the change of circumstances which has taken place since the making of the
contract (not being due to any act of the defendant himself), the parties cannot be substantially
restored to the position in which they stood when the contract was made; or
(c) where third parties have, during the subsistence of the contract, acquired rights in good faith
without notice and for value; or
(d) where only a part of the contract is sought to be rescinded and such part is not severable from
the rest of the contract.
Explanation.—In this section “contract” in relation to the territories to which the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), does not extend, means a contract in writing.
28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property,
the specific performance of which has been decreed.—(1) Where in any suit a decree for specific
performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or
lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay
the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply
in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the
court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the
justice of the case may require.
(2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the court—
(a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the
contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor; and
(b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in
respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee
until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if the justice of the case so requires, the
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refund of any sum paid by the vendee or the lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the
contract.
(3) If the purchase or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under
the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in the same
suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate
cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely:—
(a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor;
(b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the
execution of such conveyance or lease.
(4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the
instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be.
(5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the court.
29. Alternative prayer for rescission in suit for specific performance.—A plaintiff instituting a
suit for the specific performance of a contract in writing may pray in the alternative that, if the contract
cannot be specifically enforced, it may be rescinded and delivered up to be cancelled; and the court, if it
refuses to enforce the contract specifically, may direct it to be rescinded and delivered up accordingly.
30. Court may require parties rescinding to do equity.—On adjudging the rescission of a contract,
the court may require the party to whom such relief is granted to restore, so far as may be, any benefit
which he may have received from the other party and to make any compensation to him which justice
may be require.
CHAPTER V
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS
31. When cancellation may be ordered.—(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void
or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him
serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so
adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the
court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so
registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its
cancellation.
32. What instruments may be partially cancelled.—Where an instrument is evidence of different
rights or different obligations, the court may, in a proper case, cancel it in part and allow it to stand for the
residue.
33. Power to require benefit to be restored or compensation to be made when instrument is
cancelled or is successfully resisted as being void or voidable.—(1) On adjudging the cancellation of
an instrument, the court may require the party to whom such relief is granted, to restore, so far as may be
any benefit which he may have received from the other party and to make any compensation to him which
justice may require.
(2) Where a defendant successfully resists any suit on the ground—
(a) that the instrument sought to be enforced against him in the suit is voidable, the court may if
the defendant has received any benefit under the instrument from the other party, require him to
restore, so far as may be, such benefit to that party or to make compensation for it;
(b) that the agreement sought to be enforced against him in the suit is void by reason of his not
having been competent to contract under section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), the
court may, if the defendant has received any benefit under the agreement from the other party, require
him to restore, so far as may be, such benefit to that party, to the extent to which he or his estate has
benefited thereby.
13
CHAPTER VI
DECLARATORY DECREES
34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.—Any person entitled to any legal
character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested
to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration
that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief:
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further
relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
Explanation.—A trustee of property is a “person interested to deny” a title adverse to the title of some
one who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.
35. Effect of declaration.—A declaration made under this Chapter is binding only on the parties to
the suit, persons claiming through them respectively, and, where any of the parties are trustees, on the
persons for whom, if in existence at the date of the declaration, such parties would be trustees.
PART III
PREVENTIVE RELIEF
CHAPTER VII
INJUNCTIONS GENERALLY
36. Preventive relief how granted.—Preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by
injunction, temporary or perpetual.
37. Temporary and perpetual injunctions.—(1) Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue
until a specific time, or until the further order of the court, and they may be granted at any stage of a suit,
and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
(2) A perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon the merits
of the suit; the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right, or from the
commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff.
CHAPTER VIII
PERPETUAL INJUNCTIONS
38. Perpetual injunction when granted.—(1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or
referred to by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of
an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication.
(2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the court shall be guided by the rules and
provisions contained in Chapter II.
(3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of,
property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely:—
(a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff;
(b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be
caused, by the invasion;
(c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief;
(d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.
39. Mandatory injunctions.—When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel
the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion
grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite
acts.
14
40. Damages in lieu of, or in addition to, injunction.—(1) The plaintiff in a suit for perpetual
injunction under section 38, or mandatory injunction under section 39, may claim damages either in
addition to, or in substitution for, such injunction and the court may, if it thinks fit, award such damages.
(2) No relief for damages shall be granted under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such
relief in his plaint:
Provided that where no such damages have been claimed in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of
the proceedings, allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including such
claim.
(3) The dismissal of a suit to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favour of the plaintiff
shall bar his right to sue for damages for such breach.
41. Injunction when refused.—An injunction cannot be granted—
(a) to restrain any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the
suit in which the injunction is sought, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of
proceedings;
(b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate
to that from which the injunction is sought;
(c) to restrain any person from applying to any legislative body;
(d) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter;
(e) to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically
enforced;
(f) to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a
nuisance;
(g) to prevent a continuing breach in which the plaintiff has acquiesced;
(h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of
proceeding except in case of breach of trust;
(i) when the conduct of the plaintiff or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to be the
assistance of the court;
(j) when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter.
42. Injunction to perform negative agreement.—Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (e)
of section 41, where a contract comprises an affirmative agreement to do a certain act, coupled with a
negative agreement, express or implied, not to do a certain act, the circumstance that the court is unable to
compel specific performance of the affirmative agreement shall not preclude it from granting an
injunction to perform the negative agreement:
Provided that the plaintiff has not failed to perform the contract so far as it is binding on him.
1
* * * * *
1. Sections 43 and 44 rep. by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1974 (56 of 1974), s. 3 and the Second Schedule
(w.e.f. 20-12-1974).

Sunday, November 24, 2013

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Agreement to sell land - Non-execution of - Suit for specific performance - Grant of decree and plea of seller that time was essence of contract rejected - However, High Court setting aside the decree - Validity of - Held: Recital in the agreement that earnest money would be forfeited upon failure to execute agreement within stipulated period makes it clear that parties never intended time to be essence of contract - More so, seller did not prove his plea - Thus, decree granted by trial court upheld - Buyer directed to deposit balance consideration amount and seller would execute sale deed. = PETITIONER: Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (Dead)through LRs & Ors RESPONDENT: Appasaheb Dattatraya Pawar = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Agreement to sell land - Non-execution of - Suit for specific performance - Grant of decree and plea of seller that time was essence of contract rejected - However, High Court setting aside the decree - Validity of - Held: Recital in the agreement that earnest money would be forfeited upon failure to execute agreement within stipulated period makes it clear that parties never intended time to be essence of contract - More so, seller did not prove his plea - Thus, decree granted by trial court upheld - Buyer directed to deposit balance consideration amount and seller would execute sale deed.
The respondent-defendant entered into an agreement for sale of agricultural lands to the appellant-plaintiffs for a consideration amount. The sale deed was to be executed by the defendant within six months and the possession of lands was to be delivered at the time of execution of sale deed. The plaintiffs paid the earnest money and balance amount was to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed. However, the defendant did not execute the agreement. The plaintiffs filed suit for specific performance of agreement. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the defendant failed to prove that time was the essence of contract and the plaintiffs were and are ready and willing to perform their part of contract. The High Court set aside the order of trial court. Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the case of sale of immoveable property, there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even where the parties have expressly provided that time is the essence of the contract, such a stipulation will have to be read along with other provisions of the contract. [Para 10] [1176-E]
1.2 The defendant in his written statement made a bald claim that the time was the essence of contract. Even if the recital in the agreement of sale is accepted that the sale deed has to be executed within a period of six months, there is an express provision in the agreement itself that failure to adhere the time, the earnest money will be forfeited. In such circumstances and in view of recital pertaining to forfeiture of the earnest money makes it clear that time was never intended by the parties to be of essence. [Para 13] [1178-E & F]
1.3 The appellants/plaintiffs clearly established their claim to secure specific performance of the agreement by leading cogent evidence whereas the respondent/defendant having pleaded that time was the essence of the contract neither entered the witness box nor led any evidence whatsoever. The defendant did not bother to prove his claim on oath before the Court to the effect that it was the plaintiffs who avoided performing their part of contract. Neither the terms of agreement nor the intention of the parties indicate that the time is an essence of the agreement. All the above-mentioned material aspects were correctly appreciated by the trial court and unfortunately the High Court lost sight of the above material aspect and the conduct of the defendant in not strengthening his plea by placing acceptable evidence. In such circumstances, the High Court should have upheld the decree of specific performance granted by the trial Court. [Paras 12 and 13] [1177-G; 1178-A, D, H; 1179-A]
1.4 When the third plaintiff deposed before the Court explaining their case with reference to the recitals in the agreement of sale including the reference to the legal notice to the defendant, in the absence of contra evidence on the side of the defendant, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in non-suiting the plaintiff cannot be agreed. [Para 13] [1179-A & B]
1.5 The claim for refund of earnest money by the plaintiffs is only their alternative claim. It is not in dispute that in all suits for specific performance, the plaintiff is entitled to seek alternative relief in the event the decree for specific performance cannot be granted for any reason, hence there is no infirmity in the alternative plea of refund. [Para 13] [1179-C & D]
1.6 The judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside and the decree granted by the trial Court is upheld. The appellants/plaintiffs are directed to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration whereupon the respondent/defendant would execute the sale deed of the suit lands. In case of failure of the defendant to execute the sale deed, the plaintiffs would be entitled to get the sale deed executed through Court. [Para 14] [1179-E & F]
K.S. Vidyanadam and Others vs. Vairavan 1997 (3) SCC 1 - distinguished.
Chand Rani (Smt.) (dead) by LRs. Vs. Kamal Rani (Smt.) (dead) by LRs, (1993) 1 SCC 519; Swarnam Ramachandran (Smt.) and Another vs. Aravacode Chakungal Jayapalan, 2004 (8) SCC 689 - relied on.
Makarand D. Adkar, Vijay Kumar and Vishwajit Singh for the Appellants.
V.N. Ganpule, S.B. Meitei, Naresh Kumar Gaur and Ashok Kumar Singh for the Respondent.
2008 AIR 1205, 2008(1   )SCR1169, 2008(4   )SCC464 , 2008(1   )SCALE705 , 2008(2   )JT63

CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  647 of 2008

PETITIONER:
Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (Dead)through LRs & Ors

RESPONDENT:
Appasaheb Dattatraya Pawar

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/01/2008

BENCH:
Dr. Arijit Pasayat & P. Sathasivam

JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16694 OF 2005)
P. Sathasivam, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 11.01.2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in First Appeal No. 743 of 1993 in and by which the
High Court set aside the decree for specific performance
granted by the trial Court and consequently dismissed the suit
of the plaintiffs.
3) Brief facts in a nutshell are:
The appellants/plaintiffs in special civil suit No. 320 of 1988
filed the same for specific performance of agreement dated
31.07.1985.  According to the plaintiffs, the respondent
herein/defendant is the owner of land Block No. 208 and
Block No. 209 respectively admeasuring Area H. 0.60 R and H.
0.40 R of Village Nagaon in Hatkanangale Tahsil.  The
defendant had entered into an agreement for sale of the said
lands to the plaintiffs for a consideration of Rs.85,000/- per
acre.  The agreement was reduced into writing and according
to the terms of the agreement, the sale deed was to be
executed by the defendant within a period of six months.  It
was agreed that possession of the lands was to be delivered at
the time of execution of sale deed.  The defendant has also
undertaken the responsibility of obtaining necessary
permission for sale of the lands, if required.  On the date of
execution of the agreement, an amount of Rs.20,000/- was
paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant as earnest money and
balance amount of the consideration was to be paid at the
time of execution of the sale deed.  The plaintiffs were always
ready and willing to perform their part of the contract but the
defendant avoided to receive the balance amount of
consideration and neglected to execute the sale deed.  The
plaintiffs sent a legal notice on 16.07.1988 to the defendant
through their advocate calling upon him to perform his part of
the obligation under the contract.  In spite of the notice, the
defendant did not comply with the requirements which
necessitated the plaintiffs to file the suit for specific
performance or in the alternative refund of earnest money with
interest thereon @ 15% per annum.

4) The defendant filed a written statement wherein he
denied the plaintiffs claim.  It was further stated that though
agreement for sale of the suit lands was entered into between
him and the plaintiffs on 31.07.1985, the sale deed was to be
executed within a period of six months from the date of
contract as he was in dire need of money for construction of
his house and, therefore, the time was the essence of the
contract.  He had called upon the plaintiffs to pay the balance
amount of consideration and get the sale deed executed.  But
the plaintiffs were not in a position to arrange the balance
amount of consideration and complete the contract.  As the
market price of the agricultural lands have now gone up, the
plaintiffs by purchasing the suit lands are intending to dispose
of the same to others at a higher price.  In view of the same,
the plaintiffs are not entitled to discretionary relief of specific
performance of contract.

5) The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), on 23.02.1993,
after finding that the defendant has failed to prove that time  
was the essence of contract and the plaintiffs were and are
ready and willing to perform their part of contract decreed the
suit as prayed for.  Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the
trial Court, the defendant filed First Appeal No. 743 of 1993
before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.  The learned
Single Judge of the High Court not in agreement with the
conclusion of the trial Court and finding that plaintiffs failed to
substantiate their plea allowed the appeal of the defendant
and dismissed the suit. Questioning the judgment and order of
the High Court, the plaintiffs have filed the present appeal by
way of special leave.  During the pendency of the appeal before
this Court, Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik/first plaintiff died and
his legal representatives were brought on record as per order
dated 19.09.2006 in I.A. No. 3 of 2005.

6) We heard Mr. Makarand D. Adkar, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants and Mr. V.N. Ganpule, learned
senior counsel appearing for the respondent, perused the
entire annexures and other relevant materials filed before this
Court.

7) Having regard to the terms of agreement of sale dated
31.07.1985, reasonings of the trial Court as well as the High
Court and submissions before this Court, only two points arise
for consideration of this Court, namely, (a) whether time is the
essence of the contract? and (b) whether the plaintiffs were
ready and willing to perform the contract?

8) In order to find an answer to the above questions, it
would be useful to refer the relevant recitals from the
agreement of sale.  Para 3 of the agreement specifically
mentions the details of the land sought to be sold such as
extent and boundaries.  It also refers the easement rights and
the period in which the sale has to be completed.  The recital
reads as under:-
From the total consideration I have received Rs.20,000/- as
an earnest money of which no independent receipt is
necessary.  Rest of the amount is to be paid by you at the
time of sale deed of the said lands.  It is agreed between the
parties that the sale deed is to be executed within 6 months
from today.  Possession of the land is to be handed over at
the time of sale deed.
   
     It is also relevant to mention the default clause which
reads as under:-
For completion of the sale deed the permission is required
to be obtained by me.  If I fail to execute the said deed within
stipulated period then you have to get it executed on the
basis of this agreement.  On the contrary if you fail to get
execute the sale deed then this agreement is supposed to be
cancelled and the earnest amount will be forfeited.  The land
is free from all sorts of encumbrances.  This agreement is
binding on myself and my legal heirs etc. dated 31/7/1985.

The above-mentioned details in the agreement of sale
clearly show a) that the subject-matter of the property is an
agricultural land/immoveable properties b) the sale deed is to
be executed within six months from the date of sale agreement
i.e. 31.07.1985. c) possession of the land to be handed over at
the time of execution of sale deed d) failure to get execute the
sale deed, the earnest money will be forfeited.  With these
factual details, let us consider the legal principles enunciated
by this Court.

9) In Chand Rani (Smt.) (dead) by LRs. Vs. Kamal Rani
(Smt.) (dead) by LRs, (1993) 1 SCC 519, a Constitution Bench
of this Court has held that in the sale of immoveable property,
time is not the essence of the contract.  It is worthwhile to
refer the following conclusion:
19. It is a well-accepted principle that in the case of sale of
immovable property, time is never regarded as the essence of
the contract. In fact, there is a presumption against time
being the essence of the contract. This principle is not in any
way different from that obtainable in England. Under the law
of equity which governs the rights of the parties in the case
of specific performance of contract to sell real estate, law
looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement.
It has to be ascertained whether under the terms of the
contract the parties named a specific time within which
completion was to take place, really and in substance it was
intended that it should be completed within a reasonable
time. An intention to make time the essence of the contract
must be expressed in unequivocal language.

21. In Govind Prasad Chaturvedi v. Hari Dutt Shastri (1977)
2 SCC 539 following the above ruling it was held at pages
543-544: (SCC para 5)
... It is settled law that the fixation of the period within which
the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation
as to time the essence of the contract. When a contract relates
to sale of immovable property it will normally be presumed
that the time is not the essence of the contract. [Vide
Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Pallaniswami Nadar 1 (at p. 233).]
It may also be mentioned that the language used in the
agreement is not such as to indicate in unmistakable terms
that the time is of the essence of the contract. The intention
to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced
by circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace
the normal presumption that in a contract of sale of land
stipulation as to time is not the essence of the contract.
 
23. In Indira Kaur (Smt) v. Sheo Lal Kapoor (1988) 2 SCC
488 in paragraph 6 it was held as under:
... The law is well-settled that in transactions of sale of
immovable properties, time is not the essence of the
contract.
10) It is clear that in the case of sale of immoveable property,
there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the
contract.  Even where the parties have expressly provided that
time is the essence of the contract, such a stipulation will have
to be read along with other provisions of the contract.  For
instance, if the contract was to include clauses providing for
extension of time in certain contingencies or for payment of
fine or penalty for every day or week, the work undertaken
remains unfinished on the expiry of the time provided in the
contract, such clauses would be construed as rendering
ineffective the express provision relating to the time being of
the essence of contract.  In the case on hand, though the
parties agreed that the sale deed is to be executed within six
months, in the last paragraph they made it clear that in the
event of failure to execute the sale deed, the earnest money
will be forfeited.  In such circumstances, the above-mentioned
clauses in the last three paragraphs of the agreement of sale
would render ineffective the specific provision relating to the
time being the essence of contract.

11) This Court in Swarnam Ramachandran (Smt.) and
Another vs. Aravacode Chakungal Jayapalan, (2004) 8
SCC 689 has once again reiterated that time is not the essence
of contract relating to immoveable property.  The following
statement of law in para 12 are rightly applicable to the case
on hand:
12. That time is presumed not to be of essence of the
contract relating to immovable property, but it is of essence
in contracts of reconveyance or renewal of lease. The onus to
plead and prove that time was the essence of the contract is
on the person alleging it, thus giving an opportunity to the
other side to adduce rebuttal evidence that time was not of
essence. That when the plaintiff pleads that time was not of
essence and the defendant does not deny it by evidence, the
court is bound to accept the plea of the plaintiff. In cases
where notice is given making time of the essence, it is duty of
the court to examine the real intention of the party giving
such notice by looking at the facts and circumstances of
each case. That a vendor has no right to make time of the
essence, unless he is ready and willing to proceed to
completion and secondly, when the vendor purports to make
time of the essence, the purchaser must be guilty of such
gross default as to entitle the vendor to rescind the contract.

12) As observed in the said decision, in the case on hand the
appellants/plaintiffs clearly established their claim to secure
specific performance of the agreement by leading cogent
evidence whereas the respondent/defendant having pleaded
that time was the essence of the contract neither entered the
witness box nor led any evidence whatsoever.  The High Court
lost sight of the above material aspect and the conduct of the
defendant in not strengthening his plea by placing acceptable
evidence. In such circumstances, as rightly argued by learned
counsel for the appellants, the High Court should have
confirmed the decree of specific performance granted by the
trial Court.  On the other hand, the High Court wrongly placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in K.S. Vidyanadam
and Others vs. Vairavan, (1997) 3 SCC 1 as in the facts of
that case, this Court found that granting for specific
performance was inequitable, however such aspect of the
matter was totally absent in the case on hand.  Even
otherwise, para 11 of the judgment shows that the subject
matter of the property was an urban immoveable property and
in such special circumstance relaxed the general rule that
time is not the essence of the contract in the case of
immoveable properties.  In the case on hand, the details
furnished in the agreement clearly show that the subject-
matter of the property is an agricultural land situated in
Kolhapur Dist., Maharastra.  In such circumstances, the
decision in K.S. Vidyanadam and Ors. (supra) is not applicable
to the facts on hand.  In the facts of the present case, which
we have already adverted to, neither the terms of agreement
nor the intention of the parties indicate that the time is an
essence of the agreement.  We have already pointed that
having raised such a plea the respondent even did not bother
to lead any evidence.

13) It is true that the defendant in his written statement has
made a bald claim that the time was the essence of contract.
Even if we accept the recital in the agreement of sale (Exh. 18)
that the sale deed has to be executed within a period of six
months, there is an express provision in the agreement itself
that failure to adhere the time, the earnest money will be
forfeited.  In such circumstances and in view of recital
pertaining to forfeiture of the earnest money makes it clear
that time was never intended by the parties to be of essence.
The Constitution Bench decision in Chand Rani vs. Kamal
Rani (supra) also makes it clear that mere fixation of time
within which contract is to be performed does not make the
stipulation as to the time as the essence of contract.  Further,
we have already pointed out that the defendant has not
bothered to prove his claim on oath before the Court to the
effect that it was the plaintiffs who avoided performing their
part of contract.  All the above-mentioned material aspects
were correctly appreciated by the trial Court and unfortunately
the High Court failed to adhere to the well known principles
and the conduct of the defendant.  When the third plaintiff
deposed before the Court explaining their case with reference
to the recitals in the agreement of sale including the reference
to the legal notice to the defendant, in the absence of contra
evidence on the side of the defendant, we are unable to agree
with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in non-
suiting the plaintiff.  The High Court commented the conduct
of the plaintiffs in praying for refund of the earnest money,
namely, Rs.20,000/- paid as advance.  As rightly pointed out,
the claim for refund of earnest money is only their alternative
claim.  It is not in dispute that in all suits for specific
performance, the plaintiff is entitled to seek alternative relief in
the event the decree for specific performance cannot be
granted for any reason, hence there is no infirmity in the
alternative plea of refund.

14) In the light of what has been stated above, we set aside
the judgment and decree of the High Court and confirm the
decree granted by the trial Court.  In view of the said
conclusion, the appellants/plaintiffs are directed to deposit
the balance amount of sale consideration i.e., Rs.1,92,500/- in
the trial Court within a period of eight weeks whereupon the
respondent/defendant shall execute the sale deed of the suit
lands Block No. 208 admeasuring 0.60 R and Block No. 209
admeasuring 0.40 R of Village Nagaon, Tahsil Hatkanangale as
per the agreement dated 31.07.1985.  In case of failure of the
defendant to execute the sale deed, the plaintiffs shall be
entitled to get the sale deed executed through Court.

15) The civil appeal is allowed on the above terms.  However,
in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no
order as to costs.  

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Specific Relief Act, 1963: s.6 - Suit filed by landlord under s.6 against trespasser when tenant in exclusive possession of suit property is dispossessed forcibly by a trespasser/third party - Maintainability of - Held: Maintainable - Non-impleadment of tenant is not fatal to the maintainability of such suit as tenant is not necessary party in such suit. Words and phrases: Word `dispossessed' - Meaning of - In the context of s.6(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963. The questions which arose for consideration in the present appeal were whether landlord can maintain suit under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 against a trespasser for immediate possession where a tenant in exclusive possession was dispossessed forcibly by the trespasser and whether tenant is a necessary party in such suit.- Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The key words in Section 6(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 are "dispossessed" and "he or any person claiming through him". A person is said to have been dispossessed when he has been deprived of his possession; such deprivation may be of actual possession or legal possession. Possession in law follows right to possession. The right to possession, though distinct from possession, is treated as equivalent to possession itself for certain purposes. A landlord by letting out the property to a tenant does not lose possession as he continues to retain the legal possession although actual possession, user and control of that property is with the tenant. By retaining legal possession or in any case constructive possession, the landlord also retains all his legal remedies. As a matter of law, the dispossession of tenant by a third party is dispossession of the landlord. The word "dispossessed" in Section 6(1) must be read in this context and not in light of the actual possession alone. If a tenant is thrown out forcibly from the tenanted premises by a trespasser, the landlord has implied right of entry in order to recover possession (for himself and his tenant). Similarly, the expression "any person claiming through him" would bring within its fold the landlord as he continues in legal possession over the tenanted property through his tenant. As a matter of fact, on plain reading of Section 6(1), it is clear that besides the person who has been dispossessed, any person claiming through him can also file a suit seeking recovery of possession. Obviously, a landlord who holds the possession through his tenant is competent to maintain suit under Section 6 and recover possession from a trespasser who has forcibly dispossessed his tenant. A landlord when he lets out his property to the tenant is not deprived of his possession in the property in law. What is altered is mode in which the landlord held his possession in the property inasmuch as the tenant comes into physical possession while the landlord retains possession through his tenant. [Paras 16 and 19] [1082-f-h; 1084-c- d] Veeraswami Mudali v. P.R. Venkatachala Mudali and others AIR 1926 Madras 18; Ramchandra v. Sambashiv AIR 1928 Nagpur 313; (Kanneganti) Ramamanemma v. (Kanneganti) Basavayya AIR 1934 Madras 558, overruled. Nobin Das v. Kailash Chandra Dey (1910) Vol. VII Indian Cases 924; Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai and Mohideen avuther v. Jayarama Aiyar (1898) 21 Madras 288; Sailesh Kumar and ANOTHER v. Rama Devi AIR (1952) Patna 339; Gobind Ram Jamna Dass v. Mst. Mewa w/o Parbhati AIR (1953) Pepsu 188, approved. Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai (1898) 21 Madras 288; Mohideen Ravuther v. Jayarama Aiyar (1921) 44 Madras 937, referred to. Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition, page 617), referred to. 1.2. Section 6 of the Act provides that suit to recover possession under the said provision could be filed by the person who is dispossessed or any person claiming through him. The tenant having lost the possession though without his consent to a third party, may not be interested in recovery of possession. He may not be available. He may not like to involve himself in litigation. In such circumstances, if a landlord brings the suit to recover possession against trespasser under Section 6, it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that tenant must necessarily be impleaded as party to such suit. It may be desirable that a landlord in a suit under Section 6 of the Act against a trespasser for immediate possession when, at the date of dispossession, the house was in occupation of a tenant, impleads the tenant, but his non-impleadment is not fatal to the maintainability of such suit. [Para 20] [1085-c-g] Case Law Reference: AIR 1926 Madras 18 overruled Para 7 (1898) 21 Madrass 288 referred to Para 7 (1921) 44 Madras 937 referred to Para 7 AIR 1928 Nagpur 313 overruled Para 8 AIR 1934 Madras 558 overruled Para 9 (1910) Vol. VII Indian Cases 924 approved Para 11 (1898) 21 Madras 288 approved Para 12 AIR (1952) Patna 339 approved Para 13 AIR (1953) Pepsu 188 approved Para 14 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1930 of 2010. From the Judgment AND Order dated 28.3.2008 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Revision Application No. 1235 of 2001. Amol Chitale, Abhijat P. Medh for the Appellants. Sushil Karanjka, Vishal A. Patil, K.N. Rai for the Respondent.


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1930 OF 2010
[Arising out of SLP [C] No. 10418 of 2008]
Sadashiv Shyama Sawant [D] …. Appellants
Through L.Rs., & Ors.
Vs.
Anita Anant Sawant ….Respondent
JUDGEMENT
R.M. LODHA,J.
Leave granted.
2. The main question for consideration in this appeal by
special leave is: where a tenant in exclusive possession is
dispossessed forcibly by a person other than landlord, can landlord
maintain suit under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 againstsuch person for immediate possession. The incidental question is,
whether tenant is a necessary party in such suit.
3. Smt. Anita Anant Sawant – the sole respondent filed a
suit for possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
(for short `the Act’) in respect of portion of property being Gram
Panchayat House No. 97 situated on land bearing Gat No. 1, Hissa
No. 61, Village Ambet, Taluka Mahasala, District Raigad, against the
appellants and their predecessors-in-title (hereinafter referred to as
`the contesting defendants’) and one Smt. Nanibai Shankar Sawant,
since deceased, (hereinafter referred to as `defendant no. 4’). The
plaintiff averred in the plaint that she purchased the entire house No.
97 from defendant no. 4 by registered sale deed on October 1, 1981.
At the time of purchase, part of house No. 97 was in possession of
Pandurang Vichare who vacated that portion and she came into
possession of entire house. Later on, she let out southern side one
room along with hall adjacent to Padavi and northern side room of
hall (for short `suit property’) to one P.V. Warik. On October 1, 1988,
the contesting defendants forcibly dispossessed the tenant – P.V.
Warik, threw away his articles and took possession of the suit
2property. The plaintiff, thus, prayed for recovery of possession of
the suit property of which her tenant was forcibly dispossessed. The
contesting defendants filed written statement and traversed plaintiff’s
claim by stating that suit property was joint family property and
defendant no. 4 had no authority to sell the said house to the plaintiff.
The contesting defendants, thus, claimed that they were co-owners
and in possession of the entire house No. 97. Defendant No. 4 set
up the plea that no consideration was paid to her for the sale of
house No. 97 and that sale deed was obtained by fraud. It transpires,
on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed as
many as six issues, including that of title to property although such
issue was unnecessary. The trial court, after recording the evidence
and hearing the parties, held that plaintiff was able to prove her
dispossession on October 1, 1988 by the contesting defendants from
the suit property and that she could maintain the suit under Section 6
of the Act against the contesting defendants as she was in
possession through a tenant over the suit property. The trial court,
accordingly, vide its judgment and decree dated July 31, 2001,
directed the contesting defendants to handover the possession of the
suit property to the plaintiff.
34. The contesting defendants challenged the judgment and
decree of the trial court by filing revision application before the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay. It may be noticed here that
defendant no. 4 had already died during the pendency of suit and her
legal representatives were brought on record, but later on they were
deleted from array of parties in the revision application. Inter alia,
the contention raised before the High Court was that if the tenant of
the plaintiff was forcibly dispossessed, the suit under Section 6 of the
Act could be filed by the tenant and not by the landlady. The High
Court did not accept the contention of the contesting defendants and
held that in view of the language of Section 6 of the Act, either the
tenant who was actually dispossessed or the plaintiff being landlady
could file the suit. The High Court, thus, by its judgment dated March
28, 2008 dismissed the revision application. It is from this judgment
that the present appeal by special leave arises.
5. Section 6 of the Act reads as under:-
“6.- Suit by person dispossessed of immovable
property.- (1) If any person is dispossessed without
4his consent of immovable property otherwise than in
due course of law, he or any person claiming through
him may, by suit, recover possession thereof,
notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in
such suit.
(2) No suit under this section shall be brought –
(a) after the expiry of six months from the date
of dispossession; or
(b) against the Government.
(3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree
passed in any suit instituted under this section,
nor shall any review of any such order or
decree be allowed.
(4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person
from suing to establish his title to such property
and to recover possession thereof.”
6. Section 6 corresponds to Section 9 of the repealed
Specific Relief Act, 1877 (for short, `1877 Act’). The question
whether a landlord can sue a trespasser for immediate possession
where his tenant has been dispossessed has come up for
consideration before various High Courts with reference to Section 9
of the 1877 Act. Section 9 of the 1877 Act is in these terms:-
“9. If any person is dispossessed without his consent of
immovable property otherwise than in due course of law,
he or any person claiming through him may, by suit,
5recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title
that may be set up in such suit.
Nothing in this section shall bar any person from
suing to establish his title to such property and to recover
possession thereof.
No suit under this section shall be brought against
the Central Government or any State Government.
No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed
in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any
review of any such order or decree be allowed. “
 7. In Veeraswami Mudali v. P.R. Venkatachala Mudali and
others1
, it was held by the Madras High Court that the trespasser
could not interfere with landlord’s right to receive rent and a decree to
be put into possession of the rents, but so long as landlord did not
himself possess the right to enjoy physical possession, he could not
eject the trespasser under Section 9. While holding so, the Single
Judge of Madras High Court relied upon previous decisions of that
Court in Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai2 and Mohideen
Ravuther v. Jayarama Aiyar
3
.
8. The Division Bench of Additional Judicial Commissioners,
Nagpur, in Ramchandra v. Sambashiv
4
, on a question referred to it
1
 AIR 1926 Madras 18
2
 (1898) 21 Madras 288
3
 (1921) 44 Madras 937
4
 AIR 1928 Nagpur 313
6under Section 113 of Code of Civil Procedure, held that a landlord
cannot sue under Section 9 to recover possession of the land
because he was not in possession of it and was not dispossessed of
it.
9. In (Kanneganti) Ramamanemma v. (Kanneganti)
Basavayya
5
, a Single Judge of the Madras High Court held that a
suit by landlord for possession under Section 9 in which the tenant in
possession had not joined, is not maintainable.
10. Contrary to the aforesaid view of the Madras High Court
and Nagpur Judicial Commissioner, the High Courts of Calcutta,
Bombay, Patna, Pepsu and Rajasthan have taken the view that a
landlord can maintain a suit under Section 9 of the 1877 Act to
recover possession where his tenant in exclusive possession has
been dispossessed forcibly by the act of a third party.
11. In Nobin Das v. Kailash Chandra Dey6
, the Division
Bench of Calcutta High Court held:
5
 AIR 1934 Madras 558
6
 (1910) Vol. VII Indian Cases 924
7“….In the case before us, the plaintiff was originally in
actual possession of the land. He was at that stage
entitled to use the property in any way he chose. He
settled the land with tenants. The result was, not that he
was deprived of his possession, but that the mode in which
he held possession of the property was altered. His
tenants came into physical possession of the land and he
held possession thereafter by receipt of rent from them.
When, therefore, his tenants were forcibly ejected from the
land by the defendants, it may reasonably be held that he
also was dispossessed. The case before us is further
strengthened by the additional fact that the tenants, after
they had been evicted, relinquished the land in favour of
the plaintiff so that the plaintiff thereafter became entitled to
have physical possession of the land. Under these
circumstances, we hold that the plaintiff was dispossessed
within the meaning of section 9 of the Specific Relief Act
when his tenants were evicted from the land by the
defendant…..”.
12. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Ratanlal
Ghelabhai v. Amarsing Rupsing and others7
stated the legal position
with reference to Section 9 of 1877 Act thus:
“There is nothing in this section to show that possession is
confined to actual physical possession. In the case of a
landlord and tenant the landlord is in possession through
his tenant and, as pointed out in Nirjivandas Madhavdas v.
Mahomed Ali Khan Ibrahim Khan [1880] 5 Bom. 208], the
proper remedy where exclusive occupation of immovable
property is given to a tenant is for the tenant to file a suit
for possession but the landlord, if he desires to sue
immediately on the possessory right, can sue in the name
of the tenant and further, for an injury to the reversion, the
landlord can sue in his own name. The injury in the
present instance consists in a denial of the plaintiff’s title to
the land for defendant 1 has taken possession of it
claiming it to be his. I think, therefore, that there is an
7
 AIR 1929 Bombay 467
8injury to the reversion in respect of which the plaintiff can
sue in his own name….”.
13. In Sailesh Kumar and another v. Rama Devi8
, the Division
Bench of Patna High Court answered the question, whether a
landlord can maintain a suit under Section 9 of the 1877 Act against
trespasser for immediate possession when, at the date of
dispossession, the house was in occupation of a tenant entitled to its
exclusive use, in affirmative. The Division Bench considered the
matter thus:-
“(6). Mr. P.B. Ganguly, appearing in support of this
application, contended that the plaintiff’s suit under
S.9 of the Specific Relief Act was not maintainable, as
she could not sue for possession, the actual
possession having been with defendants 5 and 6 who
were the tenants of the house. In support of his
contention, he placed reliance on the cases of `SITA
RAM v. RAM LAL’, 18 All 440 and `VEERASWAMI v.
VENKATACHALA’, AIR 1926 Mad 18. It is sufficient
to state that the Allahabad case was not one under
Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and it is beside
the point in issue before us. The Madras case,
however, supports the contention. That case is a
single Judge case, and it appears that in the Madras
High Court there are conflicting decisions on the
point.
(7). Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is as follows:-
“If any person is dispossessed without
his consent of immoveable property
otherwise than in due course of law, he
8
 AIR 1952 Patna 339
9or any person claiming through him
may, by suit, recover possession
thereof, notwithstanding any other title
that may be set up in such suit”
(8). The contrary view was taken in the cases of
`JADU NATH SINGH v. BISHUNATH SINGH’, 1950
All LJ 288 & `RATANLAL GHELABHAI v.
AMARSINGH RUPSANG’, 53 Bom 773. I respectfully
agree with the view expressed in these cases. I am
of opinion that there is nothing to bar a landlord from
suing a trespasser under S. 9, Specific Relief Act, for
possession even when at the date of dispossession
the property is in occupation of a tenant entitled to
possession”.
14. In the case of Gobind Ram Jamna Dass v. Mst. Mewa
w/o Parbhati9
, the Division Bench of Pepsu High Court relied upon
the decision of Patna High Court in Sailesh Kumar8 and did not follow
decision of Madras High Court in Veeraswami Mudali1
. The Division
Bench of Pepsu High Court held that possession of the tenant can
be considered to be the possession of the landlord for the purposes
of Section 9. The Division Bench expressed its opinion in the
following words:
“….The word used in S. 9 is `dispossessed’. There is
nothing in this section to show that the possession is
confined only to actual physical possession. I am,
therefore, of the opinion that a suit is competent by
the landlord, even if he is not in actual physical
possession of the land but in its possession through a
tenant at the time of illegal dispossession. This
9
 AIR 1953 Pepsu 188
10conclusion is further strengthened by the words “he or
any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover
possession thereof” used in the section. The
language of this section, therefore, clearly indicates
that besides the person dispossessed, any person
claiming through him can seek his remedy provided in
this section for the recovery of possession. It
necessarily follows that the person seeking relief
under S. 9 need not himself be in actual physical
possession of the property. A contrary view to this
will defeat the aims and objects of this enactment.
Supposing a landlord is incompetent to sue and his
tenant who is dispossessed refuses to institute a suit
under S. 9 of the Act, the landlord would be put in a
very awkward situation and would be forced to file a
regular suit. In such a case a wrong-doer will
naturally be placed in an advantageous position. To
accept this position it would be putting a premium on
a wrong act of trespasser. This position, in my
opinion, is not contemplated by the relevant
legislation. On the other hand S.9 provides for a
speedy and summary remedy to recover possession
taken away by unlawful means. The object of the
legislation, besides this, is to place the parties in their
original position. Trespasser, if he so likes, can bring
a regular suit to prove his title. A contrary
construction, in my opinion, would result in protracted
litigation for persons ousted from lawful possession by
unlawful means on the part of a trespasser”.
15. The Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in Raghuvar
Dayal v. Hargovind and another10 was concerned with the question,
whether suit for possession under Section 9 of the 1877 Act can be
brought by a landlord even when the property is in possession of the
tenant. The Single Judge followed the afore-referred decisions of
10 AIR 1958 Rajasthan 287
11Bombay, Pepsu and Patna High Courts and reiterated the legal
position as follows:-
“(18). On a careful consideration of the wordings of S. 9
of the Act, I am of opinion that the ruling in which it has
been held that the suit for possession u/s 9 of the Act
can be brought by a landlord also even when the
property is in possession of the tenant have taken a
correct view of the provisions of S. 9. The words used
are “dispossessed” and “recover possession thereof”.
Section 9 is not confined only to those cases where the
plaintiff is in actual possession of the property in suit.
Whatever possession the plaintiff has at the date of
dispossession, he is entitled to claim in case of
dispossession. If a tenant is in possession of the
property and being dispossessed therefrom does not
care to bring a suit for possession of the property, the
landlord cannot be shut off from bringing a suit against
the trespasser.
If the tenant has a mind to remain in possession
of the property on behalf of the landlord, the landlord
will put him in actual possession of the property. If,
however, the tenant has no mind to stick to the land,
the landlord is entitled to get actual possession of the
property from the trespasser. Of course it would be
proper to make the tenant also a party to the suit. He
may either join as a co-plaintiff or in case he refuses to
join as a co-plaintiff he may be made a defendant so
that he might have his say in the matter. In this case
the tenant has also been made a defendant.
I may say here that in this particular case
according to the finding of the learned Civil Judge with
which I have no reason to disagree, the tenant had put
Raghuvar Dayal defendant in possession of the
property in collusion with him. This Reghuvardayal filed
a suit for ejectment and the tenant entered into a
compromise and suffered a compromise decree for
ejectment being passed against him. In execution of
that decree Shivchand tenant was dispossessed.
Under these circumstances to my mind the plaintiff was
12entitled to actual possession of the property in dispute
and the defendant Reghuvardayal who came into
possession of that property certainly interfered with the
possession of the plaintiff.
Shivchand tenant had no interest in the
possession of the property in dispute under the
circumstances of the case and the only persons
interested in possession thereof was the plaintiff. I
cannot therefore find any fault with the decree of the
lower Court awarding possession to the plaintiff”.
16. As noticed above, the views of the High Courts differ
about maintainability of suit for possession by the landlord under
Section 9 of 1877 Act in respect of property let out to the tenant who
has been dispossessed forcibly by a third party. That language of
Section 6(1) of the Act and first paragraph of Section 9 of 1877 Act is
exactly identical admits of no doubt. The key words in Section 6(1)
are “dispossessed” and “he or any person claiming through him”. A
person is said to have been dispossessed when he has been
deprived of his possession; such deprivation may be of actual
possession or legal possession. Possession in law follows right to
possession. The right to possession, though distinct from
possession, is treated as equivalent to possession itself for certain
purposes.
1317. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth Edition, page 617 -
para 1111), `physical and legal possession’ is distinguished as
under:
“ `Possession’ is a word of ambiguous meaning, and its
legal senses do not coincide with the popular sense. In
English law it may be treated not merely as a physical
condition protected by ownership, but as a right in itself.
The word “possession” may mean effective, physical or
manual control, or occupation, evidenced by some
outward act, sometimes called de facto possession or
detention as distinct from a legal right to possession…

`Possession’ may mean legal possession: that
possession which is recognized and protected as such
by law. The elements normally characteristic of legal
possession are an intention of possessing together with
that amount of occupation or control of the entire
subject matter of which it is practically capable and
which is sufficient for practical purposes to exclude
strangers from interfering. Thus, legal possession is
ordinarily associated with de facto possession; but
legal possession may exist without de facto possession,
and de facto possession is not always regarded as
possession in law. A person who, although having no
de facto possession, is deemed to have possession in
law is sometimes said to have constructive
possession.”
18. Pollock and Wright in their classic work, `An Essay on
Possession in the Common Law’ (1888 Edition, page 27)
explained the nature of possession, inter alia, as follows:
“Right to possess or to have legal possession. This
includes the right to physical possession. It can exist
14apart from both physical and legal possession; it is, for
example, that which remains to a rightful possessor
immediately after he has been wrongfully
dispossessed. It is a normal incident of ownership or
property, and the name of `property’ is often given to
it….
Right to possess, when separated from
possession, is often called `constructive possession.’
The correct use of the term would seem to be
coextensive with and limited to those cases where a
person entitled to possess is (or was) allowed the same
remedies as if he had really been in possession….”.
19. A landlord by letting out the property to a tenant does not
lose possession as he continues to retain the legal possession
although actual possession, user and control of that property is with
the tenant. By retaining legal possession or in any case constructive
possession, the landlord also retains all his legal remedies. As a
matter of law, the dispossession of tenant by a third party is
dispossession of the landlord. The word “dispossessed” in Section
6(1) must be read in this context and not in light of the actual
possession alone. If a tenant is thrown out forcibly from the tenanted
premises by a trespasser, the landlord has implied right of entry in
order to recover possession (for himself and his tenant). Similarly,
the expression “any person claiming through him” would bring within
its fold the landlord as he continues in legal possession over the
15tenanted property through his tenant. As a matter of fact, on plain
reading of Section 6(1), it is clear that besides the person who has
been dispossessed, any person claiming through him can also file a
suit seeking recovery of possession. Obviously, a landlord who holds
the possession through his tenant is competent to maintain suit under
Section 6 and recover possession from a trespasser who has forcibly
dispossessed his tenant. A landlord when he lets out his property to
the tenant is not deprived of his possession in the property in law.
What is altered is mode in which the landlord held his possession in
the property inasmuch as the tenant comes into physical possession
while the landlord retains possession through his tenant. The view of
Calcutta High Court that where the tenant was forcibly ejected from
the land by the third party, it may reasonably be held that landlord
has also been dispossessed is the correct view. We find ourselves
in agreement with the view of Bombay, Patna, Pepsu and Rajasthan
High Courts and hold, as it must be, that there is nothing in Section 6
of the Act to bar a landlord from suing a trespasser in possession
even when, at the date of dispossession, the property is in actual
occupation of a tenant entitled to possession. The views expressed
by Madras High Court in Veeraswami Mudali1 and (Kanneganti)
16Ramamanemma5 and by Nagpur Judicial Commissioner in the case
of Ramchandra4 do not lay down the correct law.
20. Now we advert to the incidental question whether in such
a suit, tenant is a necessary party. Section 6 of the Act provides that
suit to recover possession under the said provision could be filed by
the person who is dispossessed or any person claiming through him.
The tenant having lost the possession though without his consent to a
third party, may not be interested in recovery of possession. He may
not be available. He may not like to involve himself in litigation. In
such circumstances, if a landlord brings the suit to recover
possession against trespasser under Section 6, it cannot be laid
down as an absolute proposition that tenant must necessarily be
impleaded as party to such suit. The view of Bombay High Court in
Ratanlal Ghelabhai7
that landlord can sue in his own name where
there is an injury to the reversion exposits the correct position of law.
It may be desirable that a landlord in a suit under Section 6 of the Act
against a trespasser for immediate possession when, at the date of
dispossession, the house was in occupation of a tenant, impleads the
tenant, but his non-impleadment is not fatal to the maintainability of
17such suit. The view of Madras High Court in (Kanneganti)
Ramamanemma5 and of other High Courts following that view do not
appear to us as laying down correct law.
21. In the result, appeal fails and is dismissed with no order
as to costs.
.………………….J.
[P. SATHASIVAM]
……………..J.
[R.M. LODHA]
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 22, 2010.
18

Thursday, April 11, 2013

specific relief Act = It is a settled legal proposition that the power of attorney holder cannot depose in place of the principal. Provisions of Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of the power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. The word “acts” employed therein is confined only to “acts” done by the power-of-attorney holder, in exercise of the power granted to him by virtue of the instrument. The term “acts”, would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power-of-attorney holder has preferred any “acts” in pursuance of the power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for acts done by the principal, and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of a matter, as regards which, only the principal can have personal knowledge and in respect of which, the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.; In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the appellant has not yet acquired any title over the land, he has no right to receive compensation to the tune of Rs. 29,47,112/-. However, he withdrew the said amount by giving an undertaking to return the said amount to Res. No. 1 in case any such order was passed by the court in this regard. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside, and the same passed by the trial court is restored. As a consequence, the appellant is entitled to get the sale deed executed and registered, with respect to all the suit land available now (minus the land acquired and the land purchased by the respondent no.6). 17. The appellant is directed to refund the amount of compensation received by him to Res. No. 1 within a period of three months, alongwith 9% interest from the date of receipt till the date of payment. Civil Appeal Nos. 2888 and 4459 of 2005 In view of the judgment and order in Civil Appeal Nos. 2885- 2887 of 2005, these appeals are dismissed.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2885-2887 of 2005
S. Kesari Hanuman Goud … Appellant
Versus
Anjum Jehan & Ors. … Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2888 & 4459 of 2005
J U D G M E N T
Dr.B.S.Chauhan, J.
Civil Appeal Nos. 2885-2887 of 2005
1. These appeals have been preferred against the judgment and
order dated 10.6.2003 by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad in C.C.C.A. Nos.34 and 33 of 1991 and
C.C.C.A.No. 92 of 1993, by way of which the appeals filed by the
respondents against the common judgment and decree dated
22.3.1991, in O.S. No.30 of 1984 and O.S. No.135 of 1984, passed byPage 2
the court of the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad,
have been partly allowed, by modifying the said judgment and order
of the trial court. 
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:
A. The appellant/plaintiff was carrying on business prior to
1.1.1978 in the appurtenant land as a tenant, and had made an offer to
purchase the said premises, alongwith two other premises belonging
to the landlady Ms. Anjum Jehan - respondent No.1/defendant No.1
(hereinafter referred to as `Res.No.1’).
B. The parties entered into an agreement dated 15.10.1977, for the
sale of land admeasuring 1200 square yards situated at Musheerabad,
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, for a total consideration of Rs.1,70,070/-.
Out of which a sum of Rs.25,000/- was paid as earnest money. The
said agreement to sell, provided that the sale deed was to be executed
within a period of six months from the date of agreement, or upon
intimation by the vendor, as she had to obtain permission from the
competent authority under Section 27 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act,
1976 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act 1976), the necessary income
tax clearances and the sub division permission from the municipal
2Page 3
corporation. The aforesaid suit land was also in the possession of the
landlady, and had partly been occupied by defendant no. 2/respondent
(Narsoji).
C. After the execution of the said agreement to sell, the
appellant/plaintiff paid non-agricultural assessment tax.
A legal
notice dated 18.6.1979 was received by the appellant from Res. No.1
Ms. Anjum Jehan, stating that she had obtained requisite permission
from the statutory authorities under the Act 1976, from the income tax
authorities, and also from the sub-divisional authorities.
D. The appellant/plaintiff asked Res. No.1 vide letter dated
2.7.1979, to send the copies of the aforesaid permissions, as well as a
copy of the General Power of Attorney (hereinafter referred to as the
`GPA’), that had been executed by her. 
E. Instead of executing the sale-deed in favour of the
appellant/plaintiff, Res. No.1 tried to sell the suit property to other
persons. Therefore, the appellant/plaintiff got a public notice
published in local newspapers on 29.4.1980 and 30.4.1980, in respect
of the suit property, stating that an agreement to sell had been
3Page 4
executed between the parties as regards the said land, and that
therefore, no other person must purchase the same. 
F. Despite the said notice, the GPA holder of Res. No.1 entered
into two different agreements to sell with respondent no. 2/defendant
no.3 (K.S.R.Murthy) on 29/30.4.1980, for open land admeasuring 510
square yards.
G. The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit bearing O.S. No. 30 of 1984
on 23.6.1983 for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated
15.10.1977, directing the Res. No.1 to execute a registered sale deed
in favour of the appellant/plaintiff, and ignoring the agreement to sell
in favour of respondent/defendant nos.3, 6 and 7. 
H. Respondent no.3/Defendant No. 7 (K.Y. Rajaiah) filed Original
Suit No. 135 of 1984 on 27.12.1983, for perpetual injunction,
restraining the appellant/plaintiff from interfering with the
construction of a theatre building, including the compound wall of the
same, which was in close proximity to his land. 
I. During the pendency of these two suits, Res.No.1 executed a
sale deed, and she got the same registered on 29.4.1985, in favour of
4Page 5
respondent no.2/defendant no.3 with respect to the part of the suit
property admeasuring 260 square yards, and the recital of the sale
deed acknowledged the agreement between the appellant/plaintiff and
Res. No.1.
J. The GPA holder registered another sale deed in favour of
respondent no.2/defendant no. 3 on 30.4.1985, with respect to the suit
property admeasuring 260 square yards.
K. The trial court, vide judgment and decree dated 22.3.1991
decreed the suit of the appellant/plaintiff except for a small area
admeasuring 65 square yards, which had been purchased by defendant
no.6 (represented by Lrs. defendant nos.6 to 10), observing that the
said defendant had no knowledge of any agreement to sell between
the appellant/plaintiff and Res. No.1. The trial court also dismissed
Suit No.135 of 1984 that had been filed by respondent no.3/defendant
No.7 (K.Y. Rajaiah).
L. The appellant/plaintiff was directed to deposit the balance
consideration amount in the trial court within a period of four weeks,
and the same was duly deposited by the appellant/plaintiff on
6.4.1991.
5Page 6
M. Both sides preferred appeals before the High Court, and all the
appeals were disposed of by a common judgment dated 10.6.2003, as
referred to hereinabove.
N. The High Court held, that the appellant/plaintiff was not ready
and willing to perform his part of the contract, thus, in view of the
same, there was no occasion to decide issues regarding whether the
subsequent purchasers were in fact, bonafide purchasers for
consideration without notice of the agreement to sell between the
appellant/plaintiff and Res. No.1. However, the court further held,
that the appellant/plaintiff would be entitled to get the sale deed
executed in respect of the said land, excluding the land sold to
defendant nos.3, 6 and 7 at the rate of Rs.750/- per square yard,
adjusting the amount that had already been paid.
O. Res.No.1 filed a Review Petition before the High Court.
During the pendency of the said review petition, both the sides have
preferred these appeals. The Review Petition filed by Res. No.1 stood
dismissed vide order dated 20.2.2004. The said order is also under
challenge before us in connected appeal Nos. 2888 and 4459 of 2005.
Hence, these appeals.
6Page 7
3. Shri Anoop G. Chaudhari, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant/plaintiff, has submitted that the High Court,
while dealing with the first appeal, has decided the same under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred
to as `the CPC’), giving strict adherence to Order XLI Rule 31 CPC,
and thus that it ought to have dealt with each and every issue, and
appreciate all the evidence on record. It was under an obligation to
record findings on each issue separately. The High Court has
committed an error in appreciating the evidence on record, and
coming to the conclusion that the appellant/plaintiff was not ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract, as the appellant/plaintiff
had in fact been issuing public notices, with the intention of making
other people aware of the fact that they must not indulge in any kind
of transaction in respect of the suit property, as the same belonged to
him. He also had the financial capacity to pay, which stood proved by
the fact that within a period of three weeks from the date of judgment
and decree of the High Court, he deposited the entire amount.
Furthermore, the High Court ought to have appreciated the evidence
on record, with respect to whether the other defendants/subsequent
bonafide purchasers had purchased the land without notice. Merely
7Page 8
saying that the same was not necessary, would mean that the court
itself has violated the mandate of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. Res.No.1
(Ms. Anjum Jehan) never appeared in the witness box and never filed
a written statement. The same was filed by her GPA holder. The said
GPA was in respect of various other properties, and the GPA holder
was not authorised to pursue suits in respect of the suit property.
Under no circumstance is the GPA holder competent to enter the
witness box and to give evidence as a substitute for the original party.
Thus, the appeals deserve to be allowed, and the judgment and decree
of the High Court, is liable to be set aside.
4. Per contra Shri A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, Senior Advocate,
Shri R. Anand Padmanabhan, Shri Sohan Singh Rana and Shri A.V.
Rangam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, have
opposed the appeals contending that the High Court has appreciated
the evidence on record and has reached the correct conclusion. The
findings of the fact recorded by the High Court are based on
evidence, and do not warrant any interference by this Court. The
appellant/plaintiff, has not furnished any explanation for the delay, as
he was duly informed by Res. No.1 of the fact that she had obtained
the required sanctions/permissions. Had the appellant/plantiff been in
8Page 9
a position to perform his part of the contract, he could not have waited
for a period of more than 4 years to file the suit. During the pendency
of the cases, a part of the suit land stood acquired for widening the
road. The appellant without having any title over the land, has
claimed and withdrawn a huge amount of compensation
unauthorisedly/fraudulently. Thus, the appeals are liable to be
dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the parties,
and perused the record.
6. The trial court, after appreciating the evidence on record came
to the following conclusions:
I) The evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants does not
conclusively establish their plea to the effect that the plaintiff
himself had cancelled the agreement to sell (Ex.A-1), in view of
his inability to pay the balance of the sale consideration.
II) The plaintiff had the capacity to raise and pay the balance of the
sale consideration under Ex.A-1. Thus, the plaintiff was ready
and willing to perform his part of the contract.
9Page 10
III) There were inconsistent versions with regard to the extent of
the land alleged to have been sold to defendant nos.3 and 7.
IV) The plaintiff had paid the amount towards non-agricultural
assessment tax and property tax for the suit property.
V) The plaintiff had not rescinded the suit contract, and had not
informed the first defendant that he was not in a position to
complete the sale transaction, and that therefore, defendant no.1
was at liberty to sell the suit land to any other person, as has
been contended by defendant no.1
VI) Defendant nos.3 and 6 were subsequent purchasers for
consideration without notice. Defendant no.6 is a bonafide
purchaser for value, without notice of the agreement to sell
(Ex.A-1).
7. The High Court while deciding the first appeal filed under
Section 96 CPC, did not consider all the issues as is required under
Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. On the other hand, it dealt with only one
issue elaborately, without making any reference to the pleadings taken
by the parties. The High Court held:
(i) No steps were taken by the appellant/plaintiff in establishing his
readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.
10Page 11
(ii) Only a nominal sum was paid by the appellant/plaintiff in 1977
and till the date that the suit was filed, no effort was made by the
appellant/plaintiff to pay the balance amount.
(iii) There has been inordinate delay on the part of the
appellant/plaintiff in filing the suit. Had he been ready and willing, he
ought to have approached the court at the earliest.
(iv) As per the evidence of defendant no. 7, the power of attorney
holder (DW.1), did not call the appellant/plaintiff and ask him to get
the sale deed executed, in pursuance of agreement dated 15.10.1977.
The appellant/plaintiff expressed his inability to get the sale deed
executed as he had no ready cash.
(v) There was no requirement in law to obtain permission for
separate sub-division and thus, Res.No.1 was not required to obtain
any such sanction. Furthermore, the said property had already been
sub-divided, and bore different numbers.
(vi) Res. No.1 had obtained the requisite permission from the Urban
Land Ceiling Authorities in December 1977, and the
appellant/plaintiff had handed over the draft sale deed to Res. No.1.
(vii) It was because the appellant/plaintiff was not willing and ready
to perform his part of the contract, and was resorting to dilatory
11Page 12
tactics, that Res. No.1 had entered into two agreements to sell with
respondent nos.3 and 7.
(viii) In view of the above, there was no occasion to examine the
other issues, particularly those with respect to whether the other
respondents were bonafide purchasers for consideration without
notice, and the appeals were hence disposed of, as has been referred to
hereinabove.
8. The plaint contained a specific averment in paragraph 7 as
under:
“The plaintiff is and had always been ready
and willing to perform his part of the suit
agreement and it is the first defendant, who
evaded to perform her part of the suit
agreement and finally committed to refusal
of the terms of the suit agreement amounting
to refusal on her part to so perform her part
of the suit agreement.”
9. In the written statement, Res. No. 1 simply denied the said
averment, and further averred that:
“The allegation in para 7 of the plaint that
the plaintiff was always ready and willing to
perform his part of the suit agreement being
incorrect is denied. The allegation that the
defendant committed breach of the
agreement and failed to perform her part of
the agreement being incorrect is denied. The
12Page 13
Defendant submits on the contrary that the
plaintiff failed to perform his part of the
agreement thereby committed a breach of
the agreement The Defendant, submits that
the Defendant performed her part of the
agreement and was ready to perform her part
of the agreement, It is submitted that finally
when the plaintiff failed to raise necessary
money towards the sale price plaintiff
informed the Defendant that she/is at liberty
to sell the property to anyone.”
10. A replication was filed by the appellant/plaintiff under Order
VIII Rule 9 CPC, wherein it has been submitted in paragraph 6
thereof as under:
“The plaintiff is a big businessman having a
business turnover of more than 5 lakhs per
year. He is always capable of providing and
raising the necessary finances to complete
the sale transaction”
11. These are the only pleadings taken by the parties so far as the
issue of readiness and willingness to perform part of the contract by
the appellant/plaintiff is concerned. The appellant/plaintiff examined
himself as PW.1, and in his cross-examination he has denied any
suggestion made to him to the effect that he had ever informed the
power of attorney holder of Res. No.1, namely, Shri S.S. Noor Ali,
that he would be unable to raise the balance of the sale consideration.
13Page 14
Nor he had ever told defendant no. 7 that he wanted to sell the
agricultural land to raise money to purchase the suit property. No
question was put to him in the cross-examination, in response to
which he could establish that he was a man of means, which he has
thus stated in the replication, though he has admitted that he has
certain outstanding dues towards the bank. He has denied the
suggestion that he had neither a house, nor agricultural land, and that
he had no capacity to pay the sale consideration, and further, that he
had falsely deposed in respect of the same. 
12. The allegation made in the written statement stating that the
appellant/plaintiff had told Res. No. 1 that she was free to sell the
land, was not established by leading any evidence. Additionally, Res.
No. 1 lives in the USA. It is nobody’s case that the appellant/plaintiff
had any communication with her. It was not mentioned in the
averments raised in the written statement, that she had been informed
anyone of the same through the power of attorney holder. Further,
with respect to the issue regarding financial capacity to pay, the
appellant/plaintiff examined K. Narayana Reddy (PW.2) and Laxman
Gore (PW.3). They fully supported his case, deposing that he was a
14Page 15
man of means, and that he had sufficient properties and the means to
purchase the said suit property.
Thus, the finding recorded by the High Court on this issue is
perverse being contrary to the evidence on record.
13. It is a settled legal proposition that the power of attorney holder
cannot depose in place of the principal. Provisions of Order III, Rules
1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of the power of attorney to “act” on
behalf of the principal. The word “acts” employed therein is confined
only to “acts” done by the power-of-attorney holder, in exercise of the
power granted to him by virtue of the instrument. The term “acts”,
would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In
other words, if the power-of-attorney holder has preferred any “acts”
in pursuance of the power of attorney, he may depose for the principal
in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for acts
done by the principal, and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for
the principal in respect of a matter, as regards which, only the
principal can have personal knowledge and in respect of which, the
principal is entitled to be cross-examined. (See: Vidhyadhar v.
Manikrao & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1441; Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v.
Indusind Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217; M/S Shankar Finance and
15Page 16
Investment v. State of A.P & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 422; and Man
Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512).
14. So far as the notice of the agreement between the appellant and
Res. No. 1 is concerned, the trial court after taking note of the recital
of the said agreement in the agreement to sell and sale deed also, has
held, that, so far as the land sold to respondents other than respondent
no.6, the parties had been fully aware of the same. 
Only respondent
no.6 had no such notice. Shri A. G. Chaudhari, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that the same
being a very small area, the appellant is not willing to disturb the
possession of defendant no.6. 
15. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the appellant has
not yet acquired any title over the land, he has no right to receive
compensation to the tune of Rs. 29,47,112/-. However, he withdrew
the said amount by giving an undertaking to return the said amount to
Res. No. 1 in case any such order was passed by the court in this
regard. 
16. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The judgment
and decree passed by the High Court is set aside, and the same passed
16Page 17
by the trial court is restored. As a consequence, the appellant is
entitled to get the sale deed executed and registered, with respect to
all the suit land available now (minus the land acquired and the land
purchased by the respondent no.6). 
17. The appellant is directed to refund the amount of compensation
received by him to Res. No. 1 within a period of three months,
alongwith 9% interest from the date of receipt till the date of payment.
Civil Appeal Nos. 2888 and 4459 of 2005
In view of the judgment and order in Civil Appeal Nos. 2885-
2887 of 2005, these appeals are dismissed. 
….……………………………...................................J.
 (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
…..………………………….. ...................................J.
 (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)
NEW DELHI;
April 10, 2013
17