It is settled law that the First Information Report is not an encyclopaedia, and if the necessary details are there, on its basis detailed narration by the witnesses cannot be doubted.; the trial court committed grave error by accepting the defence case that the deceased might have died of the injuries suffered in an accident, as the possibility was not ruled out by PW-2 Dr. C. Francis. We have carefully gone through the statement of Dr. C. Francis. What he has stated in the cross-examination is “such injuries can be caused to a person if he meets accident”. There is no suggestion of the fact that at the place of incident any vehicle had passed through at the time of the indicent. The trial court appears to have taken support of conjectures and surmises. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the High Court has correctly held that the view taken by the trial court is perverse and against the evidence on record.= where two views are possible, the High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. We agree with the principle of law that when two views are possible, the view taken by the trial court should not be disturbed, but in the present case the view taken by the trial court, as discussed above, was perverse and rightly held so by the High Court. For the reasons, as discussed above, we find no force in this appeal which is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 435 OF 2006


M. G. Eshwarappa and others                  … Appellants

                                   Versus

State of Karnataka                                 …Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T

Prafulla C. Pant, J.


This appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 07.02.2006,  passed
by the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No. 1055 of  1999  whereby
the High Court has allowed the appeal filed by the State, and  reversed  the
judgment of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,  Shimoga,  in
Sessions Case No. 40 of 1998.

Prosecution story, in brief, is that PW-16  Niranjanappa  (complainant)  was
elder brother of  accused  No.  1  M.G.  Eshwarappa.   Accused  No.  2  M.G.
Shivaraj and accused  No.  3  M.G.  Girish  are  sons  of  M.G.  Eshwarappa.
Accused No. 4 Hebballi Shivappa is brother-in-law  of  accused  No.  2  M.G.
Shivaraj.  There was a  family  dispute  between  the  complainant  and  his
brother Eshwarappa pertaining to immovable property, and reaping  of  fruits
of tamarind tree in the backyard of the complainant’s house.  There used  to
be quarrel every now and then between the families of two  brothers.   Prior
to the incident, on 03.03.1998 at  about  3.00  p.m.  the  accused  persons,
armed with deadly weapons, came to the house of  the  complainant  objecting
to the  plucking  of  tamarind  fruits  by  the  complainant’s  family,  and
threatened  them  of  dire  consequences.   With  the  intervention  of  the
neighbours dispute got pacified temporarily.   Thereafter,  as  the  accused
persons went away, the complainant along with his son  Basavaraj  (deceased)
and daughter Rajeshwari (PW-1)  went  to  Honnali  to  consult  their  legal
counsel, and to get the complaint lodged against  the  accused.   The  three
left the village Marigondanahalli at about 5.00 p.m. for  Honnali,  but  the
counsel was not found at his residence.  On this,  complainant  Niranjanappa
(PW-16) asked his son and daughter to return to the village as he wanted  to
wait for the arrival of the counsel.   At  about  6.30  p.m.  Basavaraj  and
Rajeshwari left Honnali on way back to their  village.   When  the  two  had
covered a distance of about two kilometers,  and  were  only  one  kilometer
away from their  village,  four  accused  namely  -  M.G.  Eshwarappa,  M.G.
Shivaraj, M.G. Girish and Hebballi Shivappa  intercepted  them.   Eshwarappa
(A-1) was armed with club, Shivaraj  (A-2)  was  armed  with  Kandli  (heavy
sharp edged weapon), and Girish (A-3) and Shivappa  (A-4)  were  armed  with
iron rods.  The first blow was given by Shivaraj with Kandli on the head  of
Basavaraj on which he fell down.  His sister Rajeshwari (PW-1) to  save  her
brother lied down on him and requested the accused  to  leave  her  brother.
On this Shivaraj (A-2) dragged her on one side.  In  the  process  she  also
suffered  minor  injuries.   Thereafter  Girish  (A-3)  and  Shivappa  (A-4)
assaulted already injured  Basavaraj  with  iron  rods.   Basavaraj  started
bleeding from the injuries received by him.  The accused  persons  presuming
that the injured is dead left the place.  PW-1  Rajeshwari  started  crying.
One Kammar Rudresh, who was  returning  on  a  bicycle  from  Shimoga  after
selling his flowers, asked her as to what had happened, and  then  left  for
the village to inform his family members of the  injured  in  order  to  get
some bullock cart.  This incident occurred around 7.30 p.m.  There was  moon
light.  At about 8.00 p.m. Parvathamma (PW-29) mother of the injured,  along
with other villagers reached at the spot and  injured  Basavaraj  was  first
taken to Chellur.  After some time Niranjanappa (PW-16) also reached  there,
and after engaging a motor van, the injured was taken to  Shimoga  hospital,
where he was admitted at 10.45 p.m.  However, Basavaraj could not  be  saved
and succumbed to the injuries soon after midnight  at  about  0040  hrs.   A
report (Ext. P-5) was given at the nearest Police Station Doddapet on  which
PW-28 M. Gopalappa (Station House Officer) rushed to the hospital.  He  sent
intimation (Ext. P-6) to the jurisdictional Police Station  Nyamathi,  where
the same was registered as Crime No. 49 of 1998.  PW-33 S.G.  Patil  (Police
Inspector) took up the investigation and, after taking the dead body in  his
possession,  prepared  the  inquest  report  (Ext.  P-28)  and  interrogated
witnesses including Rajeshwari (PW-1), Niranjanappa (PW-16) and  Parvathamma
(PW-29).  PW-2 Dr. C. Francis  conducted  the  post  mortem  examination  on
04.03.1998 at 11.00 a.m. and prepared the autopsy  report  (Ext.  P-2).   He
opined that the deceased had died due to shock and haemorrhage as  a  result
of injuries suffered by him on the head.   On  conclusion  of  investigation
the charge-sheet was filed against all the four accused for their  trial  in
respect of offences punishable under Sections 506, 354  and  302  read  with
Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC).

After the case was committed to the  Court  of  Sessions,  the  trial  court
framed charge of offences punishable under Sections 506, 323,  354  and  302
read with Section 34 IPC, to  which  the  accused  pleaded  not  guilty  and
claimed to be tried.  As many as 33  witnesses  were  got  examined  by  the
prosecution.  The oral and documentary evidence was put to the accused  and,
after hearing the parties, the trial court  acquitted  the  accused  holding
that the charge against them is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The State of Karnataka preferred appeal against  acquittal  of  the  accused
before the High Court.  The High Court, after re-appreciating the  evidence,
held that the finding recorded by the trial court is perverse  and  contrary
to the evidence on record.  The  appeal  was  allowed  by  the  High  Court.
(Since accused No. 3 M.G.  Girish  had  meanwhile  died,  his  appeal  stood
abated.)  The High  Court  convicted  rest  of  the  three  accused,  namely
Eshwarappa, Shivaraj and Hebballi Shivappa under Sections 506, 354  and  302
read with Section 34 IPC,  and  after  hearing  on  sentence,  each  of  the
convicts is sentenced  under  Section  302  read  with  Section  34  IPC  to
imprisonment for life and to pay fine of ?10,000/-.  In default  of  payment
of  fine,  the  defaulter,  if  any,  was  directed  to   undergo   rigorous
imprisonment for a further period of one year.   In  view  of  the  sentence
awarded in respect in respect of offence  punishable  under  Section  302/34
IPC, qua rest of the offences no punishment was awarded by the  High  Court.
The convicts have preferred  this  appeal  under  Section  379  of  Code  of
Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).  During pendency of appeal before this  Court,
appellant No. 1 (M.G. Eshwarappa) has died and his appeal stands abated.

We have heard learned counsel for the appellants (A-2 M.G. Shivaraj and  A-4
Hebballi Shivappa) and  learned  counsel  for  the  State  and  perused  the
evidence on record.

Perusal  of  the  record  shows  that  the  prosecution  got  examined  PW-1
Rajeshwari (sister of the deceased), PW-2  Dr.  C.  Francis  (who  conducted
post mortem examination), PW-3  Dr.  Nanda  Koti,  PW-4  Kammar  Rudreshi  @
Rudrachari, PW-5 H.R. Haleshi, PW-6 Basavangowda, PW-7 Eshwarappa  (not  the
accused),  PW-8  Palakshappa,  PW-9  Shankarappa,  PW-10  M.   Raju,   PW-11
Chandrashekaraiah, PW-12 B. Vasavarajappa, PW-13 T.R. Mahadevappa, PW-14  C.
Chandrappa,  PW-15  S.  H.   Parameshwarappa,   PW-16   M.G.   Nirannjanappa
(complainant), PW-17 H.N. Puttaiah,  PW-18  Shankar,  PW-19  Aravind,  PW-20
Basavarajappa @ Basappa, PW-21 M.R.  Haleshappa,  PW-22  Rudreshappa,  PW-23
Angadi Nataraja,  PW-24  Koti  Rudreshi  @  Rudreshappa,  PW-25  Dr.  Suresh
(Incharge of  General  Hospital  Honnali),  PW-26  C.R.  Umesh,  PW-27  N.M.
Shankar,  PW-28  M.  Gopalappa  (SHO  of  Police  Station  Doddapet),  PW-29
Parvathamma (mother of the deceased), PW-30  Chanabasappa,  PW-31  Laxmappa,
PW-32 M.K. Gangal and PW-33 S.G.  Patil  (Inspector,  who  investigated  the
crime).

Before further discussion, we think it just and proper to mention the  ante-
mortem injuries found on the dead body of the  deceased,  recorded  by  PW-2
Dr. C. Francis in Ext. P-2 as under: -


(1)   Lacerated wound 3” x ½” bone  deep  on  the  scalp  and  left  fronto-
parietal region.
(2)   Sutured wound ½” x ¼” on the helix of left ear.
(3)   Sutured lacerated wound ½” x ½” on the left muscular region.
(4)   Sutured wound ½” x ¼” on the back of left elbow.
(5)   Sutured wound ½” x ¼” on the back of lower right arm.
(6)   Multiple, irregular, sutured wounds about ½” x ¾” all  over  the  left
leg.
(7)   Multiple, irregular, sutured wounds situated all over the right leg.
(8)   Punctured would ¼” x ¼” bone deep situated on  the  medial  aspect  of
lower third of  right  leg.   On  dissection  the  muscles  are  irregularly
lacerated and comminuted fractures of tibia and fibula on  the  upper  third
and compound fracture of tibia and fibula at the lower  third,  the  muscles
are lacerated and plenty of blood clots present.
(9)   Diffused  swelling  of  left  arm,  on  dissection,  the  muscles  are
lacerated and large blood clots present.

      In the opinion of the  medical  officer  (PW-2  Dr.  C.  Francis),  as
mentioned in Ext. P-2, the deceased died  of  shock  and  haemorrhage  as  a
result of injury to vital organ, i.e. brain.

The star witness of the prosecution case is PW-1 Kumari M.N. Rajeshwari  who
is the sister of the  deceased.   After  narrating  the  prior  incident  of
03.03.1998 which occurred at 3.00 p.m., she has stated that her father  (PW-
16 Niranjanappa) along with her brother  (deceased)  and  herself  left  the
village Marigondanahalli at about 5.00 p.m. for  Honnali  to  consult  their
lawyer to lodge the report.  She further told that Mr.  Srinivas,  advocate,
to whom they had gone to meet, was not available at Honnali and as such  her
father decided to wait for him, and advised her and her brother to  go  back
to the village.  She further told that she left Honnali  at  6.30  p.m.  and
came with her brother Basavaraj to Kadadakatte  on  their  way  back.   PW-1
Rajeshwari has further stated that at 7.00 p.m. she and her brother  reached
Kadadakatte, and by 7.30  p.m.  they  had  covered  distance  of  about  two
kilometers on  foot,  when  the  four  accused  namely  Eshwarappa,  Girish,
Shivaraj and Shivappa appeared, and intercepted them.  Accused Girish  said,
“Anna Bandaru” (brother! they have come), and Shivaraj  (A-2)  gave  a  blow
with Kandli (heavy sharp edged  weapon)  on  the  head  of  Basavaraj.   She
further told that she lied down on her brother and pleaded  to  the  accused
to leave him, but Shivaraj (A-2) dragged her away, and thereafter Girish (A-
3) and Shivappa (A-4) assaulted Basavaraj with iron rods.  She further  told
that Shivappa (A-4) assaulted on her leg.   And  Eshwarappa  who  was  armed
with club, assaulted her brother near  his  ear,  and  also  at  the  elbow.
After assaulting the two, the  accused  persons  left  towards  the  village
uttering “Soolemaga Sathu Hoda” (he is dead).

PW-1 Rajeshwari, narrating the incident further, stated that  left  helpless
after the incident, she started crying,  when  one  Kammar  Rudresh  passing
through on bicycle came, and she told about the incident.  And said  Rudresh
went to the village and informed to the  villagers,  who  in  turn  came  in
bullock cart.   Thereafter,  in  another  bullock  cart  her  mother  (PW-29
Parvathamma) reached.  And Basavaraj  was  taken  on  a  bullock  cart  upto
Kadadakatte crossing from where an autorikshaw was engaged  up  to  Chellur.
According to  PW-1  Rajeshwari,  on  receiving  the  information  about  the
incident her father also came to Chellur, and from there  they  all  boarded
matador van, and took the injured Basavaraj to the  Shimoga  Hospital.   She
further told that  at  about  10.30  p.m.  Basavaraj  was  admitted  in  the
Hospital but succumbed to injuries in the night.  Lastly she told  that  her
father (PW-16 Niranjannappa) gave  report  to  the  police.   She  has  also
corroborated the fact that the police prepared the inquest report, and  that
she had shown place of incident to the police  during  interrogation.   PW-1
Rajeshwari has been subjected to lengthy cross-examination but  nothing  has
come out which creates doubt in her testimony.

Explaining the motive of the commission of  crime  PW-16  M.G.  Niranjanappa
(complainant) has stated that there was dispute of property between him  and
his brother (A-1 Eshwarappa) for fifteen years prior to  partition.   It  is
further stated by PW-16 Niranjanappa that in the family partition  when  the
land was partitioned, four acres of  land  was  separately  kept  aside  for
maintenance of their mother who used to live with A-1 Eshwarappa.   But  A-1
sold the property given to their mother.  He has further  stated  that  when
the mother purchased a property  in  village  Marigondanahalli,  complainant
demanded his share which was denied to him.  Not only  this,  the  house  in
which the two brothers used to live separately with  their  families,  stood
in the  name  of  the  complainant  which  A-1  Eshwarappa  demanded  to  be
transferred to his name.  A Panchayat was called which resolved the  dispute
by directing A-1 to pay ?15,000/- to the  complainant,  but  A-1  paid  only
?5000/-.  PW-16 Niranjanappa further told that about  eleven  months  before
the incident, due to above  dispute  there  was  Galata  (commotion/scuffle)
between the  rival  parties  with  regard  to  which  a  criminal  case  was
registered which was pending against A-1 Eshwarappa and A-3  Girish.   Also,
fifteen days prior to the incident in question there had been  quarrel  over
plucking of tamarind fruits by the family of the complainant.  This  witness
(PW-16 Niranjanappa) has also corroborated the fact  that  on  the  date  of
incident (03.03.1998) at 5.00 p.m. he, along with  his  son  Basavaraj   and
daughter PW-1 Rajeshwari, had gone to meet their counsel,  but  he  was  not
available, and Basavaraj and Rajeshwari were asked by him to go back to  the
village as he wanted to wait to meet the counsel.  The witness  has  further
told that he made the complaint (Ext. P-17) to the police which  was  signed
by him.

PW-30 Chanabasappa has corroborated the fact that one Rudresh  came  to  his
house on 03.03.1998 at 8.00 p.m. and informed about the  incident  on  which
he went to Chellur and saw Basavaraj in injured condition.

PW-3 Dr. Nanda Koti of Mc Gann Hospital, Shimoga, where Basavaraj was  taken
after the incident, has stated that at 10.40 p.m. the  injured  was  brought
to the hospital with the history of assault by four accused (Eshwarappa  and
others).  This witness  has  proved  the  wound  certificate  (Ext.P-4)  and
stated that the injured succumbed to injuries in the night  at  about  00.45
hours.  He further told that at  the  time  of  admission  in  the  hospital
Baswavaraj was unconscious.

PW-29 Pavarthamma has also corroborated the  prosecution  story  and  stated
that after she received the information of the incident through  one  Kammar
Rudresh, she rushed to the spot with Halesh, Nataraj, Kammar Rudresh and  M.
Rudresh  on  a  bullock  cart.   She  further  told   that   Gurushanthappa,
Basavanagowda, Umesha and Shankara had  already  reached  there  with  their
bullock cart.  She further narrated that they all took the injured  to  some
distance on bullock cart whereafter an autorikshaw was engaged upto  Chellur
and from Chellur, where her husband (Niranjanappa) also  joined,  they  took
the injured in a van to Mc Gann Hospital,  Shimoga.   She  has  also  stated
that her daughter PW-1 Rajeshwari had also suffered minor injuries.

PW-25 Dr. Suresh has stated that on 04.03.1998 (next day  of  the  incident)
he medically examined PW-1 Rajeshwari and found following  injuries  on  her
person: -

(i)   Contusion on medial aspect of the right leg which was about 3 cms x  1
cms in size.
(ii)  Pain and tenderness was present on the left side of the neck.
(iii) Abrasions on the left hand is about 1 cm x ½ cm in diameter.
(iv)  Tenderness present all over the body

            He also proved the wound certificate (Ext.P-25).

The trial court has disbelieved the evidence  of  injured  eye-witness  PW-1
Rajeshwari observing that the same is not corroborated  by  other  witnesses
of fact who have turned hostile or partly hostile.  But the trial court  has
committed grave error in ignoring the fact  that  such  witnesses  were  not
witnesses of the incident.  The prosecution case is that  they  reached  the
spot  subsequently.   The  trial  court  strangely  did  not   believe   the
prosecution story on the ground that advocate Srinivas was not  produced  by
the  prosecution.   It  is  relevant  to  mention  here  that  as  per   the
prosecution story he was not at his residence when PW-16  Niranjanappa  with
his son and daughter had gone to meet him in  connection  with  the  earlier
incident of the day.

Having gone through the entire evidence on record,  as  narrated  above,  we
agree with the High Court that the trial  court  committed  grave  error  by
accepting the defence  case  that  the  deceased  might  have  died  of  the
injuries suffered in an accident, as the possibility was not  ruled  out  by
PW-2 Dr. C. Francis.  We have carefully gone through the  statement  of  Dr.
C. Francis.  What he has stated in the cross-examination is  “such  injuries
can be caused to a person if he meets accident”.  There is no suggestion  of
the fact that at the place of incident any vehicle  had  passed  through  at
the time of the indicent.  The trial court appears to have taken support  of
conjectures and surmises.  In the circumstances, we are of the opinion  that
the High Court has correctly held that the view taken by the trial court  is
perverse and against the evidence on record.

As  discussed  above,  the  statement  of  PW-1  Rajeshwari   (injured)   is
corroborated not only from  the  statements  of  PW-16  Niranjanappa,  PW-29
Parvathamma and PW-30 Chanabasappa but also from  the  medical  evidence  on
record.  The First Information Report in the  present  case  is  prompt  and
copy of the same appears to have been sent on  the  very  next  day  to  the
Magistrate without delay.  On behalf of the State it  is  pointed  out  that
from the record it is clear that all the three  appellants  were  absconding
from the  village  after  the  incident,  and  could  be  arrested  only  on
10.03.1998.  Also, there is mention in the Wound Certificate (Ext.  P-4(b)),
issued by PW-3 Dr. Nanda Koti, regarding  history  of  assault  -  which  is
quoted below: -

                             “WOUND CERTIFICATE

      Wound or injuries found on  the  person  of  a  male  calling  himself
Basavaraj aged 28 years, an inhabitant  of  Marigondanahalli  who  was  sent
with --from -- and accompanied by Channappa for report as  certain  injuries
said to have been caused on 3.3.98 and to  be  due  to  said  to  have  been
assaulted by 4 persons, Eswarappa and others with club on  3.3.98  at  about
7.30 p.m…………………..”


On behalf of the accused/appellants Shri  B.H.  Marlapalle,  learned  senior
counsel argued that had the incident taken place in the manner suggested  by
the prosecution, the injured would  have  been  taken  to  nearest  hospital
available was at Chellur but he was  taken  to  hospital  at  Shimoga  which
creates doubt as to the place of the incident.  We  find  no  force  in  the
argument for the reason that there is nothing on record to show  that  there
were facilities to treat the critically injured patient at Chellur.  It  has
come on record that the injured was in  a  critical  condition  and  he  was
unconscious when admitted in Shimoga hospital.  Merely for the  reason  that
one doctor used to be posted at  Chellur  does  not  mean  that  there  were
facilities to treat the patient of  critical  condition,  as  such,  in  our
opinion, there  appears  nothing  unusual  in  taking  the  injured  to  the
hospital where the injured could be given better treatment and time  is  not
lost.
The another argument advanced on behalf of the appellants is that there  are
no details of  assault  in  the  First  Information  Report  and  the  story
narrated by PW-1 Rajeshwari is nothing  but  an  improvement.   However,  on
carefully going through the  First  Information  Report  we  find  that  all
necessary facts are narrated and only  the  details  like  from  which  side
particular accused came are not stated.  It is settled law  that  the  First
Information Report is not an encyclopaedia, and  if  the  necessary  details
are there, on its basis  detailed  narration  by  the  witnesses  cannot  be
doubted.
The third point raised before us is that in the wound certificate  (Ext.  P-
4) there are only  two  injuries,  i.e.  bone  fracture  of  right  leg  and
puncture  wound  below  left  angle  of  mandible  covered  with  blood  are
mentioned, while in the post  mortem  report  there  are  nine  ante  mortem
injuries.  As such there is apparent discrepancy between the two  documents.
 On deeper scrutiny, we find that there is  no  material  contradiction  for
the reason that PW-3 Dr. Nanda Koti has proved Ext. P-4(b)  wherein  it  has
been mentioned that the patient needed immediate treatment,  as  such,  only
gross injuries were entered in the register (not  the  minor  injuries)  and
the patient was shifted to emergency ward.  In the cross-examination he  has
clearly  stated  that  Basavaraj  (deceased)  was   unconscious.    In   the
circumstances, addition of stitched wounds in post mortem report (Ext.  P-2)
does not create doubt regarding the incident in question.

As to the source of light it is argued that it is not clear as to  how  PW-1
Rajeshwari recognized the accused.  Had the accused  been  unknown  persons,
we would have accepted this argument.  But the accused were close  relatives
living in the house of the witness, as such, it cannot be said that  it  was
difficult at all for her to recognize them when they assaulted  her  brother
at 7.30 p.m. on the way back from Honnali to Marigondanahalli.


Shri  B.H.  Marlapalle  further  contended  that  not  recording  of   dying
declaration of the deceased is a material fact in the present case.  We  are
unable to agree with the  contention  of  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
reason that it has come on record that the deceased was not in  a  conscious
condition when he was admitted in  the  hospital.   As  such,  there  is  no
question of recording  of  dying  declaration  of  the  patient  in  such  a
critical condition.

Learned senior counsel for the appellants drew our attention to the case  of
Irlapati Subbaya v. The Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh[1], and  submitted
that in the similar circumstances this Court did not find sufficient  reason
for the High Court to set aside the order of acquittal.  On perusal of  said
case law, we find that that was  a  case  where  prosecution  witnesses  had
given different time of occurrence between  noon  and  just  before  sunset.
There was also doubt as to the place of incident in said case.  But  in  the
present case there is no doubt either as to the time of incident or  to  the
place of incident.

Next case referred on behalf  of  the  appellants  is  Joseph  v.  State  of
Kerala[2], and it is submitted that the evidence of  the  sole  injured  eye
witness should not be accepted without corroboration and caution.  On  going
through the case law referred, we find that  this  Court  observed  in  said
case that the testimony of the sole injured eye witness was not reliable  as
there were two separate versions of the incident in  two  First  Information
Reports and one was suppressed.  The First Information  Report  relied  upon
was found doubtful as PW-1 himself did not acknowledge his signature in  the
First Information Report relied by the prosecution.  In  the  present  case,
in  our  opinion,  the  evidence  of   PW-1   Rajeshwari   is   sufficiently
corroborated from the statements of PW-16  Niranjanappa,  PW-29  Parvathamma
and PW-30 Chanabasappa.


Lastly, learned senior counsel for the appellants referred to  the  case  of
Muluwa son of Binda and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh[3] and  it  is
submitted that where two views are  possible,  the  High  Court  should  not
interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court.   We  agree
with the principle of law that when two views are possible, the  view  taken
by the trial court should not be disturbed, but  in  the  present  case  the
view taken by the trial court, as discussed above, was perverse and  rightly
held so by the High Court.

For the reasons, as discussed above, we find no force in this  appeal  which
is liable to be dismissed.  Accordingly, the same is dismissed.

The appellants M.G. Shivaraj and Hebballi Shivappa (appellant   Nos.  2  and
3) are on bail.  Their bail bonds  stand  cancelled  and  the  sureties  are
discharged.  They shall  surrender  forthwith  before  the  trial  court  to
undergo the sentence awarded by the High Court.



                                                            ………………………..…….J.
                                                               [N.V. Ramana]



                                                            ………………………..…….J.
                                                          [Prafulla C. Pant]
New Delhi;
March 02, 2017.

-----------------------
[1]    (1974) 4 SCC 293
[2]    (2003) 1 SCC 465
[3]    (1976) 1 SCC 37

This Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth.- We accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions but while doing so, direct that: (i) the petitioners shall vacate the premises on or before 7 March 2017; (ii) In case the petitioners fail to vacate the premises by the date indicated in (i) above, they shall expose themselves to civil and criminal consequences under the law; (iii) the petitioners shall pay all arrears for use of the premises computed at the rate fixed in the order of this Court dated 28 August 2015 within four weeks; and (iv) the petitioners shall pay costs quantified at Rs 5 lakhs (Rupees five lakhs) to the respondents within two months.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

              SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS. 25331-33 OF 2015



DNYANDEO SABAJI NAIK AND ANR                   ..Petitioners



                                   VERSUS


MRS.PRADNYA PRAKASH KHADEKAR
AND ORS
..Respondents




                               J U D G M E N T



 Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

1.          The Special Leave Petitions  in  the  present  case  arise  from
three orders of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in a First Appeal:

(i) an order dated 22 November 2013 by which a year’s time  was  granted  to
the petitioners (in terms as prayed) to vacate  the  premises  which  formed
the subject matter of a decree for eviction, until 30 November 2014;

(ii) an order dated 2 December 2013 by which the High Court disposed of  the
First Appeal in terms of the undertaking filed by the petitioners; and

(iii) an order dated 16 June 2015 by which the petition for review has  been
dismissed.  There is a delay  of  503  and  522  days  respectively  in  the
Special Leave Petitions filed against the orders dated 2 December  2013  and
22 November 2013.  Since the petitioners moved the High Court in a  petition
for review, we condone the  delay  and  having  heard  counsel,  proceed  to
dispose of the Special Leave Petitions by this judgment.

2.          The subject  matter  of  the  dispute  comprises  of  commercial
premises bearing Shop No.8 A, Bhatia  Bhuvan  Ground  Floor,  D  S  Babrekar
Marg, Off Gokhale Road (North), Dadar, Mumbai   400  028.   The  finding  of
fact (as will be elucidated hereafter) is that  the  premises  were  granted
under a  conducting  agreement  to  the  petitioners  for  carrying  on  the
business of a laundry. The case of  the  original  plaintiff  who  sued  for
possession was that the premises were granted on the basis of  a  conducting
agreement on 31 July 1968 on a royalty of Rs.260 per month.   The  suit  for
eviction was filed against the petitioners in the Court of Small  Causes  on
26 April 1984.  Initially, the  suit was decreed on 15  September  1999.  In
an appeal filed by the petitioners, the appellate Bench of the Small  Causes
Court by a judgment dated 10 January 2002 held that  since  the  petitioners
were in occupation of the premises under a conducting agreement,  there  was
no relationship of licensor and licensee.  As a result,  the Court of  Small
Causes was held to have no jurisdiction under Section 41 of  the  Presidency
Small Causes Courts’ Act.  The appeal against the  judgment  and  decree  of
the Trial Court was hence allowed. The judgment of the appellate  Bench  was
questioned in a Writ Petition filed by the  predecessor-in-interest  of  the
respondents.  The petition was dismissed by a learned Single  Judge  of  the
High Court on 24 June 2002.

3.          The respondents thereupon instituted a suit in  the  City  Civil
Court for recovering possession of the premises.  The suit was decreed by  a
judgment  dated 5 May 2012.  The trial judge entered a finding of fact  that
the premises had been given on a  conducting  basis.   In  support  of  this
finding, the trial Judge adverted to the admission of  the  first  defendant
in certain proceedings which were instituted before the Labour  Court  under
the Payment of Wages Act to the effect that the laundry had been taken  over
on a conducting basis from the original Plaintiff.  The finding recorded  by
the trial judge was in the following terms :

“The question to be considered in this case is as to  whether  the  business
of the laundry was given to the defendant no.1 on conducting basis  or  not.
It is pertinent to note that the workers of the  Kismet  Laundry  had  filed
case in the Labour Court  under  the  Payment  of  Wages  Act  bearing  Case
nos.530 of 1974  and  531  of  1974  against  the  defendant  no.1  and  the
plaintiff. In that case defendant no.1 had given evidence.  He has  admitted
that he has taken laundry  business  “Kismat  Laundry”  for  conducting  the
laundry business on 01/08/1968 on payment of royalty of  Rs.260/-  from  the
plaintiff.  In his cross-examination DW-1 Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik in this  suit
admitted about giving  deposition  in  the  labour  Court.  Thus,  from  the
admissions of the  defendant  no.1  it  is  established  that  the  original
plaintiff had given laundry business on conducting basis  to  the  defendant
no.1.  In his cross-examination defendant no.1  has  also  further  admitted
that stock-in-trade, furniture relating to the business were  given  to  him
and the royalty of Rs.260/- per month was fixed. He has  also  not  disputed
the receipts which were issued by the  plaintiff  accepting  of  payment  of
royalty  of  Rs.260/-  from  the  defendant  no.1  towards  conducting   his
business.  Moreover the copy of license issued under the  Bombay  Shops  and
Establishment Act produced  in  the  Small  Causes  Court  relating  to  the
business run from the suit premises has been admitted by the defendant  no.1
in his evidence.  It is admitted that in the licence the  name  of  business
of Kismat Laundry managed by  Bluestar  Art  Dyers  and  Cleaners  has  been
mentioned.  In the licence Narayan Narvakar was shown as the owner and  Naik
was shown as conductor of business.  Thus, on the basis of  the  documentary
evidence  and  on  the  admissions  of  the  defendant  no.1  it  has   been
established by the plaintiffs that the suit premises  and  business  therein
was given on conducting basis to the defendant no.1.”



4.          Against the judgment and order of  the  Trial  Court,  decreeing
the suit for possession, the  petitioners  filed  a  First  Appeal.   On  22
November 2013, the learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  passed  the
following order in the First Appeal :

“In this Appeal, after  hearing  the  learned  counsel  for  the  Appellants
fully, I disclose that there is no merit in  the  Appeal.  However,  as  the
Appellants have been conducting the business  at  the  suit  premises  since
more than 40 years, it  was  suggested  that  some  time  can  be  given  to
Appellants to vacate  the  suit  premises.   The  learned  counsel  for  the
Appellants sought instructions and makes statement that the  Appellants  are
ready to give undertaking that they will vacate  the  suit  premises  on  or
before 30th November, 2014.  The learned counsel for  the  Respondent  Nos.1
and 3 submits that Appellants to disclose the names of all the occupants  of
the suit premises.

2.    The learned counsel for the Respondents submits that  if  the  Royalty
of Rs.5,000/- per month as directed by this Court is continued  to  be  paid
till 30th November, 2014 and undertaking be given that Appellants  will  not
alienate the property or create any third party right in any manner  in  the
suit property or  part  with  the  possession  of  the  property,  then  the
Respondents are ready and willing to accept the said undertaking  and  ready
to accommodate the Appellants by giving time to  Appellants  to  vacate  the
suit premises.

3.    In view of this  development  and  submissions  made  by  the  learned
counsel of both the sides, Appellants to give their undertaking. Stand  over
to 29th November, 2013 at 3.00 p.m.”



5.           In  pursuance  of  the  above  order,  the  petitioners   filed
undertakings to vacate the premises on or  before  30  November  2014.   The
petitioners took the benefit of the order of the High Court  by  which  they
were granted a year’s time to vacate the premises.  The undertakings  formed
the basis of the order of the learned Single Judge  dated  2  December  2013
when the First Appeal was disposed of.  The matter did not rest  there.   An
application for extension of time to vacate the premises  was  filed  before
the High Court which  was  allowed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  in  the
following terms, by an order dated 5 December 2014 :

“Application is moved for extension of time till 31st  May,  2015  and  also
seeking leave to deposit the rent from September, 2014 onwards.  This  Court
by order dated 2nd December, 2013, has granted  time  to  the  applicant  to
vacate the suit premises till 30th November, 2014.  Now the applicant  seeks
extension of time.  The learned counsel for the applicant submits  that  his
daughter is doing her post graduation and the applicant wants some  time  to
find out other premises for their laundry business. The learned counsel  for
the respondent submits that the applicants have  put  up  partition  in  the
suit premises and abused respondent when they went to take  possession  30th
November, 2014 at 7.00 p.m. In view of the  submissions,  Civil  Application
is disposed of by passing the following order.

                                    Order

Applicant shall vacate  the  premises  and  hand  over  possession  of  suit
premises to respondent at 7.00 p.m. on 31st March, 2015.



This is the last extension and hereafter no extension will be given.



Applicant to remove any construction i.e. partition if put up  at  the  time
of handing over possession.



The applicant shall give  undertaking  to  that  effect  on  or  before  9th
December, 2014.



The applicant is directed to deposit the arrears  of  rent  from  September,
2014 onwards till 31st March, 2015, on or before 17th December, 2014.”





6.          By and as a result of the above order, the petitioners  obtained
an  extension of time until 31  March  2015  to  vacate  the  premises.  The
petitioners then filed a Review Petition before the High Court on  17  March
2015.  Together with the Review  Petition,  the  petitioners  filed  another
application for extension of time  to  vacate  the  premises  by  a  further
period of  five  years.  The  learned  Single  Judge  dismissed  the  Review
Petition on 16 June 2015.

7.          The petitioners moved  this  Court  under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution. On 28 August 2015, notice was issued in  the  application  for
condonation of delay as well as on the Special Leave Petitions  and  a  stay
of dispossession was granted conditional on the  petitioners  depositing  an
amount of Rs 15,000 towards compensation for using the premises with  effect
from 1 December 2013.

8.           The  submission  which  has  been  urged  on  behalf   of   the
petitioners is  that  the  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  was
manifestly in error in rejecting the First Appeal without  reasons.  It  was
urged that the petitioners would be entitled  to  assail  the  judgment  and
order dated 22 November 2013 on merits notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the
petitioners had filed an undertaking to vacate the premises by  30  November
2014. In support of the submission reliance was  placed  on  a  judgment  of
this Court in P R Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti[1]   to  advance  the
submission that the filing of an undertaking does not disentitle a  litigant
to question the legality of the judgment dismissing the First Appeal.

9.          We are unable to accept the contention which has  been  advanced
on behalf of the  petitioners.   The  order  of  the  High  Court  dated  22
November 2013 indicates that  at  the  hearing  of  the  First  Appeal,  the
learned Single  Judge  indicated  to  the  petitioners  that  she  found  no
substance in the First Appeal. At this stage, counsel for  the  petitioners,
upon seeking instructions, stated that the petitioners  would be willing  to
furnish an undertaking to vacate the premises  by  30  November  2014.   The
respondents acceded to  this  request  subject  to  the  compensation  being
determined at  Rs  5000  per  month  as  was  directed  by  the  High  Court
previously. The order of the High Court indicates that the petitioners  were
granted  a  period  of  ten  days  even  thereafter  to  reflect  upon   the
undertaking which they were to file and it was only on 2 December 2013  that
the First Appeal was eventually disposed of in  terms  of  the  undertaking.
The petitioners sought and obtained the benefit of an order granting them  a
period of one year to vacate the premises. The matter did  not  rest  there.
The petitioners moved the High Court again for extension of time  which  was
allowed to them by an order dated 5 December 2014.  The order  of  the  High
Court indicates that the  extension  was  sought  on  the  ground  that  the
daughter of the applicant was pursing  her  post  graduate  studies  and  in
order to enable the petitioners  “to  find  out  other  premises  for  their
laundry business”.  This sequence of events leaves no manner of  doubt  that
the undertaking was  not  called  for  by  the  High  Court  to  secure  the
occupation of the premises during the period that the petitioner would  have
required to further assail the order of the High Court in this  Court.   The
petitioners, on  the  contrary,  clearly  indicated  that  they  would  rest
content with a time of one year to vacate the premises and in fact  obtained
a further extension of time of four months even  after  the  expiry  of  the
initial term of one year.

10.         The judgment of this Court in P R Deshpande  (supra)  lays  down
the following principle:

“11. A party to a lis can be asked to give an undertaking to  the  court  if
he requires  stay  of  operation  of  the  judgment.   It  is  done  on  the
supposition that the order would remain unchanged.  By directing  the  party
to give such an undertaking, no court can scuttle or foreclose  a  statutory
remedy of appeal or revision, much less a  constitutional  remedy.   If  the
order is reversed or modified by the superior court or even the  same  court
on a review, the undertaking given by the party will automatically cease  to
operate.  Merely because a party has complied with the directions  to  given
an undertaking as a condition for obtaining stay, he cannot be  presumed  to
communicate to the other party that he is thereby giving  up  his  statutory
remedies to challenge the order.”



11.         The above principle applies in a situation where an  undertaking
is filed by a litigant, as a part of a condition for stay  of  operation  of
the judgment of the High Court.  The filing of such an undertaking does  not
deprive the litigant of the remedy to question  the  judgment  of  the  High
Court under Article  136  of  the  Constitution.   Such  a  situation  must,
however, be distinguished  from  a  case  (such  as  the  present)  where  a
litigant rests content with seeking time to  vacate  the  premises  and  the
circumstances of the case indicate that  the  litigant  did  not  intend  to
pursue any further  remedy before this Court to assail the judgment  of  the
High Court.  Having furnished an unconditional  undertaking  to  vacate  the
premises,  it  would  be  manifestly  an  abuse  of  the  process  for   the
petitioners to seek recourse to their remedies on the merits of  the  issues
which arose in the First Appeal.

12.         This case indicates a  blatant  abuse  of  the  process  of  the
Court.  The petitioners not only took the benefit of an order  of  the  High
Court granting them one year’s time to vacate the premises  but  obtained  a
further extension of a period of four months  to  vacate.   The  petitioners
then filed a Review  Petition  before  the  High  Court  and  moved  another
application, this time seeking an extension of  five  years  to  vacate  the
premises.  The time of the High Court and, unfortunately, of this  Court  as
well had to be  devoted  to  a  thoroughly  frivolous  proceeding.   Learned
counsel for the petitioners in fact sought to urge that as a result  of  the
judgment of the City Civil Court, the  petitioners  have  been  deprived  of
establishing that their status as licensees fructified into a  tenancy  with
effect from 1 February 1973. Quite apart from the  fact  that  such  a  plea
would not be open to the petitioners in the  background  of  what  has  been
observed earlier, we find even on merits that the submission  requires  only
be stated to be rejected.  We have extracted in the  earlier  part  of  this
judgment the specific finding of the Trial Court based on the admissions  of
the predecessor-in-interest  of  the  petitioners  that  the  premises  were
granted to them on the basis of a conducting  agreement.  Besides  this,  in
the earlier proceeding that was instituted in the  Small  Causes  Court,  it
was found that the premises have been granted under a  conducting  agreement
and there was no relationship of  licensor  and  licensee.  That  being  the
position, the petitioners would not acquire status as  tenants  with  effect
from 1 February 1973, there being no licence in their favour.

13.         This Court must view with disfavour any attempt  by  a  litigant
to abuse  the  process.  The  sanctity  of  the  judicial  process  will  be
seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant  who
takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of  the  Court  should
be left in no doubt about the consequences  to  follow.  Others  should  not
venture along the same path in the hope or on  a  misplaced  expectation  of
judicial leniency.  Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even  necessary,  in
order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in  our
country, there is no premium on the truth.

14.         Courts across the  legal  system  -  this  Court  not  being  an
exception – are choked with litigation.  Frivolous  and  groundless  filings
constitute a serious menace to the administration of justice.  They  consume
time and clog the infrastructure.   Productive  resources  which  should  be
deployed in the handling of genuine causes are dissipated  in  attending  to
cases filed only to benefit  from  delay,  by  prolonging  dead  issues  and
pursuing worthless causes.  No  litigant  can  have  a  vested  interest  in
delay.  Unfortunately, as the  present  case  exemplifies,  the  process  of
dispensing justice is misused by the unscrupulous to the  detriment  of  the
legitimate. The present case is an illustration of how a  simple  issue  has
occupied the time of the courts and  of  how  successive  applications  have
been filed to prolong  the  inevitable.  The  person  in  whose  favour  the
balance of justice lies has in  the  process  been  left  in  the  lurch  by
repeated attempts to revive a stale issue.   This  tendency  can  be  curbed
only if courts across the  system  adopt  an  institutional  approach  which
penalizes such behavior.  Liberal access to justice does not mean access  to
chaos and indiscipline.  A strong message must be conveyed  that  courts  of
justice will not  be  allowed  to  be  disrupted  by  litigative  strategies
designed to profit from the delays of the law.  Unless  remedial  action  is
taken by all courts here and now our society  will  breed  a  legal  culture
based on evasion instead of abidance.  It is the  duty  of  every  court  to
firmly deal with such situations.  The imposition of exemplary  costs  is  a
necessary instrument which has to be deployed to weed out,  as  well  as  to
prevent the filing of frivolous cases.  It is only then that the courts  can
set apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the  concerns  of  those
who are in need of justice. Imposition of real time costs is also  necessary
to ensure that access to  courts  is  available  to  citizens  with  genuine
grievances.  Otherwise, the doors would be shut to legitimate causes  simply
by the  weight  of  undeserving  cases  which  flood  the  system.   Such  a
situation cannot be allowed to come to pass.   Hence  it  is  not  merely  a
matter of discretion but a duty and  obligation  cast  upon  all  courts  to
ensure that the legal system is not exploited by those who use the forms  of
the law to defeat or delay justice. We  commend  all  courts  to  deal  with
frivolous filings in the same manner.

15.         We accordingly dismiss the Special  Leave  Petitions  but  while
doing so, direct that:

(i)   the petitioners shall vacate the premises on or before 7 March 2017;

(ii)  In case the petitioners fail  to  vacate  the  premises  by  the  date
indicated in (i) above, they shall expose themselves to civil  and  criminal
consequences under the law;

(iii)       the petitioners shall pay all arrears for use  of  the  premises
computed at the rate fixed in the order of this Court dated 28  August  2015
within four weeks; and

(iv)  the petitioners shall pay costs quantified at Rs 5 lakhs (Rupees  five
lakhs) to the respondents within two months.

16.         We  also  clarify  that  this  judgment  shall  not  affect  the
contempt proceedings which have been initiated against the petitioners.

17.         There shall be an order in these terms.




...........................................CJI
                                              [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR]



.............................................J
                                               [Dr  D Y  CHANDRACHUD]




….........................................J
                                               [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]

New Delhi;
March 1, 2017

-----------------------
[1]   [2] [(1998) 6 SCC 507]


-----------------------
|REPORTABLE        |

the employee filed a response on 13.01.2017 reiterating that she had “... actually applied for revaluation of Part II of CAIIB Examination in the year 2000 ...”. A copy of the application also was produced along with reply as Annexure-R1. It is a handwritten letter by the Management-Bank to the Institute of Bankers on 08.09.2000 but enclosing a draft dated 14.09.2000. There is also an alleged endorsement of receipt of the letter by the Institute on 18.09.2000 on hand delivery. It may be noted that the forged certificate of pass in the examination and the memorandum accompanying it are dated 04.09.2000. One wonders as to what was the need for revaluation once a candidate had been declared successful on 04.09.2000, leave alone the anachronic error on the dates on the application and the draft! We reluctantly refrain from making any further observations in this regard.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                           SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3423  OF 2017
                (Arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No. 33070/2013)


THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF INDIA   ...  APPELLANT (S)



                                   VERSUS



SMITA SHARAD DESHMUKH AND ANOTHER   ... RESPONDENT (S)



                           J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T



KURIAN, J.:



Leave granted.

The appellant (hereinafter referred to as “the Management”) is aggrieved  by
the impugned judgment  of  the  High  Court  whereby  the  first  respondent
(hereinafter referred to as “the employee”) was directed  to  be  reinstated
in service with 50 per cent back wages, reversing the order  passed  by  the
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. The employee, while working  with  the
Management,  submitted  a  certificate  purportedly  issued  by  the  Indian
Institute of  Bankers  claiming  that  she  had  passed  the  CAIIB  Part-II
Examination,  and  on  that  basis,  started  drawing  additional   monetary
benefits. The Disciplinary Authority, based on the  finding  in  a  domestic
enquiry that the certificate was a forged one, dismissed  her  from  service
on 01.08.2003. The punishment was upheld by  the  Appellate  Authority  vide
order dated 10.06.2006. The Industrial  Tribunal-cum-Labour  Court  declined
to grant any relief. However, the High Court ordered reinstatement  with  50
per cent back wages, and  thus  aggrieved,  the  Management  has  filed  the
appeal.

The only ground on which the High Court interfered with the award  was  that
the Management had not established, by leading evidence, that  the  employee
was aware of the fact that the certificate produced  before  the  Management
was forged. To quote from impugned judgment:
“6. The question, therefore, before the  Enquiry  Officer  was  whether  the
petitioner knew at the time of submission of the  forged  document  that  it
was forged one. The Presenting Officer in the domestic enquiry did not  lead
any evidence to prove the knowledge and it appears  that  everyone  went  on
presuming that the petitioner knew about the  forgery  since  prior  to  its
production before the employer. Due to the fact that she produced it on  the
employer’s record and that she received monetary benefits  because  of  such
production, every one believed  that  she  ought  to  know  that  it  was  a
forgery. This  conclusion  of  the  Enquiry  Officer  is  grossly  incorrect
because it is based on guess work. He could have said that there  is  strong
doubt in his mind that the petitioner knew before hand that the  certificate
was a forgery. But, he ought to have asked the Presenting  Officer  to  lead
further evidence to prove that the petitioner knew  that  the  document  she
produced was forgery. Neither the Presenting  Officer  realised  this  gross
lacuna in their case. On the basis of this  guess  and  doubt,  the  enquiry
officer held the petitioner guilty of  misconduct.  This,  in  my  view  was
grossly incorrect decision.”





We find it difficult to appreciate the  strange  stand  taken  by  the  High
Court. The Labour Court had clearly analysed the  entire  evidence  and  had
come to the conclusion that the employee was fully  aware  of  the  forgery.
The Tribunal took note of the fact that she  had  produced  a  copy  of  the
postal receipt of dispatching the certificate from the Institute of  Bankers
in her evidence but failed to explain the source of the postal  receipt.  It
also took note of the fact that the alleged  certificate  of  having  passed
the examination is dated 04.09.2000. If that be so, there  was  no  occasion
for asking for               any re-verification of the marks by  filing  an
application dated 08.09.2000. Still further, the Court extensively  referred
to the reply  furnished  by  the  Institute  of  Bankers  and  came  to  the
conclusion that the certificate was a forged one. To quote  from  paragraph-
10 of the award dated 30.08.2011  passed  by  the  Industrial  Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court:

“10. ....The workman has claimed  that she received  the  pass  certificates
from the Indian Institute of Bankers by registered speed post  in  her  home
address and filed the same before the authority. In support  of  her  claim,
she filed an envelope to show that the certificate in question was  sent  to
her in the said envelop by the Indian Institute of  Bankers.  However,  from
by merely filing of the envelope, it cannot be held that the certificate  in
question was sent by the Institute in question to the workman  in  the  said
envelope. Moreover, there are other suspicious  circumstances  which  create
doubt regarding the said claim  of  the  workman.  If  the  certificate  was
actually sent in the said envelop by the  Indian  Institute  of  Bankers  by
registered speed post from Mumbai to the workman in her home  address,  then
the  receipt  granted  by  the  post  office  for  sending  the  envelop  by
registered speed post must have been  granted   to  the  institute  and  the
institute should have in possession of the  same  in  the  office,  to  keep
account of the same, but the workman has also filed the zerox  copy  of  the
receipt alongwith  of the envelope, to show the  date  of  dispatch  of  the
envelope, but she did not say how she was in possession of the  said  postal
receipt.  It is also pleaded by the workman in the statement of  claim  that
she failed in part II of CAIIB examination and applied for  verification  of
marks visiting in person to CAIIB office at Mumbai and on  verification  and
revaluation, she was declared pass. In the statement of claim  she  had  not
mentioned the date of her visit to CAIIB office. However, she has filed  the
zerox copy of the  letter,  Exhibit  W-17  to  show  that  she  applied  for
revaluation of her answer paper and  the  said  letter  shows  that  it  was
submitted on 18.9.2000.  However, Exhibit W-15, filed by the  workman  shows
that by letter dated 4.9.2000, she was intimated by the Indian Institute  of
Bankers that she had completed the Associate examination  of  the  Institute
and is entitled to receive the relevant  certificate.  If  the  workman  had
received the intimation of completion of the examination, then there was  no
question of her applying for revaluation of the  examination  paper  and  if
she had failed in the examination  and  she  approached  the  Institute  for
revaluation of her answer paper on 18.09.2000, then there  was  no  question
of the Institute intimating her by letter  dated  04.09.2000  regarding  her
completion of the examination and issuance of  the  certificate.  So  it  is
clear from the  materials  produced  by  the  parties  in  the  departmental
proceedings that the workman knowingly  produced  the  pass  certificate  of
part II CAIIB examination, which was a fabricated one, for monetary gain  on
ongoing basis and the findings of the  enquiry  officer  are  based  on  the
materials on record and are not perverse.....”



The evidence led by the employee, as rightly appreciated by  the  Industrial
Tribunal, would clearly show that she had the knowledge  that  the  document
she produced was a forged one. Therefore, there was no  requirement  on  the
part of the Management to establish whether she had known, at  the  time  of
submission of the document, that it was a forged one.



It  is  a  well-settled   principle   that   the   High   Court   will   not
        re-appreciate the evidence  but  will  only  see  whether  there  is
evidence in support of the impugned conclusion. The court has  to  take  the
evidence as it stands and its  only  limited  jurisdiction  is  to  examine,
whether on the evidence, the conclusion could have been arrived at.  (See  -
Union of India v.  H.C. Goel[1]) .



In the case of Bank of India and another v. Degala  Suryanarayana[2],  after
referring to H.C. Goel case (supra), this Court held at paragraph-11 :-

“11. Strict rules of evidence are not  applicable  to  departmental  enquiry
proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against  the
delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which  a
reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity  may  arrive  at  a
finding  upholding  the  gravamen  of  the  charge  against  the  delinquent
officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain  the  finding  of  guilt
even  in  departmental  enquiry  proceedings.  The  court   exercising   the
jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere  with  the  findings  of
fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a  case
of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no  evidence  to  support  a
finding or where a finding is such that no man acting  reasonably  and  with
objectivity could have arrived at that  finding.  The  court  cannot  embark
upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing  the  same  like  an  appellate
authority. So long as there is  some  evidence  to  support  the  conclusion
arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. …”


We do not think it necessary to refer to any other  judgments  on  the  same
point, since the same principle has been only  followed  and  reiterated  in
all those decisions.



In the case before us, it is  an  admitted  position  that  the  certificate
produced by the employee is a forged one. It has  been  categorically  found
by the Industrial Tribunal, on the basis of evidence, that the employee  was
fully aware of the fact  that  the  document  was  a  forged  one.  In  such
circumstances, there is no basis at all for the  stand  taken  by  the  High
Court that the Management did not establish that the employee had  knowledge
about the certificate being a forged one.



Despite the factual and legal position  as  above,  we  had  made  one  more
attempt for the verification  of  the  certificate  from  the  Institute  of
Bankers. Thus, on 08.08.2016, this Court passed the following order:

“The Deputy Director (Examinations)  of  The  Indian  Institute  of  Bankers
shall inform this Court as to whether the  candidate  Mrs.  S.  S.  Deshmukh
(Membership No. 5880536) had actually applied for revaluation of Part II  of
CAIIB Examination in the year 2000 and what is  the  action  taken  on  that
application and also whether the action thus taken,  was  informed  to  Mrs.
Deshmukh.



Needless to say that in the report, it would  be  made  clear  that  whether
Mrs. Deshmukh had actually passed in the revaluation.



The report shall be submitted to the Registrar of  this  Court  within  four
weeks from today.



The Registry shall communicate a copy of this order to the Deputy  Director,
Indian Institute of Bankers forthwith.



In addition, a copy of  this  order  be  given  Dasti  to  the  parties  for
communication.



Post on 21.09.2016.”



The Institute has, by its  letter  dated  03.09.2016,  informed  this  Court
that:

“Ref : IIBF/CO/EXAM/4832/2016        3rd September, 2016

The Registrar

Supreme Court of India,

Tilak Marg,

New Delhi-110 201

(India)



Sir,



Re: SLP (C) No. 33070/2013

In the matter of –



The Management of State Bank of India

                            v/s

Smita Sharad Deshmukh & Another.



This has reference to order date the 8th August, 2016 by the  Hon’ble  Court
in the captioned matter interalia seeking details from the Institute  as  to
whether the candidate  Mrs.  S.S.  Deshmukh  (Membership  No.  5880536)  had
actually applied for revaluation of part II of CAIIB Examination.



In this connection this is to inform that Mrs.  Deshmukh  had  appeared  for
following  2  subjects  in  May/June  2000  Examination  conducted  by   the
Institute and has secured the marks shown against each of the subjects.

      1. Practice & Law of Banking – 45  Marks

      2. Indian Economics Problem – 23 Marks



This is to  inform  further  that  the  Institute  has  provision  only  for
verification of marks and no request was received  from  Mrs.  Deshmukh  for
verification of marks in connection with above said examination.



Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,



(Joint Director)

Examination”



Despite the clear position as  above,  the  employee  filed  a  response  on
13.01.2017 reiterating that she had “... actually  applied  for  revaluation
of Part II of CAIIB Examination in  the  year  2000  ...”.  A  copy  of  the
application also was produced along with  reply  as  Annexure-R1.  It  is  a
handwritten letter by the Management-Bank to the  Institute  of  Bankers  on
08.09.2000 but enclosing  a  draft  dated  14.09.2000.   There  is  also  an
alleged endorsement of receipt of the letter by the Institute on  18.09.2000
on hand delivery. It may be noted that the forged  certificate  of  pass  in
the examination and the memorandum accompanying  it  are  dated  04.09.2000.
One wonders as to what was the need for revaluation  once  a  candidate  had
been declared successful on 04.09.2000, leave alone the anachronic error  on
the dates on the application and the  draft!  We  reluctantly  refrain  from
making any further observations in this regard.



Though learned counsel for  the  employee  made  a  persuasive  attempt  for
modification of punishment on the ground of disproportionality, in  view  of
the conduct of the employee which we have referred  to  above,  we  are  not
inclined to take a different  view  from  that  taken  by  the  Disciplinary
Authority,  Appellate  Authority  and  the  Industrial   Tribunal-cum-Labour
Court.



The impugned judgment of the High Court is  set  aside  and  the  appeal  is
allowed. However, we make it clear that there shall be no  recovery  of  the
wages and benefits already paid to her.



There shall be no order as to costs.



............................J.
(KURIAN JOSEPH)




............................J.
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)

NEW DELHI;
MARCH 1, 2017.
-----------------------
[1]     (1964) 4 SCR 718
[2]     (1999) 5 SCC 762

Once there are more than one private operators then the Clause will not apply. The decision taken by Paradip Port Trust could not be termed to be arbitrary, perverse or mala fide. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the same. In this view of the matter, both the Civil Appeals are allowed. The Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the second consortium before the High Court is dismissed.

                                         REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURSIDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3422 OF 2017
      (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil )No.23241 of 2016)

JSW Infrastructure Limited and Anr.                ..  Appellant(s)

                                   Versus

Kakinada Seaports Limited and Ors.                     ..Respondent(s)

                                    With

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3424 OF 2017
      (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)No. 23695 of 2016)

                               J U D G M E N T

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

      Leave granted.

2.    These two Civil Appeals are  directed  against  the  judgment  of  the
Division Bench of the Orissa High Court dated 14th July, 2016, whereby  Writ
Petition No.4895 of  2016,  filed  by  the  consortium  comprising  of   M/s
Kakinada Seaports Limited, M/s Bothra Shipping  Service  Pvt.  Ltd.,M/s  MBG
Commodities Pvt. Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as  the  second  consortium)
Respondent Nos. 1-3 herein, was allowed and the High  Court  held  that  the
consortium of the appellants JSW Infrastructure Limited and South West  Port
Limited, (hereinafter referred to as the first consortium) was not  entitled
to take part in the bid and, therefore, the acceptance of its bid  was  also
held to be illegal and set aside.

3.    The facts necessary  for  decision  of  these  appeals  are  that  the
Paradip Port Trust, issued Request For  Qualification  (RFQ)  on  31.10.2015
inviting global invitations for Mechanisation of EQ-1-2 and EQ-3  berths  at
Paradip Port Trust of 30 MTPS Capacity on  BOT  basis  under  PPP  mode  for
concession period of  Thirty  (30)  years.   It  is  not  disputed  that  in
response to  the  said  RFQ,  4  parties  including  the  first  and  second
consortium, submitted their bids.  All the four parties were duly  qualified
and were asked to participate in the next stage of  bid,  that  is,  Request
For Proposal (RFP) and submit their offers with regard to  revenue  sharing.
Only two parties, i.e., the  first  consortium  and  the  second  consortium
submitted the RFP.  The bid quoted by the first  consortium  was  31.70%  as
against 28.70% bid  quoted  by  the  second  consortium.   Since  the  first
consortium were the highest  bidders  their  proposal  was  recommended  for
acceptance by the tender committee of the Paradip Port Trust on  26.02.2016.
At this stage, on 27.02.16 the second  consortium  submitted  objections  to
the consideration of the application of the first consortium on  the  ground
that in terms  of  the  Policy  Clause  against  creation  of  monopoly  the
appellants were not entitled to take part in  this  entire  bidding  process
since they were already operating one  berth  for  dry  cargo.   The  Clause
which is subject matter of interpretation reads as follows :-

“Policy
If there is only one  private  terminal/berth  operator  in  a  port  for  a
specific cargo, the operator of that berth or his associates  shall  not  be
allowed to bid for the next terminal/berth for handling the  same  cargo  in
the same port.”

It would also be pertinent to mention  that  specific  cargo  in  this  very
Policy has been defined to be (i) containers, (ii)  liquid,  (iii)dry  bulk.
Letter of Award  was  issued  in  favour  of  the  appellant  of  the  first
Consortium by the Paradip Port Trust on 29.02.2016.



4.    Aggrieved by this action, the second consortium filed a writ  petition
before the Orissa High Court. The submission  of  unsuccessful  bidders  was
that since the first consortium was already operating a berth for dry  cargo
it could not have  submitted  its  application  to  bid  for  the  berth  in
question which is also admittedly meant for dry  cargo.   It  was  contended
that as per the policy quoted above, if a private operator  is  operating  a
berth he cannot be allowed to bid for the next berth for handling  the  same
cargo in the same port.  This contention of the  original  writ  petitioners
was accepted by the Orissa High Court which interpreted  the  Policy  clause
by holding that the word “next” in  the  Clause  indicated  that  a  private
operator cannot take part or bid for next  successive  berth  for  the  same
cargo.  The High Court, therefore, held that the application for  the  first
consortium  JSW  Infrastructure  Limited,   was   wrongly   considered   and
consequently set aside the award of Letter of Award in favour of  the  first
consortium and further directed that  the  Paradip  Port  Trust  may  either
accept the single remaining bid of the second consortium of Respondent  Nos.
1-3 after negotiating the price which should not  be  less  than  the  price
offered by the consortium of JSW Infrastructure,  or  it  may  invite  fresh
bids for the berth in question.

5.    Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court the first  consortium  and
the Paradip Sea Port have filed the two appeals.

6.    We have heard learned senior counsel for the appearing  parties.   The
contention of Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel  appearing  for  first
consortium  is  that  the  High  Court  has  misinterpreted  the  Clause  in
question. According to him a plain and simple reading of the Clause  clearly
indicates that this Clause will only apply when a single  private  berth  in
port for a specific cargo is being run by a private operator.  He  submitted
that in the present case there are as many as  16  berths  in  Paradip  Port
Trust, out of which 8 are being run by the  Paradip  Port  Trust.   One  dry
cargo berth is being run by the Indian  Oil  Corporation,  a  Public  Sector
Undertaking, 5 are being run by private operators and one was being  run  by
the appellant. Letter of Award for another berth was  issued  in  favour  of
the first consortium, which is the subject matter of dispute.  He  submitted
that the purpose of this clause is to avoid monopoly  and  the  judgment  of
the High Court is erroneous because it does not do away  with  the  monopoly
but only restricts a private operator from bidding in  the  next  successive
berth for the same type of cargo.  Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior  counsel
appearing on behalf of Paradip Port Trust submitted that the employer  i.e.,
Paradip Port Trust is best qualified to interpret the terms and  meaning  of
the terms of the tender and the High Court should  not  have  interfered  in
the decision taken by the Paradip Port Trust. On the other hand,  Mr.  Gopal
Subramaniam, learned senior counsel  for  the  second  consortium  submitted
that the word “next” in the Clause cannot be treated to be superfluous  and,
according to him, the clause which is the subject matter  of  interpretation
in this case clearly envisages that the private operator operating  a  berth
cannot bid for the next successful berth for similar type of cargo.

7.    We have given our careful consideration to the arguments.  This  Court
in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International  Airport  Authority  of  India[1]
held that the words used in documents cannot be treated to be surplusage  or
superfluous or redundant and must be given some meaning and  weightage.   It
was held as follows:-

“......It is a well-settled  rule  of  interpretation  applicable  alike  to
documents as to statutes that, save  for  compelling  necessity,  the  Court
should be prompt to ascribe superfluity to the language of a  document  “and
should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every  word  intended  to
have some effect or be of some use”.  To reject words as  insensible  should
be the last resort of judicial interpretation, for it is an elementary  rule
based on common sense that no author of a formal  document  intended  to  be
acted upon by the others should be presumed to use words without a  meaning.
 The court must, as far  as  possible,  avoid  a  construction  which  would
render the words used by the author of the document meaningless  and  futile
or reduce to silence any  part  of  the  document  and  make  it  altogether
inapplicable.”

This view has consistently held the field and  was  recently  reiterated  in
Central Coal Fields  Limited   and  Another   vs.   SLL-SML  (Joint  Venture
Consortium and Others)[2].

8.    On a bare reading of the Policy Clause some weightage and meaning  has
to be given not only to the word “next” as done by the High Court  but  also
to the words “only one private operator” appearing in the  opening  part  of
the Clause.  The words “only one private  operator”  cannot  be  treated  as
surplusage.  The entire clause has to be read as a whole in the  context  of
the purpose of the policy which is to avoid and restrict monopoly.   In  our
opinion, this Clause will apply  only  when  there  is  one  single  private
operator in a port.  If this single private operator is operating  a  berth,
dealing with one specific cargo then alone will he not  be  allowed  to  bid
for next berth for handling the same specific cargo.  The High  Court  erred
in interpreting the clause only in  the  context  of  the  word  “next”  and
ignored the opening part of the Clause  which  clearly  indicates  that  the
Clause is only applicable when there is only  one  private  berth  operator.
It appears to us that the intention is that when a port is started,  if  the
first berth for a specific  cargo  is  awarded  in  favour  of  one  private
operator then he cannot be permitted to bid for the next berth for the  same
type of cargo.  However, once there are  more  than  one  private  operators
operating in the port then any one of them can be permitted to bid even  for
successive berths.  In the present case, as pointed out above there  already
5 private operators other than the first consortium.

9.    We may also add that the law is  well  settled  that  superior  courts
while exercising their power of judicial  review  must  act  with  restraint
while dealing with contractual matters. A Three Judge Bench  of  this  Court
in Tata Cellular  vs.   Union of India[3] held  that  (i)  there  should  be
judicial restraint in review  of  administrative  action;   (ii)  the  court
should not act like court of appeal; it cannot review the decision  but  can
only review the decision making process (iii) the  court  does  not  usually
have the necessary expertise to correct such technical decisions.; (iv)  the
employer must have play in  the  joints  i.e.,  necessary  freedom  to  take
administrative decisions within certain boundaries.

10.   In Jagdish Mandal  vs.  State  of  Orissa[4]   this  Court  held  that
evaluation of tenders and  awarding  contracts  are  essentially  commercial
functions and if the decision is bonafide and taken in the  public  interest
the superior courts should refrain from exercising their power  of  judicial
review.  In the present case there are no allegations of mala fides and  the
appellant consortium has offered better revenue sharing to the employer.
11.   In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Nagpur Metro Rail  Corporation  Ltd.
& Anr.[5]  This Court held as follows :-

      “14.....a mere disagreement with the decision making  process  or  the
decision of the administrative authority is no reason for  a  constitutional
Court to interfere.  The  threshold  of  mala  fides,  intention  to  favour
someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity  must  be  met  before
the constitutional Court interferes with the decision making process or  the
decision.

xxx              xxx              xxx

      16.   We may add that the owner or the employer of a  project,  having
authored the  tender  documents,  is  the  best  person  to  understand  and
appreciate   its   requirements   and   interpret   its   documents.     The
constitutional Courts must defer to this understanding and  appreciation  of
the tender documents, unless  there  is  mala  fide  or  perversity  in  the
understanding or appreciation or in the application  of  the  terms  of  the
tender conditions.  It is possible that the owner or employer of  a  project
may give an interpretation to the tender documents that  is  not  acceptable
to the constitutional Courts  but  that  by  itself  is  not  a  reason  for
interfering with the interpretation given.

      17.   In the present appeals, although there does  not  appear  to  be
any ambiguity or doubt about  the  interpretation  given  by  NMRCL  to  the
tender conditions, we are of the  view  that  even  if  there  was  such  an
ambiguity or doubt, the High Court ought to have refrained from  giving  its
own interpretation unless it  had  come  to  a  clear  conclusion  that  the
interpretation given by NMRCL was perverse  or  mala  fide  or  intended  to
favour one of the bidders.  This was certainly not the  case  either  before
the High Court or before this Court....”

The view taken in Afcons (supra)  was followed  in  Monte  Carlo  Ltd.   Vs.
NTPC Ltd.[6] . Thus it is apparent that in  contractual  matters,  the  Writ
Courts should not interfere unless the decision taken is totally  arbitrary,
perverse or mala fide.

12.   Strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the second consortium  on
the judgment rendered in  APM  Terminals  B.V.   vs.   Union  of  India  and
Another[7] .  We are of the considered view that the  said  judgment  cannot
be applied to the present case because in that case  this  court  considered
the clauses of  the  contract.  The  policy  which  was  applicable  in  APM
Terminal, was not the policy of 2010 but the policy of 2007, the wording  of
which is  totally  different.   True  it  is,  that  in  the  said  judgment
reference  has  also  been  made  to  the  new  policy  but  that  was   not
specifically dealt with by the Court, and  the  matter  was  decided  on  an
interpretation of the terms of the contract and  the  policy              of
2007.

13.   In view of the above discussion we are clearly of the  view  that  the
High Court erred in interpreting the Clause in the manner which it is  done.
 As explained above, the  Clause  will  apply  only  when  there  is  single
private operator operating a single berth.  Once there  are  more  than  one
private operators then the Clause will not  apply.  The  decision  taken  by
Paradip Port Trust could not be termed to be  arbitrary,  perverse  or  mala
fide. Therefore, the High Court was  not  justified  in  setting  aside  the
same. In this view of the matter, both the Civil Appeals are  allowed.   The
Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed  by  the
second consortium before the High Court is dismissed.

                                      ....................................J.
                                                            (MADAN B. LOKUR)



                                      ....................................J.
                                                              (DEEPAK GUPTA)

New Delhi
March 01, 2017


-----------------------
[1]







       (1979) 3 SCC 489

[2]     (2016) 8 SCC 622
[3]     (1994) 6 SCC 651
[4]     (2007) 14 SCC 517
[5]     2016 SCC Online SC 940
[6]     2016 SCC Online SC 1149
[7]     (2011 ) 6 SCC 756

In the facts and circumstances of this case, we modify the decree and judgment of the Trial Court as follows: The Respondent is entitled for reinstatement w.e.f. 01.09.2004. She would be entitled to fifty per cent of the back wages between 01.09.2004 and the date of her reinstatement. The Respondent is entitled for salary and other allowances from the date of her reinstatement till the date of her superannuation.

                                                              Non-Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL No.3350   of   2017
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.31965 of 2015)

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, NANGAL & ORS.
                                                           .... Appellant(s)
      Versus
ARUNA SAINI
                                                             ….Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
      Leave granted.
       The  Suit  filed  by  the  Respondent  seeking  a  direction  to  the
Appellants to reinstate her as Social Studies Teacher in Shivalik  NAC  High
School, Naya Nangal was decreed which  was  modified  in  the  First  Appeal
filed  by  the  Appellants.   The  First  Appellate  Court  held  that   the
Respondent only had a right to be considered for  appointment  and  was  not
entitled for a direction of reinstatement.   The  High  Court  reversed  the
judgment of the First Appellate Court and restored the judgment  and  decree
of the Trial Court.   The said judgment of the High Court  is  in  challenge
before us.
2.    The Respondent was appointed as a temporary Social Studies Teacher  on
20.07.1994 against a leave vacancy.  The  vacancy  arose  due  to  the  non-
joining of Smt. Raj Verma who availed leave from  15.07.1993  to  17.07.1993
and did not report later.   By an  order  dated  03.12.1994,  the  Executive
Officer-cum-Member  Secretary,  Shivalik  NAC  High  School,   Naya   Nangal
dismissed Smt. Raj Verma w.e.f. 15.11.1994  for  her  unauthorised  absence.
Vide Resolution No.3 dated 15.11.1994 the  Respondent  was  appointed  as  a
Social Studies Teacher on a permanent basis in the  post  that  fell  vacant
due to the termination of services of Smt. Raj Verma. One of the  conditions
of the appointment of the Respondent was that she will not  be  entitled  to
claim any right if Smt. Raj Verma succeeded in the case filed by her.   Smt.
Raj Verma was reinstated on 14.07.2003 in view of the decision of the  Court
in her favour.  On  15.07.2003,  the  Executive  Officer  of  the  Municipal
Council, Nangal relieved the Respondent on  the  ground  that  her  services
were no longer required in view of the reinstatement of Smt. Raj Verma.
3.    The Respondent approached the High Court by  filing  a  Writ  Petition
challenging the termination of her  services  and  withdrew  the  same  with
liberty to approach the Labour Court.   She later filed an  application  for
modification of the order with liberty to  file  a  Civil  Suit.   The  said
application was allowed by the High Court on 03.09.2004.
4.    Pursuant to the liberty given by the High Court, the Respondent  filed
a Civil Suit for mandatory injunction directing  the  Appellants  herein  to
reinstate her as a  Social Studies Teacher in the Shivalik NAC High  School,
Naya Nangal by declaring the order dated 15.07.2003  as  illegal,  unlawful,
arbitrary  and  in  violation  of  principles  of  natural   justice.    The
Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Rupnagar, Nangal by  a  judgment  and
decree dated 16.11.2004 directed the  Appellants  herein  to  reinstate  the
Respondent as Social Studies Teacher w.e.f.  01.09.2004.   The  Trial  Court
also held that  the  Respondent  was  entitled  for  all  the  consequential
benefits attached to the post of Social Studies Teacher  w.e.f.  01.09.2004.
It was further held that the Respondent was entitled for all the  dues  from
01.09.2004 with interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum.  The  Civil
Court held that the order of termination dated 15.07.2003 was  violative  of
principles of natural justice.  Taking note of the fact that Smt. Raj  Verma
attained superannuation and retired from service on 31.08.2004 and that  the
Respondent worked as a regular employee for a period of 9 years,  the  Trial
Court  directed  reinstatement  of  the  Respondent  w.e.f.  01.09.2004.  5.
The decree and judgment of the Trial Court was modified  in  favour  of  the
Appellants by the First Appellate Court.   It was held that  the  Respondent
only had a right of being considered for appointment  to  the  post  as  and
when it fell vacant.   The Respondent approached the High Court by filing  a
Regular Second Appeal assailing the judgment of the First  Appellate  Court.
The High Court restored the judgment of the Trial Court and  set  aside  the
judgment of the Lower  Appellate  Court.   The  High  Court  held  that  the
Respondent worked for a period of 9 years as a  regular  teacher.   She  was
granted annual increments and there were deductions from her salary  towards
provident fund.  The High Court held  that  the  Appellants  ought  to  have
adjusted the Respondent in an available  vacancy  taking  into  account  the
long period of service rendered by her on a regular basis.   The High  Court
found fault with the judgment of the First Appellate Court by  holding  that
fresh consideration of the  case  of  the  Respondent  would  only  lead  to
multiplication of the litigation.  The High  Court  was  informed  that  the
Respondent had two more years of service left and in view  of  the  hardship
suffered by the Respondent due to her termination, the High Court held  that
the Trial Court was right  in  directing  reinstatement  with  consequential
benefits.
6.    After going  through  the  material  on  record  and  considering  the
submissions made by the parties, we are of the opinion that the judgment  of
the High Court does  not  warrant  interference.   The  termination  of  the
services of the Respondent is in clear violation of  principles  of  natural
justice as reasonable  opportunity  was  not  given  to  the  Respondent  to
furnish her explanation. Admittedly, notice of a mere 24 hours was given  to
the Respondent before the order of termination  was  passed.    Undoubtedly,
the regular appointment of the Respondent was on a condition that she  would
make way for Smt. Raj Verma in the event of her succeeding  in  the  pending
case.  The fact remains that the Respondent worked on regular  basis  for  a
period of 9 years before the termination of her services.   Thereafter,  the
Respondent made a representation to the Appellants to  appoint  her  in  the
vacancy that had arisen due to the  superannuation  of  Smt.  Raj  Verma  on
31.08.2004.  However, the Appellants did not consider such request  made  by
the Respondent.  If the termination is bad in law,  the  Respondent  in  the
normal course,  would  be  entitled  for  reinstatement  from  the  date  of
termination with all consequential benefits  as  the  termination  order  is
illegal.   But,  in  view  of  the  condition  of  the  appointment  of  the
Respondent on 20.07.1994, the Trial  Court  held  that  the  Respondent  was
entitled  for  reinstatement  only  w.e.f.   01.09.2004   i.e.   after   the
superannuation of the incumbent Smt. Raj Verma.
7.    The notice issued by this Court in the present case was  limited  only
for the payment of arrears.  Counsel for the Appellants submitted  that  the
Respondent is not entitled for payment of salary and  other  allowances  for
the period of 10 years during which she did not work and we  find  force  in
the said submission.  In the  facts  and  circumstances  of  this  case,  we
modify the decree and judgment of the Trial Court as follows:
The Respondent is entitled for reinstatement w.e.f. 01.09.2004.   She  would
be entitled to fifty per cent of the back wages between 01.09.2004  and  the
date of her reinstatement.
The Respondent is entitled for salary and other allowances from the date  of
her reinstatement till the date of her superannuation.
The Respondent will be entitled to count the service from 2004  onwards  for
the purpose of computation of her pension, if any payable.


8.    With the aforesaid modification of the  decree  and  judgment  of  the
Trial Court, the Appeal is disposed of.  No costs.


........................................J
        [S. A. BOBDE]




                   ....……................................J
                                                   [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

New Delhi,
February  28, 2017