During the pendency of suit, an application was filed by the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 including the appellant herein under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called as ‘CPC’) for rejection of plaint. The said application was allowed by the Wakf Tribunal on 8th March, 2016. On revision by the plaintiff, the order of rejection of plaint passed by the Wakf Tribunal is set aside by the High Court.= The property in question is not notified in the Gazette as a Wakf Property at any point of time till this date and hence it is not open for the respondent to file this suit on the presumption that the property in question is a Wakf property. Since the property is not a Wakf property, the Wakf Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That though the notification issued containing the list of certain Wakf properties was gazetted by the Wakf Board as early as in the year 1962, the High Court is not justified in raising doubt in the year 2013 about such notification which had been remained unchallenged for more than 50 years. It is not open for the respondent to generate the litigation only to harass the appellant.- In the matter on hand, as mentioned supra, the Tribunal and the High Court, on facts have held that the property in question is not included in the list published in the Official Gazette as a wakf property. Such non- inclusion was never questioned by any person including the Wakf Board. The Board has not exercised jurisdiction under Section 27 of 1954 Act and Section 40 of 1995 Act, though 50 years have elapsed from the date of the gazette notification. Hence, in our considered opinion, the averments in the plaint do not disclose the cause of action for filing the suit. The suit is manifestly meritless and vexatious. So also the suit is barred by law for the reasons mentioned supra.

                                                                (Reportable)

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.5368/2017
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.35352 of 2016)

       Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy                   ….Appellant

                                     Vs.

  Syed Jalal                                                …..Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T



Mohan M.Shantanagoudar,J.



Leave granted.

2.     The  order  dated  07.09.2016  passed  in  Civil  Revision   Petition
No.2472/2016 by the High Court  of  Judicature  at  Hyderabad  allowing  the
Revision  Petition  and  setting  aside  the  order  dated   08.03.2016   on
I.A.No.458/2015 in OS No.59/2013 passed by the  Andhra  Pradesh  State  Wakf
Tribunal at Hyderabad is called in this Appeal. The brief facts  leading  to
this appeal are as under:

3.    The respondent herein filed  suit  No.59/2013  before  Andhra  Pradesh
State Wakf Tribunal at Hyderabad  seeking  cancellation  of  the  sale  deed
dated 12.1.2013 in respect of the land bearing Survey No.113  admeasuring  4
acres 72 cents situated at Pernamitta village, Prakasam District,  State  of
Andhra Pradesh. Certain consequential reliefs are also  sought  for.  It  is
the case of plaintiff that Survey Nos.112 and 113 to an extent of  18  acres
88 cents situated at  Pernamitta  village  were  notified  in  the  Official
Gazette of Wakf Board  dated  28.6.1962  at  serial  No.966  and  were  also
surveyed by the Survey Commissioner appointed under the  provisions  of  the
Wakf Act. The part of Survey No.113 to an extent of 4  acres  72  cents  was
purchased by the defendant through the sale deed  dated  12.1.2013  executed
by Mr. Alluri Koteshwar Rao (Defendant No.6)  in  whose  name  property  was
standing. Plaintiff  claims  to  be  Mutwalli  of  the  Wakf.  The  sum  and
substance of the plaintiff’s case is that the  defendant  Nos.1  to  5  have
purchased the suit property from a private person though the  said  property
is the Wakf property and therefore the sale deed dated  12.1.2013  does  not
convey any right, title or interest in favour of the defendants 1 to 5.

4.    It is the case of the appellant/defendant No.1 that the  property  was
and is not a Wakf property inasmuch as it  was  never  notified  as  a  Wakf
property; though official gazette was published as  back  as  on  28.6.1962,
the property does not find place in the gazette notifying the same  as  Wakf
property; it is a private property  and  that  he  had  purchased  the  same
through a valid sale deed.

5.    During  the  pendency  of  suit,  an  application  was  filed  by  the
defendant Nos. 1 to 5 including the appellant herein under  Order  VII  Rule
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called  as  ‘CPC’)  for
rejection of plaint. The said application was allowed by the  Wakf  Tribunal
on 8th March, 2016. On revision by the plaintiff, the order of rejection  of
plaint passed by the Wakf Tribunal is set aside by the High Court.

6.    Learned counsel for the  appellant  taking  us  through  the  impugned
judgment of the High Court submitted that this is a  fit  case  wherein  the
plaint ought to be rejected at the threshold inasmuch  as  the  plaint  does
not disclose any cause of action and  the  suit  is  barred  by  law.    The
property in question is not notified in the Gazette as a  Wakf  Property  at
any point of time  till  this  date  and  hence  it  is  not  open  for  the
respondent to file this  suit  on  the  presumption  that  the  property  in
question is a Wakf property.  Since the property is  not  a  Wakf  property,
the Wakf Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain  the  suit.  That  though
the notification issued containing the list of certain Wakf  properties  was
gazetted by the Wakf Board as early as in the year 1962, the High  Court  is
not justified in raising doubt in the  year  2013  about  such  notification
which had been remained unchallenged for more than 50  years.    It  is  not
open for the respondent to  generate  the  litigation  only  to  harass  the
appellant.
7.    Per contra, advocate for the  respondent  submitted  that  though  the
gazette notification did not contain the property  in  question  as  a  Wakf
property, the Survey Report disclosed the property in  question  as  a  Wakf
property and therefore the defect while publishing the Gazette  notification
needs to be rectified.  He submitted that the High  Court  is  justified  in
passing the impugned judgment after verifying the records and therefore,  it
is not a fit case for rejecting of plaint at the threshold.


8.    The plaint can be rejected under  Order  VII  Rule  11  if  conditions
enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is  needless  to  observe
that the power under Order VII Rule 11, CPC can be exercised  by  the  Court
at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to  be  looked  into
for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint  only.   If  on
an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found  that  the  suit
is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense  of  not  disclosing  any
right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order VII Rule 11,  CPC.
Since the power conferred on the Court to  terminate  civil  action  at  the
threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order VII Rule  11  of
CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of  plaint  have  to  be  strictly
adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole  to  find
out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit  is
barred by any law. It is  needless  to  observe  that  the  question  as  to
whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend  upon  the  facts
and circumstances of each case. The averments in the  written  statement  as
well as the  contentions  of  the  defendant  are  wholly  immaterial  while
considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of  the  plaint.  Even
when, the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a  whole
on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or  do
not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection  of  plaint  can
be entertained and the  power  under  Order  VII  Rule  11  of  CPC  can  be
exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the  illusion  of  a
cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the  earliest  so  that
bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.

9.    In order to prima facie satisfy his case as  pleaded  in  plaint  that
the Suit property  is  a  Wakf  property,  the  plaintiff  produced  certain
documents including Gazette Notification dated  28.06.1962.   The  averments
in the plaint disclose that the property bearing Survey No. 113 situated  at
Pernamitta village was notified as Wakf property under  Serial  No.  966  in
the Official Gazette  published  by  Andhra  Pradesh  State  Wakf  Board  on
28.06.1962.  On verification of the Gazette Notification, the Wakf  Tribunal
has concluded that under Serial No. 966 (Page No.742) the property  attached
to Ashoorkhana situated at Kolachanakota  village  was  shown  and  not  the
property belonging to Pernamitta village. The  name  of  the  plaintiff  was
also not shown  as  Mutwalli.  The  property  in  question  is  situated  in
Pernamitta village, whereas the Gazette which is relied upon shows that  the
survey no. 113 is situated at a different village which is stated to be  far
away (about 20 kms.) from village Pernamitta. There is one more  Ashoorkhana
situated at Pernamitta village which is  not  the  subject  matter  of  this
litigation. List of wakf properties pertaining to  Pernamitta  village  does
not contain the property in question.  The  Tribunal,  on  facts,  thus  has
concluded that property in question does not  find  place  in  the  Official
Gazette of the Wakf Board.  The  High  Court  also  concurs  with  the  Wakf
Tribunal in that regard. Thus, there are concurrent findings  of  fact  that
property in question  was  not  notified  in  Official  Gazette  as  a  Wakf
property, as alleged by the plaintiff/respondent.

10.   The High Court though has agreed with the finding of fact  arrived  at
by the Tribunal that the property was not notified as Wakf property  in  the
Official Gazette, raising some doubt about  the  non-inclusion/inclusion  of
the property in the Survey Commissioner’s Report, erroneously has  proceeded
to set aside the order of the Tribunal.

11.    As  mentioned  supra,  notification  containing  the  list  of   Wakf
properties relied upon by the plaintiff  was published in  Gazette  as  back
as on 28.06.1962 as per the provisions of  Section  5  of   Wakf  Act,  1954
(hereinafter, in short, called as 1954 Act) which is  subsequently  replaced
by the Waqf Act, 1995 (hereinafter, in short, called as  1995  Act).  Before
proceeding further, it would be beneficial  to  note  the  certain  relevant
provisions contained under the 1954 Act as well as 1995 Act for the  purpose
of deciding this matter.



|The WAQF ACT, 1995                  |The WAKF ACT. 1954 (Old)             |
|4.  Preliminary survey of [auqaf]. –|4.  Preliminary survey of wakfs. –   |
|                                    |                                     |
|(1) The State Government may, by    |(1)  The State Government may, by    |
|notification in the Official        |notification in the Official Gazette,|
|Gazette, appoint for the state a    |appoint for the state a [Survey      |
|Survey Commissioner of [Auqaf] and  |Commissioner] of Wakfs and as many   |
|as many Additional or Assistant     |Additional or Assistant [Survey      |
|Survey Commissioners of [Auqaf] as  |Commissioners] of Wakfs as may be    |
|may be necessary for the purpose of |necessary for the purpose of making a|
|making a survey of [auqaf in the    |survey of Wakf properties existing in|
|state].                             |the State at the date of the         |
|[(1A) Every State Government shall  |commencement of this Act.            |
|maintain a list of auqaf referred to|                                     |
|in sub-section (1) and the survey of|                                     |
|auqaf shall be completed within a   |                                     |
|period of one year from the date of |                                     |
|commencement of the Wakf (Amendment)|                                     |
|Act, 20136, in case such survey was |                                     |
|not done before the commencement of |                                     |
|the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013:     |                                     |
|Provided that where no Survey       |                                     |
|Commissioner of Waqf has been       |                                     |
|appointed a Survey Commissioner for |                                     |
|aquaf shall be appointed within     |                                     |
|three months from the date of such  |                                     |
|commencement.]                      |                                     |
|                                    |                                     |
|(2) All Additional and Assistant    |(2) All Additional and Assistant     |
|Survey Commissioners of [Auqaf]     |[Survey Commissioners] of Wakfs shall|
|shall perform their functions under |perform their functions under this   |
|this Act under the general          |Act under the general supervision and|
|supervision and control of the      |control of the [Survey Commissioner] |
|Survey Commissioner of [Auqaf].     |of Wakfs.                            |
|                                    |                                     |
|(3) The Survey Commissioner shall,  |(3) The [Survey Commissioner] shall, |
|after making such inquiry as he may |after making such inquiry as he may  |
|consider necessary, submit his      |consider necessary, submit his       |
|report, in respect of [auqaf]       |report, [in respect of Wakfs existing|
|existing at the date of commencement|at the date of commencement of this  |
|of this Act in the State or any part|Act in the State or any part         |
|thereof, to the State Government    |thereof,] to the State Government    |
|containing the following            |containing the following particulars,|
|particulars, namely:-               |namely:-                             |
|                                    |                                     |
|(a) …………..                          |(a) …………..                           |
|(b) ……………                           |(b) ……………                            |
|(c) ……………                           |(c) ……………                            |
|(d) ……………                           |(d) ……………                            |
|(e) ……………  and                      |(e) ……………  and                       |
|(f) …………….                          |(f) …………….                           |
|                                    |                                     |
|(4)…………………….                        |(4)…………………….                         |
|                                    |                                     |
|(5) …….                             |(5)…..                               |
|                                    |                                     |
|(6) The State Government may, by    |(6)  The State Government may, by    |
|notification in the Official        |notification in the Official Gazette,|
|Gazette, direct the Survey          |direct the Survey Commissioner to    |
|Commissioner to make a second or    |make a second or subsequent survey of|
|subsequent survey of [waqf]         |wakf properties in the State and the |
|properties in the State and the     |provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), |
|provisions of sub-sections (2), (3),|(4) and (5) shall apply to such      |
|(4) and (5) shall apply to such     |survey as they apply to a survey     |
|survey as they apply to a survey    |directed under sub-section (1):      |
|directed under sub-section (1):     |                                     |
|                                    |Provided that no such second or      |
|Provided that no such second or     |subsequent survey shall be made until|
|subsequent survey shall be made     |the expiry of a period of twenty     |
|until the expiry of a period of [ten|years from the date on which the     |
|years] from the date on which the   |report in relation to the immediately|
|report in relation to the           |previous survey was submitted under  |
|immediately previous survey was     |sub-section (3).]                    |
|submitted under sub-section (3):    |                                     |
|[Provided further that the waqf     |                                     |
|properties already notified shall   |                                     |
|not be reviewed again in subsequent |                                     |
|survey except where the status of   |                                     |
|such property has been changed in   |                                     |
|accordance with the previous of any |                                     |
|law.]                               |                                     |
|5.  Publication of list of [auqaf]. |5.  Publication of list of wakfs. –  |
|–                                   |                                     |
|                                    |(1)  On receipt of a report under    |
|(1) On receipt of a report under    |sub-section (3) of section 4, the    |
|sub-section (3) of section 4, the   |State Government shall forward a copy|
|State Government shall forward a    |of the same to the Board.            |
|copy of the same to the Board.      |                                     |
|                                    |(2) The Board shall examine the      |
|(2) The Board shall examine the     |report forwarded to it under         |
|report forwarded to it under        |sub-section (1) and publish, in the  |
|sub-section (1) and [forward it back|Official Gazette, a list of wakfs    |
|to the Government within a period of|[[in the State, or as the case may   |
|six months for publication in the   |be, the part of the State, whether in|
|Official Gazette] a list of Sunni   |existence at the commencement of this|
|[auqaf] or Shia [auqaf] in the      |Act or coming into existence         |
|State, whether in existence at the  |thereafter] to which the report      |
|commencement of this Act or coming  |relates, and] containing such        |
|into existence thereafter, to which |particulars as may be prescribed.    |
|the report relates, and containing  |                                     |
|such other particulars as may be    |                                     |
|prescribed.                         |                                     |
|                                    |                                     |
|[(3) The revenue authorities shall –|                                     |
|                                    |                                     |
|(i) include the list of auqaf       |                                     |
|referred to in sub-section (2),     |                                     |
|while updating the land records: and|                                     |
|(ii) take into consideration the    |                                     |
|list of auqaf referred to in        |                                     |
|sub-section (2), while deciding     |                                     |
|mutation in the land records.]      |                                     |
|                                    |                                     |
|[(4) The State Government shall     |                                     |
|maintain a record of the lists      |                                     |
|published under sub-section (2) from|                                     |
|time to time.]                      |                                     |
|6.  Disputes regarding [auqaf]. –   |6.  Disputes regarding wakfs. –      |
|                                    |                                     |
|(1) If any question arises whether a|(1) If any question arises [whether a|
|particular properly specified a     |particular property specified as wakf|
|[waqf] property in the list of      |property in a list of wakfs published|
|[auqaf] is [waqf] properly or not or|under sub-section (2) of Section 5 is|
|whether a [waqf] specified in such  |wakf property or not whether a wakf  |
|list is a Shia [waqf] or Sunni      |specified in such list is a Shia wakf|
|[waqf], the Board or the mutawalli  |or sunni wakf] the Board of the      |
|of the [waqf] of [any person        |mutawalli of the wakf or any person  |
|aggrieved] may institute a suit in a|interested therein may institute a   |
|Tribunal for the decision of the    |suit in a civil court of competent   |
|question and the decision of the    |jurisdiction for the decision of the |
|Tribunal in respect of such matter  |question and the decision of the     |
|shall be final:                     |civil court in respect of such matter|
|Provided that no such suit shall be |shall be final:                      |
|entertained by the Tribunal after   |Provided that no such suit shall be  |
|the expiry of one year from the date|entertained by the Civil court after |
|of the publication of the list of   |the expiry of one year from the date |
|[auqaf]:                            |of the publication of the list of    |
|[Provided further that no suit shall|wakfs under sub-section (2) of       |
|be instituted before the Tribunal in|Section 5:                           |
|respect of such properties notified |[Provided further that in the case of|
|in a second or subsequent survey    |the list of wakfs relating to any    |
|pursuant to the provisions contained|part of the State and published or   |
|in sub-section (6) of section 4.]   |purporting to have been published    |
|                                    |before the commencement of the Wakf  |
|                                    |(Amendment) Act, 1969 (38 of 1969,   |
|                                    |such suit may be entertained by the  |
|                                    |Civil Court within the period of one |
|                                    |year from such commencement.]        |
|                                    |                                     |
|                                    |(2)……..                              |
|(2)…….                              |                                     |
|                                    |(3) ……….                             |
|(3) ……..                            |                                     |
|                                    |(4)  The list of wakfs published     |
|(4) The list of [auqaf] shall,      |under sub-section (2) of Section 5   |
|unless it is modified in pursuance  |shall, unless it is modified in      |
|of a decision or the Tribunal under |pursuance of a decision of the Civil |
|sub-section (1), be final and       |Court under sub-section (1), be final|
|conclusive.                         |and conclusive.                      |
|                                    |                                     |
|                                    |(5)  On and from the commencement of |
|(5) On and from the commencement of |the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984 in a  |
|this Act in a State, no suit or     |State, no suit or other legal        |
|other legal proceeding shall be     |proceeding shall be instituted or    |
|instituted or commenced in a court  |commenced in a Civil Court in that   |
|in that state in relation to any    |State in relation to any question    |
|question referred to in sub-section |referred in sub-section (1).]        |
|(1).                                |                                     |
|                                    |                                     |
|                                    |                                     |
|7.  Power of Tribunal to determine  |6-A.   Power of Tribunal to determine|
|disputes regarding [auqaf]          |disputes regarding wakfs             |
|                                    |                                     |
|(1) If, after the commencement of   |(1) If, after the commencement of the|
|this Act, [any question or dispute] |Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984, any      |
|arises, whether a particular        |question arises whether a particular |
|property specified as [waqf]        |property specified as wakf property  |
|property in a list of [auqaf] is    |in a list of wakfs published under   |
|[waqf] property or not, or whether a|sub-section (2) of the Section 5 is  |
|[waqf] specified in such list is a  |wakf property or not, or whether a   |
|Shia [waqf] or a Sunni [waqf], the  |wakf specified in such list is a Shia|
|Board or the mutawalli of the       |wakf or a Sunni wakf, the Board or   |
|[waqf], or [or any person aggrieved |the mutawalli of the wakf, or any    |
|by the publication of the list of   |person interested therein, may apply |
|auqaf under section 5] therein, may |to the Tribunal having jurisdiction  |
|apply to the Tribunal having        |in relation to such property, for the|
|jurisdiction in relation to such    |decision of the question and the     |
|property, for the decision of the   |decision of the Tribunal in respect  |
|question and the decision of the    |of such matter shall be final:       |
|Tribunal thereon shall be final:    |Provided that –                      |
|Provided that –                     |                                     |
|                                    |(a) in the case of the list of wakfs |
|                                    |relating to any part of the State and|
|(a) in the case of the list of      |published or purporting to have been |
|[auqaf] relating to any part of the |published after the commencement of  |
|State and published after the       |the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984, no   |
|commencement of this Act no such    |such application shall be entertained|
|application shall be entertained    |after the expiry of one year from the|
|after the expiry of one year from   |date of publication of the list of   |
|the date of publication of the list |wakfs under sub-section (2) and      |
|[auqaf]; and                        |Section 5; and                       |
|                                    |                                     |
|                                    |                                     |
|                                    |(b) in the case of the list of wakfs |
|                                    |relating to any part of the State and|
|                                    |published or purporting to have been |
|(b) in the case of the list [auqaf] |published at any time within a period|
|relating to any part of the State   |of one year immediately preceding the|
|and published at any time within a  |commencement of the Wakf (Amendment) |
|period of one year immediately      |Act, 1984, such an application may be|
|preceding the commencement of this  |entertained by the Tribunal within   |
|Act, such an application may be     |the period of one year from such     |
|entertained by Tribunal within the  |commencement:                        |
|period of one year from such        |                                     |
|commencement:                       |                                     |
|                                    |Provided further that where any such |
|                                    |question has been heard and finally  |
|                                    |decided by a civil court in a suit   |
|                                    |instituted before such commencement, |
|Provided further that where any such|the Tribunal shall not re-open such  |
|question has been heard and finally |question.                            |
|decided by a civil court in a suit  |                                     |
|instituted before such commencement,|                                     |
|the Tribunal shall not re-open such |                                     |
|question.                           |                                     |


12.   A bare reading of the  afore-quoted  provisions  (relevant  provisions
for the purpose of this matter) contained in 1954 Act and  1995  Act,  makes
it manifestly clear that the provisions, which are relevant  for  this  case
are almost parimateria with each other.

13.   Section 4 of 1954 Act, empowered the State  Government  to  appoint  a
State  Commissioner,  and  as   many   Additional   and   Assistant   Survey
Commissioners of Wakf  as  may  be  necessary,  by  a  notification  in  the
Official Gazette for  the  purpose  of  making  survey  of  wakf  properties
existing within the State.  The Survey Commissioner after  making  a  survey
of  wakf  properties  would  submit  his  report  to  the  State  Government
containing various particulars as mentioned in sub-sections (3) and  (4)  of
Section 4 of  the Act.  Section 5 of 1954 Act mandated that  on  receipt  of
such report from Survey Commissioner made under sub-section (3)  of  Section
4, the State Government should forward a  copy  of  the  same  to  the  Wakf
Board. The Wakf Board would examine the report forwarded to it  and  publish
in Official Gazette, the list of Wakfs  in  the  State.  For  resolving  the
disputes regarding Wakfs, Section 6 of  1954  Act,  provided  jurisdictional
Civil Court as a forum and decision  of  Civil  Court  in  respect  of  such
matters should be final. It was also clarified that no such suit  should  be
entertained by the Civil Court, after the expiry of one year from  the  date
of publication of the list of Wakfs as per sub-section  (2)  of  Section  5.
Sub-section (4) of Section 6 stated that the list of Wakfs  published  under
sub-section (2) of Section 5 shall be final and conclusive unless such  list
is modified on the direction of the Civil Court.

14.   The provisions found in Sections 5 and 6 of Wakf Act 1995 and  Act  of
1954 are almost akin to each other.  However the change brought  in  by  the
Parliament under 1995 Act is that, in the case of dispute  regarding  Wakfs,
the aggrieved party needs to approach the Wakf  Tribunal  constituted  under
Section 83 of the Waqf Act 1995 and consequently  the  jurisdiction  of  the
Civil  Court  is  taken  away.   Except  the  aforesaid  change,  no   other
substantial modification is found in those provisions.  Section  7  of  1995
Act empowers the Tribunal to determine the disputes, regarding  Auqaf/Wakfs,
the particulars of which are specified therein.

15.   Section 6 and Section 7 of Waqf Act  1995  bars  jurisdiction  of  the
Civil Court to try the civil  suit  in  respect  of  questions  specifically
enumerated under those provisions. Section 85  of  Waqf  Act,  1995  further
clarifies that no suit or other legal proceeding  shall  lie  in  any  civil
court, revenue court and any other authority  in  respect  of  any  dispute,
question or other matter relating  to  any  wakf,  wakf  property  or  other
matter which is required by  or  under  this  Act  to  be  determined  by  a
Tribunal.

16.   The overall view of the aforementioned provisions  contained  in  Wakf
Act, 1954 and Waqf Act 1995 make it evident that even under 1954 Act, as  in
1995 Act, the Survey Commissioners were appointed for the purpose of  making
survey of wakfs in  State.   The  Survey  Commissioner  was  duty  bound  to
conduct the survey of wakfs in the State and after making such  enquiry,  as
he might consider necessary, would submit his report  in  respect  of  Wakfs
existing in the State to the State Government  with  necessary  particulars.
Copy of the said report would be forwarded by the State to  the  Wakf  Board
which in turn would examine the report by applying its mind  and  thereafter
would publish the notification.  Whereas under  1995  Act,  the  Wakf  Board
after examining the report forwards it back to Government  within  a  period
of 6 months for publication in the Official Gazette in the State.   Pursuant
thereto the  State  will  publish  the  Gazette  notification.  The  revenue
authorities will consequently include the list  of  Auqaf  properties  while
updating the revenue records under sub-section (3)  of  Section  5  of  1995
Act.

17.   Thus it is amply clear that the conducting of  survey  by  the  Survey
Commissioner and preparing a report and forwarding the same to the State  or
the Wakf Board precedes  the  final  act  of  notifying  such  list  in  the
official gazette by the State under 1995 Act, (it was  by  the  Board  under
1954 Act). As mentioned supra, the list would  be  prepared  by  the  Survey
Commissioner after making due enquiry and after  valid  survey  as  well  as
after due application of mind.  The enquiry contemplated  under  sub-section
(3) of Section 4 is not merely an informal enquiry but a formal  enquiry  to
find out at the grass root level, as to  whether  the  property  is  a  Wakf
Property or not.  Thereafter the Wakf Board  will  once  again  examine  the
list sent to it with due application of it’s mind and  only  thereafter  the
same will be sent to Government for  notifying  the  same  in  the  Gazette.
Since the list  is  prepared  and  published  in  the  official  Gazette  by
following aforementioned procedure, there is no scope for the  plaintiff  to
get the matter reopened by  generating  some  sort  of  doubt  about  Survey
Commissioner’s report. Since  the  surveyor’s  report  was  required  to  be
considered by the State Government as well as Wakf Board (as  the  case  may
be), prior to finalisation of the list of properties to be published in  the
Official Gazette, it was not open for the High Court to  conclude  that  the
Surveyor’s report will have to be reconsidered. On the  contrary  Surveyor’s
report merges with the Gazette Notification published  under  Section  5  of
the Wakf Act.

 18.  As held by the Tribunal as well as the High  Court,  the  property  in
question does not find place in the  Gazette  notification  published  under
Section 5 of the Wakf Act.  In other words, the property in question is  not
notified in the official Gazette as Wakf  property.   If  anybody  including
the Wakf Board or the plaintiff was aggrieved by such non-inclusion  of  the
property in the list notified, the aggrieved person should have  raised  the
dispute under Section 6 within a  period  of  one  year  from  the  date  of
publication of the Gazette notification in the  matter.  The  plaintiff  has
practically questioned the non-inclusion of the property  in  the  list  and
the validity of the list notified in the official gazette  dated  28.06.1962
after the lapse of about 50 years, i.e. in  the  year  2013  by  filing  the
present suit.

19.   As per Section 27 of 1954 Act (Section 40 of 1995 Act), the Board  may
itself collect information regarding any property which  it  has  reason  to
believe to be wakf property and if any question arises whether a  particular
property is wakf property or not the Board after making such enquiry  as  it
deems fit, decide the question. The decision of the Board  on  any  question
under sub-section (1) of Section 27 of 1954 Act (or under Section  40(1)  of
1995 Act) shall, unless revoked or modified by the Civil  Court,  be  final.
The effect of Section 27 of 1954 Act or Section 40 of 1995 Act is  that,  if
any property had been omitted to  be  included  in  the  list  of  auqaf  by
inadvertence or otherwise,  then it  was/is  for  the  Wakf  Board  to  take
action, as per said provision. In this context, it is relevant to  note  the
observations by this Court in the case of T.N.Wakf Board vs.  Hathija  Ammal
[1] which read thus:

“In the event, any property has been omitted by inadvertence  or  otherwise,
then it is for the Wakf Board to take action as provided  under  Section  27
of the Act. If the Wakf Board  has  reason  to  believe  that  a  particular
property is a wakf property then it can itself collect  information  and  if
any question arises whether a particular property  is  a  wakf  property  or
not, it may, after making such  enquiry  as  it  may  deem  fit  decide  the
question and such decision of the Wakf Board shall be final  unless  revoked
or modified by a civil court. Such action has not been  taken  by  the  Wakf
Board in this case.”



20.   Sub-section (1A) of Section 4 is inserted by Act  27  of  2013  w.e.f.
1.11.2013 and the same reads thus:

            “(1A) Every State Government shall  maintain  a  list  of  auqaf
referred to in sub-section (1) and the survey of auqaf  shall  be  completed
within a period of one year from  the  date  of  commencement  of  the  Wakf
(Amendment) Act,  2013,  in  case  such  survey  was  not  done  before  the
commencement of the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013:

            Provided that where no Survey  Commissioner  of  Waqf  has  been
appointed a Survey Commissioner for auqaf shall be  appointed  within  three
months from the date of such commencement.”



21.   In the matter on hand, the said provision also will not  come  to  the
aid of the plaintiff inasmuch as the said sub-section can be  employed  only
if survey of auqaf was not done before the commencement of Wakf  (Amendment)
Act, 2013. Admittedly in the matter on hand, the survey was conducted  prior
to    1962 and based on such Surveyor’s report only, the list  was  prepared
and the  same  was  submitted  to  State  Government,  which  in  turn,  was
forwarded  to  Wakf  Board,  the  Wakf  Board  after  examining  the  report
published the list in the official gazette in the  year  1962.  Hence,  sub-
section (1A) of Section 4 also will be of no avail to the plaintiff.

22.   In the matter on hand, as mentioned supra, the Tribunal and  the  High
Court, on facts have held that the property in question is not  included  in
the list published in the Official Gazette as a  wakf  property.  Such  non-
inclusion was never questioned by any person including the Wakf  Board.  The
Board has not exercised jurisdiction  under  Section  27  of  1954  Act  and
Section 40 of 1995 Act, though 50 years have elapsed from the  date  of  the
gazette notification. Hence, in our considered  opinion,  the  averments  in
the plaint do not disclose the cause of action  for  filing  the  suit.  The
suit is manifestly meritless and vexatious. So also the suit  is  barred  by
law for the reasons mentioned supra.

  23. In view of the above, the Order of the High Court is liable to be  set
aside.  Accordingly, the same stands  set  aside.  Appeal  is  allowed.  The
order of the Wakf Tribunal is restored. No costs.



                                              …..…………………………….J.
                                               (R.K.Agrawal)



                                               …..……………………………J.
                                               (Mohan   M.   Shantanagoudar)

New Delhi,
Dated: April 19, 2017

-----------------------
[1]

      [2] (2001) 8 SCC 528

maintenance to the respondent-wife. - 25% of the husband’s net salary = Following Dr. Kulbhushan Kumar vs. Raj Kumari and Anr. (1970) 3 SCC 129, in this case, it was held that 25% of the husband’s net salary would be just and proper to be awarded as maintenance to the respondent-wife. In the result, the maintenance amount of Rs.23,000/- awarded to the respondent-wife is reduced to Rs.20,000/- per month and the impugned judgment is modified and this appeal is partly allowed. The maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month is payable to the respondent-wife on or before 10th of every succeeding english calendar month. No costs.

                                REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5369    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 34653 of 2016)


KALYAN DEY CHOWDHURY                            .....Appellant
                                   Versus
RITA DEY CHOWDHURY NEE NANDY             .....Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T


R. BANUMATHI, J.

Leave granted.

2.    Challenge in this appeal is to the order dated  15.09.2016  passed  by
the High Court at Calcutta in RVW No.85 of 2016 in  C.O.  No.4228  of  2012,
reviewing an order dated 02.02.2015 passed earlier in an  application  filed
under Section 25(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, thereby  enhancing  the
amount of maintenance from Rs.16,000/- per month to Rs.23,000/- per month.

3.    Parties are entangled in  several  rounds  of  litigation.  Background
facts in a nutshell are as follows: The marriage of the  appellant  and  the
respondent was solemnized on 10.08.1995 as per Hindu rites  and  customs  at
the appellant’s residence at Kalna. A male child was born on 04.10.1996   at
Chandannagore who is now a major pursuing his college education.  After  the
birth of child, it is alleged that the respondent continued in her  parent’s
house. The appellant-husband requested  the  respondent  to  return  to  the
matrimonial home at Kalna alongwith the child.  It is alleged  that  instead
of acceding to the request of the appellant-husband and  returning  back  to
the matrimonial home,  the  respondent-wife  insisted  that  the  appellant-
husband shifts to her father’s place at Chandannagore.

4.    Appellant filed an application under Section 9 of the  Hindu  Marriage
Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights against the respondent-wife  in
Matrimonial Suit No.370 of  1997  before  the  District  Judge,  Burdwan  on
23.12.1997.  On  receipt  of  summons  in  the  above  matrimonial  suit  on
9.02.1998, the respondent-wife lodged an FIR bearing P.S. Case  No.25  dated
13.02.1998 under Sections 498A and 406 IPC against  the  appellant  and  his
parents at P.S. Chandannagore. The appellant and his  parents  were  granted
anticipatory bail by the Sessions Judge, Burdwan on 20.05.1998  in  the  FIR
filed by the respondent-wife. The respondent-wife also filed  a  maintenance
case being Misc.  Case  No.24/98  under  Section  125  Cr.P.C.  against  the
appellant-husband claiming maintenance for herself and the minor son.

5.    On 10.08.2000, the Additional District Judge,  Burdwan  passed  decree
of restitution of  conjugal  rights  in  favour  of  the  appellant-husband.
However, the respondent did not reconcile and preferred  an  appeal  against
the said decree of restitution of conjugal  rights  before  the  High  Court
being F.A. No.198 of 2001.  In the High Court, by an order dated  24.05.2001
an interim arrangement was made directing the appellant herein to go to  the
parental home of the respondent-wife at  Chandannagore  and  take  back  the
wife and the child to his residence at Kalna and make necessary  arrangement
for living with his wife and  child  separately  from  the  parents  of  the
husband in the first  floor  of  the  matrimonial  home.  Subsequently,  the
interim arrangement was recalled.  The interim arrangement did not work  and
the appeal filed by the respondent-wife was allowed on 13.08.2003.

6.    In the year 2003, respondent-wife filed a Matrimonial Suit  No.533  of
2003 before the District Judge Hooghly against the  appellant-husband  under
Section 10 of the Act for judicial separation.  According to the  appellant,
though he filed written objections denying allegations made against him,  he
could not attend the hearing and it is alleged that  he  was  manhandled  in
the court premises by some men of the respondent-wife.  Ex parte decree  for
judicial separation was ordered on 19.05.2006, as  a  consequence  of  which
decree for permanent alimony was also ordered under Section 25 of the  Hindu
Marriage Act to the respondent-wife amounting to Rs.2,500/-  per  month  and
          Rs. 2,000/- per month to the minor son.

7.     In  the  meanwhile,  the  appellant-husband  and  his  parents   were
acquitted of all the charges by the Additional District and Sessions  Judge,
2nd Fast Track Court, Serempore on 20.07.2006 in  the  case  filed  alleging
dowry harassment.  Being aggrieved by the order hereinabove, the respondent-
wife filed a revision petition being CRR No. 3087 of 2006  before  the  High
Court at Calcutta which came to be dismissed on 21.03.2011.

8.    The appellant-husband filed a divorce petition being Matrimonial  Suit
No.71 of 2007 which was renumbered as Suit  No.193  of  2010  under  Section
13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act for  dissolution  of  marriage.  In  the
said  divorce  petition,  the  respondent-wife  filed  an  application   for
permanent  alimony  under  Section  25  of  the  Act.   By  an  order  dated
19.05.2006, passed by the Additional District Judge, 1st Court,  Hooghly  in
Matrimonial Suit No.533 of 2003, enhanced the amount of maintenance  to  Rs.
8,000/- per month in F.A. No. 193 of 2008.
9.    On 10.10.2010, the respondent filed an  amendment  application  before
the Court being Misc. Case No.2 of 2010 in Matrimonial Suit No.533  of  2003
under Section 25(2) of  the  Act  praying  for  enhancement  of  maintenance
amounting to Rs.10,000/- per month for  herself  and  Rs.  6,000/-  for  her
minor son.  Vide order dated 10.10.2012, the said  application  was  allowed
and  maintenance  at  the  rate  of  Rs.6000/-  each  was  ordered  for  the
respondent and her minor son.

10.    Aggrieved  by  this  order,  respondent-wife  preferred  a   revision
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution  of  India  before  the  High
Court being C.O. No.4228 of 2012.   During  its  pendency,  the  Matrimonial
Suit No.193 of 2010 was decreed and the marriage between  the  parties  came
to be dissolved by the order of the  Additional  District  Judge,  1st  Fast
Track Court, Serampore on 30.11.2012.  Post-divorce,  the  appellant  herein
re-married and has a male child born out of the second wedlock.
11.   By an order dated 02.02.2015, the High Court  disposed  of  the  above
revision petition by  directing  the  appellant-husband  to  pay  a  sum  of
Rs.16,000/- towards the maintenance of the respondent-wife as  well  as  her
minor son.   Aggrieved  by  this  order,  the  respondent-wife  preferred  a
Special Leave Petition (C)  No.12968  of  2015  which  was  disposed  of  as
withdrawn with liberty  to  approach  the  High  Court  by  way  of  review.
Pursuant to the above order,  respondent-wife  filed  a  review  application
being RVW No.85 of 2016 arising out of CO  NO.4228  of  2012.  Upon  hearing
both the parties, by order dated 15.09.2016, the  learned  Single  Judge  of
the High Court modified the order under review and enhanced  the  amount  of
maintenance from Rs.16,000/- to Rs.23,000/- which is the subject  matter  of
challenge in this appeal.
12.   Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Pijush K. Roy submitted that  in
exercise of review jurisdiction, the High Court ought not to  have  enhanced
the maintenance amount from Rs.16,000/-  to  Rs.23,000/-.   It  was  further
submitted that the appellant-husband is posted  at  Malda  Medical  College,
Malda, West Bengal and gets a net  salary  of  Rs.87,500/-   per  month  and
while so, the appellant would find it difficult to pay enhanced  maintenance
amount of  Rs.23,000/-  per  month  to  the  respondent-wife.   It  is  also
submitted that the respondent  is  a  qualified  beautician  and  Montessori
teacher and earns Rs.30,000/- per  month  and  the  son  has  also  attained
eighteen  years  of  age  and  hence  the  enhanced  maintenance  amount  of
Rs.23,000/- per month is on the higher side and  prayed  for  restoring  the
original order of Rs.16,000/- per month.
13.    Per  contra,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent-wife         Ms.
Supriya Juneja submitted that the High Court on perusal of the pay slip  and
the expenditure of appellant-husband has arrived at the right conclusion  of
granting Rs.23,000/- as maintenance to the respondent. The  learned  counsel
has also further submitted that even though the son  has  attained  majority
and since the son is aged only eighteen years and is presently  studying  in
a college and for  meeting  the  expenses  of  higher  education  and  other
requirements, enhanced maintenance amount of  Rs.23,000/-  per  month  is  a
reasonable one and the impugned order warrants no interference.
14.   We have considered the rival  contentions  and  perused  the  impugned
judgment and other materials on record.
15.   Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act,  1955  confers  power  upon  the
court to grant a permanent alimony to either spouse who claims the  same  by
making an application.  Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of Hindu Marriage  Act
confers ample power on the court to vary, modify or discharge any order  for
permanent alimony or permanent maintenance that may have been  made  in  any
proceeding under the Act under the provisions contained in  sub-section  (1)
of Section 25.  In exercising the power under  Section  25  (2),  the  court
would have regard to the “change  in  the  circumstances  of  the  parties”.
There must be some change in the circumstances of  either  party  which  may
have to be taken into account when an application is made under  sub-section
(2) of Section 25 for variation, modification or rescission of the order  as
the court may deem just.
16.   The review petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC came to be  filed  by
the respondent-wife pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court  when  the
earlier order dated 02.02.2015 awarding a maintenance of Rs.16,000/- to  the
respondent-wife as well as to her minor son was under challenge before  this
Court.  As pointed out by the High Court, in February 2015,  the  appellant-
husband  was  getting  a  net  salary  of  Rs.63,842/-  after  deduction  of
Rs.24,000/- on account  of  GPF  and  Rs.12,000/-  towards  income-tax.   In
February, 2016, the net salary of the appellant is stated to be  Rs.95,527/-
.  Following Dr. Kulbhushan Kumar vs. Raj Kumari and Anr. (1970) 3 SCC  129,
in this case, it was held that 25% of the  husband’s  net  salary  would  be
just and proper to be awarded as maintenance to  the  respondent-wife.   The
amount of permanent alimony awarded  to  the  wife  must  be  befitting  the
status of the parties and the capacity of the  spouse  to  pay  maintenance.
Maintenance is always dependant on the factual situation  of  the  case  and
the court would be justified in moulding the claim  for  maintenance  passed
on various factors.  Since in February, 2016, the net salary of the  husband
was Rs. 95,000/- per month, the High Court was justified  in  enhancing  the
maintenance amount.  However, since  the  appellant  has  also  got  married
second time and has a child from the second marriage,  in  the  interest  of
justice, we  think  it  proper  to  reduce  the  amount  of  maintenance  of
Rs.23,000/- to Rs.20,000/- per month as maintenance to  the  respondent-wife
and son.
17.   In the result, the maintenance amount of Rs.23,000/-  awarded  to  the
respondent-wife is  reduced  to  Rs.20,000/-  per  month  and  the  impugned
judgment is modified and this appeal is partly allowed. The  maintenance  of
Rs.20,000/- per month is payable to the respondent-wife on  or  before  10th
of every succeeding english calendar month.  No costs.

  ..….…...........……………………….J.
            [R. BANUMATHI]


          ……...............………………………..J.
                              [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR]
New Delhi;
April 19, 2017
















ITEM NO.1A                 COURT NO.7               SECTION XVI
(For judgment)
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5369/2017 @
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).  34653/2016

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  15/09/2016 in CO
No. 4228/2012 15/09/2016 in RVW No. 85/2016 passed by the High Court Of
Calcutta)

KALYAN DEY CHOWDHURY                               Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

RITA DEY CHOWDHURY NEE NANDY                       Respondent(s)


Date : 19/04/2017 This matter was called on for pronouncement of judgment
today.


For Petitioner(s)    Mr. Rajan K. Chourasia,Adv.


For Respondent(s)    Mrs Sarla Chandra,Adv.

                     Ms.Supriya Juneja,Adv.

                        Ms. Mehaak Jaggi, Adv.


             Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R.  Banumathi  pronounced  the  reportable
judgment  of the Bench comprising  Her  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice
Mohan M. Shantanagoudar.

             Leave granted.

            The appeal is partly allowed.  The  maintenance  of  Rs.20,000/-
p.m.  is  payable  to  the  respondent-wife  on  or  before  10th  of  every
succeeding English Calendar Month.

             No costs.

              Application, if any, also stands disposed of.


          (USHA BHARDWAJ)                            (RENU DIWAN)
           AR-CUM-PS                               ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
      Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.

whether, when the seat of arbitration is Mumbai, an exclusive jurisdiction clause stating that the courts at Mumbai alone would have jurisdiction in respect of disputes arising under the agreement would oust all other courts including the High Court of Delhi, whose judgment is appealed against.= In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties.- It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the case law, see Swastik Gases Private Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2013) 9 SCC 32. This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal and Another v. Chhattisgarh Investment Limited, (2015) 12 SCC 225. Having regard to the above, it is clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts in the country, as the juridical seat of arbitration is at Mumbai. This being the case, the impugned judgment is set aside. The injunction confirmed by the impugned judgment will continue for a period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment, so that the respondents may take necessary steps under Section 9 in the Mumbai Court. Appeals are disposed of accordingly.

                                 REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  5370-5371 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS.27311-27312 OF 2016)


INDUS MOBILE DISTRIBUTION
PRIVATE LIMITED                         … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

DATAWIND INNOVATIONS
PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.                … RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T

R.F. NARIMAN, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    The present appeals raise an interesting question as to whether,  when
the seat of arbitration is Mumbai, an exclusive jurisdiction clause  stating
that the courts at Mumbai  alone  would  have  jurisdiction  in  respect  of
disputes arising under the agreement would oust all other  courts  including
the High Court of Delhi, whose judgment is appealed against.

3.    The brief facts necessary  to  appreciate  the  controversy  are  that
Respondent No.1 is engaged in the manufacture,  marketing  and  distribution
of Mobile Phones, Tablets and their accessories.  Respondent  No.1  has  its
registered office at Amritsar, Punjab.  Respondent No.1 was supplying  goods
to the appellant at  Chennai  from  New  Delhi.   The  appellant  approached
Respondent No.1  and  expressed  an  earnest  desire  to  do  business  with
Respondent No.1 as its Retail  Chain  Partner.   This  being  the  case,  an
agreement dated 25.10.2014 was entered into between the parties. Clauses  18
and 19 are relevant for our purpose, and are set out hereinbelow:

“Dispute Resolution Mechanism:

Arbitration: In case of any dispute or differences arising  between  parties
out of or in relation to the  construction,  meaning,  scope,  operation  or
effect of this Agreement or breach of this  Agreement,  parties  shall  make
efforts in good faith to amicably resolve such dispute.

If such dispute or difference cannot be amicably  resolved  by  the  parties
(Dispute) within thirty days of its  occurrence,  or  such  longer  time  as
mutually agreed, either party  may  refer  the  dispute  to  the  designated
senior officers of the parties.

If the Dispute cannot be amicably resolved by such  officers  within  thirty
(30) days from the date of referral, or within such longer time as  mutually
agreed, such Dispute shall  be  finally  settled  by  arbitration  conducted
under  the  provisions  of  the  Arbitration  &  Conciliation  Act  1996  by
reference to a sole  Arbitrator  which  shall  be  mutually  agreed  by  the
parties.   Such  arbitration  shall  be  conducted  at  Mumbai,  in  English
language.

The arbitration award shall be final  and  the  judgment  thereupon  may  be
entered in  any  court  having  jurisdiction  over  the  parties  hereto  or
application may be made to such court  for  a  judicial  acceptance  of  the
award and an order of enforcement, as  the  case  may  be.   The  Arbitrator
shall have the power to order specific performance of the  Agreement.   Each
Party shall bear its own costs of the Arbitration.

It is hereby ‘agreed between the Parties that they will continue to  perform
their respective obligations under this Agreement  during  the  pendency  of
the Dispute.

19.   All disputes & differences of any kind whatever arising out of  or  in
connection  with  this  Agreement  shall  be  subject   to   the   exclusive
jurisdiction of courts of Mumbai only.”



4.    Disputes arose between the parties and a notice  dated  25.9.2015  was
sent by Respondent No.1 to  the  appellant.   The  notice  stated  that  the
appellant had been in default  of  outstanding  dues  of  Rs.5  crores  with
interest thereon and was called upon to pay the outstanding  dues  within  7
days.  Clause 18 of the Agreement was invoked by Respondent  No.1,  and  one
Justice H.R. Malhotra was appointed  as  the  Sole  Arbitrator  between  the
parties.  By a  reply  dated  15.10.2015,  the  appellant  objected  to  the
appointment of Justice Malhotra and asked Respondent No.1  to  withdraw  its
notice. By a further reply dated  16.10.2015,  the  averments  made  in  the
notice were denied in toto.

5.    Two petitions were then filed by Respondent No.1  –  the  first  dated
September 2015, under Section 9 of the  Arbitration  and  Conciliation  Act,
1996 asking for various interim reliefs in the matter.  By  an  order  dated
22.9.2015, the Delhi High Court issued notice  in  the  interim  application
and restrained the appellant from transferring, alienating or  creating  any
third party interests in respect of the property bearing  No.281,  TK  Road,
Alwarpet, Chennai-600018 till the next date of hearing.  By  an  application
dated 28.10.2015, Respondent No.1 filed a Section 11 petition to appoint  an
Arbitrator.

6.    Both applications were disposed of by the  impugned  judgment.   First
and foremost, it was held by the impugned judgment that as no  part  of  the
cause of action arose in Mumbai, only the courts of three territories  could
have jurisdiction in the matter, namely, Delhi  and  Chennai  (from  and  to
where goods were supplied), and Amritsar (which is the registered office  of
the appellant  company).   The  court  therefore  held  that  the  exclusive
jurisdiction clause would not apply on facts, as the courts in Mumbai  would
have no jurisdiction at all.  It, therefore,  determined  that  Delhi  being
the first Court that was approached would have jurisdiction  in  the  matter
and proceeded to confirm interim order dated 22.9.2015  and  also  proceeded
to dispose of the Section 11 petition by appointing  Justice  S.N.  Variava,
retired Supreme Court Judge, as the  sole  Arbitrator  in  the  proceedings.
The judgment recorded that the  conduct  of  the  arbitration  would  be  in
Mumbai.

7.    Learned counsel on behalf of the appellant has assailed  the  judgment
of the Delhi High Court, stating that even if it were to  be  conceded  that
no part of the cause of  action  arose  at  Mumbai,  yet  the  seat  of  the
arbitration  being  at  Mumbai,  courts  in  Mumbai  would  have   exclusive
jurisdiction  in  all  proceedings  over  the  same.   According   to   him,
therefore, the impugned judgment was erroneous and needs to be set aside.

8.    In opposition to these arguments, learned counsel for Respondent  No.1
sought to support the judgment by stating that  no  part  of  the  cause  of
action arose in Mumbai.  This being the case,  even  if  the  seat  were  at
Mumbai, it makes no difference as one of the tests prescribed by  the  Civil
Procedure Code, 1908,  to  give  a  court  jurisdiction  must  at  least  be
fulfilled.  None of these tests being fulfilled on the facts of the  present
case, the impugned judgment is correct and requires no interference.

9.    The relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,  1996
are set out hereinbelow:

“2. Definitions. - (1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise  requires,
-

(e) “Court” means the principal Civil Court of original  jurisdiction  in  a
district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its  ordinary  original
civil jurisdiction, having, jurisdiction to  decide  the  questions  forming
the subject-matter of the arbitration if the  same  had  been  the  subject-
matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a  grade  inferior
to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;

(2) This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India.

20. Place of arbitration. – (1) The parties are free to agree on  the  place
of arbitration.

(2) Failing any agreement referred to  in  sub-section  (1),  the  place  of
arbitration shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal  having  regard  to
the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties.

(3)  Notwithstanding  sub-section  (1)  or  sub-section  (2),  the  arbitral
tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any  place  it
considers appropriate  for  consultation  among  its  members,  for  hearing
witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods  or
other property.

31. Form and contents of arbitral award. –

(4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the place of arbitration  as
determined in accordance with section 20 and the award shall  be  deemed  to
have been made at that place.”



10.   The concept of juridical seat  has  been  evolved  by  the  courts  in
England and has now been firmly embedded in  our  jurisprudence.  Thus,  the
Constitution Bench in Bharat Aluminium Co.  v.  Kaiser  Aluminium  Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552, has adverted  to  “seat”  in  some  detail.
Paragraph 96 is instructive and states as under:-

“Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 reads as under:
“2. Definitions.—(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires—
(a)-(d)***
(e) ‘Court’ means the Principal Civil Court of Original  Jurisdiction  in  a
district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its  ordinary  original
civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming  the
subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had  been  the  subject-matter
of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to  such
Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;”
We are of the opinion, the term “subject-matter of the  arbitration”  cannot
be confused with “subject-matter of the suit”. The term “subject-matter”  in
Section 2(1)(e) is confined to Part I. It has  a  reference  and  connection
with the process of dispute resolution.  Its  purpose  is  to  identify  the
courts having supervisory control over the arbitration  proceedings.  Hence,
it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat  of  the
arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in  Section  2(1)(e)  has
to be construed keeping in view the provisions  in  Section  20  which  give
recognition  to  party  autonomy.  Accepting  the  narrow  construction   as
projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in  fact,  render
Section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature  has  intentionally  given
jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the  court  which  would  have  jurisdiction
where the cause of action is located and the courts  where  the  arbitration
takes place. This was necessary as  on  many  occasions  the  agreement  may
provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to  both
the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes  place  would
be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral  process.  For
example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of  the  parties
are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place  as  between  a
party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the  tribunal  sitting  in
Delhi passes an interim order under  Section  17  of  the  Arbitration  Act,
1996, the appeal against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie  to
the courts of Delhi being the courts having  supervisory  jurisdiction  over
the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal. This would be irrespective  of
the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract were to  be
performed either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration  is  to  take
place  in  Delhi.  In  such  circumstances,  both  the  courts  would   have
jurisdiction i.e. the court within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter  of
the suit is situated and the courts within the  jurisdiction  of  which  the
dispute resolution i.e. arbitration is located.” [para 96]


11.   Paragraphs 98 to 100 have laid down the law as to “seat” thus:

“We now come to Section 20, which is as under:

“20. Place of arbitration.—(1) The parties are free to agree  on  the  place
of arbitration.

(2) Failing any agreement referred to  in  sub-section  (1),  the  place  of
arbitration shall be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal  having  regard  to
the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties.

(3)  Notwithstanding  sub-section  (1)  or  sub-section  (2),  the  Arbitral
Tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any  place  it
considers appropriate  for  consultation  among  its  members,  for  hearing
witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods  or
other property.”

A plain reading of Section 20 leaves no room for doubt that where the  place
of arbitration is in India, the parties are free to agree to any “place”  or
“seat” within India, be it  Delhi,  Mumbai,  etc.  In  the  absence  of  the
parties'  agreement  thereto,  Section  20(2)  authorises  the  tribunal  to
determine the place/seat of such  arbitration.  Section  20(3)  enables  the
tribunal to meet at  any  place  for  conducting  hearings  at  a  place  of
convenience in matters such as consultations among its members  for  hearing
witnesses, experts or the parties.

The fixation of the most convenient “venue” is  taken  care  of  by  Section
20(3). Section 20, has to be read in the  context  of  Section  2(2),  which
places a threshold limitation on the applicability  of  Part  I,  where  the
place of arbitration is in India.  Therefore,  Section  20  would  also  not
support the submission of the extra-territorial applicability of Part I,  as
canvassed by the learned counsel  for  the  appellants,  so  far  as  purely
domestic arbitration is concerned.

True, that in an international commercial  arbitration,  having  a  seat  in
India, hearings may be necessitated outside India.  In  such  circumstances,
the hearing of the arbitration will be conducted at the venue fixed  by  the
parties, but  it  would  not  have  the  effect  of  changing  the  seat  of
arbitration which would remain in India. The legal position in  this  regard
is summed up by Redfern and Hunter, The Law and  Practice  of  International
Commercial Arbitration (1986) at p. 69 in the following  passage  under  the
heading “The Place of Arbitration”:

“The preceding discussion has been on the  basis  that  there  is  only  one
‘place’ of arbitration. This will be the place chosen by  or  on  behalf  of
the parties; and it will be designated in the arbitration agreement  or  the
terms of the reference or the minutes of proceedings or in  some  other  way
as the place or ‘seat’ of the arbitration.  This  does  not  mean,  however,
that the Arbitral Tribunal must hold all its meetings  or  hearings  at  the
place of arbitration. International commercial  arbitration  often  involves
people of many different nationalities, from many  different  countries.  In
these circumstances, it is by no means unusual for an Arbitral  Tribunal  to
hold meetings—or even hearings—in a place other than  the  designated  place
of arbitration, either for its own convenience or  for  the  convenience  of
the parties or their witnesses…. It may be more convenient for  an  Arbitral
Tribunal sitting in one country to conduct a hearing in another  country—for
instance, for the purpose of taking evidence…. In such  circumstances,  each
move of the Arbitral Tribunal does not of  itself  mean  that  the  seat  of
arbitration  changes.  The  seat  of  the  arbitration  remains  the   place
initially agreed by or on behalf of the parties.”

This, in our view, is the correct depiction of the practical  considerations
and the distinction between “seat” [Sections 20(1) and  20(2)]  and  “venue”
[Section 20(3)]. We may point out here that the distinction  between  “seat”
and “venue” would be quite crucial in the event, the  arbitration  agreement
designates a foreign country as the “seat”/“place” of  the  arbitration  and
also selects the Arbitration Act, 1996 as the curial law/law  governing  the
arbitration proceedings. It  would  be  a  matter  of  construction  of  the
individual agreement to decide whether:

(i) the designated foreign “seat” would be read as in  fact  only  providing
for a “venue”/“place” where the hearings would  be  held,  in  view  of  the
choice of the Arbitration Act, 1996 as being the curial law, or

(ii) the specific designation of a foreign seat, necessarily  carrying  with
it the choice of that country's arbitration/curial law, would  prevail  over
and  subsume  the  conflicting  selection  choice  by  the  parties  of  the
Arbitration Act, 1996.” [paras 98 – 100]



12.   In an instructive passage, this Court stated that an agreement  as  to
the seat of an arbitration is analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction  clause
as follows:

  “Thus,  it  is  clear  that  the  regulation   of conduct of   arbitration
and challenge to an award would have  to  be  done  by  the  courts  of  the
country in which the arbitration is being conducted. Such a  court  is  then
the supervisory court possessed of the power to annul the award. This is  in
keeping with the scheme  of  the  international  instruments,  such  as  the
Geneva Convention and the New York Convention as well as  the Uncitral Model
Law. It also recognises the territorial principle which gives effect to  the
sovereign right of a country to regulate, through its  national  courts,  an
adjudicatory  duty  being  performed  in  its  own  country.  By  way  of  a
comparative example, we may reiterate the observations made by the Court  of
Appeal, England in C v. D [2008 Bus LR  843  :  2007  EWCA  Civ  1282  (CA)]
wherein it is observed that:

“It follows from this that a choice of seat for the arbitration  must  be  a
choice of forum for remedies seeking to attack the award.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

In the aforesaid case, the Court of Appeal  had  approved  the  observations
made in A v. B [(2007) 1 All ER (Comm) 591  :  (2007)  1  Lloyd's  Rep  237]
wherein it is observed that:

“… an agreement as to  the  seat  of  an  arbitration  is  analogous  to  an
exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any claim for a remedy … as to  the  validity
of an existing interim or final award is agreed  to  be  made  only  in  the
courts  of   the   place   designated   as   the   seat   of   arbitration.”
(emphasis supplied) [para 123]


13.   The Constitution Bench’s statement of the law was further expanded  in
Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon Gmbh, (2014) 5 SCC 1.   After  referring  to
various English authorities in great detail, this Court held, following  the
Constitution Bench, as follows:

“It is accepted by most of the experts in the law relating to  international
arbitration that in almost all the national laws, arbitrations are  anchored
to the seat/place/situs of arbitration. Redfern and Hunter on  International
Arbitration (5th Edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford/New  York  2009),  in
Para 3.54 concludes that “the seat of the arbitration is  thus  intended  to
be  its  centre  of  gravity”.  In Balco [Bharat   Aluminium   Co. v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :  (2012)  4  SCC  (Civ)
810] , it is further noticed that this does not mean  that  all  proceedings
of  the  arbitration  are  to  be  held  at  the seat of  arbitration.   The
arbitrators are at  liberty  to  hold  meetings  at  a  place  which  is  of
convenience to all concerned.  This  may  become  necessary  as  arbitrators
often come from different countries. Therefore,  it  may  be  convenient  to
hold all or some of the meetings of the  arbitration  in  a  location  other
than where  the seat of  arbitration  is  located.  In Balco,  the  relevant
passage from Redfern and Hunter has been quoted which is as under:  (SCC  p.
598, para 75)

“75. … ‘The preceding discussion has been on the basis that  there  is  only
one “place” of arbitration. This will be the place chosen by  or  on  behalf
of the parties; and it will be designated in the  arbitration  agreement  or
the terms of reference or the minutes of proceedings or in  some  other  way
as the place or “seat” of the arbitration.  This  does  not  mean,  however,
that the Arbitral Tribunal must hold all its meetings  or  hearings  at  the
place of arbitration. International commercial  arbitration  often  involves
people of many different nationalities, from many  different  countries.  In
these circumstances, it is by no means unusual for an Arbitral  Tribunal  to
hold meetings—or even hearings—in a place other than  the  designated  place
of arbitration, either for its own convenience or  for  the  convenience  of
the parties or their witnesses…. It may be more convenient for  an  Arbitral
Tribunal sitting in one country to conduct a hearing in  another  country  —
for instance, for the purpose of taking  evidence….  In  such  circumstances
each move of the Arbitral Tribunal does not of itself mean that the seat  of
arbitration changes. The seat of arbitration  remains  the  place  initially
agreed by or on behalf of the  parties.’  (Naviera  case [Naviera  Amazonica
Peruana  S.A. v. Compania  Internacional  De  Seguros  Del  Peru,  (1988)  1
Lloyd's     Rep     116     (CA)]     ,     Lloyd's     Rep     p.     121)”
  (emphasis in original)

These observations have also been  noticed  in Union  of  India v. McDonnell
Douglas Corpn. [(1993) 2 Lloyd's Rep 48]” [para 134]



14.   This Court reiterated that once  the  seat  of  arbitration  has  been
fixed, it would be in the nature of an exclusive jurisdiction clause  as  to
the courts which exercise supervisory powers  over  the  arbitration.  (See:
paragraph 138).

15.   In Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union of  India,  (2014)  7  SCC,  603,
this statement of the law was echoed in several paragraphs.   This  judgment
makes it clear that “juridical seat” is nothing but  the  “legal  place”  of
arbitration.  It was held that since the juridical seat or  legal  place  of
arbitration was London, English courts alone would  have  jurisdiction  over
the arbitration thus excluding Part I of the Indian  Act.  (See:  paragraphs
36, 41, 45 to 60 and 76.1 and 76.2).  This  judgment  was  relied  upon  and
followed by Harmony Innovation Shipping Limited v. Gupta Coal India  Limited
and Another, (2015) 9 SCC 172 (See: paragraphs  45  and  48).  In  Union  of
India v. Reliance Industries Limited and Others,  (2015) 10  SCC  213,  this
Court referred to all the earlier judgments and held  that  in  cases  where
the seat of arbitration is London, by necessary implication Part  I  of  the
Arbitration and Conciliation  Act,  1996  is  excluded  as  the  supervisory
jurisdiction of courts over the arbitration goes along with “seat”.

16.   In a recent judgment in Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Ashapura  Minechem  Limited
and Another, (2016) 11 SCC 508, all the aforesaid authorities were  referred
to and followed.  Paragraph 34 of the said judgment reads as follows:

“As a matter of fact the mere choosing of the juridical seat of  arbitration
attracts the law applicable to such location. In other words, it  would  not
be  necessary  to  specify  which  law  would  apply  to   the   arbitration
proceedings, since the law of the particular country would apply ipso  jure.
The   following   passage   from Redfern   and   Hunter   on   International
Arbitration contains the following explication of the issue:

“It is also sometimes said that parties have  selected  the  procedural  law
that will govern their  arbitration,  by  providing  for  arbitration  in  a
particular country. This is too elliptical and, as an English  court  itself
held more recently in Breas of Doune Wind  Farm  it  does  not  always  hold
true. What the parties have done is to choose a place of  arbitration  in  a
particular country. That choice brings with it submission  to  the  laws  of
that country, including any mandatory provisions of its law on  arbitration.
To say that the parties have “chosen” that  particular  law  to  govern  the
arbitration is rather like saying that an English woman who  takes  her  car
to France has “chosen” French traffic law, which will oblige  her  to  drive
on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  road,  to  give  priority  to   vehicles
approaching from the right, and generally to obey traffic laws to which  she
may not be accustomed. But it would be an odd use of language  to  say  this
notional motorist had opted for “French traffic law”. What she has  done  is
to choose to go to France. The applicability  of  French  law  then  follows
automatically. It is not a matter of choice.

Parties may well choose a particular place of arbitration precisely  because
its lex arbitri is one which they  find  attractive.  Nevertheless,  once  a
place of arbitration has been chosen, it brings with  it  its  own  law.  If
that law contains provisions that are mandatory so far  as  arbitration  are
concerned, those provisions must be obeyed. It is not  a  matter  of  choice
any more than the notional motorist is free to choose  which  local  traffic
laws to obey and which to disregard.”   [para 34]



17.    It  may  be  mentioned,  in  passing,  that   the   Arbitration   and
Conciliation Act, 1996 has been amended in 2015 pursuant to a  detailed  Law
Commission  Report.   The  Law  Commission  specifically  adverted  to   the
difference between “seat” and “venue” as follows:

“40.  The Supreme Court in BALCO decided that Parts I and II of the Act  are
mutually exclusive of each other. The intention of Parliament that  the  Act
is territorial in nature and sections 9 and 34  will  apply  only  when  the
seat of arbitration is in India. The seat is  the  “centre  of  gravity”  of
arbitration, and even where two foreign parties arbitrate in India,  Part  I
would apply and, by 24  virtue  of  section  2(7),  the  award  would  be  a
“domestic award”. The Supreme Court recognized the “seat” of arbitration  to
be the juridical seat; however, in line with international practice, it  was
observed that the arbitral hearings may take place at a location other  than
the seat of arbitration. The distinction between  “seat”  and  “venue”  was,
therefore, recognized. In such a scenario, only if the  seat  is  determined
to be India, Part I would be applicable. If the seat  was  foreign,  Part  I
would be inapplicable. Even if Part I was expressly included “it would  only
mean that the parties have contractually imported from the Arbitration  Act,
1996, those provisions which are concerned  with  the  internal  conduct  of
their  arbitration  and  which  are  not  inconsistent  with  the  mandatory
provisions of the [foreign] Procedural Law/Curial Law.” The same  cannot  be
used to confer jurisdiction on an Indian Court.  However,  the  decision  in
BALCO was expressly given prospective  effect  and  applied  to  arbitration
agreements executed after the date of the judgment.

41.   While the decision in BALCO is a  step  in  the  right  direction  and
would drastically reduce judicial intervention in foreign arbitrations,  the
Commission feels that there are still a few areas  that  are  likely  to  be
problematic.

(i) Where the assets of a party  are  located  in  India,  and  there  is  a
likelihood that that party will dissipate its assets  in  the  near  future,
the other party  will  lack  an  efficacious  remedy  if  the  seat  of  the
arbitration is abroad. The latter party will  have  two  possible  remedies,
but neither will be efficacious. First,  the  latter  party  can  obtain  an
interim order from a foreign Court or the arbitral tribunal itself and  file
a civil suit to enforce the right created by the interim order. The  interim
order would not be enforceable directly by filing an execution  petition  as
it would not qualify as  a  “judgment”  or  “decree”  for  the  purposes  of
sections 13 and 44A  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  (which  provide  a
mechanism for enforcing foreign judgments). Secondly, in the event that  the
former party does not adhere to the terms of the foreign Order,  the  latter
party can initiate  proceedings  for  contempt  in  the  foreign  Court  and
enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under sections 13 and 44A  of  the
Code of Civil Procedure. Neither of these remedies is likely  to  provide  a
25 practical remedy to the party  seeking  to  enforce  the  interim  relief
obtained by it.

That being the case, it is a  distinct  possibility  that  a  foreign  party
would obtain an arbitral award in  its  favour  only  to  realize  that  the
entity against which it has to enforce the award has been  stripped  of  its
assets and has been converted into a shell company.

(ii) While the decision in BALCO was made prospective to ensure  that  hotly
negotiated bargains are not overturned overnight, it results in a  situation
where Courts, despite knowing that the decision in Bhatia is no longer  good
law, are forced to apply it whenever they are  faced  with  a  case  arising
from an arbitration agreement executed pre-BALCO.

42.The above issues have been addressed by way  of  proposed  Amendments  to
sections 2(2), 2(2A), 20, 28 and 31.”



18.   In amendments to be made to the Act, the  Law  Commission  recommended
the following:

“Amendment of Section 20

12.In section 20, delete the word  “Place”  and  add  the  words  “Seat  and
Venue” before the words “of arbitration”.

(i) In sub-section (1), after the words  ”agree  on  the”  delete  the  word
“place” and add words “seat and venue”

(ii) In sub-section (3), after the words  “meet  at  any”  delete  the  word
“place” and add word “venue”.

[NOTE: The departure from the existing  phrase  “place”  of  arbitration  is
proposed to make the wording of the Act consistent  with  the  international
usage of the concept of a “seat” of arbitration, to denote  the  legal  home
of  the  arbitration.  The  amendment  further  legislatively  distinguishes
between the “[legal] seat” from a “[mere] venue” of arbitration.]

Amendment of Section 31

17.In section 31

(i) In sub-section (4), after the words “its date and the” delete  the  word
“place” and add the word “seat”.”



19.   The amended Act, does not, however, contain the aforesaid  amendments,
presumably because the BALCO judgment in no uncertain terms has referred  to
“place” as “juridical seat” for the purpose of Section 2(2) of the Act.   It
further made it clear that Section 20(1) and 20 (2) where the  word  “place”
is used, refers to “juridical seat”, whereas in Section  20  (3),  the  word
“place” is equivalent to “venue”. This being the settled law, it  was  found
unnecessary to expressly incorporate what  the  Constitution  Bench  of  the
Supreme Court has already done by way of construction of the Act.

20.   A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions  shows  that  the  moment
the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause.   On
the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of  arbitration  is
Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear  that  jurisdiction  exclusively
vests in the Mumbai courts.  Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike  the  Code
of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts,  a  reference  to
“seat” is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen  by  the  parties
to an arbitration clause.  The neutral venue may not in the classical  sense
have jurisdiction – that is, no part of the cause of action may have  arisen
at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of  Section  16
to 21 of the CPC be attracted.  In arbitration  law  however,  as  has  been
held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the  seat  is  at
Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes  of
regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of  the  agreement  between  the
parties.

21.   It is well settled that where more than one  court  has  jurisdiction,
it is open for parties to exclude  all  other  courts.   For  an  exhaustive
analysis of the case law, see Swastik Gases Private Limited  v.  Indian  Oil
Corporation Limited, (2013) 9  SCC  32.   This  was  followed  in  a  recent
judgment  in  B.E.  Simoese  Von  Staraburg  Niedenthal   and   Another   v.
Chhattisgarh Investment Limited, (2015) 12 SCC 225.  Having  regard  to  the
above, it is clear  that  Mumbai  courts  alone  have  jurisdiction  to  the
exclusion of all other courts in the  country,  as  the  juridical  seat  of
arbitration is at Mumbai.  This being the case,  the  impugned  judgment  is
set aside.  The injunction confirmed by the impugned judgment will  continue
for a period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this  judgment,
so that the respondents may take necessary steps  under  Section  9  in  the
Mumbai Court.  Appeals are disposed of accordingly.

                      …………………………………..J.
 (PINAKI CHANDRA  GHOSE )


                                   …….…………………………… J.
                                   (R.F. NARIMAN)
New Delhi;
April 19, 2017.